Indus Water Treaty and
the Case for Hydro-hegemony
by Muhammad Adeel
Research Brief
www.cscr.pk
Introduction
The past few days have seen a rise of war hysteria between Pakistan and India. India seems bent on pushing its neighbor
towards isolation, and while Pakistan has shown resilience and done its utmost to take a stand on the Kashmir issue,
there are some strategic concerns that need to be discussed. India’s role as the upper riparian has been a source of
conflict in the Indus Water Treaty: a momentous document with regards to the allocation and distribution of water
resources among the two countries. Pakistan has repeatedly shown concern over India’s hegemonic interest over
water supply. India has treated and portrayed water as a strategic resource, hence it is imperative to understand the
conflict in the term ‘hydro-hegemony’. This research brief attempts not only to document the issue but also draw to
precedents from other cases. The Indus Water Treaty has been discussed here from a policy point of view.
1. Background of the Inter-State Water Conflict
Pakistan and India have shared a bitter history post-partition. Pakistan has always projected itself as a victim in terms
of allocation and distribution of resources. The issue of water conflicts predates the partition and reforms have been in
place since 1935 to mitigate the conflict. After the Indian Act 1935, the British government handed over the responsibility
of river developments to the provincial governments. A conflict started when the Bhakra Dam had to be built on the
Sutlej River. Sindh and Punjab were able to come to an agreement, but the princely state of Bilaspur announced its
displeasure. The Government of India had to form the Anderson Commission to resolve the issue of allocation of the
basin’s water between the respective stakeholders. Subsequently, conflicts have arisen at various times, sometimes
between Pakistan and India, and at times between the provinces of India and Pakistan. Before partition the following
committees and agreements were instigated to resolve the problems in allocation of water:
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Tripartite Agreement (1921)
Indus Discharge Committee (1921)
SVP Inquiry Committee (1932)
Anderson Committee (1937)
Rao Commission (1945)
1.1 The World Bank and The Indus Water Treaty
When Pakistan and India failed to reach a consensus on water distribution, the international community was asked to
intervene. Pakistan’s stance on the issue was that India has been misusing its position as the upper riparian and uses
water as a strategic tool to undermine the country’s economy. This led to David Lilienthal, a former member of the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, writing a series of articles on the issue. One of his articles described the crux of the issue
and he highlighted the fact that unless Pakistan and India work out a co-dependent method of the distribution of water,
the issue will perpetually exist. This proposal was acknowledged by the World Bank and also the two countries. The
President of the World Bank at that time, Eugene R. Black urged both stakeholders to resolve the issue that could have
serious repercussions on regional stability, economically and politically (Khalid, 2013). Lilienthal encouraged Pakistani
and Indian engineers to resolve the Indus basin issue through an integrated approach as opposed to rivalry and
confrontation (Michel, 1967). A major focus of negotiation, after this impetus centralized on ‘reinscribing the political
partition of the subcontinent on the Basin’s irrigation system’ (Haines, 2014).
Despite this positive build-up, no side was willing to relax its stance. Amid all of this, in 1954, the World Bank brought
forth its own proposal whereby Pakistan was offered three western tributaries and India was offered the eastern ones.
Pakistan had a major grievance with this distribution since it did not acknowledge Pakistan’s historical usage of the Indus
Basin and undermined its negotiating position (Gulhati, 1973). This followed a series of negotiations with no fruitful
result. There were proposals for India paying for the construction of storage apparatus on the Western side to Pakistan,
which India rejected vehemently. The World Bank also proposed external financing, primarily by U.S. and U.K., to which
Pakistan and India partially agreed. After nearly half a decade of negotiations and proposals, both sides were able to
come to an agreement in the form of the Indus Water Treaty on 19th September 1960 (Warsi, 1991). The offer from the
World Bank was grounded on three guiding principles (Black, 1951), which were:
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a. The resources of Indus Basin are sufficient to meet existing and future needs of both countries.
b. The Indus Basin should be treated as a unit and all development should be based on cooperation.
c. The use of Indus Basin Resources should be centralized on a functional basis and not on political issues.
1.2 Indus River and its Physical Characteristics
Before going into details of the treaty, it is imperative to describe the physical characteristics of the river in order to
develop a composite narrative for an assessment of the treaty. The Indus River has its origin in Tibet nearly 17,000 feet
above sea level and is nearly 1800 miles long as it passes through Jammu and Kashmir, and then to Punjab and Sindh,
after which it descends to the Arabian Sea in Karachi. From a geographical standpoint, the river basin was created when
the Indian Plate collided with Eurasia. The Indus River consists of 27 major tributaries and covers nearly 1.12 million
square kilometers. Nearly 47% of the area falls within Pakistan while 39% is situated in India including Kashmir. The
initial primary source of the Indus river was the Himalaya Mountains with its unbroken snow cover (Kazi, 2001). Annual
rainfall in the upper portion is less than 800 mm and is reduced to 125 mm when it reaches Sindh (Arif, 2010).
2. The Indus Water Treaty
The Indus Water Treaty, in its finalized form, was signed by President Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan and the Indian
Premier Jawaharlal Nehru, with 12 articles and 8 appendices. The contents of the treaty were as follows:
Article I: Introduction and Definitions
Article II: Provisions about Eastern Rivers
Article III: Provisions about Western Rivers
Article IV: Provisions regarding Eastern and Western Rivers
Article V: Financial Assurances
Article VI: Exchanging of Data
Article VII: Future Cooperation
Article VIII: Permanent Indus Commission
Article IX: Settlement of Differences and Disputes
Article X: Emergency Provisions
Article XI: General Provisions
Article XII: Final Provisions
Annexure A: Exchange of Notes between Government of India and Government of Pakistan
Annexure B: Agricultural Use by Pakistan from certain tributaries of the Ravi
Annexure C: Agricultural Use by India from the Western Rivers
Annexure D: Generation of Hydro-electric Power by India on the Western Rivers
Annexure E: Storage of Waters by India on Western Rivers
Annexure F: Neutral Expert
Annexure G: Court of Arbitration
Annexure H: Transitional Arrangements
(Indus Water Treaty, 1960, World Bank)
2.1 Critical Features
The Indus Water Treaty is focused on the distribution and use of Eastern and Western Rivers by both countries. The
Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) were made available for the unrestricted use of India. Apparently equivalent
provisions were for Pakistan for the Western Rivers. However, since India enjoys the position of upper riparian, it has
potential to misuse its allocations (Ali, 2008).
From a technical point of view, Pakistan is allowed 3.6 MAF for hydropower generation and flood storages on the
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Western Rivers. The details for this have been added to Annexures D and E. India is allowed to use water from the
Western Rivers for irrigation of crop area amounting to 13,43,477 acres (Biswas, 1992).
2.2 Assessment of Indus Water Treaty: Critical Analysis and the case for Hydro-hegemony
In order to assess the validity and execution of the Indus Waters Treaty, it is important to discuss its significance and
drawbacks. The role of International Law in modulating the treaty also needs to be discussed. Also important to note is
how the treaty has gradually encouraged the use of the narrative of IWT as a tool of hydro-hegemony. This will be seen
not only in terms of the different provisions of the treaty but also in regards to how geopolitical realities have evolved
in the subsequent decades.
The signing of the treaty was acclaimed as an effective resolution and a mean of conflict-avoidance among the two
states. Some have praised the treaty considering the hostile nature of relations between Pakistan and India. Analysis
from the World Bank acknowledges it as ‘one of the few examples of a successful settlement of a major international
river conflict’. However, perceptions and analysis on the treaty have evolved, particularly in light of emerging sociopolitical realities and environmental considerations such as scarcity of water.
Since the signing of the treaty, various aspects have been scrutinized. Following the analysis of multiple critiques, three
major pitfalls can be derived from the treaty. The first being that since prior to the arrangement Sutlej, Beas and Ravi
were part of the conventional sailab irrigation, Pakistan now suffers an inconsistent irrigation system owing to the
development of the rivers by India because of which the sailab irrigation system has faltered. This drying of the sailab
irrigation system can be viewed as India exercising its might as the upper riparian. Secondly, the irregularity in the flow
of Eastern Rivers owing to Indian control has become a pivot point in the ongoing hydro-political war between Pakistan
and India. The tributaries on the Pakistani end of the Eastern Rivers have dried up; however, India floods them upon its
need, creating a problem for Pakistan. Thirdly, the creation of storage reserves is a major burden. A storage reservoir has
a smaller life than the natural flow of water, and storage creation is also politically motivated (Khalid, 2013).
Additionally, it has been reported that one of the pitfalls of the treaty is that it doesn’t allow for the mutual development
of the Indus Basin, rather it emboldens the conflict and treats both parties as adversaries (Kokab and Nawaz, 2013).
Also important to note is that within the deal, the allocation of water resources is based on a quantitative basis. This is
unusual for a water treaty since they are generally based on tributary locations (Haq, 2010). While the treaty highlights
which tributary goes to which nation, there is little or no provision as to the mechanisms related to groundwater usage,
climate change impact and variation in domestic demand (Miner, 2011). This encourages conflict and urges both states
to think of water as a strategic tool of foreign policy.
Based on the text and the provisions of the IWT, it is quite clear that all outcomes of the treaty tilt in favor of one state.
Hydro-hegemony is exercised majorly through three dynamics:
• Resource capture
• Integration
• Containment
All of these three are being managed by India; this will be discussed here in detail.
2.2.1 Indian Projects and Indus Water Treaty: Resource Capture
Another important area is the provision of the use of western rivers by India for non-irrigative purposes. The prime
contention has always been that India, as the upper riparian, can always monitor and manipulate the waters of the
Indus Basin. The issue began with the construction of the Tulbul Navigation Project by India. The construction of 330
MW Kishanganga project has raised questions about the validity of the IWT since the project is just 160 km upstream
of Muzaffarabad. A major test of the treaty came when India announced its Baglihar Project on River Chenab in Doda
district. Following Pakistan’s complaints, the World Bank was asked to appoint a neutral expert to resolve the issue. This
was done under Article IX of the Indus Water Treaty. The technical team was headed by Raymond Lafitte in 2005. The
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team upheld Indian stance which has led to the development of a new interpretation of the treaty. The construction
of dams and hydroelectric projects by India indicates its strong position as the upper riparian and again strengthens
the narrative of hydro-hegemony. Pakistan does not have a bargaining chip to pursue its cause and has had to resort to
protesting to the World Bank and related organizations for support.
2.2.2 Baglihar Dam and New Interpretation of Indus Water Treaty: A Case for Integration
The dispute over the construction of Baglihar Dam was referred to the World Bank who appointed Raymond Lafitte to
resolve the issue. In order to come to a resolution, he applied the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) and
indicated the ‘rules of science’ and ‘state of the art practices’. So now the Indus Water Treaty was interpreted in light of
new technical norms and new standards. This has led to one important consideration that the Treaty has to adjust as
per the emerging realities of the Indus Basin (Akhtar, 2010).
An important aftermath of this judgment is that whenever India decides to launch a project on the Indus Basin, Pakistan
confers with a neutral expert for judgment and adjustments. The legal proceedings take time, and during this period,
India completes or formalizes its construction. This has led to the sense of victimization within Pakistani policy circles
and doubts over the effectiveness of the Indus Water Treaty (Bukhair, 2011).
Also, the interpretation of ‘rules of science’ and ‘state of the art practices’ benefits India more, since it has the potential
to curtail the water flow, a source of hydro-hegemony.
2.2.3 Kishanganga and the Indus Water Treaty: The Case for Containment
The 330 MW project on Kishanganga River is a direct violation of Article IV and Article VII of the Indus Water Treaty.
These articles restrict India from increasing its catchment area in any natural/artificial drainage. The said project will
increase the catchment area, hence bypassing the articles. Additionally, the project will lead to nearly 61% shortfall
in the Neelum River and obstruct Pakistan’s own Neelum Jhelum Project. This is a prime example of hydro-hegemony
whereby one state’s hydroelectric project has the potential to disrupt the hydroelectric setup of another state. Following
Pakistan’s complaint, the construction of the project was halted by The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2011.
2.2.4 Indus Water Treaty and the ‘Cumulative Impact’ loophole: Hydro-Hegemony Magnified
One of the major provisions of the Indus Water Treaty is that it allows India to harness the hydroelectric potential of
Rivers Jhelum and Chenab as long as the supply to Pakistan is not delayed. India has used this clause as a justification for
its projects. Currently, India has nearly 33 projects that have either been constructed or are under construction at these
rivers. The issue is that while none of these projects on its own can disrupt the flow of the rivers to Pakistan, but their
cumulative impact could. However, there is no provision for discussing or debating the cumulative loophole, an avenue
that has been exploited by the upper riparian (Iyer, 2012).
According to a report by PILDAT, the cumulative energy capacity of proposed storage projects would lead to a capacity
buildup of 1,055 MW. This will go against the annexure ‘D’ of the treaty as was the case with the Tulbul Navigation
Project whose storage capacity is nearly 300,000 acre feet (PILDAT, 2012). As opposed to this, Pakistan has sustained
within its storage limit of 3.6 MAF. The cumulative storage of Indus (0.35), Jhelum (1.5) and Chenab (1.7) is within the
permissible limits.
This leads to the inference that the riparian position and the capacity to exploit water through hydraulic infrastructure
is a tool for consolidating hydro-hegemony, a notion that has been previously discussed in the literature produced by
Warner (2004).
The reinterpretation of the IWT has also led to the proverbial characterization of the second face of power whereby
India can essentially waive off compliances and make Pakistan the weaker party. This strengthens the position of the
stronger party in reducing the bargaining strategy of the weaker party (Lukes, 2005).
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2.2.5 Pakistan and the Indus Water Treaty
In the aftermath of the treaty, Pakistan has formed different measures for its allocation of resources. Since the treaty
came into effect, there have been various commissions dealing with inter-state and inter-provincial matters of water
allocation. At many junctures, these approaches have been defensive in nature, indicating the hydro-hegemony of India.
Also important to note is how the conflict of Pakistan with India on Indus Water fares on the Conflict Intensity Scale
developed by Edward Azar (Yoffe & Larson, 2001).
As per the scale, the formulation of the treaty marks a positive 6 (major strategic alliance). However, a trend towards
hydro-hegemony can be clearly seen, when numerous negative events come to light. There have been mild verbal
expressions displaying discord in interaction (-1) to diplomatic-economic hostile actions (-3).
These measures have been summarized below:
a. Akhtar Hussain Committee
This was formed in 1968 to review the barrage water allocations, reservoir release patterns and use of ground water
with respect to surface water deliveries. The report could not be fruitful since the One Unit plan was dissolved (Ghani,
2009).
b. Justice Fazle Akbar Committee
This committee was set up in 1970 and envisaged to recommend an apportionment formula for water allocation. It had
to consider the Indus Water Treaty and also the requirements of provinces for agricultural, industrial and domestic uses.
The committee was able to work on an ad-hoc distribution formula for Chashma Barrage and Tarbela Reservoir (GOP,
2002).
c. Chief Justices’ Commission
Formulated in 1977 by the Government of Pakistan, the Commission was formed to resolve issues related to water
apportionment. The commission’s efficacy remained marginalized owing to political instability (Khalid and Begum, 2013).
d. Haleem Committee
The committee was formed in 1983 to hear cases related to water distribution amid conflicts among provinces on their
share. The committee could not resolve the issue and instead resorted to the ad-hoc distribution formula (Siddique,
2003).
e. Water Apportionment Accord
Following the deepening of water allocation issues, the Government formulated the water apportionment accord in
1991. For the first time, each province was allocated its share of irrigation water for Kharif and Rabi season. One of the
most important clauses of the accord was the need to establish the Indus River System Authority (IRSA). IRSA would be
sanctioned to monitor the implementation of this accord and also monitor the river flows under the IWT.
Following the accord in 1991, IRSA was formally established in 1993 to regulate and monitor the distribution of water
sources (Rehman, 2002). However, following the passing of 18th Amendment, water allocation has been retained as a
provincial aspect.
3. Indus Water Treaty and Need for Modification
With the assessment that has been provided above, it is abundantly clear that while the IWT has been able to provide
headway to reconciliation, there is still need for better measures for conflict resolution. While India benefits as the
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upper riparian, Pakistan has been unable to expand its water infrastructure indigenously owing to political conflicts.
This has led to Pakistan claiming Indian violation over the IWT. Various analyses have pointed out that the IWT needs
to be reformed based on the environmental needs of modern times. The issue of scarcity of water has deepened since
the treaty was passed and perhaps the provisions are unable to justify both parties’ claims. The rising epidemic of
water shortage will further embolden the narrative of hydro-hegemony. With each passing year, as water as a resource
becomes scarce, it will have more potential to be used as a strategic tool.
One analysis suggests that the treaty has served more as a political bifurcation of the Indus Basin, rather than leading to
an equitable distribution. Consequently, both countries have been using this issue for their nationalist agendas and have
failed to work on sophisticated and integrative approaches through enhanced technology. This has led to a negative
impact on the ecology and biodiversity of the region, a major hazard for climate change (Mustafa, 2010). The pursuit of
nationalist agendas is a direct derivative from hydro-hegemonic designs, where one state tries to trump the other using
its strategic assets.
Climate change has impacted the basin majorly, with Himalayan glaciers melting at alarming rates. The arid regions will
be affected more and there is a possibility of an acute shortage of water within the next 30 years (Sivakumar, 2011).
With the advent of cheaper renewable energy, both states should focus on ecologically balanced infrastructure instead
of capital intensive approaches. An agreement between both states is necessary (Wasi, 2009). With rising energy and
water needs, both states need to avoid confrontational policies and pursue interdependence through a modified IWT
(Reddy, 2009). PILDAT has even proposed a satellite telemetry system which could objectively monitor the water flows
so that skepticism and mistrust are avoided.
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References
• E. Black. 1951. Letter of Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. Washington DC, WBGA, IBDGNC.
• N.D Gulhati. 1973. Indus Water Treaty: An exercise in International Mediation. Allied Publishers: New Delhi. 66-67.
• R. Reddy. 2009. The Indus water treaty: its persistence and prospects. The Northwestern Journal of International
Affairs, 10(1).
• D. Mustafa. 2010. Hydropolitics in Pakistan’s Indus Basin, Report. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace
• M. Wasi. 2009. Harnessing the Indus waters perspectives from Pakistan. IPCS Issue Brief, Daily Times. 31st May
• A. Michel. 1967. The Indus Rivers: A Study of the effects of Partition. Yale University Press: U.S: 99.
• M. Warsi. 1991. Indus River Basin of Pakistan. Galaxy Publication: Islamabad. 20-21
• M. Kazi. 2001. Overview of Water Resources in Pakistan. University of Sindh Press: Jamshoro, 4-5.
• M.H Siddique. 2003. Inter-Provincial Water apportionment accord coordination and control of water distribution.
Consultant of the Government of Punjab, Irrigation and Power Department: 8
• G.K.M Arif. 2010. Estranged Neighbors: India-Pakistan 1947-2010. Dost Publications: Islamabad.
• R.U Kokab & A. Nawaz. 2013. Indus Water Treaty: Need for Review. Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities.
2(2): 210-218
• I. Khalid. 2013. Pakistan Foreign Policy: Evolution, Development and Strategies. Peace Publication: Lahore, 317-322
• I. Khalid & I. Begum. 2013. Hydropolitics in Pakistan: Perceptions and Misperceptions. South Asian Studies. 28(1):
7-23
• A. Bukhari. 2011. Setback in the Water Dispute. DAWN, 19 September 2011.
• A. Biswas. 1992. Indus Water Treaty: The Negotiating Process. Water International. 17(1): 201-219.
• H.K, Shani. 2006. The politics of water in South Asia: The Case of the Indus Water Treaty. SAIS Review. 16(2): 153165.
• E.U, Ghani. 2009. Transboundary water perspective of Indus Water Treaty 1960. Paper Presented at World Water
Day, March 2009: Pakistan Engineering Congress.
• Akhter, M. 2015. The hydropolitical cold war: The Indus Water Treaty and State. Political Geography. 46(2015): 65-75
• Haines, D. 2014. InterNationalist Rivers? Cooperative development in David Lilienthal’s plan for the Indus Basin,
1951. Water History. 6(2): 133-151
• A.H. Abbasi. 2012. Indus Water Treaty Between Pakistan and India. Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development
and Transparency (PILDAT), Pakistan.
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Muhammad Adeel Presently a PhD Scholar from WA State Agriculture Biotechnology Center
Perth, Australia is also a Career Diplomat (44th Common) at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad.
He has also served as a lecturer at FCCU and manager of PABIC, Pakistan Biotechnology Center. A
Passionate debator by heart, he has a en experience of debates of more than five years. He has
also been honored by the roll off honor for Debates, Essay writing completion and a summa cum
laude award from FCCU.
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