Pluralism, Exclusivism, and the Theoretical Virtues
Author(s): Kevin Meeker
Source: Religious Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Jun., 2006), pp. 193-206
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Religious Studies 42, 193-206
doi:10.1017/S0034412506008304
(? 2006 Cambridge University Press
Printed in the United Kingdom
Pluralism, exclusivism, and the
theoreticalvirtues
KEVIN
MEEKER
Department ofPhilosophy,HUMB 124,UniversityofSouthAlabama, Mobile, AL 36688
Abstract: This paper argues thatJohnHick's commitment to themoral principle
of altruismundermines his pluralistic claim thatall of themajor world religionsare
equally efficacious froma soteriologicalperspective.This argument is placed in a
contextof a discussion evaluating the theoreticalvirtuesofvarious hypotheses about
religiousdiversity.
is almost certainly themost
John Hick
famous philosopher
a
advocating
religious pluralist position. A major goal of this paper is to criticize a crucial moral
pluralism. To set the stage for this criticism, I shall in the first
aspect of Hick's
major
section
examine
religious diversity.More
another's positions
a dispute
between
Hick
and Alvin Plantinga
about
specifically, I shall argue that these two fail to engage one
fullybecause
of a deeper undiscussed
disagreement
over the
logical statusof religiousbeliefs.The second,more substantial,sectionargues
that, even
agree with Hick's
ifwe
views
about
the logical status of various
religiouspositions,themoral underpinningofhis religioushypothesisthreatens
to undermine
Hick, my hope
his pluralist project. By providing
is to offer a constructive proposal
this context formy criticism of
that could help
to move
the
debate about religiousdiversityforward.1
The
logical
status of religious
positions
As iswell known, Hick argues that we should view all of the great world
religions(e.g.Buddhism,Christianity,
Hinduism, Islam,Judaism)as providing
equally efficacious paths to the same Real because
all have an altruistic message
at their core.2 So all are 'true' in the religious sense
that they provide
soter
solutions to seditious selfishness.3
iologicallysatisfying
But not all religionsare
'true' in the more
common
propositional
sense because
they obviously
assert
193
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194
KEVIN MEEKER
contrary views. These
conflicting claims are not a problem,
according
to Hick,
one need not adhere to the abstract or historical doctrines of a religion to
because
follow its central altruistic teachings. After all, being nice to everyone does not
require being right about everything. Why, then, do different religions teach such
if they all follow the same Real? Hick contends
divergent doctrines
through their own peculiar
all religions view the Real
influenced by historical precedents,
Real
no conception
picture because,
that Allah
is neither one nor many;
is personal,
claim that the Real
Hindus who
many
have
it is neither personal nor
are wrong
embraced
to say
they aren't any further from the truth than
is impersonal. Both are equally wrong;
type of error is irrelevant because
While
paint an accurate
toHick, we cannot attribute any positive, substantive
view, in other words, while Moslems
On Hick's
(the Real)
are
and so on. The
conditions,
can even accidentally
of the Real
according
property to the Real. The Real
non-personal.
cultural lenses, which
of
in the image of the particular cultures of the adherents.
is thus constructed
Moreover,
environmental
that people
both preach
Hick's
but this
the same altruistic message.
vision,
pluralistic
such as Alvin
some,
Plantinga and William Alston, have attacked Hick's position and defended a more
approach. What
exclusivistic
is exclusivism?
exactly
call
In defending
the view] ... that the tenets or some
[exclusivism
religion - Christianity,
this view,
'Following current practice, I shall
Plantinga has offered the following definition:
of the tenets of one
let's say - are in fact, true ... [and] any propositions,
in
cluding other religious beliefs, that are incompatible with those tenets are false.'4
This exclusivistic position obviously conflicts with Hick's
tenets that accurately
could provide
of the great world
Plantinga's main
trouble, ethically or epistemically
is, Plantinga
immoral, unwarranted,
As mentioned
as productive
Plantinga
Plantinga's]
claims
conclusion
speaking,
denial that any religion
(at least in any positive
claims that entailed
religions are equally efficacious paths
be opposed.
view. That
the Real
if the tenets of a religion made
way). Moreover,
would
describe
that not all
to the Real, then Hick
is that one is not necessarily
in
in virtue of holding an exclusivistic
that holding an exclusivistic belief is not in itself
or irrational.
previously, the debate between
as one might hope.
these philosophers
of failing to address his main
point;
specifically, Hick writes:
argument does not even come within
'his [i.e.
sight of the central
Plantinga has replied that he does not understand Hick's
thought he had addressed
has not been
In one particular exchange, Hick has accused
the relevant issues.6 These
accusation
philosophers
issue'.5
because
he
are like the
proverbial ships sailing past each other in the night.
So what
addressed
Plantinga's
precisely
is the problem?
Several years ago, before Plantinga
issues of religious diversity, David Basinger
renowned Reformed
epistemology
person can be rational or justified or warranted
God even without basing
presciently perceived
(which claims,
even
that
roughly, that a
in accepting certain beliefs about
those beliefs on any propositional
evidence)
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could be
Pluralism
to the religious diversity issue. According
applied
and exclusivism
195
toBasinger, such an application
would address thefollowing
question:
(i) Under what conditions
is an individual within her epistemic
(is she rational) in affirming one of themany mutually
rights
exclusive
religiousdiversity
hypotheses?'
claims that Hick
On the other hand, Basinger
(2) Given
is addressing
a different question:
that an individual can be within her epistemic
rights (can be
rational) in affirming either exclusivism or pluralism, upon what
basis should her actual choice be made?8
While
Basinger
fathomed
the general
shape of an impasse
soon
that would
turned out to be slightly off the mark. A significant
appear, his characterization
project is to deny that religious beliefs are theoretical pos
feature of Plantinga's
tulates or hypotheses
that provide
then, Plantinga would
object
explanations
of certain data.9 Presumably,
to any characterization
of his positive position
in
terms of hypotheses, like (i). So we might more accurately phrase the key question
as follows:
of the Reformed approach
(i*) Under what conditions
is an individual within her epistemic
(is she rational) in affirming one of themany mutually
rights
exclusive
religiousdiversity
beliefs?
Curiously,though,(2) does notmention 'hypotheses'but insteadneutrallyin
vokes thepluralisticand exclusivistic
positions.In otherwords, (2) isambiguous;
it could be interpreted in the following ways:
(2a)
Given
that an individual can be within her epistemic
rights (can be
eitherexclusivistic
or pluralistic
rational)inaffirming
hypotheses
hypotheses, upon what basis should her actual choice be made?
Or,
(2b)
Given
that an individual can be within her epistemic
rights (can
be rational) in affirming either exclusivistic beliefs or pluralistic
beliefs, upon what basis should her actual choice be made?
Basinger
apparently means
to describe Hick's
blanket labeling of all answers
Unfortunately, neither (2a) nor (2b) captures
Hick
treats exclusivism
own words:
approach
as (2a) because
to religious diversity as 'hypotheses'
and pluralism
the nuances
of his
in (i).
of Hick's
as different types of positions.
view. For
In Hick's
'religious exclusivism and religious pluralism are of different logical
kinds [emphasis added],
the other a philosophical
the one being a self-committing affirmation of faith and
hypothesis'.10 Because
clusivism is not a philosophical
Plantinga would
agree that ex
hypothesis, Hick can charge that Plantinga's
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form
196
KEVIN MEEKER
of Christian exclusivism
force: 'the alternative to some kind of
lacks explanatory
religiouspluralismis to leaveunexplained [emphasisadded] the immenselysig
faiths are as epistemically well based
nificant fact that the other great world
Christianity'."1 In light of this distinction, we could more
as
accurately characterize
Hick's positionas follows:
that an individual can be within her epistemic
(2*) Given
rights (can be
rational)inaffirming
eitherexclusivisticbeliefsor thepluralistic
hypothesis, upon what basis should her actual choice be made?
Here Hick would
presumably
say that one's
choice
should be guided by which
view can best explain thefactsof religiousdiversity.
likely agree that (2*) is a worthy question
While Plantinga would most
findHick's answer objectionable
undoubtedly would
because,
to ask, he
as we have seen, he
rejects the view that religious beliefs should be explanatory. More
Plantinga
strongly, if
is correct that exclusivistic religious beliefs are properly basic, then they
need no positiveargumentssupportingthem.Hick findsthisstanceunacceptable.
the subtle dig implicit in the following passage:
Consider
offer any positive
reasons
argue, negatively, that it is not morally
'[Plantinga] does not
but thinks it sufficient to
for [Christian exclusivism]
reprehensible or epistemically out of order
to adopt an exclusivist stance'.12 Interestingly enough, even those sympathetic to
Plantinga
have made
about his famous Reformed
similar comments
epistem
ology thesis that belief inGod can be properly basic. William Alston, for example,
has said:
... Plantinga
takes
it to be clear on reflection,
are properly
basic.
He
acknowledges
in some
that many
cases,
people
that beliefs
disagree,
about God
but notes
are
that we
accustomed towidespread disagreement inphilosophicalmatters ... except for
negative
critiques,
the defence
defying
all comers
to dislodge
is an internal one.
It consists
of taking one's
stand
In fairness to Plantinga, we should note that he has recently attempted
such criticisms by producing
warrant'4 and knowledge,
as the epistemic
two books
that develop
a particular
and then apply this epistemology
status of belief in God.'5 Nevertheless,
cludes hisWarrant Trilogy with the following:
of philosophy, whose
competence
objections '.16 In short, then, Plantinga
explanatory
arguments
matters because
Religious
What
from philosophy
tomeet
theory of
to questions
even here Plantinga
such
con
'But is it [i.e. Christian beliefl true?
This is the really important question. And here we pass beyond
main
... and
him.13
in this area,
is quite
the competence
is to clear away certain
resistant to Hick's
should guide one's
choice
claim
that
in religious
such arguments do not apply to (many) religious beliefs.
diversity and
can be done about
burden of proof shifting? Hick's
the theoretical
virtues
such an impasse? Does
daring Plantinga
it simply boil down
to
to explain the facts of religious
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Pluralism and exclusivism
diversity suggests
have
to a theoretical level. Let us then begin
debate moved
of the debate
if exclusivist belief(s)
the upper hand
to explore
if the
the contours
is considered as a theory.As we have seen,
the notion of a theory is intimately tied to the issue of explanation.
forHick
That
that he would
that he believes
explain certain facts about
is, a theory of religion must
to perdition, but invites them to try to produce
exclusivist, consign non-believers
a better explanation
[emphasis
of the data'.17 Unfortunately, Hick never
added]
tells us what exactly (or even approximately)
his idea of an explanation
the deductive-nomological
with Carl Hempel.
type of explanation
in one of the sentences
explanandum).
the Real would
of the explanans
(itwould
Although
as it once was, we
Salmon's
Clearly Hick would
because
substantive properties
he is proposing
a philosophical
famously
trouble invoking this
need
thatwould
to be
invoked
require it to have
for the D-N model
is not nearly as strong
should note that other explanatory models,
(in this case causal
most
model
have
presumably
in a way
illustrious theories
have to be covered by a law that related it to the
support
causal model, would
properties
he thinks that a theory is. Likewise
is enigmatic at best. One of themost
is of course
of explanation
associated
religious diversity.
it: 'the religious pluralist does not, like the traditional religious
As Hick puts
such as Wesley
likewise require that the Real have substantive
properties). Granted, Hick
explicitly claims
that
hypothesis, not a scientific one. But we are still
left in the dark as to how a philosophical
hypothesis
differs from a scientific
hypothesis.
Perhaps we can avoid
by asking
(or reduce our need
the following question:
possess?
After all, presumably
making
properties
famous discussion,
tion:
what
to deal with)
virtues should
this problem
there is at least some overlap between
in scientific and
philosophical
here iswhat W. V. Quine
simply
a trustworthy theory
theories. To
and J.S. Ullian
virtue
sample
one
say in this connec
Hypothesis ... is a two-waystreet,extendingback to explain thepast and forward
to predict
the future. What
we
try to do
in framing hypotheses
is to explain
some
otherwiseunexplained happenings by inventinga plausible descriptionor historyof
relevantportions of theworld.What counts in favourof a hypothesis is a question not
tobe lightlyanswered.We may note fivevirtues thata hypothesismay enjoy in
various degrees.18
The fivevirtues towhich Quine refersare as follows:conservatism,
modesty,
and refutability.
simplicity,
generality,
ErnanMcMullin has furnished
a somewhat
differentlist of virtues: predictive accuracy, internal coherence, external
consistency,
unifying
power,and fertility."9
Needless to say,Quine andMcMullin
are not the only philosophers
Nevertheless,
to have provided
certain virtues appear
a list of theoretical virtues.20
(under various names)
on just about every
list.
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197
198
KEVIN MEEKER
So let us begin our examination
of a theoretical interpretation of exclusivism by
examining how such a theory fares with respect to the virtue of conservatism.
Quine
describes
this virtue thus:
In order to explain thehappenings thatwe are inventingit to explain, thehypothesis
may have to conflictwith some of our previous beliefs; but the fewerthebetter.
Acceptance of a hypothesis is of course likeacceptance of any belief in that itdemands
rejectionofwhatever conflictswith it.The less rejectionofpriorbeliefs required,the
more plausible thehypothesis- other thingsbeing equal.21
Most
exclusivistic
Plantinga's
position
earn
theories
very high marks
is no exception. Hick
on
these grounds.
himself describes
And
his own view as
as 'con
(revolutionary' and labels those like Plantinga who defend exclusivism
servative'22
In this connection,
consider Hick's
critique of Christian
the way
that Jesus' death and resurrection opens
seekers in other religions who
are unaware
inclusivism
to heaven
(the view
so that even sincere
sal
of Christianity will still achieve
vation):
[Christianinclusivism]is a novel and somewhat astonishingdoctrine.How arewe to
make sense of the idea thatthe salvificpower of thedharma taughtfivehundred years
earlier by the Buddha
of the death
is a consequence
of Jesus
... ? Such
an apparently
bizarre conception should onlybe affirmedforsome verygood reason. Itwas certainly
not taughtby Jesusor his apostles. Ithas emerged only in the thoughtof twentieth
centuryChristians .... But the theologianwho undertakes to spell out this invisible
causality isnot tobe envied.The problem isnot one of logicalpossibility- it
only takes logical agilityto cope with that- but one of religiousand spiritual
plausibility.23
the 'novelty' of this idea as a vice. The fact that ithas
Note how Hick emphasizes
emerged
only recently and
assumed
to count against its plausibility.
some very good reasons
conflict with
is not traceable
to accept Christian
traditional teaching
Of course
it is possible
that Hick
itself gives no indication
passage
is correct that one would
inclusivism
(and other problems),
a similar judgment about Hick's
could make
to the founder(s) of the religion is
IfHick
own
is running a reductio here
they actually are not. But then we would
should not be considered
seems
that we
to accept
as we
(although
the
still need a story as towhy
a virtue of a philosophical
are, that it is a theory).24Without
can provisionally
an exclusivist
one
that they are traditional and
conservative,
(assuming,
then presumably
'revolutionary' position.
conservatism
exclusivism
in light of its apparent
that he is offering a reductio). That is, he could
inclusivists generally assume
be arguing thatwhile
need
conclude
theory because
theory such as
such a story it
that we have at least some
it exemplifies
reason
the theoretical virtue of
conservatism.
Even ifHick does accept conservatism
of exclusivism would
not count formuch
as a theoretical virtue, the conservatism
if it entirely failed to exemplify other
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Pluralism and exclusivism
virtues. Hick
calls inclusivism
and
'astonishing'
'bizarre'. Presumably
saying that the inclusivists' theory is incompatible,
liefs that are at least as firmly established.
of internal coherence
Hick
is
or in tension, with other be
This point draws us into a discussion
in discussing
and external consistency. One problem
two virtues is that in this case, the lines between
these
internal and external are not
well-drawn.
This demarcationproblemnotwithstanding,
letus focuson internalcoherence.
McMullin
this virtue in the following manner:
explains
The theoryshould hang togetherproperly; thereshould be no logical inconsistencies,
no unexplained coincidences.One recalls theprimarymotivating factorformany
astronomers inabandoning Ptolemy in favourofCopernicus. Therewere toomany
featuresof thePtolemaic orbits,particularlythe incorporationin each of a one-year
cycle and thehandling of retrograde
motions, thatseemed to leave coincidence
and
unexplained
I assume
that an exclusivist
in the minimal
Hick
thus ... to appear
charges
exclusivist
theory of religious diversity is internally coherent
that it contains
sense
is an
that exclusivism
is no reason
to expect
no logical inconsistencies;
incoherent theory. More
that there are unexplained
theory. As we have
ing to which we
as ad hoc.25
there
broadly,
coincidences
an
besetting
has proffered a model
seen, Plantinga
can form warranted
for not even
accord
religious beliefs, including exclusivistic
ones.
While
the exclusivist
theory seems
for example,
beset
theory displays no obvious
by incoherence
internal incoherence, Hick's
at every turn. Many
that his attempt to talk of 'responding'
have
to the Real
pointed
seem
out,
to lead
inevitably to attributing some positive properties to the Real.26 To avoid rehashing
some of these complicated
herence
Iwant
debates,
that has not been much
discussed
to concentrate
on an internal inco
in the literature (ifat all). My point (to
be introduced shortly) is related to, but importantly different from, a point that
has already appeared.
Plantinga
for instance has pointed out that
...Hick thinksnot only thatsome [religions]do [transform]
better thanothersbut
also
that we
have
some
idea of what
think a thing like that? If all we
for all we
can
tell God, Vishnu
they are .... But how
know
and
about
the Real
the Buddha
could we
iswhat
Hick
are inauthentic
and
have
a reason
says we
know,
to
then
it is for example,
Ares, thegod ofwar, Lucifer,and Stalin (or,forthatmatter,Uriah Heep orBeavis
and Butthead) thatare authenticpersonae of theReal .... We don't have any reason
topick and choose among them,thinking,forexample, that thegreatworld religions
arewhere theReal manifests itselforwhere human beings experience it.For allwe
know, on
this showing,
it is in living like a thugee
or like a member
of the Ku
Klux Klan thatone ismost authenticallyin touchwith theReal.27
Plantinga
suppose.
correctly notes that Hick's
That
is, while Hick
pluralism
is not as thoroughgoing as some
covers all of the great world
religions under his
pluralistic umbrella, some types of religions are still leftout in the rain.
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199
200
KEVIN MEEKER
But Plantinga's
argument curiously overlooks Hick's
selectivity.28Hick justifies his own preference
own discussion
for the great world
of this
religions in the
passage:
following
Butwhy select theseparticular traditionsin the firstplace, ratherthanSatanism,
Nazism, theOrder of theSolar Temple, etc., as providingthe rightcriterion?The answer
arises out of the routebywhich thepluralistichypothesis is arrivedat .... The
hypothesis ... originateswithin a particular religioustradition- inmy own case
Christianity.As a Christian, then,one accepts that the sense of thepresence ofGod
within theChristian community is indeed an awareness of a divine presence; and one
sees a confirmationof the self-evidently
[emphasisadded] valuable and desirable 'fruit
of theSpirit'which St Paul listedas 'love, joy,peace, patience, kindness,goodness,
faithfulness,
gentleness, self-control'(Galatians 5.22).29
In this passage
and elsewhere, Hick places much weight on the self-evidentness
principles.30 So, contrary to what Plantinga
of moral
But Hick's
self-evidently correct moral principles.3'
to accepting
commitment
themajor world
some others on the basis of a self-evident moral
problem. Of course, his appeal
to self-evident moral
religions and excluding
criterion produces
a serious
appears
principles
ous as long as it is conjoined with the claim thatmost of the great world
have
identified, and attempt to operate
trumpets the 'Universality of the Golden
Rule ',32 and more
forHick's
claim
If indeed everyone
even Hick recognizes
religions do not follow theGolden Rule. To be sure, Hick recognizes
exist among
idealism, and
those involved
might pro
acceptance
that the criterion is self-evident. But we cannot
take these universality claims seriously because
threads of personal
religions
broadly proclaims
recognized'.3
to his ethical criterion, then such widespread
vide evidence
innocu
in light of, these principles. Thus Hick
that: 'the 'fruits of the spirit' are universally
consented
try to
religions on the
among various
provide a justification for picking and choosing
basis of their ability to promote
suggests, Hick does
... a genuine
that certain
that 'shining
... spirit of service'34 did in fact
he most
in even some of the ideologies
repudiates. But he still does not grant that the movements
in which
explicitly
theywere
involved are salvifically efficacious. So what becomes
crucial in attaining a loftier
status is that, as Hick puts it, all of the great world
religions
central
... role
Even with
presaged
to the unselfish
this qualification,
regard
'agree in giving a
for others'.35
though, Hick
faces a monumental
problem, one
at the beginning of this paper. In short, he is committed both to a broad
pluralism and a self-evident ethical criterion that can undercut his pluralism. For
although Hick says that themajor world religions view altruism as constitutive of
salvation/liberation,
this is an empirical question
and it could turn out thatmany
religions are not so altruistic-centric. In such a situation Hick could either stick to
his ethical criterion and admit
which undermines
that not all of the major
religions measure
up,
his pluralism, or he can reject his 'self-evident' criterion and
thus have no resources
to support his rejection of 'selfish' religions. That
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is, his
Pluralism and exclusivism
pluralisticcommitmentto the salvificefficacyof themajor world religionsis
to a self-evident moral principle requires him to be open
settled while his appeal
as towhat religions really are salvifically efficacious.
the depth of the problem
To better understand
how questionable
his empirical
are.36Many Asian
claims about
traditions appear
thatHick faces, let us consider
the major world
religions really
to deny that altruistic behaviour
is necessary
Altruisticselflessnessmay be helpful from
or sufficientfor 'transformation'.
a Buddhist
perspective
(particularly Hinayana
Buddhism)
because
it helps
to
forenlighten
extinguishdesire.But altruisticselflessnessis surelynot sufficient
ment on any Buddhist
to Hick's
Hinduism's
view with which
are Sri Krishna's
case
I am acquainted.37 Even more damaging
pronouncements
about
'in this world, aspirants may
famous Bhagavad-Gita:
in
enlightenment
find enlight
enment by two different paths. For the contemplative is the path of knowledge:
for the active is the path of selfless action'. 3 In other words, it appears that Sri
Krishna
is maintaining
that, for some
at least, selfless action
people
is not
necessaryto findenlightenment.
This stance seems to flyin the face ofHick's
reading of the universal embrace of
altruism as central to transformation. To be sure, Hick quotes
from, say, Hindu
texts that advocate
altruistic actions are necessary or central (as opposed
Moreover, Hick concedes
thatBuddhism
can
its status as a salvifically efficacious
religion. After all, if,as some claim, enlightenment
altruistic adherents
to being merely helpful).
(and even some forms ofHinduism)
be interpreted in such a way as to undermine
for the most
some passages
altruism. But these texts do not show that
of Buddhism,
is very difficult to achieve even
then Buddhism
can be seen as
'good news for an elite few but, by contrast, bad news for the generality of the
human
this elitist interpretation Hick argues that 'clearly this
race '.39To combat
cannot be the original or the historically normative
made
Buddhism
one of the great world
centuries Buddhism
millions
understanding
has imparted a positive meaning
and purpose
has
to hundreds of
'40
Hick offers no textual or historical support forhis claims. He
of people.
merely asserts that such an elitist interpretation of Buddhism
its status as a 'great world
supporting
which
religions. In the course of twenty-five
religion'. But
the strong modal
claim
this assertion
cannot account
falls woefully
that the elitist interpretation
correct. Hick here simply seems to be begging the question. When
for
short of
'cannot'
be
the possibility
that he must exclude a major world religion based on his ethical criterion arises,
he simply imposes
effectivelymasks
his ethical understanding
on that tradition in a way
that
the tension between his criterion and his pluralism. That is, he
tries to avoid the obvious conclusion
that his ethical criterion might cause him to
retreat from his broad pluralism.
Now
some could object
thatmy reading is a mischaracterization
and Hindu
thought and
that Hick's
Buddhism,
are correct. Of course
readings,
one
of Buddhist
including his ant-elitist view of
finds so much
diversity within
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these
201
202
KEVIN MEEKER
traditions that it is extremely difficult to generalize
point that Iwant
about them. Fortunately,
the
tomake does not require the truth ofmy interpretation. As long
as this type of interpretation is a real (as opposed
bility, then Hick's
genteel pluralism
to a merely
is in deep
feathers to dismiss views such as Nazism
theoretical) possi
trouble. After all it ruffles few
as salvifically impotent. But
ifHick
sticks to his 'it is self-evident that altruism is the core of religion' guns, then he
must be willing
to bite the bullet and disqualify
if they fail to live up
and Hinduism
allowing
for this possibility,
his
undermining
Although
is in great
the great world
Hick's
pluralism
much more
tension - if not
Of course, one might object
to Hick's
their theoretical
For example, Guy Axtell has argued
the neo-Kantian
akin to Lakatos's
Such a view could avoid
for a
scepticism about
methodology
of scientific re
the internal coherence
problem
is superior
to show that exclusivism
competitor. Instead one ofmy goals is to show thatwe should not
that exclusivism would
criticize themoral underpinnings
fare poorly
even on a theoretical
insofar as Hick's
if it is considered
because
ofHick's pluralism,
forms of exclusivism
at least some
are in many
as a hypothesis
another major
I assume
respects
is to
goal
that showing that
superior
to Hick's
level is in itself a significant accomplishment
views are so influential.
could dispute my assessment
as a hypothesis, and Hick's
two virtues and we await Hick's
because
this theoretical
and so on, we need to consider
rather than a statement of faith.Moreover,
incoherence
theory exhibits
displays
there are many
above. But my goal has not been
to any possible
Some
test. That is,
theory. Because
exclusivism.
the Real with an epistemology
considered
to
that it is true.
that is similar toHick's but replaces
pluralism
his desire
that the argument up until this point only shows
forms of pluralism, universalism,
virtues before accepting
mentioned
- with
the exclusivist
Insofar as exclusivism
that an exclusivist theory is preferable
assume
incompatible
is internally incoherent while
internal coherence.
search programmes.4'
religions are
to altruism as constitutive of religious
religions.
virtue, we have some reason to believe
pluralism
(great) world
that all
theory fares poorly on the internal coherence
then,Hick's
Overall,
In
in the foot by
it turns out that some
than others. In short, his appeal
transformation
embrace
implies
Hick
religions are equal, on closer examination
more equal
of Buddhism
standards.
is shooting himself
though, Hick
inclusiveness.
(major segments?)
to his self-evident moral
charge. Hick,
he has showed
of the competition
possible
response
an objector may
that exclusivistic
external consistency front.More
between
exclusivism,
pluralism. After all, I have only discussed
to this version of the internal
contend,
is still on firm ground
theories like Plantinga's
specifically while
suffer on the
the set of propositions
prising the exclusivistic hypothesis might be consistent,
com
the set itself seems
in
consistent with the further facts that there are somany different religions and that
culture and environment plays a significant role in determining one's
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religious
Pluralism and exclusivism
affiliation. And even ifexclusivism
is inadequate
because
is at the very least consistent with these facts, it
it cannot explain
them. This type of charge might work
refrains from offering such explanations;
against Plantinga, who
but others have
offered friendly amendments
to this type of view to explain religious diversity42
and the cultural conditioning
of one's
religious beliefs.43 The debate will doubt
less continue. Again, though, my aim here ismore modest. Assuming
that at least
some exclusivistic
models are conservativeand internally
consistent(andHick
does not dispute
these claims), we have reached a tentative conclusion
have some positive
reason
that we
to lure
for thinking that they are true. Hick hopes
debates about religious diversity to a theoretical level to show that his pluralism
superior. But it is far from clear that debate at this level would
forHick. Indeed, given the internal coherence
problems
he should be careful about what
turns, perhaps
is
result in a victory
that beset Hick at many
types of debates
he hopes
to
instigate. In any event, I suggest that thinking of these controversies
in terms
of the theoretical virtues has
religious
diversity in a constructive
the potential
to move
and fruitful direction
the debate
that sheds
about
light on important
issues.
Brief conclusion
To sum up briefly, I have argued
that both Hick and Plantinga
consider
pluralismtobe a philosophicalhypothesis
while exclusivismis,at leastgenerally,
a
affirmation of faith'. Hick
'self-committing
similar ilk to explain why
dispute
even ifone recognizes
this point. He wants
that changing
theory emerging victorious.
seems
and others of
that there are many
religions. Hick does not
in a more
instead to engage
theoretical enterprise,
finds inappropriate. But we have seen that Hick
one that Plantinga
simply assume
dares Plantinga
different religions from this per
responds by arguing that exclusivistic beliefs can be rational
spective. Plantinga
or warranted
there are so many
Indeed, from the theoretical perspective, his theory
to suffer from some major
sivistic theories do not suffer.More
incoherence because
should not
the level of debate will offer a good chance of his
vices, ones
from which
at least some exclu
specifically, his view displays a major
internal
his selection of the great world religions rests on an appeal
to a self-evident moral
principle
that, ironically, could justify rejecting some of
the very religions his pluralism wants
to embrace.44
Notes
i. Articles merely criticizing Hick are legion.While
such critiques can of course be very useful, this paper
not only criticizes Hick but also attempts to provide a framework that can help to direct future
discussions.
2. Hick's views appear
in various places. See for example his An Interpretation of Religion
Yale University Press, 1989). A fairly concise summary appears
in John Hick
(New Haven CT:
'Religious pluralism and
salvation', Faith and Philosophy, 5 (1988), 365-377.
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203
204
KEVIN MEEKER
3. Hick provides specific examples
awakened
to support this view:
'Phenomenologically,
the Buddhist
experience of
life and the Christian experience of the new life in Christ are different ... .But at the same
time the two types of core experiences
a radical shift from self-centredness
have very important features in common. They both hinge upon
to a new orientation centred in theUltimate
the transformed state, in its basic moral and spiritual attitudes and outlooks,
awakened person
is filledwith compassion
practice seem indistinguishable';
... .Further, the fruit of
is very similar. The
(karuna) and the saved person with love (agape) which
John Hick
'Religion as " skilfulmeans":
in
a hint fromBuddhism',
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 30 (1991), 155.
4. Alvin Plantinga Warranted
5. John Hick
Christian Belief (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 440.
'The epistemological
challenge of religious pluralism', Faith and Philosophy, 14 (1997), 280.
Hick does not just single out Plantinga on this score. He also claims that no exclusivist has properly
'The purpose of this paper
the relevant issues. He states:
addressed
not yet have any adequate
... [has been] to suggest thatwe do
response from [Alston,Van Inwagen, Mavrodes]
to the problem of religious
diversity' (285).
6. See Alvin Plantinga
7. David Basinger
'AdHick', Faith and Philosophy, 14 (1997), 295-296.
'Hick's religious pluralism and "Reformed epistemology"',
Faith and Philosophy, 5
(1988), 427.
8. Ibid., 428.
9. See Plantinga Warranted
Christian Belief, 91-92, 329-331, 371, 476-477. Plantinga summarizes his views on
construing religious beliefs as hypotheses
or explanations
throughout this book ... it is an enormous assumption
larger set of Christian
(or Jewish, orMuslim)
hypothesis. Not only is this assumption
in the following passage:
beliefs ofwhich God
enormous:
'As I have argued
to think that belief in God or,more broadly, the
is a part, is ... like a scientific
it is also false. The warrant for these beliefs, if they
have warrant, does not derive from the fact (if it is a fact) that they properly explain some body of data.
For most believers, theistic belief is part of a largerwhole
and is not ordinarily accepted because
... it is accepted
it is an explanation
as part of that largerwhole
of anything; hence
it ifhas some, does not depend on its nicely explaining some body of data'
io. JohnHick
'The possibility of religious pluralism:
a reply toGavin D'Costa',
its rationality or warrant,
(477; Plantinga's
emphasis).
Religious Studies, 33
(1997), 163.
is. Hick
challenge of religious pluralism',
'The epistemological
which asked for a specification of themain
exclusivists is: 'how tomake
279. In response to a letter from Plantinga,
issue in the debate, Hick wrote that themain
difficulty for
sense of the fact that there are other great world religions, belief inwhose
tenets is as epistemologically well based as belief in the Christian doctrinal system, and whose moral
and spiritual fruits in human
Plantinga
'Ad Hick',
functionally equivalent
12. Hick
lives seem to be as valuable
as those of the Christian faith'; Quoted
295. Note how Hick seems to think that an explanation
in
of religious diversity is
to 'making sense' of religious diversity.
challenge of religious pluralism',
'The epistemological
280.
13.William Alston Perceiving God (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 197.
14. 'Warrant' is Plantinga's
stipulative term for, roughly speaking, whatever
is needed
to transform true
belief into knowledge.
15. See Alvin Plantinga Warrant:
and Proper Function
16. Plantinga Warranted
17.Hick
The Current Debate
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); idemWarrant
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and idemWarranted
'The possibility of religious pluralism:
a reply toGavin D'Costa',
163. Elsewhere Hick claims that
his anti-exclusivist arguments should be read as 'invitations' or 'provocations'
epistemological
i8. W. V. Quine
Christian Belief.
Christian Belief, 499.
challenge of religious pluralism',
to debate;
and J.S. Ullian The Web of Belief 2nd edn (New York NY: McGraw-Hill,
Iwill attribute passages
19. Ernan McMullin
in this book only toQuine
'Values in science',
'The
286, n. 7.
for convenience's
in Peter D. Asquith
1978), 66. Hereafter,
sake (with apologies
and Thomas Nickles
toUllian).
(eds) PSA 1982: Proceedings
of the 1982 Biennial Meeting of thePhilosophy of Science Association, Volume 2 (East Lansing, MI:
Philosophy of Science Association,
1983), 15-i6.
20. For yet another listing, see Thomas Kuhn
Essential Tension (Chicago
virtues appears
possesses
'Objectivity, value-judgement,
IL: University of Chicago
and theory-choice',
Press, 1977), 220-239. Kuhn's
to be different from that of either Quine
orMcMullin;
in his The
view of theoretical
for the latter two, ifa theory
a sufficient number of these virtues, then the theory is likely to be true. Kuhn, on the other
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Pluralism and exclusivism
hand, does not want
to claim that these virtues are epistemically
important. More
specifically, Kuhn
is
about the claim that these virtues provide anyone with a reason for thinking that a theory that
dubious
he does allow that as a matter offact these virtues are of
them is true.Nevertheless,
possessed
importance when adjudicating
considerable
21. Quine Web of Belief 66-67.
22. See Hick 'The epistemological
among different theories or paradigms.
challenge of religious pluralism',
285.
23. Idem 'Religious pluralism and salvation', 376-377.
24. William
'Plantinga and coherentisms',
Lycan
(Lanham MD:
Epistemology
in Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.) Warrant
inContemporary
Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), argues that ifone accepts
theoretical virtues
such as 'simplicity, testability, fruitfulness, power, and the like' (6), then one must also accept
conservatism as a theoretical virtue (6-7). These are deep and complicated
'Values in science',
25. McMullin
26. As George Mavrodes
issues of course and here
is a theoretical virtue.
I am simply assuming, along with many others, that conservatism
15.
'A response to JohnHick', Faith and Philosophy, 14 (1997), 293, points out: 'Hick's
Real is not loving, not powerful, not wise, not compassionate,
not gentle, not forgiving. The Real does
(or anything else), and so on. The Real did not create theworld, did not design the
not care about me
world, does not sustain theworld, and will not bring theworld to an end. What
Real have to do with anything which happens
in theworld? Why would
in theworld does the
anyone suppose
that it
for any fact at all, religious or otherwise? Hick, I think, is himself unsatisfied with the
" accounts"
ineffabilitywhich he professes. So he is continually drifting into causal, or quasi-causal,
Real - that is the " noumenal
ground " of certain experiences,
talk about the
that there is a " transmission of
information from a transcendent source to the human mind/brain",
the Real has an "impact on us",
and so on. But this talk is either empty (though with the appearance
of content) or else itviolates the
prohibition of applying to the Real any humanly conceivable,
positive, substantial characteristics.' Other
charges of incoherence can be found in, e.g. Plantinga Warranted
27. Plantinga Warranted
28. Plantinga's
discussion
Christian Belief 49-63.
Christian Belief 58-59.
inWarranted
Christian Belief concentrates
solely (as far as I can tell) on Hick's
1989 book An Interpretation of Religion and does not touch on Hick's
29. Hick
subsequent
explanations
and
of his pluralism.
qualifications
'The possibility of religious pluralism: a reply to Gavin D'Costa',
30. He emphasized
this in a personal
164.
letter, inwhich he says thatmoral principles, unlike beliefs about the
Real, are self-evidently true.
31. Of course it is an open question
as towhether
thismanoeuvre
incoherent to talk about living a selfless life as an appropriate
Hick tries to deal with problems
answers Plantinga's
charge that it is
response to an ineffableReal. But at least
in this general vicinity.
32. Hick An Interpretation of Religion, 309.
33. Ibid., 301.
34. JohnHick Disputed Questions
in Theology and Philosophy of Religion (New Haven CT: Yale University
Press, 1993), 80.
35. Hick
'Religious pluralism and salvation', 367-368.
36. Thanks
tomy colleague Eric Loomis
37. As I understand Buddhism,
forhelpful discussions
on these issues.
desire is the great enemy and ridding oneself of desire is the key to escaping
thewheel of rebirth: 'ifyou fail to grasp themeaning
ofwhat you were taught, ifyou still continue to
feel a desire to exist as an individual, then you are now doomed
to again re-enter thewheel of
Buddhist Scriptures, selected and translated by Edward Conze
becoming';
Books, 1986), 229. Because
presumably
(New York NY: Penguin
even those who generally act selflessly could still retain a desire
to exist as an individual, it is clear that altruism is not sufficient for enlightenment. Generally speaking
inBuddhism
liberation is the combination
colleague Eric Loomis
ofwisdom
and merit. (Here again I am indebted tomy
for incisive comments.)
38. The Song of God: Bhagavad-Gita,
Swami Prabhavananda
and Christopher
NY: Mentor Books, 1972), 44. Similar ideas crop up in other Hindu
ofManu:
'Austerity and sacred learning are the best means
Isherwood
(trs) (New York
texts, such as the controversial Laws
by which a brahmin secures supreme bliss;
by austerities he destroys guilt, by sacred learning he obtains cessation of (birth and) deaths'; A
Sourcebook
in Indian Philosophy, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
and Charles A. Moore
(eds) (Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 173 (XII.104).
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205
206
KEVIN MEEKER
39. Hick An Interpretation of Religion, 184.
40. Ibid., 185.
41. Guy Axtell 'Religious pluralism and its discontents',
Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion, 8 (2003),
49-73.
42. Kelly James Clark
43. Andrew Koehl
'Perils of pluralism', Faith and Philosophy, 14 (1997), 303-320.
'Reformed epistemology and diversity', Faith and Philosophy, 18 (2001), 168-191.
44. Thanks are due Michael
Bergmann
and Eric Loomis
for insightful comments on previous versions of
this paper. A version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting
of Religion
inHilton Head,
South Carolina
D. Z. Phillips, and themembers
the University of South Alabama
of the Society for the Philosophy
(February 2005). I am grateful tomy commentator,
of the audience
for reassigned
for instructive comments. Finally, I am indebted to
time that allowed me
towork on this paper.
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