The Middle East’s Democracy Gap: Causes and Consequences
The Middle East’s Democracy Gap:
Causes and Consequences
Robert Springborg
Director
London Middle East Institute
Four years after the landmark 2002 Arab Human Development Report highlighted
the yawning gap between global democracy and its comparative absence in the Arab
world, that gap remains.1 Despite promises of reform by most Arab leaders, expenditure
in the hundreds of millions of dollars on Arab democratization projects by bilateral and
multilateral donors, and an increasingly assertive Arab media, authoritarian governments
persist. By even the least demanding definition of democracy—a change of the ruling
executive through a free and fair election—only Palestine and Lebanon even partially
qualify.
The purposes of this article are to illustrate the extent of the region’s democracy
gap; to suggest reasons as to why it exists, exploring its suggested relationship with Islam
in greatest detail; and finally, to speculate on the vulnerability of the nondemocratic
polities in the region to the politically radicalizing impacts of globalization.
Authoritarians in Arab States
An overview of Arab governance reveals underlying authoritarian characteristics. The
Middle East is the only region of the world in which ruling—as opposed to reigning—monarchies continue to prosper in significant numbers. All of the six Gulf
Cooperation Council states, plus Jordan and Morocco, are ruled by monarchs. Thus 8
out of the 22 Arab states are so governed.
Moreover, the distinction between Arab monarchies and republics has steadily
eroded as a result of longevity of presidential rule and successions within incumbents’
families. Muammar el-Qaddafi, who was never elected, has ruled Libya for 37 years.
Robert Springborg holds the MBI Al Jaber Chair in Middle East Studies at the School of Oriental
and African Studies in London, where he is also the Director of the London Middle East Institute. His
publications include Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order, Family Power and Politics in
Egypt, and Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East.
Copyright © 2007 by the Brown Journal of World Affairs
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Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq for 35 years. Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh was in September
reelected for another seven-year term, which means that if he serves out this term he will
have been president for 35 years. Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was reelected last year for
another six-year term after having already served more than 24 years. Habib Bourguiba
ruled Tunisia for 30 and his successor, Ben Ali, has been in the saddle for 19 more.
Hafiz al Asad, who was in power in Damascus for 30 years, succeeded in handing the
office over to his son Bashar, who is now in his sixth year of rule. Mubarak, Qaddafi,
and Saleh are all working assiduously to assure the same for one of their offspring,
something which Lebanon’s Rafiq Hariri managed to do posthumously. The Arab
world, in sum, not only has a higher percentage of monarchies than any other region
of the world, it also has the longest average tenure of heads of state. The nations of no
other region of the world are so characteristically ruled by one man and his family as
those of the Arab world.
Another ubiquitous and antidemocratic feature of Arab governments is that their
executive branches are large and top-heavy. The ratio of government spending to GDP
averages about one-third, which is some 10 percentage points above the average for
developing countries as a whole. Arab governments’ disproportionate claim on finances
is matched by their domination of labor markets. The wage bill constitutes on average about one-third of total government spending—which, according to the IMF, is
some 4 percent higher than the average for all developing countries. Some particularly
egregious examples reflect the broader situation. In Qatar and Kuwait, 95 and 99
percent, respectively, of nationals in the labor force are employed by the government.
Even in the comparatively populous Arab states, civil services are bloated. In Egypt, for
example, some 6 million of a total nonagricultural labor force of about 18 million are
civil servants. The United Kingdom, in comparison, has some 500,000 civil servants
out of a population that is only some 17 percent less than Egypt’s.2
These large and powerful executives politically marginalize the other branches of
government, rendering them incapable of performing even their limited constitutional
and legal roles. Only two Arab parliaments—those of Palestine and Kuwait—have succeeded in forcing cabinet changes, the most dramatic evidence of parliamentary power.
A better indicator of the day-to-day relationship between executive and legislative
branches is the degree to which the latter is able to oversee the business of the former,
as contained in the government’s budget. Most Arab parliaments have yet to achieve
the first stage of such oversight, which is to force the executive to produce in timely
fashion sufficiently detailed budgets for parliamentary review of them to be meaningful.
The global Open Budget Index for 2006, recently released by Washington’s Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, ranks 59 countries according to their budgetary transparency, including five from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Two of those
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The Middle East’s Democracy Gap: Causes and Consequences
five, Egypt and Morocco, “provide scant or no information to citizens,” the lowest of
the index’s five categories. Algeria provides “minimal information,” which places it in
the second to bottom category, while Jordan and Turkey provide “some information
to citizens,” which places them in the middle category.3 All of these MENA countries
are outperformed by such states as Botswana, Brazil, Peru, and Romania.
Legal–judicial systems are unable to impose the rule of law because executive
branches, typically through ministers of justice, exert heavy influence on them and
because their deficient capacities result, among other things, in extensive case backlogs.
Justice delayed is justice denied. In Egypt, for example, the average civil case lasts for
more than six years before a court hands down a verdict. Implementation of such verdicts
in any event is uneven, in part because of corruption among bailiffs and other court
officers and in part because the executive is reluctant to serve at the behest of courts.
The over-centralization of Arab executive branches is also reflected in the lack
of autonomy and capacity of local government. Nowhere in the Arab world does local government have extensive powers of the purse and nowhere are elections to local
representative bodies conducted without extensive involvement and manipulation by
the executive branch. Virtually all employees at the local levels in Arab governments
report not to a branch of local government but to a central ministry.
These manifold government deficiencies in the Arab world are reflected in measures of democracy and governance. As Figure 1 indicates, of the world’s developing
regions, Freedom House ranks the Arab world the least free on the combined scores
of personal and political freedoms (each scale is from one to six so the two combined
are twelve; the higher the score, the less freedom).4 The second least free region is the
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Latin America
& Caribbean
South Asia
Africa
Asia / Pacific
MENA
Arab
Figure 1: Freedom House Ratings—Regional Averages
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Robert Springborg
MENA as a whole.
Figure 2 reveals that by the World Bank’s rankings, the MENA provides dramatically fewer opportunities to its citizens for voice and accountability than does
any other region.5 Of the World Bank’s various measures of governance quality, the
Voice and Accountability Index is not only the one which measures democratization
most directly, but it is also the one which has the strongest inter-correlation with the
other World Bank measures. It is the strongest predictor of the ability of government
to control corruption, for example. This in turn suggests that governance quality is
strongly and positively correlated with democracy. This indicates that the MENA has
the world’s largest democracy gap and implies that its governance is extremely poor in
globally comparative terms.
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
Latin America &
Caribbean
South Asia
SS Africa
Asia / Pacific
MENA
-0.6
236
-0.8
-1
-1.2
-1.4
Figure 2: Voice and Accountability Indicators—Regional Averages
Problems for Arab Governments
Arab and MENA governments are not just comparatively undemocratic and unaccountable, but they are also poor at delivering benefits to their citizens. The UN’s
Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite of health, longevity, and education
measures. If a country is performing as predicted by its comparative level of wealth, its
score when its rank on HDI is subtracted from its rank on GDP per capita should be
zero. If it is performing better, it should have a positive score, if worse, a negative one.
As the World Bank Data in Figure 3 indicates, only sub-Saharan African countries are
developing their human resources less effectively than the MENA countries.6 Again,
the Arab world underperforms the MENA as a whole, reflecting the fact that Turkey,
Iran, and Israel outperform the Arab countries on average.
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The Middle East’s Democracy Gap: Causes and Consequences
10
5
0
MENA
Arab
South Asia
Latin America Sub-Saharan
and Caribbean
Africa
East Asia and
Pacific
-5
-10
-15
Figure 3: GDP Minus HDI Rank—Regional Averages
Arab and MENA governments are also not user-friendly for businesses. The International Finance Corporation ranks 175 countries according to the ease of doing business
within them. As Figure 4 reveals, seven Arab countries are in the top half of the ranking
and seven, as well as Iran, are in the bottom half.7 This seems to suggest an adequate,
if not good, performance on this measure by Arab and MENA countries. The average
rank of the 15 MENA countries listed, however, is over 100, whereas the median rank
is 87.5. More importantly, if one considers the populations of the countries listed, the
outcome is substantially more negative. Those Arab countries in the top half have a
total native population of about 30 million, while those countries in the bottom half
have approximately ten times as many inhabitants. Thus the vast majority of Arabs and
Iranians live in countries where doing business is more difficult than in the majority of
countries in the world. This in turn reflects the comparatively poor governance of the
MENA region, which, as suggested above, is a consequence of its lack of democracy.
Country
Saudi
Kuwait
Oman
UAE
Jordan
Rank
38
46
55
77
78
Country
Tunisia
Lebanon
Yemen
Morocco
Algeria
Rank
80
86
98
115
116
Country
Iran
Syria
Iraq
Sudan
Egypt
Rank
119
130
145
154
165
Figure 4: Ease of Doing Business
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Robert Springborg
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Africa
Latin
America
Asia Pacific
MENA
S.Asia
Figure 5: Military Expenditure (Percent of GDP, 2003)
238
MENA countries further demonstrate deficits in democracy and governance—and the
subsequent impact on their economic performance—in their progress toward marketbased economies and democracy as measured by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index.8
Based on several economic and political variables, this index revealed in 2006 that only
one Arab country was in the upper half of the 113 countries ranked. That country was
Bahrain, the population of which is approximately one million. Nine of the thirteen
Arab countries ranked were in the bottom two of the five categories.
Finally, as Figure 5 demonstrates, the MENA outspends all other developing
regions on the military, presumably one of the reasons why its comparative ranking on
human development is so low. On the face of it, high spending on the military signals the
likelihood of poor governance and lack of democracy. Paradoxically, this high spending
also correlates with high levels of violence, indicating that MENA citizens are probably
not reaping many benefits from governmental expenditures on the military.
A recently released RAND Corporation study reveals that in terms of terrorist
incidents and numbers killed by terrorist acts, the MENA is far and away the most
dangerous region in the world. Terrorists in this region killed 10,200 people in the
period from 2002 to 2005, with the next highest region being that of all of South,
East, and Northeast Asia, where 3,600 people were killed in terrorist incidents. The
comparative population densities of these two regions implies that a MENA citizen is
about 15 times more likely to be killed by terrorists than is a person living in South,
East, or Northeast Asia, the next most dangerous part of the globe.9
Other forms of political violence are just as omnipresent. Civil wars have occurred
in the last twenty years in Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, and Yemen. Major insurrections have broken out in Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. Cross-border wars have occurred
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The Middle East’s Democracy Gap: Causes and Consequences
between Lebanon and Israel, Iran and Iraq, and Libya and Chad. In sum, comparatively
high expenditures on MENA militaries correlate not with peace and security, but with
war, terrorism, and death.
It may not be totally unrelated that the Arab countries have the lowest female
participation rates in politics of any world region, with an average of only 6 percent
of Arab parliamentarians being women. By comparison, in Britain, where the rate is
low by European standards, 28 percent of the members of the House of Commons
and the House of Lords are women. In Europe and possibly the world as a whole, the
higher the percentage of women participating in the political system, the more representative and effective that system is likely to be. It may also be the case that women’s
participation correlates negatively with a state’s propensity to engage in violence, as an
impressionistic interpretation of the European data suggests.
The form, content, and output of Arab and MENA governments thus remain far
below global averages, even for developing countries, some four years after the issuing
of the 2002 Arab Human Development Report. Public opinion reflects these objective
realities: a recent Telhami/Zogby poll revealed that a majority of Arabs believe that the
Arab world is less democratic now than it was at the start of the Iraq War in 2003.10
Explanations for the Democracy Gap
Explanations of democracy and governance gaps in the Arab world and the MENA
region more broadly are sought in its history, geography, economics, culture, and religion. Key historical factors include the absence of a precursor pluralism prior to the
imposition of colonial rule, and then colonialism itself. British and French rule in the
region emphasized the development of the administrative or output side of government,
while purposely neglecting the policy-making or input side. At the time of independence most states in the region inherited overdeveloped administrative capacities and
underdeveloped political and policy-making ones.
Perhaps more importantly, colonial rulers drove a progressive radicalization of
nationalism in those they ruled. Where colonialism persisted, it resulted in the displacement of traditionalists and moderate liberals by radical nationalists who sought to use
the state to address ills they believed to have been visited upon their various countries by
the colonialists. In most republics in the region the immediate inheritors of this legacy
of radical and authoritarian Arab nationalism are still in power, while the remaining
monarchies, most of which were created by British rule, have erected various bulwarks
against popular participation, sweeping them away.
Geographic explanations of persisting authoritarianism typically refer to artificial
states created by imperial designs, of which Iraq is currently the most dramatic but by
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no means exclusive example; to the region’s proximity to Europe, which has resulted in
the Middle East having had more intense relations with that continent than any other
region of the developing world, an intensity that has reinforced the colonial dynamic
mentioned; and to the very fact that the Middle East constitutes an interactive subsystem of international politics. Leon Carl Brown’s seminal work, International Politics of
the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game, suggests the analogy of a kaleidoscope, in
which even a slight movement in any part of the system causes all of the others to have
to adjust.11 In these circumstances of interlocked interdependency, in which interstate
conflict is ever present, the task of democracy-building is rendered substantially more
challenging.
Political economists have emphasized disparities of national incomes in the region
and the negative consequences for governance of both extreme poverty and extraordinary wealth. There is no doubt that the region is economically bifurcated. Qatar,
for example, has the second highest GDP per capita in the world after Luxembourg,
while Yemen, which directly borders the oil-rich Gulf States, has one of the lowest. For
the latter and other poor MENA countries, democratization is impeded by resource
scarcities and the comparative weakness of independent middle classes. In the wealthy
countries of the region the predominance of oil revenues and their control by states
has led to a rentier politics of “no taxation, hence no representation.”
Whether or not the predominance of Islam affects the region’s political systems is
a multifaceted and controversial issue. Like most religions, Islam is not just a theology,
but consists also of social practices, belief systems, a unique but variegated history, and
even normative and empirically identifiable approaches to economics and politics. For
our purposes what is probably most relevant is what contemporary Muslims actually
believe about governance and politics. We are fortunate in now having a substantial
body of public opinion data addressed to this issue. Much of that evidence appears on
first glance to be negative. Muslims, especially those living in any of the 53 Muslim
majority countries, have low regard for democratic institutions, especially parliaments
and elected local government bodies.
While having scant regard for political institutions, especially elected ones, Muslims appear to place particular trust in ulama (religious leaders). A study by Moataz
Fattah found that in 26 of the 32 countries where interviewed Muslims live, respondents
were much more likely to turn to ulama for political opinions and advice than to any
other source.12 The more respondents trusted ulama on politically related matters, the
less supportive they were of democratic norms and institutions.
It also appears from Fattah’s survey of over 31,000 Muslims that they are not
particularly willing to make sacrifices on behalf of democracy. Arab Muslims stand out
in this regard, being the Muslims least likely to make sacrifices for political rights. The
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The Middle East’s Democracy Gap: Causes and Consequences
researcher concludes that this suggests that “if Arabs are given democratic freedoms
and procedures as a gift from their rulers, they will accept them, but the chances of a
mass-led democratization are relatively low.”13
The available evidence also suggests that Muslims tend to favor outputs and
achievements over processes, group solidarities, and individual rights. Fattah found,
for example, that almost three-quarters of his respondents and 89 percent of his Arab
respondents would accept rule for life by someone like Saddam Hussein if he liberated
Palestine.
Finally, the majority of Muslims do not support secularization. In 26 of the 32
societies surveyed by Fattah, most respondents preferred that politics be suffused with
Islam. It was only in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Mali, Albania, Tunisia, and Turkey—all
countries with considerable experience with secularism—that this was not the case.
Similarly, a survey conducted in June 2004 by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the
University of Jordan found a strong desire among respondents in the five Arab countries
studied for Islam to inform the governmental and legal structures and their outputs.
The massive Pew Global Attitudes project discovered similar attitudes, but also revealed
strong direct correlations between support for secularization and residence in Muslim
countries with relatively developed democratic institutions and processes.14
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence to suggest that Islam is not a
profound hindrance to democratization, especially if one accepts the proposition that
there can be Islamic democracy. Survey data reveal that most Muslims believe Islam and
democracy to be compatible.15 Claims that There is considerable evidence to
Muslims reject democracy as a Western
suggest that Islam is not a profound
implant contradictory to their religion or
customs are unfounded. Although there hindrance to democratization, espeis some evidence to suggest that the more
cially if one accepts the proposition
Muslims observe Islamic rituals the less
likely they are to support democracy, this that there can be Islamic democracy.
is not universally the case. Moreover, as Fattah found, the great majority of Muslims
are in fact modernists rather than traditionalists, meaning that they are open to the
outside world, are willing to engage in interpretation of their religion in light of new
circumstances, and view democracy as being compatible with Islam.
Possibly the most crucial finding revealed by this plethora of investigations is that
the more experience Muslims have with democracy, including residing even temporarily
in non-Muslim majority democratic countries, the more likely they are to support it.
Experience with democratic institutions breeds support for them, a finding of virtually
all public opinion polls taken on the subject. Further reinforcing this interpretation is
Fattah’s finding that in 24 of the 32 countries he surveyed, the majority of respondents
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favored a pro-democratic ruler rather than the incumbent.
The evidence thus suggests that while attitudes of Muslims may pose some obstacles to democratization, those obstacles are not overwhelming and, in any case, the
attitudes are susceptible to change. The evidence also suggests that the democracies
likely to emerge in presently non-democratic Muslim countries will probably assign
substantial political and even governmental roles to religious figures, will emphasize
sharia (Islamic law) in legal systems, and be characterized by the prominence of religiously-based political parties and civil society organizations. They will, in sum, likely be
Islamic democracies rather than secular ones. But democracies they can still be, so long
as they respect individual rights and accord citizens equal rights and protections.
Finally, the fact that Muslims prefer democracy more as they experience it indicates that it is the lack of democracy, rather than the dominance of Islam, that has
been primarily responsible for the comparatively slow spread of democracy within
Muslim-majority countries. This is not tautological. Indeed, the evidence can be read
to suggest the existence of a keen awareness among Muslims of the fact that they suffer
from a democracy deficit and that they have a real desire to change this situation. This
in turn holds out the promise of a virtuous spiral, whereby incremental reforms that
bring about limited democracy create yet more demand for further democratization,
as well as providing opportunities for citizens and institutions to develop the necessary
skills and capacities to practice democracy effectively.
The Middle East and Islam in World Politics
Political attitudes in the Middle East, as anywhere, do not exist in a vaccum; they are
affected by world wide trends. In particular, a Fourth Wave of democratization is now
flowing in the wake of what was labeled the Third Wave that developed in the immediate wake of the collapse of the USSR.
The chief characteristic of this new democratic wave is that it is reaching down
into ever lower social strata, which are being mobilized into politics by radical populists—the most dramatic exemplars of which are the Latin Americans Chavez, Morales,
and Obrador, but which are also to be found as far afield as Thailand. As the 2006
Thai coup indicates, political and economic establishments threatened by this populist mobilization seem willing to abandon democracy in their attempts to defeat their
rivals. The populists have not had to bend the rules to attain power for they have the
numbers, thanks to the bifurcating impact of globalization which divides economies
into a few rich and many poor.
The Middle East has its own variant of the reaction against globalization. Interestingly it is not that of resource nationalism, as it is in Venezuela and Bolivia for example.
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The Middle East’s Democracy Gap: Causes and Consequences
Few Arab voices are heard demanding nationalizations or renegotiations of contractual
terms with multinational oil companies. The vast hydrocarbon reserves of the region
were for the most part brought under absolute state control during the nationalist phase
of the 1950s through the 1970s.
More important than the present state of ownership and control of the Middle
East’s natural resources in shaping the reaction to globalization, is the nature of governments in the region. They are either pre- or post-populist. The former, the so-called
pre-populists, are the monarchies of the Gulf and, to a lesser extent, those of Morocco
and Jordan. In these countries the level of political mobilization remains low, partly for
historical reasons, and partly because severe curtailment of human rights and political
liberties renders mobilization a parlous challenge. The post-populist governments, such
as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia, are ruled by regimes whose populist phase
is long spent, but whose lives have been extended by their overdeveloped coercive apparatuses and opportunistic utilization of economic resources for political ends.
Not more immune from the divisive impacts of globalization than is Latin America
or any other developing region, the Middle East likewise has to cope with the political demands of the swelling ranks of the marginalized. But whereas in Latin America,
democracy has provided ballot boxes as paths to power for those claiming to represent
these social forces, no such path exists in the nondemocratic Middle East. As a result,
Islamism has become the mobilizing ideology and movement for those in the region
seeking to ameliorate the impacts of globalization (although in the Middle East these
impacts are not just economic, but cultural as well). So the lethal brew of authoritarian government and economic deprivation, combined with challenges to identity and
culture, provides abundant energy to drive the Islamist challenge to post-populist and
even pre-populist Arab regimes.
The West’s predominant reaction to this threat is to reinforce incumbent governments against Islamists. The Bush administration’s propensity to label almost any and
all manifestations of Islamism as terrorism is the most extreme statement of what is
general policy in the West. This policy is bound to fail and will contribute to the very
outcome it is seeking to avoid. Islamism is being propelled by fundamental economic,
social, and political trends. It is not forever going to be contained by aging monarchs
or unpopular presidents, however strong their security and intelligence agencies presently appear.
The West is thus better advised to facilitate power-sharing between incumbents
and Islamist challengers. Instead of backing the former to the hilt, it needs to support
ways and means to accommodate both the demands of Islamists and their participation
in the political order. By doing so, it will likely moderate those demands and those making them, rendering compromises possible. At the same time an approach of inducing
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accommodation would help to invigorate tired incumbent elites, whose political skills
have decayed because authoritarianism has been substituted for political bargaining.
Democracy, in sum, better copes with the rising demands that globalization
generates. Hugo Chavez is a nuisance for the West, not a mortal threat. Venezuela has
not dissolved into civil war and its oil continues to reach world markets. Over time his
excesses are likely to discredit both himself and the radical populism he expounds. If
cooler heads prevail, the challenge of globalization to Venezuela and much of the rest
of Latin America will wash over in the form of the Fourth Wave of democratization. It
will leave in its wake democratic orders that have responded in some ways to the needs
of globalization’s losers and thus helped reconcile them with its winners.
There being no democratic wave yet in the Middle East, but a veritable Islamist
tsunami on the horizon, it is difficult to see exactly how an accord between regimes
and Islamists on the one hand and Islamists and the West on the other is going to be
reached in time. What is certain is that unless the tsunami of Islamism is diverted and
channelled by at least limited democratizations, it will do substantial and possibly lasting damage to not only the MENA region, but to the world as well. W
A
Notes
244
1. United Nations Development Programme, The Arab Human Development Report (New York: Regional
Bureau for Arab States, 2002).
2. George T. Abed and Hamid R. Davoodi, Challenges of Growth and Globalization in the Middle East
and North Africa (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003); Programme on Governance
in the Arab Region, “Statistics and Indicators,” United Nations Development Programme, http://www.
pogar.org/stats.
3. The International Budget Program, “Open Budget Initiative 2006,” http://www.openbudgetindex.
org.
4. Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2006: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
5. World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators 2006,” http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata.
6. Ibid.
7. International Finance Corporation, “Doing Business: Economic Rankings,” World Bank, http://www.
doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/Default.aspx?direction=asc&sort=1.
8. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006: Toward Democracy and a Market
Economy (Gütersloh, Germany: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006).
9. Rand Corporation, “Terrorism and Homeland Security,” http://www.rand.org/research_areas/terrorism.
10. Zogby International, “Unprecedented Middle East Poll Tackles Key Questions about Future of
Arab World,” http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews1042.html.
11. Leon Carl Brown, International Politics of the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984).
12. Moataz A. Fattah, Democratic Values in the Muslim World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).
13. Ibid., 114.
14. The Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Conflicting Views in a Divided World 2006,” Pew Research
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The Middle East’s Democracy Gap: Causes and Consequences
Center, http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/DividedWorld2006.pdf; Brian Katulis, “No Chance for a Caliphate: Public Attitudes on Political Authority in the Muslim World and the Challenge of Democratic Reform
in Muslim-Majority Countries” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, forthcoming).
15. Fattah, Democratic Values in the Muslim World; Katulis, “No Chance for a Caliphate.”
245
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