CHAPTER
4
TO MALAY A
N the circumstances revealed by the Singapore conference report, and
I with the danger of war in the Pacific steadily growing, Air Chie f
Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Pophaml arrived in Singapore on 14th November 1940 as Commander-in-Chief in the Far East . He had been appointed ,
with Australia's concurrence, a few days before the conference began .
The new leader would command the land and air forces throughout
the Far East . Such a charter was rare in British experience . The fact tha t
the task was assigned to an air leader no doubt reflected the importance
of air power in the command ; but the British Cabinet had chosen a n
officer of great seniority who had served as both soldier and airman, an d
therefore might be more acceptable to both Services . Brooke-Popham ,
aged 62, was, however, relatively old for an active command of suc h
extent . 2 Three years before the war he had retired from the post o f
Inspector-General of the Air Force to become Governor and Commanderin-Chief of Kenya .
From 1898 to 1912 Brooke-Popham had been an infantry officer .
Then as a captain he had joined the Air Battalion, Royal Engineers—th e
beginning of a British military air force, later to become the Royal Flyin g
Corps and later still the Royal Air Force . He gained distinction as an air
officer in the war of 1914-18 and when it ended was one of its senio r
leaders . In the following nineteen years he held a series of high appointments, including command of the R .A .F . Staff College and the Imperia l
Defence College (school of future senior commanders of all three Services) . A tall, spare man, of distinguished appearance, he had steppe d
from his vice-regal position to rejoin the Royal Air Force in 1939 .
On the British Government ' s current list of priorities, defence of th e
United Kingdom came first, on the principle that on this all else depended ;
then the struggle in the Middle East . Provision for resistance to a
Japanese assault was next. 3 There was thus little prospect that the deficiencies, especially of aircraft, to which the Singapore conference had draw n
attention, would soon be remedied . Nevertheless, Brooke-Popham ha d
been told by Mr Churchill that Britain would hold Singapore no matte r
what happened, and that there would be a continuous and steady flo w
of men and munitions to the areas of his command .
Brooke-Popham had been made responsible to the United Kingdo m
Chiefs of Staff for the higher direction and control, and general directio n
of training, of all British land and air forces in Malaya (which for th e
KCB, CMG, DSO, AFC ; C-in-C Far East
1 Air Ch Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, GCVO,
. Died 20 Oct 1953 .
1940-41 . B . Wetheringsett, Suffolk, 18 Sep 1878
a For example, General Gort, who had commanded the British Expeditionary Force in France ,
was aged 54 ; General Wavell, then C-in-C Middle East, was 57 ; and General Auchinleck, soon
to become C-in-C India, was 56 .
a In June 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the Far East was relegated to fourt h
place on the list .
(Australian
War Memorial )
The Queen Mary, carrying some 5,750 Australians, including the 22nd Brigade, arrived a t
Singapore on 18th February 1941 . A group of British officers, including the G .O .O . Malaya ,
Lieut-General L . V . Bond (carrying cane) and the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas (on Bond' s
left) . greeted the Australians .
(Australian
A group of Australians after disembarkation .
War Memorial )
(Lt-Gen N . Gordon Bennett )
Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander in Chief Far East, and General Sir Archibald Wavell .
Lieut-General A . E . Percival, G .O .C . Malaya, and MajorGeneral H . Gordon Bennett, G .O .C . A .I .F . Malaya .
1940
BROOKE-POPHAM TAKES OVER
47
purpose would include Sarawak and North Borneo) and in Burma an d
Hong Kong . He was responsible also for the coordination of plans fo r
the defence of these territories . He was similarly responsible for th e
British air forces in Ceylon, and squadrons which it was proposed t o
station in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal for ocean reconnaissance . The General Officers Commanding in Malaya, Burma, and Hong
Kong, and the Air Officer Commanding in the Far East, were place d
under his command . Despite these widespread responsibilities, his staff
originally comprised only eight officers . 4 Civil administration, althoug h
obviously it must play an essential part in the defence of Malaya, la y
outside his jurisdiction ; so also did the naval forces, despite the fac t
that the approaches to his areas of responsibility were largely by sea.
The directive given to Brooke-Popham specified that he should dea l
chiefly with matters of major military policy and strategy, and should no t
assume administrative or financial responsibilities, or the normal day-to day functions exercised by the army and air commanders . This, whil e
perhaps intended to help him concentrate on the broader issues, tende d
to isolate him from those "normal day-to-day functions" which are under lying realities of planning at even the highest level . Indeed, as he wa s
passing through Cairo on his way to Singapore, General Wavell, 5 th e
wise and learned Commander-in-Chief of the army in the Middle East ,
told him that he considered a general headquarters based on such a
directive was impracticable .
Brooke-Popham opened his General Headquarters, Far East, a t
Singapore on 18th November . A primary task was to ensure the security
of the costly naval base at Singapore, which occupied a large area of th e
northernmost part of Singapore Island, facing Johore Strait and the Mala y
state of Johore, on the mainland of Malaya . The two entrances from
the sea to the strait, from the south-west and east of the island respectively ,
were covered by big coastal guns . Near the western end of the nava l
base area was a long, heavily-constructed causeway which formed the sol e
link with the mainland for surface traffic . After delays caused chiefly by
political and financial difficulties, the base had been officially opened i n
February 1938 . It was then hailed as, for example, "the Gibraltar of th e
East . . . the gateway to the Orient . . . the bastion of British might" . 6 A
correspondent gaily reported that there were "more guns on Singapore
Island than plums in a Christmas pudding" . 7 But in the fifteen years since
the plan for this base had been introduced to the British Parliament, th e
range of aircraft had been increasing, to an extent which challenged th e
strategy on which the plan was founded .
6 1n August 1941, he was given authority for an establishment of 20 in all .
6 Field Marshal Rt Hon Earl Wavell, GCB, GCSI, GCIE, CMG, MC . GOC-in-C Middle East
1939-41, India 1941-43 ; Supreme Comd SW Pacific (ABDA Area) Jan-Mar 1942 ; Viceroy of Indi a
1943-47 . B . 5 May 1883 . Died 24 May 1950.
6 Sydney Morning Herald, 14 Feb 1938.
', Sydney Morning Herald, 10 Mar 1938 .
48
TO MALAYA
194 0
Brooke-Popham's problems were increased by inter-Service jealousie s
which, in his view, caused lack of cooperation and a tendency by on e
Service to go ahead with its plans, particularly for airfields, with scan t
regard for how they might fit in with defence requirements as a whole .
Moreover, the working relationship between the civil and military authorities left a great deal to be desired in the event of swift and effective
military action being necessary. The system of government of British
Malaya was of a type which tended to develop in Asian and Africa n
areas where a European Power had established a trading post and thenc e
extended its influence by a variety of encroachments and compromises .
In 1941 Malaya comprised (a) the Straits Settlements, a Crown Colon y
including Singapore, Malacca, Penang and some other areas, (b) th e
Federated Malay States, whose sultans still sat on their thrones but whic h
were largely governed by a central administration at Kuala Lumpur, and
(c) six "unfederated" States ruled by sultans, beside each of whom was a
British adviser with an administrative staff which was almost completel y
British at the higher levels .° The most important of these States wa s
Johore, whose capital Johore Bahru lay at the northern end of the
causeway connecting Singapore Island with the mainland . The sultan° of
this State was a shrewd and urbane potentate and in 1941 had been
on the throne since 1895, when he was 21 . The Governor of the Straits
Settlements was also High Commissioner for the federated and unfederated
States and thus the coordinating authority for the whole area . This organisation with its complex of "influences" and pressures, political, administrative, commercial and personal, had for long served its purpose ; but the
closest possible collaboration was necessary to adapt it to the demand s
of war .
In practice it proved difficult, especially because of Malaya ' s importance as a source of strategic raw materials and of economic strength, t o
reconcile the aims of the military authorities, who placed defence requirements first, and of the civil authorities, whose concern continued to be
primarily political and economic . Brooke-Popham considered the view
of the Colonial Office to be that rubber and tin output was of greater
importance than the training of the forces in Malaya ; a belief which he
based largely upon a telegram from London to the Governor, Sir Shento n
Thomas,l asserting that "the ultimate criterion for exemption (from military service) should be not what the General Officer Commanding considers practicable, but what you consider essential to maintain the necessary production and efficient labour management" . 2
6
Five of these States were in Malaya, the sixth was Brunei, 800 miles away in Borneo .
9 H. H . Sir Ibrahim, GCMG, GBE.
i Sir Shenton Thomas, GCMG, OBE . Governor and C-in-C of Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for the Malay States 1934-42 . B . London, 10 Oct 1879 .
9 The Govemor subsequently described Malaya as a "dollar arsenal" and announced that durin g
the eleven months ended July 1941 it had contributed 135,000,000 United States dollars to th e
Bank of England, compared with 98,000,000 in the first year of the war in Europe . "This,"
he said, " . . . represents a principal part of Malaya's contribution to the Empire 's war offensive."
1940
REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE
49
As failure to hold Malaya would involve not only loss of these resources ,
but other and far greater consequences, the need for some over-ridin g
authority for defence purposes was strongly urged, but without avail . The
circumstances tended therefore to a pull devil, pull baker relationshi p
between the civil and military authorities .
Lack of a sense of urgency, arising from factors such as a long perio d
of immunity from war in the area, the enervating climate, and a feelin g
of superiority towards Japan despite the shortcomings of Britain's Fa r
Eastern defences also had a marked effect on the conduct of affairs . Th e
wide gulf between the standard of living of the Europeans and that o f
the mass of the Asian population of Malaya separated them socially a s
well as economically, and in general prevented sympathetic reciproca l
understanding of each other ' s viewpoints . This situation was accepted
fatalistically by the Asians as a whole ; but it produced extremes of hard ships on one hand, and on the other an artificial existence which tended
to restrict the Europeans ' outlook and sense of reality. There were nevertheless many Asians and Europeans to whom this did not apply, an d
among whom mutual understanding was possible .
Malaya lacked a balanced economy, and a large proportion of th e
Asian population's staple diet of rice had to be imported . Rice was " a
constant source of anxiety" in maintaining the six months' supply o f
food which had been laid down as a minimum military requirement . 3
Vast though Malaya' s resources were as applied to the task of feedin g
distant factories, secondary industries that might have been turned t o
local production of munitions were almost wholly lacking . On the whole ,
however, Malaya rated as a prosperous and well-administered territor y
by standards of comparison at the time . British rule was generally accepted ,
and its corollary, military protection, was taken for granted .
Within a few weeks of Brooke-Popham ' s arrival two additional brigades
(the 6th and 8th) arrived from India, and two British battalions (th e
2/East Surrey and 1/Seaforth Highlanders) arrived from Shanghai . Th e
military garrison then included 17 battalions of which six (one a machine gun battalion) were British, ten were Indian, and one was Malay . In
addition the headquarters of the 11th Indian Division (Major-Genera l
Murray-Lyon4 ) had reached Malaya . There was thus infantry enough to
form two divisions ; but the only mobile artillery was one mountain regiment, whereas two divisions should have possessed six artillery regiment s
between them, not counting anti-tank units .
The air force included two squadrons of Blenheim I bombers, tw o
squadrons of obsolescent Vildebeeste torpedo-bombers, one squadron o f
flying-boats (four craft) and the three Australian squadrons (two wit h
Hudsons, the third with Wirraways) . Since September 1939, one R .A .F .
squadron had departed and the three Australian squadrons had arrived .
3 R . Brooke-Popham,
Despatch on Operations in the Far East, from 17 October 1940 to 2 7
December 1941, p . 548.
• Maj-Gen D . M . Murray-Lyon, DSO, MC . GOC 11 Indian Div 1940-42 . Regular soldier ; b .
14 Aug 1890.
50
TO
MALAYA
1940
Only 48 of the 88 first-line aircraft—the Blenheims and Hudsons—coul d
be counted as modern at the time, and the range of the Blenheims wa s
inadequate .
Brooke-Popham 's other territorial responsibilities were strung out alon g
a 2,500-mile line from Colombo to Hong Kong . The doctrine of "Burm a
for the Burmese", demanding removal of British control, had taken a
firm grip in Burma, and there was antipathy by Burmese to Indians ,
principally because of the hold which Indians had obtained on much o f
Burma's best agricultural land . Thus the internal situation, as well as the
weakness of the forces stationed there (a few battalions mostly o f
Burman troops and virtually no air force), complicated the problem o f
Burma's defence . Brooke-Popham formed the opinion that Burma's safet y
depended largely upon holding Malaya, and that defence of Malaya mus t
have priority, in view particularly of the weakness of the available air
forces throughout his command .
Hong Kong, a British colony situated partly on the island of Hon g
Kong and partly on the mainland of China, with a population of som e
1,500,000 people, "was regarded officially as an undesirable military commitment, or else as an outpost to be held as long as possible " . Brooke Popham held that it was very valuable to China as a port of access, an d
that had the Chinese "not been convinced of our determination to stan d
and fight for its defence, and been taken into our confidence and given
opportunities to inspect the defences and discuss plans for defence, th e
effect on their war effort would in all probability have been serious . A
withdrawal of the troops in Hong Kong coinciding with the closing of th e
Burma Road might have had a marked effect on Chinese determination t o
fight on . . . ." He held also that "had we demilitarised Hong Kong, o r
announced our intention of not defending it, the Americans might hav e
adopted a similar policy with regard to the Philippines . In this case, they
might have ceased to take direct interest in the Far East, and confined
themselves to the eastern half of the Pacific ." 5
A rapid increase of population caused by a large and continuin g
influx of Chinese was one of the main local problems affecting the defenc e
of Hong Kong . It placed an abnormal strain on the provisioning an d
other essential services of the crowded little colony, and made adequat e
security measures practically impossible . From his broad strategical viewpoint Mr Churchill considered at this time that there was not the slightes t
chance of holding or relieving the colony in the event of attack by Japan .
Brooke-Popham supported the proposal, already mentioned, that if th e
Japanese entered Thailand the British should occupy the southern par t
of the Kra Isthmus . He urged that efforts should be made to encourag e
the United States to show a firm front to Japan . One sequel to the arrival
in London in December of his first appreciation was the appointment o f
Major-General Dennys6 as military attache at Chungking with the tas k
6
Brooke-Popham, Despatch, p . 541 .
'Mai-Gen L. E . Dennys, MC . Military attach€ Chungking 1941 . Regular soldier ; b . 10 May 1890.
1940-41
CHURCHILL ' S POLICY
51
of organising a British military mission ("204 Mission") should war brea k
out between Britain and Japan . 7
Meanwhile the Chiefs of Staff in London had examined the report o f
the October conference at Singapore, and on 8th January replied tha t
although they considered that the conference's estimate that 582 first-line
aircraft were required was the ideal, nevertheless experience indicate d
that their own estimate of 336 would give a fair degree of security ; an d
in any event no more could be provided before the end of 1941 . The y
would try to form five fighter squadrons for the Far East during the year .
(There were then no modern fighters there .) They accepted the conference's estimate of 26 battalions (including three for Borneo) and indicate d
that this total would be reached by June . Mr Churchill, however, wa s
unwilling to agree to any diversion of forces to the Far East and o n
13th January the Chiefs of Staff received from him a minute in which h e
said that
the political situation in the Far East does not seem to require, and the strengt h
of our Air Force by no means warrants, the maintenance of such large force s
in the Far East at this time .
Five days earlier Mr Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff had decide d
that "in view of the probability of an early German advance into Greec e
through Bulgaria it was of the first importance, from the political poin t
of view, that we should do everything possible, by hook or by crook, t o
send at once to Greece the fullest support within our power " . 8 There wa s
little to offer the Greeks ; and Churchill evidently considered that ther e
was nothing at all for Singapore.
Meanwhile some reinforcement of the garrison of Singapore was du e
soon to arrive from another quarter . At the beginning of December, th e
Australian Government's offer to send a brigade group to Malaya i f
necessary was gratefully accepted by Mr Churchill, who added that th e
Australian force would be relieved in May 1941 by the equivalent o f
a division from India . Churchill said to the Australian Government tha t
he believed the danger of Japan going to war with the British Empir e
was definitely less than it was in June after the collapse of France .
The naval and military successes in the Mediterranean and our growing advantag e
there by land, sea, and air will not be lost upon Japan (he continued) . It is quite
impossible for our Fleet to leave the Mediterranean at the present juncture without
throwing away irretrievably all that has been gained there and all the prospect s
of the future. On the other hand, with every weakening of the Italian naval powe r
the mobility of our Mediterranean Fleet becomes potentially greater, and shoul d
the Italian Fleet be knocked out as a factor, and Italy herself broken as a combatant, as she may be, we could send strong naval forces to Singapore withou t
suffering any serious disadvantage . We must try to bear our Eastern anxietie s
patiently and doggedly until this result is achieved, it always being understood tha t
if Australia is seriously threatened by invasion we should not hesitate to coin * About 40 Australians, then serving in Malaya, were later enlisted in this mission . See Appendix 1
for a brief account of their activities .
', Churchill, The Second World War, Vol III (1950), p . 14 .
52
TO MALAYA
1940-41
promise or sacrifice the Mediterranean position for the sake of our kith and kin. . . .
I am also persuaded that if Japan should enter the war the United States will com e
in on our side, which will put the naval boot very much on the other leg, an d
be a deliverance from many perils .
. With the ever-changing situation it is difficult to commit ourselves to th e
precise number of aircraft which we can make available for Singapore, and w e
certainly could not spare the flying-boats to lie about idle there on the remot e
chance of a Japanese attack when they ought to be playing their part in the deadl y
struggle on the North-western Approaches . Broadly speaking, our policy is to build
up as large as possible a Fleet, Army, and Air Force in the Middle East, an d
keep this in a fluid condition, either to prosecute war in Libya, Greece, o r
presently Thrace, or reinforce Singapore should the Japanese attitude change fo r
the worse . In this way dispersion of forces will be avoided and victory will giv e
its own far-reaching protections in many directions . . . . 9
Arrangements were made in Australia for the 22nd Infantry Brigad e
and attached troops, 5,850 all ranks, to embark for Malaya early i n
February preceded by a small advanced party . The Chief of the General
Staff (General Sturdee) visited Malaya in December on his way back fro m
a visit to the Middle East, and inspected the areas and accommodation
that the A .I .F . was to occupy .
On 27th December a vessel with a Japanese name, and showing a
Japanese flag, shelled and wrecked the phosphate loading plant on Naur u
Island, north-east of the Solomon Islands and just south of the Equator .
The island, a prolific source of phosphates of particular importance t o
Australia, was among the German possessions in the Pacific occupied b y
Australian forces in 1914 . Placed by the Versailles Treaty under mandat e
to Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, it had then been continuously administered by Australia . The raider, after she had signalle d
that she was about to fire, hoisted a German flag . It later transpired tha t
she was the Komet, which with the Orion, another German raider, ha d
sunk near Nauru early in the month five ships engaged in the phosphat e
trade .
As 1941 dawned, America intensified her diplomatic and material assistance to the Allies . "We were convinced," wrote the American Secretar y
of State subsequently, "that an Allied victory was possible, and we were
determined to do everything we could to bring it about, short of actuall y
sending an expeditionary force to Europe or the Orient . We were especially
convinced that an Axis victory would present a mortal danger to the
United States . . . . We were acting no longer under the precepts o f
neutrality, but under those of self-defense . "10
American policy crystallised in a directive from President Roosevel t
in mid-January 1941 . At informal talks in London in August 1940 betwee n
British and American officers, the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff ha d
made it clear that despite the importance of Malaya they were not pre pared to support its defence at the cost of security in the Atlantic an d
9
Quoted in Churchill, Vol II, pp . 628-9 .
10 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol II, p . 919.
Ian-Mar1941
WASHINGTON TALKS
53
the Mediterranean . Roosevelt agreed at the end of November to furthe r
Anglo-American staff talks being held at Washington ; and in preparation
for these, steps were taken to plot a clear course for the United State s
to follow. In the resultant directive, which followed a White Hous e
conference between the President and his Secretaries of State (Mr Cordel l
Hull), War (Mr Henry L. Stimson), Navy (Mr Franklin Knox), Chie f
of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark), and Chief of Staff (Genera l
Marshall) Roosevelt laid it down tha t
The United States would stand on the defensive in the Pacific with the flee t
based on Hawaii ; the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet would have discretionar y
authority as to how long he could remain based in the Philippines and as to hi s
direction of withdrawal—to the East or to Singapore ; there would be no naval
reinforcement of the Philippines ; the Navy should have under consideration th e
possibility of bombing attacks against Japanese cities ; it should be prepared to
convoy shipping in the Atlantic to England, and to maintain a patrol offshore fro m
Maine to the Virginia Capes.
The Army should not be committed to any aggressive action until it was full y
prepared to undertake it ; the United States military course must be very conservative until her strength had developed ; it was assumed that she could provid e
forces sufficiently trained to assist to a moderate degree in backing up friendl y
Latin-American governments against Nazi-inspired "fifth column" movements .
The United States should make every effort to go on supplying material t o
Great Britain, primarily to disappoint what Roosevelt thought would be Her r
Hitler's principal objective in involving the United States in war at this time ;
"and also to buck up England").
For the purpose of the Washington staff talks, which it was emphasise d
must be held in the utmost secrecy, the British delegation wore civilia n
clothes and were known as "technical advisers to the British Purchasin g
Commission" . The talks, which commenced at the end of January and
lasted until late in March, resulted in a plan for the grand strategy o f
Anglo-American cooperation, and embodied the "Beat Hitler first" principle (the principle that, in a war against both Germany and Japan, th e
aim should be to concentrate first against Germany and go on the defensiv e
in the Pacific and Far East) . Provision was made for continuing exchang e
of information and coordination of plans . In sanctioning such measures ,
Roosevelt took a big political risk, fo r
It is an ironic fact that in all probability no great damage would have bee n
done had the details of these plans fallen into the hands of the Germans and th e
Japanese; whereas, had they fallen into the hands of the Congress and the press ,
American preparation for war might have been well nigh wrecked and ruined . . . .2
Canada, Australia 3 and New Zealand were represented at meetings of
the British delegates but not at the joint meetings . 4 Despite the growin g
' The directive is quoted in M . S. Watson,
Chief of Stall : Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp .
124-5 .
2 R . E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, pp . 273-4.
8 The Australian representatives were Rear-Admiral M. W . S . Boucher, Maj-Gen Northcott, an d
Air Vice-Marshal S. J . Goble.
' The Australian Government received telegrams from both the Australian Legation at Washingto n
and the Dominions Office in February 1941 reporting that President Roosevelt had told Lord
Halifax that even if the United States were involved in a war with Japan the Atlantic an d
Britain would be the main theatre and the United States would have to fight a "holding war "
in the Pacific .
54
TO
MALAYA
Ian-Mar
partnership between the United States and Britain, the United States Join t
Planning Committee gave warning in a memorandum preparatory to th e
talks that "it is to be expected that proposals of the British representative s
will have been drawn up with chief regard for the support of the British
Commonwealth . Never absent from British minds are their post-war interests, commercial and military . We should likewise safeguard our
eventual interests . . . ." 5
Britain's critical plight in American eyes at the time was indicated
by an accompanying statement that the conversations should include "the
probable situations that might arise from the loss of the British Isles" ;
and the "Beat Hitler first" policy was maintained in the outcome of th e
talks as basic to the common aim . It was agreed that America ' s paramount
territorial interest was in the western hemisphere, though dispositions mus t
provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations ,
a cardinal policy in this respect being retention of the Far East position
" such as will assure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth " . 5
Should Japan enter the war, military strategy in the Far East woul d
be defensive, it was agreed ; but the American Pacific Fleet would b e
used offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanes e
economic power, by diverting Japanese strength away from the Mala y
Archipelago . It was held that augmentation by the United States of force s
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean would enable Britain to release th e
necessary forces for the Far East . The British delegation proposed that
the United States send four cruisers from its Pacific fleet to Singapore ,
but this proposal was rejected on the grounds that they would not b e
enough to save Singapore ; that the United States might later be compelled either to abandon these vessels to their fate and face Japan with a
weakened Pacific fleet, or reinforce them to the extent of applying th e
navy ' s principal strength in the Far East, with resultant risk to the securit y
of the British Isles .
The agreements reached at the talks were not formally accepted by
either the British or the United States Governments, but planning proceeded along the lines agreed on by the staffs . Whether or not Japa n
became aware of this policy, it certainly suited her designs . Europea n
and American possessions in the area which Japan sought to dominate ,
whose peoples were insufficiently armed and trained by their rulers t o
enable them to defend themselves, were an inducement to aggression ,
especially if, by diversion of America ' s main effort towards Europe, th e
extent of possible intervention in the Pacific by the United States Flee t
would be lessened .
At this stage Germany retained her mastery of Europe, but Italia n
failures were proving an embarrassment to her in Greece and North Africa ,
and Britain was gaining strength . Russia, neutral but wary, was still a
6
Quoted in M . S . Watson, Chief of Staff : Prewar Plans and Preparations, p . 371 .
Watson, p . 376 .
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Malaya
Ian-Feb
ISOLATIONIST SENTIMENT
55
danger to Japan, who therefore maintained large forces along the border s
of Manchuria and Mongolia. Despite the pro-British attitude of American
leaders, isolationist sentiment in the United States was still strong . Perhaps the greatest single deterrent to further Japanese aggression was th e
presence of the American fleet in the Pacific . Was there any way by whic h
Japan might remove this obstacle? "If war eventuates with Japan, it is
believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surpris e
attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbour," wrote Kno x
to Stimson on 24th January 1941 . Knox added : "The inherent possibilities
of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step ,
as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of th e
Army and Navy to withstand a raid . " In this Stimson completely concurred . The United States Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr Grew, cabled t o
Hull on 27th January that there was talk in Tokyo that a surprise mas s
attack on Pearl Harbour was planned by the Japanese military forces in
case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States . This report was
passed on to the War and Navy Departments . The new Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, who called o n
Hull on 12th February, gave an impression of sincerity in seeking to avoid
war between the two countries . He said, however, in the course of inter views during which President Roosevelt and Hull at least did some fran k
talking, that his chief obstacle would be the military group in contro l
in Tokyo .
The Lend-Lease Act, which provided means whereby Britain coul d
obtain the supplies she needed from the United States without paying
cash for them, was to become law on 11th March, providing a furthe r
answer by America to Japan's signature of the Tripartite Pact . Evidenc e
given by Hull in support of Lend-Lease before the House Committee o n
Foreign Affairs in January, in which he hit hard at Japan's propose d
"New Order" in Eastern Asia, stung the fiery Japanese Minister fo r
Foreign Affairs to belligerent reply .
"Japan must demand America 's reconsideration of her attitude, "
declared Matsuoka, "and if she does not listen there is slim hope fo r
friendly relations between Japan and the U .S .A . I will try my hardes t
to make the United States understand, but I declare that this cannot b e
accomplished by courting—the only way is to proceed with unshakeabl e
resolve ." 7
Undaunted by an accompanying assertion by Matsuoka that Japa n
must dominate the Western Pacific, the Dutch rejected any suggestion o f
having the East Indies incorporated in a "New Order", under the leader ship of any Power whatsoever . Japan found opportunity further to assert
her claim to such leadership, however, by acting as mediator betwee n
Thailand and Indo-China, the latter under Vichy (French) governmen t
7 During this sultry period in Pacific affairs there appeared in Australia a Major Sei Hashida ,
of the Japanese Army . The Japanese Consul-General said Hashida had come to investigat e
wool, metal and other industries in relation to Japan's military requirements . Hashida said
he was travelling for health reasons . A request to the Minister for the Army by the ConsulGeneral that Hashida be permitted to inspect Army establishments in Australia was declined .
56
TO MALAYA
Dec 1940-Feb 194 1
but now subject to Japanese domination . Fighting between Thai an d
French forces had flared up at the end of December, in a territoria l
dispute which it was suspected had been promoted by Japan . Terms for
an armistice, presented by a Japanese general, were signed aboard a
Japanese warship at the end of January, and a peace treaty was subsequently concluded in Tokyo . 8
Matsuoka said early in February that the situation between Japa n
and the United States had "never been marked by greater misunderstanding" . The United States, however, gained means of knowing a great dea l
more about what was in the minds of Japanese leaders than the latte r
intended that they should . Although it was a top secret at the time, mean s
of deciphering the secret code used in communications from Japan t o
her representatives in America were discovered by American experts .
By this means, known as "Magic " , many of Japan ' s secrets were bared .
As an instance, Roosevelt was able to know not only what Nomura wa s
saying to Hull, but Matsuoka' s instruction to Nomura of 14th February
—to the effect that United States recognition of Japanese overlordship o f
the Western Pacific was the price sought for avoidance of war . At th e
same time it was learned that Japan contemplated the acquisition o f
military bases in Indo-China and Thailand, and ultimately an attack o n
Singapore ; that her aims included incorporation of south-east Asia an d
the south-west Pacific in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Scheme . 9
In London, in the second week of February, Mr Churchill
.
became conscious of a stir and flutter in the Japanese Embassy and colony .
They were evidently in a high state of excitement, and they chattered to one anothe r
with much indiscretion . In these days we kept our eyes and ears open . Various
reports were laid before me which certainly gave the impression that they ha d
received news from home which required them to pack up without a moment' s
delay . This agitation among people usually so reserved made me feel that a sudde n
act of war upon us by Japan s might be imminent . . . .2
Thereupon Churchill sent Roosevelt a message, dated 15th February, i n
the course of which he said :
Any threat of a major invasion of Australia or New Zealand would of cours e
force us to withdraw our Fleet from the eastern Mediterranean, with disastrou s
military possibilities there . . . . You will therefore see, Mr President, the awfu l
enfeeblement of our war effort that would result merely from the sending out b y
Japan of her battle-cruisers and her twelve 8-inch gun cruisers into the Easter n
oceans, and still more from any serious invasion threat against the two Australia n
[sic] democracies in the South Pacific .3
8 When he was informed of the decision to enforce mediation on Thailand and Indo-China, on
terms which would suit Japan's purpose, the Emperor of Japan remarked "I do not approv e
of anything in the nature of a thief at a fire . However, in dealing with the fast-changing world
of to-day, it would not be gratifying to err on the side of benevolence . " (Entry for 3 Feb
1941 in the diary of Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and one of the mos t
influential of the Emperor's advisers. )
9 The Roosevelt Letters (edit. Elliott Roosevelt), Vol III (1952), p . 355.
' It is now known that in January 1941 Admiral Yamamoto, Commander of the Japanese Fleet ,
ordered his staff and Rear-Admiral Inishi, Chief of Staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study an d
work out details of an attack on Pearl Harbour such as Yamamoto had conceived .
s Churchill, Vol III, p . 157 .
Quoted in Churchill, Vol III, p . 158 .
Feb 1941
ALARM IN AUSTRALIA
57
In Australia, cable messages from Japan were intercepted which
instructed Japanese firms to reduce staffs and send home all who wer e
not required, particularly women, by 1st March . In assessing the action
likely to be taken by Japan in the near future pursuant of her southwar d
expansion policy, the Senior Intelligence Officer at Army Headquarters ,
Colonel Chapman,4 reported that as at 8th February there were indications that the most suitable time for any such action would be in the thre e
or four weeks ending in mid-March . An endeavour to convey a sense o f
urgency to the Australian public was apparent in newspaper report s
of meetings of the Advisory War Council on 5th and 12th February .
Records show that keen concern about the safety of Australia had bee n
expressed by Mr Curtin, to the extent that at the later meeting he suggested a test mobilisation of Australia's forces . Although this proposa l
was not adopted, he also drafted a suggested press statement . This wa s
modified in response to objections that it might create a panic, but th e
statement issued contained a declaration that "it is the considered opinio n
of the War Council that the war has moved to a new stage involvin g
the utmost gravity . . . there should be neither delay nor doubt about th e
clamant need for the greatest effort of preparedness this country ha s
ever made" .
The alarm soon died down ; but it had served to draw more attention
than hitherto to the danger from Japan, as compared with the need s
of the Middle Eastern theatre of war . Mr Curtin, who would becom e
Australia 's Prime Minister later in 1941, had declared publicly on 11t h
February that it was imperative that both the front and back doors o f
Singapore should be safeguarded, and Darwin and Port Moresby shoul d
be made as strong as possible . Islands of the Pacific must not become
the spring-boards for an attack on Australia, and increased naval strengt h
should be afforded to the Australia Station . Mr Menzies, who was in
Cairo on his way to discuss the war situation with Mr Churchill and other s
in England, was asked to press for a frank appreciation by the United
Kingdom authorities as to probable actions by Japan in the immediat e
future which would make war unavoidable, and possible moves she might
make which would be countered by other means . Mr Menzies had passed
through the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, and India on his way fro m
Australia .
At this stage Mr David Ross,° a former air force officer, then Superintendent of Flying Operations of the Australian Department of Civi l
Aviation, was instructed to go to Dili, capital of the Portuguese sectio n
of the island of Timor, ostensibly as the Department's representative there ,
but also to send Intelligence reports, especially about what the Japanes e
'
Col James A. Chapman, OBE, VX59424 . (1st AIF : Maj 30 Bn .) DMI AHQ 1941-42;
Col i/c Admin HQ 7 MD 1942• Comd 12 Inf Bde 1942, Tas Force 1943-44 ; AMLO Middle
East 1944-46. Regular soldier ; of Toorak, Vic ; b. Braidwood, NSW, 7 Aug 1895 .
6 The Advisory War Council, formed in 1940, included senior Ministers and senior members o f
the Opposition parties.
" Gp Capt D . Ross . Superintendent of Flying Operations, Dept of Civil Aviation ; Aust Consul
in Portuguese Timor 1941-42 ; Director of Transportation and Movements RAAF 1943-46 . Public
servant ; of Ivanhoe, Vic ; b. Melbourne, 15 Mar 1902.
58
TO MALAYA
Feb 1941
were doing there, and to tell the Government how Australia's interests i n
the area might be promoted .
Brooke-Popham flew to Australia and attended a meeting of the Australian War Cabinet on 14th February which discussed an appreciatio n
of the position in the Far East by the Australian Chiefs of Staff. This
followed receipt of the views of the United Kingdom advisers on th e
report of the October Singapore conference, and the tactical appreciatio n
at that time by the commanders of the forces at Singapore . The Britis h
advisers held that the views of the Singapore commanders on the genera l
defence position were unduly pessimistic, and that both the threat o f
attack on Burma and the need for additional land forces for defence o f
Burma and eastern India had been over-estimated . Nevertheless, the
weaknesses in British land and air forces in the Far East, particularl y
the air forces, were "fully recognised", and "everything possible wa s
being done to remedy this situation, having regard to the demands o f
theatres which are the scene of war " . Brooke-Popham urged the Wa r
Cabinet to press on in every possible way with local manufacture of
munitions . Reviewing prospects in his command, he said that althoug h
the defences on the mainland part of Hong Kong might be overcom e
shortly after war began, the island could defend itself for at least fou r
months . In Malaya, even if Johore were captured by Japan, and use o f
facilities at the naval base lost, this would not prevent Singapore Islan d
from holding out .
The supreme need at the moment was more munitions and more air craft, Brooke-Popham declared ; but he added that Japanese planes wer e
not highly efficient, and he thought that the air forces in Malaya woul d
cause such loss to the Japanese Air Force as to prevent it from puttin g
the British forces out of action . Japanese fighter aircraft were not as goo d
as Brewster Buffaloes, of which sixty-seven were on the water from the
United States to Singapore . The training of the British and Australian Ai r
Forces was more thorough and sounder than that of the Japanese . He
said he did not look upon the Japanese as being air-minded, particularl y
against determined fighter opposition, and that the Japanese were no t
getting air domination in China despite overwhelming numerical
superiority . He spoke, however, of the necessity for a clear definition o f
actions by Japan which would be regarded as justifying retaliation, an d
said that he hoped the line would be drawn at Japanese penetration o f
southern Thailand . He estimated the minimum naval strength necessar y
at Singapore at a battle squadron of four or five battleships and thre e
or four cruiser squadrons totalling between ten and twelve cruisers, bu t
said that with the British commitments elsewhere it would not be possibl e
to provide this unless America joined in .
Neither the Australian Chiefs of Staff nor the War Cabinet were a s
confident regarding the situation as the United Kingdom authorities o r
Brooke-Popham. The Australian Chiefs of Staff gave warning that th e
current trend of events pointed to Japan having made up her mind to
Feb1941
DIVISION RETAINED
59
secure freedom of action in Indo-China and Thailand for her forces, preparatory to securing control of those two countries . If the penetration
included southern Thailand, they said, it might be regarded as a disclosure of intention to attack Malaya, and Japanese movement in strength
into southern Thailand should be considered a cause of war . Numerou s
reports recently received had given evidence of great activity by th e
Japanese in increasing the defences and facilities of her mandated island s
east of the Philippines, such as would facilitate seizure of further base s
from which she could harry American lines of communication with the
West Indies, and attack sea communications vital to Australia . Japan
could make available forces greatly superior to the British and Dutch naval
forces in the Far East and, in the absence of American intervention, wa s
free to take any major course of action she might determine . She could
provide a preponderance of military forces in any two of the three principa l
areas—Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia—and air force s
greatly superior in numbers to the combined total of British and Dutc h
air forces in the Far East . If Australia deferred reinforcement of her
"outer zone" of defence until hostilities began, she might find that Japa n
had forestalled her ; but arrival of Australian troops at other than Britis h
territories, while she was at peace with Japan, might serve as a pretext
for war.
The Australian Chiefs of Staff were anxious to establish air forces i n
the islands as far north as possible . The Chief of the Air Staff, however ,
was not willing to station air forces in the islands unless there were army
garrisons to protect the airfields . With reluctance, General Sturdee agree d
to send a battalion group to Rabaul for this purpose, and to hold two
other such groups ready to go to Timor and Ambon when war becam e
an immediate threat . The Chiefs of Staff recommended that these move s
and preparations be made, but advised that the concurrence of th e
Dutch authorities be sought for the stationing of Australian forces i n
the Netherlands East Indies, particularly Timor ; and that the 8th Division ,
instead of joining the Australian Corps in the Middle East as had bee n
intended, be retained for use in the Australian area and East Asia .
The War Cabinet approved these recommendations ; and decided to rais e
two reserve motor transport companies and one motor ambulance uni t
for service in Malaya, to overcome a shortage of drivers there which
Brooke-Popham had mentioned . Soon after, the Cabinet decided, "i n
principle", to move one A .I .F. Pioneer battalion and one A .I .F. infantry
brigade group less one battalion, to the Darwin-Alice Springs area . These,
with units already at Darwin, could provide one battalion for Timor an d
one brigade group for the Darwin area, as well as coast and anti-aircraf t
units . It authorised the distribution of one militia battalion between Por t
Moresby and Thursday Island ; and the sending of one A .I .F. battalion
to Rabaul . Thus there would be three A .I .F . divisions in the Middl e
East, a brigade at Singapore, another at Darwin, and another in trainin g
in Australia, where also a proportion of the militia was always in training .
60
TO
MALAYA
Jan-Fe b
The original plan to send a brigade group to Malaya, where it would b e
directly under Malaya Command, had given way to a decision to send
also part of the divisional headquarters, on the ground that the staff of
a brigade was insufficient to handle an Australian force in an oversea s
country . Major Kappe7 left Australia on 31st January with a small advanced party, and General Bennett on 4th February, by air, to set up
the headquarters in Malaya . On 2nd February the 22nd Brigade an d
attached units boarded the 81,000-ton Queen Mary, formerly famous as
Britain' s largest liner . The vessel (whose designation was the n
"H .T .Q .X .") rode in Sydney Harbour, off Bradley's Head, site of Tarong a
Park Zoo . Although efforts had been made to keep the destination of th e
troops, known as "Elbow Force", as secret as possible, the embarkatio n
became a great public occasion . Crates marked "Elbow Force, Singapore" ,
which had been waiting to be loaded on the ship, were among the factors
which robbed security precautions of much of their effect . Relatives and
friends of the men, and sightseers from city and country, crowded rowin g
boats, yachts, launches, and ferries, and massed at vantage points aroun d
the harbour when, on 4th February, the Queen Mary, accompanied b y
the 45,000-ton Aquitania and the Dutch liner Nieuw Amsterdam (36,000
tons) carrying troops to the Middle East, put out to sea escorted by th e
Australian cruiser Hobart. 8
The convoy as a whole lifted approximately 12,000 members of th e
A.I .F. Their cheers mingled with those of many thousands of spectators
ashore and afloat, the toots of ferries and tugboats, the screams of sirens ,
and the big bass of the Queen Mary's foghorn as the convoy steame d
down the harbour and through the Heads . Despite the brave showin g
of the farewell, it impressed on many more deeply than before the extent
to which Australia was committed to a war on the other side of th e
world while it showed signs of spreading to the Pacific, and possibly t o
her own soil .
Colonel Jeater was addressing his men at sea next day on subjects whic h
included the necessity for security measures, when the Queen Mary picke d
up a radio message that when the convoy had been at sea only twelv e
hours an enemy raider was within 39 miles of the ships . 9 The voyage
was otherwise uneventful until the Mauretania, carrying reinforcement s
to the Middle East, joined the convoy early on 8th February . At Fremantle, which the convoy reached on the 10th, small vessels circled th e
ships and collected parcels and letters from the men . These local craft
Brig C. H . Kappe, OBE, VX48789. GSO2 (Ops) 8 Div ; CO 8 Div Sigs. Regular soldier ; of
Ballarat, Vic ; b . Ballarat, 2 Dec 1900.
8 With the 22 Bde HQ and the 2/18, 2/19 and 2/20 Bns, the Queen Mary carried the 2/10 Fd
Regt ; a battery of the 2/4 A-Tk Regt; 2/10 Fd Coy ; 8 Div Sigs ; 10 AGH, 2/4 CCS, 2/9 F d
Amb ; 2/2 MAC, 2/5 Fd Hyg Sec; 2 Mobile Bacteriological Laboratory ; 17 Dental Unit ; 4 Supply
Pers Sec; Res Motor Tpt Coy ; a field bakery ; 2/4 Fd Workshop ; 2/2 Ord Store ; 8 Div Cash
Office, 8 Div Provost Coy, 8 Div Postal Unit, and other headquarters details . The tota l
was some 5,750 troops . Brigadier Taylor left Sydney the same day by flying-boat for Malaya .
T
e 2/18th Battalion war diary . In fact there was no enemy raider within thousands of miles o f
the Queen Mary at that time . The message probably originated as security propaganda .
Feb1941
ARRIVAL AT SINGAPORE
61
were searched when they returned to shore, and 6,000 pieces intende d
for mailing, which might have spread details of the force far and wide,
were confiscated . 1 °
The convoy weighed anchor again on 12th February, and next day
Major Whitfield, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the 8th Division ,
cleared air thick with rumours about the destination of the force whe n
he told the men that they were going to Malaya, and described thei r
probable role . On the 16th the British cruiser Durban came into sight, an d
swung into line abreast of the Australian cruiser Canberra, which ha d
taken over escort duty from the Hobart at Fremantle . The scene which
followed stirred the emotions of the entire convoy, as the Queen Mary
swung to port, circled behind the other ships, and then when they wer e
again in formation, charged past them at twenty-six knots . Wholehearte d
cheers burst from the men thronging the decks of the vessels, and fro m
the nurses who accompanied them . New Zealanders cheered Australians ;
Australians cheered New Zealanders, with equal vim . Bands rolled great
chords of music across the waters ; then the convoy headed by the Canberra
set course towards the sinking sun, and the Queen Mary and the Durban
headed for the tropics and a land where never yet an Australian contingent of soldiers had set foot . The splitting of the convoy was eloquent
of Australia's now divided responsibilities—for assistance to the Imperia l
cause in the European war, and for helping to man barriers agains t
onslaught by Japan .
A broadcast by Moscow Radio on 11th February to the effect that th e
Queen Mary had arrived in Singapore laden with Australian troops wa s
recorded in Australia . The time of the broadcast was approximately nine teen hours after the vessel could reasonably have got there had she not ,
as happened, altered course shortly after leaving Sydney, and travelled
via Fremantle instead of around the north of Australia . Whether or no t
this change of course misled enemy raiders, the Queen Mary, after several
nights of stifling heat for the troops pent up under blackout conditions ,
arrived safely at Singapore on 18th February, and poured them into thei r
new and strange environment .
Security officers soaked in water the letters confiscated at Fremantle, and dropped them over 10board
when the Queen Mary was a day and half from Singapore ; yet some of the letter s
were recovered and came soon after into possession of Malaya Command .