Turkey and Saudi Arabia: A Comparative Arab Spring
Jennings R Brieck
POLS 596 – Arab Spring Year 3
Dr. Willoughby
11/13/2013
Brieck 2
Introduction:
Two of the most powerful states in the Middle East, one directly and the other indirectly,
have managed to bypass the Arab Spring and keep revolution out of their country. Though not
entirely immune to the violence or the impact of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have
managed to keep unrest to a minimum. These two countries at a glance are seemingly different.
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy with a devout Islamic leadership and Turkey perpetuates
its secular Kemalist tradition as a democracy with an Islamic backing. Islam is an obvious factor
these countries share and is what ties them to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a
whole. Saudi Arabia has had a more substantial connection with the Arab world over the last half
of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st. Saudi Arabia has a population of 25.7 million
people with a majority Sunni population constituting between 85-95%.1 The Saudi leadership
coming from the Al Saud family has successfully ruled over this time frame. As a regional power
and possessor of the largest oil reserves in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has enjoyed an average
of 6.2%growth from 2008-2012.2 This growth has translated into continued subsidization of
education, housing, water, and a long list of other patronage programs. This patronage has led to
a literacy rate, an average of males and females, of roughly 78%3 and a well-educated population
of youth. This is all funded by a GDP of about $622 billion. On the same note Turkey has
enjoyed moderate growth and GDP has tripled since 2002.4 Turkey is currently growing at a five
year average of 3.5% and produces $1.1 trillion in GDP.5 These two countries have also been
allies of the United States for the better part of the last century. Turkey joined NATO in the early
1
Christopher Blanchard. “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”. Congressional Research Service.
November 27 (2012): 2.
2
Moin Siddiqi. “Saudi Arabia: Looking at the Long Game”. The Middle East. October (2013): 33.
3
Blanchard, 2.
4
Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/turkey.
5
Heritage, heritage.org
Brieck 3
1950’s as a strategic pillar to communist containment and Saudi Arabia since the 1940’s has had
a strong security commitment with the United States in shared antipathy for communism.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as shown above, have developed a regional dominance. Saudi
Arabia has a regional dominance in the Arab world and Turkey, as will be discussed below, is
developing a Middle East pivot. The following analysis will take a comparative approach to
these countries across four themes. The culmination of this paper will take the evidence from the
themes and put them into the context of the Arab spring and whether these countries, across the
themes, were affected or not by the Arab Spring and why. Taking this comparative approach will
allow for analysis of how different factors impact revolution in these countries and will allow for
predictions to be made on the future of these countries in regards to the spread of revolution
throughout the Arab world.
U.S. Relations:
The first theme of analysis will look at the relationship between the United States and
Saudi Arabia, and the United States and Turkey. As mentioned earlier the United States and
Saudi Arabia have been engaged in a mutual security commitment since the 1940’s. This
relationship developed upon mutual economic interests and opposition to communism. The
shared economic interests stem from the fact that hydrocarbons are the mainstay of energy
consumption and Saudi Arabia holds 19% of the world’s reserves.6 The trade of oil is the driving
force of U.S.-Saudi relations and the anchor is security cooperation. In 2011 exports to the
United States ran roughly $47.5 billion, mainly oil, and imports from the U.S. were $13.8 billion,
mainly arms and defense equipment.7 This is the largest trading relationship the U.S. has in the
Middle East, by comparison the second largest Middle East partner is Israel who exports $23
6
Hiba Khodr and Ruble. “Energy Policies and Domestic Politics in the MENA Region in the Aftermath of the Arab
Upheavals: The Cases of Lebanon, Libya, and KSA”. Politics and Policy. Volume 41, 5 (2013): 669.
7
Blanchard, 1.
Brieck 4
billion and imports $11 billion.8 Developing this relationship is important as it provides the U.S.
with a powerful Middle Eastern ally and gives Saudi Arabia the defense commitment that comes
with such a partnership. As a majority Sunni nation its Middle East rival Iran competes for
regional hegemony. Relying on this heavy trade in oil and import of defense equipment which
averages around 10% of oil revenues, or $10 billion,9 allows Saudi Arabia to remain a strong
power and continue to counter regional competitors.
This relationship has been challenged in recent years, however. With the spread of
revolution in the region and instability following the decade long war in Iraq, Saudi Arabia has
found itself in a few standoffs with the U.S. The main rifts come from the U.S. attempted
negotiations with newly elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and U.S. inaction in Syria.
With destabilization in Iraq, Iran has been able to gain headway in competition for regional
dominance which threatens Saudi Arabia. As civil war rages throughout Syria, regional stability
is threatened on a second level. As the U.S. is a major ally, and world hegemon, Saudi Arabia
looks to the U.S. to fulfill security commitments in the Middle East. These included action in
Syria and continued pressure on Iran to stop alleged development of nuclear weapons. As these
two things have not happened, Secretary of State John Kerry has been on a Middle East tour
attempting to mend the rift that was created.10 Though clearly disgruntled with lack of U.S.
action on terms favorable to the Saudis, the Saudis do not want to lose the U.S. as an ally. The
strategic alliance is too deep and as the United States inches closer to energy independence, the
Saudis cannot afford to lose this relationship; “[w]e don’t want the West to go and find
alternatives…”11
8
Blanchard, 1.
Siddiqi, 48.
10
Ellen Knickmeyer. “U.S. Tries to Repair Rift with Saudis”. Wall Street Journal. November 5 (2013).
11
Toby Craig Jones. “Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring”. Raritan. Volume 31, 2 (2011): 46-7.
9
Brieck 5
Just as with Saudi Arabia, Turkey has very good relations with the West and more
specifically the United States. As a member of NATO Turkey was a key component of the
United States containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Though the relations with
Turkey are stable and for the most part good, this has not always been the case. Tensions first
began with the U.S. in the 1960’s in regards to Turkish relations with Cyprus. Then an arms
embargo in the 1970’s was placed on Turkey after the invasion of Greece.12 More recently
Turkey was against U.S. action in Iraq and the subsequent destabilization has caused trouble for
Turkey. Also, the declining relations with Israel have thrown a wrench in the machinery of U.S.Turkey relations. Despite these foul developments the ties between these two nations remain
strong.
Turkey has been viewed as the bridge between East and West.13 This bridge has served a
strategic function for the U.S. providing access to its allies in the Middle East and Turkey has
been viewed as the example for those countries in the Middle East which aspire to become
Islamic democracies.14 Turkey still remains an important security component for NATO as well.
Turkey has agreed to base an anti-missile system radar on its territory, which Turkey was
hesitant for fear of antagonizing Iran; but Iran’s, seeming, complicity over Syria’s violent
crackdown has changed Ankara’s position.15 This change of heart is important for its relationship
with the West because Turkey continues to be an important piece of the security puzzle for the
West. Looking at Saudi Arabia and Turkey it is obvious the relationships they have with the U.S.
are very similar. They both have major security commitments with the U.S. and will continue to
12
Stephen J. Hadley and Madeline Albright. “U.S. Turkey Relations: A New Partnership”. Council on Foreign
Relations. (2012). 7.
13
Nicole Johnson. “Turkish Reactions to the Arab Spring: Implications for United States Foreign Policy”. Global
Security Studies. Volume 3, 4 (2012): 2.
14
Johnson, 2.
15
Hadley, 3.
Brieck 6
be strategically important. How this relationship affects the impact of the Arab Spring will be
looked at later in this paper.
Repression:
Continuing the analysis onto the second level Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been
strategic in their repressive regimes. Saudi Arabia has built its state on the repression of its
people and consolidation of power within the ruling family. This has been done through a harsh
hand and punishment, but more worthwhile has been the patronage system that is used to
assimilate potential dissidents. Most recently this has been seen as Saudi Arabia has been mildly
responsive to economic demands in order to tamp out potential protests.16 Beyond the system of
patronage, which will be discussed below, gender persecution and a violent cohort of security
forces keep the Saudi people in check. One systemic form of oppression is the gender
guardianship system. This system requires women to obtain a male relatives permission, if not
married, to participate in any public affairs.17 Drawing from a similar vein is the oppression of
the clergy by the Saudi leadership.
As an Islamic nation it would seem that the Saudi leadership would be at the mercy of the
clergy, but it is certainly the other way around. The clergy throughout the 1980’s and 90’s were
revolutionary and attempted to wrestle power away from the central leadership.18 This contest
between the clergy and central authority was reined in by King Abdullah in 2005. King Abdullah
as soon as he took the throne began an oppressive program to wrestle power back from the
clergy. The King fired prominent members of the clergy, overruled judgments, issued fatwas
without the consent of the clergy, and set in motion a judicial reform program to undermine the
16
Blanchard, 8.
Blanchard, 11.
18
Jones, 51-52.
17
Brieck 7
consolidation of power that the clergy had made in the judiciary.19 On top of this reaction against
the clergy, the King reinstated a ban on criticism of the crown and religious figures20 (though
this second part was to gain favor with the clergy which will be discussed in the context of the
Arab spring). The clergy also became a part of the patronage system that has been the “soft
power” of the Saudi oppression regime.
The Saudi kingdom is an extremely violent and oppressive regime. It violently puts down
revolution utilizing its security forces, transfers violence to help others put down revolutions (as
it did with Bahrain and its revolution), but the system of patronage set up by the Saudis is just as
effective. The Saudi patronage system is at the heart of the political and social contract of Saudi
Arabia.21 The Saudis use their oil wealth to gain favor with those they oppress. In 2011 the
clergy received part of a $120 billion patronage package to help put down revolution.22 In the
wake of the Arab Spring as it reached Saudi Arabia the leadership threw money into a small
economic package to answer the demands of the people. This tactical use of money here and
there to keep the masses at bay is a more intricate system of economic manipulation and
oppression to consolidate power, and it works.
Turkey has not been as kind as to offer extensive patronage packages in its repression.
Since Kemal Ataturk had established Turkey as an independent state out of the ruins of the
Ottoman Empire, Turkey has been through decades of repression in attempts to hold onto their
secular Kemalist ideology. This forceful implementation of political philosophy has led to
successive military coups and repressive military regimes resulting in the ousting, arresting, and
19
Jones, 54.
Jones, 54.
21
Jones, 45.
22
Jones, 54.
20
Brieck 8
killing of political radicals, especially from Democratic and Islamists parties.23 This succession
of violence and military oppression has allowed for democracy (as they see it) and development
to flourish at the expense of political pluralism and participation. In recent years, however, the
type of repression has changed. With the re-election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
over the 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections, Prime Minister Erdogan has been enforcing a new kind
of oppression. The AKP is an offshoot of the Islamist Virtue Party which was banned by
constitutional authorities after a military coup in the 1980’s.24 Now that the government has an
Islamist tint to it, though still extremely secular, a new regime of repression has been installed to
hold onto power.
The military has been instrumental throughout the history of Turkey in keeping those out
of power it deems revolutionary or Islamic. So in order for an Islamic offshoot party to stay in
power, it must control the influence of the military. Erdogan has a campaign of repression
resembling that which the military had before the ascension of the AKP. Since 2007 Erdogan has
arrested “…more than seven hundred people …, including generals, admirals, members of
parliament, newspaper editors and other journalists, owners of television networks, directors of
charitable organizations, and university officials. Some fifteen per cent of the active admirals and
generals in the Turkish armed forces are now on trial for conspiring to overthrow the
government”.25 This conspiracy against the military establishment has deep roots in Turkey. As
it has been the main instrument of repression in Turkey, Erdogan’s paranoia is not farfetched.
The idea that a “deep state” exists within Turkey employing the press to exaggerate leftist threats
23
Henri J. Barkey and Omer Taspinar. “Republic of Turkey,” in The Government and Politics of the Middle East
and North Africa, ed. Mark Gasiorowski. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2014): 21-25.
24
Barkey, 24-26.
25
Dexter Filkins. "The Deep State." New Yorker. Volume 88, 4 (March 12, 2012.)
Brieck 9
and utilizing the military as the steward of the secular Kemalist tradition is undeniable. 26 This
notion of an underground secret state that has ruled Turkey from behind the scenes keeps the
government paranoid and the ascension of opposition at bay. As with Saudi Arabia, the
government keeps a tight grip on power and destroys any opposition to its power.
Economy:
When looking at the Saudi system of patronage it is obviously a big part of their
economy. Economic productivity and how the state makes money is an important feature to
analyze. This will be the next theme for comparison between these two states. It has been
mentioned that the Saudi economy is highly dependent on oil. Without it the Saudi kingdom
would neither have as much power as it has nor would it have the security alliance with the
United States. Over the past few years Saudi Arabia has seen very good economic growth. As
mentioned earlier between 2008 and 2012 it saw an average of 6.2% growth. With a GDP of
$622 billion, 45% of this is derived from oil;27 Saudi Arabia has been called one of the best
performing of the G-20 nations.28 Regardless of these performance indicators Saudi Arabia faces
many problems.
First, is the horrible job market for its increasing population of educated youth. Saudi
Arabian patronage is responsible for free education. This creates a large population of welleducated youth, but they face dismal job prospects. The yearly increase of workers in the job
market is roughly 4.5%, or 150,000.29 Another major sector of the patronage network is the
importation of low-wage foreign labor. This causes problems within the labor market with
26
Filkins, “Deep State.”
Khodr and Ruble, 669.
28
Siddiqi, 33.
29
Siddiqi, 34.
27
Brieck 10
competition for jobs between the youth and imported foreign labor. To counter this, the Saudi
leadership has started a nationwide campaign against foreign labor as part of a reform package to
increase job opportunities.30 This jobs creation package also includes the development of
industrial cities in non-oil producing sectors of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian General
Investment Authority has predicted 1.5 million jobs to be created after these five industrial cities
are developed.31 These “band-aids” may not work, however. A long term strategic economic
reform package is needed as Saudi Arabia has the highest per capita energy consumption, a lack
of affordable housing, and all this coupled with high unemployment among the educated youth
causes major economic problems.
The Turkish economy on the other hand does not have a large network of patronage
networks to manipulate the economy and keep the civilian population content. Turkey has been a
democracy since its founding in the 1920’s. The expansion of the Turkish economy has been
through its extensive connections with the West. Turkey being part of the NATO alliance has
allowed for extensive military aid and arms trades. As mentioned above Turkey is seen as a
bridge between East and West. This precarious position makes it necessary for the West to
ensure economic stability in Turkey. The State played a direct role in development over the 20th
century but privatization has led to expanded economic production and development. Turkey’s
economy is run by its industry and service sectors, but its traditional agricultural sector still
accounts for 25% of its economic output.32 As mentioned above Turkey’s GDP is roughly $1.1
trillion and has an average growth rate of 3.2%. One of the major differences between the
economic productivity between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is the energy sector.
30
Ellen Knickmeyer. Clashes Erupt in Saudi Crackdown on Foreign Workers”. Wall Street Journal. November 11
(2013).
31
Siddiqi, 34.
32
CIA, ciaworldfactbook.com.
Brieck 11
Where Saudi Arabia is highly dependent on oil production, Turkey imports roughly 97%
of its energy (oil and gas).33 This dependence on foreign sources of energy creates a problem for
a country with Middle East ambitions and western ties. Turkey’s economy is doing fairly well
amidst the recent global financial crisis; but the reliance on such a large amount of foreign
sources of energy leaves Turkey vulnerable to price fluctuation and conflict. In 2006 Turkey
opened a pipeline from Central Asia. This can be problematic as Central Asia will become a
major energy hub and center for competition between India and China as it holds some of the
largest untapped oil and gas reserves in the world.34 Here there is a divergence in sources of
economic production between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but both countries have problematic
economic situations in that Saudi Arabia is having trouble supporting its extensive patronage
networks and Turkey relies on energy sources from potentially unreliable foreign sources.
Water Security:
The last theme that will be looked at here is water security. As Saudi Arabia is an
extremely dry country and Turkey receives much of its water from the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers running through the eastern Mediterranean, water security is extremely important for these
two countries. Saudi Arabia subsidizes the distribution of water throughout the state. As part of
its large patronage system, water is explicitly linked to how the population reacts to government
policies. As long as leadership can secure water and keep prices down then it can keep protests
from rising. This is evident in that all of Saudi Arabia’s development plans make special
emphasis on water management and development.35 Saudi Arabia has no perennial rivers and
33
CIA.
Neil Padukone. “India and Pakistan’s Afghan End Games.” World Affairs 175 (2012): 80-82.
35
Masudul Choudhury. “Oil and Water Do Mix: The Case of Saudi Arabia”. The Journal of Developing Areas.
Volume 37, 2. (2004): 170.
34
Brieck 12
only receives 100 millimeters of rain a year.36 The lack of renewable/reliable water sources
makes it difficult to provide water and necessary for the Saudi government to subsidize water as
it would be very expensive for the citizens otherwise.
The citizens only pay 1% of what the Saudi government pays for water. The sources of
this water are 1) ground water from deep fossil aquifers, 2) desalinated water, 3) surface waters,
and 4) reclaimed water.37 The number one source comes from ground water, however heavy
agricultural use has depleted significantly this available source of water. 85% of water usage
goes for agriculture; this caused the Saudi government to reverse its wheat subsidy and made
2015 the last year for domestically produced wheat.38 The scarcity of water and growing
population, especially with the importation of foreign labor, makes it extremely important for the
Saudi government to create new sources of water. Here the Saudis have implemented a $132
million water and sanitation project to reclaim water in order “…to provide all the necessary
services to every citizen”.39
The problems for Turkey and its water security are not far off from that of Saudi Arabia.
Turkey relies heavily on water from the Tigris and Euphrates river basin. Two other countries
also rely heavily on these water sources, Syria and Iraq. Understanding the current situation of
these two countries, Syria and Iraq, makes it obvious how water insecurity has become an even
greater issue for Turkey. This is not a recent development however. Looking back into the
1960’s tension between these three countries over water resources began. Each country during
the 1960’s began unilateral implementation of water development projects that changed the
36
Elly Jupp. “Water Security in Saudi Arabia”. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. June (2013).
http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2013-1e35/june-2013-e750/water-security39bc
37
Jupp, iiss.org.
38
Jupp, iiss.org.
39
Deema Almashabi. “Saudi Arabia Approves $132 Million of Water, Sewage Works”. Bloomberg. October 9
(2013). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-09/saudi-arabia-approves-132-million-of-water-sewageworks.html
Brieck 13
natural patterns of water distribution and drained water resources.40 This tension over water
resources continued over the next few decades. Attempts were made to curb tension, but focus
on water flow and control over that flow resulted in zero-sum negotiations over resources.41
At the turn of the millennium, and a new focus for foreign policy with the election of the
AKP government, relations with Syria improved. A new focus for foreign policy with a new
government purposed towards improving relations with the Middle East allowed for more
credible engagement on water issues. Unfortunately regime change in Iraq led by the United
States created greater uncertainty regarding Iraq and its needs for water. In 2008, however, Highlevel Strategic Cooperation Councils were created between Turkey and Iraq, and Turkey and
Syria.42 These councils focused on all matters of development, including much needed water.
From this Memorandums of Understanding were signed directly relating to water, one with Iraq
and four with Syria.43 Syria and Turkey also signed a deal to share the cost of a dam that would
provide energy to both sides in 2011 right before civil war broke out in Syria.44 Civil war in
Syria and continued instability in Iraq make the agreements made on sharing water resources
unreliable. 33% of the water basin from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers drains into Turkey,45 and
negotiations recently have focused on this fact but there is no guarantee that Turkey will be able
to claim those resources. Regional instability with the spread of revolution and civil war in both
Syria and Iraq makes Turkey water insecure.
40
Aysegul Kibaroglu and Waltina Scheumann. “Evolution of Transboundary Politics in the Euphrates-Tigris River
System: New Perspectives and Political Challenges.” Global Governance, 19 (2013): 279.
41
Kibaroglu, 290.
42
Kibaroglu, 290.
43
Kibaroglu, 291.
44
Kibaroglu, 292.
45
Kibaroglu, 282.
Brieck 14
In the Context of the Arab Spring:
The final section here will take the above evidence and put it in context of the Arab
Spring. Revolution did not reach any of these countries, despite some of the evidence that might
suggest it should have, or perhaps it will in the future. First, U.S. relations and connections with
the West make it necessary for the West to commit to protecting the status quo. In Saudi Arabia
the large exchange of arms and oil make it extremely important for the United States to keep the
Saudi leadership in power. A disruption of trade could result in drastic economic turmoil and a
decrease in energy supplies. Thus, the large amounts of arms that flow into Saudi Arabia are
used to arm security forces and build up its counterrevolutionary forces.46 The military and
security forces as counterrevolutionary forces have been supported by the U.S. Saudi Arabia
exported them to Bahrain and violently put down revolution there without the U.S. batting an
eye. Within Saudi Arabia, security forces clamped down on protests popping up in the wake of
the Arab Spring. In Turkey, the U.S. connection serves a similar purpose. Major military
investment in Turkey has allowed for a formidable military. However, as mentioned above the
current leadership has effectively leashed the military to implement its own brand of power. But
the United States is still committed to the established status quo. Thus the repression instituted
by the Erdogan government is not questioned and support for the country, by the U.S., remains
strong.
The repressive regimes in both countries provide insight into why revolution did not
spread into Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The Erdogan government has been strategic in utilizing the
fear of the “deep state” to smoke out political dissidents and rein in the power of the military.
Erdogan’s success in weeding out dissent has made it difficult to incite revolution. In Saudi
Arabia the government’s security forces, as mentioned, have been successful in keeping
46
Jones, 49.
Brieck 15
revolution out of the country, but it goes deeper than that. The “soft power” patronage system
has kept the population complacent and has reinstated the clergy as a major driver of repression.
Recalling from above the fact that King Abdullah had provided $120 billion in reforms to curb
the spread of revolution, the clergy were a major recipient of that. After somewhat successfully
wrestling power away from them, King Abdullah bribed them to provide assistance to the
government by declaring that political dissent was un-Islamic.47 The government also utilizes
diversion tactics to oppress the Shiite minority to divert attention away from government
activities. Shiites are forbidden from practicing, building mosques, openly declaring their faith,
and the government consistently stokes sectarian violence against them.48 These tactics have
been successful in curbing the spread of revolution throughout Saudi Arabia.
Revolution has been successfully curbed for now, but some indications are there that it
may happen. In Turkey the economy is doing fairly well. Unemployment is rather high, but it is
on par with the global average and slightly above that of the U.S. at 9.8%.49 The problem here is
the heavy reliance on foreign sources of energy and water insecurity. The reliance on such a high
percentage of foreign energy sources sets an economy up for an unstable ride. Turkey has been
effective in building relationships throughout the Middle East, but the Arab Spring has produced
a lot of instability and Central Asia is not going to be any better. Next, water security will be a
driving factor of unrest in Turkey. The civil war raging in Syria and continued violence in Iraq
make any development in water negotiations unreliable. Hostility over water has persisted since
the 1960’s. Even though relations have improved over the past decade, the Arab Spring and the
U.S invasion of Iraq have made the Tigris and Euphrates an unstable source of water. It will be
47
Jones, 54.
Jones, 55-56.
49
CIA.
48
Brieck 16
important for Turkey to shore up more reliable sources of energy and secure water resources
before the impact of the Arab Spring on these sectors creates opportunities for revolution.
Similar issues rest on the Saudi’s shoulders, only the weight is much greater. Saudi
Arabia’s economy relies mainly on oil exports, and most of those exports go to the United States.
As the United States becomes more energy independent those oil exports will decline and cut
into oil revenues. This is a major problem as oil revenues are what sustain the intricate system of
patronage that keeps the Saudi economy going. As unemployment rises for educated youth, and
housing becomes more and more scarce; how will Saudi Arabia pay for these things? Demands
for economic reform are common place and the leadership does what it can to respond just
enough to keep them quiet, but what will they do when oil revenues no longer support their
patronage? Next is water security. There are no consistent sources of water on which to rely in
Saudi Arabia. Because of this, again, the Saudi government pays 99% of the cost. With no
reliable jobs for domestic labor, if the Saudi government decides to increase the price of water to
cut costs as potential oil revenues drop, how will the people pay for this? There are more
implications for revolution in Saudi Arabia than the forces to counter it. It is a little surprising
that the government has been able to curb revolution this far, but the grip the government has on
society is fairly strong. Despite its grasp on society, as the economic patronage system breaks
down from too much stress and water becomes a serious problem (more so than it is now) it will
be difficult for violence to suppress revolution.
This essay has analyzed why revolution had not spread through Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Both countries have very similar systems for countering revolution, and similar problems from
which revolution can be sparked. The biggest support system for the status quo is the connection
each share with the West. The United States is a valuable source of legitimacy for these
Brieck 17
governments and if they gain the support to remain in power, it will be done. What will be
interesting is when the forces that drive revolution, not all of which were looked at here nor were
these the most important or influential, overwhelm the status quo. How will these governments
respond? If Syria is any indication, a powerful military will have no trouble committing
unspeakable violence onto its people. With the history of Saudi Arabia this is a definite
possibility, but with Turkey it looks as though the connection with the West and its desire for
continued economic cooperation would make it a little more responsive to demands. Time will
tell if Turkey actually runs into these problems or if the government can spot problems on the
horizon before they strike.
Brieck 18
Bibliography
Almashabi, Deema. “Saudi Arabia Approves $132 Million of Water, Sewage Works”.
Bloomberg. October 9 (2013). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-09/saudiarabia-approves-132-million-of-water-sewage-works.html.
Barkey, Henri J. and Omer Taspinar. “Republic of Turkey,” in The Government and Politics of
the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Mark Gasiorowski. (Boulder: Westview Press,
2014): 19-49.
Blanchard, Christopher. “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”. Congressional
Research Service. (November 27, 2012): 1-15.
CIA, ciaworldfactbook.com.
Choudhury, Masudul. “Oil and Water Do Mix: The Case of Saudi Arabia”. The Journal of
Developing Areas. Volume 37, 2 (2004): 169-179.
Filkins, Dexter. "The Deep State," New Yorker. Volume 88, 4 (March 12, 2012.): 38-49.
Hadley, Stephen J. and Madeline Albright. “U.S. Turkey Relations: A New Partnership”.
Council on Foreign Relations. (2012): 1-83.
Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/turkey.
Johnson, Nicole. “Turkish Reactions to the Arab Spring: Implications for United States Foreign
Policy”. Global Security Studies. Volume 3, 4 (2012): 1-10.
Jones, Toby Craig. “Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring”. Raritan. Volume 31, 2 (2011): 43-59.
Jupp, Elly. “Water Security in Saudi Arabia”. The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
(June 2013).
http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2013-1e35/june-2013e750/water-security-39bc
Khodr, Hiba and Ruble. “Energy Policies and Domestic Politics in the MENA Region in the
Aftermath of the Arab Upheavals: The Cases of Lebanon, Libya, and KSA”. Politics and
Policy. Volume 41, 5 (2013): 656-689.
Kibaroglu, Aysegul and Waltina Scheumann. “Evolution of Transboundary Politics in the
Euphrates-Tigris River System: New Perspectives and Political Challenges.” Global
Governance, 19 (2013): 279-305.
Knickmeyer, Ellen. Clashes Erupt in Saudi Crackdown on Foreign Workers”. Wall Street
Journal. (November 11 2013).
Brieck 19
Knickmeyer, Ellen. “U.S. Tries to Repair Rift with Saudis”. Wall Street Journal. (November 5
2013).
Padukone, Neil. “India and Pakistan’s Afghan End Games.” World Affairs. Volume 175 (2012):
Siddiqi, Moin. “Saudi Arabia: Looking at the Long Game”. The Middle East. (October 2013):
32-36.