Gundula Ludwig
L`Etat cest moi. State power and gendered subject constitution.1
Paper presented at the Historical Materialism Conference, London, 2012
“The human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality
it is the ensemble of the social relations.“ (Marx 1995) This well-known quote from the
theses on Feuerbach shows that already Marx has proposed to consider the subject
not as a given entity but rather as constituted within historical-concrete power
relations. The assumption that the constitution of subjectivity is a key effect of
domination and power has been taken up in particular in the state theories by Antonio
Gramsci (1985) and Louis Althusser (1971). Both argue, that in capitalist societies,
the subject is an effect of a specific state power and that the constitution of subjects
is a crucial precondition for the reproduction of the mode of the production. From a
feminist perspective there remains an astounding blank space, namely the ignorance
of the question how the constitution of femininity and masculinity can be linked to
state power and capitalism. From a queer-feminist perspective, this blank space can
even be twisted a bit more: The question then is not only how femininity and
masculinity can be considered as effect of state power and can be seen as
precondition for the reproduction of the mode of the production but how the
heteronormative constitution of female or male subjects in the first place can be
conceptualized as effect of state power that also enables a specific form of mode of
production.
Until today, neither in Marxist state theory nor in queer studies we find answers to
these questions. This double-sided blank space is the starting point for my paper. Its
aim is to link heteronormative subject constitution to state power. For this purpose, I
will briefly discuss Judith Butlers work on heteronormative subject constitution (Butler
1990, 1993, 1997) because I still consider Butler’s contribution here as the most
1
The paper is based on some of my previous work (Ludwig 2011a and 2011b).
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thorough theorization of heterosexuality as power formation that constitutes subjects
in a certain way. In a second step, I argue that although the term heterosexual matrix
undoubtedly clarifies the role of heterosexuality as a structuring social force, its
underlying conceptualization of power remains limited, in particular from a materialist
perspective. After diagnosing my ‘troubles’ with the heterosexual matrix, I will re-visit
this concept based on an understanding of power as hegemony, drawing on Antonio
Gramsci, in order to link a deconstructivist understanding of female and male
subjects to a materialist understanding of state power and capitalism (see also
Ludwig 2011a and 2011b).
The heterosexual matrix
Butler introduces the notion heterosexual matrix in order to reject the assumption
that gender and gendered subjects are the effects of a pregiven sex. Instead,
gender is a construction constituted within the discursive realm of the heterosexual
matrix (Butler 1990: 5ff.). The materialization of gender not only constitutes a sexed
body but also an intelligible form of subjectivity. The constitution of a sexed body
coincides with the constitution of an intelligible subject.
This heteronormative constitution of gender relies on disavowals that are the effect
of a heterosexual law. Butler describes these disavowals with the psychoanalytical
term ‘abject’ in order to grasp the simultaneity of the ‘production’ and disavowals of
the intelligible (Butler 1990). In this vein, the constitution of subjects also relies on
disavowals. Butler theorizes these disavowals as a form of violence – as normative
violence that lies within the gender norm itself. Through the naturalization of
heterosexuality and the dichotomy of gender as naturally given, distinct and
unchangeable, this normative violence remains disarticulated (Butler 1999: xix,
Butler 2004: 8, see also Chambers/Carver 2008: 128).
Butlers understanding of power
With her work, Butler has shifted our understanding of heterosexuality crucially by
providing a tool with which heterosexuality is viewed as a power formation that
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renders bodies and subjects intelligible. Nevertheless, there are some aspects of her
argument that I consider problematic. Let me focus on three of them.
Firstly, Butler’s notion of the heterosexual matrix remains abstract. She does not
clarify how the heterosexual matrix is linked or embedded in the modern state, in
society and/or in a capitalist society.
Secondly, in her concept, social actions, social relations and relations of social
forces hardly play a role. Consequently, what is missing here is the question of how
the heterosexual matrix and gender as (binary) norm can possibly be challenged
and transformed through social struggles.
Thirdly, Butler does not theorize how the heterosexual matrix gains and remains its
power and stability. Interestingly, Butler criticizes Louis Althusser in his essay
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1971) for assuming that power
operates like a ‘religious authority’, addressing subjects as a ‘divine voice’ (Butler
1997: 110). However, her conceptualization of the heterosexual matrix is also
unable to address this question. Although Butler states that the heterosexual matrix
requires performative acts to become powerful, she does not take up the issue of
how the heterosexual matrix gains its authority at all. I argue that it is possible for
Butler to avoid addressing this question since she grasps the law as the ‘dominant
framework within which social relations take place’ (Butler 1990: 76; emphasis
mine). Since the matrix relies on the law, Butler draws on a juridical frame when it
comes to the question how the heterosexual matrix gains its stability. Consequently,
the heterosexual matrix remains a sovereign grid; once in place, it remains there
and has power – leaving out the question of how it attains power.
I propose that approaching the idea of the heterosexual matrix as hegemony could
open up some ways to overcome these power troubles. Interestingly, in Bodies
That Matter, Butler herself proposes a rethinking of her work by using the concept
of hegemony – a step that Butler herself never undertakes. So let me take Butler’s
suggestion seriously and investigate how the concept of a heterosexual power
formation changes when it is developed using the notion of hegemony. In my
understanding of hegemony, I refer to Gramscis Prison Notebooks. Clearly and as
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we all know, Gramsci solely refers to hegemony as a power formation shaped by
class relations. Like other queer, feminist and postcolonial scholars who refer to
Gramsci’s work my underlying assumption is that hegemony describes a specific
way of exercising power which does not have to be reduced to class relations. It
can also be applied in order to understand how gendered and sexual relations are
governed. Hence, I will argue in a way similar to Stuart Hall (1986) in his essay
about the relevance of Gramsci for the study of race and ethnicity, where he
argues that even though Gramsci has not explicitly written about racism, his key
notions still can be helpful for an analysis of racism. But then paradoxically the
Gramscian notions have to be developed further. This is also true for Gramsci’s
relevance for feminist and queer theory.
Let me briefly highlight some key issues of Gramscis understanding of hegemony as
I read them.
Gramsci introduces the notion of hegemony for explaining the stability of a specific
social order, the capitalist society. Hegemony is a formation of state power that
operates through ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (Gramsci 1985: 57), which in
turn leads its subjects to affirm social orders, social practices and certain ways of
living. The notion of hegemony shifts the traditional understanding of the modern
state in two ways. Firstly, since the modern state not only exercises power through
repression and coercion but also through guiding and conducting, state power can
thus be understood as relying on guiding and conducting. Thus, hegemonic
worldviews are not only forced on the subjects, they are also actively affirmed and
reproduced. Consequently, state power not only relies on laws and repression but to
a crucial extend on consensus. Secondly, instead of operating from a sovereign
centre, or from top-down, ‘the state’ as the integral state is deeply rooted in civil
society. Within everyday interactions in civil society – in neighbourhood
communities, religious groups, political associations, trade unions, schools,
newspapers and leisure facilities – hegemonic worldviews about society are
negotiated. These worldviews become part of the state (1985: 259).
Hegemony is a dynamic formation of state power that is simultaneously a medium
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and a result of social struggles within civil society (1985: 182). Gramsci uses the
term ‘passive revolution’ to describe this movement of integrating the demands from
social groups that oppose or criticize hegemonic worldviews for the purpose of
maintaining hegemony through transformation (1985: 105). This implies a paradox:
while social struggles can challenge hegemony, the incorporation of the demands
and critique from social movements and struggles simultaneously uphold
hegemony through its transformation. Obviously, in the articulation of compromises,
not all social actors have the same amount of resources and importance or receive
equal attention.
In Gramscis theory of hegemony, the concept of common sense plays a crucial
role. It is an arena where worldviews (ideologies) and values that pervade civil
society are integrated in every day actions. In these processes of integration,
ideologies and worldviews materialise as forms of thinking, feeling, and perceiving,
and, and this is a crucial aspect of Gramscis theory of hegemony, in these
processes the subject is constituted. Individuals gain subjectivity through and
within the hegemonic world views and ideologies. In his notes ‘Americanism and
Fordism’ he deepens this argument by showing how not only a specific form of
subjectivity is a result of state power but that a specific form of subjectivity is a
precondition for the reproduction of the mode of production. This goes back to
Gramscis scepticism against any form of ‘economistic’ theories that view economic
“laws” as a principal cause of social structures or actions. The mode of production
does not reproduce itself through any intrinsic automatic force, but rather through
an interplay of worldviews, consensus, lifestyles and certain forms of ‘being’ a
subject or – through hegemony.
Heteronormative hegemony
If we put these parts and pieces from Butlers work on heteronormativity and
Gramscis work on hegemony together, how can we re-think the relationship between
the constitution of gendered subjects, state power and mode of production from a
queer and materialistic perspective?
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In the last part of my paper, I introduce the notion of heteronormative power as
proposal to re-think Butlers heterosexual matrix. I will present three arguments that
outline how the introduction of heteronormative hegemony leads to a different
understanding of heteronormativity, that is more embedded in historical-concrete
social relations and forces.
Firstly, heteronormative hegemony is a formation of state power grounded in civil
society. Thus, the constitution of gendered subjects can also be seen as effect of
state power, as effect of the integral state. Doubtless, the state with its juridical power
defines which forms of subjectivity are viewed as ‘natural’ and legal. But this juridical
and repressive dimension is not the only form through which heteronormativity is
secured. The dichotomy of gender also has to be reinforced and consented to in
various everyday practices in civil society. The media, the education system,
architecture, the clothing industry, as well as medical discourses, initiate and repeat
the ‘truth’ about the dichotomy and binary nature of sexes as ‘natural’ and
reasonable, and individuals absorb this perception into their common sense. As
subjects consent to a hegemonic truth in their common sense the norm of gender
dichotomy thus gains its stability not through force but through consensus.
However, from a Gramscian perspective this does not mean that heteronormative
as form of state power solely operates top-down. Neither is heteronormative
hegemony a sovereign law that ‘dictates’ heteronormativity, as Butler suggests.
The concept of hegemony allows us to argue that the definition of
heteronormativity is effect of social struggles and compromises. Various
organizations, institutions and actors in civil society, such as intellectuals from the
medical and social sciences, law and the humanities, feminist and queer political
groups, family organizations and religious groups, articulate ‘heterosexuality’,
‘homosexuality’, ‘gender’, ‘sexed bodies’ and images of ‘normality’. These
articulations become state power as the state addresses subjects on the basis of
these hegemonic worldviews.
In Butler’s work, the heterosexual matrix remains abstract since she does not link it to
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state power or social relations. Approaching heteronormativity with the notion of
hegemony not only enables us to analyse state regulations such as kinship
regulations, family tax policies and laws that only recognize subjects as female or
male ‘beings’, it also allows us to understand these regulations as a result of
articulations within civil society.
Secondly, by linking a queer-deconstructivist perspective on bodies and subjects
to a materialist perspective on state and capitalism, it allows us to specify
Gramscis argument that capitalism also needs a specific form of subjectivity; it
also needs a specific heteronormative subjectivity that is result of the
heteronormative hegemony or to put it differently of the integral state. Following
Butlers work, Renate Lorenz and Brigitta Kuster (2007) have introduced the term
“sexual labor” in order to highlight that in modern Western societies capitalist labor
relations require and constitute a specific historic form of gendered and sexualized
subjectivity in order to fulfill their capitalist function. Kuster and Lorenz argue that
capitalism not only requires a gendered division of labor, but also a specific form of
heteronormative subjectivity or respectively a coherent gendered and sexual
identity. Performing these identities can then be framed as work. The term “sexual
labor” describes the multiple processes of embodiment of gender and sexuality –
which is continuously asked to be performed in capitalist societies. That subjects
are intelligible as either female or male can then be seen as precondition for any
capitalist mode of production. From a Gramscian perspective, this sexual labor is
also and again not only forced upon subjects, but they also consent to it in their
various every-day practices.
Finally, heteronormative hegemony is a dynamic formation of power since it is both
an effect of and the terrain for social struggles. As I have just said, it is produced,
undermined, reinforced and shifted within social struggles. Consequently, because
heteronormative hegemony is an effect of social struggles and compromises, it
always entails a certain degree of openness and contradiction. And it is precisely
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this openness and inconsistency that make it so powerful on one side, but that also
open up the possibility for resistance, subversion and re-working it on the other
side. Referring to Butler’s notion of a heterosexual matrix would not allow for an
analysis of these ambivalences and contradictions. Neither would it allow
embedding changes in the heterosexual matrix in broader social, political and
economic changes. These ambivalences characterize current neoliberal societies in
‘Western Europe’. Over the last decades, criminalization of and legal discrimination
against gays and lesbians in ‘Western European’ societies have decreased. The
rise of registered partnerships, openly gay and lesbian politicians, as well as the
increasing importance of the ‘pink economy’ and the inclusion of gay or lesbian
characters in mainstream soap operas, are all examples of this. They all attest to
the fact that the continuum of ‘normality’ has expanded. Without any doubt, this is
also result of social struggles from the gay and lesbian community. This is one side
of the coin. However, these changes by no means point to a general decrease in
the importance of heteronormativity for the constitution of intelligible subjects and
the social order. Rather, these gains are still only a transformation of
heteronormativity, one that fits into the transformation from a Fordist society to a
more “diverse” and plural neoliberal one. But still, they entail even as passive
revolution also new possibilities for subversion and resistance.
Let me conclude by pointing out the following remarks: The aim of my paper was to
sketch out some ideas for rethinking heteronormativity or gendered subject
constitution by linking Butlers abstract understanding of power with a Gramscian
understanding of power. For a material state theory as well as for our
understanding of capitalism, these arguments hopefully have also shown that
heteronormativity is a crucial social force that also has to be taken into account if
we think about power, domination and exploitation, state and capitalism. For queer
studies, I introduced the Gramscian notion of hegemony to reveal that
heteronormativity is not only a matrix but that it is the integral state that interpellates
individuals as female or male beings and that these processes of interpellation take
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place in a capitalist society. Furthermore, I also intended to argue – from a
Gramscian perspective – that the stability of heteronormativity cannot be explained
by solely referring to modes of repression, laws and coercion. Rather, the stability
of heteronormativity is also effect of hegemony, worldviews and consensus. This
argument is not meant to diminish the effect of heteronormative hegemony. Nor is it
meant to imply that a volitional and rational subject could get rid of its gender by not
consenting to it. Instead, my intention is to illustrate that heteronormative hegemony
is not a sovereign form of power that has a divine-like authority. Instead, it is a form
of power that is also consolidated by ideologies and common sense. If we follow
Butler that the heteronormative constitution of subjects as either female or male
also is always a form of (normative) violence, we can argue that the
heteronormative interpellations by the integral state always entail a form of violence
which is – and this is the crucial shift if we follow Gramsci – also secured by
consensus of the majority of the population. The fact that intersex babies are still
victims of violent medical treatments is paradoxically also secured through the
common sense of people that these surgeries cannot be seen as violence.
Consequently, contesting hegemonic worldviews on the ‘naturalness’ of the
dichotomies built around sex and heterosexuality – through interventions in the ‘war
of manoeuvre’ (Gramsci 1985: 235) and through using various practices within civil
society – can be viewed as vital to queer politics. Gramsci (1985: 235) concludes
from his understanding of hegemony as a formation of power that it is deeply rooted
in civil society and that emancipatory struggles must address everyday practices on
a micro-level. Given heteronormative hegemony’s strong connection to civil society,
the transformation of hegemonic worldviews also take place on the level of social
micro-structures through counter-knowledge, counter-practices and strategies of
equivocation (Engel 2002) that are the crucial ‘battlefield’ for challenging
heteronormative hegemony.
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