British Journal of Social Work (2017) 47, 181–197
doi: 10.1093/bjsw/bcw072
Advance Access Publication June 15, 2016
What Can Moral and Social Intuitionism
Offer Ethics Education in Social Work? A
Reflective Inquiry
David Hodgson* and Lynelle Watts
Edith Cowan University, Bunbury, Western Australia
*Correspondence to David Hodgson, Edith Cowan University, Robertson Drive, Bunbury,
Western Australia, 6230. E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract
There is broad agreement that attention to codes of ethics, ethical reasoning and social work values is an important component of any social work education. There appears to be less consensus about ethics content and how best to teach ethics and
ethical practice. Situated within a reflexive methodology—and utilising a pair-interview
technique—this paper presents the results of an inquiry designed to explore our practice as social work educators in the context of the debates about ethics in social work
education. We found that our experience is best illustrated by a social intuitionist approach to moral development that has emerged in recent years. We found that this
model developed by Jonathan Haidt can bridge the divide between rational and a socially situated and reflective approach to ethics, often considered appropriate to practice. We argue that the model also encompasses the way in which culture and learning
can inform intuition as well as the role of critical reasoning in the formation of ethical
judgements. The model fits closely with our experience as educators and we conclude
the paper by linking classroom and field practices with different aspects of the model.
Keywords: Ethics, moral intuitionism, teaching, social work education, curriculum
Accepted: May 2016
Introduction
It is established that a defining feature of the social work profession is
its expression of, and identification with, ethical principles and standpoints (Banks, 2012). Teaching social work students the ethics and
# The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of
The British Association of SocialWorkers. All rights reserved
182 David Hodgson and Lynelle Watts
values of social work is a core part of social work education (Bryan,
2006) and ethical standards are important to the regulation of social
workers in practice (Congress and McAuliffe, 2006). Social work ethics
include principles such as justice, fairness and respect for persons, the
latter usually described in contested concepts such as autonomy
(Twomey, 2015). Ethics also concerns issues that arise in practice, such
as dual relationships, confidentiality and duty of care, among others
(Butters and Vaughan-Eden, 2011; Congress and McAuliffe, 2006).
Socialisation into the ethics and values of the profession can be seen as
an aspect of constructing a professional identity (Trede et al., 2012). As
noted by Bryan (2006), although there is agreement that ethics education is important to social work education, disagreement exists over
what and how ethics should be taught. While the development of an ethical vocabulary is important, a focus on this leaves little room for deeper
engagement ethical skills such as reasoning, reflection and moral judgement. As educators and authors of this paper, we have begun to explore
our teaching of ethics to social work students, with a focus on the development of critical thinking and reasoning skills. While we are mindful of
the criticisms of strictly rational approaches to ethical analysis and decision making (Gray and Gibbons, 2007; Hugman, 2003), our experience
suggests that effortful cognitive reasoning, evaluation, reflection and
judgement remain important, if not essential, to learning and acquiring
ethical knowledge and dispositions towards professional practice.
This paper presents reflections on our teaching experience and the purpose is to situate that experience within a social intuitionist approach
(Kennett and Fine, 2009) to teaching ethics. The position taken herein
argues for consideration of social intuitionist approaches to social work
ethics education that can accommodate the development and place of rational models of ethical reasoning, as well as the role of socially situated
reflective skills. We suggest an approach that can incorporate both intuition and rational frameworks for the teaching of ethics in social work.
Ethics and values in social work
The importance of ethics and values in social work has been the subject
of numerous publications (Banks, 2008, 2012; Chambon and Irving,
2003; Congress and McAuliffe, 2006; Gray and Gibbons, 2007;
Guttmann, 2006; Hugman, 2003, 2013; McAuliffe, 2005; Reamer, 2012,
2013) and social work ethics, values and principles are enshrined in ethical codes (e.g. Australian Association of Social Workers, 2010; National
Association of Social Workers, 2015; British Association of Social
Workers, 2014).
Many social work ethics books introduce readers to the domains of
moral philosophy considered relevant to social work. These generally
Ethics Education in Social Work 183
include consequentialist, Kantian and other principle-based ethical systems, including social justice (Banks, 2012; Bowles et al., 2006). These
are largely considered rationalist models, where ethical behaviour
emerges from ‘reasoning and reflection’ (Haidt, 2001, p. 814).
Increasingly, social work educators have sought ways to include Eastern
and Indigenous philosophies into social work ethics (McAuliffe, 2014)
and perspectives influenced by virtue ethics and ethics of care (Banks,
2009, 2012; Bowles et al., 2006; McBeath and Webb, 2002). Social work
ethics literature often discusses practice issues and concerns, such as confidentiality and self-determination (Linzer, 1999), relationships of power
(Hugman, 1991), human rights (Connolly and Ward, 2007; Ife, 2008),
justice and reciprocity (Banks, 2012), ethics and culture (Healy, 2007;
Hugman, 2013), activism, personal conduct, digital and online ethics
(McAuliffe, 2014) and ethical decision making (Congress, n.d.; Dolgoff
et al., 2012).
Recent writing about social work ethics critiques the foundationalism
of consequentialist theories such as Utilitarianism and the universalism
of Kantian categorical theories (Hugman, 2003). In tandem with the development of critical social theories, there is a push to explore the role
of feminist, interpretivist, pluralist and postmodern social theories in the
development of social work ethics (Banks, 2008; Hugman, 2003).
Teaching ethics in social work education
There are several examples in the literature that discuss teaching ethics
and values in social work education (Bryan, 2006; Gray and Gibbons,
2007; Hugman, 2005; Reamer, 2001, 2012; Sanders and Hoffman, 2010).
Many of these focus not so much on the pedagogical side of how ethics
should be taught, but on curriculum content or what should be taught.
Work by Reamer (2001) provides a useful survey of the history of social
work ethics and values, contending that educators should engage in sustained teaching in the areas of social work values and mission, ethical dilemmas and decision making, and risk management. Reamer’s work
scopes out the conceptual basis of these domains, but also contends by
way of conclusion that students need to develop critical analysis skills,
and that a ‘key goal of ethics education in social work should be the cultivation of students’ ability to analyze ethical issues’ (Reamer, 2001, p.
169).
While much of the literature is concerned with the content or substance of social work ethics, other literature focuses on the ethical development of the student themselves as a form of character development
(Gray, 2010). Hugman (2005) addresses these distinctions, by making a
comparison between an ‘elucidation of a clear framework for “good”
practice’ (p. 538) on the one hand and ‘learning to think ethically in the
184 David Hodgson and Lynelle Watts
constant process of reflection on one’s own practice that includes
scrutiny of the principles that underlie any particular ethical position’
(p. 538) on the other. The former position involves learning rules, principles and standards and applying them in a rational manner; the latter involves a sustained reflection and critique of the very idea of decisionist,
normative and universal principles and standards (Gray, 2010; Gray and
Gibbons, 2007; Hugman, 2005).
This kind of dualism can be thought of as a problem between theory
and practice as explained by Kenny, Lincoln and Killian (2015). Some
have proposed that case studies can help bridge this gap (Milner, 2009)
by assisting students to contextualise ethical concepts and principles to
practice (Kenny et al., 2015). However, according to Hugman (2005), the
well-rehearsed position of uncertainty and pluralism in social theory generally (including social work) means that ethical learning and practice
must go much further than case studies and engage students with the socially situated context of ethics. The implication of this push beyond
learning abstract principles means that ‘ethics education in professional
social work is to assist each member of the profession to recognise
and engage in ethical dialogue with a variety of others’ (Hugman, 2005,
p. 540).
This is also a point discussed by Gray and Gibbons (2007). Rather
than treating ethics as a rational activity only, they appeal for an approach to ethics education that develops students’ intuitive, reflective
and contextual analysis skills in dealing with the uncertainty and complexity of ethical problems, thereby rejecting what they see as the inherent limitations in rational and linear ethics decision-making models
(Gray and Gibbons, 2007). They conclude their paper with a somewhat
Aristotelian notion of virtue qua phronesis, or the development of an
ethically reflective disposition to habitually developed good judgement
(Gray and Gibbons, 2007). Such an approach is concerned with the development of an ethical character more than it is concerned with learning or internalising the content of ethical knowledge per se. The point
that Gray and Gibbons (2007) make is that ethics is learned, practised,
situational and embedded in one’s character, rather than being an objective or technical–rational exercise.
How this is to be achieved is less clear. There is an argument that
pedagogical approaches using case material might serve as a transition
between a university curriculum and the situated curriculum of field
placements (Gherardi et al., 1998; Lave and Wenger, 1991). Learning
here is a form of professional immersion and socialisation into the discipline and habitus (Bourdieu, 1999) of social work. Calder (2015) suggests
that ‘we need to keep in full view, and take seriously, the various tensions in the relationship between classroom and professional settings’
(pp. 309–10) and that both types of curricula offer important ingredients
for the creation of ethical practitioners.
Ethics Education in Social Work 185
Yet, Hugman (2003) has observed a paradox contending that ‘ethics
cannot be taught it must be learned’ (p. 543, emphasis in original).
Learning must occur in the context of a development of practice knowledge and experience gained throughout a course of social work education including field education, and through reflective engagement with
the relationships, situations and contexts of practice (Hugman, 2005, pp.
543–4). Calder (2015) discusses this is as an ‘orientation-based skill’ (p.
309) where social work practice is combined with propositional knowledge and practical reasoning. These perspectives from Hugman and
Calder are in concert with a recent push in the USA that has argued
that ethics education in social work must move beyond conceptual
‘knowing that’ understanding to applied ‘knowing how’ (Ryle, 1990) engagement with ethical decisions and judgement on what to do in practice
(Sanders and Hoffman, 2010).
In summation, recent discussion on ethics in social work entails a
range of critiques. First there is a critique of universal or foundational
ethical theories, in favour of more pluralist, critical and culturally responsive models (Gray, 2010; Healy, 2007). Second, there is a related
critique of rational ‘tick-box’ approaches to ethical decision making and
analysis, in favour of more intuitive, situated and emotionally responsive
approaches (Gray, 2010). Lastly, there is a critique of an approach to
critical thinking built strictly on scientific reasoning and rational argument, in favour of a reflective approach to knowledge construction and
deconstruction with attention to values and ideologies (Giles and
Pockett, 2012).
Rather than treating this debate in such either/or distinctions, we propose a way of integrating elements of different kinds of knowledge and
skills together. Our inquiry began with a question about how to bring
different forms of knowledge, critique and reflection together to enhance
the repertoire of skills of social work students to engage in the complexities of ethics in theoretical and practical terms. Our purpose is to engage
in a reflection of our own teaching of ethics, and present this within the
social intuitionism research developed by Haidt and others (Haidt, 2001,
2004, 2013; Kennett and Fine, 2009; Sauer, 2011). First, we outline the
methodology we have utilised to guide our reflections on teaching and
learning ethics in social work.
A reflexive inquiry into teaching ethics
Our inquiry utilised a reflexive methodology (Alvesson and Sköldberg,
2009), which incorporates four layers of interpretation: (i) interaction
with empirical materials; (ii) interpretation for understanding; (iii) critical interpretation of power, ideology and social reproduction within the
research; and (iv) reflection on language use, text production and claims
186 David Hodgson and Lynelle Watts
to authority (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009). The methodology generates interpretive forms of critical reflection (Tully, 1989) through combining elements from disparate qualitative methodologies (Alvesson and
Sköldberg, 2009). The main critique of this methodology concerns the
difficulty in maintaining a separation between the layers of interpretation within a single study. Our adaptation of specific methods of data
generation, analysis and discussion of our interpretations aimed to address this difficulty.
We utilised a dialogical and reflective process to explore our experiences of teaching ethics to social work students. We adapted a process
outlined by Gilmore and Kenny (2015) and Way, Kanak Zwier and
Tracy (2015) that involved a pair-interview technique using semistructured interviews. The interview questions were designed to establish
the context of the classes we teach, with an emphasis on where the class
is placed within the overall curriculum (Wass et al., 2011); how we came
to teaching ethics; what challenges we experienced; and how we approach teaching ethics generally. To maximise the reflexivity of the interview, we adapted a technique described by Way et al. (2015) that
used probing questions, member reflections and counterfactual
prompting.
Two interviews were conducted in which we interviewed each other.
Interviews were audio-taped and were thirty minutes each in duration.
Analysis involved four steps and utilised an abductive process, which is
in keeping with the interpretive methodology (White, 1997). We began
by separately listening to both interviews and creating a transcript of the
key points from each interview. We did this on our own to use our individual introspective capacities as a ‘springboard for [generating] interpretations’ (Finlay, 2002, p. 215) for discussion. Next, we reviewed these
transcripts and engaged in a reflective discussion of our interpretations.
This included a negotiation of themes and questions about the content of
the interviews in addition to the inter-subjective elements of the process
(Finlay, 2002). This addressed the concern associated with generating
our research text, claims to authority as well as the ideology embedded
in the assumptions each of us bought to the discussion. Through the explicit use of a parallel process, we explored the experience of learning
and teaching ethics (Chatham Clarke, 2002). The next step contrasted
these themes with those contained in our own previous research on assessment in social work education (Watts and Hodgson, 2015) and the
literature on teaching ethics in social work. We read the collected literature and then re-read and listened to the interviews before a final discussion of how to present the findings. The process of engaging with the
literature enabled us to widen our ‘repertoire of interpretation’
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, p. 272) to incorporate insights beyond
our experience and the initial account generated through the pairinterview technique. The aim was not to arrive at a generalisable
Ethics Education in Social Work 187
account of how ethics education should be taught, but instead to use a
reflexive process as a catalyst for generating interesting and novel insights into some practices of learning and teaching ethics in social work.
The result of this interpretive work is presented below, situated within a
discussion of social intuitionism and illustrated through examples from
the interview data.
Social intuitionism as a framework for social work ethics
education
Intuitionism has a long history in philosophy since Hume’s sentimentalism
(Haidt, 2001). Moral intuitionism is based in the idea that moral knowledge
can be derived without recourse to deliberate reasoning or inferences based
in evidence (Tropman, 2014). For intuitionists, there is a place for selfevident moral truisms that prima facie appear rationally correct (Tropman,
2014). However, Tropman (2014) is cautious about the use of the term intuition as it ‘lacks a univocal meaning in the literature’ (p. 178). The term ‘intuition’ also suffers from this problem in social work where it is variously
described as expertise (Fook et al., 1997), practice wisdom (Tsang, 2013)
and personal knowledge (Hudson, 1997). What unites these definitions and
insights from philosophy and social work is that they are descriptive of the
kinds of knowledge that arrive fast and that may be linked to experience
and cultural knowing. This is a form of knowledge that does not necessarily
require the use of reasons as justification for knowing. The effortlessness of
this knowledge is the marker of a kind of cognition understood as Type 1
processing (Evans, 2008; Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
Both of us have observed this facility in ourselves and in our students,
and this emerged during the interviews:
When we look at some ethical cases—which certainly raise emotions
[for] people—well they can have an emotional reaction . . . I wanted to
introduce a pause and slowing down of that side of the reaction . . . so
they are both thinking critically about why they would have a preference
and [that] reaction (First author).
I found that early on [in my teaching] when I said let’s just think
ethically about this case that we would get much more fast responses,
intuition or gut responses to it and then I couldn’t get them [students] to
move past these (Second author).
This observation was a major impetus to examine this tendency and
its relation to critical thinking and reasoning. The literature in social
work both lauds intuition and laments the absence of theoretical and
ethical thinking (Fook et al., 1997, 2000). We discussed how we began to
look for processes that would enable a more deliberative process for engaging with ethical dilemmas and case materials. This was a challenge,
188 David Hodgson and Lynelle Watts
as students sometimes expressed dislike at having to think differently
about matters that they thought were settled, or which for them were
quite black and white. We became interested in exploring ways to understand this tendency.
This kind of Type 1 processing, or intuition, has been taken up as a
central plank in the social intuition model (SIM) of moral development
(Haidt, 2001). While intuitionism might be situated philosophically, the
SIM is located within the broad domain of moral psychology. The model
brings together philosophical observations and questions with empirical
research grounded in the cognitive, social, emotion and moral development arms of psychology. Sauer asks whether ‘moral judgement [is]
based on moral reasoning or on an emotion and intuition?’ (2011, p.
708). This question and dichotomy has particularly influenced the work
of Jonathan Haidt (2001), who explains that ‘the central claim of the social intuitionist model is that moral judgement is caused by quick moral
intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral
reasoning’ (2001, p. 817). In Haidt’s (2001) model, moral judgement contains six processes or links, illustrated in Figure 1. These links can be
summarised as follows:
intuitive judgement link—moral intuitions are spontaneous and
effortless;
post-hoc reasoning link—moral reasoning occurs after the initial judgement is made;
Figure 1 The social intuitionist model (SIM)
Source: Haidt, 2001, p. 815, American Psychological Association, reprinted with permission.
Ethics Education in Social Work 189
reasoned persuasion link—moral reasoning is used to persuade
others by triggering affective responses in the listener;
social persuasion link—moral judgement is significantly influenced by others who may hold similar views;
reasoned judgement link—logical reasoning may override a
gut-feeling intuition; however, this may be rare;
private reflection link—later reflection may alter, revise or refine the initial intuitive judgement.
This model helped us to conceptualise some of the processes we observed in our teaching and in our discussion of this topic. We identified
how we had changed our teaching processes due to experiences of students settling too soon on an initial reaction without much engagement
in reasoning or discussion. We changed our teaching to create opportunities for students to lead with their own reasoning, decoupled from our
analysis or views about the material as lecturers:
I think when I first started [teaching] my preferences for different
theories was more on show, whereas now they are much less on show . . .
and really that’s to open up a bit of a space for students to think about
how they think about things without my running interference around
their views, particularly when they are very new students (First author).
Our experience suggests that, alongside introducing theoretical ideas
of the discipline, there need to be opportunities for students to explore
and gain skills in the processes of critical thinking:
[students] need a space to test out and experiment with the ideas that
are in the subject . . . I also have a higher inclusion of critical thinking
skills in the philosophy subject, by which I mean the ability to examine
and consider the way moral arguments are constructed and put together,
possible flaws and weaknesses in the way people make moral statements,
such as fallacies or biases . . . so I put a lot of that in there first . . . partly
so that students . . . when they do look at complex case material [later in
that unit] they can develop a more reserved judgement . . . of the subject
material (First author).
This link between ethics and critical thinking is important because
critical thinking enables analytic reasoning generally and can be thought
of as a form of ‘mind-ware’ (Stanovich, 2009, p. 71). This is part of Type
2 processing associated with cognitive decoupling required for rehearsing
possible responses (Stanovich and Toplak, 2012) to new situations or dilemmas. It is through this cognitive decoupling ability that people demonstrate their reflexive capabilities (Archer, 2010), albeit in different
ways (Archer, 2012).
Haidt’s model suggests that there are a number of routes to changing
one’s mind post intuition and that critical thinking and post-hoc reasoning are important. Seminars and tutorials offer ways to engage with materials that can work with the intuitive link, but they also offer
190 David Hodgson and Lynelle Watts
opportunities to engage in public uses of reason (Owen, 1999). This kind
of public reasoning needs to be modelled for and with students:
I think that like anyone you forget what you’ve learnt—and I think that
a lot of people who teach . . . forget that they were instructed in critical
thinking at the beginning and so we’ve already got the skill [but] we
forget we have to teach it; and it’s really difficult for students to
understand ethics at all without the ability to test the limits of an
[ethical] theory, let alone be able to reason and evaluate the thinking
that has gone before them. We forget as educators that we were taught
that skill and [we] can’t expect people to come in and not embed that
somehow (Second author).
Our inquiry suggests that the spaces for learning critical thinking
about ethics need careful structuring to maximise the potential for engaging students in the kind of ethical dialogue advocated by Hugman
(2005):
[I have] become much less enamoured with all the [ideas and] language
around critical pedagogy and much more focussed on the practical
applications of how to choreograph a class space that allows people to
come into ideas in a way [so] that they can think with others, think
differently, challenge and so on. So I’ve become more [engaged] with
thinking about [teaching] as a space that you choreograph (Second
author).
Haidt’s model helped to make sense of our experience of student engagement with case materials and with field placement experiences.
Despite the criticisms about the use of case materials in tutorials and seminars, these do provide a means for engaging students in practising skills of
reasoned discussion, deliberation and challenge. We identified that there
are differences in students’ comfort and willingness to experiment and engage with moral arguments, hence these spaces need to be high support
and high challenge to be effective (Larkin and Richardson, 2012). Both of
us could describe instances of designing seminars that provide space for students to explore beyond their initial reactions. Here is an example:
I spend a lot more time setting up the conditions by which [students] are
to do those actions . . . I say ‘this is what we are about to do, we are
going to look at so-and-so’s theory about this particular case, I don’t
want you to judge it too quickly, I want you to understand it first and to
think about what reactions you are having to this case, where they might
be coming from and then I want you to think about the merits and
possible weaknesses and be clear about those. And then I want to hear
what your view is and whether you think the theory has merit and
whether you have objections and why would you object to it, and what
would you offer as an alternative conception?’ In the past I would have
just gone into the case without much preparation for students (First
author).
Ethics Education in Social Work 191
By structuring these spaces carefully, we were able to maximise the
potential of social context for engaging in ethical dialogue with others,
where reasons for and against a judgement may be debated, refuted,
challenged or supported. While Haidt’s model does not preclude the
idea that people change their minds through private reflection, it does
suggest that the influence of others remains a powerful persuasive force
in moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001). Social persuasion may be positive, but
can have other consequences:
Critical thinking is [needed] for testing the limits of knowledge and my
view is that we introduce theory too soon and these theories become
habitual forms of thought . . . by the time I get [students] in fourth year
they’ve developed a lot of routine thought around some very key parts
of the profession—[these] have become [protected from scrutiny] and I
think that’s because the critical thinking element is missing and does not
get as much airplay as learning the theory . . . theories then become
shorthand for ways of thinking (Second author).
Providing opportunities for ethical dialogue is important for reflecting
on cultural assumptions and beliefs that might be inimical to ethical practice. In the SIM, the social, cultural, historical, physiological and metaphorical basis of moral intuition are assumed as a priori knowledge. This
addresses a criticism outlined above that teaching ethics using rationalist
models misses the situated nature of ethical dilemmas. The SIM accepts
that culture is embedded within the very substrate that informs people’s
social intuitions. Here, Haidt (2001) uses the term custom complexes,
which involve a ‘complex web of explicit and implicit, sensory and propositional, affective, cognitive and motoric knowledge[s]’ (p. 827). This
means that the domain of ethics may include the adoption of universal
ethical ideas in principle, with a reflexive interpretation over the form
and function that such principles take. Both of us identified that part of
the challenge in teaching ethics involved engaging students in examination
of their own ‘custom complexes’ in addition to learning to think differently using ethical decision models. Using class discussion as forms of social discourse and interpersonal interactions recognises the evolutionary
functions others serve regarding impression management, solidarity, and
building in-group relationships and loyalties (Haidt, 2001).
It should be pointed out that there are criticisms of the SIM, and
these need to be considered in the context of adapting it into ethics education, and for further research in social work specifically. Saltzstein and
Kasachkoff (2004) have criticised the SIM on the grounds that they see
that the place of reasoning in moral judgement has been extracted and
that this is undesirable (see Haidt, 2004, for a rejoinder and defence).
Further criticisms of moral intuitionism are offered by SinnottArmstrong (2006, cited in Smith, 2010), two of which are the most
salient to social work ethics. These include the criticism that moral
192 David Hodgson and Lynelle Watts
intuitionism is partial and self-referential. The implications are that the
SIM may justify a partial ethical judgement according to particular interests—for example, a highly selective post-hoc rationalisation that provides a defensive rationale for a social worker’s practice. However, as
noted by Smith (2010), this on its own does not render the judgement
unjustified—for example, a post-hoc defence of one’s practice may be
morally justifiable if it accords with broader or external criterion, such
as ethical standards. The second criticism is that moral intuitionism entails an appeal to emotion, which is said to cloud or interfere with an effective moral judgement (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2016, cited in Smith, 2010).
However, Smith (2010) refutes this claim on the basis that, while some
emotions (think of anger) might interfere with effective judgement, it is
an over-generalisation to conclude that all emotions operate in the same
problematic way (Smith, 2010). There is evidence that emotions cooccur or precede moral judgements and can amplify or qualify a moral
judgement (Avramova and Inbar, 2013; see also Maibom, 2010, for a
review).
Conclusion: what can intuitionism offer the teaching of
social work ethics?
Social intuitionism is thought to be able to accommodate the idea of
foundational moral judgements and cultural variation (Roeser, 2005),
avoiding the pitfalls of relativism and moral dogmatism (Haidt, 2013;
Roeser, 2005). In the SIM, there is a place for a priori intuitionist claims
as well as a claim that ‘morality is culturally variable’ (Haidt, 2004,
p. 286). There are a number of opportunities for teaching ethics in social
work within a social intuitionist framework.
First, while a post-hoc rationalisation may support moral judgement,
social discourse and private reflection can influence and moderate the
course and development of the judgement. People can and do change
their minds and are influenced by each other. What is important here is
not just private reasoning processes that take the form of rational argument or inner reflective activity. What is also important is the quality
and calibre of social discourse, debate, exchange and reflection that can
be developed pedagogically with deliberately threaded links across a
whole social work curriculum. The over-riding teaching principle is to
work with the sociality of moral judgement and ethics, and help students
to develop and examine their thinking in the context of others (Haidt,
2001). This involves more than a focus on critical reflection and teaching
about and to abstract theories and cases. It includes debate, think-aloud
reasoning, and revision of initial moral judgements using the more effortful kind of deliberative analytical and hypothetical reasoning associated with Type 2 processing (Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2011).
Ethics Education in Social Work 193
Second, students should understand that intuitive judgements are normal and inescapable, but this does not mean they are exempt from scrutiny and examination by themselves and by others. Slowing the intuitive
process down between intuition and action and introducing reasoning
steps in judgement and decision making along with deliberative reflective processes can refine, moderate or alter the judgement if need be.
This may take the form of developing an awareness of confirmatory
bias, and teaching to increase reasoning skills by examining the forms
and functions of post-hoc reasoning processes used to support intuitions.
For example, although stereotypes and prejudices drive judgements, people can revise these so long as they can recognise the prejudicial basis of
the judgements and self-regulate to control or revise their effects (Mark
and Monteith, 2005), through conscious instruction, and critical reflection and diversity education, for example (Rudman et al., 2001).
Third, teaching can assist with creating new habits of thought about
‘which types of things a person responds to with her moral disapproval’
(Sauer, 2011, p. 718). Morality may have blind spots but, according to
Haidt (2013), it is also formative and binding—it can form and sustain
moral communities. This is, however, a double-edged sword: ‘once a
group is bound together by shared values (such as tolerance and diversity) and shared demons (such as racism), people in the group find it
hard to perceive or accept empirical findings that contradict their shared
moral “matrix”’ (Haidt, 2013, p. 293). The pedagogical approach to social work ethics teaching is to engage in problematisation by testing the
limits of ideas and confronting the ‘normal science’ associated with social work’s received knowledge (social, cultural, personal and
Figure 2 Framework for adapting the social intuitionist model (SIM) for ethics education in social work
194 David Hodgson and Lynelle Watts
professional). By way of a final conclusion, we present Figure 2, which
outlines how some of the key aspects of the SIM may be adapted for
ethics education in social work.
Further research into how these practices transfer beyond the classroom into practice would be one way to engage with insights from moral
psychology on the role that intuition and cognition play with regard to
the formation and reflection on moral judgements and decision making
in social work.
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