Presidential Renomination
Challenges in the 20th Century
WAYNE P. STEGER
DePaul University
This article develops an expected utility model to derive the circumstances in which candidates might consider challenging an incumbent president seeking renomination. Candidates
are hypothesized to challenge incumbents who (1) succeed to the presidency from the vice
presidency, or (2) seek renomination amid an intra-party split. Historical evidence is used to
identify the circumstances in which renomination challenges occur and the consequences for the
general election. The evidence supports both hypotheses, especially the hypothesis that vice
presidents are likely to be challenged if they seek renomination. The magnitude of renomination challenges relates positively to the incumbent’s chances of winning reelection.
One of the common generalizations about presidential elections is that incumbents
win their political party’s nomination if they seek it (David et al. 1960, 67; Keech and
Matthews 1976, ch. 2; Epstein 1978, 178; Abramson et al. 1987). Though renomination challengers have not defeated an incumbent in over 100 years, several have generated significant attention and public support.1 Most notable are Theodore Roosevelt’s
challenge to William H. Taft (1912), Ronald Reagan’s challenge to Gerald Ford (1976),
and Ted Kennedy’s challenge to Jimmy Carter (1980). Lesser challenges include Hiram
Johnson against Calvin Coolidge (1924), Joseph France against Herbert Hoover (1932),
George Wallace against Lyndon Johnson (1964), and Pat Buchanan’s challenge to George
Bush (1992). Harry Truman also faced opposition to his nomination from southern
Democrats in 1948, though no serious alternative emerged during the primaries. Truman
(1952) and Johnson (1968) chose not to seek reelection, decisions that may have been
influenced in part by the strength of other candidates in the New Hampshire primary
(Keech and Matthews 1976, 45-51).2 Since 1912, only Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D.
1. Franklin Pierce (1856), John Tyler (1844), Millard Fillmore (1852), Andrew Johnson (1868), and
Chester A. Arthur (1884) were denied renomination.
2. Lyndon Johnson’s decision to retire was probably more affected by McCarthy’s showing in the
1968 New Hampshire primary than was Truman’s by Kefauver’s showing in the 1952 New Hampshire
primary (Keech and Matthews 1976, 44, 51).
Wayne Steger is associate professor of political science at DePaul University. His research focuses on agenda setting
and presidential nominations, with emphasis on media coverage and the role of party elites in nomination campaigns.
Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (December)
© 2003 Center for the Study of the Presidency
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Roosevelt (FDR), Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton
were essentially unchallenged in their renomination bids. While incumbents prevailed
in every case, it is worth asking when and why candidates challenge incumbent presidents, and why some challenges attract more support than others.
Renomination challenges correlate strongly with the president’s chances in the
general election. In the last 100 years, five of the six most serious renomination challenges preceded the president’s defeat in the general election. Presidents who faced no
or only weak renomination challenges won reelection, typically by a landslide. Whether
renomination challenges affect or reflect a president’s chances in the general election is
a matter of debate. Crotty and Jackson (1985, 205-06) characterize renomination
challenges as increasing the likelihood of defeat in the general election. Mayer (1996b,
58-60) argues that presidents face renomination challenges when they are already likely
to lose the general election. I address this debate by investigating the circumstances in
which different kinds of candidates enter the race.
Despite their frequency and apparent significance, we know relatively little about
when and why renomination challenges occur. Key (1964, 399) recognized the incidence
of renomination challenges, but dismissed them as “revolts by noisy dissident factions
within the parties.” Though Keech and Matthews (1976, ch. 2) offered a detailed analysis, they excluded the most significant renomination challenges.3 Abramson, Aldrich,
and Rhode (1987) concluded that senators rarely challenge incumbents, but their theory
does not explain why senators were the most frequent renomination challengers in the
20th century.4 Crotty and Jackson (1985, 205-06) recognized that incumbents generally
lose their reelection bids after facing a renomination challenge, but they did not address
why incumbents are challenged. All of these studies discuss the difficulties of defeating
an incumbent; none explain when and why presidents face renomination challenges in
the first place.
Mayer (1996b, 46, 58-60) comes closest to providing an explanation when he
observed that incumbents who are popular with their party members tend to be renominated with ease, while those who are not face a rocky reception. I agree with Mayer that
renomination challenges depend on party members’ evaluations of the incumbent’s performance, but argue that renomination challenges are more complex. First, whether a
challenger attracts support depends on party members’ opinion of the president’s performance and the characteristics and strategies of the candidates who pose an alternative
to the president. Second, in contrast to Mayer (1996b), the model leads to the prediction that no, or only a weak candidate will challenge an incumbent when the president’s
party is considered likely to lose the general election. The strongest candidates challenge
an incumbent who is vulnerable within the party in a year when the president’s party
has a strong chance of winning the general election.
3. Keech and Matthews (1976) studied nominations between 1936 and 1972.
4. By my count, seven of the 15 renomination challengers since 1912 were U.S. senators. The time
frame of the Abramson et al. (1987) study excluded most challenges by senators. The underestimation of
senators who challenge incumbent presidents suggests a need to modify their expected utility equation.
Steger / PRESIDENTIAL RENOMINATION CHALLENGES
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The Decision to Enter the Nomination Campaign
Following Black (1972), Aldrich (1980), Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode (1987),
and Adkins (2000), I presume that individuals who run for the presidency are boundedly rational actors who act purposively to attain efficiently some goal under conditions
of uncertainty and risk.5 By efficient, I mean that candidates seek to maximize benefits and minimize costs in an uncertain world, subject to the constraints of limited time
and cognition. Candidates in these circumstances sometimes make errors; they may misjudge their odds or the costs and benefits of entering a campaign. From an analytical
standpoint, the assumption of rational decision making simplifies the assessment of
prospective candidates’ goals and the circumstances that give rise to the probabilities of
success or failure of alternative courses of action available to decision makers, and the
costs and benefits of those alternatives. Individuals considering whether or not to enter
a presidential nomination campaign do so if the utility of running is positive. The utility
of entering the nomination campaign can be presented as:6
Uc = P(Uc|win) + ((1 - P)(Uc|lose)) - C,
where Uc is the utility of entering the nomination campaign; P is the probability the
candidate wins the nomination; (1 - P) is the probability the candidate loses the nomination campaign; Uc|win is the utility of entering the campaign given the candidate
wins the nomination; Uc|lose is the utility of entering the campaign given the candidate does not win the nomination; and C is the costs of entering the nomination campaign, including opportunity costs.
The utility of entering, and winning, the nomination campaign includes the value
of the campaign and the outcomes of both the nomination and general elections. The
decision to enter a nomination campaign is thus a two-stage utility equation, in which
the utility of entering and winning the nomination campaign is a second utility equation for the general election:
(Uc|win) = P1(Ugc|win) + (1 - P1)(Ugc|loss) - Cgc,
where P1 and (1 - P1) are the probabilities of winning and losing the general election
campaign; (Ugc|win) and (Ugc|loss) are the utilities of the general campaign given a victory
and a loss, respectively; and Cgc are the costs of the general election campaign.7 I
5. People have limited time, information, and cognitive capacities, so they cannot consider every
alternative or necessarily choose the option that maximizes their outcome in an absolute sense (Simon 1955).
At a minimum, the transaction costs of gaining information force policy makers to make decisions with
limited information under conditions of uncertainty and risk (Becker 1976; Stigler 1961). Even if we reject
the descriptive accuracy of a bounded rational actor model, we may still assume that presidents act as if they
made boundedly rational decisions within the constraints of reality. See Ordeshook (1986) on the assumptions of rational choice models.
6. None of the studies model expected utility as a two-stage lottery for both the nomination and
general elections.
7. Substituting the utility equation for the nomination campaign becomes: Uc = P(P1(Ugc|win) +
(1 - P1)(Ugc|loss) - Cgc,) + ((1 - P)(Uc|lose)) - C.
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| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
model the value of winning the nomination as a two-stage utility calculation because
strategic candidates likely consider not only the odds of winning the nomination, but
also the odds of winning the general election. A larger number of serious candidates are
expected to enter a nomination campaign if it looks like a good year for their political
party (e.g., 1975 for Democrats), while shying away if conditions indicate low odds of
winning the general election (e.g., 1932 for Republicans).8
The probabilities of winning and losing in the nomination and general election
campaigns depend on a variety of factors including the candidate’s own characteristics,
qualifications, name recognition, favorability ratings, campaign funds, campaign skills,
and campaign strategy; and external factors such as events, economic conditions, media
coverage, voter preferences, and the characteristics and strategies of the other candidates
entering the campaign. The value of winning the nomination and general elections
include the value to the candidate of winning the office with its accompanying prestige,
power, policy influence, and historical value, among other things. The value of winning
the nomination campaign and losing the general election include the value of taking
over the party and/or of promoting issues and policies during the two campaigns. The
utility of entering the nomination campaign given the candidate loses is the value to the
candidate of promoting issues and policies the candidate cares about, and the effects on
the candidate’s current and future career prospects. The costs of entering the nomination campaign include the effects on the candidate’s family, financial status, health,
reputation, current and future career options, and issue and policy concerns, as well as
the opportunity costs of options forgone (e.g., Adkins 2000). A key difference between
this utility equation and previous formulations is that the benefits and costs of entering
the campaign are modeled to vary with whether the candidate wins or loses and by how
much. A good showing, for example, may boost a candidate’s future prospects while a
bad showing could diminish their future prospects. Also, a campaign may benefit or
harm a candidate’s preferred policy positions, if, by running, the candidate increases or
decreases the odds of obtaining favorable policy outcomes, respectively.
I also contend the payoffs of a nomination campaign vary with candidates’ objectives. Previous studies have assumed, in effect, that candidates entering presidential nomination campaigns first and foremost seek to win (e.g., Black 1972; Peabody et al. 1976;
Aldrich 1980; Abramson et al. 1987). In this formulation, the key factors for entering
a nomination campaign are the probabilities of winning and the costs of entering the
campaign (Black 1972; Peabody et al. 1976; Aldrich 1980; Abramson et al. 1987).
While we can assume all rational candidates prefer winning to losing, candidates may
be influenced by multiple goals. The relative weight given to different goals affects the
costs and benefits of entering a nomination campaign. Schlesinger (1975) argued that
individuals who run for the presidency tend to be office seekers interested mainly in
winning and/or policy seekers interested in influencing policy (see also Aldrich 1980,
43).9 While scholars using rational choice models have recognized the distinction,
8. Note that I expect renomination challenges only for presidents of the majority party. The party
advantage of a majority party president leads to a prediction of winning the general election—all else being
equal. Circumstances for specific conditions of nomination challenges are discussed below.
9. Schlesinger’s (1975) benefit seekers derive gains from controlling office, so winning is key.
Steger / PRESIDENTIAL RENOMINATION CHALLENGES
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their analyses tend to discount the impact of a candidate’s policy ambitions. The
relative weight of the values for winning and losing differ for career politicians with
presidential ambitions and those who strongly aspire to influence the party’s policy
agenda. Career politicians with presidential ambition are influenced relatively more by
the odds of winning, while advocates are relatively more influenced by the value of
promoting issue positions, benefits that can be had without necessarily winning the
nomination.
Most of the candidates who mount a serious campaign for a presidential nomination have recently held, or hold, a major political office (Aldrich 1980; Abramson et al.
1987).10 Strategic careerists with progressive presidential ambition devote their careers
to developing their qualifications, reputations, skills, and connections by seeking gubernatorial or Senate office before running for the presidency (Schlesinger 1966; Aldrich
1980). This career path gives them a political base, access to the media, access to fundraising networks, and the experience and credentials needed to be taken seriously as a candidate should they run for higher office (Rhode 1979; Abramson et al. 1987). Short of
winning, a career politician may enter a presidential nomination campaign as a dry run
to improve their chances in a future bid for the nomination or to increase their influence in party circles or Congress (Adkins 2000).
Because they want the office and have something to lose, strategic careerists with
progressive presidential ambition tend to run if they estimate good chances of winning
and low costs of running (Black 1972; Peabody et al. 1976; Aldrich 1980; Abramson et
al. 1987). Because incumbents are so difficult to defeat and the costs of running are high
(Keech and Matthews 1976, ch. 2), career politicians are unlikely to challenge a president for the nomination of their party (Abramson et al. 1987). Thus, while strategic
careerists may be the most threatening to an incumbent, they are unlikely to challenge
an incumbent. Strategic careerists also tend to withdraw from the race when it becomes
obvious they cannot win (e.g., Norrander 2000). Because they are concerned about their
current and future career prospects, career politicians do not want to gain the enmity of
party elites who might view a prolonged campaign as dividing the party and/or damaging the nominee’s chances in the general election (Abramson et al. 1987, 7).
Candidates may also derive benefits from advocating certain issues or policies
(Schlesinger 1975; Aldrich 1980, 43). Advocates enter the nomination campaign to
advance a particular cause, which may be ideological, or issue or constituency oriented.
Advocates may derive sufficient value from raising the saliency of certain issues that they
gain positive utility even if the odds of winning the nomination are small. They gain
value from sending signals to the rest of the party that certain party constituencies cannot
be taken for granted or their policy positions ignored. They may even succeed in influencing the party’s platform or the policy positions of the party’s nominee. Advocates may
also derive career benefits, such as establishing themselves as a national spokesperson for
some constituency or issue. Like career politicians seeking to win, advocates try to maximize votes. Their ability to influence the party’s agenda is in part a function of the
10. Senators and governors are said to be the best offices from which to run for the presidency
(Peabody et al. 1976; Aldrich 1980, 32).
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| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
support they attract. The main difference between strategic careerists seeking foremost
to win, and advocates seeking to influence the agenda, is that advocates are more likely
to derive positive utility from running when they do not win.
An important factor influencing an advocate’s utility calculation is the potential
for raising the salience of issues or policies preferred by some segment of the party membership. The necessary condition for advocates to enter the nomination campaign is the
existence of some partisan constituency whose policy preferences are not being satisfied
by the president. Advocates essentially have motives and utilities similar to candidates
who mount third-party challenges in general elections. Advocates should be more willing
to challenge an incumbent than would career politicians with presidential ambitions
because they can derive more utility from running even when they lose. Advocates also
will be less likely to withdraw during the primaries. Because the conditions that give
rise to disaffection are difficult to reverse during a campaign, a challenger could continue competing even though he or she is unlikely to win. An advocate might withdraw
from the race if the president modifies his policy positions.
The two positions are not mutually exclusive. Strategic careerists have policy preferences and advocates would prefer to win, all else being equal. Candidates have electoral and policy goals, differing mainly in the weight they attach to different goals.
Classifying candidates is difficult because we cannot directly observe their motivations.
Further, once a candidate is running, that candidate will act as if he or she has presidential ambition. Still, it may be possible to make rough estimations about the extent
to which candidates lean more toward one type or the other. We can gain insights about
candidates by looking at their prior behavior and by identifying which groups they associate with and seek support from.
Candidates who previously sought a presidential nomination are more readily
argued to have presidential ambition.11 Repeat candidates have already demonstrated
their ambition and willingness to take risks.12 Candidates who associate with and seek
support from a minority faction of the party are likely to be advocacy candidates, as their
core support in the party is unlikely to prevail in a nomination struggle. Candidates tend
to generalize or specialize in their appeals to voters (Hickman and Yohn 1998; Mayer
1996b, 40-41). Candidates who generalize seek the support of multiple segments of
voters, while those who specialize focus their appeals to draw the support of a particular segment(s) of voters. Strategic careerists tend to adopt a generalized strategy of appealing to multiple constituencies because they seek to form a winning coalition (assuming
that no single constituency group constitutes a majority of the party). Advocates, by contrast, tend to adopt specialized strategies to maximize their vote-getting potential among
constituencies sympathetic to their cause.13 While advocates may increase their odds of
11. This criterion is necessary but not sufficient for identifying a strategic careerist versus an advocacy candidate who runs repeatedly (e.g., Jesse Jackson). See below on this point.
12. Abramson et al. (1987) measured risk acceptance in terms of whether a senator had challenged
an incumbent when he or she first ran for the Senate.
13. Specialized strategies require fewer resources to campaign for the votes of targeted groups
(Hickman and Yohn 1998). Protest candidates can continue competing in part because they run skeletal
campaigns, spending far less than mainstream candidates (Mayer 1996b, 40-41).
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gaining votes among disaffected party segments, their vote-getting power is generally
constrained to those constituencies—creating an upper limit to their support. If the targeted constituencies comprise a minority of the party, then it is nearly impossible for an
advocate to win the nomination.14
The main limitation of this method of classifying candidates occurs when the competing factions of a party are of nearly equal size or strength. In this circumstance, there
is uncertainty about which will prevail in the competition for the party’s presidential
nomination, and the specializing and generalizing strategies converge.
When Do Careerists and Advocates Challenge an Incumbent?
The normal expectation is that incumbent presidents will not be challenged. First,
most presidents enter the campaign with a winning coalition built during the preceding nomination cycle. The president’s renomination reflects an expression of power by
the coalition that he has constructed in the party (Key 1964, 399). Challenging an
incumbent for the nomination is tantamount to attacking the party’s earlier decisions,
its record in office, and threatens to split the party (Keech and Matthews 1976; Abramson et al. 1987, 7). Second, challengers must overcome the president’s enormous competitive advantages. Presidents can use their offices to deter or defeat competitors with
their advantages in name recognition, organizational support, media access, fundraising
capacity, and access to government resources (Key 1964; Keech and Matthews 1976, 42;
Aldrich 1980; Crotty and Jackson 1985; Abramson et al. 1987; Polsby and Wildavsky
2000). These studies conclude that the best challengers do not run, and that those that
do are unlikely to defeat an incumbent for the presidential nomination of one of the
major political parties (Polsby and Wildavsky 1976, 103; Keech and Matthews 1976,
43; Abramson et al. 1987).
There are, however, circumstances in which strategic careerists and advocates might
expect positive utility from challenging an incumbent. Neither strategic careerists nor
advocates would challenge an incumbent unless they perceive the president lacks support
among some segment(s) of the party membership, which they could tap in building their
own coalition in the nomination campaign.15 Disaffected party constituencies define the
potential support that a challenger may hope to attract in a renomination campaign. A
challenger’s odds of winning the nomination depend on the breadth and intensity of disaffection among party constituencies, and on a challenger’s ability to gain the support
of disaffected partisans. The breadth and intensity of disaffection reflects broader socio-
14. This holds unless there are multiple candidates dividing the majority faction of a party (e.g.,
Brams 1978).
15. Each political party’s membership consists of multiple constituencies—segments of voters who
do not necessarily form definable groups, but who share similar characteristics and/or policy preferences that
motivate those voters’ candidate preferences. These segments overlap to the extent that voters in each
segment share similar issue or policy preferences. A segment of a party may be uni-dimensional in the case
of single-issue voters, or multi-dimensional in the case of voters with more complex preferences (Steger
et al. 2002).
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| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
economic and cultural conditions, and the president’s performance in articulating and
implementing policy strategies for dealing with those problems (Mayer 1996b, 46).
Whether disaffected partisans support a challenger also depends on the challenger’s characteristics and appeals. For a strategic career politician, the breadth and intensity of disaffected party constituencies would have to be estimated to be large enough to make
possible the forming of a majority coalition during the primaries and/or at the convention. For an advocacy candidate, the number and sizes of disaffected constituencies need
not constitute a majority of the party for him or her to gain positive value from entering the campaign. An advocacy campaign needs, at a minimum, only to demonstrate
the willingness of certain party constituencies to defect from the president if their policy
concerns are not addressed.
I argue that renomination challenges are more likely if the president has failed
to gain or maintain a winning coalition of party members. First, the incumbent could
have attained the presidency without gaining the support of a majority coalition in the
party in the preceding nomination cycle. One possibility is that a candidate from a
minority faction of a political party won the previous nomination as a result of several
candidates splitting the vote of the party’s majority faction in the primaries (Brams
1978). Such an event, however, would be uncommon if it occurs at all. Another possibility occurs when a vice president succeeds to office on the death or resignation of the
elected president. Unlike elected presidents, vice presidents who succeed to the presidency have not demonstrated their command of a majority coalition of the party membership during the previous election cycle. Vice presidents selected to balance the ticket
may be particularly vulnerable if they come from the “minority” faction of the political
party.16 Vice presidents may also be more constrained than an elected president in using
the office to build support for their renomination (see below). Potential challengers in
the party may view such presidents as vulnerable and be more willing to challenge them
for the party’s nomination.
Second, a renomination challenge might occur if the coalition that previously nominated the incumbent fragments during the president’s term. Coalition fragmentation
could increase the probability of a renomination challenge by giving a potential challenger a pool of constituents to whom they can appeal during the nomination campaign.
Fragmentation of the president’s nominating coalition could occur, first, as part of longerterm patterns of party coalition coalescence and fragmentation, as Skowronek (1993)
argues. The instability and uncertainty of a critical era (Aldrich 1995) may leave the
nomination “up for grabs” and lead a challenger to believe he or she has a good chance
of forging a new majority coalition within the party. For a renomination challenge to
occur in this case, a challenger must be seeking to preserve the party’s status as the majority party by reconfiguring the coalition that comprises it. In the absence of this condition, I would not expect party coalition fragmentation to produce a renomination
challenge.
16. Historically, presidential tickets were balanced along sectional lines with candidates coming
from different regions, often corresponding to the majority and minority factions of a political party (Key
1964).
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The president’s electoral coalition might also fragment if a president’s actions or
inaction alienate one or more party constituencies. Most presidential actions or inaction
are not expected to produce a renomination challenge. A necessary precondition is a
latent intra-party division, which a president’s actions or inaction activate. An intraparty split on some issue(s) of consequence increases the likelihood that some segment
of the party membership will be disenchanted with the president, especially if constituent expectations on both sides cannot be satisfied. Both political parties have had
major internal divisions during the periods of stability that occur between realignments,
as defined by Burnham (1970) and Sundquist (1973). The majority Republican coalition of 1896 to 1930/32 experienced a major division between conservative and progressive factions (Wilensky 1964; Mayer 1967; Mowry 1972). The New Deal coalition
of 1932 experienced a recurring split between southern and northern Democrats after
1937 (Shelley 1983; Fredrickson 2001).17 These divisions were of such magnitude that
a president who failed to keep the peace in the party could see partisans willing to defect
to a renomination challenger. There may also be more transient, but still major, splits
on specific issues such as the major parties experienced during the Vietnam War (Mayer
1996b).
If the degree of coalition fragmentation reaches a critical level (i.e., the president
lacks a clear majority coalition in the party), then a strategic career politician might estimate a reasonable chance of building a winning coalition in the primaries and/or at the
convention. The conditions for entry by an advocacy candidate are broader because
unsupportive party segments need not constitute a majority coalition in the party. Advocates would seem to be especially likely to run if a split exists within the president’s
party. Because presidential candidates usually are selected by a majority coalition of party
constituencies, the policy preferences being discounted will likely be those of a minority faction of the party. I expect that advocates typically associate with a minority
faction of their party and are unlikely to win because disaffected constituencies constitute a minority of the party’s membership.
Thus, I hypothesize that candidates will challenge an incumbent’s renomination
when (1) the incumbent is associated with a minority faction of the party, as could occur
when either candidates split the majority faction vote during the preceding nomination
campaign or a vice president succeeds to office between elections; or (2) the incumbent’s
coalition in the party deteriorates as a result of a broader party coalition fragmentation
or an intra-party split on some salient issue. A strategic careerist with presidential
ambition is expected to challenge an incumbent when circumstances give him or her
reasonable odds of forming a majority coalition in the party (and favorable odds in the
general election). Challenges by advocates are expected to be even more common, but
to attract only limited support because the sum of these constituencies need not form a
winning coalition in the party.
17. Realignment studies diverge on when the New Deal coalition fragmented. While the New
Deal coalition decayed slowly over time, a growing literature views 1964 as pivotal in this decline (Carmines
and Stimson 1989; Aldrich 1995). Skowronek (1993) views Carter as the last president of the New Deal
coalition.
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Assessing the Occurrence and
Magnitude of Renomination Challenges
Renomination challenges occur all the time. What makes a challenge serious is the
degree of support they attract in the primaries and/or at the convention. I view a “serious”
nomination challenger as one who attracts more than a trivial amount of support and
is taken into account by other candidates. Following Steger et al. (2001), I use a
modified Hirshman-Herfindahl concentration index to summarize the number of
serious candidates in an election and their respective vote shares (see also Hickman 1992).
The number of serious candidates in an election, Nc, is obtained by dividing 1 by the
sum of squares of each candidate’s share of the national primary vote: Nc = 1/S(c1%2 +
. . . + cn%2). The additional information of vote share makes the measure superior to
simply counting the number of candidates in an election and avoids data truncation problems that result from using a threshold to define a serious candidate.18 The measure also
provides an intuitive sense of the number of serious candidates in a race. The measure
is bounded at 1 on the lower end in the case of an unopposed candidate, and increases
as the number of serious candidates gets larger. To illustrate how the measure works,
consider three hypothetical elections. In the first, the president is the only candidate and
receives all of the votes. This yields an Nc = 1.0 serious candidates. In the second race,
the incumbent wins 75% of the vote and a challenger wins 25% of the vote. This race
yields an Nc ± 1.6 serious candidates, indicating the incumbent is certain to prevail but
with significant slippage in support. In the third race, the incumbent and challenger
win 51% and 49% of the vote, respectively. This would yield an Nc ± 1.99 serious candidates. See Appendix A for coding of variables.
By this measure, Wilson, FDR (in 1936 and 1944), Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan,
and Clinton were essentially unchallenged in either the primaries or the conventions (see
Table 1). An average of only 1.13 candidates received votes in the primaries, and an
average of only 1.18 candidates received votes on the first convention ballot of these
renomination campaigns. While Eisenhower and Nixon were challenged, their opponents attracted negligible support (see below). The most serious challenges were against
Taft, Ford, and Carter. An average of 2.2 candidates received votes in the primaries, and
an average of 1.83 candidates received votes on the first convention ballot of these renomination campaigns. The other, lesser challenges were uni-dimensional—gaining substantial votes in either, but not both, the primaries or the convention. Coolidge (1924),
Hoover (1932), Johnson (1964), and Bush (1992) faced opponents in the primaries but
not at the conventions. Because primaries became more consequential following the
McGovern-Fraser reforms, Buchanan’s challenge to Bush should be considered more
serious than similar primary-based challenges in the pre-reform era. FDR and Truman
faced some opposition in the 1940 and 1948 Democratic conventions, respectively, but
not in the primaries.
18. Reiter (1985) counts as serious any candidate who received more than 10% of the vote in any
given primary. Such a threshold, however, truncates the data (Achen 1986). Abramson et al. (1987) use lists
of major candidates from the CQ Weekly Report. This list includes individuals who never actually ran.
Steger / PRESIDENTIAL RENOMINATION CHALLENGES
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TABLE 1
Average Number of Effective Candidates Seeking the Republican and Democratic Party
Presidential Nominations, 1912-2000
Number of
Effective
Democratic
Candidates in
Primaries1
Number of
Effective
Democratic
Candidates on
1st Convention
Ballot2
Number of
Effective
Republican
Candidates in
Primaries1
Number of
Effective
Republican
Candidates on
1st Convention
Ballot2
President’s
Share of the
Popular Vote
in the General
Election
1996
1992
1984
1980
1976
1972
1964
1956
1948
1944
1940
1936
1932
1924
1916
1912
1.12
—
—
2.13
—
—
2.33
—
1.00
1.10
1.27
1.15
—
—
1.00
—
1.00
—
—
1.88
—
—
1.00
—
1.58
1.16
1.33
1.00
—
—
1.00
—
—
1.57
1.00
—
1.99
1.16
—
1.22
—
—
—
—
2.63
1.79
—
2.49
—
1.02
1.00
—
2.00
1.00
—
1.00
—
—
—
—
1.04
1.08
—
1.62
49.2
43.0
58.8
41.0
48.0
60.7
61.1
57.4
49.5
53.4
54.7
60.8
39.6
54.1
49.2
23.2
Avg.
St. dev.
1.39
0.53
1.24
0.33
1.73
0.61
1.22
0.38
50.23
9.99
1
2
Number of candidates is averaged across all primaries in a nomination campaign.
Floor votes on the first convention ballot, prior to shifts by individual delegations.
Having established which presidents faced moderate or serious challenges, I turn
to the circumstances of these challenges (see Table 2). I begin by noting that none of the
four hypothesized circumstances existed for incumbents who were essentially unchallenged in their renomination campaigns (Wilson 1916, FDR in 1936 and 1944, Reagan
in 1984, and Clinton in 1996). Eisenhower (1956) and Nixon (1972) faced minor challenges, based in part on policy disagreements on foreign policy (see below). These cases
seem sufficiently clear-cut that I will focus on the circumstances of the moderate and
serious renomination challenges.
Within the time frame of this study, Carter is arguably the only president associated with a minority faction of his party who might have been previously nominated as
a result of other candidates splitting the votes of the party’s majority faction. Carter associated with moderate/conservative Democrats (Drew 1976), and his nomination was
owed in part to the division of the liberal primary vote among several candidates (Brams
1978; Aldrich 1980).19 Carter’s renomination was made more difficult by the decline of
19. Carter’s nomination also owed to the dynamics of campaign momentum (e.g., Bartels 1988).
838
| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
TABLE 2
Circumstances of Incumbent Renomination Challenges, 1912-2000
Min. Faction
President1
1912
1916
1924
1932
1936
1940
1944
1948
1956
1964
1972
1976
1980
1984
1992
1996
VP Succession
to Presidency2
Party Coalition
Fragmentation
Intra-Party
Split3
Strategic
Challenger
Advocacy
Challenger
X
X
X
No Serious
Challenger
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1
Elected president is associated with minority faction of the party. See Appendix A for methodology on classifying majority or minority faction.
2
Vice president succeeded to presidency on the death or resignation of the elected president.
3
President’s party is divided or split on some constituency-based issue.
4
Different scholars offer different dates for the possible end of New Deal coalition (compare Carmines and
Stimson [1989] and Skowronek [1993]).
the party organizations, and more susceptible to mass partisan preferences as a result of
the expansion of primaries in the selection of delegates to the nomination convention.20
While one could argue that Clinton and Eisenhower were associated with the moderate
wings of their parties, both had received the support of large partisan majorities in the
primaries that they had entered during their first nomination bid.21 Also, Eisenhower
was a mainstream Republican on fiscal and foreign policy (Alexander 1975), and Clinton
had ties to social liberals, who constitute a majority of Democrats voting in primaries
(Green et al. 1999). Carter faced a renomination challenge; the others did not.
Vice presidents who succeed to the office upon the death or resignation of an elected
president almost always face a renomination challenge. Of the nine vice presidents ever to
succeed to the presidency on the death or resignation of the elective president, only
Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 was unchallenged in his bid for renomination.22 All four
20. Before the McGovern-Fraser reforms, public opinion (polls) influenced nomination decisions
indirectly through their effects on the calculations of party bosses who controlled blocs of delegates to the
conventions (Reiter 1985).
21. Eisenhower’s “modern Republicanism” modified the party position, accepting federal provision
of welfare insurance (Shafer and Claggett 1995). Clinton had served as chair of the Democratic Leadership
Coalition and was endorsed mostly by conservative Democrats in Congress (Steger 2000b).
22. Aware of his precarious position, Roosevelt avoided affronting conservative Republicans by
holding back on progressive legislation until after his reelection; he spent most of his first term securing
support for his nomination in 1904 (Mayer 1967; Josephy 1976).
Steger / PRESIDENTIAL RENOMINATION CHALLENGES
| 839
vice presidents to succeed to the presidency in the 1800s were associated with a minority faction in their political party (David et al. 1960, 67-68).23 All four failed to be
renominated. After 1904, every vice president to succeed to the presidency won renomination. These later vice presidents were associated with the majority faction of their
political party (Mayer 1967, 390-94; Kirkendall 1971; Martin 1971; Boller 1996).
Vice presidents who succeed to the office may be more likely to face a renomination challenge in part because they often have less opportunity to use the office to
consolidate support within the party. Successionary vice presidents of the 1800s were
constrained in their use of the office to promote their own candidacy because administration positions and other sources of patronage were largely committed through the
negotiations of the preceding party convention. Presidents of this century have had more
flexibility, as this constraint gradually declined as the political party machines declined
and the presidency became more centered on the individual in the office. The opportunities of successionary vice presidents also are affected by party control of Congress.
Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, and Lyndon Johnson had the advantages of large
partisan majorities in Congress. Truman and Ford had to deal with a Congress controlled
by the opposition party. Whereas Truman had enough Democratic votes to sustain his
vetoes, Ford often did not. Vice presidents who succeed to the presidency can be advantaged if their predecessor was popular (e.g., Johnson), but disadvantaged if their predecessor left office under a cloud of scandal or other source of disapproval (e.g., Coolidge
and Ford). While Truman and Johnson faced the difficulty of living up to high expectations, they could use their office to establish themselves in their own right. More
limited were Calvin Coolidge, who inherited the Teapot Dome scandal, and Gerald Ford,
who inherited the legacy of Watergate. How these presidents responded may have
affected their renomination and reelection prospects. Coolidge disassociated himself from
the scandals by launching investigations and punishing corrupt administration officials;
Ford continued to be saddled with Watergate by pardoning Nixon.
Assessing the fragmentation of a party coalition is difficult, though research on
party realignments generally hold that a critical period of party coalition fragmentation
occurred in 1930/32 (Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1973). The majority Republican Party
coalition was bleeding support by the elections of 1930 and 1932, which were critical
in the realignment between the fourth and fifth party systems (e.g., Burnham 1970;
Sundquist 1973). Some party leaders, concerned with the prospect of a bad showing at
the top of the ticket, considered dumping Hoover (Mayer 1967). The severity of the
Depression, however, probably had the effect of minimizing the quality of challengers
in the 1932 Republican nomination campaign. No major party figure, even progressive
Republicans, would run because of the dim prospects for victory in the general election
(Fausold 1985, 194-95; Boller 1996, 232).24 Further, while the Republican Party was
deteriorating, the conservative wing maintained its grip on the party (Fausold 1985,
23. These were John Tyler (1844), Millard Fillmore (1852), Andrew Johnson (1868), and Chester A.
Arthur (1884).
24. The continuation of the Depression and Republican losses in Senate and gubernatorial races contributed to the paucity of major candidates in the 1932, 1936, and 1940 Republican nomination campaigns
(Bain 1960, 245).
840
| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
194). Our model predicts only a weak candidate, if any, to challenge Hoover as a result
of the dim prospects for victory in the second stage of the expected utility equation.
Joseph France was such a candidate (Bain 1960, 234-35).
More difficult to pin down is whether and when the New Deal coalition underwent a “critical era” of fragmentation. Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Aldrich (1995)
argue that the critical era occurred in the 1960s, with the 1964 election being particularly important in the fragmentation of the New Deal coalition. Skowronek (1993) views
Carter as the last president of the New Deal coalition, with 1980 being critical in the
cycles of coalition coalescence and fragmentation. While 1964 is often considered a critical election in arguments of a realignment leading to a sixth party system, the election
of 1964 was not as decisive as that of 1932 (Bullock 1988; Aldrich 1995). Though the
pace of defection by southern Democrats increased, arguments on 1964 focus more on
the efforts by Republicans, under Barry Goldwater, to appeal to southern white voters
(Eldersveld and Walton 2000, 400-05).25 Still, southern opposition to federal activity on
civil rights might have made the party ripe for a renomination challenge. Carter had the
misfortune of holding office when the New Deal coalition was on its last legs (Skowronek
1993, 361-406). Carter had poor relations with traditional Democratic constituencies
such as labor and liberals and with congressional Democrats (Polsby 1981, 39-41; Light
1982). Uncertainty about which faction would prevail might have contributed to Ted
Kennedy’s challenge to Carter’s renomination. Kennedy’s renomination campaign
featured efforts to pull together a coalition of traditional Democratic constituencies
and “new liberals,” consistent with the earlier prediction about party coalition
fragmentation.
While party fragmentation is a concern, the more consistent problem for incumbent presidents, of the majority party, is the existence of intra-party splits that have
occurred between critical eras—the periods widely referred to as stable party systems
(1896 to 1930/32, and 1932 to 1964). Intra-party divisions afflicted the majority Republican and Democratic coalitions of the fourth and fifth party systems, respectively. With
the sole exception of 1944, candidates challenged every majority party president who
sought renomination during these party splits.
Republican Presidents Taft and Coolidge faced renomination challenges during the
conservative-progressive split of this era. The progressive-conservative Republican split
began to emerge in 1902, peaked between 1910 and 1916, and waned in the 1920s
(Mayer 1967, 283-87; Mowry 1972; Link and Link 1993). The election of 1910 set off
an intense struggle between Taft and conservative Republicans on one side, and the
progressives organized in the National Progressive Republican League on the other, for
control of party organizations throughout the country (Wilensky 1964; Mayer 1967,
318-21). In these circumstances, Taft’s command of a majority coalition in the Republican Party was uncertain (David 1972, 39), such that a progressive challenger might
have believed he could gain the party’s presidential nomination. Calvin Coolidge sought
25. This appeal makes the 1964 election similar to the 1932 election, when the Democrats, under
FDR, began to appeal to progressive Republican voters. From this perspective, 1964 is arguably the clearer
turning point—not 1980 as Skowronek argues. The qualitative difference between 1980 and 1964 is that
Reagan was more successful appealing to socially conservative Democrats from all regions.
Steger / PRESIDENTIAL RENOMINATION CHALLENGES
| 841
renomination during the later stages of the conservative-progressive split of the fourth
party system (Noggle 1974; Link and Link 1993). Coolidge faced renomination challenges from Hiram Johnson and Robert LaFollette—the leaders of the diminished bloc
of progressive Republicans in the Senate. Though the party continued to be split, the
conservative wing of the party demonstrated its control of the nomination process, defeating progressive presidential candidates in 1912, 1916, 1920, and 1924 (Bain 1960,
215).26
The majority New Deal coalition began to split after the elections of 1936 when
southern Democrats began to join Republicans in the conservative coalition opposed to
growing federal activity in areas formerly handled by state governments (Burke 1971;
Keech and Matthews 1976, 35-36). While FDR remained enormously popular and the
preferred choice of most Democrats, he alienated southern Democrats when he tried to
replace several anti-New Deal Democrats in the nomination cycle of 1938 and with his
efforts to pack the Supreme Court with sympathetic judges (Frederickson 2001). There
also was concern about whether a run for an unprecedented third term would create
a backlash against Roosevelt (Bain 1960, 251). To overcome this potential backlash,
Roosevelt remained publicly noncommittal to renomination while a “draft Roosevelt”
effort went on behind the scenes. By the time Roosevelt’s intentions were clear, however,
Vice President James Garner and Democratic National Committee Chair and PostMaster General James Farley had initiated their campaigns (see below).
Southern opposition to growing federal power increasingly focused on the issue of
civil rights, which threatened the “southern way of life.” Truman faced serious opposition to his renomination from southern Democrats outraged by his call for desegregation in his 1948 State of the Union Address (Donaldson 1999, 157-64).27 The extent of
popular southern Democratic opposition is difficult to measure, however, because no polls
were taken of Truman’s popularity among southern Democrats and no southern state
held a presidential primary in 1948. Delegates from Alabama and Mississippi walked
out of the Democratic convention after failing to defeat a desegregation plank (Key 1964,
330-44). Most of the remaining southern delegates supported Senator Richard Russell
(GA), who won 22% of the vote on the first convention ballot. Truman’s renomination
was owed in part to his cultivation of support among the party’s state and local
organizations, and his aggressive opposition to the Republican Congress during 1948
(Kirkendall 1971). Truman’s opposition also may have been constrained by widespread
perceptions of dim Democratic Party prospects of victory in the general election (Keech
and Matthews 1976, 41).
While one could view the 1964 renomination as occurring during a party fragmentation (as part of a realignment), the renomination could also be viewed as occurring amid a continued intra-party split between realignments. LBJ sought renomination
26. The Republican Party establishments reasserted control in the 1920 and 1924 nomination campaigns, in part by increasing the number of convention delegates selected in party-controlled caucuses and
conventions (Mayer 1967; Noggle 1974).
27. Truman also alienated liberal Democrats. His crackdown on labor strikes and growing conflict
with the Soviet Union (an ally only three years before) motivated a minor third-party challenge in the general
election by Henry Wallace (Keech and Matthews 1976, 38-41).
842
| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
amid continued southern opposition to the federal efforts to promote desegregation
(Frederickson 2001, 236). While circumstances suggested a possible renomination challenge, Johnson had gained support among non-southern Democrats by enacting legislation stalled under Kennedy and he had cultivated the support of party bosses throughout
the country (Tillett 1966; Roseboom and Eckes 1979).
To understand the circumstances of Bush’s renomination in 1992, it is useful to
remember that the growing Republican coalition of traditional and cultural conservatives, which emerged with Goldwater and Nixon’s southern strategies and was cemented
by Reagan, began to experience tensions by 1988. The split between social conservatives
and moderates that emerged in 1988 continued in 1992 (Glenn 1994). Social conservatives who had supported Pat Robertson in the 1988 Republican nomination were
dubious of George Bush’s commitment to their issues in 1988, and Bush did little to
meet their expectations in office (Baker 1993). Bush also angered traditional conservatives by reneging on his 1988 “no new taxes” pledge (Burnham 1992, 28-30). Unlike
previous presidents, Bush did little to mollify growing opposition in his party by spelling
out what he intended to do in a second term (Burnham 1992, 28).
In sum, evidence suggests that vice presidents who succeed to the presidency typically face renomination challenges and that divisions within the majority party consistently produce struggles over nominations and renominations as factions vie for control
of the party. The coalitional integrity of a majority party following a party realignment
does not appear to be long lasting. The majority coalitions that emerged in 1896 and
1932 soon began to split between majority and minority factions. These intra-party splits
are evident in the competition over presidential nominations and appear to be a primary
source of renomination challenges.
Characteristics of the Challengers
In contrast to arguments that career politicians are unlikely to challenge an incumbent president, I find that most of the candidates who challenged incumbents were
career politicians with a major elective office (see Table 3). Nominations are in part struggles between competing factions of a party (Brams 1978; Aldrich 1980). Leaders of these
struggles typically are career politicians who associate with the policy preferences of one
(or more) factions of a party, and who may have presidential ambition. Of the challengers
who attracted notable support in the primaries or at the conventions, only James Farley
and Pat Buchanan were not career politicians in the sense of having held elective
office. The frequency of renomination challenges by career politicians belies the unidimensional assumption of single-minded seekers of reelection who characterize most
rational choice models. Most presidential renomination challengers were career politicians, many of whom had previously demonstrated their willingness to take risks by
seeking a presidential nomination. The majority of these candidates, however, are
probably better thought of as advocates rather than strategic careerists. Most of the
challengers associated with and drew support from a minority faction of their party.28
28. See Appendix A for a brief description of how majority and minority factions were identified.
Steger / PRESIDENTIAL RENOMINATION CHALLENGES
| 843
TABLE 3
Profiles of Candidates Challenging Incumbent Presidents, 1912-2000
Incumbent
1912
1916
1924
Taft
Wilson
Coolidge
1932
1936
1940
Hoover
F. Roosevelt
F. Roosevelt
1944
1948
1956
F. Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
1964
1972
L. Johnson
Nixon
1976
1980
1984
1992
1996
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Bush
Clinton
Leading
Challenger
Prior
Presidential
Candidacy
Highest
Elective
Office
Share of
Primary
Vote
Vote on 1st
Convention
Ballot1
T. Roosevelt2
Yes
President
52.5
9.9
Johnson
La Follette
France2
Yes
Yes
No
Senator
Senator
Senator
28.6
2.3
48.5
1.0
3.1
—
Garner
Farley2
Yes
No
Vice Pres.
none3
9.5
—
5.6
6.5
Russell
Knowland
Bricker
Wallace
Ashbrook
McCloskey
Reagan
T. Kennedy2
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Senator
Senator
Senator
Governor
US Rep.
US Rep.
Governor
Senator
—
1.4
8.24
10.8
5.0
2.1
45.9
37.1
21.6
—
—
—5
—
—
47.4
34.5
Buchanan2
No
none3
22.9
—
Primary vote and convention vote tabulated from Bain (1960) and Congressional Quarterly’s (1998) U.S.
Elections, 3d ed.
1
Percentage of votes on the first ballot, excluding candidates with less than 1 percent of the vote. Lyndon
Johnson was nominated by acclamation, rather than by roll call vote in 1964.
2
The incumbent faced no challenger or only a token challenger in one or more primaries or at the
convention.
3
James Farley had been appointed postmaster general and Democratic National Committee chair in 1940.
Pat Buchanan had been a speechwriter in the Nixon and Reagan administrations.
4
Senator John Bricker ran as a favorite son in 1956; his delegates cast votes for Eisenhower on the first ballot
at the convention.
5
Lyndon Johnson was nominated by acclamation rather than by roll call vote on the first ballot.
A career politician, Theodore Roosevelt could be considered to be either a strategic careerist or an advocacy candidate. There is ample evidence that Theodore Roosevelt
was still highly interested in being president (Wilensky 1964; Mowry 1972). Roosevelt
may have estimated a good chance of winning given his popularity, the growing strength
of the progressive movement, and the schism within the Republican Party that weakened Taft’s control of the party. Given his popularity and the majority status of the party,
Roosevelt may well have believed he could have won the election if he became the Republican presidential nominee. Roosevelt beat Taft in the primaries, but failed to overcome
Taft’s support by the regular party organizations.29 It is also clear that Roosevelt sought
29. Roosevelt was advantaged in primaries because states with progressive movements tended to
adopt primaries for selecting convention delegates. Taft’s supporters won control of the credentials committee, which rejected disputed Roosevelt delegates selected in caucuses (Mayer 1967).
844
| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
to advance a progressive agenda (Schlesinger 1963; Wilensky 1964; Link and Link 1993).
Roosevelt’s frustration with Taft’s opposition to progressive legislation motivated his
decision to challenge Taft (Mayer 1967, 317-21).
Though they were career politicians with presidential ambition, Senators Hiram
Johnson and Robert LaFollette are probably better characterized as advocates. Johnson
and LaFollette were the leaders of the minority, progressive faction of the Republican
Party, and both had long histories of challenging the party’s dominant conservative
faction (Mayer 1967). Johnson had been a founder and vice-presidential candidate of the
Bull Moose Party in 1912 and had sought the Republican nomination in 1920 (Burner
1971). LaFollette had long been a leader of the progressive Republicans who had worked
to undermine party machine control over nominations (Burner 1971, 261-62). LaFollette also had challenged Taft’s renomination in 1912.30 Neither Johnson or LaFollette
could have realistically expected to win the nomination in 1924; conservative party regulars had demonstrated their ability to defeat progressive candidates in 1912, 1916, and
1920 (Bain 1960, 215; Noggle 1974). LaFollette appears to have accepted the slim odds
of winning the nomination, because he focused more on laying the groundwork for his
third-party candidacy than he did seeking the Republican nomination.
As a former one-term senator, Joseph France had little to lose in terms of his political career. France had never run or received support in a prior presidential nomination
campaign. France did not actively seek delegates to the 1932 Republican convention and
did not even gain credentials to the convention (Fausold 1985, 196). He entered primaries mainly to demonstrate the degree of opposition to Hoover that existed in the
party (Bain 1960, 234; Friedel 1971). He avoided most primaries with binding votes
while entering preferential primaries with non-binding votes (Freidel 1971, 2713).
France encouraged delegates to the 1932 Republican convention to support Calvin
Coolidge rather than himself (Bain 1960, 237). France’s central policy stance was opposition to prohibition, which was the more popular position but contrary to the party’s
platform (Bain 1960, 234-35). None of these behaviors reflect presidential ambition.
Though he had finished third in the 1932 Democratic primaries, John Nance
Garner was probably closer to an advocacy candidate in 1940. Garner was associated with
the minority faction of the Democratic Party, having joined conservative southern
Democrats opposed to the New Deal in 1938 (Bain 1960, 251-59). James Farley’s campaign was more clearly that of a candidate seeking to win. As postmaster general and
Democratic National Committee chair, Farley dispensed patronage as he began seeking
support for the nomination as early as 1938. Both campaigns, however, could not initially be seen as challenges to Roosevelt because they began amid uncertainty about
whether Roosevelt would seek an unprecedented third term. Farley’s campaign was
premised on the assumption that Roosevelt would not seek a third term (Burke 1971,
2932).31 Neither was considered to have realistic chances of winning the nomination
(Burke 1971, 2932-33). Garner opposed the New Deal, which had broad support among
30. LaFollette’s 1912 renomination challenge was dwarfed by Roosevelt’s.
31. Before the 1960s, the general doctrine was that the office should seek the man, not the man the
office (David et al. 1960). FDR sought to create the appearance of a draft Roosevelt movement, to which
he would reluctantly accept the nomination (Bain 1960).
Steger / PRESIDENTIAL RENOMINATION CHALLENGES
| 845
Democrats (Burke 1971; Keech and Matthews 1976). While he held two patronagedispensing positions, Farley had lacked the support of almost all party bosses. Party
leaders and the media considered Farley unelectable because of his Catholic religion (Bain
1960; Burke 1971, 2932).32 Garner’s was essentially an anti-New Deal advocacy campaign. While Farley sought to win, his chances were considered minimal given prevailing
“conventional wisdom” that a Catholic could not be elected.
Though no candidate emerged during the primaries, many southern Democrats
opposed Truman’s renomination in favor of “someone” supporting states rights and segregation. The Dixiecrats sought to reestablish southern influence in the Democratic Party
and to reduce federal government interference in the southern way of life (Kirkendall
1971, 3121). Excepting delegates from North Carolina, southern Democrats supported
Senator Richard Russell (GA) on the first ballot of the convention (Bain 1960).33 Russell’s
candidacy, however, was limited to providing an option for southern Democrats to cast
a protest vote at the convention. The rebelling Dixiecrats supported Strom Thurmond’s
third-party candidacy in the 1948 general election. These campaigns are more reflective
of advocacy than serious attempts to win the Democratic presidential nomination.
Though Eisenhower was highly popular, he faced challenges from Senators John
Bricker and William F. Knowland in 1956. Neither candidacy should be considered
renomination challenges, however. Bricker ran only as a favorite son in Ohio and his delegates were cast for Eisenhower on the first ballot of the convention. Knowland’s candidacy was less a challenge to Eisenhower than a contingency if Eisenhower’s health failed.
Knowland entered the primaries in case Eisenhower, who had suffered a heart attack and
had continuing health problems, decided not to seek the nomination (Moos 1971).
Knowland withdrew from the campaign once Eisenhower declared his intentions to seek
a second term (Bain 1960, 298).
Alabama Governor George Wallace’s 1964 campaign could be viewed as either a
southern issue advocacy campaign, or as an initial presidential bid to increase his chances
in a subsequent nomination. Wallace was a popular governor who would run again in
three subsequent presidential nomination campaigns. Wallace, however, had not previously sought the presidency, and his 1964 campaign advocated segregation, conservative
social values, and states rights in the Dixiecrat tradition (Schlesinger 1993, 591). He
suspended his campaign after Barry Goldwater became the Republican nominee,
claiming that the nomination ensured southern voters the “opportunity to vote for a
candidate sympathetic to Southern concerns” (Tillett 1966, 6). I view Wallace as an
advocacy candidate in 1964, who later evolved into a strategic candidate with presidential ambition. Wallace modified some of his segregationist positions as he sought to
broaden his appeal in subsequent nomination campaigns.
Nixon faced two minor challenges from Representatives Paul McClosky and John
Ashbrook, who challenged Nixon’s renomination in 1972. McClosky’s challenge was an
32. Al Smith’s disastrous defeat in the 1928 general election was widely attributed to his Catholicism (Bain 1960). The prospect of war in Europe further reduced opposition to Roosevelt’s nomination to
an unprecedented third term (Bain 1960; Burke 1971).
33. Most of the delegates from Alabama and all of those from Mississippi had already walked out of
the convention after failing to prevent a desegregation plank in the party’s platform.
846
| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
advocacy campaign, emphasizing an anti-war perspective, while Ashbrook’s was an advocacy campaign from the right (Keech and Matthews 1976, 98-99). Neither campaign
received serious attention. The media generally ignored them and Nixon focused more
on potential Democratic rivals than either of these campaigns (e.g., Bernstein and Woodward 1974). McClosky and Ashbrook each gained less than 5 percent of the national
primary vote and no convention delegates.
Most analyses of the 1976 nomination portrayed Reagan as a serious candidate who
believed he could win the nomination (Drew 1976; Bartels 1988, 205-19; Boller 1996).
Reagan had finished second in the 1968 Republican primaries. Reagan began the 1976
campaign with a sizable base, having inherited the supporters of Barry Goldwater (Boller
1996, 345). Ford was arguably the most vulnerable successionary vice president of the
20th century. He had not been nominated or elected to either the presidency or the vice
presidency. He had never run a national campaign. He had to deal with a resurgent
Congress in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate. Congress frequently overrode his
vetoes, preventing Ford from effectively putting up the good fight as Truman had done
in 1948. Given Ford’s vulnerabilities, the strength of Reagan’s renomination challenge
is not surprising. It is worth noting that Reagan’s challenge may have presaged the
emerging conflict between social and traditional (economic) conservatives in the Republican Party. With the exception of Florida, Reagan won every southern primary, where
social conservatives are strongest in the Republican Party. Ford ran strongest in states
with more socially moderate Republicans.
Like Reagan in the Republican Party, Ted Kennedy was a major figure in the
Democratic Party. “Kennedy was not only the heir to America’s most famous political
name, but he was also a talented and powerful politician in his own right and the
acknowledged leader of his party’s liberal wing” (Bartels 1988, 219). While he had not
formally run for the Democratic nomination, Kennedy had received write-in votes in the
1968, 1972, and 1976 primaries, and his presidential ambitions were well known.34
Though he possessed strong ideological preferences, Kennedy was widely seen as running
because he did not think much of Carter’s leadership and because he seemed to have a
good chance of winning in the summer and fall of 1979 (Drew 1981, 14-16, 245; Pomper
1981; Polsby 1981). Carter was vulnerable as the nomination campaign approached.
Through most of 1979, Kennedy consistently beat Carter in trial heats among Democrats by a margin that hovered around two to one, and Democratic leaders from around
the country encouraged Kennedy to run in 1979 (Pomper 1981, 9; Polsby 1981, 4243). Kennedy sought to build a “revived coalition of traditional Democratic voters such
as union workers, urban residents, Catholics and blacks” (Pomper 1981, 22). Kennedy’s
association with the traditional, majority faction of the Democratic Party lends credence
to our earlier argument that Carter was challenged in part because of his identification
with the moderate/conservative faction of the Democratic Party.
34. How to consider write-in votes is particularly problematic, because candidates (e.g., Hubert
Humphrey) often ran campaigns for write-in votes rather than appear on the ballot as an official candidate.
Kennedy received over a third of the 1968 Illinois primary votes on write-in ballots. Kennedy seriously
considered running in 1972, but opted not to after the Chappaquidick Creek scandal (Bernstein and
Woodward 1975).
Steger / PRESIDENTIAL RENOMINATION CHALLENGES
| 847
Having never held elective office, Pat Buchanan had few of the characteristics
associated with a serious presidential candidate. Buchanan ran on an anti-tax, socialconservative, and America-first agenda. His stump speeches criticized the “Washington
establishment” and appealed to Republicans to “send a message” to Washington (Steger
2001). Though Buchanan drew support from various Republican constituencies in New
Hampshire, he was mostly associated with the social-conservative wing of the Republican Party. Across the primaries, his main support came from social-conservatives dissatisfied with Bush’s lack of commitment to their issues (Baker 1993). His was clearly an
advocacy campaign, fitting with the view of the contemporary Republican Party as split
between social conservatives and moderates.
Interestingly, many of the candidates I identify as advocates were at one time or
another involved in a third-party challenge in the general election, which suggests the
power of their policy motivations. Theodore Roosevelt gained 27.4 percent of the popular
vote on the Bull Moose ticket, which included Hiram Johnson as the vice-presidential
candidate. Robert LaFollette gained 16.6 percent of the vote on the Progressive Party
ticket in 1924. Strom Thurmond gained 2.4 percent of the popular vote and 39 Electoral College votes on the States’ Rights ticket in 1948.35 George Wallace gained 13.5
percent of the vote on the American Independent Party ticket in 1968. Following another
unsuccessful nomination campaign in 1996, Pat Buchanan ran in 2000 on the United
We Stand ticket. This is consistent with our argument that advocates have similar motivations as third-party candidates in general elections: they realize they are unlikely to
win, but run anyway to move the agenda to a more favorable position.
While they all failed to win the nomination, many of the challengers may have
derived benefit from policy gains. Most of the renomination challengers succeeded in
moving the style, if not the substance of the incumbent’s agenda, more so as their challenge gained support. Roosevelt’s candidacy pushed Taft toward a more progressive position (Wilensky 1964; Mayer 1967, 327). Taft tried to position himself as in between the
“radical” progressives and the “stand-pat” conservative Republicans in Congress (Wilensky 1964, 12-14; Mayer 1967, 320-21). Johnson’s and LaFollette’s 1924 challenges had
the effect of pushing the Republican Party to adopt progressive planks on trusts and
agriculture (Burner 1971, 2462-65). The potential loss of southern votes induced a
change in Truman’s approach to civil rights during 1948. Truman adopted more ambiguous language in his rhetoric on civil rights and he refrained from proposing any draft
legislation on civil rights in 1948 (Kirkendall 1971, 3107-08). Ford’s campaign
responded to Reagan by pushing proposals dear to traditional conservatives (e.g., tax
credits, cutting certain welfare programs, increasing defense spending) but conceded
little on social issues (Drew 1976). Carter’s campaign seemed to be influenced mostly in
being pushed to explain how it would provide better leadership in a second term, though
he did make some promises to particular Democratic constituencies such as labor (Drew
1981). Pat Buchanan’s challenge induced George Bush to adopt the rhetoric of family
values during the primaries and summer of 1992 (Glenn 1994, 190), suggesting that
35. Thurmond’s low popular vote total owes in large part to the historically low voter turnout in
southern states.
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he recognized the need to regain the support of socially conservative Republicans. The
prominent time slots given to Buchanan and other social conservatives at the 1992
Republican convention indicate Bush’s willingness to give at least rhetorical support for
the preferences of social conservatives.
Of the advocacy candidates, only France, Garner, and Wallace appear to have had
little effect on the incumbent’s campaign. France’s campaign had almost no effect on the
Republican convention or platform, which renominated Hoover and maintained a prohibition plank (Bain 1960, 234-37). Garner’s opposition to the New Deal and support
for isolationism had no notable effect on Roosevelt’s rhetoric, the party platform, or the
outcome of the general election (Burke 1971). Wallace’s candidacy did not discourage
Lyndon Johnson’s support for desegregation or federal involvement in social welfare
(Keech and Matthews 1976, 98-99).
Discussion and Conclusions
Vice presidents who succeed to the presidency and presidents whose party has
serious divisions have been more likely to face challenges to their renominations. I am
less confident about the effects of party fragmentation (as part of a realignment) and presidents associated with a minority faction of their party; the number of cases is too small
for reliable inferences. Unfortunately, we cannot isolate which factor (minority faction
president, vice-presidential succession, party coalition fragmentation, or intra-party
splits) were decisive in generating renomination challenges in elections when more than
one factor is present. Elected presidents whose party remained reasonably unified faced
only trivial opposition to their renominations.
Keech and Matthews (1976, 43) and others have argued that candidates who challenge an incumbent president generally do not come from the top tier of a political
party’s potential candidates. I agree in that most renomination challengers are associated with a minority faction of their party, but I disagree in that they are not party
leaders. Further, I have argued that strong candidates from a majority faction of the president’s party may challenge if the president is not nominated and elected in his own
right and if the president associates with a minority faction of the party. Renomination
challenges by Reagan and Kennedy exemplify this point. Most renomination challengers
were senators or governors and were known leaders of minority factions of their party.
Theodore Roosevelt, Hiram Johnson, and Robert LaFollette were leaders of progressive
Republicans. John Nance Garner, Richard Russell/Strom Thurmond, and George
Wallace drew support mainly from southern Democrats and others dissatisfied with
growing federal power, particularly with respect to desegregation (Tillett 1966). Only
Pat Buchanan could be considered to have been a relatively low-caliber candidate given
his relative lack of experience in elective office.
Norrander (2000) observed that strategic careerists withdraw from their nomination campaigns once it becomes apparent they cannot win. Candidates who challenge an
incumbent president, in contrast, rarely abort their campaign when it becomes apparent the incumbent has enough convention delegates to win renomination. Candidates
Steger / PRESIDENTIAL RENOMINATION CHALLENGES
| 849
who challenged incumbent presidents continued their campaigns throughout the
primaries in both the pre- and post-reform eras. The frequent characterization of these
nomination challenges as “protest candidacies” fits with the argument that candidates
who challenge incumbents are strongly motivated by policy concerns. All of the candidates who challenged an incumbent president, including those I identify as career
politicians seeking primarily to win, had important policy differences with the incumbent. The assumption of a single-minded seeker of election probably oversimplifies
candidates’ motivations. Generally, both motivations seem to matter in presidential
renomination challenges.
Studying renomination challenges has several implications for our understanding
of party realignments. The intra-party splits associated with renomination challenges do
not coincide with critical elections (e.g., Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1973). The existence of intra-party splits in each party suggests an overstatement of “majority” party
status during stable party systems. Both parties, when in the majority, had serious internal divisions that made them susceptible to renomination conflicts. These splits emerged
early in both the fourth and fifth party systems. The Republican Party’s majority coalition began to split after the election of 1902. The New Deal coalition began to split
after 1936. These splits did not immediately lead to realignment, however. Leaders of
defecting partisans remained with their party for years before realigning with the other
party. The Republican Party began to splinter after 1902, but the Democratic Party did
not attract progressive Republicans until Franklin Roosevelt ran on a progressive platform in 1932. The Republican Party did not appeal to disaffected southern Democrats
until Barry Goldwater’s campaign in 1964. Future research on realignments needs to
look at the intra-party competition that occurs during presidential nominations.
Appendix A
Data on candidate vote shares in presidential primaries come from Scammon and
McGillivray’s (1996) America Votes, cross-referenced and updated with Congressional
Quarterly’s (2001) Guide to U.S. Elections. I calculated the sum of votes for each primary
using the aggregate vote shares of individual candidates rather than the total number
of votes cast in primaries. This sum excludes votes for unidentified “others,” “scattered
write-ins,” and “uncommitted,” because vote shares are not identifiable for individual
candidates. Including these votes creates measurement error because these votes would
appear as those received by a single candidate when they are spread among unknown
numbers of individuals or none at all. I included write-in votes for candidates who
received at least 1 percent of the total number of votes cast in the primaries to make the
measure as inclusive and as close to the total number of votes cast as possible. Write-in
votes often constitute a significant portion of primary votes and occasionally affect outcomes (Key 1964, 411). The main problem with the measure is that favorite son candidates from large states (e.g., Ohio) can inflate the number of candidates in the measure.
This happened in 1932 and 1964 when the incumbents avoided primaries. The effect of
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favorite son candidates is trivial in other elections because incumbents entered most of
the primaries.
The number of candidates receiving votes on the first ballot of the convention is
used because, for most state delegations, this is the only vote on which delegates were
bound by prior commitments. The concentration index for convention vote share is
calculated in the same way as the measure for candidates’ primary vote shares. Data on
conventions from 1912 to 1956 were obtained from Bain (1960, appendix D). Data
on convention ballots from 1960 to 2000 were obtained from the CQ Guide to Elections,
4th edition.
Assessing whether a candidate represented the majority or minority faction of a
party is impossible with statistical measures because relevant survey data does not exist
prior to 1980. For Table 3, I relied on qualitative judgments using historical studies as
cited in the text.
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