China’s Declining Military Power
China’s Declining
Military Power
JAMES H. NOLT
Senior Fellow
World Policy Institute
S
ince the demise of the Soviet Bloc more than a decade ago, China has
often been touted as the military superpower against which the United
States must arm. While there is some debate over how strong China is
today and how long it will be before it is a real danger to the United States,
almost all academics, journalists, and public officials writing or speaking about
China assume that it is a rising power. Economically, China is a rising power.
Militarily; however, China has been declining relative to the United States and
its allies for three decades now. Furthermore, China’s current military means are
insufficient for victory over feasible adversaries, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, India,
Japan or Russia, not to mention the United States. Unless China greatly increases
its relative military effort in the coming years, it would not be able to prevail
against any major aggression. China can defend itself from foreign occupation
and remain a regional status-quo power, but it is not a rising or threatening
power.
International relations theorists have long maintained that what matters
is not absolute but relative military power. Relative power is significant in two
ways: first, ability to prevail over likely adversaries, and second, trends in power
relative to likely adversaries. A country may be in decline but still likely to
prevail over adversaries in a variety of circumstances. Many who do agree that
China is not now a major military threat to Taiwan or other potential adversaries
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nevertheless suggest that China may be formidable in the future. China’s relative
military decline; however, suggests otherwise.
A surprising number of books and articles warning of China’s military
ascent do not examine China’s power relative to potential enemies, but only
discuss China’s “military modernization” in an isolated sense. Yet China’s relative
military decline is evident in military spending, weapons procurement, combat
manpower, technology, military industrial base, ability to attract allies, and
economic self-sufficiency. China’s impressive economic growth is the only basis
for claiming China is a rising power, but the nature of that growth militates
against China’s emergence as an autonomous military power.
Ground forces have always been the foundation of China’s military. In
fact, the Chinese air force and navy are not independent and equal services, as
in most countries, but subordinate parts of the army, or PLA. Mao Zedong’s
strategy of “people’s war” against the threat of all-out invasion by the Soviet
Union or the United States reinforced the dominance of the ground forces until
after Mao died in 1976. More recently, with the demise of the Soviet Union and
the crucial role played by air power in the Gulf War, the NATO campaign
against Serbia and Afghanistan, Chinese strategists have emphasized the greater
possibility of limited wars conducted predominantly by naval and air forces,
but the PLA has been slow to restructure and modernize to adapt to this change
in strategic thinking. The existing armed forces remain adequate to defend
Chinese territory against invasion, but they are inadequate for any significant
offensive operations beyond China’s borders and coastal waters.
China’s Relative Military Decline
China has enjoyed rapid economic growth since Deng Xiaoping gained power in
1978. Many people assume that this economic growth almost automatically
ensures that China is also a rising military power.1 In fact, China’s pattern of
growth and modernization since 1978 has gutted the old Stalinist-style militaryindustrial state, greatly reducing the resources and productive capacity available
to the military. Whereas before Deng much industrial planning was dedicated to
squeezing mass consumption to direct investment and other resources to military
uses, China in recent decades has developed a consumer-driven economy in
which the ability of the state to direct resources towards the military has been
severely curtailed. This change is evident in labor policy and the decentralization
of industrial ownership and control.
Ordinary Chinese are most cognizant of the first change. Before Deng,
the Communist party assigned employment. Many of the best engineers and
other skilled workers were forced to work in the arms industry. During the
1960s, Mao worried that war with either the United States or USSR might be
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imminent. Under the “Third Front” program he relocated much of arms
production to remote regions in the interior of China. Many Chinese resented
being assigned to work in such places, but they had no choice. Since Deng’s
economic reforms, people have chosen their own careers and work where they
want. If you poll university graduates today, you will find very few going to
work in military industries, whereas in Mao’s time most of them, especially
engineers and scientists, worked on military projects. Most of the former military
factories and research facilities, especially those in remote areas, have either
closed down or converted to civilian production.
Political and economic decentralization was one of the hallmarks of
Deng’s reforms. Initially wholesale privatization did not occur, but most state
factories were transferred from central government administration to the control
of provincial and local governments. Reforms have made individual businesses,
and even state-owned ones, more responsible for their own product development,
hiring, pricing, and planning. Since China has not yet developed a national income
tax system, enterprise profits remain a major source of government revenue.
Local governments pass a negotiated portion of it to the central government,
but the latter now commands a much smaller share of GDP than in most other
countries, including the United States. The central government’s limited resources
make any large increase in military spending nearly impossible without thorough
domestic fiscal reform and political recentralization.
Military spending
China’s first major cuts in defense spending occurred before Deng’s rise to power.
Chinese military effort peaked at over 10 percent of GDP during 1969-71,
when Chinese leaders feared imminent war with the Soviet Union, and has
declined to about one quarter of that peak percentage.2 The biggest cuts were
in 1972, after the death of Defense Minister Lin Biao, and in 1978, after the
accession of Deng as China’s paramount leader.3 Military procurement was cut
in half from 1978 to 1982, and fell another 20 percent by 1986. Real military
spending continued to fall by about 3.5 percent per year during the 1980s. It has
increased slightly since 1989, but still continued to decline as a percentage of
GDP. The latest budgets show large increases, but most of that is to cover
increased personnel costs.4 Military salaries have tended to lag below those
available to comparably skilled workers in the private sector. Although
calculations of China’s defense spending vary widely because of secrecy,
researchers agree on these basic trends. During the Deng years, factories
producing for the military have been encouraged to switch production to civilian
goods. By 1994, about 70 percent of the gross output of the former arms factories
was for civilians. That figure is expected to plateau at about 80 percent.5
China’s major military spending cuts preceded the post-Cold War cuts in
the United States, Russia, and Europe. U.S. military spending decreased during
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the 1990s, but not nearly as much as China’s did earlier. Since the 11 September
terrorist attacks, military spending is again rising substantially. Other major Asian
powers, including Japan, Taiwan, India, and Pakistan did not cut back their
military effort as China did in the 1970s and 1980s. Japan, India, and Pakistan
have expanded military spending at roughly the same rate as their economies
grew, so that spending as a percentage of GDP remained approximately constant
at about 1, 3, and 7 percent, respectively. During the 1990s, military spending
rates in Taiwan did not keep pace with its booming economy, but nevertheless
real spending expanded significantly while China’s stagnated. Taiwan’s military
effort has fallen from 8-9 percent of GDP during the 1970s to around 5 percent
recently.
Weapons procurement
China’s military spending cuts greatly reduced weapons procurement. During
the 1950s, China’s military forces were modernized using massive imports of
Soviet arms, supplemented by increasing domestic production of Soviet designs.
From the 1960s through 1980s, China
relied almost entirely on domestic
Amazingly, Taiwan has production of increasingly obsolete
consistently outranked designs, but production dropped after the
1970s defense cuts. During the 1990s,
mainland China as an China resumed arms imports from Russia
and began modest purchases from France.
arms importer.
Because of the failure of most of its
domestic arms development programs,
China is increasingly dependent on imports and licensed production of foreign
designs for most of its military modernization needs. However, the volume of
arms China can afford to import is small in relation to the size of its forces.
Thus very few units are able to reequip with modern weapons.
Amazingly, Taiwan, with only 22 million people, has consistently
outranked mainland China as an arms importer, with 1.3 billion people. In fact,
during 1996-2000, Taiwan surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the world’s biggest
arms importer, buying over $12 billion. China’s arms imports were less than
half that, at about $5.2 billion. China recently surpassed India as an arms importer,
but is still behind Turkey and South Korea, as well as Taiwan and Saudi Arabia.6
Domestic manufacturing supplements arms imports. Even including
domestic production; however, China remains behind Taiwan in combat aircraft
procurement. Since air power would be decisive in any China-Taiwan conflict,
this is a major shortcoming. During the past decade, China ordered 118 Su-27/
30 fighters from Russia (not all have been delivered). China has begun assembling
the Su-27 from Russian kits, about 15 so far, but “considerable quality control
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problems”7 have delayed deliveries. China has been unable so far to produce
any modern indigenous designs, but did also build about a hundred obsolescent
J-8 fighters during the past decade. During the same period, Taiwan procured
340 modern combat aircraft, including 150 U.S.-made F-16, 60 French-made
Mirage 2000, and 130 Taiwanese-built Ching Quo (developed from the F-20).
Thus Taiwan procured nearly three times as many modern fighters as did China.
Even adding the less modern J-8 to China’s totals, Taiwan maintains a
considerable procurement lead.8
India has also been procuring modern combat aircraft faster than China.
During the past decade it acquired 215: 63 MiG-29, 18 Su-30, 90 Jaguar, and 40
Mirage 2000 fighters. Another 224 of these types have been ordered, most to be
license-built in India. During the next five years, as all these enter service, China
is expected to complete no more than about 100 Su-27 (J-11) and J-10, plus
perhaps a few dozen JH-7 bombers. In addition, during the 1980s and 1990s,
India procured 213 MiG-23/27 and 23 Sea Harrier, superior in quantity and
quality to China’s 218 J-8 (including early models). Both China and India are
also upgrading some of their older MiG-21/J-7 fighters, though in this category,
China has a numerical edge (324 to125) that somewhat offsets their disadvantage
in more modern fighters. China also has an advantage in even older models of
the MiG-21 (300 to 96) and maintains nearly 2000 MiG-19 derivatives (J-6/Q5) in service, but these are mostly worn out and nearly worthless in modern air
combat. Numerically, China’s air force (PLAAF) is the world’s second largest
after that of the United States, but since procurement of modern replacements
is below that of several potential rivals (not to mention the United States), the
PLAAF is declining in relative capability as worn out and obsolete planes are
being rapidly scrapped.9
The Chinese navy (PLAN) seems to be the most favored of the three
services. The navy is the only branch of the PLA that has actually increased its
strength since 1978. The surface navy grew throughout the Deng years, adding
two or three seagoing warships (destroyers and frigates) each year during the
1980s. New construction has slowed down recently; however, to about one per
year, and seems to be slowing further to release funds for purchasing Russianbuilt ships, beginning with two recently-ordered Sovremenny-class destroyers
(aping the import-dependent trend of the PLAAF). A rapid building program
during the 1970s brought the PLAN to a peak of over 100 submarines by the
early 1980s. The submarine force has since declined to about half that; however,
as old submarines wear out, since new construction has dropped to two per
year, but most of these are the obsolete ‘Ming’ class. The PLAN is, at best, the
world’s sixth most powerful navy (after the United States, Russia, UK, France,
and Japan), but is more backward than any other major navy. Chinese naval
technology has made few advances over the standard inherited from the 1950s
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cooperation with the Soviets. Maintenance and operational standards are not
very high. The PLAN’s best equipment is imported from France and Russia, but
China can afford it only in small quantities. Considering only hulls constructed,
China’s surface navy (though not its submarine fleet) seems to be growing, even
relative to some adversaries, but considering the lack of modern weapons and
electronics mounted on those hulls, China’s naval expansion looks less
impressive.10
Of the three services, the army has been cut the most in recent years.
Its personnel strength of 1.6 million is less than half of what it was in 1978.
Recent announcements promise further cuts. China’s army equipment, though
less obsolete than navy and air force equipment, is nevertheless more backward
than that of all neighboring Asian powers. China has the world’s third largest
tank force, but about two-thirds of the PLA’s 8,000 tanks are the obsolete Type59: Chinese copies of the Soviet T-54 tank of the 1950s. Production of newer
models has been very limited, far below the peak levels of Type-59 production
in the 1970s and completely inadequate to replace existing stocks as they wear
out. Although China has long land borders and potential enemies on every side,
it produced only 400 Type-85-III tanks, plus a handful of more recent models,
while Taiwan, an island, recently bought 300 superior U.S. M-60A3 tanks. India
has less than half as many tanks as China, but far fewer of them are obsolete
models. India is now manufacturing 124 of its own modern Arjun tank and will
procure 310 very advanced Russian-designed T-90 tanks, giving India’s tank
force an increasing technological edge over China’s.
Combat manpower
Because China is procuring new weapons at a much lower rate than during the
Mao era, its manpower strength must inevitably continue shrinking until it reaches
a level that is sustainable. Manpower strength has already dropped from over 4
million in the early 1980s to less than 2.3 million today. Reductions continue
toward a goal of about 2 million in the next few years. U.S. reductions have been
almost as steep: from 2.2 to 1.4 million. On the other hand, the Indian armed
forces, now the world’s third largest, have actually increased during that same
period from about 1.1 to almost 1.3 million (after increasing substantially from
less than 500,000 in the mid-1960s). South Korean forces also increased from
600,000 to 683,000. Japan’s active armed forces have remained steady at about
240,000. Of Asian powers, only Vietnam and Russia have dropped faster than
China. Russia dropped the most: from 4.4 million when it was still the Soviet
Union to less than a million today. Vietnam’s military went from 1.2 million to
less than 500,000. Taiwan’s manpower dropped, but much less than China’s:
from 484,000 in 1983 to 370,000 today, dropping toward a goal of 350,000.
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Active military manpower tells only part of the story; however. Many
countries retain equipment for recently trained reserves that could be mobilized
in the event of war. Many combat units are only partially manned during
peacetime. For example, the Chinese army has about 1.6 million active soldiers
and over 500,000 reserves that are needed to fill out many of its units before
they would be combat ready. This total of over two million troops form about
60 combat divisions and a couple dozen brigades (roughly 1/3 of a division),
plus numerous local garrisons and support troops. Taiwan depends on 1.5 million
reservists to fill out its 21 larger divisions (including 7 reserve), 8 brigades, and
other support units. Because of its greater reliance on reserves (given that Taiwan
is safe from invasion without long preparation), Taiwan has not reduced the
number of combat units it fields, whereas China has decreased its combat
divisions from over 120 in the 1980s to half that today.
Military technology
China’s leaders decided in 1985 that China was unlikely to face a major war for
at least ten years; therefore, they further cut current weapons production to
concentrate on developing more modern weapons in an effort to close the
technological gap between China and potential adversaries. Chinese leaders
expected that modernization of the civilian economy would also facilitate military
modernization and that closer cooperation with the West would include transfers
of military technology. Both these expectations have been frustrated. The civilian
economy has been greatly stimulated by a combination of decentralization and
privatization. However, these same processes have undermined China’s militaryindustrial complex. Numerous military joint ventures with the West were canceled
after the Chinese government’s violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square
protest in June 1989.
Most of these projects have never recovered. The most important were
the J-10 fighter, which was to be equipped with advanced Western jet engines
and electronics, and two ‘Luhu’-class destroyers. With the cessation of Western
help, the development of the J-10 has been so delayed that it is not expected to
enter service before 2005, yet it is unlikely to be much better than the imported
Su-27 in service with the PLAAF since 1992. Since 1989, China has turned
more to Russia for military technology. China has been disappointed by Russia’s
preference for selling complete weapons or assembly kits rather than transferring
technology. So far, Russian help has done little to advance China’s capacity for
indigenous development of sophisticated weapons. China’s major weakness is
in systems engineering, as integrated weapons systems become more complex.
The inferior quality of China’s arms is highlighted by the experience of
two important export customers. During the 1980s, Thailand bought many
Chinese arms. The Thai navy began a rapid expansion with the purchase of six
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Chinese-built frigates. Thailand wanted to buy only the hulls from China, and
equip the ships with Western weapons and electronics. China insisted on providing
complete warships, offered a good price, and delayed its own warship programs
to prioritize the Thai order. Thailand agreed, but was soon disillusioned with its
choice. The workmanship was so poor the ships had to be overhauled as soon
as they arrived in Thailand. The diesel engines proved so unreliable that Thailand
has had to confine the ships to coast guard duties. Thailand insisted that the
final pair be delivered as empty hulls, which were fitted in Thailand with GE
gas turbines, German diesels, and weapons and electronic equipment from the
United States, as originally planned. The Thai army was similarly disappointed
with Chinese Type-69 tanks and 130mm artillery. The 130mm gun barrels wore
out too quickly. The tanks’ inferior diesel engines belched black smoke, rendering
them too conspicuous on the move. They are now in storage. Thailand now
prefers to buy surplus U.S. Army M60 tanks rather than newly manufactured
Chinese models.
Myanmar (Burma) has had a similar experience. After the army violently
crushed the pro-democracy movement there in 1988, China was one of
Myanmar’s few foreign friends. From 1990, China sold Myanmar over $1 billion
worth of warships, planes, tanks, and other weapons. “Now, however, Myanmar
is trying to diversify its sources of military hardware. The Burmese are
complaining about the poor quality of the Chinese equipment, as well as problems
with maintenance and spare parts.”11 Other major Chinese arms customers, such
as Pakistan and Iran, now prefer to buy most of their weapons from more
sophisticated producers like France and Russia, respectively. Chinese arms
exports have plummeted from their peak in the 1980s to about 3 percent the
value of U.S. arms exports in recent years.12
Military alliances
A nation’s security does not depend solely on its own efforts. One must also
consider its ability to attract allies. During the 1950s, China was part of the
powerful Soviet Bloc. By the mid-1950s, China had also become one of the
leaders of the Third World movement. During the 1960s, China split from the
Soviet Union, culminating in some border battles in 1969, but retained influence
in many parts of Asia and Africa because of its support for national liberation
movements and powerful pro-China communist parties in many countries.
However, hostility with India increased as a result of the 1962 border war.
During the 1970s, China restored relations with the United States, partly on the
basis of common animosity towards the Soviet Union, replaced Taiwan in the
UN, and restored relations with many U.S. allies, including Japan. However,
relations with Vietnam went from military alliance to open hostility in the 1979
border war. During the 1980s, China’s influence among communists evaporated,
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but its trade with many countries expanded considerably. Although China’s
commercial relations continued to expand in the 1990s until today, militarily,
China became more isolated.
The demise of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991 was an enormous relative
gain for the United States and a relative loss for China. Nearly all European,
American, and Japanese military efforts had been focused on the Soviet threat.
Removing that threat has brought U.S. and allied hegemony to a degree
unprecedented in world history. Whatever cuts were made to the military forces
of the United States and its allies since, they are insignificant compared to the
disintegration of the principal threat they were designed to face. With most of
the old Soviet navy now scrapped or rusting at anchor, the United States and its
allies possess an overwhelming majority of the world’s naval and air power,
utterly unrivaled. Eight of the top ten industrial powers in the world are longstanding members of the U.S. alliance system. New countries continue to be
drawn into the U.S. alliance system. Most Eastern European states have joined
or are joining NATO. Even Pakistan, which has long had close military
cooperation with China based on mutual antagonism with India, has been weaned
away from China toward the United States during the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.
Russia and China have improved their relations since the demise of the
Soviet Union, which does somewhat relieve China’s security concerns on its
northern border, but this reduction of the threat to China is nowhere near as
significant as the reduction in the threat to the United States and its allies.
Operations like the Gulf War in 1991, the NATO air campaign against Serbia,
and the war in Afghanistan today would have been inconceivable for the United
States if the Soviet bloc had not collapsed. During both the Korean and Vietnam
Wars, U.S. commitment of military force to Asia was limited by the need to
deter the Soviets in Europe as well. Today there is no such constraint. The
United States could potentially deploy nearly its entire navy, air force, and army
to a war in Asia, if required. Whereas China is nearly surrounded by potential
adversaries with significant military capabilities, the United States is secure (from
war at least, if not terrorism) in its own hemisphere. U.S. interests in Europe
and Japan are now more secure than ever before in history. Militarily, China has
no reliable allies. It is at least as isolated today as it was in the 1960s, but even
more vulnerable because of the lack of any countervailing force to the United
States and its allies. China is not a superpower and cannot possibly rival the
United States and its allies in this century.
Limits of China’s Offensive Military Capabilities
Despite the nervousness abroad about the “modernization” of China’s large
armed forces, China’s offensive capabilities remain quite limited. The most talked
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about scenarios involve Chinese armed action against Taiwan or against rival
ASEAN claimants for the islands and waters of the South China Sea. A successful
invasion of Taiwan would be impossible. More limited harassment of Taiwan
or ASEAN by sea and air is possible, but China’s ability to prevail is doubtful.
Given the considerably
more rapid buildup and
Australia purchased an operational modernization of the
F-class submarine from the Russian military forces of Taiwan
Navy, larger and more capable than and ASEAN, China’s
capability to gain from
China’s R-class, as a museum military action in the East
exhibit.
or South China Seas is
actually declining. Many
commentators focus on China’s acquisition of certain modern capabilities,
without noting that modernization is not affecting the vast bulk of the Chinese
forces. Taiwan, on the other hand, is procuring more new weapons than China.
During the 1990s, Taiwan re-equipped virtually its entire navy, air force, and
army with new warships, missiles, combat aircraft, and tanks.
Blue water navy?
China still lacks the ability to project significant naval power outside its coastal
waters. China has no aircraft carriers and nearly all of its fighter force has limited
range, so China’s surface navy is quite vulnerable to air attack. Therefore, the
most important element of the PLAN is its submarine force. Submarines can
more safely operate beyond the range of friendly air cover.
China has the world’s third largest submarine force. However, much of
it is non-operational and the entire force is technologically backward, despite
the fact that China’s most noteworthy naval technological accomplishment has
been the design and development, at great expense, of nuclear-powered
submarines.13 The main thrust of this project was to add a handful of submarinebased ballistic missiles to China’s nuclear weapons delivery capability, but the
technology was also applied to produce five nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs), launched 1971-90. Submarines depend on stealth for protection, yet
the Chinese SSNs, like the earliest Soviet ones, are noisy, and thus relatively
easy to detect and destroy. Their sonar and other electronic equipment was
recently replaced by superior French gear, but it is not nearly as sophisticated as
that of foreign SSNs. Like all other Chinese submarines, the SSNs’ weapons—
torpedoes and cruise missiles—are less sophisticated than those of the top naval
powers. China has for some years been constructing a more modern nuclear
submarine (Type 093) similar to the Russian Victor III class of the 1980s, but it
will not be completed before 2005.
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The bulk of China’s submarine force is actually several dozen copies of
the diesel-electric Soviet R-class of the 1950s. China built 84 from 1962 to
1984, continuing to produce them for years after the last of the Soviet R-class
was scrapped as obsolete. Jane’s Fighting Ships estimates that about 30 still
exist, but says, “Operational numbers are difficult to assess as no submarine
spends more than a few days at sea each year because there are insufficient
trained men...[Anti-submarine] capability is virtually non-existent.” Submarines
are very difficult to operate, and especially difficult to operate effectively in
combat. China has no combat experience with submarines. Its crews spend so
little time at sea that even their basic seamanship is questionable, let alone their
combat ability.14 The PLAN’s inexperience must seriously impair the capability
of most of its submarine force. It is interesting to note that Australia purchased
an operational F-class submarine from the Russian Navy, larger and more capable
than China’s R-class, as a museum exhibit open to public inspection in Sydney
harbor.
Since completing the R-class, the Chinese have built diesel-electric
submarines of their own design, but the rate of construction has dropped from
over eight per year in the later 1970s to no more than two per year since the
1980s. The 20 Type 035 ‘Ming’ class and 3 new Type 039 ‘Song’ class are slightly
larger and 38 percent faster underwater than the R-class (Type 033). The ‘Song’
class represents a significant advance because they can fire modern anti-ship
missiles from underwater and are much quieter than the ‘Ming’ class. Two more
are under construction, along with additional ‘Ming’ class submarines. China
has recently purchased four modern Russian ‘Kilo’ class submarines. The 7
Chinese ‘Kilo’ and ‘Song’ classes are comparable to the Dutch, Swedish, and
German-designed submarines obtained by South Korea (9), Taiwan (2),
Indonesia (2), Singapore (4), and India (14, including 10 ‘Kilo’ class, plus 2
more building), but inferior to the 16 Japanese submarines and the six Swedishdesigned submarines with revolutionary air-independent propulsion built in
Australia. China’s few modern submarines do not outclass forces available to
several other Asian navies, not to mention the huge and sophisticated U.S. and
Russian submarine fleets.
China-Taiwan military balance
China today has no viable military options against Taiwan. Many competent
analysts have dismissed the prospect of an outright invasion of the island, given
Taiwan’s large army and China’s small amphibious lift capability.15 Even an air
and naval blockade of Taiwan would be very difficult for China. Chinese air
bases within range of Taiwan can accommodate about 700 aircraft. Some
additional aircraft could fly from more distant airfields with in-flight refueling,
but Chinese capability for this is limited. Even if all of China’s most modern
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aircraft were employed, China’s force would be qualitatively inferior to Taiwan’s
460 combat aircraft without enough numerical superiority to compensate. Taiwan
has U.S.-supplied airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft whose large airborne
radar would alert Taiwan to enemy air missions in time to intercept. Even if the
United States did not become directly involved in the fighting, it would almost
certainly resupply Taiwan with aircraft and missiles as needed (as the United
States has done for Israel in all of its wars). China could only replace its losses
with imports, if available. China could not expect to win an air war of attrition
in these circumstances.
Without command of the air, China’s navy would be too vulnerable to
maintain a blockade. The biggest threat to surface ships would be from Taiwanese
aircraft armed with Harpoon missiles. Since the range of these missiles is greater
than the range of any defensive anti-aircraft missiles on Chinese warships,
Taiwanese aircraft could sink Chinese warships from a distance with virtual
impunity. Taiwan’s surface navy, while not quite as large as China’s, is equipped
with better weapons, and could take a heavy toll as well. Taiwan will substantially
increase its ability to fight the PLAN in coming years as it acquires the arms
promised in the latest U.S. offer: 4 Kidd-class destroyers, 12 P-3 Orion antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and 8 modern submarines (probably U.S.-built versions
of a German design). Merchant shipping of both Taiwan and China would suffer
from this kind of naval war, as would both countries’ economies, but no decisive
result is likely. Furthermore, by attacking shipping China would risk attacking
U.S. or U.S.-allied ships. If the United States were to do what it did for Kuwait
during the Iran-Iraq War, and simply put American flags on Taiwanese ships,
China could not attack them without committing an act of war against the
United States, which would lead to certain defeat for China in the air and in the
sea.
Some claim that China could threaten Taiwan by attacking with some
of its 300 or so ballistic missiles. The threat from these is often greatly
exaggerated. They are much less accurate than a fighter-bomber, carry a smaller
payload, and, unlike an aircraft, can be used only once. Even hundreds of them
would do little damage, like the ineffective Iraqi Scud missiles during the Gulf
War. If they were used with nuclear warheads, they could devastate Taiwan’s
cities and kill hundreds of thousands if not millions of people, but this would
not make it easy for China to invade and occupy. Furthermore, any Chinese use
of nuclear weapons would surely provoke a global economic embargo against
China, devastating its economy, if not U.S. nuclear retaliation.
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Prospects for Reversing China’s Military Decline
China’s willingness to participate in the liberal world economic order designed
and sustained by the United States and its allies illustrates the fundamental
difference between this era and the 1930s or the Cold War. During the 1930s,
Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union were all in revolt against the world
economic order that the victorious allies attempted to construct after World
War I. All three tried to create autarkic economic empires to enable them to
pursue their nationalist economic and military aims with little regard for the
broader consequences. Likewise, the Soviet bloc emerged from World War II
largely self-sufficient. It was able to spurn the Marshall Plan, World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and
other pillars of the liberal world economic order. China since Deng has made no
such attempt to create an alternative economic order or to shun the current one.
As long as China continues on its present course and does not
fundamentally challenge or abstain from the world economic order, its success
as a nation will require it to maintain peaceful and constructive relations with
its major commercial partners: the United States, European Union, and Japan.
Two-fifths of all Chinese exports go to the United States. Nearly all the rest is
sold to formal allies of the United States. A severe conflict with any of these
would shatter the trade-dependent Chinese economy. This would also weaken
China militarily, since it could no longer earn enough foreign currency to purchase
the weapons and technology from abroad needed for military modernization.
There are indeed “rogue nations” today that seem to accept economic
isolation and even decay as the necessary price for pursuing an autonomous
national course. However, their economic isolation also leaves them militarily
weak since they cannot produce their own high-tech weapons or import them in
sufficient quantities. China has shown no willingness to isolate itself in this
manner again, as it did during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Only a very
major political realignment within China could conceivably move it toward
isolation again. Such realignment could only occur if those in China who most
benefit from the current policy of global integration were to lose the political
initiative to those who suffer from the increasing competition and dislocation
of globalization.
Such a backlash is possible, but unlikely as long as the current policies
continue to be so successful. However, severe U.S. hostility toward China or
significant increases in barriers to Chinese exports could derail China’s current
course and stimulate a backlash against the liberal world economic order, as in
Germany and Japan before World War II. As long as the United States and its
allies maintain the policy of the last three decades, gradually accommodating
China into the world economic order, peace in East Asia is likely to be sustainable
Spring 2002 – Volume IX, Issue 1
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James H. Nolt
over the long term. China is more likely to become an economic superpower
like Japan than a military superpower like the former Soviet Union. WA
Notes
1. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Random House, 1988), popularized the
notion that military power is largely a function of wealth. While this was true to some extent in the
modern era and into the twentieth century, since World War II growing economies of scale in
weapons development and production plus increasing economic interdependence have made it
difficult for secondary powers to become autonomous military powers. Some, like Japan, have
largely given up the game, despite Kennedy’s prediction to the contrary.
2. I agree with Shaoguang Wang’s (“China’s Defense Expenditure,” manuscript, 1995) more
conservative estimate of Chinese military spending that place it at about 2.5 percent of GDP, rather
than the higher estimates of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), CIA, or U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, which estimate it at up to double that percentage. The precipitous drop in
Chinese arms procurement is more consistent with Wang’s figures. If the higher figure were
accepted, it would have to reflect higher income of soldiers (including from non-military business
ventures) rather than higher spending on arms or research. Some estimates inflate Chinese military
spending by including the budget of the People’s Armed Police, which is purely for internal
security, or by inflating the cost of Chinese arms by estimating what similar systems would cost in
the United States, which underestimates the inferior quality of most Chinese arms.
3. Spending increased briefly during 1980-81 in response to the threat perceived from the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the costly 1979 border war with Vietnam.
4. Military Balance 2001-2002: 177.
5. Eric Arnett, “Military Technology: The Case of China,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security: 362; and Jean-Claude Berthélemy and Saadet Deger,
Conversion of Military Industries in China, OECD Development Centre Studies, 1995: 43-44, 51.
6. SIPRI Yearbook 2000: 353.
7. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2001-2002: 434.
8. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2001-2002 and The Military Balance 2001-2002.
9. For example, a Chinese-made J-6 (MiG-19) fighter flown to South Korea in May 1996 by a
North Korean defector was so worn out, according to a Japanese air force officer who inspected it,
“The aircraft could disintegrate if it engaged in air combat,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 10 July 1996: 18.
10. Details can be found below and in James H. Nolt, “The China-Taiwan Military Balance,”
www.comw.org/pda/nolt99.pdf.
11. Bertil Lintner, “Myanmar’s Chinese Connection,” International Defense Review, November
1994: 23.
12. SIPRI Yearbook 2000: 329-330, 357.
13. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower, Stanford University Press, 1994.
14. A former U.S. Navy commander of a P-3 anti-submarine patrol plane based in Japan informed
me that though his crew got lots of practice tracking Russian submarines, they rarely detected a
Chinese submarine out of port. The few times when they did it was at or near the surface. He said
that the Navy believes that most Chinese crews are not trusted to dive their boats deeply.
15. See a more detailed argument in James H. Nolt, “The China-Taiwan Military Balance,”
www.comw.org/pda/nolt99.pdf.
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