P3∼25
P5∼20
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political
Parties in Korea*
∗
Alec Haskard**
Abstract
This paper aims to answer the question: Why are political parties underperforming
in Korea’s democratic system and failing to contribute to the consolidation of democracy?
The consequential findings have important implications for democratic representation,
accountability, and transparency in Korea. Previous studies have examined this issue in
the context of political culture and regionalism, arguing that these distinct phenomena
result in political party underperformance. However, this paper’s argument is that an
initial “birth defect” under foreign rule and subsequent development under authoritarian
regimes explain political parties’ underperformance. This paper’s aim is to examine the
historical trajectory of political parties by analyzing political parties as institutions that
are shaped by history, but which also condition politics and behavior.
This paper first traces political party underperformance back to the period
following Korean liberation, where the U.S. Military Government In Korea (USAMGIK)
empowered underperforming parties, constructed an “anticommunist system,” and then
transposed democratic institutions onto Korea. Next, this paper highlights that following
this period, political parties did not perform or reform, as autocratic and authoritarian
governments ruled Korea under the façade of a democracy. Finally, this paper shows
that after Korea’s transition to democracy, many past legacies continue to hamper
political party performance including institutional settings, a continuity of actors, and a
strong president.
This paper identifies the challenges that political parties pose to Korean democracy,
but comprehensively recognizes the challenges that political parties have faced and
continue to face-an approach that political culture and regionalist arguments fail to
address. This paper allows for a more nuanced appraisal of Korea’s present political
situation by exploring political parties’ history. This is imperative for understanding
persistent power relationships in Korean politics. Furthermore, this paper concludes
that due to the institutional and historical origins of political party underperformance,
actors such as civil society and processes such as institutional change are likely means
* I would like to cordially thank Professor Doowon Suh, Professor Hiwhoa Moon, and Professor Sunghan Kim.
** Dual Degree M.A. graduate from Korea University and American University,
E-mail: [email protected].
4 • Korea Review of International Studies
to improve Korean political parties, and thereby strengthen the process of consolidation.
Keywords: Political Parties, Korea, Authoritarianism, Democratization, USAMGIK,
Historical Institutionalism
I. Introduction
South Korea (hereinafter Korea) is considered to be one of the most prominent
cases of a relatively new democracy that was part of the “third wave” of global
democratization (Diamond and Shin, 1999). After nearly four decades of autocratic and
authoritarian rule, Korea transitioned to a democratic political system in 1987. Since
then, the country has experienced relative stability, and through institutional, political,
and economic reforms as well as growing civil awareness, it has worked to deepen its
growing democracy. Yet despite crucial gains, democratic consolidation in Korea has
been a gradual process and is still unfinished (Diamond and Shin, 1999; Shin, 1999; Im,
2004).
The pathway to democratic consolidation is facilitated by a number of conditions
that occur in multiple dimensions of society. Scholars have argued that in a democratic
system, political, economic, and social dimensions of society are interrelated and exert
pressure on one another to democratize (Linz and Stepan, 1996). In Korea, this has only
been partially true, as political parties and the Korean party system have remained
impervious to change in the face of pressure from other dimensions of society. This is
crucial because the sound performance of political parties is considered to be one of the
major conditions facilitating democratic consolidation (Diamond et al., 1995; Shin, 1999;
Dalton et al., 2008).
Political parties perform a variety of roles that contribute to democratic consolidation,
which include serving as a medium between the demands of society and the power of the
state; collecting diverse and conflicting interests from society and turning them into
policies to be implemented by the government; recruiting members from society; building
platforms and causes through grassroots support; and setting the agenda for future goals
and polices that will benefit society. While Korean political parties play an important
role in their country’s democratic system, they have failed in many of these roles. There
is a broad consensus that they are a major factor inhibiting the consolidation of democracy
(Jaung, 1999; Diamond and Kim, 2000; Croissant, 2002; Kim, 2002; Steinberg and Shin,
2006).
Explanations for Korea’s underperforming political parties have fallen into two
main categories: regionalism and political culture. The emphasis on regionalism contends
that due to strongly-felt regional sentiments, citizens vote for politicians based on regional
lines. Political parties and political leaders represent specific regions in Korea, and
voters who live or find their origins in these provinces vote for homegrown politicians.1
1
The two main regions in Korea are referred to as Honam and Yeongnam. Honam represents the southwestern
part of the country that includes the two Jeolla Provinces while Yeongnam represents the southeastern part
of the country that includes the two Kyoungsang provinces. Regionalism is also apparent in Chungcheong
province.
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political Parties in Korea • 5
Party platforms and programs that reflect class, religious, or other self-interested policy
lines are, therefore, subsumed under these particularistic motivations. As a result,
Korea’s underperforming and polarized political party system is able to continually
reproduce itself due to voting behavior inspired by regional rivalries. Thus, some social
scientists view that, “regionalism in South Korea is generally regarded as the disease of
Korean politics” (Kim, 2003: 29).
However, other studies focus on regionalism as a product of elite manipulation,
authoritarian-era economic disparity, and “institutional constraints.” Due to this consensus,
the phenomenon does not appear old enough or pernicious enough to explain the
underperformance of political parties (Kang, 2003; Kim, 2003; Sonn, 2003). There
might be an argument that regionalism plays a role in the reproduction of an underperforming
party system, yet it lacks depth in detecting the underlying sources of political parties’
underperformance.
The political culture explanation emphasizes the “lasting legacies of Confucianism,”
especially its influence on groups, whose reliance on hierarchical relations and obedience
to leadership relates to the personalism, weak organization, and zero-sum conception of
power that hinder political parties’ performance (Helgesen, 1998; Kim, 2000; Kim, 2002;
Steinberg and Shin, 2006). However, culture is dynamic and using it as a dominant
explanation ignores its changing nature as well as the influence that other factorsexternal, institutional, personal, and legal-can exert on culture. A reliance on the political
culture explanation, where Confucianism breeds homogeneity and rigid obedience to
authority, also has difficulty in explaining phenomena such as a stubborn and resistant
Korean political culture (Koo, 1993) or a contentious and defiant Korean civil society
throughout Korean history (Kim, 2000).
This paper does not deny that regionalism and political culture both have an
impact on the underperformance of political parties in South Korea. Regionalism has
aided in reproducing the underperformance of political parties after democratization and
political culture plays a role in shaping political outcomes. However, neither argument
is decisive or sufficient in their explanation. This paper’s argument is that political party
underperformance in Korea can be traced back to an initial “birth defect,” emphasized
by political parties’ mode of formation and political insertion into society under United
States of America Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) rule from 1945 to 1948.
The USAMGIK suppressed a large segment of Korean political society; created the
conditions under which political parties had to quickly form to fill in institutional needs;
supported personalistic, power-hungry, and weakly organized political parties; and
transposed democracy upon Korea after it had already constructed an exclusive
“anticommunist system.”
Furthermore, from 1948 until 1987, political parties were not able to develop and
did not need to reform or perform because of their subversion by state institutions,
namely the presidency, for nearly four decades. After democratization, political parties
continue to face challenges from a strong president and remain impervious to change
from outside pressure. This resistance to change has been shaped by the “birth defect”
and the continued external challenges-particularly from the executive-that political parties
face. This has allowed underperforming political parties to persist from the USAMGIK
period to the present.
6 • Korea Review of International Studies
The underlying theoretical framework of this paper focuses on the role that
institutions play within society, their role in affecting political outcomes, and the
conditions that affect their performance over time. It examines political parties as an
institution, an independent variable being shaped by history, and a dependent variable
conditioning political behavior. Following Putnam (1993: 8), however, this paper’s
major focus is how historical processes have “conditioned institutional performance.”
According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 938), institutions can be defined as, “formal or
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions.” Putnam (1993: 7-8) gives an
impressive understanding of institutions and elaborates on the two main points that
those who study institutions share when he states that “institutions shape politics” and
that “institutions are shaped by history.” Inherent in this understanding is that “history
matters,” and that what comes before often has a powerful impact on shaping and
conditioning subsequent interactions that take place within institutionalized settings.
However, while placing theoretical emphasis on historical institutionalism, this
paper does accept that an overreliance on the framework can lead to a belief in “genetic
determinism,” where institutions determine or control subsequent outcomes or behaviors
so that they cannot be changed. If one pays too much attention to institutions, they
ignore the transformative potential of agents and the interactive relationships between
institutions and agents. This paper agrees that during certain “windows of opportunity”
or at “critical junctures,” such as a crisis or upheaval, agents have the opportunity to
influence or transform existing institutions. Yet, institutional change is often a daunting
task due to institutional inertia, time constraints, and other factors. This paper’s examination
of Korean history illuminates that institutional change has often been achieved through
power and force. In their absence, change has been both a difficult and protracted process.
The institutional dynamics of Korean political parties and the party system have
changed and evolved over time, but the underlying structure has stayed the same, as the
shaping power of institutions and other forces have played a major influence.
Many studies on Korea have also made the argument that history and, particularly
authoritarian legacies, have been a crucial factor in shaping and influencing present-day
politics in Korea (Diamond and Shin, 2000; Kang, 2001; Lee, 2001; Im, 2004; Stockton
and Heo, 2005). This paper’s contribution to the literature is its historically detailed and
comprehensive approach, with a theoretically-informed analysis that picks up where
past studies have left off by tracing party politics up to the current Lee Myung-bak
administration. Vigorous research and extensive studies on Korean political parties have
been scarce, at least among the English-language literature.2 This paper hopes to
contribute to the literature by filling in this gap. It also hopes to give a new insight into
the period 1945-1948, a relatively understudied but nonetheless crucial time period in
contemporary Korean history, and one that has had lasting effects for Korean politics.
II. Political Parties
Political parties are essentially defined as organizations that form to attain political
2
In fact, studies in the Korean language have examined the formation, development, and history of political
parties in great detail.
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political Parties in Korea • 7
power. According to Epstein (1967: 9) a political party is “any group, however loosely
organized, seeking to elect governmental office-holders under a given label.” In a
democratic political system, political parties have a variety of roles that include
articulating and aggregating the interests of citizens, bringing these interests into the
political arena, transforming them into policy options, working to implement them in an
institutional setting, and presiding over or supporting the process of governance (Jaung,
1999: 45). As a result of these roles and functions, political parties are considered to be
a fundamental building block and possibly the most important institution within
democratic political systems (Diamond et al., 1995).
This paper evaluates the performance of political parties in qualitative terms.3 In this
regard, political parties’ performance is measured through their level of “institutionalization,”
which refers to the process “by which organizations and procedures acquire value and
stability” (Huntington, 1968: 12). Huntington (1968) evaluates this using four criteria:
adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Adaptability refers to parties’ ability
to deal with new challenges, the length of their existence over time, the continuance of
their original leaders, and the success of their specific functions. If political parties fail
to adapt to new challenges, exist for a short period, maintain the same generation of
leaders over time, and are not able to fulfill their specific functions in the legislature and
society (mentioned previously), then they are rigid rather than adaptable, and do not
fulfill the criterion (13-17).
Complexity refers to organizational nature and the depth of an institution. When
a political party is comprised of organizational layers and levels that are comprised of
differing subunits, then it is complicated or “institutionalized.” If this is not the case, it
is simplistic and does not fulfill the criterion (17-20). Autonomy relates to parties’
independence from outside forces. When political parties are constructed or influenced
by outside forces or “spheres of power,” then they are in a subordinate relationship and
are not autonomous as an institution (20-22). Finally, coherence deals with how unified
a party is and how loyal its members are to the party name. If party members frequently
switch parties or personally revolve around factions or individuals in a party, then the
party is characterized by disunity. In the Korean case, this becomes common before
elections (22-24). Unfortunately, Korean political parties over time have not been able
to fulfill these criteria, with their “uninstitutionalization” negatively affecting their
performance.
According to Dalton et al. (2008: 1), the functioning of the democratic process is
virtually impossible without political parties articulating the interests of and representing
citizens. Political parties play the crucial-but not the only-role as an intermediary
between society and the state. Political parties serve as the linkage or “transmission
belt” connecting citizens to government policies that will benefit them; it is the parties’
role to motivate, familiarize, and bring citizens into the democratic process through
appealing to their values, goals, and interests (Dalton et al., 2008). As Diamond et al.
(1995: 34) note, “only political parties can fashion diverse identities, interests, and
preferences into laws, appropriations, policies, and coalitions.” Political parties are the
3
Scholars have also measured political party performance in quantitative terms. See Kim and Woo (1973)
or Loewenberg and Kim (1978).
8 • Korea Review of International Studies
“dynamic of democracy” and just as a democracy needs a state and citizens, it cannot
function without the presence of political parties.
Democratic consolidation entails more than just the holding of elections, but
requires the deepening of legitimacy and accountability in regards to political elites,
parties, and citizens. Huang (1997: 137) indicates the “decisive role” that parties and
party systems play in deepening democracy in countries that are coming off the heels of
a democratic transition. Yet, if parties hold little legitimacy in the eyes of citizens,
progress towards greater democratic deepening is hindered. Citizens may become less
involved in the democratic process and in the belief that they can make a difference
within their political system. In the Korean case, low voting turnout and widespread
displeasure with formal political institutions has become a trend after democratization.
When the mass public has grievances to air, but no formal institution to turn to,
they often take to the streets. Large-scale protests against government polices have
become a frequent occurrence in Korean society since democratization (Choi, 2005).
During these protests, political parties did not articulate the mass public’s interests but
rather served as cheerleaders after the fact. While civic engagement and protest can be a
sign of a healthy democracy, frequent protests can lead to political gridlock, instability,
and severe distrust. The cleavages between the state and society in Korea that political
parties have been unable to temper have been an important factor hindering the
consolidation of democracy.
Political parties do not only exist in democracies; they also originate and take shape
in non-democratic regimes (Duverger, 1964). Additionally, their origins have important
consequences for their actions and behavior. According to Duverger (1964: xxii), “Just
as men bear all their lives the mark of their childhood, so parties are profoundly
influenced by their origins.” Panebianco (1988) makes a similar argument that parties’
origins and external environment have a strong influence on their subsequent shape,
organization, and development.
The existence of an authoritarian system alongside ruling parties and/or limited
political pluralism also clarifies parties’ character. Yang (1999: 404) states, “In the
authoritarian system the legislature is criticized, cajoled, used or ignored, depending
upon the ruling elites’ power needs, their political make-up and the balance between the
ruling party members and the opposition.” Additionally, Randall (2007: 647) notes that
ongoing authoritarian rule negatively effects both political parties’ organization and
institutionalization. These theoretical arguments support the claim that the underperformance
of political parties in Korea has been shaped by their origins and by their external
environment, which in turn has conditioned the actions and behaviors of politicians.
III. Defective Formation: 1945-1948
United States military forces arrived in Korea in September of 1945 following
their victory over Japan in World War II. Established soon after, the United States of
America Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) encouraged the organization of
political parties, but also set out to disenfranchise and subdue leftist/progressive political
and social forces in its zone of occupation. This included passing laws that forbade
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political Parties in Korea • 9
labor or peasant organizations, closing newspapers, shutting down political offices, and
arresting labor and political leaders (Kim, 2000: 27; Choi, 1993).
Most importantly, USAMGIK rule allowed political parties to undergo an initial
“birth defect” that was the result of a number of conditions. First, political parties were
formed as expedients for the personalized rule of political bosses. Second, they were
built on unstable, loosely organized, and particularistic interests partly due to their topdown formation by elites and the limited time period in which they were allowed to
organize. Third, due to the anticommunist posture of the USAMGIK, the political parties
it supported were built on reactionary political principles and espoused rudimentary
policies and platforms for aggregating the mass public’s interests.
Soon after the establishment of the USAMGIK, its leader, General John R.
Hodge, made two immediate and important decisions. First, he stated that the U.S. military
government would not acknowledge the bottom-up constructed Korean People’s Republic
(KPR), which had been established two days before the arrival of U.S. forces and was
nationalist inspired, well organized, and widely supported by the Korean populace (Han,
1974; Oh, 2002). Second, on September 12 Hodge declared that he would, “consult only
with organized political groups” (Kim and Kihl, 1976: 8). This declaration resulted in a
“participation explosion,” as political parties rushed to gain legitimacy and power in
anticipation of a Korean provisional government. Kim and Kihl (1976: 9) find that by
October of 1945, at least 54 political parties had been cataloged by the USAMGIK. By
March 1946, when the USAMGIK required all political parties to register, the number
had increased to 134.
Due to the immediate call for their participation, the political parties that ultimately
captured power experienced an inverted formation. In this sense, they were not a product
of grassroots or bottom-up efforts engendered by societal cleavages. These political
parties were created either by a political boss or small groups of elite individuals, who
chose a charismatic boss as a means to access power in the environment constructed by
the USAMGIK (Kang, 2001: 84). As the USAMGIK’s announcement had made clear,
there was not a sufficient amount of time for groups and individuals to sit down and
mull over ideas, plans, and platforms. In addition, as was known at the time by all political
actors, a rival sphere of power was being established in the north.
The plan to institute a provisional government created a situation where connections
had to be quickly made, palms had to be greased, and the doors to power had to be
opened. It was a situation where “anyone could become a politician,” all motivated by
the chance to attain political power and preside over national life (Ko, 1967). The most
obvious and expedient way to do this was through charismatic individuals standing atop
small factions who, in turn, supported this leader in bringing them to power and
prominence. According to Ko (1967: 19), “political parties in Korea were nothing but
groups of maids which always gathered around particular power and served it.”
From these circumstances arose the quintessential Korean political party, the
Korean Democratic Party (KDP), which was established on September 16th of 1945
(Cumings, 1997). The formation of the party was a response to the proliferation of
progressive forces, as its members feared that the political power vacuum might allow
the left to come to power (Han, 1969: 448). Therefore, the KDP “endeavored to win over
anyone who was anti-communist” (Han, 1962: 413). The KDP’s members, many of
10 • Korea Review of International Studies
who had worked together with the previous Japanese occupiers, worried that a political
opening would bring them both material and physical harm.
The KDP, unfortunately, lacked substantial programs or policies with which it
could present to the Korean public (Han, 1962). The policies it did espouse were no
different than those advocated by the left-except for issues such as “compensation for
landlord-distributed land, and less mention of collaborators and their punishment”
(Henderson, 1968: 281). Additionally, the organization of the KDP was weak, cadrelike, and “poorly organized or unorganized in most places” (Cumings, 1981: 193). There
were no concrete ideological or social bases to bring the party members together, only
material ones.
Though the KDP established itself as an institutionalized fixture of Korean
politics, Syngman Rhee became the dominant political figure in the south during the
1945 to 1948 period (Cumings, 1997: 195). Syngman Rhee did not personally believe in
political parties and he only allied himself with the KDP in order to cement his own
personal power (Han, 1974). He believed he was the leader of the whole nation and that
political parties should not encumber him in the achievement of this goal. According to
Palais (1973: 322), “At the outset he [Rhee] possessed a contemptuous disdain for
political organization and viewed himself as a national leader who transcended the
demanding competition of political parties and factions.” Yet, Rhee understood that
under the circumstances of the USAMGIK’s tutelage, building a political organization
underneath him would expedite his chances of attaining presidential power (Henderson,
1968: 282).
As there was a lack of a better alternative, the USAMGIK kept Rhee as their
main benefactor in Korea. His right-wing credentials and patriotism endeared him to
American policy in Korea, though his relationship with officials such as Hodge was
often tense (Cumings, 1981: 431). He gradually increased his stature as the most
influential Korean political figure in the south and became the founding president of the
Republic of Korea in 1948. The KDP’s significance should not be understated as well.
According to Cumings (1997: 193), “the KDP has structured the opposition from that
time right down to the present, when one of its stalwarts finally became president: Kim
Young Sam. He and Kim Dae Jung both trace their political roots back to this group.”
With the help of its allies on the right, the USAMGIK constructed an “anticommunist
system” in Korea by the summer of 1946 (Park, 2002). It removed virtually all of the
elements in political or civil society that challenged this system, and did it regardless of
the wishes of the Korean populace. The USAMGIK then hoisted democratic institutions
upon the south. It engineered a system that included a legislature, executive, and
judiciary, checks and balances between them, universal suffrage, and other democratic
institutions. According to Kang (2001: 79), “the initial American legacy was the wholesale
transposition of U.S. institutions onto Korean society.” This transposition allowed
specific actors and parties to become embedded in the most ideal political system for
Korea.
The actions of USAMGIK also point towards a paradox of its rule. While it transposed
its democratic institutions onto Korea, this happened to empower and perpetuate the
rule of weakly organized, underdeveloped, and parochial political parties and actors.
With national elections in 1948, these actors presided over the institutionalization of a
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political Parties in Korea • 11
democratic system-though soon to be ignored-as the most legitimate organizations for
attaining political power in Korea. As Park (2002: 145) states, “political competition
was limited within a confined ideological spectrum and among conservative elites
severed from civil society. This resulted in the strong state, with feeble civil society and
an equally frail political representative system of parties and parliaments.” This legacy
has had lasting results.
IV. Delayed Development: 1948-1987
1. Syngman Rhee
The elections of 1948 voted for a national assembly that chose the Republic’s
first president, Syngman Rhee (Kim and Kihl, 1976: 13). Upon assuming the presidency,
Rhee began subverting the democratic process as he strove to weaken political parties
and make them ineffective as a check on his growing autocratic power (Kang, 2001: 81).
In December of 1948, the National Security Law (NSL) was passed in the KNA as a
result of rebellions in Cheju and Yeosu. The NSL had an enormous effect on increasing
Rhee’s power as it provided a very nebulous definition of “treason and sedition.” It gave
the government and the police wide leeway in going after political opponents, communists,
and anyone else they deemed to be a threat to the nation. According to Palais (1973:
323), “Under the new security law, ‘disturbing the tranquility of the nation’ was made a
crime against the state, and on these grounds and others ninety thousand persons were
arrested in the aftermath of the rebellions.” Rhee continued to use the NSL throughout
the late 1940s and 1950s to attack political parties and politicians who threatened his
hold on power.
In 1951, with the specter of a unified opposition party in the Korean National
Assembly (the DNP), Rhee formed the Liberal Party (LP). The president had a number
of different motivations in establishing the party. These included using it as a tool to
“organize society from above” and also using it as a bulwark between the president and
society, which included the political opposition and the public (Bedeski, 1994: 63; Kang,
2001: 81). Most importantly, Rhee needed the LP to assist him in changing the
Constitution in the KNA. Fearing challenges to his power, Rhee wanted to change the
Constitution to a directly elected presidential system, weaken the legislature, and also
enact presidential elections that August. In order to push through these changes, Rhee
used his authority over the police to have opposition politicians arrested and forced
them at gunpoint to vote for the new laws (Palais, 1973: 325).
Comparably, the LP was weak and “disunited,” as it was a vehicle through which
the president could extend his power onto society (Henderson, 1968: 295). Yet, its
impact on the opposition should not be overstated. According to Bedeski (1994: 63),
“the emergence of the ruling Liberal Party sparked the opposition parties to coalesce,
with the NDP [DNP] at the core, into the Democratic Party (Minju-Dang) in September
1955.” As a result, by the mid-1950s the country experienced a two-party system-a
strong president presided over a weak ruling party and they faced off against a cohesive
and noisy opposition (Han, 1974; Lee, 2001). According to Choi (2005: 73), “The origin
12 • Korea Review of International Studies
of the party system in Korea can be traced to the establishment of the politically
confrontational relationship between the two political groups [KDP and Rhee].”
Syngman Rhee was overthrown by student-led street protests that erupted against
his corrupt rule in April 1960. Forced into exile, Rhee’s departure marked the end of
Korea’s First Republic. The Second Republic marked a more pluralistic, democratic
arrangement led by the opposition figure Chang Myon. But it was a chaotic, divisive,
and unstable period, which turned out to be short-lived. Less than a year after replacing
Rhee, the Chang Myon government was overthrown by a military coup in May of 1961
(Kim and Kihl, 1976).
2. Park Chung Hee
The 1961 coup brought a group of military officers to power, operating from
1961 to 1963 as the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR). The SCNR
chose the military general, Park Chung Hee, as its chairman, and Park would go on to
become president of Korea for the next 18 years. It was during this three-year period
that a number of major institutional changes were made that both debilitated party
politics in Korea for the next 18 years but also reproduced their existing personnel,
organization, and structure (Han, 1969).
One major change was the promulgation of a new Constitution. The coup-makers
learned a lesson from Rhee’s trials in the KNA and built into the Constitution new
amendments that ensured executive dominance and significantly weakened the powers
of the KNA (Palais, 1973: 334). The Constitution stipulated that the president be elected
by a direct, popular vote and the KNA become unicameral rather bicameral (Bedeski,
1994: 64). It also ensured other methods to weaken political parties. As Palais (1973,
335) states, “The constitution allowed for the dissolution of parties by government request to
the Supreme Court if their goals and activities were judged not to be in conformity with
the ‘the basic democratic order’-whatever that meant.” Nevertheless, Park also understood
the importance of maintaining political parties in the system, for both their role in
producing political order, the state’s need for holding onto legitimacy through the
veneer of parliamentarianism, and because of external U.S. pressure (Palais, 1973: 335).
Soon after they seized power, the military officers started creating their own
political party. Kim Jong-pil, the head of the Korean CIA (KCIA) and a protégé of Park
Chung Hee, secretly gathered university professors, journalists, military officers, and
young bureaucrats to become members of this new party, the Democratic Republican
Party (DRP) (Kim Eugene, 1976). With the aid and backing of the KCIA, the DRP
followed in the steps of Syngman Rhee’s LP because it functioned as an extension of
the coup-makers’ power and acted as an instrument through which Park and the state
could extend their power onto society. Though Park and his fellow officers had excoriated
1950s-era politicians, they brought many of them into the DRP because it was a way to
ensure “political stability.” As Han (1969: 450) states, “[a]s it turned out, many who had
held important administrative positions during the Liberal regime were absorbed into
the new ruling force.”
Due to the overwhelming advantage of the president’s DRP in politics, the
leaders of opposition parties, such as future presidents Kim Dae-jung (KDJ) and Kim
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political Parties in Korea • 13
Young Sam (KYS), were required to act as strong and charismatic bosses, enforcing
strict discipline during the 1960s and 1970s (Yoon, 1973: 25; Im, 2004: 189). This was
done to protect and keep their party together in the face of state pressure, but also to
keep the loyalty of their party members through demanding organizational strength (Im,
2004: 189). Political party leaders also had another advantage in keeping their organization
together because party finances flowed down from the leadership to party members. The
livelihood of party members, therefore, depended on their individual allegiance to the
party head (Steinberg, 2005).
In the 1971 elections, Park narrowly beat KDJ despite massive fraud and vote
rigging. It was shortly after the elections that the Yushin Constitution was established
(Palais, 1973). The promulgation of this new constitution affected political parties by
making them obsolete in the political process. KDJ was banned from politics, and while
a legislature was still allowed to exist, its checks on the president’s powers were
insignificant after 1972, though a two-party system technically remained intact throughout
the 1970s (Palais, 1973: 344-346). For the remainder of the 1970s, Korea experienced
emergency decrees, martial law, and growing authoritarianism under the state’s
repression. In 1979, the chief of the KCIA assassinated Park, and the president’s hold
on power came to a tragic and chaotic end. However, his presidency’s effect on political
parties was great. According to Huang (1997: 151), “In particular, Park’s authoritarian
rule obstructed the institutionalization of political parties and a party system within
which a new generation of leaders could emerge and could bring a variety of social
forces and interests into politics.”
3. Chun Doo Hwan
Within a year of Park’s assassination, another military coup took place, bringing
the military general Chun Doo Hwan to power. Chun declared martial law in 1980 and
had the politicians Kim Jong-pil, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Dae-jung arrested, the
latter having been barred from politics since 1972 (Bedeski, 1994; Brazinski, 2007:
235). According to Hinton (1983), “Approximately 560 individuals were banned from
politics until June 30, 1988.” Kim Dae-jung was shortly thereafter accused of sedition
and sentenced to death by a military court (Hinton, 1983: 61).
Chun also established a new constitution in 1981; a practice that his predecessors
had also carried out. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic strove to weaken the power
of political parties and increase the power of the executive. And though Chun affirmed
that he would only serve one seven-year term, many doubted he would eventually step
down due to Korea’s past experiences with presidential overstretch. The new Constitution
represented a number of changes to Korea’s political and party system. For one, a
popularly elected 5,278-member “electoral college” would indirectly choose the president.
KNA terms were also reduced from six to four years, with seats allocated through a
mixed voting and proportional representation (PR) system, where one-third of Assembly
seats would be given to parties based on the percentage of elected seats they received.
Lastly, the president still had the ability to dissolve the KNA, alongside other wide–
ranging powers. In many ways, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was an addendum
14 • Korea Review of International Studies
to Park’s Yushin Constitution (Hinton, 1983).
One of the most wide-ranging of Chun’s new proclamations was transforming
the political party system. The party system in previous decades had been structured by
a two-party competition, although this competition’s features had differed between Rhee
and Park. Chun, though, wished to change it into a multi-party system characterized by a
strong ruling party opposed by a group of smaller parties. The motivation behind this
was apparently to keep the opposition from solidifying into a strong coalition as it had
done in previous decades. This also explains the institutional changes that were built
into the new Constitution, which weakened the overall power of political parties through
the diffusion of power to the “electoral college,” shorter KNA terms, and the addition of
PR (Hinton, 1983: 59-60).
Chun also formed the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) as his ruling party, a party
that only differed from the LP and DRP as a tool of authoritarian rule by its name
(Bedeski, 1994). He was easily elected in a “gymnasium election” in February of 1981
by the “electoral college” represented mainly by military officers and Chun’s allies. The
DJP also won the majority of seats in the KNA election the following month, where
without the presence of banned politicians, political parties were comprised of many
new members. According to Huang (1997: 151-152), these new political parties’ existence
was possible because they “could not challenge the ruling group in any effective way.”
And as Brazinski (2007: 243) notes, “[b]y 1982, more than half the members of the
National Assembly were former military officers.” The increase of military officers in
politics was twice as great as under Park Chung Hee (Lie, 1998: 123). Despite the end
of the Yushin Constitution and the DRP’s dominance, the politics of a strong presidency
and a weak party system had not changed.
The illegitimacy of the president and popular resistance to his authoritarian
government marked Chun’s rule. The opposition that had been banned by Chun also
continued to challenge the regime from the sidelines. Citizens in the southwestern city
of Kwangju, the home base of Kim Dae-jung, staged an uprising in May of 1980 as a
response to government repression. It was brutally suppressed by the army’s special
units. Popular movements against the state grew, embodied by the Minjung Movement.
Their struggle against authoritarianism eventually resulted in Korea’s transition to a
democratic political system.
V. Antagonistic Aftermath: 1987-Present
1. Korea’s Mode of Transition
The democracy movement in Korea, spearheaded by students and workers, who
were later joined by the middleclass, pressured the ruling DJP into declaring presidential
elections for December of 1987 (Kim, 2000). Prior to the presidential elections, banned
politicians including the “three Kims” were allowed to re-enter politics. However, the
two major opposition politicians, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-jung, could not agree
on a unified candidacy. This personal rivalry echoed the party politics of the past, as the
two opposition leaders and their followers were more concerned with achieving presidential
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political Parties in Korea • 15
power than defeating the old authoritarian political forces (Lee, 1990). As a result, Roh
Tae Woo, the ruling DJP’s candidate, and a confidant of authoritarian leader Chun Doo
Hwan, won the election with 37 percent of the total vote (Bedeski, 1994).
There are a number of distinct features that characterized the type of transition
that occurred in Korea. First, in contrast to countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America
where the democratic opening was facilitated by economic crisis, Korea’s opening
resulted from a “crisis of success.” The previous military regimes, including Chun’s
dictatorship, had presided over impressive economic growth. This influenced the 1987
election because it allowed many of the previous ruling political actors back into power
under a democratic regime. It meant that a significant percentage of the populace approved
of existing economic and political arrangements. According to Haggard and Kang
(1999: 111), the circumstances of a “conservative transition” lead to “democratization
processes which result in governments showing a comparatively high degree of policy,
and even political continuity with their authoritarian predecessors.”
While the impetus for the political opening was a product of civil society’s
continued pressure, the transitional path from an authoritarian to a democratic system
was institutionalized by a “strategic settlement” among political elites, where none of
the organizations involved in the democracy movement were allowed to participate
(Choi, 2005: 157). After Roh Tae Woo declared political opening and competitive
presidential elections on June 29, 1987, eight members of the ruling and opposition
parties met in a series of nineteen closed-door talks to decide the new “rules of the
game” that would be incorporated into the constitution of the Sixth Republic (Bedeski,
1994: 70). The key to these backroom deals is that they allowed for the continuity of
authoritarian legacies and practices (Im, 2000: 25).
Additionally, the “mega-party” merger of 1990, where the DJP-originally Chun
Doo Hwan’s handmaiden-merged with KYS’s RDP and Kim Jong-pil’s NDRP to form
the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), allowed a gradual decay of authoritarian rule (Lee,
1995; Yang, 1995). The same ruling party controlled power from 1980 to 1997, similar
to the length that Park’s DRP had been in control, though the DLP and its former
incarnations had three different leaders. After democratization, it took another ten years
for presidential power to be turned over from the ruling to opposition parties. The
immediate implications of this legacy were that complete political and economic reforms
breaking with the authoritarian past were stifled during KYS’s five-year presidency
(Lee, 1999; Kang, 2003).
The three-party merger into the DLP also precipitated the beginning of the “threeKims” period in Korean party politics. Throughout the 1990s, with a now opened
political playing field, each of the Kims lorded over their respective parties and formed,
dissolved, merged, and used them in any way they could to achieve their long-awaited
presidential power. According to Im (2004: 189), “Since 1987, the ‘three Kims’ created
ten new parties: Kim Young Sam three, Kim Dae Jung four, and Kim Jong Pil three.”
2. Delegative Democracy and Political Parties
Korea’s political system after democratization has been theorized as a “delegative
democracy.” According to O’Donnell (1994: 59), “[d]elegative democracies rest on the
16 • Korea Review of International Studies
premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he
or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a
constitutionally limited term of office.” Every Korean president since democratization
has arguably practiced this style of governance. However, given the nature of the
Korean context, there are a number of caveats that must qualify it.
Reforms undertaken by Kim Young Sam are one example of a “delegative” style
of presidential leadership. While the reforms Kim instituted early on in his presidency
were tremendously popular with the public and were meant to consolidate Korean
democracy, the manner in which the president carried out the reforms was proactive and
personalistic (Lee, 1999). Kim used a “blitzkrieg” approach, as he attempted to ram as
many bills through the legislature as he could by using presidential initiatives (115).
The real-name bank accounts reform, which did reduce corruption in politics, was
instituted through an “emergency decree” that the president issued in the summer of
1993 (Diamond and Shin, 1999: 11). During his presidency, Kim issued around 1,780
presidential decrees, nearly twice the amount as laws passed by the parliament (Croissant,
2002: 19).
Kim Dae-jung was also susceptible to “delegative” tendencies. Upon assuming
the presidency, he faced the monumental task of cleaning up the financial crisis that had
befallen Korea. In order to institute much-needed financial reforms, he resorted to
“manufacturing” himself a majority in the KNA through coercion and persuasion. This
was done through the “recruitment” of around 16 members of the opposition GNP
during the KNA meeting period, which included attacking GNP lawmakers in order to
change the balance of the legislature. According to Kang C.S. (2003: 237), “he [Kim]
employed state prosecutors and tax auditors to pressure and to oust numerous GNP
assemblymen who were suspected of violating various laws.” It was also later revealed
that Kim used the National Intelligence Service to spy on the opposition within the
KNA building (Kang C.S., 2003: 238). As a result of the new balance of power, Kim
was able to “railroad several bills through the legislature” (Kim, 2002: 49).
KDJ’s troubles with the opposition highlights one of the caveats needed to qualify
the “delegative democracy” thesis. The powers of the Korean president are increased
exponentially when their party holds a majority in the National Assembly. When a
majority is lacking, legislative politics resorts to gridlock and a non-compromising brand
of politics. During periods where the president held the majority in the legislature (19901997; 1999-2000), the ruling party disproportionately pushed legislation through the
KNA (Croissant, 2003: 91). Croissant (2002: 16) notes, “The ‘majority terror’ exercised
by the government parties in parliament is manifested above all in the practice of forcing
government draft bills through the plenum in a matter of minutes, without previous
discussion and en bloc, thus depriving the opposition to its right to codetermination.”
This is particularly evident in reference to political parties’ internal organization
and structure, where party finances are directed from the top down and party members
rely on the leader for their livelihood. This ensures their unwavering support, a practice
that has been consistent for decades (Steinberg, 2005). Croissant (2003: 81) clarifies
this when he states:
The strict control presidents as party founders exercise over internal party procedures,
their monopolization of access to financial resources, and their high capacity to
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political Parties in Korea • 17
affect the nomination chances of individual candidates allowed them to keep most
parliamentarians dependent on them. Hence, they could discipline legislators, stabilize
the political support of the nominal majority in parliament, translate this support
into votes for their policies and therefore, could reduce the costs of governing.
The second caveat of the “delegative democracy” argument relates to the
president’s political policies and credentials. If the president is perceived to be too far to
the “left” in the Korean ideological spectrum, it would be far less likely for them to be
able to delegate legislation due to the entrenchment of conservative ideology and the
authoritarian legacy in the political structure. In the 1992 presidential elections, the
military elite publicly warned against the presidency of KDJ due to the perception that
he would implement “leftist policies.” In 1995, the Agency for National Security and
Planning carried out a secret operation to thwart KDJ from running in the 1997 election
(Shin, 1999: 266). Roh Moo Hyun additionally faced considerable ideological opposition
towards his policies.
3. Continuity and Change in Political Parties and Party Politics
Roh Moo Hyun’s election to the presidency in the 2002 elections appeared to be
the beginning of a new era in Korean politics. Many argued that it would bring change
and reform to Korea’s dismal political situation. However, by the end of his presidency,
Roh’s behavior and actions did not diverge greatly from those of the “three Kims.”
While he called his administration a “participatory government,” Roh attempted
early on to bypass the KNA as his party, the MDP, did not hold the majority in the
Assembly. Roh appealed directly to the Korean populace in his attempt to push through
reforms and changes, ignoring institutional and formal political avenues (Lee, 2004).
Due to his challenge of entrenched political structures and the high hopes that his
rhetoric brought out within the populace, Roh’s proposed reforms were ultimately
unsuccessful. According to Lee (2004: 133), “Roh’s first year witnessed intensified and
spreading labor unrest, disputes, strikes, and social conflicts.” The administration also
overstepped its mandate in the case of a proposed nuclear storage site on Korea’s west
coast, where the government made a deal with a local political leader rather than first
consulting with local citizens (Lee, 2004).
The opposition Grand National Party (GNP) attempted to impeach Roh in 2004
due to his public support for the newly formed Uri Party. But the impeachment failed
and Roh and the Uri Party won a majority in the KNA due to the mass public’s
dissatisfaction with the impeachment proceedings (Hundt, 2008). However, according
to Armstrong (2008: 124-125), “Roh’s political capital evaporated almost instantly …
Roh’s high-handed style alienated many Koreans even from his own part of the political
spectrum … as well as nearly all significant interests in the Korean establishment: the
mainstream media, the military, business leaders and leading universities.” By the end
of Roh’s presidency, the Uri Party had split up into different parties, preparing
themselves for the 2007 elections. In Roh’s most comprehensive policies-dispatching
Korean troops to Iraq and signing a Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States-
18 • Korea Review of International Studies
the president showed little ideological difference from his predecessors (Armstrong,
2008).
Lee Myung-bak’s election to the presidency in 2007 signaled a mandate for
change felt by Korean voters. Campaigning on a pledge to rejuvenate the Korean
economy, the former CEO of a construction-arm of Hyundai Heavy Industries won 49%
of the vote to his closest opponent’s 27%-the largest voting gap since 1987 (Hundt,
2008). His victory also represented a shift of presidential power between the opposition
and ruling parties for the first time in a decade (Moon, 2008). Shortly after his election,
Lee’s GNP-which split off from Kim Young Sam’s ruling party in the 1990s-won a
majority in the KNA.
With these achievements under his belt, the president proposed a wide-ranging
program of reform including privatization of public companies, capital and banking
deregulations, corporate tax decreases, easing of rules on FDI, and an ambitious “grand
canal” project that would link Seoul to Korea’s port of Busan in the southwest (Ziegler,
2008; Kirk, 2008). As a way to move forward the stalled FTA with the United States,
Lee lifted a ban on U.S. beef into Korea while visiting George Bush. This was the spark
that lit massive protests that began shortly after the triumphant Lee returned to Seoul.
While the “beef brouhaha” was the catalyst, the protests represented a popular belief
that Lee was overstepping his bounds-through a “delegative” style much more visible
than it ever had been under Roh Moo Hyun (Kirk, 2008).
Even after Lee’s experience with the protests, his attempts to ram legislation
through the KNA and the Blue House’s use of a special prosecutor to investigate former
president Roh have also illuminated a “delegative democracy” in Korea. In July of 2009,
the KNA passed three bills that would restructure the Korean media industry, including
allowing government-run television (MBC, KBS, etc.) stations and other public news
agencies to be privatized and for there to be media cross-ownership. As the mainstream
media is either owned by or closely aligned with the Chaebol, there are considerable
prospects of these new outlets becoming part of the media oligopoly (Ramstad, 2009a).
While the “grand canal” project was abandoned, the Blue House has begun a “four
rivers” project that bears striking resemblances to the former plan. The new project has
been heavily criticized by the opposition in the KNA as it entails a price tag over 14
billion U.S. dollars and revolves around “cleaning” and “beautifying” Korea’s four
major rivers (Economist, 2009). The criticism is tied to the apparent un-usefulness of
the project and its cover for creating public-works projects catering to the construction
arms of the Chaebol, a reminder of the giant infrastructure projects that authoritarian
governments began pursuing during the 1960s in order to support the economy (Ramstad,
2009b). However, the ruling GNP has backed the plan in the KNA and, as in the past,
the bill will most likely be “railroaded” through the KNA in the face of severe opposition.
Though the “three Kims” era has ended, boss politics and “delegative” leadership
styles remain. They have continued under politicians such as Park Geun Hye and the
former GNP chairman Lee Hoi Chang. Furthermore, the personalization of political
parties continues to be seen as a factor inhibiting democratic consolidation (Hermanns,
2009). The constant and continual mergers and dissolutions of parties also highlight that
party instability and underdevelopment remain a persistent problem for political parties
in Korea. While there are now more parties operating in the KNA, the two-party
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political Parties in Korea • 19
competition between the ruling and opposition parties continues to characterize party
politics. In the run up to elections, mergers and dissolutions increase in anticipation of
gaining power. Political parties’ life spans have also shrunk rather than expanded after
democratization. According to Stockton and Heo (2005: 686), “parties have exhibited
slightly shorter lifespans compared to the old order, and personalism continues to retard
the institutionalization of parties.”
VI. Conclusion
This paper has argued that the underperformance of Korean political parties has
been conditioned and shaped by their initial formation under U.S. military government
rule, their subsequent development under authoritarianism, and the continual challenges
they face from a strong executive. As a result, there has been continuity in the function,
organization, personnel, and structure of political parties from 1945 to the present. In
highlighting this historical perspective, this paper has attempted to shed light on how
historical conditions and circumstances impact and shape political institutions.
This paper’s argument was broken down into three historical components. First,
the conditions and circumstances surrounding the initial formation of political parties in
the years from 1945 to 1948 created a “birth defect” that shaped and conditioned the
trajectory of political parties. Second, from the establishment of the Republic of Korea
in 1948 until the “democratic spring” of 1987, Korean political parties had to contend
with domestic autocratic or authoritarian rule that kept the façade of a democratic system
but precluded a proper role for political parties within it. Third, following Korea’s transition
to democracy in 1987, the country has experienced the lasting legacies and influence of
the authoritarian era, which have continued to exert an influence on the political system
and political parties.
While this paper has focused on continuities in modern Korean politics, there
have been important changes as well. The underperformance of political parties and the
challenges to democratic consolidation in Korea should not overshadow significant
progress that the country has made in deepening its democracy. The military’s role in
the political arena has been removed, and the possibility of authoritarian or military
reversion is slim; the country has had civilian presidents since 1992, and presidential
power has now transitioned between the ruling and opposition parties twice; civil
society in Korea has expanded and taken on new roles and influence; and many political
and economic processes and transactions that were once opaque have become more
transparent.
Where does this all leave political parties? While this paper has argued that
institutions continue over time, this does not mean that there is a genetic determinism
that they will always remain the same. Time horizons and path dependence mean that
changes are often gradual. Given that authoritarian practices and behavior have eroded
slowly in Korea-even after democratization-real reform of political institutions has been
ongoing. There have been a number of “critical junctures” and “windows of opportunity”
where political parties and the political system have been reformed, but in substantial
terms, past institutional arrangements continue.
20 • Korea Review of International Studies
The emergence of civil society in Korea after democratization has been much
trumpeted (Kim, 2000). Civil society has influenced political parties, pressuring them to
reform and become more internally democratic. Civil society groups have worked with
political parties regarding legislation, pressured political parties to adopt certain policies,
and civil society members have been incorporated into political parties. This civil
society role of partnering with political parties and instigating change has the ability to
resolve the “genetic determinism” inherent in the historical institutionalist perspective.
But civil society itself remains divided in Korea: between Seoul and the periphery,
between group leaders and members, and between those advocating radical approaches
versus those advocating moderate approaches. Civil society has also been more consumed
with challenging the state and its “delegative” tendencies than focusing its energy on the
improved performance of political parties (Seong, 2000). Yet, civil society in Korea
remains one of the most important forces that can work towards influencing the
democratization of political parties in the future.
The nature of Korea’s institutional setting is also a crucial factor regarding the
nature of political parties. Decentralization in Korea, which empowers local communities
and reduces their reliance on the central government, is a positive institutional change.
As national political parties derive significant resources and votes from areas outside of
Seoul, providing local bureaucrats and politicians greater autonomy has the ability to
change the performance of political parties in the KNA. Further liberalization on the
levels of the state and business will also give these groups greater potential to put
pressure on political parties.
The choice of political institutions can also have an important effect on democratic
performance. Linz (1990) argues that parliamentary systems are more conducive to
stable democracies than are presidential ones. Given the history of a strong president in
Korea, a parliamentary system has been argued by some to be a better option for the
country (Kim, 2008). If political parties were required to play a greater role in politics,
both internal and external pressure for them to reform would possibly increase. Park
(1999) finds a number of institutional changes that could be made within the KNA
including year round assembly sessions, strengthening the neutrality of the assembly
speaker, improving the legislative staff, making the selection process of committee
members more efficient, and giving more broad powers to the assembly. This paper
advances that among the various remedies affecting the performance of political parties,
changes in the institutional setting of Korea’s democratic system and National Assembly
could have the most wide-ranging and effective results.
This paper has set out to offer an explanation of why political parties are
underperforming in Korea through a historical and detailed analysis. It has also hoped to
contribute to the existing literature on political parties in Korea. Political parties remain
relatively understudied in both the literature on democratic consolidation and institutions
(Shin, 1999). Moreover, political parties are facing criticism and challenges around the
world. Technological, generational, and socio-economic changes all pose a dilemma to
the continued existence of political parties (Diamond and Gunther, 2001; Gunther et al.,
2002). This paper’s argument has involved returning to history in order to detect the
origins of political parties’ underperformance in the case of Korea. Its aim has been to
shed light on the present status of political parties and open doors for prescriptions to
Defective Formation and Underperforming Political Parties in Korea • 21
the challenges they face.
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