ColonialApproachestoGovernanceinthePeriphery:
DirectandIndirectRuleinFrenchAlgeria
AdriaLawrence
AronsonAssociateProfessor
ofInternationalStudiesandPoliticalScience
JohnsHopkinsUniversity
[email protected]
PreparedfortheComparativePoliticsWorkshop
UniversityofChicago
May2017
Draft:Pleasedonotcirculatewithoutpermission
Abstract:WhentheBritishandFrenchexpandedintoAfrica,Asia,andtheAmericas,they
beganrulingdiversepopulationsthatdifferedfromthemalongethnic,linguistic,and
religiouslines.Tomanagethisdiversity,theyarticulatedtwodistinctideologies:direct
andindirectrule.Advocatesofdirectruleenvisionedacolonialprojectthatwould
modernizeandtransformcolonialterritories;proponentsofindirectrulefavored
preservingtraditionandworkingwithlocalauthorities.Recentscholarlyworkonthe
legaciesofcolonialrulehascodeddirectandindirectruleinformercolonies,arguingthat
thetypeofcolonialrulehasimportantlong-termconsequences.Thispaperexamineshow
theconceptsofdirectandindirectrulehavebeendefinedandmeasuredinthesocial
scienceliterature.Itarguesthatthedistinctionbetweenthetwohasbeenoverstated.
DrawingonthecaseofcolonialAlgeria,itpointstoagapbetweencolonialrhetoricand
actualcolonialgovernance.ThroughconsideringtheAlgeriancase,itsuggestsnewwaysof
understandingwhyandhowcolonialstrategiesvariedovertimeandplace.
“TheRomansaccomplishedlessinAfricain200yearsthantheFrenchhavesincethe
conquest”–GeneralDaumas,speakingtotheLegislativeCorpsinAlgeria,1861.1
In1830,KingCharlesXofFrance,hopingfortheprestigeofaswiftmilitaryvictory,
sentanarmyof37,000mentoAlgeria.ThearmytookAlgiers,buttoolatetosavetheking,
whoseregimecollapsedinthe1830JulyRevolution.Althoughtheoriginalimpetusforthe
conquestwasgone,FrancewouldremaininAlgeriaforthenext130years.HowdidFrance
governAlgeria?Specifically,whatkindsofstrategieswereemployedtogainthe
complianceoftheconqueredBerberandArabpopulationsofAlgeria?
The“nativequestion,”asMamdani(1996)calledit,affectednotjustAlgeriabut
nearlytheentireAfricancontinentastheEuropeanpowersseizedanddividedAfrican
territoryinthe19thandearly20thcentury.Europeanapproachestogoverningpopulations
thatdifferedfromthemalongracial,ethnic,religious,andlinguisticlineshavesincebeen
characterizedasfallingintooneoftwocontrastinglogics:directorindirectrule.Advocates
ofdirectruledefendedandjustifiedcolonialismasa“civilizing”projectthatwould
modernizeandtransformcolonialterritories.Theconqueringstateprovidedthemodelto
beemulated:Europeanbureaucracies,laws,andmodesofeconomicexchangewouldbe
transplantedtothecolonies.Above,GeneralDaumasspokeofthetransformativenatureof
colonialrule,justthirtyyearsaftertheFrencharrivedinAlgeria.
Incontrast,proponentsofindirectruleframedthecolonialprojectin
preservationistterms.Theyfavoredworkingwithlocalauthoritiesandmaintaining
indigenoustraditions,notreplacingthemwithacentralizedauthority.Indirectrule
impliedlimitedcolonialintervention.
1L’AlgérieetleDécretdu24Novembre,1861.CentredesArchivesNationalesd’Outre-Mer.BIBB2374.
1
Asthe19thcenturygavewaytothe20th,indirectruleappearedtobecomethe
preferredapproach.SirFrederickLugard(1922)formallydescribedthesystemofindirect
ruleduringhistenureinnorthernNigeria,althoughtheideaofindirectrulegrewoutof
earliercolonialexperiences,suchastheresidencysysteminIndia.EventheFrench,known
fortheircentralizedapproachtoimperialrule,beganspeakingof“association”insteadof
“assimilation.”Indirectrulewaspromotedasacorrectiontotheperceivedproblemsof
directrule:itscosts,aswellasthedifficultyofabsorbingpopulationsthatcametoseemtoo
culturallydistanttobe“civilized.”AsSirDonaldCameron,governorofTanganyika,wrote
soonafterarrivingathispost,“Itisourdutytodoeverythinginourpowertodevelopthe
nativeonlineswhichwillnotWesternizehimandturnhimintoabadimitationofa
European”(quotedinMamdani1996,80).Indirectrulewasthuschampionedon
normativegrounds,defended“asadeferencetonativeagencyand,inmoreenlightened
self-descriptions,asaformofcosmopolitanpluralism,onethatrecognizedthespecificityof
nativesociety”(Mantena2010,6).Italsohadpracticaladvantages.JulesFerry,speaking
aboutthenewlyestablishedprotectorateinTunisiabeforetheFrenchChamberofDeputies
onApril1,1884,statedthatpreservingtheOttomanBey’ssovereignty
freesusfrominstallingaFrenchadministrationinthiscountry,whichisto
sayitfreesusfromimposingsignificantburdensontheFrenchbudget.It
allowsustosupervisefromabove,togovernfromabove,toavoidtakingon,
inspiteofourselves,responsibilityforallthedetailsofadministration.2
Governingfromabovehadtheaddedbenefitofdeterringrebellionsinceindigenous
populationswereexpectedtobelesslikelytorebelagainsttheirownleadersthan
outsiders.
2quotedinLewis(2013,62).
2
Thesetwocontrastingstrategiesformanagingconqueredpopulationswere
articulatedanddefendedattheelitelevel,bycolonialofficersandgovernors,aswellas
proponentsofempireinEuropeancapitals.Buthowweretheycarriedoutinpractice?
Evenastheoverarchingaimsofandjustificationsforcolonialismshiftedfroma
transformativelogictoapreservationistone,empirically,imperialpracticescontinuedto
varyacrossandwithinterritoriesthroughoutthecolonialperiod.3
Scholarsworkingindifferentdisciplineshaveaddressedthisvariationinopposing
ways.Politicalscientistsandsociologists,particularlythoseconcernedwiththelegaciesof
colonialrule,havetendedtotreatthecategoriesofindirectanddirectruleasempirical
realities,codingcolonialterritoriesbyusingmeasuresdesignedtocapturethedirectness
ofcolonialrue.4Incontrast,inrecentwork,historianshavequestionedthecorrespondence
betweenthesecategoriesandactualcolonialpractice,arguingthatindirectanddirect
strategieswereoftenlargelyrhetorical,capturingcolonialaspirationsandjustifications
ratherthanday-to-daycolonialgovernance.Inpractice,colonialofficersand
administratorsweretoobusyrespondingtoimmediatechallengesandconcernsto
implementaconsistentoverarchingstrategy,andthusmuchofcolonialruledepended
upontheman-on-the-spot.Inthisview,therewasfarmorevariationinrulingstrategies
thanthetermsdirectandindirectruleimply.5
3SeeHerbst(2000,81–89)ontheextenttowhichcolonialapproachesvariedacrossAfrica,regardless
ofwhichEuropeanstatewasincontrol.
4Forexamples,seeGerringetal(2011);Hariri(2012);Lange(2004);Wucherpfennigetal(2015).
5SeeAgeron(1991,22);Porch(1982),addcites.Herbst(2000,82)alsoemphasizesthedifference
betweencolonialtheoryandpractice:“somuchof“colonialscience”wasmadeupinthefaceof
particularexigenciesandoftenbythemanonthespotratherthaninthecolonialcapital,muchlessin
Europe…Thehallmarkofcolonialtheorieswastheirextremeflexibilityattheexpenseoftheory.”
3
Oneoftheaimsofthisprojectistoadjudicatebetweenthesecompeting
understandingsofcolonialgovernance,drawingoninsightsfromboththerecenthistorical
andsocialscientificliteratures.Fromthehistoricalliterature,Itakethepointthatthe
ideologyofcolonialruleisdistinctfromitsexecution.Indirectanddirectcharacterizations
donotcorrespondwellwithcolonialgovernance,butobscureavarietyofdifferentpolicies
andarrangementsthatwerereachedwithindigenouspopulations,makingitdifficultto
categorizecoloniesaseitherdirectorindirect.Thenextsectionexaminestheconceptsof
directandindirectruleandtheirusageinthesocialscienceliterature,andarguesthat
greaterattentionneedstobepaidtothespecificandmultiplewaysthatcolonialstrategies
varied.Variationincolonialstrategycannotbemeaningfullyplottedalongasingle
dimensionofthedirectnessofcolonialintervention.
Yetcolonialrulewasunlikelytobeashaphazardashistoriesofparticularcasesmay
suggest.Thenotionthatcolonialagentshadtorespondtolocalactorsandconditionson
thespot,withoutmuchguidancefromafar,isausefulcorrective:preferencesforindirect
ordirectrulehadtobeinterpretedandmodifiedtothesetting,andlocalpopulations’
responsesandreactionsdoubtlessshapedthewillandcapacityofcolonialactorstoact.
Theconstraintsandpressuresthatcolonialagentsfacedmay,however,havebeensimilar
inmanysettings,makingitpossibletoformulategeneralclaimsabouthowandwhy
colonialapproachesvariedovertimeandplaceacrossdifferentdimensions.Inthispaper,I
considerwhyparticularmetropolitanactorsfavoredindirectordirectrule,focusing
specificallyondebatesregardingtherolethattheindigenousnobilityshouldplay.
Iarguethatunderstandingpreferencesfordirectorindirectstrategiesrequires
investigatingthepoliticsoftheperiod.Specifically,imperialstrategieswereoftena
4
functionofcompetitionandconflictamongdifferentactorswithincolonialstates.
Europeanswerenotaunifiedgroup;thecostsandbenefitsofdifferentcolonialpolicies
werenotthesameforall.Soldiers,settlers,bureaucrats,andbusinessmenhaddifferent
objectives;theythuspreferredthecolonialpoliciesthattheythoughtwouldbesthelpthem
achievetheirobjectives.
Iexaminehowdisagreementsbetweenmilitaryandcivilianofficers,betweenthose
inthecoloniesandthoseinthemetropole,andamongthosewithdifferentpolitical
orientations,ledtoparticularviewsabouthowcolonialruleshouldoperate.Competition
amongcolonialactorsalsoshapedtheirunderstandingofthesecuritysituation.Ilookat
howcolonialviolenceandfearsofrebellionaffectedthewillingnessofcolonialactorsto
empowerindigenousleaders.
Theseargumentsdifferfromtheexistingliterature,whichclaimsthatstrategiesof
indirectrulewereemployedwhereverfeasiblebecausetheywerecheaperandmore
acceptabletolocalpopulations,whiledirectruleoccurredwheretherewerenumerous
settlersandweakpre-existingstateinstitutions.Colonialpolitics,Iargue,weremore
importantinshapingpolicythantheattributesofthecolonialterritoryitself.
IdrawprimarilyonthecaseofAlgeriatoillustratetheplausibilityofmyarguments
andthelimitsofexistingexplanations.TheAlgeriancaseisusefulintworespects.First,the
Algeriancasedemonstratesthedifficultiesofcharacterizingasinglecolonyasgovernedby
eitherdirectorindirectrule.TheFrenchhaveoftenbeenassociatedwithdirectrule,in
contrasttotheBritish,whoaresaidtohaveruledmoreindirectly.AlgeriawasFrance’s
prizecolonyandthelevelofinterventionwasextremelyhigh.Itisoneoftheparadigmatic
casesofdirectrule.IfAlgeriacannotbeaccuratelydescribedasacaseofdirectrule,it
5
raisesthequestionofwhichcaseswouldcount.Second,theAlgeriancase,withitslengthy
andcomplexcolonialexperience,providesanopportunitytoconsiderthemeritsof
competingexplanationsfordifferentcolonialstrategies.ThediscussionofAlgeriais,
however,preliminary.6Itfocusesonthefirstfourdecadesofcolonialrule,aperiodoftime
duringwhichtheFrenchwereengagedinestablishingcontrolanddecidingoncolonial
policy.
Thenextsectiondiscussesconcepts.Thesecondsectionlooksatsubnational
variationincolonialapproachesinAlgeria.Thethirdsectionlaysoutthetheoryand
hypotheses.
I.
Concepts:DirectandIndirectRule
Theliteraturesuggeststwowaystoconceptualizedirectandindirectrule.Thefirst
reflectsthetheoryofindirectruleaslaidoutbythecolonialiststhemselves.Itseesindirect
ruleaslessdisruptivethandirectrulebecauseitpreservedlocaltraditionsandpractices
byworkingwithalready-existingauthorities.Incontrast,directruleimposedEuropean
leaders,laws,andinstitutionsonindigenouspopulations.Indirectanddirectrulethushad
oppositeeffectsonpre-colonialstructuresofpower:indirectruleaimedtopreservethem,
whiledirectrulewasintendedtoeradicateandreplacethemwithanewcolonialorder.
Againstthisview,MahmoodMamdani(1996)arguesthatindirectruledidnot
preservepre-colonialauthoritybutwasinsteadjustasdisruptive,ifnotmoreso,than
directrule.“Inspiteofitsclaimstobeingamorebenignformofrule,onethattendedto
6Atthisstage,IamworkingonanalyzingarchivaldatacollectedattheArchivesNationalesd’OutreMer
inAix-en-Provence,withfurtherdatacollectiontooccuroverthenextyear.Ilaidoutmyresearchplans
andinitialhypothesesinLawrence(2016).
6
reproduce“nativecustom”inapermissivefashion,indirectrulewasthemorehegemonic
assertionofcolonialpower.Unlikedirectrule,itaimedatchangingthepreferencesofthe
massofthecolonized,notjustanarrowelite”(Mamdani1999,862).Indirectrule,
Mamdaniargues,didnotmaintainlocalauthorityasithadexistedbeforecolonialconquest,
butaltereditbyempoweringlocalleadersinspecificways;itmadetheirauthoritylike“a
clenchedfist”(ibid.,874).Mamdani(1996)thuscharacterizeddirectandindirectruleas
“centralizeddespotism”and“decentralizeddespotism.”
Mamdani’sclaimsraiseimportantquestionsforexistingcharacterizationsof
colonialrule:cantheexistenceandcontinuationofpre-colonialtraditionsandleadership
betakenasagiven,aspartofwhatdefinesindirectruleandsetsitapartfromdirectrule?
Ordidindirectrulealter,notpreserve,priorformsofpoliticalauthorityasMamdani
suggests?Ifso,howdiddirectandindirectrulediffer?
Numerousstudiestaketheviewthatcontinuityfromthepre-colonialerasets
indirectruleapartfromdirectrule.ScholarsofcolonialNigeriaoutlinedseven
characteristicsthatdefineindirectrule,thefirstofwhichisthecontinuityoftheprecolonialdynasty(inFisher1994,5).Herbst(2000,83)arguesexplicitlythatMamdani
overstatedtheextenttowhichBritishindirectruledisruptedpre-colonialarrangements,
writing:“Insomeways,theBritishmanagedtoduplicatemanyaspectsofpre-colonialrule,
includingtheincompletedominationofthesubjectpopulationthatwasinevitablewhen
foreignerstriedtorulethroughlocalstructures.”Recently,Gerringetal(2011)have
offeredathoroughanalysisofdirectandindirectrule.Theyarguethatindirectrulewas
morelikelytobeemployedwherestate-likestructuresofauthorityalreadyexisted.They
conceptualizeindirectanddirectruleasacontinuum,ratherthantwodistincttypes.This
7
continuumrepresentstheamountofpowerdelegatedtolocalintermediarieswhorulefor
apowerfulcentralactor.Theydefineindirectruleas“amoredecentralizedframeworkin
whichimportantdecision-makingpowersaredelegatedtotheweakerentity”(Gerringet
al.2011,377).7
Notably,thesestudiescharacterizetheroleoflocalintermediariesdifferentlythan
Mamdanidoes.ForGerringetal,amongothers,indirectruleimpliespower-sharingwith
localelites,whileunderdirectrulepoweriscentralizedinthecolonialadministration.In
contrast,Mamdaniarguesthatthepowerofintermediariesstemsnotfromtheirpreexistingstatus,butfromtheirrelationshipwiththeEuropeancolonialstate.Indirectruleis
notaconcessiontothepoweroflocalelites,butservestocreateandaugmenttheirpower.
Putotherwise,forGerringetal,thepoweroflocalelitescausesthemtobecome
intermediaries,whileforMamdani,itistheirroleasintermediariesthatcausesthemto
becomepowerful.
Thetensionbetweentheseaccountsliesintheirrespectivedefinitionsofindirect
anddirectrule.ForMamdani,independentauthoritywasnotthedefiningfeatureof
indirectrule.ForGerringetal,thepoweroflocalleadersvis-à-vistheconqueringpoweris
definitional:greaterindependentauthorityimpliesindirectrule,greaterdependenceon
theconquerorimpliesdirectrule.AlthoughGerring’setaldefinitionisintuitive,
parsimonious,andpermitsvariationalongacontinuum,Isuggestthatitisproblematicin
threeways.
7Mahoney(2010)rejectstheindirect-directdistinction,butsimilarlyfocusesonthe“level”ofcolonial
intervention,whichisdeterminedbythenumberofEuropeansettlersandthepre-existinginstitutions
oftheconqueredstate.
8
First,atapracticallevel,itisdifficulttooperationalize.Thepoweroftheeliteswho
ruledonbehalfofcolonialpowersvariedtremendouslyinwaysthatarenotcapturedbya
singlecontinuum.8Forinstance,localrulerscouldhaveindependentauthority,yet
exerciseitondifferentscales.AsHerbst(2000,81)writes,“insomeBritishareas,indirect
rulemeanttheappointmentofacouncilofelderswhosewritdidnotextendmuchbeyond
avillage,whileinotherareas,itmeanttherecognitionofanalreadypowerfulrulerwho
hadauthorityoverhundredsofthousandsofpeople.”Rulerscouldalsoexercisea
significantamountofpowerbutthenfindthemselvesdismissedbythecolonial
administration,whichretainedtherighttoremoveleaders.Fittingcasesontoacontinuum
ofpowerisnotaneasytaskiftheabilityoflocalleaderstoactindependentlyfluctuated
overtimeandspace.Measuresofpowerarealsodifficulttoobtainsincelocalrulers
exercisedpowersindifferentdomains,suchaspolicing,taxcollection,andthe
administrationofjustice.Measurementsofoneofthesemaynotreflecttheirpowerin
otherdomains.
Second,therequirementthatlocalleadershaveindependentauthorityomitscases
inwhichconquerorsruledvialocalleaderswhowerenotpowerfulbeforethecolonialera.
Gerringetalexplicitlydiscountindirectruleviachiefswhoarelargelycolonialcreations.
ThewarrantchiefsinAfricaare,theysuggest,aformofpseudo-indirectrulebecausethey
8Recognizingthetremendousempiricalvariationinindirectrulearrangements,Naseemullahand
Staniland(2014)offeratypologyofindirectruleinwhichthepoweroflocalintermediariesvaries.They
describeasuzerainsystem,inwhichlocalrulersmaintainahighdegreeofautonomy,adejuresystem,
inwhichthestatemonopolizesimportantfunctionsbutdelegatescoercivepowerstolocal
intermediaries,andahybridsystem,inwhichthestateandlocalintermediarieshaveoverlapping
spheresofcontrol.Theytakeanimportantsteptowarddisaggregatingdifferentindirectrule
arrangements,butcasesmaystillmovebetweenthesecategories,renderingcategorizationdifficult.
Moreover,liketheGerringetaldefinition,theimplicationthatdirectruleequateswithmorepowerfor
thestate,whileindirectentailspower-sharing,requiresempiricalvalidation.
9
havelittleindependentauthority.9Thispracticeofinstallingchiefsispuzzling,however.If
Gerringetalarerightthatthisisfakeformofindirectrule,itraisesthequestionofwhythe
Britishdidnotsimplyruledirectly.Whatusewerelocalintermediarieswhodidnothave
theirownpowerbases?Whatdifferencediditmakethatrulerswerelocalsratherthan
Europeansiftheiractionsweredictatedbythecolonialpower?ForGerringetal(2011,
388),thiswasamisstep;anattempttoconstructindirectrulewhereitcouldnotsucceed.
InMamdani’sframework,thesechiefswereuseful,notbecauseofanypriorlegitimacyor
power,butbecausethecolonialpowers’delegationofthemaschiefswasitselfasourceof
power.ReconcilingtheseviewpointsrequiresconsideringwhyEuropeanssometimes
workedthroughleaderswithminimalindependentauthority.
Third,andperhapsmostimportant,definingindirectruleasapower-sharing
arrangementeffectivelyassumesawaysomeofthemostinterestingandpressingquestions
aboutwhatitwasthatindirectanddirectrulewereintendedtoaccomplish.Ifwetake
Mamdani’spositionseriously,directrulemaynothavegiventhecolonialstatemorepower
overindigenouspopulationsthanindirectruledid.Indirectrulemayhavebeena
particularlyeffectivewaytoextendEuropeanpowerandachievecolonialobjectives,orit
mayhavebeenaconcessiontoexistingpower-holders,asGerringetalsuggest.Mediating
betweenthesepointsofviewrequiresaninvestigationintothereasonswhyparticular
colonialactorsadvocatedfordirectorindirectrule.Italsorequiresabetterunderstanding
9Thewarrantchiefsarenottheonlyexamplesofthis;Wucherpfennigetal(2015)positthatFrench
indirectrulewasdifferentfromBritishindirectrulebecausechiefswhoworkedwiththeFrenchtended
tohavelessindependentpowerthanthechiefsinBritishcolonies.Ochono’s(2014)studyofMiddleBelt
NigeriaalsoshowsthattheBritishoutsourcedcolonialruletoHausa-Fulanioutsiders,ratherthanusing
localchiefsorrulingdirectly.
10
ofthepowersofandconstraintsonthelocalintermediarieswhoruledonbehalfof
Europeanstates.
ItiseasytoseewhytherelativepowerofEuropeanandindigenousactorshasbeen
consideredanimportantdifferentiatingcharacteristicbetweendirectandindirectrule.
Continuitywithpre-colonialtraditionsandthepreservationoflocalauthoritywasthe
overarchingtheoreticalgoalarticulatedbythecolonialiststhemselves.Butitisamistake
totaketheirwordforit;inpractice,thiscontinuitywasvariable.Ratherthanaccepting
eitherthatcolonialrhetoricaccuratelydescribedarrangementsonthegroundorthat
indirectrulealteredandaugmentedthepoweroflocalelites,itmakessensetothinkof
theirpowerasavariable,notadefiningfeatureofonetypeofcolonialrule.Empirically,
bothGerringetalandMamdaniarecorrect;colonialrulersdidsometimessharepower
withlocalelites,butothertimes,theyempoweredlocalactorswhowereoutsidersorwho
hadlittlepriorauthority.
Ifwerejectaconceptualizationbasedonpower,andturnthedisruptivenessof
colonialruleintoaquestionratherthanadefiningfeature,howthenshoulddirectand
indirectrulebedefined?Definingthesetermsiscomplicatedbecausetherearemultiple
dimensionsalongwhichindirectanddirectrulearesaidtodiffer.Onecommon
understandingofthedifferencebetweenthemistheuseoflocalsincolonial
administration.Somehavesuggestedthatanyuseoflocalsqualifiesasindirectrule,10but
placescommonlyconsideredunderdirectrulealsoemployedlocalsasinterpreters,clerks,
andtaxcollectors;theyreporteddirectlytothecolonialadministrationbuttheyalso
10SeethediscussioninFisher(1994,5–6).Doyle(1986)suggeststhatunderdirectrule,onlythelowest
levelsoftheadministrationareentrustedtoindigenousactors.
11
sometimeswieldedconsiderableindependentauthorityandinfluence.11Theuseoflocals
wasubiquitousinthecolonialperiod,sobythisdefinition,fewcaseswouldcountasdirect
rule.
Itmaybemoreaccuratetosaythatitisnotthegeneraluseoflocals,butwhetheror
nottheyaregivennominalrecognitionasleaders.12Nominalrecognitiondoesnotimply
thatleaderswieldaparticularamountofpower,butitdoesacknowledgethemasofficial
authoritiesdesignatedbythecolonialpower.Thiscriterionsetsaparttheemploymentof
localsfromtheirdesignationasleaders;underdirectrule,localsmaybeemployedand
delegatedspecifictasks,butthenominalrulersareEuropeans,eveniflocalssometimes
standinontheirbehalf.Aremainingquestioniswhynominalrecognitionwouldmatter:
howdoesdelegationtoindigenousleaderswhoareinfactconstrainedbyEuropean
oversightaltercolonialpolicy,ifitdoes?
`
Anothercommoncriteriontodistinguishindirectfromdirectruleisthesystemof
law.Directrulesuggestsasinglesystemoflawsetbytheoccupyingpower.Thatsystem
doesnotimplyfairnessorrights;itoftenestablishedunjustlawsforindigenous
populations,butitwasacentralizedlegalstructure.Legalpluralismcharacterizesindirect
rule.Areasofindirectrulearegovernedbycustomarylaw,whichmaydifferfromregion
toregion,oreventribetotribe;thelegalcodeoftheoccupyingpowerisreservedfor
Europeansandselectothers(Mamdani1996,17).
11Onthis,seeDerrick(1983),whonotesthatclerkssometimesheadedcolonialofficesduringlong
absencesbyEuropeanstaff;theyalsohadconsiderableprestigeandaccesstoinformationthatthey
couldleverageoverbothcolonialadministratorsandthelocalpopulation.
12Fisher(1994,6–7)writesthattheexternalpowerrecognizes,atleasttosomedegree,thesovereignty
ofthelocalstate.
12
IfitwerethecasethatplacesclearlyfellundereithercustomaryorEuropeanlaw,
thiscriterionwouldbeusefulforcodingandclassification.Indeed,statisticalworkhas
oftenusedcustomarylawasanindictorofindirectrule(seeGerringetal.2011;Hariri
2012;Lange2004).Yet,customarylawoftengovernedsomedomainswhileEuropeanbasedlawgovernedothers,orcustomarylawwasalteredsuchthatitwasnot,infact
customary.Forexample,Lewis(2013)showshowthedecisiontohavedifferentlegal
systemsforTunisiansandFrenchcitizensinTunisiaundertheprotectoratewas
exceedinglydifficulttoimplement,andendeduprequiringasignificantFrenchpresencein
thecourtsthatweresupposedtoberunbyTunisiansforTunisians,renderingproblematic
theideathatthisformofrulewasmeaningfully“indirect.”Thetroublewasthatdiscerning
whocouldandcouldnotbeconsidered“French”or“Tunisian”itselfrequiredadjudication,
asclaimantsmanipulatedidentityclamsinordertoappearinthejudicialsystemthatthey
preferred.Inpractice,decidingwhetherandwhenthereisacustomarylegalsystem,
versusaEuropeanlegalsystem,maybedifficulttodetermine,andmanycasesmayhave
bothtypesofsystemsdependingontheregion,areaoflaw(criminalversuscivil,for
example),orconstituentstatus.
Otherinstitutionsmayalsobeimplicatedincommonunderstandingsofdirectand
indirectrule.TheextenttowhichthepoliceareEuropeanorindigenous,theratioof
Europeanpersonneltoindigenouspersonnelinthecolonialadministration,thesystemof
education,andthepresenceofEuropeansettlercommunitieshavealsobeendescriptively
linkedtothetypeofcolonialrule(Hechter2013;Hechter2000;Mahoney2010).
Insum,theconceptsofindirectanddirectrulearenoteasilydifferentiablealonga
singleaxisofthe“directness”ofcolonialoversight.Itisnotjustthenamingofindigenous
13
actorstoleadershippositionsthatsetsareascommonlyconsideredunderindirectrule
apartfromareaslabeleddirectrule.Theinstitutions–legal,criminal,andadministrative–
mayalsodiffer,andtheremayormaynotbeasignificantEuropeanpopulation.
UnderstandingthecausesandeffectsofEuropeanstrategiesthusrequiresgreater
specificityaboutwhatpreciselydifferedacrosscolonialspace,sothattheconsequencesof
specificcolonialpoliciescanbeconsidered.Thenextsectionillustratessomeofthese
issuesthroughdiscussingcolonialAlgeria.
II.
MilitaryandCivilianRuleinColonialAlgeria
FrenchcolonialruleistypicallyconsideredmoredirectthanBritishcolonialrule.
TheFrenchcolonialmodelwasexplicitlyinterventionist.Francehadacivilizingmission:it
aimedtoassimilateitscolonies.Further,France’sJacobincentralizingpoliticaltradition
meantthatcolonialadministrationwouldbedirectedfromthecenter(Kudo2010,21).
Algeria,France’smostimportantcolonialterritory,wasnotjustacolony,butconsideredan
integralpartofFranceitself.In1848,thethreedivisionsofBone,Constantine,andAlgiers
weredesignatedFrenchdepartments,theadministrativeequivalentofdepartmentsin
France.Algeriaisacasethatwemightexpecttobeeasilyclassifiableasdirectrule,butthis
sectionshowsthatcolonialgovernancevariedovertimeandplaceinAlgeria,makingan
assertionofthetypeofcolonialrulefortheentirecolonyinaccurate.LargeareasofAlgeria
weregovernedinwaysthatwetypicallythinkofasindirect,andthetypeofrulevaried
dependingonwhowasincharge.Further,controlfromthecenterwasnotuniformand
colonialofficers,settlers,andcivilianleaderswereabletoactindependently,sometimes
ignoringdirectivesfromthecenteroractingontheirowninitiative.
14
AlgeriaundertheJulyMonarchy,1830-1848
France’sfirstdecadeinAlgeriawascharacterizedbyuncertainty(Lorcin1995).
Proposedpoliciesintheearlyyearsincludedwithdrawal,alimitedoccupationofcoastal
citieswithnativechiefsgoverningtheinterior,exterminatingorexpellingindigenous
populations,andfullconquest.Thequestionofwhattodowithconqueredpopulationsin
anagewhenslaverycouldnotlongerbejustifiedwasanopenone;France’sremaining
coloniesattheoutsetoftheAlgerianconquestwerelargelyslaveplantationcolonies,but
slavery,thoughnotyetoutlawed,wasnolongeraviableapproachforanewlyannexed
colony.13
ForseveralyearsafterthecollapseofCharlesX’sregime,thegeneralsinAlgeria
werelargelylefttoformulatetheirownpolicies,althoughtheywerefrequentlyrecalled–
thereweretendifferentgovernor-generalsduringthefirstdecade.Theseearlygovernors
tookdifferentactionstowardtheindigenouspopulation.Thesecond,forexample,General
Clauzel,soughttoworkwithMuslimchiefswhohehopedwouldassisttheFrench;he
proposedinstallingTunisianbeystoruleatOranandConstantineandsignedasecret
treatywiththeTunisianrulingfamilybeforebeingrecalled(Ageron1991,11).General
Savary,thefourthgovernor,andaformerministerofpolice,usedmoreviolenttactics,
exterminatinganentiretribe,assassinatingseveralArabchiefs,andrulingbrutallyinthe
townofAlgiersbeforedyinginoffice(ibid).Subsequentgovernorsoscillatedbetween
brutalityagainstindigenousgroups,andformingallianceswithlocalleaders.Thistwinuse
13Onthis,seeSessions(2011,Chapter4)whosuggeststhatsettlercolonialismwasawaytoreplacethe
indigenouspopulation.
15
ofviolenceontheonehand,anddelegationtolocalauthoritiesontheother,became
characteristicofmilitaryruleinAlgeria.
GeneralBugeaud(governorfrom1841-1847)initiatedasystematicapproachto
nativeadministrationwhenhere-establishedtheDirectionofArabAffairsin1841.
Bugeaudinitiallymeanttomodelthemanagementoftheindigenouspopulationafterthe
Ottomanmakhzansystem.ButDaumas,thedirectorofArabAffairs,studiedtheexisting
administrationofAlgerianleaderAbdel-Kader,andpersuadedBugeaudthatasystemof
indirectgovernmententrustedtoArabchiefsfromthemilitaryandreligiousnobilitywas
thebestexampletofollow:“Thearistocracystillhavegreatpowerandinfluenceoverthe
natives,andmustalwaysbegivengreatconsideration”(inAgeron1991,22).Themilitary
thusdidnotabolishtheprevioussystemofgovernment,buttookovertheorganizationit
hadfound(ibid.,23).
TheDirectionofArabAffairsoversawlocalbureauxarabes,whichwerecharged
withadministeringtheindigenousAlgerians.EachincludedFrenchandindigenous
personnel:FrenchmilitaryofficerswhospokeArabic,knewthearea,andcoordinatedwith
thecadi(localjudgeandnotary),khodja(arabsecretary),andFrenchandindigenous
soldiers.ThepurposeoftheArabaffairsbureauswas“abovealltoassuresecuritythrough
intelligencecollection,surveillance,andtiestonotables.”14
TheFrenchofficersofthebureauxarabesactedasintermediariesbetweenthe
Frenchmilitaryleadershipandthenativechiefs(Ageron1991,23).KnownasArabists,
theyspokeArabic,claimedknowledgeoflocalpeopleandcustoms,andtendedtohave
14CAOM,Gouvernementgénéraldel'Algérie.Bureauxarabesdel'Oranie-Registres(1841/1913),
histoireadministrative.
16
experienceinAlgeria.Theysawthemselvesasvastlymoreenlightenedwhenitcameto
indigenousadministrationthancivilianrulers.15
Civilianrulewastheexceptionduringthe1830-1848period;onlysmallurban
pocketswereunderciviliangovernment.Intheseareas,Frenchcivilservantsand
magistratesbehavedasiftheywereinFrance,applyingFrenchmetropolitanlaw.In1847,
civilianareasweredividedintocommunes,thebasicunitsoflocalgovernmentinFrance,
headedbymayorswhosesalarycamefromtaxescollectedfromthesubjectpopulation
(Ageron,26).BythetimeBugeaudleftin1847,therewere109,400settlersinAlgeria.Of
these,about15,000hadsettledinthemilitaryruledareasofthecountryside;therestlived
inthecitiesofthecoast(ibid.).Theseearlysettlersdetestedthemilitaryofficersofthe
bureauxarabes,whotheysawassidingwiththenatives(Ageron,24).
Themilitary’sclaimstounderstandandrepresenttheinterestsoftheindigenous
populationdidnotpreventtheuseofconsiderableviolence.Bugeaudadvocated
conqueringAlgeria“byploughandbysword.”Accordinglyevenasadministrativeoffices
wereestablishedtoadministerlocalpopulations,theFrencharmyengagedinatrocious
actsofbrutality.TheFrenchemployedatactictheycalled“razzia,”atermtakenfromthe
Algerianwordforraiding.Theyusedthetermtoimplythattheirattacksagainst
recalcitranttribeswereconsistentwithlocalnormsofviolence,butthelevelofbrutalityof
theFrenchpracticewentbeyondtheterm’soriginalusage(Gallois2013,2–4).In1845,
BugeaudcommentedontherecentasphyxiationofalocaltribebyFrenchsoldiers,“Itisa
cruelextremity,butahorrifyingexamplewasnecessarytostriketerroramongthese
turbulentandfanaticalmontagnards”(inBrower2009,22).
15OnthebureauxarabesandtheSaintSimonianideologythatguidedmanyofitsofficers,seeAbi-
Mershed(2010);Pilbeam(2013);Rey-Golzeiguer(2010).
17
Themilitaryprincipleinplacewastheaggressiveuseofforcetooverwhelmthe
enemyandcrushresistance(ibid.,23).LieutenantColonelLucien-FrançoisdeMontagnac
described“howtomakewarontheArabs”inthefollowingway:“Killallthemendownto
theageoffifteen,takeallthewomenandchildren,putthemonboatsandsendthemto
MarquesasIslands,orsomewhereelse;inaword,annihilateallwhowillnotgrovelatour
feetlikedogs”(ibid.,22).DuringBugeaud’sterm,FranceexpandeditsreachintoAlgeria,
attackingtheresistanceleaderAbdel-Kader,towhomtheyhadearliercontemplated
delegatingpower(Ageron1991,18–19).
AlgeriaundertheSecondRepublic(1848-1851)andtheSecondEmpire(1852-1870)
Theperiodfrom1848to1870sawmultipleshiftsinauthorityinAlgeria,ascivilian
areasexpanded,whilethemilitary’sauthoritywaxedandwaned.The1848Revolutionin
Francebroughtinarepublicangovernmentthatsettlershopedwouldexpandcivilian
controlofAlgeria.TheConstitutionof1848statedthatAlgeriawasanintegralpartof
FranceandpromisedtoextendthelawsofFrancetoAlgeria.AtthistimeAlgiers,Bone,and
Constantinebecamedepartments,thebasicunitsofprovincialgovernmentinmetropolitan
France.Ineachofthethreedepartments,therewereareasundercivilianandmilitary
control.Inthecivilianareas,thedepartmentsweredividedintoarrondissements(districts)
andcommunes,justastheywereinmetropolitanFrance(Ageron1991,29).Themilitary
zonesweredividedincerclesandcommunesandthebureauxarabescontinuedtoshape
policytowardindigenousAlgerians.
18
Withineachdepartment,therewerethreetypesofcommunes:communesdeplein
exercise,whichwerelargelypopulatedbysettlersandwereadministeredverysimilarlyto
communesinFrance,communesmixtes,wheretherewerebothsettlerandindigenous
populations,andcommunesindigènes,whichwerelargelyindigenous.Thisspatial
variationprovidesanopportunitytobetterunderstandthecausesandconsequencesof
differentcolonialapproaches.Sincethequestionhereconcernsthecolonialpolicies
towardindigenouspopulations,Iamparticularlyinterestedinthecomparisonbetween
mixedcommunesunderbothmilitaryandciviliancontrol.Iamstillintheprocessof
compilingsourcesonhowtheseareasweregoverned;belowIprovideapreliminary
discussionofthemotivationsofcivilianandmilitarycolonialagents.
In1852,NapoleonIIIcametopower,establishingtheSecondEmpireinFrance.
Withthereturnofmonarchy,themilitaryagaingainedtheupperhand.Inaletterwritten
in1863,NapoleonIIIstated“Algeriaisnot,strictlyspeaking,acolonybutanArab
kingdom.”Thisstatement,alongwiththeclaimthatthenativesofAlgeria,likethesettlers,
hadanequalrighttoNapoleonIII’sprotection,infuriatedthesettlers.16Thebureaux
arabesimplementedtheemperor’sprogram,establishingMuslimcourtsofjustice,
reopeningKoranicschoolsinmilitaryterritory,andintroducingArab-Frenchprimary
schoolsincertainurbanandtribalareas.Incivilianareas,settlerspushedbackagainst
policiesfavoringtheindigenouspopulation.Theymadestridestowardthepolicyof
cantonnement,whichdelimitedpropertyrights.Inpractice,thispolicyforcednative
Algerianstocedetheirlandstothestate.
16QuotedinAgeron(1991,38).
19
Theinfluenceofthebureauxarabesbegandecliningafter1870,whenareasunder
militarycontrolbegantobetransferredtocivilianrule.In1875,therewere1,418,315
millionpeoplelivingundermilitaryrule,including7,055Frenchsettlers;while1,047,092
wereundercivilianrule,including136,826Frenchsettlers.By1902,numberofpeople
livingundermilitaryruleinthethreedepartmentshaddeclinedto588,691(andonly
3,245Frenchsettlers),whiletherewere4,134,534peopleunderciviliancontrol,including
354,884Frenchsettlers.17Thetransferofcommunesfrommilitarytocivilianruleprovides
anotheropportunitytoexplorethereasonsforandconsequencesofchangingcolonial
policies.
ThispreliminarydiscussionofthefirstfortyyearsofcolonialisminAlgeriashows
thattheFrenchapproachisnoteasilyclassifiableasdirectorindirect.TheFrench
implementeddifferentstrategiesindifferentplaces,andtheirapproachchangedovertime.
EventhoughAlgeriahasbeenconsideredaquintessentialcaseofdirectrule,theFrench
militaryempoweredlocalelites,retainedlawbasedonthesharia,andsupported
indigenouseducationinArabic.TheFrenchmilitaryalsoattackedsomelocalchiefs,rather
thanempoweringthem,engaginginhorrificviolenceastheconquestcontinuedintothe
Algerianinterior.Insomeareas,FrenchrulewasverysimilartoFrenchruleinFrance,with
metropolitanlawsandadministration,butthemajorityofthecountrywasundermilitary
rulethatdidnotincludemetropolitaninstitutions.
Further,thecivilian-runareasimperfectlyresembledirectrule.Onlythecommunes
depleinexercise,wherethemajorityofinhabitantswereEuropeans,hadlegalstructures
andadministrativeinstitutionsthatweresimilartoFrance.Yetsincetheseareaswere
17TableauGénéraldesCommunesd’Algérie,1875&1902.CAOM.
20
largelyinhabitedbyEuropeans,itisproblematictoconceiveofthesestrategiesasaimedat
managingtheindigenouspopulation.Assimilationappliedtothesettlersandtheirlands,
nottherestofthepopulation.Inthemixedcommunes,whereciviliansdidrulesignificant
numbersofindigenousAlgerians,theyselectivelydefendedsomeaspectsof“tradition”or
putinplacenewmeasuresthathadnocorrespondenceinmetropolitanFrance.For
example,althoughadirectruleapproachwouldfavorEuropeanmethodsofeducating
natives,settlersarguedagainstFrencheducationforindigenousAlgerians(Ageron1991,
76).AssimilationwasusefultociviliansasawaytostrengthenFrance’spresenceinand
commitmenttoAlgeria,butpoliciestowardthepopulationweredependentontheir
perceivedeffectsonvyingFrenchinterests.
TherewasnosingleoverarchinglogicofcolonialruleinAlgeria;themilitaryand
civilianshadapproachesthatwereatoddswithoneanother.Inthenextsection,Iconsider
whytheirapproachestocolonialgovernancediffered.
III.Theory:Whofavoreddirectandindirectruleandwhy?
Competitionbetweenmilitaryandcivilianactorswasacorefeatureofcolonialrule
inAlgeria.Civilianadministratorsandsettlersinsistedthattheirapproachwassuperior,
thattheultimategoalwastheadministrativeassimilationofAlgeriatothemotherland.18
TheywantedtodestroythenativearistocracyandreplaceitwithaFrenchbureaucratic
system.Theyaccusedthemilitaryof“despotismbythesword,”pointingtothecontinued
18Theyfavoredadministrativeassimilationandtheimportofmetropolitanlawsforsettlers,notthe
assimilationofindigenousAlgerians;settlersvehementlyopposedcitizenshiprightsofAlgerians.On
theprospectsofassimilationforAlgerians,seeLawrence(2013).
21
relianceonviolenceasaweaknessofthemilitary’sapproach.19Inresponse,proponentsof
themilitary’sapproachdefendedtheuseofindigenouschiefsandthemaintenanceof
nativeinstitutionsandpractices,decryingcivilianruleasineptandunjust.20General
Hanoteau,anofficerofthebureauxarabes,criticizedthesettlersinthecivilianzones,
stating,“Whatoursettlersdreamofisabourgeoisfeudalisminwhichtheywillbethelords
andthenativestheserfs.”21Bothsidespresentedthemselvesasbetterqualifiedfor
governing,defendingtheirownbureaucraticinterestsinthecolony.
Twofactorshelpedshapewhetherthemilitaryorthecivilianleadershipdominated
atparticularpointsintime:thestanceofthegovernmentinParis,andthesecurity
situationinAlgeria.TheFrenchgovernmentchangedhandsoverthecourseoftheperiod;
withciviliansgenerallygainingthesympathyofrepublicans,whilethemilitarywasfavored
bymonarchy.Butthisalonecouldnotgiveonepartytheupperhand.Akeyissuewasalso
theongoingneedforsecurity,aconcernsharedbybothciviliansandthemilitary,but
whichwasthemilitary’sresponsibility.Rebellionsandthethreatoftherebellionensured
thatthemilitaryretainedanimportantroleingoverningAlgeria.
Butwhywasitthatthemilitaryfavoredastyleofrulethatmorecloselyresembles
indirectrule,whilethecivilianleadershipwantedtoimportFrenchinstitutions?This
sectiondevelopsageneralargumentfordifferentapproachestocolonialgovernance,
19Forexamplesoftheseviews,see:Morsly,DocteurT.ConseillerMunicipaldeConstantine.
«ContributionàlaQuestionIndigèneenAlgerie.»Constantine:ImprimerieJéromeMarleetF.Biron,
1894CAOMB3932;«UnProgrammeAlgérien»DiscoursdeM.Marchal,vice-présidentduConseil
Générald’Alger,membreduConseilSupérieur.Alger:ImprimerieC.Zamith,1898.CAOMB7721;
Foucher,Vitor.LesBureauxArabsenAlgérie.Extraitdela«RevueContemporaine»t.XXXIV31
Octobre1857,pp.209-230CAOMB3931.
20See«Alger:SituationPolitique1860»GouvernementGénéralCivildeL’Algérie.BureauPolitiques.FR
ANOMGGA11H1;LeblancdePrébois,François(ex-représentantdel’Algérieen1848),«Bilandu
RégimeCivildel’Algérieàlafinde1871».Paris:E.Dentu,1872CAOMB7059.
21QuotedinAgeron(1991,39–40).
22
layingouttheimplicationsthatstillrequireempiricalinvestigation,bothinAlgeriaandin
additionalcases.
Indirectruleandthemilitary
Iarguethattherhetoricofindirectrulewasusefulforthemilitaryinpartbecause
theprimarytaskofamilitaryengagedinconquestistoestablishorder.Securityisthe
foremostconcernforageneralengagedinoperationsoverseas.Indirectrulehelpedsolve
thisproblem:itallowedcolonialmilitariestodelegatetheuseofforcetoindigenous
leaderschargedwithmaintainingstabilityandpreventingdisorder.Disordercouldtake
theformofoutrightrevolt,butitcouldalsoinvolvelessovertformsofresistance,suchas
therefusaltoprovidelaborforcolonialprojectsortaxevasion.Bydelegatingauthorityto
localrulers,theactionstheserulerstookcouldbejustifiedasconsistentwithindigenous
cultureandtraditions.Theabilitytopassoffthecoercionexercisedbylocalintermediaries
asamanifestationoftraditionconvenientlydistancedcolonialactorsfromthebrutalityof
colonialrule;itprovidedawaytodeflectdirectresponsibilityforcoercionthatwasuseful,
orinsomeinstancesessential,tothesuccessofthecolonialproject.
Byportrayingthecoerciveactsoflocalintermediariesasalamentableby-productof
indirectrule,colonialactorscouldaccountforviolencetodomesticaudiencesinthe
metropolewhooversawcolonialrulefromafar.Proponentsofindirectrulewerethus
carefultonottopubliclycondonetheuseofbruteforce,andEuropeansretainedthe
prerogativetoinvestigatesuch“abuses”whentheyoccurred.Inpractice,however,
brutalitywasexpectedtoaccompanyindirectrule.AsC.L.Temple,thelieutenantgovernor
innorthernNigeriafrom1914-1917explainedinNativeRacesandtheirRulers,“Toputthis
policyintoeffectmeansfirstofallthatyoumustshutyoureyes,uptoacertainpoint,toa
23
greatmanypracticeswhich,thoughnotabsolutelyrepugnanttohumanityarenevertheless
reprehensibletoourideas…youhavetomakeupyourmindthatmenarenotallequal
beforethelawandcannotbesotreated”(quotedinSmith1970,16).Inthisview,indirect
rule,withitsrelianceonmultiplesystemsoflawostensiblybasedontradition,requireda
degreeoftoleranceforunrestrainedleadership,uptoanunspecifiedpoint.
Theneedforcolonialofficialsto“shuttheireyes”tobrutalpracticescouldbetaken
toimplyanecessaryabsenceofaccountabilitythataccompaniedthedelegationofruleto
localleaders.Indeed,Gerringetal(2011,414)suggestthatindirectruleentailsatrade-off
betweenaccountabilityandtheeffectivenessoflocalrulers,writingthatinterferencemay
threatenthelegitimacyofthedesignatedrulers.Yetpracticesthatwerejustifiedas
unwelcomeaccompanimentstoindirectrulemay,infact,havehadutilityforcolonial
actors.Insteadofconceptualizingtheuseofforceasaproblemofaccountability,the
absenceofaccountabilityanddirectoversightcouldbeadvantageous,notonlybecauseit
distancedthecolonialpowerfromviolencecarriedoutbyintermediariesandallowedthem
toavoiddirectresponsibility,butalsobecausecoercionitselfwasusefulfordeterringand
dealingwithactsofrebellionandforjustifyingthecontinuedneedformilitaryoversight.
MartinThomas(2012,2)hasdirectedourattentiontotheutilityofpolicingforthe
economicaimsofcolonizingpowers,pointingtotheuseofrepressionagainstworkersin
industriesandplantations.Thisrepressionisnotaby-productofcolonialrule,butpartof
“whatcolonialpolicewerecalledupontodo.”Totakeanexample,incolonialGambia,the
Britishnotonlytoleratedcoercionbychiefs,theyexpectedchiefstowield“strongpowers”
inordertofullycontroltheirdistricts(Ceesay2014,29).
24
Militaryactors,byhabitus,arelikelytoprioritizeorderandtofavormethodsthat
reducerestrictionsontheuseofforce.Inareasofindirectrule,forcecouldbedelegatedto
localactors,butadditionally,indirectrulegavethemilitaryitselfsignificantfreedomof
action.InAlgeria,themilitarycarriedoutnumerousattacksonunconqueredareas,and
alsobrutallyputdownrebellionswhentheyoccurred.Theviolenceofthemilitaryin
Algeriastandsincontrasttotheirroleasthe“defender”oftheindigenouspeopleandthe
civilianclaimthatthemilitaryofficersinAlgeriaputthenativeaheadofthesettler.Itis
indeedremarkablethatFrenchmilitaryofficersbothbrutallyattackedandvehemently
defendedindigenouspopulations,andthisapparentcontradictionmakesmoresenseifwe
positthattheabilitytowieldviolencewasamorefundamentalpartoftheappealof
indirectapproachesthanrespectforindigenousnormsandinstitutions.22
Severalempiricalimplicationsfollowfromhypothesizingindirectruleasan
authoritarianprojectaimedatestablishingorder.First,theargumenthasimplicationsfor
thekindsoftraditionsthatmightbetoleratedunderindirectrule.AsSuzanneRudolph
(2005,9)writes,“traditionisnotanunbreakablepackage.”Customarylawcodifiedsome
practicesandomittedothers;colonialrulerslikewisetoleratedsomecustoms,but
outlawedothers,astheeventualabolitionofslaverysuggests.Theargumentheresuggests
thatindirectrulewouldtendtopermitelementsoftraditionthatwereusefulfor
maintainingautocraticcontrol.Therazzia,forexample,wasappropriatedbytheFrench
andusedagainstrecalcitranttribes.Bugeaudstatedexplicitlyin1841thattherazziawas
22OnekeyproblemthatconfrontedcolonialofficersinAlgeriawasthatalthoughtheywishedtorelyon
localchiefs,theirnotesandcorrespondencesuggestthattheyoftenhadtroublebelievingtheycould
trustlocalchiefsbecauseofthehistoryofFrenchviolenceinthecolonies.Thearchivessuggesta
lingeringsuspicionthatleadersmightdefectatanypointbecausetheconquesthadbeensobrutalthatit
wouldbedifficulttoforgiveandforget.
25
“systematizedbecauseofitsusefulness”(quotedinGallois,p.3),suggestingthattheFrench
wereselectiveaboutwhichelementsof“traditional”culturetheyused.
Asecondimplicationisthatweshouldobservevariationinthekindsofcoercion
employed.Specifically,inareasthatwereruledmoreindirectly,colonialofficersandlocal
leadersshouldhavehadafreerhandtoengageinpracticessuchascollectivepunishment,
imprisonmentwithoutdueprocess,confiscationofproperty,andviolentpunishmentof
offendersthaninareasofdirectrule.Totakeanexample,inGambiain1919,when“the
UpperSaloumChiefburntdowntheentirevillageatBantantoforcingitsinhabitantsto
seekrefugeinnearbyNianijadistrict,asubsequentinquiryexoneratedthechief.Itstated
thus:“Thecrimeswereverycommon,andwerenotcrimesintheeyesofhispeople…In
fact,theywerecommittedtoshow‘power’”(Ceesay2014,34).Inareasofdirectrule,the
legalcodeinplace,includingtheNativeCodesthatestablishedpunishmentsspecificto
indigenouspeoples,shouldprovideamoreuniformsetofpenaltiesandrestrictions.
Athirdimplicationisthatindigenousleaderswhowerenotsignificantpowerholdersduringthepre-colonialeracouldstillperformaneffectiveintermediaryrole.The
opportunitytousecoercionundertheguiseoftraditionallowedleaderswhowere
appointedbythecolonialpowertoconsolidatecontrolevenwhentheylackedalegitimate
pre-colonialleadershiprole.Wemightexpectthattheseleaderswouldneedtorelyon
forcemoreheavilythanleaderswhoalreadyhadestablishedrolesbeforethecolonial
period,atleastinitially.Themovetoappointleaderswholackedtheirownindependent
powerispuzzlingforexistingaccountsofdirectandindirectrule,butifthepowersthat
theyweregrantedhelpedtoestablishtheircontrol,theycouldstillfulfillausefulrolefor
colonialactors.Indeed,theymighthaveprovenmorepliabletocolonialintereststhanpre-
26
existingleaders,whosepriortiestothepopulationmayhavefacilitatedresistanceagainst
colonialorders.
CivilianAdministrationandDirectApproaches
AreaswherecivilianswereinpowerinAlgeriawerehardlymorebenevolentthan
areascontrolledbythemilitary.Thecivilianzoneswerenotviolence-free,buttheformsof
violenceandtheytypesofpenaltiesthatAlgeriansfaceddiffered.
Iarguethatcolonialbureaucratsandsettlersconceptualizedorderdifferentlythan
themilitarydid.Forthem,ordermeantruleoflaw.23Themissionofcolonialbureaucrats
differedfromtheirmilitarycounterparts;forthem,thekeygoalwastoinstallan
administrationcapableofgoverningnewlyconqueredareas.Thisimpliedimplementinga
bureaucraticstructurethatwouldroutinizeandregulaterelationsbetweenEuropeansand
thecolonializepopulation.24Civilianofficersexplicitlycomparedtheirapproachtothe
military’s,arguingthattheruleoflawwassuperiortothecapricioususeofforce,whether
byFrenchforcesorlocalchiefs.
Thisunderstandingoforderdidnotimplyrightsforthecolonizedpopulation.Often,
itcarriedwithitasetoflegalpenaltiesandrestrictionstargetedspecificallyatthenative
population.ItprovidedrightstoEuropeansinthecolony,butestablishedaninferiorlegal
statusforthewiderpopulation.Settlersthushaveoftenbeenassociatedwiththe
establishmentofdirectrule;theywereeagertomaintaintheircitizenshiprightsand
preventtheconqueredpopulationfromgainingsimilarrightsinordertopreservetheir
23AsThomas(2012,7)arguedforcolonialpoliceofficersacrossEuropeancolonies,differentactorsmay
havetheirownstandardsforhowtheworldoughttobe.
24OnEuropeanwaysofseeingandbringingordertoacolony,seeMitchell(1991).
27
privileges.Bothsettlersandadministratorscanbeexpectedtofavortheinstallationofa
legalcodethatwouldofferuniformityandclearlydelineatethelawsgoverningbehavior.
Theestablishmentofaunifiedlegalcode,withrightsforEuropeansandselected
groupsamongthecolonized,affectedtheformofcollectiveactionthatoccurredin
responsetocolonialrule.AsIhavearguedelsewhere,theinitialresponseofindigenous
activistsintheFrenchcolonieswastousethelegalcodetomakedemandsupontheFrench
administration.RebellionagainstcolonialismintheFrenchEmpirewasguidedbythelaws
andrightsinplace,asactivistspointedtothehypocrisyofasystemwhoseaimwasto
“civilize”nativepopulationsbutwhichrefusedtoextendtothemthesamerightsthat
Europeancitizensenjoyed.Activiststhussoughttoextendtherightsthatwereprovidedto
EuropeansettlerstothelocalpopulationandworkedtodismantletheNativeCodesthat
setthemapartfromEuropeans(Lawrence2013).Directrulewasthusnotalways
illegitimatebecauseoftheidentityofthecolonialrulers,butbecauseofthelawsandrules
thataccompaniedit.
CompetitionandColonialGovernance
ThehypothesesIhaveoutlinedfocusontheinterestsofparticularcolonialactors.
Theyreflectinsightsfromhistoriansabouttheimportanceofstudyingtheinteractionsthat
occurredduringthecolonialperiod.Colonialpolicywasnotdecideduponinimperial
centersandthenimplementedsurgicallyfromabove.Colonialactorshadopposingideas
andintereststhatledtodivergentviewsabouthowcolonialgovernanceshouldbe
approached.Competitionbetweendifferentcolonialagentsledtoshiftsinstrategyover
timeandplace.Andtheactionsoftheindigenouspopulationalsomatteredbecausethe
28
prospectofrebellionempoweredsomecolonialactorsoverothers.Whenrebellion
occurred,italsoprovidedanopportunitytochangecolonialpolicy.Arebellionprovided
ammunitionforthosewhoopposedexistingpolicies,afailurethatcouldbepinnedon
particularstrategiesofrule.Dependingonwhoseunderstandingprevailed,colonialpolicy
couldshiftineitherdirectioninthewakeofinsurrection.25
Theseargumentsdifferfromexistingexplanationsfordirectandindirectrulein
waysthatrequiregreaterelucidation.Theprimaryalternativesfocusontwofactors:the
costsofdirectversusindirectrule,andthesuitabilityofeachtypeofruleforparticular
locations.Indirectruleissaidtobelesscostlyandthereforemoreattractivetocolonial
powerslookingtoreducethecostofempire.Yetindirectrulecannotbeimplementedinall
settings;Gerringetal(2011),forexample,arguethatitisonlypossiblewherethereare
pre-existingleaderscapableofrulingfortheimperialpower.Forlackoftimeandspace,I
donotdiscussthesealternativeargumentshere.Itisworthwhiletoadd,however,thatIdo
notintendtosuggestthatthesefactorswerenotimportant,butthatthepoliticsofthe
periodmaybeequallycrucial,ifnotmoreso,forexplainingwhycolonialstrategieswere
adoptedandwhytheychangedovertime.
Conclusion&Implications
Thispaperhasofferedapreliminarylookatvariationincolonialgovernance,witha
focusoncolonialAlgeria.Itispartofanongoingprojectthatseekstoinvestigatedifferent
colonialstrategies,demonstratesubnationalvariationthatisoftenignoredinmacro
characterizationsofcolonialrule,andconsiderwhycolonialapproachesvaried.
25MultipleauthorshavearguedthattheIndianMutinypushedtheBritishfromdirecttoindirectrule
(Mantena2010);inAlgeria,the1870insurrectionresultedintheexpansionofdirectciviliancontrol,
suggestingthattheinterpretationofrebelliondifferedacrosscontexts.
29
Studyingindirectanddirectruleduringthelatecolonialperiodisimportantfor
understandinghowEuropeansruledoverdiversepopulationsatgreatdistancesfrom
imperialcenters.Recentscholarshiphasshownhowimperialiststhoughtaboutand
defendedbothformsofcolonialrule.26Myaimistocomparedifferentmodesofrule,
considerwhyproponentsfavoredsomestrategiesoverothers,anddescribehowthey
workedinpractice.
Thistopichasimplicationsforunderstandingtheeffectsofthecolonialperiod.The
ideathatcolonialrulehadlong-termconsequencesmakessense,giventhatcolonialrulers
oftenclaimedtobeinthebusinessoftransformation.Evenwherecolonialinterventions
weresupposedtobeindirectandlimited,rulersactedinwaysthatchangedlocal
economiesandpatternsofauthority.Agrowingbodyofworkhasfoundpersistentlegacies
ofthecolonialera.Directandindirectruleinparticularhavebeenlinkedtonationalist
resistance,theempowermentofprivilegedgroups,economicunderdevelopment,and
autocracy,27yetthemechanismsremainunclearbecauseknowledgeofanddataoncolonial
practicesislacking.Abetterunderstandingofhowimperialgovernancevariedcanpoint
topotentialproblemswithcurrentwaysofmeasuringandinterpretingcolonialera
variables.
Further,strategiessuchasindirectrule,ordivide-and-rule,continuetobeinvoked
incontemporarycasesofoccupationandstateexpansion.28Thisprojectsuggeststhatthese
approachesareunlikelytobeimplementedinthewaysthatproponentsenvision.Indirect
rulemaynotbeeffectivebecauseofitsuseofindigenousleaders,asissooftenassumed,
26SeeMantena(2010)andPitts(2009).
27Forrecentexamples,seeAcemogluetal(2014);Hariri(2012);Hechter(2000;2013);Kohli(2004);
Lange(2004);Wucherpfennigetal(2015).
28SeeFisher(1994,3–4)andNaseemullahandStaniland(2014).
30
butbecauseoftheviolencethataccompanieditsapplication.Acloserlookatthecolonial
periodmaythushaveimportantlessonsforthestudyofcounter-insurgencyandconquest
morebroadly;bylookingatthegapbetweenwhatcolonialrulerssaidaboutwhatthey
weredoingandwhattheyactuallydid,itispossibletoidentifystructurallimitationsthat
thwartpolicyimplementation.
31
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