Exam No. 0347947
How successfully did Neville Chamberlain preserve his political authority during the ‘phoney
war’ of September 1939 to May 1940?
Abstract
This essay explores the political authority of Neville Chamberlain during the early stages of World
War Two. This period also informed the closing stages of his political career. The legacy of
appeasement not only haunted him throughout the ‘phoney war’ but has resonated in the historical
memory of Britain. This, however, has resulted in a teleological tendency in the existing
historiography on Chamberlain and his role in the war. As much of the literature seeks to explain his
downfall, it bestows a sense of inevitability on the course of events which is not altogether accurate.
This essay attempts to address this problem by assessing Chamberlain’s political authority during the
‘phoney war’ period within its own right, not simply as an explanation for his downfall. It argues that
in order to avoid a Whiggish interpretation of Chamberlain’s political authority a distinction must be
made between political authority and the extent to which he proved to be a legitimate war leader.
Key words: War; Chamberlain; Politics; Authority
Essay
When Neville Chamberlain addressed the nation on 3 September 1939 declaring that Britain
was at war, Leo Amery’s verdict on his speech was that it was ‘good, but not the speech of a war
leader’.
1
This highlights a key distinction that must be made in order to assess Chamberlain’s
political authority during the ‘phoney war’. The concept of political authority itself, even in peace
time, is shrouded in philosophical debate, making an assessment of it in times of war even more
problematic. C.W. Cassinelli argues that a distinction must be made between the ‘exercise’ of political
authority and the ‘possession’ of it. Chamberlain exercised his political authority well between
September 1939 and May 1940, but the extent to which he possessed the authority to lead the nation
through a war was questioned throughout this period. However, Chamberlain’s resignation as Prime
Minister in May 1940 has given rise to a teleological tendency in the historiography; much of the
literature seeks to explain his downfall, making it tempting to bestow a sense of inevitability on the
course of events. According to Kevin Jefferys, there is general agreement that Chamberlain’s fall was
unavoidable, ‘a logical result of Britain’s attempt to square up to the Nazi menace’.2 The reasons for
this are varied, but the overall approach carries with it a Whiggish mentality which is not altogether
justified. On the contrary, while grumblings about his lacklustre and uninspiring war leadership did
affect Chamberlain, the fact that there was no outright challenge made against him until after the
disaster in Norway, when it became clear that the war was not going to be short-lived, suggests that
1
2
J. Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (1989), pp.209-210.
K. Jefferys, ‘May 1940: The Downfall of Neville Chamberlain’, Parliamentary History, 10 (1991), p.364.
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Exam No. 0347947
his political authority was preserved up to this point, when the ‘phoney war’ ended. In order to assess
Chamberlain’s political authority it is important to view the events of the ‘phoney war’ in their own
right, not as an explanation for his downfall. Therefore we must highlight the difference between
Chamberlain’s political authority during this period and the extent to which he proved to be a
legitimate war leader.
Macleod maintains that Chamberlain should have resigned at the outbreak of war, arguing
that ‘he was too much of a man of peace to lead a nation … effectively in war’.3 As Prime Minister
since 1937 Chamberlain had proved a formidable leader, but the outbreak of war damaged this
reputation and his style of leadership came under constant attack thereafter. That war was declared at
all meant he had fundamentally failed in his objective to conserve peace. On the other hand, however,
that he continued unchallenged as Prime Minister into the war despite the failure of appeasement
shows that his political authority, albeit tainted, was still intact. Complaints regarding Chamberlain’s
poor choice in ministers were rife in the party and have since been supported by historians such as
Colvin, who describes Chamberlain as a ‘shy autocrat’ who made policy in silence before putting it to
the Cabinet.4 The early work of the first War Cabinet, however, challenges these claims. One of
Chamberlain’s biggest fears was realised in October 1939 when a ‘peace offensive’ from Hitler
demanded a response from Britain; the Cabinet spent hours drafting a response and by the 12 th had
agreed on a statement which was delivered by Chamberlain to the House of Commons and received
with cheering from both sides of the chamber. One minister noted, ‘it would be impossible to improve
upon it. It bears every evidence of the collective mind of the best brains in the Cabinet’.5 Thus, while
criticisms about Chamberlain’s governance existed they were not to any degree which would harm
Chamberlain’s political authority during the phoney war. On the contrary, the pressure exerted on
Chamberlain by his opponents and his skill in handling them actually strengthened the government.6
The appointments of figures such as Churchill and Eden to the Cabinet were calculated by the Prime
Minister to supress the potential threats to Chamberlain without taking power away from his most
valued advisers; ‘In one coherent move, Chamberlain disarmed the dissidents of a grievance while at
the same time decapitating them of their potential leadership’.7
By bringing Churchill into the War Cabinet Chamberlain hoped to have effectively ‘muzzled’
him. However to say that Churchill was a constant hazard to Chamberlain in the cabinet would be to
pander to the myth – partly perpetuated by Churchill himself in The Gathering Storm - that the two
were of irreconcilable minds over the direction of the war. In fact they agreed on most things, not
3
I. Macleod, Neville Chamberlain (1961), p.283.
I. Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet: how the meetings in 10 Downing Street, 1937-9, led to the Second World
War : told for the first time from the Cabinet papers (1971), p.265.
5
R. Self, Neville Chamberlain: a biography (2006), p.400.
6
K. Jefferys, ‘May 1940: The Downfall of Neville Chamberlain’, Parliamentary History, 10 (1991), p.368.
7
L. Witherell, ‘Lord Salisbury’s ‘Watching Committee’ and the fall of Neville Chamberlain, May 1940’,
English Historical Review (2001), p.1141.
4
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Exam No. 0347947
least the view that the war would not last. Robbins warns against over-exaggerating the significance
of Churchill’s appointment to the War Cabinet. Churchill’s supporters urged him not to accept the
Prime Minister’s offer but to go to the House of Commons and destroy him, yet the overwhelming
support for Chamberlain, and Churchill’s rogue status within Whitehall, prevented him from doing so.
Instead he declared his loyalty to the Prime Minister. Chamberlain, however, retained a good measure
of his character, observing that ‘Winston is in some respects such a child that he neither knows his
own motives or sees where his actions are carrying him’.8 This insight bears truth in the events which
led to Britain’s defeat in Norway, where the politically measured and calculated actions of the Prime
Minister can be seen in stark contrast to those of Churchill. When Norway was invaded and the Chair
of the Military Coordinating Committee resigned, Chamberlain replaced him with Churchill.
Doubting Churchill’s strategic judgements and wanting to maintain Cabinet access to the Chiefs of
Staff, it was deemed more desirable to appoint him as head of the Committee rather than as Minister
of Defence, the role he really wanted.9 Churchill, however, handled the Committee so badly that he
had to ask Chamberlain to take over, saying ‘they’ll take from you what they won’t take from me’.10
Thus Chamberlain’s administrative mastery and experience kept him at the centre of the War Cabinet
and he continued to be a dominant force over everyone in his ministry, including the destiny man
himself.
It was within the broader political community where frustration towards the Prime Minister
was more keenly felt. Historians within the last decade have sought to emphasise the role of such
Tory dissidents. Lynne Olson, in his Troublesome Young Men, credits these Conservatives with the
feat of bringing down a Prime Minister in possession of an overwhelming parliamentary majority.11
However, with the May debates that followed the Norwegian campaign being cited as the climax of
this anti-Chamberlain movement, it calls into question the extent to which the debates provided them
with the final push needed to secure his downfall, or whether it was more of a lucky break. In this
sense perhaps the question is not how successful Chamberlain was in preserving his political authority,
but how unsuccessful the political outsiders were in challenging him. The Edenite ‘Glamour Boys’,
according to Self, amounted to little more than an ‘awkward squad’.12 Indeed, the group was snubbed
once Eden returned to office. As Chamberlain sensed that Eden’s ‘star was now waning’ he offered
him not a restoration to high office but the Dominions Office, demonstrating his sharp political
8
R. Self (2006), p.388.
M. Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940 (1975), p.370
10
D. Dilks, ‘The Twilight War and the Fall of France: Chamberlain and Churchill in 1940’, D. Dilks (ed.),
Retreat from Power – Studies in Britain’s Foreign Policy of the twentieth century, volume two: After 1939
(1981), p.52.
11
L. Olson, Troublesome Young Men: The Churchill Conspiracy of 1940 (2007), p.7
12
R. Self (2006), p.392.
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Exam No. 0347947
judgement.13 Furthermore, without Eden, the group continued to meet under Leo Amery but failed to
do anything more than offer ‘conspiratorial mutterings’.14
Salisbury’s ‘Watching Committee’ was of a similar calibre. Larry Witherell described what
the group was meant to be; ‘a vehicle with which to influence government reform, shape policy, and
make a positive contribution to the administration of the war’.15 In reality, the extent of their activities
lay no further than in that of their name; they watched, and passed judgement, but did not challenge.
That is not to say that the group was not active, they circulated papers and considered detailed
memoranda, but they were merely ‘playing house’ in their attempts to imitate the actions of the War
Cabinet itself. When Salisbury wrote to advise the Prime Minister that the ‘Watching Committee’ had
been formed – ‘in case we might be able to contribute … to the successful conduct of the War’16 –
Chamberlain agreed to meet with him in April to hear the Committee’s recommendations for a
smaller executive Cabinet. Ultimately, however, the Prime Minister did not see any merit in the
proposals and refused to even consider them.17 Salisbury then met with Churchill, who also opposed
the suggestions. Surely then, if the Committee could not get the one man in the Cabinet who was
known to disagree with Chamberlain over the machinery of government to help them, they were
incapable of posing any real threat to Chamberlain’s authority.
Witherell argues that there was a marked shift in the Committee’s focus after this from war
machinery to the issue of Chamberlain’s leadership, and that the Norway crisis provided the spark
they needed to pursue their course of action against him in May.18 However, the matter of timing is
paramount here. The fact that as late as April - when the Norway campaign was underway - the
committee was attempting to influence Chamberlain, not overthrow him, suggests that the change in
their course of action was actually just a change in fortunes, dependent on the outcome of events in
Norway. Moreover, during the debates the Tory dissidents found it difficult to persuade others to
replace Chamberlain. It was only when the debates resumed on 8 May that circumstances changed;
when Attlee was satisfied that enough Conservatives were committed to seeing Chamberlain go, and
the Labour party agreed to vote against the Prime Minister.19
Arguably, of Chamberlain’s opponents, the only group able to make real gains at his expense
was the Labour party. Although the fact that Labour rejected the offer to join the government early in
the phoney war was considered of little importance, their presence became increasingly felt in the
months that followed. Crowcroft describes how the Labour leadership embarked on a concerted
13
D. Dutton (2003), p. 413.
R. Self (2006), p.392.
15
L. Witherell (2001), p.1149.
16
L. Witherell (2001), p.1150.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid, p.1154.
19
Ibid, p.1159.
14
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Exam No. 0347947
strategy of biding time, ‘exerting their leverage over Chamberlain while accumulating political capital
to be expended if circumstances changed’.20Using the home front to make political gains, the Labour
party could hold their industrial influences over the government as Chamberlain was greatly
mistrusted within the Labour movement because of his association with appeasement.21 As opposition
to him increased over his handling of the labour supply and Labour’s political standing grew, the
leaders were able to deny the government its ‘full industrial weight until it shared political
responsibility’. 22 But they were very cautious in this approach. It wasn’t until after the failed
Norwegian campaign that Labour struck the government and even then it was only once the extent of
dissatisfaction with Chamberlain was fully realised. This argument is bolstered by an exchange which
took place in early May between Ernest Bevin and a journalist. On 2 May a report on the front page of
the Daily Herald contained a speech by Bevin – transcribed the day before- which was meant to reach
a rally of workers, in which he boldly claimed that the time had come for a new government.
However, it appears Bevin shrank from the decision and never actually delivered the speech, but by
this time the transcript had already gone to print. Corfield describes it as ‘one of the most important
non-events to shape the course of history’.23 Labour had wanted to see Chamberlain fall since the
outbreak of war, when they rejected his first invitation to form a coalition, however in terms of
Chamberlain’s political authority it is significant that even as late as the beginning of May his
opponents were unwilling to declare themselves as outright opponents to him.
The case of Norway is, therefore, pivotal in terms of Chamberlain’s fate as a war leader. It is
an illustration of how his authority was damaged not in a political sense, but in a military one. Britain
was to finally face up to the reality that the war was not going to be over quickly. However, this was
not just Chamberlain’s miscalculation. His expectations about the nature of war stemmed from two
key assumptions which he shared with his Cabinet ministers – including Churchill – and his military
experts, but which revealed how little any of them knew about the nature of the Nazis and Hitler’s
intentions. 24 They believed that time was on the side of the Allied forces and that the German
economy was sure to implode under the strain. Timing was to play a key role in Norway, but not on
the side of Britain. It is highly ironic that the date set for Allied action in Scandinavia, with the aim of
disrupting the transport of German supplies - the backbone of the entire Nazi war machine - coincided
exactly with that set by Hitler to plan an offensive against France,25 especially since the possibility of
action had been on the War Cabinet agenda since December 1939. Chamberlain’s delay had been
purely political, not wanting to preconceive the chance of permission from Norway and Sweden to aid
Finland, and bearing in mind the Americans who might regard the action as an attack on neutral rights.
R. Crowcroft Attlee’s War: World War II and the Making of a Labour Leader (2011), p.39.
T. Corfield, ‘Why Chamberlain really fell’, History Today, 46 (1996), p.25.
22
K. Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (1946), p.433.
23
T. Corfield (1996), p.26.
24
R. Self (2006), p.395.
25
Ibid.
20
21
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Exam No. 0347947
Churchill, on the other hand, in his bull-like manner, made public broadcasts that caused much harm
among neutrals.26 Chamberlain paid a heavy price for putting Churchill in charge of the Military
Coordinating Committee, as he was primarily responsible for the humiliating defeat in Norway.
Another irony was that Churchill’s first big defeat would prove to be the making of him and the
breaking of Chamberlain.
Whether historians consider the May debates that followed to be an unexpected uprising or
the climax of a longer term and more deep-seated campaign to get rid of Chamberlain, most agree that
the final outcome which saw Chamberlain resign as Prime Minister was only possible after it became
clear that a ‘sea-change’ had taken place.27 The level of frustration felt by Tory dissidents throughout
the ‘phoney war’ cannot be dismissed, nor the opportunity that the Norway debate effectively
provided for Chamberlain’s critics to challenge him be discounted. Equally, however, the events in
Norway cannot give undue credit to Tory dissidents who up until May were largely ineffectual and
passive. Indeed, their best chance at toppling Chamberlain was through the Labour party, and even as
late as May the Labour leaders were reluctant to vote against the government. Only when debates
resumed on the second afternoon did Attlee, now satisfied that enough Tories wished it, agree to see
Chamberlain go. Afterwards, Atlee recorded, ‘the revolt against the Chamberlain government was
more widespread than I had thought’.28 This suggests that it wasn’t until the parliamentary debates
that Chamberlain’s political authority was at risk. Arguably, however, by May it was clear that the
‘phoney war’ was over and the need for a national government to bear the burden of a far more
extensive war effort was necessary for the first time.
A parallel can be drawn between Chamberlain and his successor, Churchill, which helps to
illustrate the dichotomy between political authority and legitimacy as a war leader. In 1942 Churchill
faced a similar situation to that of Chamberlain in May 1940. With a series of humiliating defeats
weighing heavily on the government, Churchill came close to the firing line. He also had a threat to
his leadership in the form of Stafford Cripps. Whilst his political shrewdness, coupled with Cripps’s
ineptness, allowed him to deal effectively with this and preserve his political authority, his hopes of
doing so were greatly pinned on the course of events at Alamein in late 1942. Victory was what saved
Churchill, something that Churchill himself recognises in his account of the period, entitled The
Hinge of Fate, which is the largest volume in his works on the Second World War. This shows that
even Churchill was not above the War and neither was Chamberlain; Norway was Chamberlain’s
Alamein, but ultimately their fortunes were very different.
26
D. Dilks (1981), p.49.
K. Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition and wartime politics (1991), p.27.
28
L. Witherell (2001), p.1159.
27
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Authority is defined as ‘the power or right to give orders, make decisions, and enforce
obedience’.29 There were those who felt Chamberlain did not have the legitimacy to do this in an
environment of war; nevertheless he still retained the power to do so until after Norway, which
marked the end of the ‘phoney war’. While it seemed that the war would be won quickly
Chamberlain’s political authority was successfully preserved in that there was no outright challenge to
him, however with the events in Norway his perceived abilities to lead the nation through a long war
were brought into question. But that everyone has their favourite candidate for the person or group
responsible for the fall of Chamberlain amounts to a ‘historian’s party game’. 30 It is a unique situation
to find a Prime Minister who was not also the leader of the majority party; but that Chamberlain
remained the unquestioned leader of the Conservative party even after Churchill became Prime
Minister is a fundamental endorsement of his political authority. Churchill had very little following,
whereas Chamberlain was one to whom the large majority of his party were still devoted.31 In a letter
to Chamberlain on the 10th May, Churchill – the man supposedly destined to lead Britain through the
war – revealed the extent to which Chamberlain’s political authority still remained, writing, ‘my first
act on coming back from the Palace is to write and tell you how grateful I am to you for promising to
stand by me … to a very large extent I am in your hands – and I feel no fear of that’.32
29
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/authority>
N. Smart, ‘Four Days in May: The Norway Debate and the Downfall of Neville Chamberlain’, Parliamentary
History, 17 (1998), p.239.
31
D. Dilks, (1981), p.57.
32
K. Feiling (1946), p.439.
30
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8