Special Forces Doctrine
for
A Monograph
by
Major James P. Realini Special Forces First Term AY 90-91
~~~~~~~d for public Release; Dislribuilon is Unlimited
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED M I L I T A R Y STUDIES MONOGRAPH APPilOVAI. MAIOR IAMES P. REALINI
Title of Monograph: S ~ e c i a lForces Doctrine for
Counternarcotics Operations
Approved by:
Acting Director.
School of Advanced
Military Studies -
, C ~hLr d o n Atcheson ./-'
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Director, Graduate
Degree Program
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Philip J. Brookes, Ph. D.
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Accepted this !.,.
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199 1
S PEClAL FORCES DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS b y
Major James P. Realini. Special Forces, 4 0 pages
This monograph addresses the s u i t a b i l i t y of Special Forces doctrine
f o r t h e i r p r i m a r y wartime missions o f Special Reconnaissance. D i r e c t
Action, and Foreign Internal Defense when considered f o r application i n
counternarcotics operations. This study i s motivated b y the continuing
threat to national security presented b y illegal drug t r a f f i c k i n g and the
increased r o l e of the United States m i l i t a r y requested b y the people of the
United States through t h e i r congressional representatives. A significant
p a r t of the m i l i t a r y contribution to the so-called 'war on drugs' i s being
provided b y U. S. Army Special Forces.
This study begins w i t h an analysis of the National Drug Control
Strategy to derive what the tactical counternarcotics missions f o r Special
Forces could be. The missions are related i n terms of the p r i m a r y wartime
mission described b y c u r r e n t U. S. A r m y doctrine f o r Special Forces
Operations. The A r m y Counternarcotics Plan i s analyzed to determine the
constraints and r e s t r a i n t s imposed on the mission b y p u b l i c laws and DoD
resowces. The capabilities f o r each mission are analyzed and then
compared to an application i n counternarcotics operations. The analysis of
each mission evaluates how each mission recognizes political and
diplomatic sensitivities, facilitates interagency activities i n an affected
country, and balances 'security of operations' w i t h the operational tenet
of synchronization.
The study concludes that the doctrine f o r each mission i s suitable
when applied to counternarcotics operations only i f law enforcement i s not
the purpose f o r interdiction. The study finds that each mission can
accomplishes the tasks required f o r counternarcotics operations, except
when called upon to perform law enforcement duties. The study finds the
application of Special Forces i n a Foreign Internal Defense mission to be
most suitable f o r defeating drug t r a f f i c k i n g when i t i s viewed as an
insurgency.
TABLEOF CONTENTS
Page
ii. PART ONE:
REQUIREMENTS OF THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY ------
4
iii. PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTERNARCOTICS RELATED TASKS
WITH THE PRIMARY MISSIONS FOR SPECIAL FORCES:
APPENDICES
FORCESOPERATIONAL DETACHMENT ORGANIZATION
1.
SPECIAL
2.
DOD ORGANIZATION FOR COIINTERNARCOTICS-----------------------
3.
4,
MISSION TRAINING
5.
6,
7,
--
50 51
PLAN OUTLINE: SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE 52 -----.­ ..­ 53
--------..
MISSION TRAINING PLAN OUTLINE: DIRECT ACTION ------­ --.----
55 SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE ORGANIZATION
56 COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION ANALYSIS .-----------.--------------.57
SPECIAL FORCES MISSION BRIEFBACK FORMAT
---------.---*--------
INTRODUCTION 'Traffic i n i l l i c i t drugs imposes exceptional costs on the economy of
the United States, undermines our national values and institutions, and i s
d l r e c t l y responslble f o r the destruction and loss of many American lives.
The international t r a f f i c i n i l l i c i t drugs constitutes a major threat to our
national security and to the security of other nations.'l
Drug t r a f f i c k i n g threatens national security. Accordingly, the
President and the Congress of the United States of America have given a
clear mandate to the Department of Defense to counter the flow of i l l i c i t
drugs into the United States. The National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS)
describes how the United States of America w i l l defend against i t s epidemic
of illegal drug use. Specific departmental and agency guidelines f o r
executing the strategy have evolved progressively. The National Command
Authority (NCA) directed the Specified and Unified Commanders to prepare
plans supporting the President's National Drug Control ~ t r a t e g y 2 . Several
elements of these plans have reached the implementation stage. The A r m y
Counternarcotics Plan3 articulates the Army's support f o r the National
Drug Control Strategy.
Numerous Commanders-in-Chief (CiNCs) have designated US Army
Special Forces Operational Detachments (see Appendix 1, SFOD
Organizational Chart) to f u l f i l l important tasks supporting the
interdiction of drugs flowing into the United States. The most significant
plans f o r employment of Special Forces c u r r e n t l y appear w i t h i n the United
States Southern Command (SOUTHCON). Specifically, the Andean Ridge
region i s a focal point f o r combatting cocaine production and smuggling.'
I n compliance w i t h the A r m y Plan, United States Army Special Forces must
now organize to conduct counternarcotics operations.
There are three c r i t i c a l premises for this study of Special Forces
Operational Detachments conducting counternarcotics operations. The f i r s t
premise asserts that we w i l l use Special Forces Detachments as long as the
NCKs assessment of drug trafficking determines that a threat exists to the
national security of the United States. This could change for several
reasons. For example, future domestic political decisions could shift the
United States' policy towards tolerance. A greater, more immediate
m i l i t a r y threat could present itself requiring a diversion of m i l i t a r y
resources from counterdrug operations. Optimally, drug trafficking w i l l
no longer threaten national security because the NDCS has succeeded. The
second premise requires that employment of Special Forces Operational
Detachments be part of a combined, multi-agency (Department of Defense
and other U.S. and host nation governmental agencies) and conventional
force supporting the National Drug Control Strategy. Special Forces alone
are not capable of f u l f i l l i n g a l l the support roles required for the Army.
The t h i r d and final premise declares that Special Forces Operational
Detachments must deploy outside the borders of the United States as
described by public law. Counternarcotics Operations are inextricably
woven into the business of law enforcement, so commanders must take
great care to prevent Army elements from acting as law enforcement
agents.
With these premises i n mind, this study w i l l examine the National
Drug Control Strategy to discern what are the tactical counternarcotics
missions for Special Forces units. The missions w i l l be matched with a
primary wartime mission of Special Forces which w i l l establish a basis
for comparing existing doctrine with requirements for counternarcotics
operations. Then this study w i l l examine whether current doctrine for
Special Forces operations i s suitable for executing the tasks required i n
counternarcotics operations. Specifically, i t w i l l analyze the Army
Special Operation Force's doctrine for the conduct of the Special
Reconaissance. the Foreign Internal Defense, and the Direct Action
missions. These Special Forces wartime missions appear to have the most
u t i l i t y i n counternarcotics operations for intelligence. interdiction and
security assistance.
SPEClRL OPERBTIONS IMPESltlTIPlES
Fig 1-8, pi-22, FM 3i-20, Doclrine for Special Forces Operatiol
'Recounize Political l m ~ l i c a t i o n s
inters- A c .t r. v. w
*me
1
-
'Engage a Threat Discriminately
'Consider Long-Term Effects
'Ensure Legitimacy & Credibility of SO Activlties
'Anticipate & Control Psychological Effects
'Apply Capabilities Indirectly
*Develop tlultiple Options
'Ensure Long-Term Sustainment
'Provide Sufficient Intelligence
'Balance Security and Svnchronization
Fig. 1
Criteria derived from three key Special Operations Imperatives w i l l
be used to evaluate the doctrines for each mission (See Figure 1 ). I w i l l
examine the following questions. Does the doctrine recognize the political
implications for counternarcotics operations described by United States
Public Law (Posse Comitatus Act Title 18 United States Code 1385) and
host nation diplomatic and political sensitivities? Does the doctrine
facilitate interagency activities directed by the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (The Drug Czar) and the Department of State activities i n
each affected country? Finally, does the doctrine balance 'security of
operations' with the operational tenet of synchronization? The
conclusions drawn from answering these three questions w i l l illustrate the
implications for Special Forces Operational Detachments preparing to
conduct counternarcotics operations both now and i n the future.
PART ONE: REQUIREMENTS OF THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY '-an issue of this sort concerns the extent to which force should be
used, either by the police o r by the Army.'5
President George Bush f i r s t articulated the National Drug Control
Strategy i n September 1989. This strategy mobilized a l l the departments
and agencies of the Executive Branch of the United States government to
combat the threat to national security imposed by illegal drug use and
trafficking. The task of coordinating the federal departments and agencies
with drug reduction missions i s the responsibility of the 'Drug Czar'or
Office of National Drug Control Policy.6
The implementation of the NDCS i s expensive. A budget authority of
$10.6 b i l l i o n for Fiscal Year 199 1 represented an increase of 68% from
19897. I n an era of constrained resources for government programs, the
use of existing m i l i t a r y resources appears prudent. Congress has
carefully given permission to use m i l i t a r y resources. I n this regard.
intense and continuous Congressional investigation of the NDCS reveals a
national desire to balance two c r i t i c a l factors, what potential exists for
usurpation by the m i l i t a r y of law enforcement duties and what are the
potential adverse effects on combat readiness?
Specific guidance on assistance given to civilian law enforcement
agencies prohibits the Army from directly participating i n law
enforcement activities. Army personnel o r equipment can only provide
operotional support to civilion law enforcement agencies upon approval
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Understanding the Public Laws
dorfved from the Posse Comitatus Act. Section 1385 of Title 18 (Crimes
and Criminal Procedure) United States Code, i s crucial for any Army
element's implementation of a counternarcotics program. The Act i s short
and concise:
Whoever, except i n cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, w i l l f u l l y uses any
part of the Army or the A i r Force as a possecumitatus or otherwise
to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more thon two years, or both8.
Congress created this Act i n 1878 i n reaction to the sometimes
excessive use of m i l i t a r y force during the occupation of the South's five
m i l i t a r y districts after the C i v i l Warg. Recognition of the separation of
the United States A i r Force from the Army and extension of the law to
Alaska are the Acts' only two modifications. The United States Navy,
through SECWVINST 5820.7, recognizes that Posse Comitatus also applies
to i t s operations and those of the Marine Corps as well. SECNAVINST
5820.7 allows no Naval (or Marine Corps) involvement i n c i v i l i a n law
enforcement actions whatsoever, without authorization from the Secretary
of the Navylo.
The Congress again clarified the military's relationship and
responsibilities with c i v i l law enforcement agencies i n Section 908 of
Public Law 97-86. Section 908 added a new chapter. Chapter 18
' R i l i t a r y Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,' to Part
One (Organization and General M i l i t a r y Powers) to Subtitle A (General
M i l i t a r y Law) to Title 10 United States Code. The law reaffirmed the
traditional prohibition against direct m i l i t a r y involvement i n law
enforcement (i.e., arrests. searches, seizures, etc.) and also provided the
Secretary of Defense with specific authority to use the armed forces for a
variety of indirect assistance roles.11
DoD Directive 5525.5 explains the requirements for employing DoD
resources i n support of any law enforcement activity. Enclosure 4 of DoD
Directive 5525.5 states that the following activities are not restricted by
the Posse Comitatus Act.
Actions that are taken for the primary purpose of furthering
a m i l i t a r y o r foreign affairs function of the United States,
regardless of incidental benefits to c i v i l i a n authorities. This
provision must be used w i t h caution, and does not include actions
taken for the p r i m a r y purpose o f aiding c i v i l i a n law enforcement
officials o r otherwise serving as a subterfuge to avoid the
restrictions of reference (v) [Posse Comitatusl. Actions under this
provision may include the following, depending on the nature of the
DoD interest and the authority governing the specific action i n
question:
( 1) Investigations and other actions related to the
enforcement of the Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y Justice (UCMJ)
........................................................................................ (5) Protection of DoD personnel. DoD equipment, and
official guests of the Department of Defense.
(6) Such other actions that are undertaken p r i m a r i l y for a
m i l i t a r y o r foreign affair's purpose.12
i n summary, both the DoD Directive and public laws serve to keep
the m i l i t a r y out of the law enforcement business inside the borders of the
United States.
Regardless, the question of m i l i t a r y involvement i n drug
enforcement operations outside the borders of the United States remains
unanswered. Nevertheless, a precedent of sorts has been established
during Operation JUST CAUSE when agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency
arrested Manuel Noriega. This provides a clear exnmple of cooperation
w i t h c i v i l i a n law enforcement activities ( i n t h i s case the Drug
Enforcement Agency) operating outside the borders of the United States.
Clearly, u n t i l the laws o r policies change, the m i l i t a r y can be applied
d i r e c t l y outside the borders of the United States to support
counternarcotics operations as long as they do not attempt to enforce
c i v i l i a n laws. This w i l l occur only when a host nation requests our
assistance. No unilateral counternarcotics operations are authorized o r
implied b y any U. S. policy.13
Secretary Richard B. Cheney announced in September 1989 the
Department of Defense policy f o r implementing support f o r the NDCS. The
Secretary described the r o l e of the armed forces as follows:
We (The United States Armed Forces) w i l l work on the drug
program at every phase-at the source, i n the delivery pipeline and
to f u r t h e r support federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.
I n countries where the plants are grown and the raw materials are
converted i n t o drugs, we (The United States Armed Forces) can
provide economic and security assistance. t r a i n i n g and operational
support f o r host country forces and assistance to law enforcement
agencies of those countries i n stopping the export of drugs.
Deploying appropriate elements of the armed forces w i t h the
p r i m a r y mission to cut off the flow of drugs, should, over time help
reduce the flow o f drugs into the country.
We need also to make clear that the Department of Defense i s
not a law enforcement agency. We do not enforce domestic c r i m i n a l
laws, nor can we solve society's demand problem. But there i s much
we can do without usurping the police role.'l4
This statement provided the s t a r t point f o r DoD implementation of
counternarcotics programs. I n response, DoD aqencies and designated
Unified and Specified commanders (CINCs) prepared specific mechanisms
to support the NDCS. (See Appendix 2, Organization of DoD f o r
Counternarcotics Operations-Chart)
The CltlCs took various cctions
including the formation of Joint Task Forces.
Joint Task Force (JTF) 4 (commanded by a Coast Guard Yice
Admiral) was formed i n Key West. Florida to coordinate counternarcotics
detection and monitoring operations for the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM).
Commanded by a Coast Guard Rear Admiral i n Alameda; California. JTF 5
performs similar functions for the Pacific Command (PACOH). JTF 6
(commanded by an Army tlajor General) i n E l Paso. Texas coordinates
Army and regional law enforcement agencies along the southwestern United
States border with Mexico. I n addition to the foundation of JTF's, several
of the CINCs increased the deployment of mobile training teams (HTTs) to
host countries including Peru. Bolivia. and Thailand. The Director of the
Defense Communications Agency (DCA) established the Counterdrug
Telecommunications Integration Office. The role of the DCA i s to lead DoD
i n coordinating the exchange of intelligence between the different operating
'cultures' found in law enforcement agencies and the military. A l l of these
actions provided the foundation for a command and control infrastructure
within the DoD to support counternarcotics operations.
I n March 1990, Stephen M. Duncan, DoD coordinator for drug
enforcement policy and support, further clarified the role of DoD i n drug
reduction. Mr. Duncan described interdiction ooerations, ooerational
suooort, and Mobile Training Teams missions and capabilities.15 Although
lengthy, these descriptions are v i t a l to understanding the philosophy of the
U. S. Army Counternarcotics Plan.
InterdictionO~~erarions
involves several phases, including detection,
sorting of probable drug t r a f f i c k e r s from a l l other a i r c r a f t o r
surface vessels that have been detected, interception (directing
ships o r a i r c r a f t to the target f o r identification), tracking and
monitoring (following a target u n t i l i t can be 'handed off' to a law
enforcement agency); and apprehension, search, seizure and a r r e s t
b y a law enforcement agency. Often these phases overlap.
Interdiction can take place i n the a i r , at sea o r on land.
Thus, interdiction i s a multiphase, multienvironment and
multiagency a c t i v i t y i n which the DoD has significant
responsibilities. lb
...'Interdiction'
Ooerational Supoort
The DoD i s assisting i n the attack on the supply of drugs i n
source countries through assistance f o r nation building, operational
support to host country forces and cooperation w i t h host country
forces to prevent drug exports. ...U. S. m i l i t a r y personnel are
authorized to accompany host nation forces during authorized
t r a i n i n g and administrative activities w i t h i n areas which have been
previously designated b y the U. S. m i l i t a r y group commander i n
each country and approved b y the CINC, but they do not accompany
host government forces on actual f i e l d operations.
The operational support takes various forms, e.g., planning.
communications, medical and logistics support, but U. S. m i l i t a r y
personnel do not serve as f i e l d advisors o r replace agents of the
Drug Enforcement Administration on coca eradication operations.17
Mobile Trainina Teams (MTTs)
The MTTs have been sent to the region (Andean) to provide
t r a i n i n g in individual and small u n i t tactics, leadership and
airmobile and r i v e r i n e operations. Advice i s being given on the
procurement and architecture of command. control and
communications and intelligence facilities. Medical and engineering
support and c i v i c action are being provided along w i t h a i r m o b i l i t y
assets which enhance the capability of the source countries to insert
t h e i r own counternarcotics forces to remote regions where cocaine
i s grown, processed o r transported.
The DoD has not. and does not intend to. substitute U. S.
programs f o r those which the host countries must implement f o r
themselves. U. S. m i l i t a r y personnel w i l l not replace o r augment
host country m i l i t a r y personnel who are engaged i n
counternarcotics operations.18
Having articulated these components of counternarcotics operations,
the United States A r m y i n A p r i l 1 9 9 0 distributed i t s Counternarcotics
p l a n l q f o r supporting the ClNCs counternarcotics strategies. This
memorandum of instruction (M.0.i.) issued by the Secretory of the Army,
Michael P. W. Stone and Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Yuono.
charged the Army with two principal missions. First, the Army w i l l
provide forces to combatant commanders and assist them i n developing and
executing plans to effectively employ the unique capabilities of Army
forces. Second, the Army w i l l provide operational support, equipment
training, and personnel to other U. S. Government Agencies and (through
security assistance) selected foreign governments to counter drug
production, trafficking, and use. A l l specified and implied tasks w i l l be
derived from these primary missions.20
The concept of the operation i n the H.O.I. also states three key
imperatives for providing Army forces. The f i r s t imperative requires that
their employment should be consistent with existing Army doctrine.
Second, Army forcss w i l l be placed under direct m i l i t a r y command.
Finally, the concept recognizes that units or individuals may face an armed
adversary. As a consequence, they should be prepared for actions related
to combat, even when conducting training, deterrence, surveillance or
other non-combat operations.
The last imperative leads directly to subsequent guidance about
development of rules of engagement (ROE) and rules on the use of force
(RUF). Ensuring protection of soldiers i s the key concern for
commanders. Army forces and personnel w i l l conduct counternarcotics
operations i n accordance with peacetime ROE and RUF as directed by
supported CINCs21. Ideally, the Army plan directs that thorough
familiarity with the ROE and RUF w i l l preclude a mission from being
hindered by uncertainty about permissible statutory actions and responses.
In addition to these concerns for employment, the Army
Counternarcotics Plan specifically addresses u n i t readiness and t r a i n i n g
f o r wartime p r i o r i t i e s . Any degradation of readiness attributed to
counternarcotics taskings o r operations w i l l be identified specifically i n
the commander's comments o f U n i t Status Reports. Training i n units
continues as prescribed i n FM 25- 100. Trainino the Force. Employment
of the 'battle focus' concept w i l l resolve conflicts w i t h wartime missions
that are unrelated to any requirements f o r counternarcotics operations.
Cancelling o f National Training Center o r Joint Readiness Training Center
rotations and outside CONUS j o i n t and combined exercises are to be avoided,
but are not prohibited.22
Using these concerns identified by the Army Counternarcotics Plan.
l e t us now examine haw the NDCS translates into tactical operation f o r
Special Forces. When translating the NDCS into specific tactical missions,
the Army accepts the premise that counternarcotics i s low intensity
conflict.?3 This provides a doctrinal framework f o r developing how to
support the NDCS. The NDCS stipulates interdiction of drua t r a f f i c k i n g as
the focus f o r counternarcotics operations f o r land forces. The
requirements f o r accomplishing t h i s are intelligence collection;
interdiction at a source o f production, enroute to and at c r i t i c a l
d i s t r i b u t i o n points; and t r a i n i n g of host nation law enforcement and
m i l i t a r y personnel i n techniques, tactics and procedures that support
t h e i r own counternarcotics programs.
Army doctrine f o r low intensity conflict specifies that intelligence
operations are c r i t i c a l before organizing successful employment of
m i l i t a r y forces.jq Army leaders recognize that developing intelligence i s
the f i r s t task i n counternarcotics operations.?5 The tasks required for
intelligence collection i n the drug production and trafficking cycle range
from the employment of highly sophisticated intelligenco gathering
equipment to simple foot-mobile reconnaissance. These intelligence
collection tasks f a l l within the description of 'Special Reconnaissance' for
Special ~orces.26 Using cocaine as an example, several places exist where
collection targets appear (see figure 2). Locating any of the 'low
technology' processing and
Cocaine: Production to Sales
Figure 2
manufacture sites i n the r u r a l areas of most undeveloped countries and the
routes connecting them would require human intelligence (HUHlNT) i n the
form of reconnaissance patrols. As the drug moves farther down the
pipeline, the smuggler's security measures for each site become more
technologically extensive and thus detectable by technological collection
means?:.
By using the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process.
an intelligence estimate and analysis o f the battlefield area w i l l be
prepared to assist i n depicting the drug t r a f f i c k i n g network.
After identifying the drug t r a f f i c k i n g network. there are two ways a
m i l i t a r y u n i t can Interdict a drug t r a f f i c k i n g system. It could destroy
c r i t i c a l f a c i l i t i e s o r i t could intercept shipments. Conventional m i l i t a r y
raiding techniques accomplish the destruction strategy. This study
recognizes that D i r e c t Actlon of t h l s type I s not authorized for m l l t a r y u n i t s
by any agency o f the United States. However. Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) agents and national police organizations trained and supported b y
Special Forces Detachments w i l l conduct t h i s mission. Special Forces
Detachinents can support drug interception operations by acting as p a r t of a
'real time' reconnalssance and security force to identify times and locations
o f drug shipment functions.
The f a r t h e r along a drug processing system you are able to penetrate
and then interdict, the more substantial the loss to the t r a f f i c k e r (see Fig.
2). The best 'payoff' for interdiction takes place when interception of the
actual drug i n shipment occurs because the smuggler has committed a l l h i s
manufacturing resources and cannot recover them. H i s shipping system i s
also disrupted and assets are removed f r o m f u r t h e r use. This has been a
p r i m a r y focus of CONUS based forces, p a r t i c u l a r l y the A i r Force and Navy
working together to vector the Coast Guard to make actual seizures and
arrests. Another l u c r a t i v e target f o r interception are the processing
chemicals produced at commercial chemical production facilities.
H o n i t o r i n g purchases of these 'legitimate' chemicals affords an opportunity
to identify drug t r a f f i c k e r s and cut o f f t h e i r 'controlled' chemical
purchases. I f nothing else, the drug traffickers must expmd more resources
to protect and reestablish facilities and smuggling systems.28
Additionally, unified commander's must consider rescue operations as
part of their counternarcotics plans. Drug Enforcement Agents, m i l i t a r y
personnel operating intelligence gathering equipment, and mobile training
teams threatened i n the performance of trainlng misslons are l l k e l y targets
for capture by drug traffickers. A responsibility specified i n the Army
Counternarcotics Plan i s the protection of soldiers facing an armed
adversary.*9 This requirement implies the development of plans to recover
soldiers and sophisticated intelligence equipment.
Finally, the most extensive role for Special Forces units w i l l be their
cooperating with law enforcement agencies i n the conduct of security
assistance operations. I f the United States expects cooperation from foreign
nations i n the form of their own drug reduction programs, then the United
States must provide the training and equipment to assist these programs to
succeed. The training national police forces need to implement their own
counterdrug programs has been identified: individual and small unit tactics,
leadership, airmobile and r i v e r i n e operations, advice on the architecture of
command, control and communications and intelligence facilities, medical
and engineering training and civic action. Keep i n mind that many countries
national police forces are organized as paramilitary forces or m i l i t a r y
forces thus understanding of a host nation's political sensitivities and
institutions w i l l be critical. For the most part this training mission
appears to be satisfied by the 'Foreign Internal Defense' mission for Special
Forces.30
I n summary, Special Reconnaissance employing l1UHINT and
sophisticated intelligence collection equipment; Direct Action to i n t e r d i c t
drug t r a f f i c k i n g systems, rescue and equipment recovery; and security
assistance are tactical missions identified f o r use i n counternarcotics
operations. None of these tasks appear to violate p u b l i c law because they do
not r e q u i r e the m i l i t a r y to act as a law enforcement agent. They also
specifically direct the support of the NDCS to be directed outside the borders
of the United States of America. The question concerning the Army now is.
'Is the doctrine f o r each Special Forces mission suitable f o r the
counternarcotics environment?'
PART TWO:
ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTERNARCOTICS RELATED TASKS WITH THE PRIHARY MISSIONS FOR SPECIAL FORCES 'The function of the profession o f a r m s i s the ordered application of /
I
force i n the resolution of a social problem,' f r o m a lecture t i t l e d 'The
Profession of Arms' given by LTG S i r John Winthrop Hackett. K.C.B..
1
i
The Special Forces operational detachment t r a i n s to conduct Special
Reconnaissance (SR) as one of i t s p r i m a r y wartime missions (See
Appendix 3, SR mission functional diagram). Under the following
circumstances theater commanders employ Special Forces to perform SR.
Special Reconnaissance i s conducted when 'normal' battlefield
reconnaissance methods are impractical. The reasons f o r t h i s are various.
The area of interest f o r a commander may be i n an inaccessible area.
There could be a requirement f o r real-time intelligence i n a denied area.
Also, clandestine reconnaissance may be ordered which n o r m a l l y employs
assets (equipment and personnel) available to the U. S. intelligence
community.j2 Special Forccs employed on clandestine reconnaissance may
be controlled directly by the U. S. intelligence community and require
Congressional oversight coordination. Any of these various situations can
provide a reason to conduct SR.
The simplified Special Reconnalssance mission execution cycle i s
preinfiltration activities, infiltration, conduct of the reconnaissance.
exfiltration, and debriefing. ARTEP 31-807-31-MTP.
Mission Training
Plan for the Special Forces Detachment describes a l l of these tasks i n
detall. Preinfiltration activitfes are c r i t i c a l to any Special Forces
mission. The crucial events during preinfiltration are: isolation,
preparation for the mission, debriefing an 'asset-33. and presenting a
b r iefback.
isolation occurs at the beginning of a l l Special Forces missions and
provides operations security for the team. I n addition, i t serves to keep
the missions' employment status (covert or clandestine) plausible.
Mission preparation i n isolation includes detailed planning to coordinate
a l l the participating support agencies with the identified mission tasks.
The coordinations of the specific methods for controlling the deployed
detachment are also made. This preparation permits a precise mission
execution that i s normally restrained i n conventional operations because of
time. An 'asset' debriefed during isolation can be protected as a future
source. 'Assets' provide detailed information o r instructions required to
perform some c r i t i c a l aspect of the mission. Examples include: linking up
with a foreign agent, the location of a cache site, or a description of a
specific route to an objective. Regardless, preinfiltration activities
conclude i n isolation with the SF mission briefback.
The detcchment's brieiback i s a detailed presentation to the
immediate and other concerned commanders; i t may be given to the ClNC
himself. The latter i s normally represented b y a deputy and responsible
staff action officers. The purpose o f the briefback (See Appendix 4
- SF
Mission Briefback Format) i s to demonstrate a thorough understanding of
the assigned mission to include i t s implications and the intent. The
briefback details the required coordination and serves as a f i n a l check f o r
everything that must occur to guarantee mission accomplishment.
After making an i n f i l t r a t i o n , the Special Forces Detachment may
establish contact with an 'asset' who w i l l assist i n the reconnaissance
task. I f not, the detachment moves i n the denied area to the objective area
and establishes a mission support site. From t h i s site, the detachment
conducts i t s reconnaissance task. Reconnaissance activities may involve
the deployment of sophisticated technological devices to assist i n the task.
For example, these devices may include comrnunlcations equipment designed
to relay immediate intelligence data. Once the reconnaissance task i s
complete the detachment moves to another mission o r conducts e x f i l t r a t i o n
operations.
Other c r i t i c a l tasks i n the mission t r a i n i n g and evaluation outline
are: employment of active countermeasures, maintenance of OPSEC, and
battle d r i l l s f o r reacting to contact o r ambushes and breaking contact.
These tasks function p r i m a r i l y to protect the detachment members and
safeguard from compromise the deployment status (clandestine-covertovert) of the mission.
A detachment could conduct the Special Reconnaissance mission to
support the NDCS i n a variety of ways. Gathering intelligence data to
confirm or deny data gathered from another source to provide redundancy
of collection means i s just one example. Upon request of a host nation or
United States law enforcement agency, the detachment can also collect data
from a physically denied area. Perhaps the best payoff for the Special
Reconnaissance mission occurs when i t supports an interdiction operation
by providing 'real time' data on drug shipments.
The doctrine for SR recognizes the polltlcal implications for
counternarcotics operations described by United States Public Law and host
nation diplomatic and political sensitivities. I t does this by two methods.
one direct and one indirect.
Directly, i n preinfiltration isolation the detachment conducts a
mission analysis. Specified i n the Army Counternarcotics Plan i s the
requirement for '..a
properly executed memorandum of understanding or
other agreement (that) w i l l specify the responsibility and authority of
both Army commanders and the civilian agency personnel i n a supervisory
position over Army forces.34' ClNCs are also required to establish ROE or
RUF. DoD Directive 5525.5 combined with these specifications and the
detachment's mission statement ( i n the concerned Special Operations
Commander's mission tasking letter135, provides the detachment with the
necessary guidance to address any political implications of the mission.
The briefback, p r i o r to mission execution, verifies the detachment's
understanding of responsibility and authority. A l l concerned commanders
can validate the detachment's understanding by placing specific questions
o r topics i n the SF mission briefback sequcnce for each mission as stated
i n FM 3 1 - 2 0 , Appendix E, SF Mission Briefback.
Because FM 100-20, f l i l i t a r v Ooerations i n Low lntensitv Conflict,
l i s t s counternarcotics operations as a peacetime contingency, the
detachment must consider the Imperatives of pol Itlcal dominance and
legitimacy. The imperative of p o l i t i c a l dominance requires adoption of
courses of action which are legally supportab1e.3~ Legitimacy, w h i l e not
tanglble o r easily quantifiable. i s v e r y susceptible to misperception when
inappropriately applying force.3'
These imperatives, when applied to the
SR mission, r e q u i r e the detachment to adopt c a r e f u l l y courses of action
which protect a l l concerned p o l i t i c a l entities. For example. a host nation
may reluctantly agree to allow a Special Reconnaissance mission w i t h i n i t s
borders only i f i t I s kept from the host notion's p u b l i c knowledge.
Indirectly, the detachment recognizes p o l i t i c a l implications by the
tasks of employing countermeasures, safeguarding of 'assets',
and OPSEC
techniques. Countermeasures can range from the employment of classified
technological devices to subtle cover and deception operations conducted
concurrently w i t h in-country s e c u r i t y assistance activities. Handling of
'assets'
includes not only protecting the identity of the individual, but
preventing disclosure of who o r why the individual i s helping. OPSEC
measures are sound tactics f o r any m i l i t a r y unit. P r i m a r i l y , OPSEC means
s t e r i l i z a t i o n of any s i t e a detachment occupied d u r i n g the mission that
could provide evidence that a reconnaissance took place. Special Forces
detachments r o u t i n e l y practice site-sterilization techniques. This action
i s extremely valuable for retaining the capability to conduct f u t u r e
reconnaissance.
The doctrine surrounding the Special Reconnaissance mission
facilitates interagency activities directed b y the Office of National Drug
Control Policy and the State Department a c t i v i t i e s i n each country
affected. B y i t s v e r y nature. counternarcotics operations w i l l r e q u i r e
input from agencies directed b y the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(The Drug Czar) and support from Department o f State activities i n an
affected country. Special Forces Detachments are f a m i l i a r w i t h procedures
f o r working i n support of non-military agencies, predominantly the
Department o f State through t h e i r participation i n 'country-teams.'
A r m y Counternarcotics Plan specifies that, '...forces
The
w i l l always be under
direct m i l i t a r y command.'38 Once again. the detachment w i l l demonstrate
i n the SF Mission Briefback how w e l l i t has coordinated required
supporting agencies.
Furthermore. the capability f o r Special Forces Detachments to
operate i n a multitude of communications modes i s p a r t i c u l a r l y useful to
law enforcement agencies. This i s c r i t i c a l f o r a Special Reconnaissance
mission because the data collected w i l l often be time sensitive. Time
s e n s i t i v i t y may in fact be the reason f o r directing a Special
Reconnaissance mission i n the first place. Once again, the b a s k SF
mission briefback b y the detachment operations sergeant w i l l demonstrate
just how the information requested transmits to the 'askfng' agency.
Finally. the problem o f balancing 'security of operations' w i t h the
operational tenet of synchronization w i l l always trouble the Special Forces
commander. The commander must resolve the conflict between who 'needs
to know' and OPSEC f o r mission execution.39 The doctrine addresses t h i s
problem because i t also exists i n 'conventional' wartime applications of
Special Rcconnoissance. Thc number and v a r i e t y of n o n - m i l i t a r y agencies
involved f u r t h e r complicates counterdrug efforts. The employment status
o f the mission now becomes a factor, p a r t i c u l a r l y when attempting a covert
operation. However. the mission t r a i n i n g plan f o r Special Reconnaissance
treats security of the operation and data reporting as co-equal, c r i t i c a l
tasks. When issuing the Special Reconnaissance mission, the r e l a t i v e
importance of the data to be gathered versus the level of operational
security required must be clearly identified. This w i l l guide the
detachment during t h e i r course of action development.
DIRECT ACTION
The Special Reconnaissance mission v e r y often leeds d i r e c t l y t o the
conduct of a Direct Action mission. The Special Forces Detachment
conducting the Direct Action mission provides the Theater Commander w i t h
the capability to conduct combat operations beyond the range of tactical
weapon's systems o r the area of influence of conventional m i l i t a r y
forces.30 i n addition to attacking designated 'high payoff' targets and
c r i t i c a l nodes of a designated target system, the detachment performs
capture, rescue and recovery operations. Objectives f o r these operations
may encompass: selected hostile personnel and equipment; U. S. o r Allied
prisoners, both m i l i t a r y and political; downed aircrews; nuclear o r
chemical weapons; downed satellites; classified documents o r equipment; o r
other sensitive items of materiel. The Direct Action mission i s a direct
application of m i l i t a r y power and does not r e l y on a foreign power."
Special Forces detachments conduct Direct Action operations under
the direction and control of a Special Operations headquarters.
Detachments execute DA operations in four modes:
*Unilaterally, w i t h Special Forces qualified personnel only.
*Unilaterally. w i t h a m i x of SF, other SOF, and conventional forces.
*As a combined operation. w i t h SF-led foreign teams.
*As a combined operation, w i t h SF-trained and directed foreign
teams.42
The theater commander controls Direct Action operations b y
providing the theater special operations commander a combination o f
mission-type orders, specific mission taskings, r u l e s o f engagement, and
other mission guidance. I n situations short o f war, the National Command
Authority (NCA) directs the appropriate regional unified commander to
plan and execute contingency DA operations. I f the NCA desires more
positive control, i t may direct United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) to plan and d i r e c t the operation. The NCA may also d i r e c t
USSOCOH to establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)
r e p o r t i n g d i r e c t l y to the NCA o r Chairman of the J o i n t Chiefs of Staff
(cJcs).~~
The s i m p l i f i e d Direct Action mission execution cycle includes:
p r e i n f i l t r a t i o n activities, i n f i l t r a t i o n , interdiction o f a target system o r
recovery, e x f i l t r a t i o n , and debriefing (See Appendix 5, Direct Action
mission functional diagram). The size o f a detachment conducting a Direct
Action mission can range from a two-man team conducting a clandestine
sabotage to a reinforced Special Forces company conducting an overt raid.
Examples o f U. S. Direct Action missions are the recovery of 5 13
prisoners of war from Cabanatuan, Luzon by the 6 t h Ranger Dattalion i n
January 1915 and the attempt to recover American prisoners from a
prison camp i n North Vietnam i n November 1970.
In t h e i r target selection process f o r Direct Action missions, Special
Forces Detachments use the C A R Y E R ~factors.
~
The factors are c r i t i c a l i t y ,
accessibility, ~ e c u p e r a b i l i t y v, u l n e r a b i l i t y , effect-on-population. and
r ecognizability. Special Forces detachments use the CARVER factors when
analyzing any target f o r any mission. The CARVER factors should aid i n
determining what the precise Direct Action mission tasking should be.
C r i t i c a l i t y describes the r e l a t i v e importance of a target system o r
subsystem to an enemy's a b i l i t y to make o r sustain war or drug production
and shipment. Four r u l e s judge a target's c r i t i c a l i t y . The f i r s t i s
determining the location and number o f targets i n the system. When w i l l
the effects of the target's interdiction be f e l t i s a second consideration.
The t h i r d is: what i s the reduction i n total output f o r the whole system
caused by the levels of possible target damage? F i n a l l y , are t h e i r
substitutes o r alternatives available to continue output i n spite of any
damage caused?
Accessibilitv describes the r e l a t i v e ease an action element w i l l have
to strike a target. Elements involved i n setting the accessibility
calculation are i n f i l t r a t i o n and e x f i l t r a t i o n techniques; s u r v i v a l and
evasion and escape potential i n the operational area: the security situation
enroute to and from the target; and whether the target i s w i t h i n range of
direct o r indirect weapons' f i r e .
Recuoerabilitv relates to c r i t i c a l i t y . I t measures the time required
to replace, r e p a i r o r by-pass the damage. The evaluation of recuperability
includes an estimate o f economic capability and technical resources
available to the enemy.
Vulnerabilitv i s different from accessibility because i t considers
how to damage a target. The attack means and expertise of an action
element establish the calculation of damage possible. The calculation
considers the following. What are the nature and construction o f the
target? What i s the amount o f damage required and what systems w i l l
cause that amount? Who has the expertise to transport and employ each o f
the destruction systems.
Effect-on-the-oooulation
r e f e r s to p u b l i c reaction i n the target
area and the domestic and international reaction to the target's destruction.
Consideration o f p u b l i c reaction must answer several key questions. W i l l
r e p r i s a l s against f r i e n d l y forces occur? What effect w i l l target
destruction have on national PSYOP's themes? W i l l the e x f i l t r a t i o n o r
evasion potential i n the area be helped o r h u r t ? W i l l target destruction
alienate o r reinforce the enemy population w i t h i t s government?
The f i n a l CARVER factor i s recoanizabilitv. This factor assesses the
physical effects o f weather, light, t e r r a i n , target size, and distinctive
target signature. This assessment then compares the a b i l i t y of an action
element to identify the target i n the operational area.
The targeting process employing the CARVER factors can easily
analyze a drug t r a f f i c k i n g system l i k e cocaine (see Figure 2). Because the
design of the targeting process focuses at the theater level, i t n a t u r a l l y
incorporates implications for not just m i l i t a r y power but a l l elements of
national power. As a r e s u l t i t does not matter i f a Special Forces
detachment o r some other agency (U. S. o r host nation) provides the action
element f o r interdiction. Most importantly, the target analysis process
serves t o identify the best place t o s t r i k e .
As seen i n the analysis of the Special Reconnaissance mission, the
detachment briefback p r i o r to mission execution w i l l satisfy many key
questions raised b y the special operations imperatives. Those answers are
also t r u e for the Direct Action mission. The SF mission briefback format
includes a section on target analysis using the CARVER factors which
demonstrates the detachment's understanding of the target's r o l e i n the
d r u g t r a f f i c k i n g system.
However, the D i r e c t Action mission of interdiction doesnot
recognize the p o l i t i c a l implications f o r counternarcotics operations. The
c r u c i a l p o l i t i c a l implication not recognized concerns the provisions o f the
Posse Cornitatus Act. W h i l e the doctrine may have great potential f o r
aiding law enforcement agencies i n analyzing targets for interdiction, the
doctrine does not contain any specifications f o r arrests, searches and
seizures. These a r e activities reserved specifically to law enforcement
personnel and not authorized f o r m i l i t a r y personnel. M i l i t a r y personnel
can assist b y 'tracking' a target and then handing i t o f f to an authorized
agent f o r legal 'due process.'
The doctrine i s also v a l i d i n recognizing host nation diplomatic and
p o l i t i c a l sensitivities. I f the National Command Authority authorizes
interdiction45, w i t h o r without host nation support. i t would f a l l w i t h i n
one of the four normal operating modes f o r a Direct Action mission.
Nevertheless, i t would only be v a l i d i n t h i s circumstance i f the detachment
personnel perform no legal 'due process' activities.
The Direct Action mission o f rescue o r recoverv doesrecognize the
p o l i t i c a l implications f o r counternarcotics operations and host nation
political and diplomatic sensitivities. There are two ingredients which
combine to allow this recognition: the rescue o r recovery operation and the
modes o f operation.
The f i r s t ingredient, the rescue o r recovery operation, does not
r e q u i r e any law enforcement a c t i v i t y b y m i l i t a r y personnel and the A r m y
Counternarcotics Plan specifies 'protection of soldiers' as p r i m a r y
concern f o r commanders. The capability to perform rescue and recovery
operations w i l l be an essential element of any plan to provide protection to
m i l i t a r y personnel and other agency personnel. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y
important i n those areas where p o l i t i c a l considerations f o r development of
ROE and RUF may r e q u i r e acceptance of r i s k . For example, a detachment
deploys at the request of a host nation to provide operational support to a
drug eradication program. The host nation desires to downplay the
m i l i t a r y assistance given b y the United States. Accordingly, the
detachment i s allowed to c a r r y only personal sidearms and remain inside
the remote base camp. I n response, the drug t r a f f i c k e r s arrange f o r a
local insurgent movement to attack the base camp.
The four operating modes f o r Direct Action missions supply the
f i n a l ingredient allowing the recognition o f host nation p o l i t i c a l and
diplomatic sensitivities. Upon NCA approval, w i t h o r without host nation
sanction, a rcgional CINC cen conduct recovery or rescue operations w i t h
assigned Special Forces detachments. Each of the four modes can be adopted
to conform to the status of host nation participation.
The doctrine f o r both Direct Action missions facilitates interagency
a c t i v i t i e s between the Drug Czar and the State Department a c t i v i t i e s i n
each target country. By doctrine, a Direct Action mission i s under the
control of the Theater Special Operations Command o r a JSOTF established
b y USSOCOM b y NCA direction. This places r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the mission
on a senior m i l i t a r y officer. This officer coordinates d i r e c t l y w i t h the
Department of State m i l i t a r y attach6 and the concerned law enforcement
agency. Under the provisions of the Army Counternarcotics Plan, t h i s
officer w i l l also ensure compliance w i t h any memorandum of understantling
governing the employment of the m i l i t a r y personnel.46
The doctrine f o r Direct Action recognizes the balance between
'security of operations' and the tenet of synchronization. The employment
of D i r e c t Action missions against specific targets f o r interdiction w i l l
have the best chance f o r optimizing the balance. The isolated planning t i m e
and preparation p r i o r to mission execution w i l l safeguard the mission's
deployment status and support OPSEC. The time i n isolation w i l l also allow
detailed information sharing and i t s incorporation i n t o the mission's
concept of execution.
A problem w i t h the doctrine and t r y i n g to balance OPSEC w i t h
synchronization occurs when attempting a rescue o r recovery operation.
I n the counterdrug environment there w i l l exist a plethora of agents and
activities operatlng both o v e r t l y and clandestinely i n the area of
operations. B y i t s v e r y nature. a rescue o r recovery mission i s a r a p i d
response operation. Because o f the many agencies that may operate i n an
area and the short time available to conduct the recovery o r rescue, the
information available to the detachment may only come from the
organization requesting the mission. The level where law enforcement
agencies, the Department o f State, and the m i l i t a r y chain o f command l i n k
w i l l govern effective response to required information, simultaneously
effecting OPSEC and the certainty o f successful mission execution.
The Foreign Internal Defense mission i s n o f e x c l u s i v e l y a Special
Forces mission. I t i s a joint and interagency a c t i v i t y o f the United States
government.r7 The p r i m a r y tasks f o r a Special Forces detachment on a
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission a r e to organize, t r a i n , advise, and
assist host nation m i l i t a r y and p a r a m i l i t a r y forces. Ideally, b y improving
the host nation tactical and technical proficiency, an insurgency can be
defeated without direct U.S.
involvement.+^ According to the Army's
doctrine f o r FID, detachments conduct the following types of operations:
t r a i n i n g assistance, advisory assistance, intelligence operations, PSYOP,
CA operations,
populace and resource control operations. and tactical
combat operationsq9. A b r i e f synopsis of operational doctrine follows.
Training assistance operations i n a host nation p e r m i t the r a p i d
development o f specific individual s k i l l s o r the preparation o f u n i t s to
defeat an insurgent. The m i l i t a r y assistance e f f o r t begun f o r E l Salvador
in the e a r l y 1980's w i t h i t s weapons, tactics, and j u n i o r leadership by
elements o f the 7 t h Special Forces Group (Airborne) i s an example.
Training ass~stonceincreases tho overall host nation force capability by
making untapped host nation resources available f o r use against
insurgents. This supports the U. S. doctrine f o r Internal Defense and
Development (IDAD) b y focusing on building viable host nation m i l i t a r y
institutions that respond to the needs of society.50 Training assistanca
also reduces the requirement f o r U.S. resources.
Special Forces provides advisory assistance i n the form of
operational advice and assistance to specific host natlon and p a r a m i l i t a r y
organizations. The advisory assistance i s provided under the operational
control (OPCON) of the in-country U. S. defense representative, usuaily
the Chief of Security Assistance Operations. Activities of the detachment
may intersect jurisdictional boundaries o r responsibilities of other
Country Team members (See figure 3). The detachment anticipates
potential conflicts and coordinates working agreements through i t s
m i l i t a r y chain of command and the m i l i t a r y organlzation working for the
ambassador i n the country. Additionally, the Special Forces advisers
coordinate their portion of the overall FID e f f o r t w i t h each member of the
country team.
STATEDEPARTMENT
PLANS 6
OPERATIONS
0
AMERICAN
EMBASSY
M i l i t a r y Forcer
S 0 F
Host Nation
Police/Military
CLANOESTINE
OPERATIONS
Ambassador
C IA
JUSHm6
USAID
US15
C I A
S 0 F
Local Military
and
Constaeulary
INTELLI6ENCE
COLLECTION
SECURITY
C I A
Military Forcer
5 0 F
C I A
Military Aslets
press Pool
Figure a. T h e Fignt Against Supply
From HarCo?morilm: rhe ntw unconventional war
MRJ MarR P. Hertlin!, Hili:~r~lh'!:m :larch 1 9 9 0
For a variety of reasons, host nations may refuse U. S. advisers. At
the same time, that host nation may request and receive U. S. mobility and
f f r e support assets to combat a potent insurgent. Special Forces are
capable of coordinating a l l types of heliborne, tactical a i r l i f t , close a i r
support and gunship operations. Special Forces detachments, as liaison
teams, can coordinate this support to ensure i t s proper tactical
employment.
The Special Forces adviser must balance four c r i t i c a l conditions of
the host nation environment. First, he must always act as a representative
of the United States. Problems must be resolved by means appropriate to
the host nation without violating U. S. laws and policies. A second
condition for successful advisory assistance i s understanding crosscultural communications while building close personal relationships. This
i s especially difficult because host nation counterparts normally act
within the context of their own sociopolitical experience. Host nation
leaders may tolerate advice only to obtain material and training assistance.
To safeguard both the U. S. interests and the adviser's, specific ROE exist
to keep the adviser an advizr. This i s the t h i r d condition under which an
adviser operates. The fourth condition incorporates the f i r s t three.
Simply stated, i t i s that political objectives and constraints, rather than
m i l i t a r y capabilities, often dictate the organization and force development
of host nation m i l i t a r y and paramilitary forces.
Three pre-eminent resources: language qualification, the area
study51, and the SF mission briefback make the Special Forces adviser
especially suited for the FID mission. Special Forces headquarters orient
their teams to specific global regions. Accordingly, this orientation
focuses language proficiency requirements f c r training. Each team
prepares a specific area study incorporating i t s language proficiency.
This study i s kept c u r r e n t and continuously updated. It i s f u r t h e r updated
w i t h additional, specific deployment area information p r i o r to deployment.
The briefback demonstrates tho adviser's understanding of the relationship
o f the RUF/ROE w i t h the area of operations.
The Special Forces detachment conducts comprehensive and detailed
intelligence operations as p a r t of FID to assist the host nation i n using i t s
own superior ( r e l a t i v e to the insurgents) resources to perforate an
insurgent s e c u r i t y system. The detachment concentrates not only on
m i l i t a r y significant information, but on assisting the host nation i n
conducting operations designed to destroy o r neutralize the insurgent's
p o l i t i c a l and intelligence infrastructure.
Closely related to intelligence operations are PSYOP operations.
Psychological operations target the host nation populace's perceptions
about t h e i r government's interests and goals i n order to gain t h e i r support
o r at least deny i t to an insurgent. The Special Forces detachment assists
host nation forces to accomplish the following objectives w i t h support
from PSYOP elements:
*Assisting the host nation i n gaining o r retaining the support of i t s people. .Assisting the host nation i n defeating the insurgents. .Establishing a favorable U. S. image in the host nation. *Favorably presenting U. S. actions and intentions to neutral groups and the international community. *Assisting the host nation i n supporting defector rehabilitation programs. *Providing close and continuous support to increase the effect of C i v i l A f f a i r s operations. The ultimate goal of the U. S. m i l i t a r y i s to help the host nation i n
developing i t s own PSYOP p r o g r a d 2 .
When the Special Forces detachment conducts c i v i l a f f a i r s
(CAI
operations i n FID, i t s p r i m a r y mission i s to help host nation forces to
effectively use i t s resources to mobilize the people to support the host
nation government against an insurgent. C i v i l A f f a i r s elements work
closely w i t h the detachment to coordinate the detachment operations w i t h
host nation, U. S. Mission, and international agencies. This coordination
aims at providlng host nation c i v i l assistance programs to the people.
C i v i l assistance programs improve the capabilities o f host nation
authorities to deal w i t h the political, economic, and social aspects of IDAD.
Special Forces detachments participate i n m i l i t a r y c i v i c action projects
that enhance host nation economic and social development. These programs
function to gain the active support o f the population b y emphasizing the
host nation's role.
PSYOP and C i v i l A f f a i r s operations are c r i t i c a l to the Special Forces
detachment when assisting a host nation i n population and resources
control operations (PRC). The detachment normally l i m i t s t h e i r
participation to advice, training, and indirect support of PRC.
Nevertheless, they must convey to the people that they a r e supporting a
host nation program, not implementing a U. S.-directed program. I n that
regard, the host nation must persuade the people of the following essential
*The insurgents, not the host nation government. are to blame f o r the inconvenience of the PRC measures. *The government acts f o r the long range benefit of the people. *The insurgents a c t i v i t i e s are h a r m f u l to the people and r e q u i r e the imposition of the PRC measures. elnsurgents arc? tilt? eneny of the ~~~!t:;)le
and must III! dcnicd suj~!)orl
and supplies.
*Loyal citizens must declare their support of the government w i t h
f u l l and voluntary compliance w i t h the PRC programs.
=The government w i l l reduce and eliminate the PRC programs as the
insurgent threat decreases.
When the United States decldes to participate i n a host natlon IDAD
strategy that includes combat operations, a detachment may conduct f i v e
types o f tactical combat operations described for FID: consolidatfon,
s t r i k e , remote area, border, and urban. Tactical operations are not
Independent actlons to destroy Insurgent forces and bases. Each operation
should be synchronized to gain a broader regional o r national objective. I t
i s the detachment commander's task to convince h i s counterpart to
integrate intelligence, CA, and PSYOP into every tactical operation along
w i t h the minimum use of violence. The IDAD p r i n c i p l e of minimum use of
violence54 i s v i t a l to success and the ultimate elimination of an
insurgency.
The f i r s t type of combat operation i n FID i s Consolidation.
Consolidation operations are long-term population security operations
conducted i n areas generally under government control. They aim at
providing s e c u r i t y to free the people from fear of insurgent reprisals.
This i s accomplished by isolating the insurgent, protecting the populace
and neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure. Some techniques to
accomplish t h i s are population resettlement o r 'strategic hamlet'
programs l i k e those used i n Malaysia and the Republic of Vietnam.
Second are s t r i k e ooerations. S t r i k e operations are short-duration
operations conducted in contested o r insurgent controlled areas. They are
designed to destroy, isolate, and interdict insurgent forces. t h e i r bases,
and t h e i r lines of support. They are offensive operations that are
decisive b v themselves. They can support consolidation operations b y
preventing insurgents from contesting host nation pacification efforts.
Special Forces advisers must advise against s t r i k e operations that
overshadow and dominate the n o n m i l i t a r y aspects of counterinsurgency.
Another type of FID combat operation are remote area ooerations.
Remote area operations are undertaken i n insurgent controlled o r contested
areas to establish 'islands o f popular support' for the host nation
government and deny support to the insurgents. PSYOP and C i v i l A f f a i r s
programs can best assist i n obtaining local support f o r remote area
operations when significant segments already support the host nation
programs and the host nation r e c r u i t s local personnel for service i n the
p a r a m i l i t a r y o r i r r e g u l a r force for that remote area. Special Forces
detachments support remote area operations to interdict, destroy base
areas, collect and r e p o r t intelligence, and demonstrate host nation support
f o r the remote area.
The f i n a l types of tactical combat operations i n FID are border
ooerations and urban onerations. Both are the responsibility of host
nation police. customs o r p a r a m i l i t a r y security forces. They also involve
extensive application o f population and resource control measures. The
goal of border operations i s to i n t e r d i c t insurgent forces and support.
Urban area operations are concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h combatting
t e r r o r i s m , sabotage, and destruction of the insurgent infrastructure.
PSYOP and C i v i l A f f a i r s support are again c r u c i a l f o r gaining and
maintaining popular support during these operations.
The doctrine for executing the FID mission hy Special Forces c a l l s '
f o r the creation of a security assistance force (See Appendix 6). The
security assistance force (SAF) i s s i m i l a r t o a conventional, combined
arms task force. A Special Forces detachment can be the nucleus of a SAF.
The Special Forces led SAF i s normally augmented w i t h C i v i l Affairs.
PSYOP, medical, engineer, m i l i t a r y police. m i l i t a r y intelligence,
communications and other combat, combat support and combat service
support elements as required. The SAF must be capable of supporting a l l
potential FID operations. When an area coordination center (ACC) i s
established, the SAF has the capability to integrate and coordinate a l l of i t s
a c t i v i t i e s w i t h combined (U. S./host nation) c i v i l - m i l i t a r y headquarters
w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the appropriate area commander.
The doctrine f o r the Special Forces mission of Foreign internal
Defense recognizes the p o l i t i c a l implications f o r counternarcotics
operations described b y United States Public Law. The FID doctrine
stipulates that the Special Forces adviser must solve problems without
violating U. S. laws and policies. The Special Forces mission briefback i s a
fundamental device for v e r i f y i n g that deploying detachments understand
t h e i r duties and the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed under these laws. During t h e i r
briefback, the detachment describes the Rules of Engagement (and o r Rules
on the Use of Force) for t h e i r FID mlssion. The ROE o r RUF serve as the
ClNCs means to keep the detachment from breaking any law o r policy.
The doctrine c l e a r l y recognizes host nation diplomatic and p o l i t i c a l
sensitivities. The doctrine actually describes the specific employment of
m i l i t a r y personnel i n an internal defense and development r o l e as
described i n FM 1 0 0 - 2 0 . M i l i t a r y Ooerations i n Low Intensity Conflict.
The Army recognizes the close linkage between drug trafficki.ng and
insurgency.55 The doctrine f o r the FID mission describes how to w i n
against an insurgency. B y s i m p l y substituting the word 'drug-trafficker'
f o r 'insurgent' you can apply the doctrine. For example, t h i s can be
p a r t i c u l a r l y useful when contending w i t h the problem of how to convince
the local populace to cease r a i s i n g drug crops ( o r support an insurgent).
The doctrine facilitates the interagency activities directed by the
Office o f National Drug Control Policy and the Department o f State
a c t i v i t i e s I n each affected country. The employment of a SAF working
under a memorandum of agreement w i t h the Drug Enforcement Agency
automatically puts the s e c u r i t y assistance office of an embassy, the Drug
Enforcement Agency representative, and the detachment commander i n a
coordination group. The establishment of an area coordination center
o f f e r s a way to include the host nation i n the counternarcotics effort.
F i n a l l y , the doctrine balances s e c u r i t y of operations w i t h the tenet
of synchronization. I m p l i c i t i n a l l FID missions i s the requirement to
protect the populace from the insurgent ( o r i n t h i s case the drug
t r a f f i c k e r ) and to provide a safe environment f o r national development.
Combining t h i s w i t h the emphasis i n every FID operation to integrate
intelligence, PSYOP, and C i v i l A f f a i r s t o w i n government support b y the
people, produces a s p i r a l i n g effect where the drug t r a f f i c k e r becomes less
secure as the populace becomes more secure. This i s a r e s u l t o f the host
nation supporting those who oppose the drug trade.
'it i s the business of armed services to f u r n i s h a constituted I
authority. a government, i n situations where force is, o r might be.
used the greatest possible number of options.' from a lecture t i t l e d
'The Profession of Arms' given b y LTG S i r John Winthrop Hackett. I
[K.c.B.; C.B.E., D.S.O., M.c:E.~~ .
1
I f the threat to the national security of the United States presented
b y drug t r a f f i c k i n g i s viewed as an External insuraencv, then the c u r r e n t
doctrine f o r the Special Forces missions of Special Reconnaissance, Direct
Action, and Foreign I n t e r n a l Defense i s suitable f o r conducting
counternarcotics operations outside the borders of the United States. When
the drug t r a f f i c k i n g threat i s viewed as a problem of domestic law
enforcement, then the doctrine f o r the Special Forces missions isnot
suitable f o r counternarcotics operations.
There are three fundamental components which cause the doctrine to
be suitable for application i n counternarcotics operations. Each of these
components satisfies the c r i t e r i a f o r t h i s study established b y the
imperatives for special operations. Consequently, Special Forces i s a
p r i m a r y tool available f o r interdicting drug t r a f f i c k i n g outside the
borders o f the United States.
The f i r s t component that demonstrates s u i t a b i l i t y i s the p r e mission isolation process that culminates i n a formal briefback from the
executing detachment to the commander directing the mission. This
b r i e f i n g c l a r i f i e s exactly what i s to be done and the conditions under which
the mission w i l l occur. This i s c r i t i c a l f o r protecting the m i l i t a r y from
committing to an operation that could violate the provisions imposed b y
Posse Comitatus. The b r i e f i n g also c l a r i f i e s what safeguards and
provisions are being made to prevent any undue o r unwarranted acts of
force. This c l e a r l y provides recognition of the p o l i t i c a l implications f o r
counternarcotics operations described b y United States P u b l i c Law (Posse
Comitatus Act T i t l e 1 8 United States Code 1 3 8 5 ) and host nation diplomatic
and p o l i t i c a l sensitivities.
The second component i s the inherent capability of Special Forces to
coordinate any of these missions as p a r t o f a combined, multi-agency
(Department o f Defense and other U.S. and host nation governmental
agencies) and conventional force. This w i l l be indispensable to any
counternarcotics e f f o r t coordinated b y the ONDCP that involves United
States and host nation law enforcement agencies, the State Department, and
the Department of Defense. The key factor i n making t h i s work i s the
experience and t r a i n i n g that Special Forces commanders have i n working i n
combined, multi-agency environments. This is p l a i n l y the c r i t e r i a o f
f a c i l i t a t i n g interagency a c t i v i t i e s directed b y the Office of National D r u g
Control Policy (The Drug Czar) and the Department of State a c t i v i t i e s i n
each affected country.
The t h i r d component i s the application o f the tenets of Low Intensity
Conflict and i n t e r n a l Defense and Development. The concept of a m i l i t a r y
force concentrating on the winning of popular support ( t o stop the flow o f
drugs) r a t h e r than the physical destruction o f an enemy force, w i l l be
essential to assisting host nations i n implementing lasting counterdrug
programs. Essential to t h i s concept are the requirements f o r intelligence
and s e c u r i t y as described i n FM 1 0 0 - 2 0 , M i l i t a r v Operations i n Low
intensitv Conflict. Synchronizing the s e c u r i t y of the force, the s e c u r i t y of
the host nation populace we w i l l be attempting to dissuade from drug
trafficking, and intelligence c c t i v i t y leoding to intcrdiction efforts i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y inherent i n the doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense. Thus
the last c r i t e r i a , balancing 'security of operations' w i t h the operational
tenet o f synchronization, i s met.
On the other hand, a single c r i t e r i o n renders a l l the doctrine
unsuitable when applying the doctrine to conduct counternarcotics
operations w i t h the objective of domes!ic law enforcement. None of the
doctrine i s able to comply w i t h the provisions i n the p u b l i c laws and
regulations which are derived from Posse Comitatus. W h i l e i t i s i m p l i c i t
in the doctrine that the detachment w i l l not violate any law i n the
execution of i t s mission, there are no provisions for the detachment to act
as law enforcement agents. No t r a i n i n g plan exists for the missions to
enable the detachment to become capable of affecting searches, seizures, o r
arrests f o r the purposes of bringing individuals to justice i n a c i v i l i a n
c r i m i n a l court. If b r i n a i n o c r i m i n a l s t r a f f i c k i n g drugs outside the United
States to iustice i s the focus of U. S. s t r a t e w , then the Special Forces
detachment is nofan appropriate tool.
If the Office of National Drug Control Policy pursues a strategy f o r
interdicting drugs i n t o the United States that doesnof require Special
Forces detachments to act i n a law enforcement manner; i n other words,
just stoo the flow, then detachments canbe employed as an effective tool to
stop that flow. I f the United States of America wants to pursue a strategy
where host nations assume the greater p a r t of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
stopping the flow of drugs w i t h lasting host nation counterdrug programs;
then Special Forces deployed on a Foreign lnternal Defense Mission as p a r t
of a combined, multi-agency (Department of Defense and other U.S. and
host nation governmental agencies) and conventional force tha! supports
the host nations' economic and political development of those lasting
counterdrug programs, i s the most suitable amlication of Special Forces
Doctrine.
ENDNOTES
-
U. S. I'rcsidcnt, National S e c u r ~ t vSlrateav of the United Statcs, The
I.
White House. March 1990, page 7.
U. S. Department of Defense. Deoartm-ent of Defense Guidance for
2.
lmolementation of the President's National Drua Control S t r a t e w . Richard
6. Cheney, Secretary of Defense. September 18, 1989. page 4.
U. S. Department of Defense. Department of the A r m y Memorandum,
3.
A r m v Counternarcotics Plan, A p r i l 17, 1990. (Hereinafter r e f e r r e d to as
A r m v Counternarcotics Plan.)
U. S. Department of Defense, Dapartrnent of the Army, h m
4.
Counternarcotics Symnosium, Report of Conference Proceedings, Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, February 1 5 - 16,
1990. (Hereinafter r e f e r r e d to as Armv Svmoosium.)
Kitson, Frank, Low Intensitv Ooerations: Subversion. I n s u r a e m
5.
Peacekeeoina. Faber & Faber Limited. London, 1 9 7 1. page 70.
U. S. President. National Drua Control Strateqy. The White House,
6.
January 1 9 9 0 , page 3.
7.
m.,page 100.
Posse Comitatus Act, United States Code. Section 1 3 8 5 of T i t l e 1 8
8.
(Crimes and C r i m i n a l Procedure)
9.
T r i t c h l e r , W i l l i a m K. 'Employment o f the U.S. Armed Forces and
the War on Drugs.' (Unpublished Research Report for the United States
Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Nay 6 , 1987.) page 32.
Adams, Michael R. 'Navy Narcs', Proceedings, United States Naval
10.
Institute, September 1984. page 35.
1 1.
T r i t c h l e r . W i l l i a m K. 'Employment of the U.S. Armed Forces and
the War on Drugs.' page 37.
12.
U. S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5 5 2 5 . 5 , 'DoD
Cooperation w i t h C i v i l i a n Law Enforcement Officials'. January 15. 1986.
page 4- 1.
13.
U. S. Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service.
'DoD Steps Up the Counternarcotics Fight." Defense Issues, Vol. 5. No. 2 2 ,
March 22, 1990. page 6.
U. S. Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service,
14.
'DoD Role i n Drug Control.' Defense Issues, Vol 4 . No. 3 0 , September 18,
1989. page 1.
15.
U. S, Department of Defense, 'DoD Steps Up the Counternarcotics
Fight." Defense Issues, Vol. 5 , No. 2 2 , March 2 2 , 1990. page 5-8.
ENDNOTES 16.
LIJJ., p q e 3.
I7.
bid.. page 6.
18.
m.,page 7.
19.
A r m v Counternarcotics Plan. D i s t r i b u l:ion was made to a l l major
commands o f the A r m y ( MACOM)
20.
w..page 3.
2 1.
m..page 2 1.
22.
u.,
page 17.
23.
A r m v Svmoosium., pages I, 4, and 23. Page 2 3 contains notes f r o m
a b r i e f i n g given b y COL Thomas E. Swain, Commander, A r m y / A i r Force
Center f o r Low Intensity Conflict. The b r i e f i n g described the relationship
o f counternarcotics to Low Intensity Conflict.
United States Army Field Manual 100-20/United States A i r Force
24.
Pamphlet 3 - 2 0 , M i l i t a r v Ooerations i n Low lntensitv Conflict (Approved
Final D r a f t ) United States Army Command and General Staff College, F o r t
Leavenworth. Kansas. December I. 1989. page 1 - 12. (Hereinafter
r e f e r r e d to as F i l 100-20.)
25. A r m v Svmoosium., pages 4 and 29. Page 2 9 contains notes from a
seminar on Intelligence Support to Counternarcotics led b y BG John F.
Stewart. Jr., Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff f o r Intelligence.
26.
United States A r m y Field Manual 3 1-20, Doctrine f o r Soecial
Forces Ooerations, United States A r m y John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School. F o r t Bragg. North Carolina, February 1. 1990. page
12- 1. (Hereinafter r e f e r r e d to as FN 31 -20.)
27.
Reuter, Peter, Gordon Crawford and Jonathan Cave. Sealina the
Borders: The Effects of increased M i l i t a r v Particioation i n D r u g
Interdiction, The RAND Corporation, January 1988. page 14.
28.
w.,pages v - v i i .
29.
A r m v Counternarcotics Plan. pages 4 and 2 1.
30.
FM31-20,pagelO-I.
31.
HacketI, Lieutenant General S i r John Winthrop, K.C.B.. C.B.E.,
D.S.O., N.C., The Profession of Arms, (The 1 9 6 2 Lees Knowles lectures
given at T r i n i t y College, Cambridge, United Kingdom). Center for M i l i t a r y
History, United States Army, Washington D.C. 1988. page 3. (Hereinafter
r e f e r r e d t o as The Profession of Arms.)
32.
F f l 3 1-20., page 12- 1.
ENDNOTES 33.
Qi11
,,
~ \ I J % XpIq' i~
: 5 . -1Yi31:ls"i I V f > c::l!nt::l
i1;(11~ 1tiUdI:j. !]Iw:{K
of individuals, or organizations i n place or which can be placed i n position
to accomplish specific tasks. These assets may be covert o r overt
depending on the nature of t h e i r activity. The must be responsible to U. S.
control and committable i n support of U. S. objectives.
34.
&mv Counternarcotics Plan. page 17.
FM 3 1 - 2 0 , appendix E provides an example of a Special Operations
35.
Command Mission Letter.
FM 100-20. page 1-8.
m.,page 1-9. Armv Counternarcotics Plan. page 4. FM 3 1-23, page 1-9.
Ibid.,
-
page
m.,page
m.,page
m.,page 11-3.
United States A r m y Special Operations Command, Deputy Chief of
Staff f o r Intelligence, Student Handbook on Special Omrations Taraetinq,
5 t h Edition. Strategic Industrial Target Analysis Training Course. Fort
Bragg, North Carolina. pages 2 & 3.
45.
FM 3 1-20, paragraph 1 1-2a.
46.
A r m v Counternarcotics Plan. page 17.
47.
FM 3 1 - 2 0 , page 10- 1.
49.
w.,pages 1 0 - 2
50.
F f l 1 0 0 - 2 0 , page 2 - 13.
through 10-7.
5 1.
F f l 3 1-20., annex I contains a recommended general outline format
f o r systematically organizing information i n an area of operations.
52.
m.,page 10-3.
53.
U.,page 10-4.
51.
F f l 1 0 0 - 2 0 . page 2 - 17.
ENDNOTES
55.
tlorris. James A . NAJ. USA. 'OCONUS Coun tcrnilrcot ic Campaign
Planning.' (Unpublished Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990.) describes i n detail the direct
relation o f counter narcotics with insurgency. Also see Armv Svmoosium.,
pages 4 and 23.
56.
Jhe Profession O f Arms.. page 29.
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~
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15- 16. J u l y 18. and October 2 4 . 1985.
U. S.. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. I n i t i a t i v e s
on Drua Interdiction ( P a r t 2 ) . Hearinas, before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations. 3 6 t h Congress, F i r s t Session.
February 6-7. A p r i l 16. May 14. and September 9, 1985.
U. S. Department of Defense. American Forces lnformation Service. 'DoD
Role i n Drug Control,' Defense Issues, Vol 4, No. 3 0 , September 18, 1989.
U. S. Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service,
'Defense Against B a l l i s t i c Missiles and Drug Traffickers.' Defense Iss-UB.
Vol 4. No. 3 0 , October 12, 1989.
U. S. Department of Defense, American Forces lnformation Service, 'DoD
Implementation of the President's Drug Control Strategy.' Defense Issrles,
Yo1 4, No. 3 8 , October 17, 1989.
U. S. Department of Defensz, American Forces lnformation Service. 'DoD
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U. S. Department of Defense, Deoartment of Defense Guidance f o r
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B. Cheney. Secretary of Defense, September 18, 1989.
U. S. Department of Defense. Department of the Army Memorandum. A
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m
U. S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army, A m
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1930.
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U. S. Department of Defense, DoD D i r e c t i v e 5525.5, 'DoD Cooperation w i t h
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U. S. Department of Defense. JCS PUB 3 - 0 7 . Doctrine for Joint O ~ e r a t i o n s
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M i l i t a r v Review: March 1990.
Meyer. Dan C. CPT(P) 'The Myth of Narcoterrorism i n L a t i n America.'
M i l i t a r v Review: March 1990.
Moore, Richter H., Jr. 'Posses Comitatus Revisited: the Use of the
M i l i t a r y i n C i v i l Law Enforcement.' Journal of C r i m i n a l Justice, Volume
15: 1987.
Temple, Herbert R. Jr., LTG(Ret1 and LTC Walter L. Stewart. 'The
National Guard i n the War on Drugs.' M i l i t a r v Review: March 1990.
UNPUBLISHED PAPER/BRIEFINGS
Abbott, Michael H. 'U. S. Army Involvement i n Counterdrug Operations--A
Matter of P o l i t i c s o r National Security?' (Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y
Studies Program Paper. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania. March 30, 1988.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Clements, Theodore S. 'The Role of the Army i n the War on Drugs.'
(Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y Studies Program Paper, US A r m y War
College. C a r l i s l e Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 28, 1988.)
Cooper, Norman G and others. 'The P r o s and Cons o f M i l i t a r y Intervention
i n t o Drug Trafficking.' ( Unpublished I n d u s t r i a l College o f the Armed
Forces - Research Report, H a r c h 1986.)
Dehoust, Walter F. 'The Use of Conventional M i l i t a r y Forces f o r Drug
Interdiction.' (Unpublished Research Report f o r the Naval War College.
Newport. Rhode Island. June 17. 1988.)
F r i e r s , T.R. 'DOD Involvement i n the lnterdiction of Illegal Drugs.'
(Unpublished Research Report f o r the A i r Command and Staff College.
1986.)
Gerlach. Stephen R. ' H i l l t a r y Forces and lntelllgence In the Drug War.'
(Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y Program Paper, US A r m y War College.
C a r l i s l e Barracks, Pennsylvania. March 23, 1987.)
H a r r i s , W i l l i a m H. Jr., HAJ. USA. 'Are Counternarcotics Operations a
Viable Mission f o r U.S. Army Special Operations Forces?' (Unpublished
MMAS Thesis, U.S. A r m y Command and General Staff College, F o r t
Leavenworth, Kansas. 1989.)
Haselton, Mark A.. HAJ, USA. 'The Role of Special Operations Forces i n
Counter-Narcotic Operations' (Unpublished MHAS Thesis. U.S. A r m y
Command and General Staff College. F o r t Leavenworth. Kansas. 1990.)
H o r r i s , James A.. MAJ. USA. 'OCONUS Counternarcotic Campaign
Planning.' (Unpublished Monograph. U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990.)
Mahaffey, P a t r i c k D. 'What i s the U.S. Navy's Role i n Drug Interdiction?'
(Unpublished Research Report for the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode
Island. November 1 0, 1 988.)
Moseley, Michael S. 'The M i l i t a r y Joins the War on Drugs.' (Unpublished
USAWC M i l i t a r y Program Paper, U S A r m y War College, Carlisle Barracks.
Pennsylvania, A p r i l 14, 1987.)
Mudd. Joseph F. 'Assigning DoD a Narcotics Interdiction Mission.'
(Unpublished individual study project National War College, Washington,
D.C.. February 1 9 8 6 )
Shurtleff, Richard Ward, Major, USAF. 'The A i r Force Involvement i n
Drug Interdiction--An Analysis.' (Unpublished individual study project
A i r Command and Staff College, Maxwell A i r Force Base, Alabama, A p r i l
1986)
Smith. Matthew L.. MAJ. USA. 'The War on Drugs - - Can an Operational
A r t i s t Help W i n It?' (Unpublished Monograph, U.S. Army Commantf and
General Staff College. F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas. 1989.)
Squier, Michael J. 'The Role of U.S. M i l i t a r y i n the 'Druy War'.'
(Unpublished USAWC M i l i t a r y Program Paper, US A r m y War College.
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 19. 1987.)
T r i t c h l e r . W i l l i a m K. 'Employment of the U.S. Armed Forces and the War
on Drugs.' (Unpublished Research Report f o r the United States Marine
Corps Command and Staff Collegc. flay 6, 1987.)
Walker. Lynn 0. ' M i l i t a r y Use i n the Druy War." (Unpublished USAWC
M i l i t a r y Program Paper, US Army War College, Cariisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, March 17. 1987.)
n ~ ~ p e n t lI~. xS l ~ e c i n iF o r c e s i:onr!)nn~l i ~ r ( l ~ r l l Z . , ! l ~ :i:i~,lri
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iA R I L P 31-807-32 h CP S p e c m l F o r c e s Company, D i r e c t AC~WII page
rnj
Special Forces Company Airborne Special Forces Group TOE 31 -8Oi'LOOO Company Headquarters (B Detachment)
Company Commander
Executive 0 f f i r . e r
O p e r a t i o n s i R d m i n ~ s t r a t i u eOfficer
Detachment NCO
Operations NCO
Communications NCO
Assistant Operations and I n t e l l i g e n c e NCO
M e d i c a l NCO
Supply NCO
C o m m u n i c a t ~ o n sNLO
NBC NCO
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SSG
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4 ODR
1 ODR M i l i t a r y Free-Fall Qunlified
1 ODR Scuba Quaiifled
Commander
Detachment Technician
Operations NCO
Communications NCO
Engineer NCO
M e d i c a l NCO
Weapons NCO
Rssistant Operations and I n t e l l i g e n c e NCO
Communications NCO
Engineer NCO
M e d i c a l NCO
Weapons t i c 0
CPT
UIO
MSG
SFC
SFC
SFC
SFC
5FC
SSG
SSG
SSG
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18R00
180FIO
18250
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18D40
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J o i n t Chiefs
of Staff
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.
Vic e C t ~ i k i r l n ~ n
J o i n t Chiefs
of Staff
Director
Defense
Intelligence
(Command, C o n t r o l ,
Colnnbunications. and
nce)
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f o r D r u g Enforcement
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a n s Support)
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Cr;
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D i r e c t o r -13
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21-5-0112
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21-5-0103
31-5-0107 1 5 ) I N F I L T R A T E B Y C O V E R E D H E A H S (U) 31-5-00'18 I E S T A B L I S H C O N T A C T WITH A N A S S E T 31-5-0 1 0 4 31-5-00
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P R E S E N T BRIEFBACK
I
i
21-5-0004 i P R E P F ) R E THE I S O L R T I O H n R E R ' 31-5-0001
-!
52
1
Appendix 4 - Special Forces Mission Briefback F o r m a t (FH 31 - 2 0 , Doctrine f o r Special Forces O i ~ e r a t i u r ~ App
s . H , page H- 1 t h r o u g h t i - 2 )
SF n155!CN D R i E F D A t X r O R n A T
This appendix provides an outline format for an SF mission briefback. It can also be used by a group or battalion staff to prepare an initial mission briefing. The f o r m a l provides a systematic means for presenting information concerning a specific SF mission. Although the basic outline i s general, it i s flexible enough to be used f o r any doctrinal SF mission. The user must modify the outline by deleting those portions that do not apply. COHnnnDCn
Purpose of briefing nission a s s t a t e d in t h e OPORD
Higher Commander% Intent Detachment Commander's Intent
le. Organization of Detachment Chain of
IComrnand and Hssigned Responsibility
if. Attachments and Detachments
[a.
b.
c.
d.
I
5 2 o r INTELLI6ENCE SER6ERNT
la. o e s c r i ~ t i o nof t h e JSOA
~ b I. PB
'
1. Threat Evaluation a) Threat identification
b ) naditions t o t n e initial t h r e a t a a t a
I
i
I
I
I
i
I
I
i
o Determination of c u r r e n t o r d e r o i
[ b a t t l e (overlay)
4) Disposltion, composition, and s t r e n g t h !
I
jof committed f o r c e s and reinforcements
:(identify e a c h unit by c a t e g o r y )
e l Hostile f o r c e capabilities, intentions, /
land activities tair, ground, u a t e r , M a c ) f0 Hostile populace and resource
icontrol measures
I 2. Civilian population
I a. capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions,
land activities of supported indigenous force.
+. The e f f e c t s of terrain and weather on
I
lboth h i e n d l q and hostile f o r c e s in t h e J 5 0 A . I
( U s e t e r r a i n b v e r l a y s as appropriate.) 5. Threat integration and probable course
of hostile action.
Ic. PIR and I R
I d. EEFI
I
Ie. Detachment Intelligence Rctivities in t h e
j
j J S O R (Include defenswe C I Activities1
I
i
!
S~OrOPERATIOHSSER6ERNT
a. Command and support relationships in t h e
*Son. b. concept of t h e operation.
Ic. m u l e s of engagement/Rules on t h e u s e of
IPorce
d. Infiltration Plan 1. Route 2. Point of no r e t u r n (PONR) a. Contingency Plan a ) In-flight a b o r t plan (include r e c a l l
procedures)
b ) Crash a n d l o r f o r c e d landing
1) Before PONR
e) A f t e r POHR
4. Primary and a l t e r n a t e points of entry,
5. Contingency plan at e n t r y points.
6. Assembly plan.
a) a n prlmary and a l t e r n a t e points of
entru
b ) Disposition of excess items <SCUBA o r i
:AIR ITEMS)
-
a, primary b ) Alternate
C ) Contingency 8. Movement Plans
a ) From points of e n t r y t o c o n t a c t s i t e
(If needed)
b ) From c o n t a c t site to operations a r e a .
3. Security Plans
lo. s p e c i f ~ cduties of c o n t a c t team, bundle
recovery team, and t h e r specialized teams.
e. Training Plan
1. Tentative Dlan t o train indiaenous force.
2. Program o> Instruction a1 Individual
b) Collective
c) Leader
f. Combat operations (only if preplanned
t a r g e t s are included)
1. Concept of t h e operation. 2. Routes t o and from t h e target. a. Securitu Plan.
4. Rctions-at t h e objective t o v e r a l l
concept). If a aemolition t a r g e t , ?be
aemohtion s e r g e a n t briefs; if a ra#d/ambush,
the weaoons s e r a.,e a n t briefs.
5. uithdrawal
g. Link-up o r exfiltration plan
1. Primary
2. Alternate
a. Contingency
n. Demobilization Plan
1. PSYOP
2. Deception
a. OPSEC
-
51 o r DETACHMENT TECHHICIRH
ia. Personnel status.
1. Assigned s t r e n g t h 2. Shortage by nos a. cross-trained personnel
I b. Discipline, Law and o r d e r
I
1. Court-martial and Article 1s jurisaiction
lit a n exception t o SOP
2. Knom inaigenous f o r c e policy
/concerning discipline and la- and o r d e r
a. L e g a l s t a t u s of t h e team in t h e Jsoa
(c.Dispasition of PIS in JSOA
lo. s r a v e s registration
I
I. US personnel
I
2. Indigenous personnel ( s t a t e l o c a l
'customs)
le. n o r a l e a n a personnel s e r v i c e s crt o t h e r
, t h a n SOP)
/ i . ~ e r s o n n e lr e c o r d s checx
j
2. Mail handling
I a. Promotions
I
4. Comfort items
1 5. Replocements and augmentations
i
6. Pay and a l l o r a n c e s
.f. Operational nrnd
i
I
!I
I
I
I
i
,
;
I
I
I
I
i
I
i
I
i
i
I
;
I
!
!
I
i
!
!
!
Appendix 4 - Special Forces Mission Briefback Format (FM 31-20, 9octrine i c r Special Forces Opuri~tions,App H ) S l o r OET&C+IliENT
TECHHICInN -.
lg. Indigenous force strength
Ih.
f the
indiacnous f~-~
arc
e
.~
. -.- - - - = o
, ~ Proccssina
-~
-I 1. Oath o f alleaiance
Records t o ;b kept
a) pay
I
b3 Training
c > Miscellaneous a. Identification photographs
- ----
~~~
1
e
COPiWIJHICATIOHS 5ER6.EnnN_T_
1
1
I I
I i
I i
S t o r SUPPLY S E R 6 E m fa. Supplies and equipment
1. n
i
s
p
o
s
i
litems not accompanying team
I Z. Special mission equipment issued to the
ldetachment
I 3. Cross-load p l a n
I b. Resupply plans
I
1. Automatic resupply
I
a ) Schedule
I
b) Drop zone data/or delivery means
I
o Recovery p l a n
I n. on-call resupply
I
a ) Schedule
I
b3 Drop zone data/or delivery means
C) Recavery p l a n
I
I 3. Emergency resupply and conditions f o r
limplementetion
1 4. Existing logistical nets i n t h e JSOA
[ 5. Indigenous 10gisticai p l a n
I
I
t
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
I
SS or CIVIL AFFAIRS NCO
[a. politico-military implications o r the mision
Ib. Status o f l o c a l government in the JSOA
IC. Status o f the snaaor resistance
lgovernment i n the JSOA
j& Requirements f o r inreragency coordination j
i:n the JSOA
le. Plans t o minimize civilian interference with
l the mission
I
<. Plans t o p r o t e c t cultural properties i n the
,
1i
5- Security
a
> Site sccuritu
-.
..
b > ~ransmissiogsecuritu
c ) Cryptographic equip&nt
I 6. I n t e r n a l detacnment communications
c. Communications training p l a n d. Existing communications in the JSOA
UEDICRL SER6ERNT (a. Health status of detachment
Ib. Medical supplies and equipment to
laccompany detachment
I 1. cross-load p l a n
I P. Individual medical equipment and
lsupplies
Ic. Estimate o f the medical situation i n the
IJSOA
I
1. Indigenous f o r c e h e a l t h I
P. Preventitive mcdiciene
I
a. Health hazards in the JSOA
I
Food and nutrition i n the JSOA
1 5. Indigenous medical personnel and
Ifacilities
Id. Medical logistical p l a n
le. Medical training p l a n
I 1. Indigenous individual soldiers
I 2. Indigenous medics
I a. Clandestine treatment center personnel
+.
I
I
i
i
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
!
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
ENGINEER SER6EANT
la. Enclinecr eauioment and suoolies to
iaccoihpany d6tachment
I
1. Status o f equipment
I
P. Cross-load p l a n
ib. Estimate o f a r e a potential t o support
ldemolitions and engineer requirements
c. Mission planning folder (CARVER o v e r l a y ) d. CARVER Analysis o f potential targets le. muailability o f supplies in the JSOA If. Engineer training p l a n 1. Individual
2. Collective
a. Leader ..
1 I
i,-. --
19. Plans t o develop t h e Auxiliary i n the JSOFI
In.
Plans t o aevelop Civ:l Defense 6roups in
l the JSOA. ii:
Humanitarian and civil assistance plans.
LJ. Military Civic action plans
5 Y O P OFFICER o
m
'a. Target audience
1. Uncommitted
i 5L Hostile sympathizer+
I a. Hostile mllitary forFes
I 4. Resistance sympathizers
10. Approved themes and messages for each
i t a r a e t audience
ic. ~iaemesand messages to b e avoided
id. Media production and dissemination means
!availabule in the JSOA.
~ hPSYOP
.
materiel to accompany detachment
1
C~MMUNICATIONS
SER6ERNT
la. Signal equipment and supplies to
iaccompanu detachment
1. siatu; o f equipment
2. Crass-load plans
! b. Communicatians p l a n and procedures
I
1. Scheduled contacts
1
S. Mandatory reports to SFOB o r FOB
a. Alternate encryption system
4. Emergency communicallons system and
~rocedures
(
i
i
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
i
I
I
I
i
I
j
I
i
i
i
I
i
I
UEAPONSSER6ERNT
la. weapons and t a c t ~ ~ & ~ m te
o n
t
i
laccomoanu detachment
1. siatu; o f weapons and t a c t i ~ a equipment;
l
P. Basic l o a d o f ammunition
i
a. cross-load p l a n
i
b. Estimate o f a r e a potential to provide
!
additional weapons, ammunition, and t a c t i c a l i
equipment
i
c. security
i
1. Assembly a r e a !if not SOP1 P. contact areas o f not SOP)
a. Tentative base camp security plans
I
d. weapon5 and tactics training p l a n
I
1. Individual
I
P. Collective j
a. Leader
I
COMMANDER I
la. CLOSIN6 STATEMENT
!
i.READINESS POSTURE OF DETACHHENT I
2. UNRESOLVED ISSUES OR CONCERNS ( I F
I
INONE. 5 0 STATE)
i
lb. L!u&stions
I
i
CONDUCT
POSTflISSlOH ACTIVITIES
T A S K NO. 21-5-012+
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AI'I'CNDIX 7
( P K PAREIL
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COUNTERNARCOTICS MISSION ANAI YSlS FOR SI'ECIAI. FORCES MISSIONS
BY AlllllOR FROM ANALYSIS OF TIII: ARHY
COIJNIERNAI~COTICSPLAN)
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OINTFRDICT DRIJG INTO UNITED STATES
*(:IN(:'
IWi'PARE: COlJNTIIRNARCOl~ICSP1.ANS
rONOCP COORDINA7-EZi IJ. S. EFFORTS
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ONLY WI TH 0.S.I). APPROVAL
*COI.l.ITC~T INTEI-LIGFNCE
*IN l t-RDIO r AT TI-IE SOURCE, ENROUTC, AND
IJl!; ISRI 13U'I-ION POI N-rS
*I I I A I N 1IOS'T NA-TIONS TO ENAF31.E THEM TO
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---.--------
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-- -- . - .--- I
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NDCS
.-....
(POSSES COMITATUS)
*NO AIIRESTS, SEIZURES, SEARCHES
*NO MI1.I TARY USE INSIDr! U. S. BORDERS
.NO OI)IXATIONAL.
suPPoI>-r TO LAW
ENI-ORCEMENT AGENCIES WITHOUT O.S.D.
APPIIOVAL
---
-
ICS PLAN - DOD
-AllMY
..-. -.- COlJN~lERNARCO~l~
.NO (:IVII..IAN LAW ENFORCEMENT DUTIES
*DO NO-T AC-T TO ENFORCE DOMESTIC LAWS
.DO NO T SIJHSTITUTE U.S. IWOGRAMS/ ACT ION'
1-01?HOST NATION PRO(;RAMS/ACTIONS
.AVOID CANCELLING ROTAl- IONS TO NTC
mAVOll) CANCEI-LING JOIN-T TRAINING
CXI'IIC ISES
mAVOIO CANCELLING COMIII NFD TRAINING
I_XITIlC ISES