The British Strategy of Appeasement: Why Did
Britain Persist in the Face of Negative Feedback? *
Stephen G. Walker
Department of Political Science
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ 85287
Mark Schafer
Department of Political Science
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
B. Gregory Marfleet
Department of Political Science
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ 85287
*Prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association Meeting, Hilton San Francisco and Towers, August 29-September 2, 2001.
Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
The British Strategy of Appeasement: Why Did
Britain Persist in the Face of Negative Feedback?
ABSTRACT
In this paper the operational codes of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and Foreign
Secretary Lord Halifax are examined to account for why Britain persisted with a strategy
of appeasement toward Germany in spite of negative feedback in the form of continued
German expansion. Their public statements between 1937 and 1939 are analyzed with
the Verbs In Context System (VICS) to detect patterns of continuity and change in their
philosophical beliefs about the nature of the political universe and their instrumental
beliefs regarding the most effective strategies for realizing political goals. The analysis
shows that Chamberlain’s beliefs altered very little from an appeasement orientation even
after Germany seized Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Halifax’s beliefs showed more
evidence of learning but actually shifted toward support for appeasment over time. The
results support recent historical research that attributes the persistence in Britain’s
appeasement strategy after Munich to Chamberlain’s personality and beliefs, which
disposed him toward an obstinate pursuit of appeasement in the face of negative
feedback. This historical account is consistent with theoretical explanations offered by
control theory and cognitive-behavioral theory, which predict persistence in the face of
negative feedback when leaders either have a high sense of self efficacy (Chamberlain)
regarding the present strategy or have a sense of low self efficacy (Halifax) regarding the
present strategy and its alternatives.
INTRODUCTION
The British strategy of appeasement toward Germany, Italy, and Japan during the
last half of the 1930s is associated with the politics of miscalculation and failure. By
appeasement, we mean “the policy of settling international (or, for that matter, domestic)
quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and
compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive,
bloody, and possibly very dangerous” (Kennedy 1983. Italics Kennedy’s). The policy of
appeasement has been discredited as naïve, counterproductive, and even immoral (Rock
2000). Critics of British appeasement were vocal during and after the series of events
leading up to World War II. Although most historians blame Hitler’s Germany for the
onset of the Second World War in Europe, Britain and France come under criticism as
well for not recognizing the nature of the threat posed by Hitler’s leadership and for not
acting sooner to contain German expansion in Europe. So why did Britain’s appeasement
strategy persist in the presence of such criticism and after negative feedback in the form
of German expansion?
Initially, historians emphasized the political naiveté of democratic statesmen in
dealing with dictators. In this account, Britain’s leaders misperceived Hitler’s intentions
and overestimated Britain’s ability to reach a general settlement with Germany regarding
the latter’s eastern frontiers with Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland (Taylor 1961;
Gilbert and Gott 1963). A second set of historians stressed the domestic constraints on
British leaders from public opinion and tight budgets in the midst of an economic
depression (Churchill 1948; Kennedy 1961; Rowse 1961; George 1965; Maisky 1964;
1
Cowling 1975). A third school of historical scholarship takes a global perspective to
highlight the external constraints on a world power with commitments outside Europe
and unrest within the British Empire (Clifford 1967; Colvin 1971; Middlemas 1972;
Thorne 1973; Lee 1973; Hardie 1974; Barnett 1972; Kennedy 1976).
While still vilified in the public mind, the appeasement policy has become more
favorably viewed by scholars who account for its persistence as a pragmatic response to
circumstances at three levels of analysis: the dispositions of British leaders, the
constraints of domestic politics, and the burdens of empire (Rock 1977; Fuchser 1982;
Mommsen and Kettenaker 1983; Parker 1993; Robbins 1997; Finney 1997). This
perspective tends to be shared by political scientists (e.g., Wolfers 1966; Newman 1968;
Walker 1978, 1980; Walker et al 1984; Schweller 1998, 2001; Rock 2000). Over time,
there has also been a refinement in the interpretation of appeasement’s implementation as
a strategy, which characterizes it as a mix of diplomatic and military actions that ranged
between submission in response to demands from Germany and Italy and at least keeping
the dictators guessing about British responses (Middlemas 1972; see also Kupchan 1994;
Rock 2000).
The result is a more nuanced answer to the question, “Why Did Britain Persist in
the Face of Negative Feedback?” The British government both persisted and adapted
over time to aggressive initiatives by Germany, a pattern criticized by Taylor (1961) as
sending contradictory signals to Hitler and a worse strategy than either pure appeasement
or deterrence (see also Walker, et al 1984). These qualifications in the empirical
depiction of British appeasement lead us to revise and recast our main research question
into three more specific questions. First, we pose an antecedent question: “How much
did Britain persist in the face of negative feedback?” Second, we ask, “When did
Britain adapt the strategy of appeasement toward a more forceful strategy of ‘keeping
Germany guessing” (Middlemas 1972) or even “weak deterrence” (Walker, et al 1984)?
Third, we inquire, “Why didn’t Britain learn to adapt more and sooner to the threat from
Germany?”
UNPACKING THE APPEASEMENT PUZZLE
The main claim in this paper is that the ultimate mechanisms of continuity and
change were located in the beliefs of the British elite. We shall argue that as Prime
Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Halifax altered their beliefs about the nature
of the German threat and the most effective means to counter it, the behavior of the
British Government changed in response to German and Italian expansion. However,
before we present this analysis, it is necessary to address more briefly the first two
questions above. More nuanced historical accounts of British foreign policy argue that
the Chamberlain Government implemented a policy of appeasement with a dual strategy
of negotiations and rearmament. The rationale was to try and resolve German grievances
with negotiations while rearming in case these conciliatory efforts failed. When military
confrontations occurred between Britain and Germany, the strategic objective was to
“keep Germany guessing” about whether a German use of force over issues with
Czechoslovakia and Poland would result in a war with Britain. The accompanying
critique of Chamberlain’s leadership revolved around his inability to keep this strategy on
course and his tilt toward negotiations over military moves even after conciliatory
2
gestures were not reciprocated by Germany (Middlemas 1972; Colvin 1971; Parker
1993; Finney 1997).
How Much Did Britain Persist?
Crisis research by political scientists indicates that Britain implemented a “trial
and error” strategy toward Germany during the 1938 Sudeten crisis, trying to gain a
German cooperative response either to escalatory or de-escalatory initiatives. Hitler
pursued a bully strategy toward Czechoslovakia, characterized by escalating demands for
more concessions; however, his strategy toward Britain was a reciprocity strategy in
which he responded in kind to British cooperative and conflictual initiatives. Leng’s
(1993) careful analysis of within-crisis exchanges by the rival powers leads him to
conclude that Hitler’s tough demands on Czechoslovakia, backed up by a willingness to
use force and coupled with a readiness to respond positively to appeasing moves by other
major powers, produced a diplomatic victory for Germany at the Munich conference in
the form of submission to his demands by the other powers.
In the crisis over Danzig approximately a year later, Germany pursued a bully
strategy toward Poland while Warsaw “stood firm” but did not match German escalation.
Britain pursued a reciprocity strategy rather than a trial-and-error approach. Leng (1993)
notes that a reciprocity strategy is the most effective counter to a bully strategy, but the
combination often results in a pattern of mutual escalation. This dynamic can lead to war
if the bullying party does not respond to cooperative initiatives by the reciprocating party.
In this case it led to the outbreak of World War II.
Leng also points out that Britain’s reciprocity strategy was flawed and erratic in
several respects. British cooperative initiatives tended to be preceded by a conflictual
move, but the cooperative move then took the form of a unilateral concession without
coercive accompaniment. The effect was a form of bullying that seemed like bluffing.
The British also inconsistently applied the reciprocity strategy by deviating both from a
“tit-for-tat” norm and from the pattern of responses by other states who pursued a
reciprocity strategy in Leng’s sample of crises. They matched German threats to use
force about 40% of the time, under-responded about 40% of the time, and over-responded
about 20% of the time compared to the crisis sample’s average responses of 38%, 52%,
and 10%. When no threat of force was involved, Britain adopted a matching response
and matched immediately any kind of positive initiative by Germany.
Other crisis analyses support Leng’s findings regarding Britain’s cooperative,
then somewhat erratic, pattern of crisis management, respectively, across the two crises.
In their inventory of 20th century crises, Brecher, et al (1988) code British strategy as
“negotiation” during the Sudeten crisis and a “multiple not violent” strategy during the
Danzig crisis. Their data set does not include a breakdown of within-crisis exchanges
between parties to the crises. Walker, et al (1984) do calculate the mode and mean levels
of intensity for British behavior during the two crises. They report that Britain pursued
“defensive verbal cooperation” consistent with an appeasement strategy during the
Sudeten crisis. The British shifted toward “offensive verbal conflict” in the Polish crisis,
which made them slightly more coercive than Germany in the previous Sudeten crisis.
However, Germany also shifted during the Polish crisis to a level of verbal and physical
3
conflict behavior that was significantly more intense than German behavior in the
previous crisis and British behavior in either crisis.
When Did Britain’s Strategy Shift?
Between these two crises Germany annexed the remainder of Czechoslovakia in
March, 1939, provoking Britain to issue a military guarantee of Polish independence.
While this move represented a shift in British strategy, it did not signal the abandonment
of appeasement. Even though public opinion no longer favored appeasement and British
rearmament increased dramatically in 1939, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
continued to work toward a peaceful settlement of the issues between Germany and
Poland that led to the crisis in August 1939. This persistence and the failure to make an
alliance with Russia against Germany during the summer of 1939 has led historians full
circle to a critical assessment of Chamberlain’s leadership as the main cause of British
persistence in the face of negative feedback (Finney 1997).
In this evolution, there are three waves of scholarship that address British foreign
policy prior to World War II. The first wave faults British leadership as naïve about
Hitler and the threat he posed to European peace and stability. A second wave offers a
revisionist account, which shows the British Cabinet to be fully informed about Hitler’s
dangerous personality but constrained by domestic economic problems, a public that did
not want war over Germany’s legitimate grievances regarding the Versailles Treaty, and
imperial responsibilities as a global power engaged in regional conflicts outside Europe.
A third wave makes a counter-revisionist argument that all of these constraints held only
through the Munich crisis. In its aftermath, public and elite opinion shifted away from
appeasement, leaving only Chamberlain as a true believer. He rearmed reluctantly, was
pessimistic about alliance prospects with Russia and the United States, and attempted to
find a way not to honor the military guarantee to Poland even after Germany attacked in
September, 1939 (Finney 1997).
Why Didn’t Britain Learn More and Sooner?
This latest turn in British historiography leads us to focus on our third question
about the learning curve of British leaders between 1937 and 1939. There are three
obstacles to British learning invoked in recent analyses. First, there is the inertia
problem of replacing appeasement as a doctrine in British strategic culture. Even after its
usefulness declined, it remained as a paradigm for strategic thinking within British
diplomatic and military circles (Kupchan 1994). Second, there is the configuration of
British political institutional norms, which permitted “Prime Minister’s Rule” in the area
of foreign policy (Middlemas 1972; Colvin 1971). Even though the British Cabinet was
the ultimate decision unit in the British Government, subject to a vote of confidence by
the House of Commons, Neville Chamberlain shaped British foreign policy within the
Cabinet and presided over a passive Conservative Party majority in parliament between
1937 and 1939 (Walker and Watson 1989, 1992, 1994; Parker 1993). Third, there is the
contribution of the Prime Minister’s personality, which accounts for the direction and
style of his political leadership. He has been vilified by Churchill (1948) as lacking “all
sense of proportion and even of self-preservation” and possessing a “limited outlook and
inexperience of the European scene” (cited in Parker 1993, p. 10).
4
This first-wave assessment of Chamberlain as naïve has been questioned by
second-wave scholars, who show that he was more well-informed and experienced in
foreign affairs than his early critics acknowledged (Finney 1997). He was actually a key
player in the MacDonald and Baldwin Cabinets in the early 1930s across a variety of
issues including foreign and defense policy (Parker 1993). Rather than simple ignorance
or stupidity, Chamberlain’s personality flaws were an inflated sense of political efficacy,
a misplaced optimism, and an inflexible belief in the viability of appeasement. These
beliefs and stylistic predilections were given the opportunity to influence British policy
by institutional and cultural variables and an ambiguous strategic environment. In the
end, however, Chamberlain’s personality appears indispensable in explaining why Britain
persisted so long with an appeasement strategy in the face of negative feedback.
Parker (1993, p. 11) is most explicit about this judgment, contrasting the role of
the Prime Minister before and after the settlement at Munich. “Until 1938 British policy
towards Germany was dictated by the belief among the majority of the British public that
Germany had real grievances….reinforced by consciousness of British military
inadequacies. At that time Chamberlain expressed and formed part of a consensus in
foreign policy.” However, the debate in Parliament following the Munich agreement and
the initiatives that the Prime Minister took subsequently toward general appeasement
with Germany and Italy demarcated an increasing gap between the British leader and his
followers:
After Munich he attempted, tenaciously, but with varying degrees of
concealment from increasingly disillusioned colleagues and from worried
public opinion, to renew and extend his supposed success. He persisted
even after the German occupation of Prague in March 1939. Whenever he
was free to choose he opted for conciliation rather than confrontation
towards Germany. It seemed impossible for him to think himself
mistaken. No one can know what would have happened in Europe if Mr.
Chamberlain had been more flexible or if someone else had taken charge,
but it is hard to imagine that any other foreign policy could have had a
more disastrous outcome (Parker 1993 p. 11).
OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS AND LEARNING DYNAMICS
The counter-revisionist account of British persistence in the face of negative
feedback suggests that Chamberlain’s operational code provides the most satisfying
explanation to the puzzle of appeasement at least during the final year leading up to
World War II. The operational code construct is a complex set of elements defined
initially by Leites (1951, 1953) as the conceptions of political strategy in Bolshevik
ideology, which reflect motivated biases in Lenin’s character and Russian political
culture. George (1969) recommended that a leader’s conceptions of political strategy be
identified as a political belief system in which some elements (philosophical beliefs)
guide the diagnosis of the context for action and others (instrumental beliefs) prescribe
the most effective strategy and tactics for achieving goals. The focus on beliefs places
operational code analysis within the general cognitivist research program in world
politics that is a part of the trans-discipline of political psychology (Tetlock 1998). The
general puzzle addressed in this literature is the explanation of foreign policy decisions.
5
[Figure 1 Here]
Alexander George (1969) and Ole Holsti (1977) argued that a focus limited to
cognition rather than character was the most promising application of operational code
analysis. They assumed that a leader’s operational code was a system of beliefs that were
hierarchically organized, interdependent, and relatively stable. George (see Figure 1)
formulated a set of research questions to identify the organization and contents of
different belief systems, and Holsti (see Figure 2) created a typology of belief systems
based on these questions. According to cognitive consistency theory, the elements in
these belief systems should be (1) internally consistent with one another and (2)
externally consistent with the leader’s behavior (Festinger 1957; Rokeach 1960, 1968;
Converse 1964).
[Figure 2 Here]
The evolution of operational code theory has oscillated from a focus on images of
other to images of self and then ultimately to a dual focus on self and other as boundaries
of a leader’s foreign policy decisions. Both the initial formulation of the operational code
construct by George (1969, 1979) and the operational code typology by Holsti (1977)
focused on images of other rather than self and cognition rather than affect as the key
dimensions of belief systems. A re-analysis of the Holsti operational code typology by
Walker (1983) redirected attention to self-images and affect in the form of motivational
biases, which was consistent with Leites (1951, 1953) prototypical study of the
Bolsheviks. The elements of a leader’s belief system are also subdivided into different
domains by target and issue area, which form different types of belief systems (A, B, C,
DEF) or schemata, and represent different “states of mind” for the same leader as well as
differentiate between leaders (Walker 1995; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998).
Ultimately, self and other images can be paired into sets of role and counter-role
identities that prescribe behavior for self and other in the form of strategies specified in
Figure 2 as different preference orderings for the political outcomes of settlement,
domination, submission, and deadlock (Walker 2000a, 2000b; Schafer and Walker 2001).
The applicability of operational code analysis has evolved over the years from a
focus on (1) negotiation styles to (2) foreign policy decisions to (3) crisis bargaining to
(4) strategic interaction in world politics. The utility of operational code analysis is for
describing a leader’s propensities for (a) diagnosing the political universe and the
possibilities for effective political action, (b) choosing among different strategies, tactics,
and moves, and (c) shifting between them over time or across issue domains. Applied
over time, it is also possible to detect changes in a leader’s operational code beliefs.
[Tables 1 and 2 Here]
We can plot a leader’s location over time in Figure 2 with indices of key beliefs
retrieved and calculated by the Verbs In Context System (VICS) for identifying the
elements of the operational code construct. The indices and the procedures for retrieving
and coding elements of a leader’s operational code are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. In
analyzing the operational codes of British leaders, we shall employ an automated content
analysis program called Profiler+ to retrieve the transitive verbs from each leader’s public
6
statements, code them with the aid of an operational code dictionary developed by Robert
Wyach and Mark Schafer, and calculate the index for each element of the leader’s
operational code (Young 2001; Schafer and Walker 2001). The same leader may move
within and across the quadrants of the Holsti typology in Figure 2, a dynamic that we
shall argue below indicates “learning” by the leader.
LEVELS OF LEARNING
The hypotheses that we advance to explain the pattern of British decisions are
learning hypotheses. By learning, we mean changes in the beliefs of British leaders,
which guide British foreign policy decisions toward Germany. These changes may take
the form of strengthening, weakening, or transforming a leader’s existing beliefs about
the nature of the political universe and the strategies and tactics for effective political
action. Changes in operational code beliefs may indicate three levels of experiential
learning: simple learning in the form of changes in instrumental beliefs about the means
of political action, diagnostic learning in the form of changes in philosophical beliefs
about the political universe, and complex learning in the form of emergent changes in
beliefs about goals and the nature of the relationship between self and others in the
political universe. Here we follow distinctions in levels of learning made by Levy (1994)
Tetlock (1991), Nye (1989), and Leng (2000).
We also follow Levy (1994) in defining these levels of learning as experiential
learning, i.e., as changes in beliefs rather than changes in behavior. In this definition of
learning, changes in behavior may follow from changes in beliefs, but behavioral change
by itself does not indicate learning. The latter change could reflect a leader’s adaptation
to changing circumstances (structural adaptation) or simply a reaction to a stimulus
(social learning) without a corresponding change in important beliefs (Levy 1994).
This distinction is important in order to assess whether the shift in British strategy
was simply structural adaptation, due to a significant increase in British air power by the
summer of 1939, or just behavioral adaptation due to social learning following the
German takeover of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939. As British rearmament gained
momentum, Britain was able to take a harder line toward German ambitions and
adventures in Eastern Europe. This line of argument assumes that Chamberlain and
Halifax were not naïve about the nature of the threat posed by Hitler and were simply
constrained by resources in their responses to the German challenge prior to 1939. On
the other hand, if British leaders remained myopic about the German threat, it is possible
that the British guarantee of Poland in response to the Czech coup was simply social
learning and did not represent a shift in their beliefs. Under either set of assumptions,
experiential learning (altered beliefs) does not explain the British military guarantee to
Poland in the spring of 1939. Continuity in British beliefs may explain British attempts
to seek a peaceful settlement with Germany right up to the outbreak of World War II.
The counter-revisionist interpretation of British foreign policy emphasizes that
Chamberlain was reluctant to abandon appeasement as a strategy and remained optimistic
about the prospects for peace even after the German invasion of Poland (Parker 1993).
Consequently, in our research design for this paper we assign a pivotal role to
beliefs and examine a sample manifested by British leaders and inferred from the public
7
records of British statements between 1937 and 1939. The sample includes statements
before the British Parliament by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his two Foreign
Secretaries (Eden and Halifax). Lord Halifax became Foreign Secretary in February
1938 after a dispute over the wisdom of appeasing Italy occurred between the Prime
Minister and Anthony Eden. The roster of statements appears in Appendix 1 along with
the sources for the texts. They are grouped into several time periods to reflect our
interest in detecting changes in British operational code beliefs following key events
leading up to the onset of World War II (see Figure 3).
[Figure 3 Here]
Period I begins with Chamberlain’s accession to the post of Prime Minister in the
spring of 1937 and ends with the Anschluss (German annexation of Austria) in March
1938. During this first period Eden’s resignation occurs in February 1938, followed by
Halifax’s appointment as Foreign Secretary. We will compare British philosophical and
instrumental beliefs in Period I with the operational codes of Chamberlain and Halifax
following the Anschluss (Period II). We will make a second set of comparisons between
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary before (Period III) and after (Period IV) the
crisis over German occupation of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia in October
1938. In a final series of comparisons, we will search for significant differences in their
operational code beliefs before and after Germany annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia in
March 1939 (Periods IV and V),. We shall conclude by comparing British beliefs in the
subsequent months leading up to the German invasion of Poland in September 1939
(Period VI) with the days immediately following the German attack (Period VII).
Most historians agree that British policy changed from appeasement to at least a
weak form of deterrence toward Germany after the conquest of Czechoslovakia and the
ensuing British guarantee of Poland in March 1939. Therefore, our two main hypotheses
are that if experiential learning is related to British foreign policy, then:
H1:
British operational code beliefs should not experience a significant change
prior to March 1939.
H2:
British operational code beliefs should experience a significant change
after March 1939.
These hypotheses do not rule out less dramatic changes in British beliefs in the form of
patterns of re-enforcement or qualification (increases or decreases in intensity) either
before or after March 1939. Nor do they specify the level of learning at which the
changes in the beliefs occur. It is possible that the level of learning is:
•
at the instrumental level of simple learning (how to deal with Hitler);
•
at the philosophical level of diagnostic learning (what the German
threat is);
•
an interaction of changes in instrumental and philosophical beliefs
resulting in complex learning (redefining goals and the nature of the
strategic relationship between Britain and Germany).
8
The solution to our basic research puzzle, why did Britain persist in a strategy of
appeasement, lies in making these comparisons. It is possible that the initial pattern of
persistence is at least partly a misnomer. There may be significant changes in British
beliefs prior to the turning point in Anglo-German relations demarcated in the two main
hypotheses. It is also possible that the change in behavior following the annexation of
Czechoslovakia was not the result of learning. Perhaps British operational code beliefs
persisted and undermined the credibility of the Polish guarantee. We shall explore these
questions along with testing our two main hypotheses in the following operational code
analysis of British leaders.
THE OPERATIONAL CODES OF BRITISH LEADERS
When Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister in the spring of 1937, the
British Government had already experienced tensions with all three Axis powers. The
Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria and northern China between 1931 and 1934 had
threatened British imperial interests in the Far East, and the outbreak of the ItaloAbyssinian conflict in 1935 had created tensions between Italy and Britain. While
Britain and France were distracted by the latter conflict, the German occupation of the
Rhineland caused Anglo-German relations to deteriorate in March 1936. Finally, the
outbreak of the Spanish Civil in July 1936 would further strain British relations with both
Italy and Germany.
The new Prime Minister soon decided on a general strategy of active appeasement
to reach a resolution of the conflicts between Britain and the two fascist states in Europe
and the Mediterranean. Since the issues in these conflicts did not directly involve British
possessions, the British priority was to resolve them peacefully without taking a firm
position on the terms of settlement. Chamberlain was mainly interested that the disputes
be resolved through negotiation instead of force. This posture also governed the British
approach to subsequent problems with the Axis powers between 1937 and the outbreak of
World War II in 1939. The Chamberlain Government was reluctant to escalate a conflict
and, when pushed, only pursued a radical escalation strategy when British possessions
were at stake (Walker 1980).
Chamberlain and Eden (Period I)
The bias toward a strategy of appeasement is reflected in Prime Minister
Chamberlain’s operational code. Subsequent changes in his beliefs about the nature of
the political universe and the most effective means of managing and resolving conflict
are also consistent with this bias. Chamberlain’s operational code for the first nine
months in office is summarized in Table 3, which also shows the operational code of
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden during this period. A comparison of the two leaders is
instructive for two reasons. First, the profile of Chamberlain provides a base line to
assess his subsequent learning patterns at different levels. Second, the profile of Eden
offers an opportunity to assess the differences between the two men that led to Eden’s
resignation as Foreign Secretary in February 1938.
9
[Table 3 Here]
A comparison of the operational codes in Table 3 for the two leaders reveals that
they differ significantly on the nature of the political universe (P-1), optimism regarding
the realization of fundamental political values (P-2), and the predictability of the political
future (P-3), and the role of chance (P-5). They did share similar beliefs regarding the
degree of control over historical development (P-4). Their approaches to strategy (I-1)
and tactical intensity (I-2) are also similar. However, they differ significantly in their risk
orientations (I-3), plus in their propensities to shift between conflict and cooperation (I4a) and between words and deeds (I-4b). Finally, they differ significantly in their
propensities to exercise five of the six forms of power (I-5).
Do these differences in the operational codes of the two leaders matter? This
question addresses the historical interpretation of appeasement as a misguided strategy
adopted by some British leaders who were either naïve about the threat posed by Hitler or
too sympathetic with Germany’s revisionist aims in Eastern Europe. It raises also the
related issue of whether Eden was an appeaser or a leader who saw more clearly the dual
threat posed by Hitler and Mussolini and sounded the alarm through his resignation. To
address these research questions, it is necessary to normalize the operational code profiles
in Table 3 by comparing them to a reference group. The three continua in the sidebar
below provide this frame of reference by demarcating the means and a range of two
standard deviations for the key operational code indices (P-1, I-1, and P-4). They
represent the scores for each index at intervals of one-half standard deviation from the
mean in each direction for twenty world leaders in a variety of states and regions from
data collected and analyzed in previous studies by the authors.
More Conflict
Extreme
-.10
Very
-.01
More Conflict
Extreme
-.01
Very
+.10
Lower Control
Extreme
.22
Very
.27
* * * ** * * * * * * *
Nature of the Political Universe
Definitely
+.09
Somewhat
+.18
Mean
+.28
Somewhat
+.37
Strategic Approach to Goals
Definitely
+.20
Somewhat
+.30
Mean
+.41
Somewhat
+.51
More Cooperation
Definitely
+.47
More Cooperation
Definitely
+.61
Control Of Historical Development
Definitely
.31
Somewhat
.36
Mean
.41
Somewhat
.46
Very Extreme
+.56
+.66
Very Extreme
+.72
+.82
Higher Control
Definitely
.51
Very
.55
Extreme
.60
************
These normalization figures allow us to put the key operational code indices for
Chamberlain and Eden in a broader perspective. Chamberlain’s view of the political
universe (P-1 = .30) is very close to the mean for the reference group while Eden’s view
(P-1 = .16) is somewhat more conflictual. Chamberlain’s strategic orientation (I-1 = .40)
is virtually identical to the mean, and Eden’s strategic orientation (I-1 = .47) is somewhat
more cooperative. The third continuum in the sidebar shows the intervals for the control
of historical development index. Chamberlain (.45) and Eden (.47) are virtually
10
indistinguishable from each other and locate themselves as having a somewhat higher
degree of control than the average leader. Since the historical control index for Other is
the complement of the index for Self, each leader’s index for Other’s control is the same
distance from the mean (.41) as for Self but in the opposite direction on the continuum in
the sidebar. Other’s P-4 score is .37 in Chamberlain’s operational code and .35 in
Eden’s.
The predictions from their key operational code indices for each leader’s likely
strategy are represented in Figure 4 by locating a leader in the quadrants of the Holsti
typology with normalized VICS scores for the P-1, I-1, and P-4 indices. Chamberlain has
a mixed view of the political universe (P-1) and attributes a somewhat lower degree of
control over historical development (P-4b) to others, leading him to anticipate a mix of
Assure and Punish strategies from them. His strategic orientation (I-1) is close to the
mean for the reference group along with a somewhat higher locus of control score for self
(P-4a) predicts that he has a propensity to choose a mixture of Compel and Reward
strategies. Eden attributes a somewhat more conflictual orientation (P-1) along with a
lower degree of control over historical development (P-4b) to others, which causes him to
expect a Punish strategy from them. His somewhat cooperative strategic orientations (I1) plus a somewhat higher locus of control attributed to self (P-4b) incline him toward a
Reward strategy.
[Figure 4 Here]
While the strategic orientations of both leaders partly overlap, their differences
regarding the strategic orientation of others suggest that Eden may be less optimistic than
Chamberlain. He should be less inclined to expect others to cooperate in response to a
cooperative initiative from Britain. This expectation is consistent with the significant
difference in Table 3 for their beliefs about the prospects for realizing fundamental
political values (P-2). It is also consistent with the issues in the dispute between the two
leaders that ended with Eden’s resignation. Eden was less optimistic about the prospects
for Anglo-Italian cooperation while Chamberlain was more sanguine. When the Foreign
Secretary pressed Chamberlain to insist on Italian reciprocation to British diplomatic
initiatives before making further cooperative overtures, the Prime Minister refused and
Eden resigned (Eden 1962).
Chamberlain and Halifax (Period II)
When Lord Halifax replaced Eden, his appointment coincided closely with the
German annexation of Austria. He also came to the role of Foreign Secretary in the
aftermath of Eden’s resignation speech before the House of Commons in which he had
outlined his differences with Chamberlain. Consequently, he was probably under cross
pressures to acknowledge the most recent aggressive actions by Germany and also to be
careful to align his views with the Prime Minister who had appointed him. It is also
possible that Chamberlain’s operational code had changed following the Anschluss,
which suggests that a pair of comparisons first between the beliefs of Chamberlain and
Halifax and then between Chamberlain’s beliefs before and after the German occupation
of Austria should be done.
11
[Table 4 Here]
These results appear in Table 4. They show that Chamberlain’s philosophical
beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the prospects for realizing
fundamental political values actually became more cooperative and more optimistic
following the Anschluss. These changes were accompanied by a decrease in the Prime
Minister’s beliefs in the predictability of the political future and his ability to control
historical developments, plus an increase in the role of chance. However, his
instrumental beliefs about strategy, tactics, the calculation and control of risk, and the
timing of action did not change significantly. The only changes in instrumental beliefs
were an increase in the propensity to use rewards and a decrease in the propensity to use
punishments accompanied by a decreased belief in the use of promises and an increased
belief in the use of threats. This profile indicates that both diagnostic and simple learning
occurred following the Anschluss. Chamberlain’s cooperative diagnosis of the political
universe and optimism about political outcomes were re-enforced and accompanied by an
increased propensity to use rewards in the exercise of political power.
Halifax’s operational code appears both to re-enforce and complement his Prime
Minister’s beliefs. There are no significant differences in their views of the political
universe and the prospects for realizing political values. However, his beliefs in the
predictability of the political future and the ability to control historical developments are
significantly lower, plus the role of chance increases. The new Foreign Secretary is also
significantly different in his strategic and tactical orientations. He is less inclined to
reward or promise and more inclined to resist or punish others. His propensity to shift
between conflict and. cooperation is greater, and he is less likely to shift between words
and deeds.
[Figure 5 Here]
The strategic implications of these scores appear in Figure 5. They show that
Chamberlain’s definition of the relationship between self and others changed following
the Anschluss. He now predicts a Reward strategy by others and prefers a mix of Assure
and Punish strategies for self, reflecting a shift in the locus of control over historical
development toward others and away from self. Lord Halifax’s operational code predicts
a Reward strategy by others, and he has a weak propensity to choose a Punish strategy.
This somewhat schizophrenic combination of diagnostic and choice propensities may
reflect the cross-pressures that he experienced as Eden’s successor and Chamberlain’s
lieutenant.
Chamberlain and Halifax (Period III and IV)
Neville Chamberlain’s operational code did not change significantly between the
end of the Anschluss episode (Period II) and the onset of the confrontation over German
demands to annex the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia (Period III). This crisis in
Period III led to a series of meetings with Hitler and ended with an agreement brokered
by Mussolini at Munich. In his public statements following the crisis (Period IV), the
Prime Minister’s view of the political universe (P-1) was significantly less cooperative
12
than before the crisis (Period III). The predictability of the political future (P-3) was
significantly lower, and the role of chance(P-5) increased (see Table 5).
[Table 5 Here]
In the aftermath of the Munich settlement, Chamberlain also showed a significant
decrease in his propensity to choose rewards (I-5a) or promises (I-5b) in the exercise of
power while the utility of positive appeals (I-5c) significantly increased. Expressions of
opposition (I-5d) decreased while the propensity to use threats (I-5e) significantly
increased. However, these changes in Table 5 were not accompanied by significant
changes either in the Prime Minister’s strategic orientation (I-1) or in his assessment of
the locus of control between self and others (P-4).
Prior to the Sudetenland crisis (Period III), Lord Halifax showed a significant
increase in his assessment of the cooperative nature of the political universe (P-1) and in
his optimism regarding the realization of political values (P-2) (see Table 6). His belief
in the predictability of the political future (P-3) increased, and the role of chance (P-5)
significantly decreased. He also increased his cooperative strategic (I-1) and tactical (I-2)
orientations and became more risk-acceptant (I-3) with a lower propensity to shift
between cooperation and conflict. His propensity to choose rewards (I-5a) and appeals
(I-5c) increased while his propensity to choose promises (I-5b), threats (I-5d), and
punishments (I-5f) significantly decreased.
[Table 6 Here]
Halifax was more optimistic than Chamberlain in Period III and viewed the
political universe as significantly more cooperative prior to the Sudetenland crisis (see
Table 6). However, his belief in the predictability of the political future and the ability to
control historical development was lower, accompanied by a stronger belief in the role of
chance The Foreign Secretary’s strategic orientation was less cooperative than the Prime
Minister’s. He was also less risk-acceptant and showed a greater propensity to shift
between cooperation and conflict as well as between words and deeds. Their differences
also extended to beliefs about the utility of means: Halifax had weaker propensities to
use rewards, punishments, and statements of opposition, plus stronger propensities to use
appeals and threats.
[Figure 6 Here]
These differences define the relationship between self and others so that
Chamberlain’s operational code predicts a Reward strategy for others and stipulates an
Assure strategy for self prior to the Sudetenland crisis (see Figure 6). Halifax’s
operational code predicts the same strategy for others and assigns a weak Punish strategy
for self. Following the crisis, Chamberlain and Halifax defended a view of the political
universe characterized by others who pursue an Assurance strategy while attributing a
mix of Reward and Compel strategies to self (see Figure 6). The indices in Figure 6 from
statements coded in our data set for Chamberlain following the Munich conference also
reflected the views of Halifax, because both leaders delivered similar statements,
respectively, before the House of Commons and the House of Lords.
13
Chamberlain and Halifax (Periods IV and V)
When Germany occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, the
operational codes of Chamberlain and Halifax changed in a direction consistent with a
shift in British strategy from appeasement to a weak form of deterrence (Walker 1984;
Taylor 1961). The results in Table 7 show that Chamberlain’s cooperative view of the
political universe (P-1) decreased significantly along with his optimism regarding the
realization of political values (P-2) and the predictability of the political future (P-3).
However, his belief in the ability to control historical development (P-4) increased
significantly while the role of chance (P-5) decreased.
[Table 7 Here]
The Prime Minister’s strategic orientation (I-1) also shifted downward to a less
cooperative level (I-1), and he showed a significant decrease in risk acceptance (I-3).
The intensity of his propensity to use cooperative tactics increased (I-2), but he increased
his propensity to shift between cooperation and conflict (I-4a) and between words and
deeds (I-4b). He was more inclined to use rewards (I-5a) and promises (I-5b), though
less likely to use appeals (I-5c). He became more disposed to employ statements of
opposition and resistance (I-5d) but less likely to use threats (P-5e).
Halifax’s operational code in Period V following the occupation of
Czechoslovakia was similar to Chamberlain’s, though there were some differences of
degree and emphasis (see Table 7). The Foreign Secretary was less optimistic and
viewed the political future as less predictable, plus he assessed the ability to control
historical development as lower and the role of chance as higher. He was less
cooperative at the tactical level of decision, less inclined to reward and more disposed
than Chamberlain to punish. He was more disposed to use both promises and threats and
less likely to use statements of opposition or resistance.
The strategic implications of these changes were significant (See Figure 7).
Chamberlain shifted from a prediction of Assure to a mix of Assure and Punish strategies
for others. Halifax predicted a Bully strategy for others. The significant difference
between the two leaders regarding the locus of control between self and other leads to
different strategic preferences for self. While both prefer a more conflictual strategy
toward others, Chamberlain’s beliefs prescribe a mixed strategy of Reward and Compel
while Halifax’s beliefs prescribe a Bluff strategy. The net effect is to prescribe a
strategy of weak coercive diplomacy in the wake of German aggression.
[Figure 7 Here]
According to Taylor (1961), this strategy was the worst one that Britain could
have chosen. Either a continuation of appeasement or a shift to a strong coercive
diplomacy would have sent Hitler an unmistakable signal about British intentions when
he began to escalate tensions between Germany and Poland in the summer of 1939. In
the period leading up to the German invasion of Poland, Chamberlain had no significant
change in philosophical beliefs (see Table 8). Halifax’s belief in the ability to predict the
political future and control historical development increased, and his belief in the role of
14
chance significantly decreased. Halifax also increased his strategic propensity for
cooperation (I-1) and decreased his propensity to shift between conflict and cooperation
(I-4a).
[Table 8 Here]
With the exceptions of decreasing their propensities to shift between words and
deeds and increasing their beliefs in the utility of positive appeals, the two British leaders
exhibited contradictory changes in their respective instrumental beliefs. Chamberlain’s
cooperative tactical intensity index significantly decreased at the same time that Halifax’s
increased. This pattern is reflected in the changes in their respective beliefs in the utility
of different means. Chamberlain’s propensity to use rewards decreased while Halifax’s
increased. The Prime Minister became more likely to use promises, but the Foreign
Secretary’s probability decreased. Whereas Halifax’s belief in the utility of statements of
opposition and resistance strengthened, Chamberlain’s belief weakened. Chamberlain’s
propensities to threaten and punish increased, but Halifax’s propensities decreased.
The strategic implications of the changes in their operational code beliefs appear
in Figure 8. They show that Chamberlain preferred a mixed strategy of Compel and
Reward and predicted an Assure strategy by others. Halifax predicts a mixed strategy of
Reward and Compel strategy by others and prescribes an Assure strategy for self. These
shifts in beliefs occurred within the context of the British military guarantee of Poland,
cemented by a Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the two states in August, 1939.
Overall, this pattern of mixed signals conforms to Taylor’s (1961) controversial critique
of the conduct of British foreign policy leading up to World War II.
[Figure 8 Here]
Once Germany attacked Poland, the operational codes of the two leaders diverged
in their responses (see Table 9). Chamberlain’s philosophical beliefs did not change
significantly except for a decrease in the predictability of the political future, and his
instrumental beliefs changed very little. He did become more risk- acceptant (I-3), and
he displayed a higher propensity to shift between words and deeds (I-4b). His propensity
to reward (I-5a) increased while his propensity to promise decreased. His propensities to
resist (I-5d) and threaten (I-5e) increased, but his propensity to punish (I-5f) significantly
decreased.
[Table 9]
In contrast, Halifax’s belief in the ability to control historical development
declined significantly, and his belief in the role of chance increased. Both his strategic
and tactical choice propensities shifted significantly in a conflictual direction. He also
became less risk-acceptant, changing to a very high propensity to shift between
cooperation and conflict as well as increasing his propensity to shift between words and
deeds. His propensities to use rewards, promises and positive appeals decreased while
his propensities to resist and punish virtually doubled.
[Figure 9 Here]
15
The strategic implications of these changes varied (see Figure 9). Chamberlain
continued with a mixed Compel/Reward strategy as the prescription for self while still
anticipating an Assure strategy by others. Halifax moved from an Assure to a Bluff
strategy for self and predicted a mixed strategy of Lead and Bully by others. The British
leaders entered into war with Germany reluctantly, therefore, and not without some
illusions about the prospects for settlement on the part of Chamberlain and the need for
resolve on the part of Halifax. While their beliefs altered in response to negative
feedback in the summer of 1939, the changes did not alter the course of British foreign
policy enough or in time to prevent the outbreak of World War II.
CONCLUSION
So what did British leaders learn and when did they learn it? Chamberlain and
Halifax displayed all three levels of learning, simple, diagnostic, and complex, in their
attempts to deal with the Axis powers between 1937 and 1939. Simple learning involved
adjusting the instrumental beliefs in their respective operational codes. It sometimes took
the form of strengthening existing beliefs while at other times these beliefs weakened.
Since most observers are critical of the British appeasement strategy, the latter form of
learning is more significant as it implies the undermining of existing cooperative beliefs
toward others shared by both leaders.
In fact, the instances of simple learning by Prime Minister Chamberlain divided
almost equally between strengthening and weakening his cooperative instrumental beliefs
(see Table 10). He was more inclined to strengthen his cooperative beliefs prior to
March, 1939 and became somewhat disposed to weaken these instrumental beliefs after
the occupation of Czechoslovakia (d = +.163). Lord Halifax displays the same simple
learning patterns, though the contrast between the two time periods in the main
hypotheses is slightly more pronounced (d = +.219). Chamberlain’s diagnostic beliefs
tended to strengthen (become more cooperative) before March, 1939 and shifted only
slightly afterward toward conflict (d = +.045) . In contrast, Halifax’s pattern of
diagnostic learning shifted more dramatically (d = +.386) from a pattern of strengthening
his cooperative beliefs to reversing them in the direction of conflict (see Table 10).
[Tables 10 Here]
The emergent patterns of complex learning (defining the relationship between self
and other) were insufficient to reverse Britain’s strategy strongly away from appeasement
and toward deterrence even after March, 1939 (see Table 11). The shift toward a conflict
orientation in the philosophical and instrumental and philosophical beliefs of the two
leaders in 1939 did not endure. Overall, the two leaders shared a more conflictual view
of the political universe only in March, 1939 (Period V). Chamberlain’s operational code
never did shift unequivocally into the conflict section of the continuum of strategies
attributed to self and other in Table 11. Halifax’s philosophical and instrumental beliefs
vacillated between conflict and cooperation between Periods V and VII. The net effect of
these complex learning patterns was to define the self and other relationship so that a
strategy of appeasement rather than deterrence persisted in the face of negative feedback.
[Table 11 Here]
16
If Britain persisted with a strategy of appeasement in response to negative
feedback, then why? Two theories offered by other contributors to this volume as general
explanations for persistence appear to be relevant in varying degrees. One is that
persistence continues until or unless a boundary error occurs. According to control
theory, behavioral adaptation within a system is likely to occur when feedback from
previous behavior violates an acceptable boundary, i.e., a “boundary error” occurs
requiring adjustment to close the gap between expected and discrepant feedback
(Vancouver 2001). Since British leaders set such an elastic boundary threshold in dealing
with German expansion in their own pursuit of a general settlement, a boundary error was
not detected unequivocally until March 1939. In response, Britain adapted its behavior
by issuing a military guarantee to Poland following the German violation of the boundary
set by the Munich agreement between Chamberlain and Hitler regarding Czechoslovakia.
A second explanation is that in order to shift strategically from appeasement to
deterrence, it is necessary for cognitive as well as behavioral adaptation to occur in
response to negative feedback. Control theory and cognitive behavioral theory agree that
it is more difficult for negative feedback to stimulate cognitive change than behavioral
change. Both theories applied to humans and organizations compare expected results with
the actual results of behavior identified by beliefs about the most appropriate way to
pursue and achieve goals. In order for significant, i.e., higher-order, behavioral
adaptation to occur—defined as a change in strategy—it is necessary for significant
cognitive change to occur. That is, experiential learning is a necessary condition for
strategic change because beliefs define the strategic direction of behavior in pursuit of a
goal (Vancouver 2001; Hermann and Billings 2001; Whyte and Fassina 2001). In this
account, Britain’s persistence in pursuit of an appeasement strategy toward Germany is
due to the persistence of beliefs in support of appeasement. There was an absence of
significant complex learning, which would alter the philosophical and instrumental
beliefs in the operational codes of Chamberlain and Halifax, even after Britain’s
armaments had increased, public opinion had shifted away from the support of
appeasement as a strategy, and Germany violated the Munich agreements.
Finally, why didn’t the operational codes of Chamberlain and Halifax change
significantly toward deterrence and away from appeasement as a strategy in response to
negative feedback? The theoretical explanation offered by Whyte and Fassina (2000) for
the escalation of commitment is that leaders with a strong sense of efficacy will persist in
response to negative feedback. A change in strategy depends upon the existence of two
contingent conditions: a weak sense of efficacy associated with the present strategy and a
strong sense of efficacy associated with an alternative strategy. In Chamberlain’s case,
his belief in the ability to control historical development (P-4) actually increased over
time. His average P-4 score was .41 pre-Munich (Periods I-III) and .46 post-Munich
(Periods IV-VI), falling to .39 only after the outbreak of World War II (Period VII). For
Halifax, the corresponding scores for P-4 were .33 (Periods II-III) and .29 (Periods VVI), falling to .28 once the war began (Period VII).
Chamberlain’s post-Munich sense of historical control was consistently higher
than the average (.41) for the norming group of political leaders in this analysis while
Halifax was lower than this average both before and after Munich. Chamberlain’s
elevated sense of historical control in the period after Munich is consistent with a leader
17
whose strong sense of efficacy leads him to persist in a strategy in spite of negative
feedback. While Halifax’s low sense of historical control indicates that one condition
necessary for change was present, it was not sufficient. He vacillated between Bluff and
Appease after Munich, a pattern consistent with a lack of personal efficacy regarding
either appeasement or deterrence.
This theoretical explanation is also consistent with the post-revisionist historical
explanation for why Chamberlain did not shift his cognitive and behavioral orientations
unequivocally away from appeasement and toward deterrence after Munich. Parker
(1993, p. 218) argues that in 1939, ““His policy was arrogant, not weak or timid….When
Chamberlain could choose between threatening combativeness and careful moderation
towards Germany, he chose the latter.” He later concludes (p. 347) that, “Led by
Chamberlain, the government rejected effective deterrence. Chamberlain’s powerful,
obstinate personality and his skill in debate probably stifled serious chances of preventing
the Second World War.” Ultimately, therefore, leaders matter in this case for explaining
why governments persist in response to negative feedback. As a leader with a strong
sense of historical control and an operational code oriented toward appeasement, Prime
Minister Chamberlain was the main cause of Britain’s persistence in pursuing a
settlement with Germany even after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March
1939 and a concomitant shift in British military capabilities and public support in favor of
a deterrence strategy.
18
Table 1. Indices for Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs
PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS
Elements
Index*
Interpretation
P-1.
NATURE OF THE POLITICAL
UNIVERSE (Image of Others)
%Positive minus %Negative
Transitive Other Attributions
+1.0 friendly to
-1.0 hostile
P-2.
REALIZATION OF POLITICAL
VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)
Mean Intensity of Transitive
Other Attributions divided by 3
+1.0 optimistic to
–1.0 pessimistic
P-3
POLITICAL FUTURE (Predictability of Others Tactics)
1 minus Index of Qualitative
Variation** for Other Attributions
1.0 predictable
to 0.0 uncertain
P-4.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
(Locus of Control)
Self Attributions divided by
[Self plus Other Attributions]
1.0 high to 0.0
low self control
P-5.
ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of
Control)
1 minus [Political Future x
Historical Development Index]
1.0 high role
to 0.0 low role
INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS
Elements
Index
Interpretation
I-1.
APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction
of Strategy)
%Positive minus %Negative
Transitive Self Attributions
+1.0 high cooperation to –1.0 high
conflict
I-2.
PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity
of Tactics)
Mean Intensity of Transitive
Self Attributions divided by 3
I-3.
RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of Tactics)
1 minus Index of Qualitative
Variation for Self Attributions
+1.0 high cooperation to –1.0 high
conflict
1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk
averse
I-4.
TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibilbility of Tactics)
1 minus Absolute Value [%X
minus %Y Self Attributions]
a. Coop v. Conf Tactics
b. Word v. Deed Tactics
Where X = Coop and Y = Conf
Where X = Word and Y = Deed
UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise
of Power)
Percentages for Exercise of
Power Categories a through f
a. Reward
b. Promise
c. Appeal/Support
d. Oppose/Resist
e. Threaten
f. Punish
a's frequency divided by total
b's frequency divided by total
c's frequency divided by total
d's frequency divided by total
e's frequency divided by total
f's frequency divided by total
I-5.
1.0 high to 0.0
low shift propensity
+1.0 very frequent
to 0.0 infrequent
*All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between –1.0 and +1.0.
P-2 and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998).
** “The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a
distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number
of cases] and the same number of variable classifications” (Watson and McGaw 1980: 88).
19
Table 2. Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS)
1. IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT AS
SELF
OR
OTHER
2. IDENTIFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS
PAST
PRESENT FUTURE
AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS
WORDS
DEEDS
POSITIVE (+) OR
NEGATIVE (-)
---------------------------------------------------APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1)
OPPOSE, RESIST (-1)
OR
OR
PROMISE BENEFITS (+2)
THREATEN COSTS (-2)
---------------------------------------------------REWARDS (+3)
PUNISHMENTS (-3)
3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS
DOMESTIC
OR
FOREIGN
4. IDENTIFY TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT
AN EXAMPLE
A quote taken from President Carter's January 4, 1980 address to the nation:
"Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign
nation of Afghanistan..."
1. Subject. The subject is "Massive Soviet military forces" which is coded as
other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.
2. Tense and Category. The verb phrase "have invaded" is in the past tense and
is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.
3. Domain. The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the
speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.
4. Target and Context. The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore,
the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: SovietAfghanistan-conflict-1979-88.
The complete data line for this statement is: other -3 foreign past Afghanistan
Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.
20
Table 3. Operational Codes of Chamberlain and Eden: Period I
Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs
Ch1
Ed1
Diff.
2SE**
P-1.
Nature of Political Universe
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.30
.16
.08*
.0846
P-2.
Realization of Political Values
(Optimism/Pessimism)
.14
.05
.09*
.0668
P-3.
Political Future
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
.11
.09
.02*
.0151
P-4
Historical Development
(Low Control/High Control)
.45
.47
.02
.0430
P-5
Role of Chance
(Small Role/Large Role
.95
.96
.01*
.0104
I-1.
Strategic Approach to Goals
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.40
.47
.07
.0930
I-2.
Intensity of Tactics
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.20
.23
.03
.0602
I-3.
Risk Orientation
(Averse/Acceptant)
.15
.18
.03*
.0328
I-4
Timing of Action
.60
.62
.53
.42
.07*
.20*
.0652
.0492
a. Conflict/Cooperation
b. Words/Deeds
I-5.
Utility of Means
a. Reward
.19
.15
.04* .0204
b. Promise
.05
.09
.04* .0124
c. Appeal/Support
.45
.50
.05* .0310
d. Oppose/Resist
.18
.18
.00
.0326
e. Threaten
.00
.02
.02* .0099
f. Punish
.12
.07
.05* .0234
_____________________________________________________________________
*Significant differences between indices at the p < .05 level (two-tailed) are asterisked.
** This coefficient is twice the standard error in a sample of twenty leaders from a
variety of states. If the difference between Chamberlain’s and Eden’s scores reaches this
error term, then the probability is p < .05 that the difference occurred by chance.
21
Table 4. Operational Codes of Chamberlain & Halifax: Period II
Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs
Ch1 Ch2
Diff.
Ha2
Diff.
2SE**
P-1.
Nature of Political Universe
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.30 .42
.12*
.46
.04
.0846
P-2.
Realization of Political Values .14 .25
(Optimism/Pessimism)
.11*
.21
.04
.0668
P-3.
Political Future
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
.11 .10
.01*
.14
.04*
.0154
P-4
Historical Development
(Low Control/High Control)
.45 .38
.07*
.33
.05*
.0430
P-5
Role of Chance
(Small Role/Large Role
.95 .96
.01*
.95
.01*
.0104
I-1.
Strategic Approach to Goals
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.40 .42
.02
.22
.20*
.0930
I-2.
Intensity of Tactics
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.20 .22
.02
.05
.17*
.0602
I-3.
Risk Orientation
(Averse/Acceptant)
.15 .17
.02
.17
.00
.0328
I-4
Timing of Action
.60 .58
.62 .63
.02
.01
.78
.58
.20*
.05*
.0652
.0492
a. Conflict/Cooperation
b. Words/Deeds
I-5.
Utility of Means
a. Reward
.19 .21
.02* .13
.08* .0204
b. Promise
.05 .03
.02* .01
.02* .0124
c. Appeal/Support
.45 .47
.02
.46
.01
.0310
d. Oppose/Resist
.18 .18
.00
.22
.04* .0326
e. Threaten
.00 .01
.01* .01
.00
.0099
f. Punish
.12 .10
.02* .16
.06* .0234
________________________________________________________________________
*Significant differences between indices at the p < .05 level (two-tailed) are asterisked.
** This coefficient is twice the standard error in a sample of twenty leaders from a
variety of states. If the difference between a pair of scores reaches this error term, then
the probability is p < .05 that the difference occurred by chance.
22
Table 5. Chamberlain’s Operational Code: Period III and Period IV
Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs
Ch3
Ch4
Diff.
2SE**
P-1.
Nature of Political Universe
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.52
.41
.11*
.0846
P-2.
Realization of Political Values
(Optimism/Pessimism)
.24
.22
.02
.0668
P-3.
Political Future
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
.15
.13
.02*
.0151
P-4
Historical Development
(Low Control/High Control)
.40
.42
.02
.0430
P-5
Role of Chance
(Small Role/Large Role
.94
.95
.01*
.0104
I-1.
Strategic Approach to Goals
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.46
.45
.01
.0930
I-2.
Intensity of Tactics
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.19
.13
.06*
.0602
I-3.
Risk Orientation
(Averse/Acceptant)
.25
.27
.02
.0328
I-4
Timing of Action
.54
.43
.55
.37
.01
.06*
.0652
.0492
a. Conflict/Cooperation
b. Words/Deeds
I-5.
Utility of Means
a. Reward
.12
.08
.04* .0204
b. Promise
.04
.05
.01* .0124
c. Appeal/Support
.57
.60
.03* .0310
d. Oppose/Resist
.17
.11
.06* .0326
e. Threaten
.01
.06
.05* .0099
f. Punish
.09
.10
.01
.0234
_____________________________________________________________________
*Significant differences between indices at the p < .05 level (two-tailed) are asterisked.
** This coefficient is twice the standard error in a sample of twenty leaders from a
variety of states. If the difference between a pair of scores reaches this error term, then
the probability is p < .05 that the difference occurred by chance.
23
Table 6. Operational Codes: Halifax & Chamberlain
Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs
Ha2
Ha3
Diff.
Ch3
Diff.
2SE**
P-1.
Nature of Political Universe
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.46
.68
.22*
.52
.16*
.0846
P-2.
Realization of Political Values
(Optimism/Pessimism)
.21
.37
.16*
.24
.13*
.0668
P-3.
Political Future
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
.14
.22
.08*
.15
.07*
.0151
P-4
Historical Development
(Low Control/High Control)
.33
.33
.00
.40
.08*
.0430
P-5
Role of Chance
(Small Role/Large Role
.95
.93
.02*
.94
.01*
.0104
I-1.
Strategic Approach to Goals
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.22
.33
.11*
.46
.13*
.0930
I-2.
Intensity of Tactics
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.05
.15
.10*
.19
.04
.0602
I-3.
Risk Orientation
(Averse/Acceptant)
.17
.21
.04*
.25
.04*
.0328
I-4
Timing of Action
.78
.58
.67
.56
.11*
.02
.54
.43
.13*
.13*
.0652
.0492
a. Conflict/Cooperation
b. Words/Deeds
I-5.
Utility of Means
a. Reward
.13
.17
.04* .12
.05* .0204
b. Promise
.01
.00
.01* .04
.04* .0124
c. Appeal/Support
.46
.50
.04* .57
.07* .0310
d. Oppose/Resist
.22
.22
.00
.17
.05* .0326
e. Threaten
.01
.00
.01* .01
.01* .0099
f. Punish
.16
.11
.05* .09
.02* .0234
________________________________________________________________________
*Significant differences between indices at the p < .05 level (two-tailed) are asterisked.
** This coefficient is twice the standard error in a sample of twenty leaders from a
variety of states. If the difference between a pair of scores reaches this error term, then
the probability is p < .05 that the difference occurred by chance.
24
Table 7. The Operational Codes of Chamberlain & Halifax: Periods IV and V
Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs
Ch4
Ch5
Diff. Ha5
Diff.
2SE**
P-1.
Nature of Political Universe
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.41
.27
.14* .20
.07
.0846
P-2.
Realization of Political Values
(Optimism/Pessimism)
.22
.16
.06* .10
.06*
.0668
P-3.
Political Future
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
.13
.08
.05* .05
.03*
.0151
P-4
Historical Development
(Low Control/High Control)
.42
.47
.05* .24
.23*
.0430
P-5
Role of Chance
(Small Role/Large Role
.95
.96
.01* .99
.03*
.0104
I-1.
Strategic Approach to Goals
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.45
.36
.09* .33
.03
.0930
I-2.
Intensity of Tactics
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.13
.20
.07* .09
.11*
.0602
I-3.
Risk Orientation
(Averse/Acceptant)
.27
.15
.12* .13
.02
.0328
I-4
Timing of Action
.55
.37
.64
.65
.11* .67
.28* .67
.03
.02
.0652
.0492
a. Conflict/Cooperation
b. Words/Deeds
I-5.
Utility of Means
a. Reward
.08 .22
.14* .15
.07* .0204
b. Promise
.05 .03
.02* .07
.04* .0124
c. Appeal/Support
.60 .44
.16* .45
.01
.0310
d. Oppose/Resist
.11 .19
.08* .10
.09* .0326
e. Threaten
.06 .02
.04* .05
.03* .0099
f. Punish
.10 .11
.01 .18
.07* .0234
________________________________________________________________________
*Significant differences between indices at the p < .05 level (two-tailed) are asterisked.
** This coefficient is twice the standard error in a sample of twenty leaders from a
variety of states. If the difference between a pair of scores reaches this error term, then
the probability is p < .05 that the difference occurred by chance.
25
Table 8. The Operational Codes of Chamberlain & Halifax: Periods V and VI
Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs
Ch5 Ch6
Diff. Ha5
Ha6
Diff.
2SE**
P-1.
Nature of Political Universe
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.27
.34
.07
.20
.26
.06
.0846
P-2.
Realization of Political Values
(Optimism/Pessimism)
.16
.20
.04
.10
.12
.02
.0668
P-3.
Political Future
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
.08
.08
.00
.05
.07
.02*
.0151
P-4
Historical Development
(Low Control/High Control)
.47
.46
.01
.24
.33
.09*
.0430
P-5
Role of Chance
(Small Role/Large Role
.96
.96
.00
.99
.98
.01*
.0104
I-1.
Strategic Approach to Goals
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.36
.39
.03
.33
.49
.16*
.0930
I-2.
Intensity of Tactics
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.20
.11
.09* .09
.23
.14*
.0602
I-3.
Risk Orientation
(Averse/Acceptant)
.15
.19
.04* .13
.25
.12*
.0328
I-4
Timing of Action
.64
.65
.61
.44
.03 .67
.21* .67
.51
.46
.16*
.19*
.0652
.0492
a. Conflict/Cooperation
b. Words/Deeds
I-5.
Utility of Means
a. Reward
.22 .08 .14* .15
.16
.01
.0204
b. Promise
.03 .08 .05* .07
.04
.03* .0124
c. Appeal/Support
.44 .53 .09* .45
.55
.10* .0310
d. Oppose/Resist
.19 .13 .06* .10
.18
.08* .0326
e. Threaten
.02 .04 .02* .05
.00
.05* .0099
f. Punish
.11 .14 .03* .18
.07
.11* .0234
________________________________________________________________________
*Significant differences between indices at the p < .05 level (two-tailed) are asterisked.
** This coefficient is twice the standard error in a sample of twenty leaders from a
variety of states. If the difference between a pair of scores reaches this error term, then
the probability is p < .05 that the difference occurred by chance.
26
Table 9. The Operational Codes of Chamberlain & Halifax: Periods VI & VII
Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs
Ch6 Ch7
Diff. Ha6
Ha7
Diff.
2SE**
P-1.
Nature of Political Universe
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.34
.39
.05 .26
.31
.05
.0846
P-2.
Realization of Political Values
(Optimism/Pessimism)
.20
.21
.01 .12
.12
.00
.0668
P-3.
Political Future
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
.08
.10
.02* .07
.12
.05*
.0151
P-4
Historical Development
(Low Control/High Control)
.46
.43
.03 .33
.28
.05*
.0430
P-5
Role of Chance
(Small Role/Large Role
.96
.96
.00 .98
.97
.01*
.0104
I-1.
Strategic Approach to Goals
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.39
.38
.01 .49
.05
.44*
.0930
I-2.
Intensity of Tactics
(Conflict/Cooperation)
.11
.14
.03 .23
-.02
.25*
.0602
I-3.
Risk Orientation
(Averse/Acceptant)
.19
.23
.04* .25
.18
.07*
.0328
I-4
Timing of Action
.61
.44
.62
.52
.01 .51
.08* .46
.95
.53
.44*
.07*
.0652
.0492
a. Conflict/Cooperation
b. Words/Deeds
I-5.
Utility of Means
a. Reward
.08 .15
.07* .16
.11
.05* .0204
b. Promise
.08 .00
.08* .04
.00
.04* .0124
c. Appeal/Support
.53 .55
.02 .55
.42
.13* .0310
d. Oppose/Resist
.13 .17
.04* .18
.32
.14* .0326
e. Threaten
.04 .03
.01* .00
.00
.00
.0099
f. Punish
.14 .11
.03* .07
.16
.09* .0234
________________________________________________________________________
*Significant differences between indices at the p < .05 level (two-tailed) are asterisked.
** This coefficient is twice the standard error in a sample of twenty leaders from a
variety of states. If the difference between a pair of scores reaches this error term, then
the probability is p < .05 that the difference occurred by chance.
27
Table 10. Evidence of Simple and Diagnostic Learning by British Leaders
SIMPLE LEARNING*
Chamberlain
Halifax
Pre-Mar ’39 Post-Mar ’39
Pre-Mar ’39
Post-Mar ’39
Strengthen
(10)62.5%
(12)46.2%
Strengthen
(6)66.7%
(13)44.8%
Weaken
(6) 37.5%
(16)100%
(14)53.8%
(26)100%
Weaken
(3)33.3%
(9)100%
(16)55.2%
(29)100%
%diff = +.163
%diff = +.219
DIAGNOSTIC LEARNING**
Chamberlain
Pre-Mar ’39
Post-Mar ’39
Strengthen
(6) 54.5%
(3)50.0%
Weaken
(5) 45.5%
(11)100%
(3)50.0%
(6)100%
%diff = +.045
Halifax
Pre-Mar ’39
Post-Mar ’39
Strengthen
(3)75.0%
(4)36.4%
Weaken
(1)25.0%
(4)100%
(7)63.6%
(11)100%
%diff = +.386
_____________________________________________________________________
*Simple learning is defined as the number of times a significant change (p < .05)
occurred in the VICS index for a cooperative instrumental belief from one time
period to another across the seven periods in Figure 3. When the VICS index
increases (except for I-4a and I-4b), then it is counted as a strengthened belief.
When the VICS index decreases (except for I-4a and I-4b), then is counted as a
weakened belief. Changes in the I-4 indices are reverse-scored, because an
increase represents a weakening rather than a strengthening, and vice versa.
**Diagnostic learning is defined as the number of times a significant change (p <
.05) occurred in a cooperative philosophical belief from one time period to
another across the seven periods in Figure 3. When the VICS index increases,
then it is counted as a strengthened belief. When the VICS index decreases, then
it is counted as a weakened belief.
28
Table 11. Evidence of Complex Learning Across Periods by British Leaders*
CHAMBERLAIN: PERIODS 1-7
COOPERATION
Appease
1
2
Assure
Reward
Lead
MIXED
Bluff
O
O/S
3
4
S
O
5
6
7
O
O
S
S
O
S
S
O/S
Punish
Compel
Bully
CONFLICT
EDEN & HALIFAX: PERIODS 1-7**
COOPERATION
Appease
1
2
3
Assure
Reward
S
O
5
(O)
S
(S)
O
S
O
S
6
7
O
Lead
MIXED
Bluff
Punish
4
O
S
S
Compel
Bully
O
CONFLICT
__________________________________________________________________
* S = Self (Britain) and O = Other. The cells in the tables represent the type of
strategy pursued by S and predicted for O by the leader for each period in Figure
3 ordered by columns. The strategies are ordered in rows from most cooperative
to most conflictual and are taken from Figures 4-9. **Eden is in Period 1, Halifax
in Periods 2-7; no direct observation for Halifax in Period 4.
29
The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code
P-1.
What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political
universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the
fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
P-2.
What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s
fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must
one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or
the other?
P-3.
Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4.
How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical
development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history
in the desired direction?
P-5.
What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical
development?
The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code
I-1.
What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for
political action?
I-2.
How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3.
How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and
accepted?
I-4.
What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?
I-5.
What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s
interests?
Figure 1. George’s Ten Questions About Operational Code Beliefs
30
TYPE A
TYPE C
Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding
and miscommunication. A “conflict spiral,” based upon
misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger
of war. Opponents are often influenced by nonrational
conditions, but tend to respond in kind to conciliation and
firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader’s
ability and willingness to shape historical development.
The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is
possible. Establish goals within a framework that
emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that
control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly
when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.
Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state
system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source
of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a
variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature,
goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One
should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is
changed, because predictability and control over historical
development is low under anarchy. Establish optimal goals
vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue
shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather
than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities
arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible;
other resources than military capabilities are useful.
Preference Order: Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit
Preference Order: Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit
Preference Order: Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit
Preference Order: Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit
Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D);
nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power
disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may
vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short
run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power
equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over
historical development. Seek limited goals flexibly with
moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and
circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.
Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war.
Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is
relatively predictable, and control over
historical
development is possible. One should seek optimal goals
vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control
risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and
resource may be appropriate, including the use of force
when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risk.
TYPE DEF
TYPE B
Figure 2. Contents of the Revised Holsti Operational Code Typology*
*Instrumental beliefs are in bold, and philosophical beliefs are not.
31
PERIOD I. PRE-ANSCHLUSS (May, 1937-February, 1938)
Conflict in China and Spain
Conflict and Conversations with Italy and Germany
Eden’s Resignation
Anschluss Occurs
PERIOD II. POST-ANSCHLUSS (March-May, 1938)
Czechoslovakian Rearmament
Anglo-Italian Agreement
Recognition of Italian Empire
May Crisis Over Czechoslovakia
PERIOD III. PRE-MUNICH (May-September, 1938)
Britain Guarantees French Territorial Integrity
Runciman Mediation Mission
Chamberlain and Hitler Meet
Munich Agreement
PERIOD IV. POST-MUNICH (October, 1938-March, 1939)
Post-Munich Debate
General Appeasement
Break-up of Czechoslovakia
Occupation of Czechoslovakia
PERIOD V. POST-CZECHOSLOVAKIA (March-May, 1939)
British Military Guarantee for Poland
Italian Occupation of Albania
British Guarantee for Greece and Rumania
PERIOD VI. PRE-POLAND (June-August, 1939)
Britain Declares That It Will Resist Aggression
Anglo-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance
Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
Germany Invades Poland
PERIOD VII. POST-POLAND (September 1-7, 1939)
Britain Calls on Germany to Withdraw from Poland
Britain Delivers Ultimatum to Germany
Britain Declares War on Germany
Figure 3. Periods in British Foreign Policy, 1937-1939
32
P-1
Type A*
A-1
Type C***
A-2
C-1
I-1
C-2
+.66 Appease
Assure Extreme Reward
Lead
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.56
Very
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.47
Definitely
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.37
Somewhat
|
|
Ed (Self)
|
|
* (.47, .47)
|
Ch (Other) |
|
*(.37, .30) |
+.28------------------------------------------------------Mixed/Mean------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
* (.45, .40)
|
|
Ch (Self)
|
|
|
|
+.18
Ed (Other)
Somewhat
|
* (.34, .16)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.09
Definitely
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.01
Very
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-.10
Bluff
Punish
Extreme Compel
Bully
+.82
|
|
|
|
+.72
|
|
|
|
+.61
|
|
|
|
+.51
|
|
|
|
. 41
|
|
|
|
+.30
|
|
|
|
+.20
|
|
|
|
+10
|
|
|
|
-.01
.22----------27---------.31-------------.36------------------- .41-----------.46----------------.51-------------. 5 5 ------------- .60 P-4
Extreme Very
Definitely Somewhat
Mean
Somewhat
Definitely
Very
Extreme
DEF- 1
DEF-2
Type DEF**
B-1
B-2
Type B****
Figure 4. The Operational Codes of Chamberlain and Eden: Period I
*When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Appease Strategy (A-1): Settle >Submit >
Deadlock > Dominate. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Assure Strategy
(A-2): Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate.
** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Bluff Strategy (DEF-1): Dominate >Submit >
Settle > Deadlock. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Punish Strategy
(DEF-2): Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock.
***When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Reward Strategy (C-1): Settle >
Deadlock > Dominate > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Dominate
Strategy (C-2): Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit.
**** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Compel Strategy (B-1): Dominate >
Settle >Deadlock > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Bully Strategy (B2): Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.
33
P-1
Type A*
A-1
Type C***
A-2
C-1
I-1
C-2
+.66 Appease
Assure Extreme Reward
Lead
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.56
Very
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.47
Definitely
Ha-2 (Other)
|
|
* (.49, .46)
|
|
Ch-2 (Other)
|
|
*(.44, .42)
|
|
+.37
Somewhat
Ed (Self)
|
|
* (.47, .47)
|
|
|
Ch-1 (Other) C-2(Self) |
|
(.37, .30)* *(.38, .42) |
+.28------------------------------------------------------Mixed/Mean------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
* (.45, .40)
|
|
Ch-1 (Self)
|
|
|
|
+.18
Ed (Other)
Somewhat
|
* (.34, .16)
|
|
|
|
Ha-2 (Self)
|
|
*(.33, .22)
|
+.09
Definitely
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.01
Very
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-.10
Bluff
Punish
Extreme Compel
Bully
+.82
|
|
|
|
+.72
|
|
|
|
+.61
|
|
|
|
+.51
|
|
|
|
. 41
|
|
|
|
+.30
|
|
|
|
+.20
|
|
|
|
+10
|
|
|
|
-.01
.22----------27---------.31-------------.36------------------- .41-----------.46----------------.51-------------. 5 5 ------------- .60 P-4
Extreme Very
Definitely Somewhat
Mean
Somewhat
Definitely
Very
Extreme
DEF- 1
DEF-2
Type DEF**
B-1
B-2
Type B****
Figure 5. The Operational Codes of Chamberlain & Halifax: Period II
*When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Appease Strategy (A-1): Settle >Submit >
Deadlock > Dominate. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Assure Strategy
(A-2): Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate.
** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Bluff Strategy (DEF-1): Dominate >Submit >
Settle > Deadlock. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Punish Strategy
(DEF-2): Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock.
***When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Reward Strategy (C-1): Settle >
Deadlock > Dominate > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Dominate
Strategy (C-2): Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit.
**** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Compel Strategy (B-1): Dominate >
Settle >Deadlock > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Bully Strategy (B2): Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.
34
P-1
|
Type A*
A-1
Type C***
A-2
C-1
I-1
C-2
* (.49, .68)
+.66
Appease
Assure
Extreme
Reward Ha-3(Other)
Lead
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.56
Very
|
| Ch-3(Other)
|
| *(.42, .52)
|
|
|
|
+.47
Definitely
|
Ch-4(Other) |
|
(.40, .41)* |
|
|
|
|
+.37
Somewhat
|
Ch-3(Self) |
|
(.40,.46) * | Ch-4(Self)
|
| *(.42, .45)
|
|
+.28------------------------------------------------------Mixed/Mean------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
|
Ha-3 (Self)
|
|
*(.33, .33)
|
+.18
Somewhat
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.09
Definitely
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.01
Very
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-.10
Bluff
Punish
Extreme
Compel
Bully
|
+.82
|
|
|
|
+.72
|
|
|
|
+.61
|
|
|
|
+.51
|
|
|
|
. 41
|
|
|
|
+.30
|
|
|
|
+.20
|
|
|
|
+10
|
|
|
|
-.01
.22----------27---------.31-------------.36------------------- .41-----------.46----------------.51-------------. 5 5 ------------- .60 P-4
Extreme Very
Definitely Somewhat
Mean
Somewhat
Definitely
Very
Extreme
DEF- 1
DEF-2
Type DEF**
B-1
B-2
Type B****
Figure 6. The Operational Codes of Chamberlain & Halifax: Periods III & IV
*When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Appease Strategy (A-1): Settle >Submit >
Deadlock > Dominate. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Assure Strategy
(A-2): Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate.
** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Bluff Strategy (DEF-1): Dominate >Submit >
Settle > Deadlock. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Punish Strategy
(DEF-2): Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock.
***When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Reward Strategy (C-1): Settle >
Deadlock > Dominate > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Dominate
Strategy (C-2): Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit.
**** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Compel Strategy (B-1): Dominate >
Settle >Deadlock > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Bully Strategy (B2): Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.
35
P-1
Type A*
A-1
Type C***
A-2
C-1
I-1
C-2
+.66 Appease
Assure Extreme Reward
Lead +.82
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.56
Very
+.72
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.47
Definitely
+.61
|
Ch-4(Other |
|
|
(.40, .41)* |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.37
Somewhat
+.51
|
|
|
|
| Ch-4(Self)
|
|
| *(.42, .45)
|
|
|
|
+.28------------------------------------------------------Mixed/Mean------------------------------------------------------------+ . 4 1
|
*(.35, .27)
|
Ch-5(Self)
|
|
Ha-5(Self)
Ch-5(Other)
|
*(.47, .36)
|
| *(.24, 33)
|
Ha-5(Other) |
|
|
(.58, .20)* |
+.18
Somewhat
+.30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.09
Definitely
+.20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.01
Very
+10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-.10
Bluff
Punish
Extreme
Compel
Bully
-.01
.22----------27---------.31-------------.36------------------- .41-----------.46----------------.51-------------. 5 5 ------------- .60 P-4
Extreme Very
Definitely Somewhat
Mean
Somewhat
Definitely
Very
Extreme
DEF- 1
DEF-2
Type DEF**
B-1
B-2
Type B****
Figure 7. The Operational Codes of Chamberlain & Halifax: March, 1939
*When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Appease Strategy (A-1): Settle >Submit >
Deadlock > Dominate. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Assure Strategy
(A-2): Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate.
** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Bluff Strategy (DEF-1): Dominate >Submit >
Settle > Deadlock. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Punish Strategy
(DEF-2): Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock.
***When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Reward Strategy (C-1): Settle >
Deadlock > Dominate > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Dominate
Strategy (C-2): Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit.
**** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Compel Strategy (B-1): Dominate >
Settle >Deadlock > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Bully Strategy (B2): Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.
36
P-1
Type A*
A-1
Type C***
A-2
C-1
I-1
C-2
+.66 Appease
Assure Extreme Reward
Lead +.82
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.56
Very
+.72
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.47
Definitely
+.61
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.37
Ha-6(Self)
Somewhat
+.51
|
*(.33, .49)
Ch-6(Other)
|
|
|
*(.36, .34)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.28------------------------------------------------------Mixed/Mean------------------------------------------------------------+ . 4 1
|
*(.35, .27)
| Ch-6(Self) *(.46, .39) *(.49, .26)
|
|
Ha-5(Self)
Ch-5(Other)
|
*(.47, .36) Ha-6(Other)
|
|
*(.24, 33)
|
Ch-5(Self)
Ha-5(Other) |
|
|
(.58, .20)* |
+.18
Somewhat
+.30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.09
Definitely
+.20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.01
Very
+10
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-.10
Bluff
Punish
Extreme
Compel
Bully
-.01
.22----------27---------.31-------------.36------------------- .41-----------.46----------------.51-------------. 5 5 ------------- .60 P-4
Extreme Very
Definitely Somewhat
Mean
Somewhat
Definitely
Very
Extreme
DEF- 1
DEF-2
Type DEF**
B-1
B-2
Type B****
Figure 8. The Operational Codes of Chamberlain & Halifax: Periods V & VI
*When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Appease Strategy (A-1): Settle >Submit >
Deadlock > Dominate. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Assure Strategy
(A-2): Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate.
** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Bluff Strategy (DEF-1): Dominate >Submit >
Settle > Deadlock. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Punish Strategy
(DEF-2): Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock.
***When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Reward Strategy (C-1): Settle >
Deadlock > Dominate > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Dominate
Strategy (C-2): Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit.
**** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Compel Strategy (B-1): Dominate >
Settle >Deadlock > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Bully Strategy (B2): Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.
37
P-1
Type A*
A-1
Type C***
A-2
C-1
I-1
C-2
+.66 Appease
Assure Extreme Reward
Lead
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.56
Very
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.47
Definitely
|
|
|
|
|
Ch-7(Other) |
|
(.39, .39* |
+.37
Ha-6(Self)
Somewhat
|
*(.33, .49)
Ch-6(Other)
|
|
*(.36, .34)
|
|
|
Ha-7(Other)
|
|
*(.54, .31)
+.28------------------------------------------------------Mixed/Mean------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
*
*(.46, .39) *(.49, .26)
|
| (.43, .38) Ch-6(Self) Ha-6(Other)
|
|Ch-7(Self)
|
|
+.18
Somewhat
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+.09
Definitely
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.01
Very
|
|
|
Ha-7(Self)
|
|
*(.28, .05)
|
|
|
-.10
Bluff
Punish
Extreme Compel
Bully
+.82
|
|
|
|
+.72
|
|
|
|
+.61
|
|
|
|
+.51
|
|
|
|
. 41
|
|
|
|
+.30
|
|
|
|
+.20
|
|
|
|
+10
|
|
|
|
-.01
.22----------27---------.31-------------.36------------------- .41-----------.46----------------.51-------------. 5 5 ------------- .60 P-4
Extreme Very
Definitely Somewhat
Mean
Somewhat
Definitely
Very
Extreme
DEF- 1
DEF-2
Type DEF**
B-1
B-2
Type B****
Figure 9. The Operational Codes of Chamberlain & Halifax: Periods VI & VII
*When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Appease Strategy (A-1): Settle >Submit >
Deadlock > Dominate. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Assure Strategy
(A-2): Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate.
** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is less than .31, then Bluff Strategy (DEF-1): Dominate >Submit >
Settle > Deadlock. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .31 and .41, then Punish Strategy
(DEF-2): Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock.
***When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Reward Strategy (C-1): Settle >
Deadlock > Dominate > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Dominate
Strategy (C-2): Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit.
**** When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is between .41 and .51, then Compel Strategy (B-1): Dominate >
Settle >Deadlock > Submit. When P-4 Locus-of-Control Index is greater than .51, then Bully Strategy (B2): Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.
38
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42
Appendix 1. Sampling Procedure for Chamberlain & Halifax Statements
Here are the procedures for extracting the sample of public statements by British
leaders for coding with the VICS Profiler software. The sources are mainly three
compilations of public statements uttered by Chamberlain, Eden, and Halifax, the Prime
Minister and his two Foreign Secretaries. The samples are from Chamberlain, Neville
(1939) In Search of Peace. New York: Putnam & Sons; Eden, Anthony (1971) Foreign
Affairs. London: Faber & Faber; Craster, H.H.E., ed. (1940) Speeches on Foreign
Policy by Viscount Halifax. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press. Additional
statements were extracted for Period VI from Parliamentary Debates. House of
Commons Official Reports. London: H.M.S.O., 1937-43.
The speeches in the samples are all taken from either the House of Commons
(Chamberlain & Eden) or from the House of Lords (Halifax). Some are the texts of
official government statements read by Chamberlain and Halifax almost simultaneously
in the two Houses. In those cases, we have omitted one of the speeches from the sample.
Collectively, the total sample (n = 44) includes speeches by the three leaders in the three
sources before the two Houses from May, 1937, when Chamberlain became Prime
Minister, during the respective terms of office for each Foreign Secretary up through
September 3, 1939. Eden resigned on February 20, 1938, and the sample does include
his resignation speech on February 21, 1938. Omitted are speeches and other public
statements from these sources given before other audiences. Here is the chronological
roster of statements with titles, dates, pages, and word counts for each period.
No. & Date
Speech
Leader
Pages
Words
I. PRE-ANSCHLUSS (Words: Ch 10670, Ed 14332)
062537
071937
110137
122137
022138
022138
030738
The Fall of the Avalanches.
From China to Spain
Co-operation…None
Fencing in a China Shop
Resignation
Conversations w. Italy
Out of Strength…
Ch
Ed
Ed
Ch
Ed
Ch
Ch
19-21
199-214
227-250
33-40
259-265
49-59
63-66
1342
4880
7446
3106
2006
4657
1565
II. POST-ANSCHLUSS (Words: Ch 12951 Ha: 11782)
031438
031638
032438
032438
032938
050238
051838
The Anschluss
Ch
The Austrian Anschluss II Ha
The Vital Interests of Britain Ch
Czechoslovakia/Rearmament Ha
The Purpose of British Policy Ha
The Anglo-Italian Agreement Ch
Recognition of Ital. Empire Ha
69-76
125-130
79-91
131-138
139-143
105-115
158-170
3061
2135
5486
2628
1858
4404
5161
43
III. PRE-MUNICH (Words: Ch 12663 Ha 2308)
052338
072638
072738
092838
Czech’ia: the May Crisis
An Investigator & Mediator
Czech: Runciman Mission
Light After Darkness
Ha
Ch
Ha
Ch
171-173
149-159
182-186
179-198
632
4448
1676
8215
IV. POST-MUNICH (Words: Ch 11517)
100338
100638
110238
031539
Post-Munich Debate( p1)
Post-Munich Debate (p2)
General Appeasement
The Break-Up of Czech
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
203-212
212-218
221-225
261-266
4309
2949
1953
2306
V. POST-CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Words: Ch 13011 Ha 7455)
033139
040339
041339
041939
042739
051939
Guarantee Ag’st Aggression Ch
Make Britain’s Position ClearCh
Italian Occupation of Albania Ha
Principles of Int’l Relations Ha
Compulsory Mil Training
Ch
International Situation
Ch
279-280
283-290
249-258
259-269
291-399
1828-39
2255
2321
3550
3905
3619
4816
VI. PRE-POLAND (Words: Ch 9928 Ha 10571)
060839
071039
073139
080339
082439
082439
082939
082939
Negotiation
Oral Answers: Danzig
International Situation
Russia and Danzig
The Danzig Crisis I
International Situation
The Danzig Crisis II
International Situation
Ha
Ch
Ch
Ha
Ha
Ch
Ha
Ch
270-281
1787-90
2018-28
298-303
304-313
3-10
314-317
111-116
4345
898
3977
1889
3246
2928
1091
2125
VII. POST-POLAND (Words: Ch 5173 Ha 3203)
090139
090139
090239
090239
090339
090339
090739
German Invasion of Poland
German Attack on Poland
The Eve of War
Germany and Poland
War with Germany
War with Germany
Oral Answers
Ha
Ch
Ha
Ch
Ha
Ch
Ch
318-324
126-133
325-326
280-282
327-329
291-292
579-87
2006
2243
533
550
664
548
1832
44