The Senatorial Career of Albert J. Beveridge
By JOHNA. COFFIN
(Concluded)
A REFORMER I N THE FIELD OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC LEGISLATION
Unprecedented progress was made in the field of social and
economic legislation during the first decade of the twentieth
century. Conservation of natural resources was promoted ;the
pure food and meat inspection acts were passed ; railway rate
legislation was enacted, as well as an employers liability law
and a provision for limiting the hours of labor of those people
who were engaged in the promotion of interstate commerce.
A new nationalism was thus developed.
In this constructive legislation, Beveridge played a not unimportant part. When not the sponsor of a bill, he was an untiring questioner of other Senators. He did not question just
to be annoying, although it amounted to that at times, but he
challenged all statements which he thought were not based on
facts. He was not a believer in generalities ; so his questioning
at times was an attempt to get specific information in order to
approach the truth or fundamental bases of policies as nearly
as possible.
His interest in conservation was enhanced, because, during
his first three years in the Senate, he was chairman of the
Committee on Forest Reserves and Protection of Game. Furthermore, it was an administration policy. President McKinley was much interested in conservation, and used the power
granted him by an act passed in 1891 to set apart &s reserves
forest-bearing lands. When Roosevelt became President, he
used this power more extensively, adding approximately 148,000,000 acres to the 46,425,528 already set apart.'
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J. Beveridge
243
Along with this tremendous increase of the forest reserves
under Roosevelt’s administration, came the development of the
Division of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture,
brought about largely by the interest and efforts of Gifford
Pinchot. By creating this bureau the government was attempting to systematize the forest service and put it upon an
efficient, scientific basis.
When the argicultural appropriation bill was up for consideration in 1907, Senator Redfield Proctor and others attacked
Mr. Pinchot and his administration of the forestry division;
and at the same time, they attempted to decrease the appropriation for the forestry service. During his eight years in the
Senate Beveridge had known and admired Mr. Pinchot,2 and
now vigorously defended him in his work in the forestry department. He did not believe that the appropriation should be
decreased; for when such a phase of the government’s work
was so vital to the people, to the development of the western
States, and to the Nation as well, the appropriation should be
increased rather than decreased.
Beveridge’s estimate of Mr. Pinchot and his great work can
best be presented in his own words :
The truth about it [Pinchot and his forestry work] is that either in
this Hall or in any other place of public service, in the legislative or executive departments, I do not know a man who so long and so faithfully and so hard and so thoroughly has equipped himself for a great mxvice to the whole country; and who almost alone, by his work and by his
talents, has created a very great beneficence for the entire Republic aa
this man; nor do I know here or in any Department, o r in any level of
work, private o r public, that I have seen in all my life, a man who gives
his remarkable talents, his high and severely acquired accomplishments,
so completely to any work as this man gives his whole life to the public
service.*
After describing the ruthlessness with which our natural
resources had been destroyed, Beveridge explained that it was
now the purpose of the government to prevent further destruction as well as to restore the conditions which formerly existed.
To carry on this great work the Division of Forestry had been
established and it was laboring not only with fidelity, but with
an in€elligence unsurpassed by any other Department of the
government. “The whole system”, said he, “is as perfect as
knowledge and integrity can make it.”*
Cong. Record. 69 Cone., 2 Sess., 9. 8640.
69 Cons.,2 Sees., 9. 2966.
Ibid., pp. 8632-8686.
* Cong. Record.
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Indiana Magazine of History
It is an unusual occurence for public opinion to crystalize
and make itself felt so strongly that it will cause immediate
action in the halls of Congress. Yet, when the leaders are
progressive and attentive to the demands and welfare of the
people, the unusual is likely to happen. Such was the case in
the spring and summer of 1906.
For some years criticism had been directed toward phases
of the immense business built up by the Chicago packing companies. Bitter condemnation of the packers for furnishing impure preserved meats and other packing-house products had
been expressed at home and abroad. A storm of protest had
been raised against the so-called “embalmed beef” fed to the
soldiers in the Spanish American war ; but the greatest sensation of all was Upton Sinclair’s book, The Jungle. This author,
commonly classed as one of the “Muckrakers”, told everything
ugly and unwholesome that he could find in regard to the Chicago industry in order to shock the country with a grim and
revolting realism. This book certainly produced results, for
the country as a whole was deeply stirred, and President
Roosevelt did not hesitate to act.
To be sure of his footing, before making any charges or
recommendations, Roosevelt appointed Charles A. Neill, head
of the Bureau of Labor, and James B. Reynolds, of New York,
to investigate the conditions at the Chicago packing-houses
and make a report to him. Although this investigation was
not exhaustive, it was sufficient to prove that a more rigid inspection of the industry was needed, and that many of the
other charges made by Sinclair were possibly true.5
While this investigation was being made, Roosevelt asked
Beveridge to draft a bill which would enable the government to
inspect rigidly all the processes in the slaughter and preparation of meat-food products. Beveridge was assisted by the Department of Agriculture, which already had the machinery for
a very limited amount of meat inspection.e The bill (S. 6219)
was formally presented to the Senate on May 21,1906. It was
read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry.’ The Committee dealt with it favorably. The bill
was submitted to the Senate on May 25 by Beveridge as an
6Revi8w of R e v h s , XXXIV, p. 6: Mark Sullivan, Our Times, XI. p. 657. Mr.
Dooley’s characterization of the influence of 2‘ % Jungle on President Roosevett is intereating. See ibid.. p. 686.
@Rea’ewof Revi8we. XXXIV, p. 6. (July 1906).
1 Cow. Reeurd, 69 Cang., 1 S
-. p. 7127.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
245
amendment to the agricultural appropriation bill which was
then under consideration. This rider was passed without a
dissenting vote.8 It was then sent to the House, and was referred to the Committee on Agriculture, of which James W.
Wadsworth was chairman.
The Chicago packers soon realized what had happened in
the Senate. Many of their representatives were hurried to
Washington to lobby, and to get the bill modified if it could not
be defeated. They considered that it was not to their best interests to have such a bill passed, and if one was to be passed
under the impelling force of a strong public opinion, which was
at this time adverse to the great Chicago industry, it would be
very severe. Furthermore, if consideration of this amendment could be prevented at this session, public dissatisfaction
would probably subside and the agitation for this legislation
would probably die out before Congress convened again. In
the meantime the packers elaborately denied all the charges
made against the industry, and severely criticized the President for being against them.g They were wholly wrong in
viewing this bill as an attempt to injure their interests, for it
was the only measure that could rescue them from the grave
charges which had been hurled against the methods which they
had been using in the packing business. The packers were too
frantic to understand where their own interests lay.
According to Henry C. Adams, of Wisconsin, a member of
the House Committee on Agriculture, Senator Wadsworth and
his associates took up the consideration of the proposed bill in
the utmost good faith, with every man actuated by the desire
to draft and present to the House a measure which would compel a rigid and, in so f a r as human judgment could make it,
perfect inspection of meat ; and to present a bill which would
not only be just to the producers of live stock, but also fair and
just to those great meat packing interests which were handling
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of the meat products of
the country.lo Many men who were in favor of the bill as well
as many who were opposed to it were called into conference.
It appeared to those who wanted immediate consideration of
the amendment that this was an attempt on the part of Wadsworth to thwart its progress. Many of the legislators, as well
Zbid., p. 7420. The exact copy of the Amendment is given here also.
DRevietu of Review, XXXIV, p. 8. (July. 1906) : Sullivan, bp. cit. p. 688.
1oConn. Reoord, 69 Cong., 1 Sess.. p. 8728.
a
Indiana Magazine of History
246
as numerous newspapers, condemned Wadsworth and his committee for this delay, and it was generally accepted that the
motive for delay was a vindication of the packers. But a more
serious consideration of the situation tends to prove that the
committee as a whole believed that the Senate had passed the
bill without due consideration, and that, in order to perfect the
bill, hearings were necessary.11
There were just bases for argument on both sides of this
question. There is much to prove that the packers were doing
all they could to delay action and to defeat the bill if possible.
The committee made investigations in order to perfect the bill,
which the members were very desirous to do. Whether or not
they would have ever perfected it and presented it to the
House, had not President Roosevelt played his hand, is a matter
of conjecture. It seems reasonable t o believe that in time they
would have done so. However, the President’s action made it
more certain that the bill would be reported to the House.
Roosevelt did not wish to publish the contents of the NeillReynolds report unless forced to do so, because such action
would create a greater European distrust at the expense of this
great American industry. But when he became convinced that
the packers were trying to prevent legislation so necessary to
the public welfare, he decided to send a special message to Congress together with a part of the report in order to force the
Beveridge Amendment from the committee room.
In his remarks prefacing the report, President Roosevelt
stated that this was only a preliminary report. The investigation as yet was not complete. The alleged abuses in the use of
deleterious chemical compounds in connection with curing and
preserving meat products, and the alleged doctoring in this
fashion of tainted meat and of products returned to the packers as having grown unsalable or unusable from age or various
other reasons, had yet to be looked into. To use the President’s
own words :
I submit it [the report] to you now because it shows the urgent need
of immediate action by the Congress in the direction of providing a drastic
and thorough going inspection by the Federal Government of all stock
yards and packing houses and their products, so far as the latter enter
into interstate or foreign commerce. The conditions shown by even this
short inspection to exist in the Chicago stock yards are revolting. It is
imperatively necessary in the interest of health and of decency that they
Ibid., p. 8728.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
247
should be radically changed. Under the existing law it is wholly impossible to secure satisfactory results.
After pointing out the grave inadequacies of the existing
legislation to meet the prevailing conditions, Roosevelt recommended that the House immediately pass Beveridge's amendment.lz
Wadsworth and his committee, however, proceeded to take
testimony and to give the amendment prolonged consideration.
When all the hearings had been completed a vote was taken by
which the Beveridge amendment was rejected, 9 to 7. A substitute which had been drawn up by chairman Wadsworth was
reported to the House by a vote of 11to 6.18
When President Roosevelt heard about this action he WEN
enraged. After conferring with Beveridge and George P. McCabe" and after having reviewed the proposed substitute, he
wrote to Wadsworth on June 14. He unequivocally stated his
opinion of the bill.
My. Dear Mr. Wadsworth: I have gone over your bill very carefully
and not only obtained a report from Mr. McCabe, as I told you I would,
but also obtained a report from Mr. Reynolds on it. I am sorry to say
the more closely I investigate your proposed sub[stitute] the worse I find
it. Almost every change is one for the worse.
.
He then proceeded to state his objections to Wadsworth's
proposed substitute : (1) There was no provision for making
the plants accessible at all hours to the inspectors. (2) It
hampered in the most grossly improper fashion the Secretary
of Agriculture in doing the work which Congress had assigned
him to do. (3) The court review provisions as well as the other
provisions were so bad that if they had been deliberately designed to prevent the remedying of the evils complained of they
could not have been worse. In conclusion the President baldly
stated :
It seems to me that the surest way to keep our foreign trade from us,
and indeed our interstate trade likewise, is a thoroughly unsatisfactory
condition, and to prevent its resuming the position that it formerly had,
is to enact the law in the shape proposed in the amendments submitted to
me by you.16
Cong. Record, 69 Cons.. 1 Seas.. pp. 7800 ff. : Sullivan, o p . cit., pp. 640-41.
'SZbid., p. 646.
l4 Mr. McCabe was the solicitor of t h e Department of Agriculture.
16 New York Times,June 16, 1906.
'1
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Indiana Magazine of History
Wadsworth, not willing to give in, even to the President,
retaliated on June 15 :
My Dear Mr. President: I received your letter last night. You are
wrong, “Very, very wrong” in your estimate of the Committee’s bill. I t
is as perfect a piece of legislation to carry into effect your own views on
the question as was ever prepared by a Committee of Congress. Every
member of the Committee is absolutely as hoiest and sincere as yourself
in the desire to secure the passage of a Meat Inspection bill. They know
the meaning of the English language.16
Wadsworth then attempted to point out wherein the President was in error. There was a definite provision in the bill
for rigid inspection at all times of every part of the packing
estabishments, as well as a provision which granted the Secretary of Agriculture extensive if not unlimited power to enforce
or supervise this inspection.
Roosevelt then conferred with Joseph G. Cannon, Speaker
of the House. On Cannon’s suggestion, the President asked
Henry C. Adams of the House Committee on Agriculture to
confer with him. Adams went over the proposed substitute
with Roosevelt and noted every objection which the President
had to the bill. In the final analysis, it was found that there
were only a few material differences between the Committee
and the President in regard to the bill. Many other differences, however, were rather trivial, being matters of phraseology rather than of ~0ntent.l~
In a second letter to Wadsworth, Roosevelt stated his modified views of the substitute. He first acknowledged that he
was in error in the statement, which he had accepted from
Beveridge, that there was no provision for making the plants
accessible at all hours to the inspectors. This important provision had been modified and shifted to a different place in
the bill. Furthermore, the modified provision was not as definite as the original. The President objected most to the “court
review” provision, and insisted that it be excluded from the
bill, because in his opinion, a court review was not necessary.
In fact, Roosevelt viewed it as an attempt to interfere with the
administration of the bill. In concluding Roosevelt advised
Wadsworth to consult Adams and to examine the annotated
copy of the bill, which Adams had in his possession, for the
other changes which he recommended.‘*
10 Zbid.,
June 16, 1906.
New York Times, June 17, 1906.
la New York Times. June 17, 1906.
‘7
Coffin: Senutmial Career of Albert J . Beueridge
249
John Sharp Williams of Mississippi observed that this Meat
Inspection bill could not be defeated even if anyone wanted to
defeat it, because the two ruling authorities under this boasted
American form of free government-to-wit, the President of
the United States and the Speaker of the House of Representatives-had consulted together about it and determined upon
and prescribed exactly what should be done.l9 After changes
in the bill were agreed to by the House, the Wadsworth substitute was passed without a roll call.2o
On June 20, it was presented to the Senate for consideration,21and thereupon a long and heated discussion ensued, led
by Redfield Proctor of Vermont and Beveridge, who were in
favor of the bill as passed by the Senate, but who were opposed
to the two chief changes made by the House. These changes,
which rose to the dignity of principles, as Beveridge viewed
them, were : (1) the date on the label of canned goods was not
required ; (2) cost of inspection was to be borne by the Government instead of by the packers.22 Proctor could not see that
the former change was so obnoxious, because he did not think
that the dealers would keep in stock more than a year’s supply,
and it would also be to their interests to sell the oldest first;
therefore, there would be no danger of selling canned meats
which had been on their shelves for several years.28 Beveridge,
however, viewed it from the angle that the people had a right
to know whether a can of goods was five days old or five years
old, and that concealment of the age of meat WM a fraud on the
consumer^.^* He also pointed out that the British War office
required that the food for their soldiers must have the date on
the container, and if the date were not placed on the label by
American packers the chances for the British Army trade
would be “nil”, unless the rule should not be rigidly adhered to
by them. Therefore, the date was necessary in order for these
products to compete for British sales. In concluding his arguments on this point, and answering the charge that label dates
would work a hardship on the dealers and manufacturers, he*
boldly stated :
‘OCong. Record, 69 Cons. 1 Sesa., p. 8723
Ibid., p. 8728.
Ibid., p. 8763.
mCong. Record, 69 Cong., 1 Sesa., p. 8764.
g Ibid., p. 8763.
”Ibid., p. 8764.
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Indiana Magazine of History
It does not hurt any business to tell the truth about it and to correct
the evils which that truth reveals. Any business which can be permanently hurt by telling the truth about it ought not only to be hurt, but it
ought to be destroyed.28
Proctor and Beveridge were in complete harmony on the
question of paying for the cost of inspection. They could see
no reason why the packers should not be made to pay for this
work, because no advertising could be more profitable or yield
a more tremendous return than the government stamp on their
goods.26 Beveridge estimated that this government “O.K.”
would be worth at least eight or ten million dollars annually to
the packers in the future as an advertising proposition. In the
light of this fact, then, he viewed this legislation as granting
the packers a favor rather than imposing upon them a burden.
“Shall we do more,” he reasoned, “and give them $3,000,000 of
the peoples money every year in addition to the boon we are
granting them in the inspection itself ?” He could not see that
this would be fair or logical, and argued that the cost of inspection should be paid by the packers themselve~.~~
There was no particular advantage in having the packers
pay for this inspection. Beveridge’s only argument was that
since they would be so greatly benefitted, as a result of the government’s supervision, they should pay for the favor. Obviously the people, in the last analysis, would pay for the inspection whether it came out of the government’s treasury or
whether it came out of the treasuries of the packing establishments, since the packers would simply shift the burden. The
question was whether or not the people should be taxed directly or indirectly. However, Beveridge did not believe that there
was any danger of the packers shifting the burden to the people. He also pointed out that a government appropriation
might be too small to insure a rigid and complete inspection at
all times. In the light of these things, he maintained that a
fee system would be better, because it would be more equitable.
In this way the cost would be borne by those who received the
benefits in direct proportion to the volume of business.**
Many of the more conservative Senators, however, firmly b e
lieved that the packers would tax the live-stock producers for
the cost of inspection if the fee system was agreed upon. FurS I b i d . , 9. 8766.
*Cone. R66ord. 69 Cons., 1 Seas., p. 8768.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
251
thermore, the inspectors would probably be more independent
and would inspect the packing-house products more stringently
if they received their salaries from the government.
The Senate refused to concur in the House amendment. On
June 23, Senators Proctor of Vermont, Henry C. Hansbrough
of North Dakota, and Furnifold M. Simmons of North Carolina were appointed as the Senate members of the conference
committee. The first conference report was presented to the
Senate on June 27. The House conferees positively refused to
consider the fee system and insisted that the Senate accept the
House provision. Proctor advised the Senate to acquiesce, because the House took the position that the bill would fail unless
the Senate yielded to everything asked.28 The Senate again
insisted on its amendments. A show-down was at hand.
After further deliberation in conference, the amendments
came up for consideration in the Senate on June 29. The disagreement still prevailed, but if the Senate continued to insist
on its demands the amendment would be defeated. Proctor
then explained that the bill still retained all the essential features which the President had insisted upon ;and since this bill
was so vitally important to the welfare of the country, he again
made the recommendation that it was best for the Senate to
waive their objections to the label dates and cost, but expressly
state €heir views on the matter.*O
While the two houses were deadlocked on the bill, a flood of
telegrams, emanating from Chicago, poured into Washington
asking that the expense of inspection be borne by the government. Many came supposedly from the cattle raisers, livestock dealers, bankers, and others but the phraseology of the
telegrams clearly showed that they were sent at the instigation of the packers. This method of trying to influence legislation had never been surpassed and it called forth Senator
Proctor’s bitter denunciation.
We have all had much experience with round robin telegrams. We
expect them from certain associations, but I have never seen such open
and barefaced use of this method of trying to influence Congress as has
been made by these packers in flooding us with telegrams from all over
the West in identical language, all evidently emanating from Chicago. If
we are to be buncoed, as I hold that we are to be in this matter of exXbid., p. 8766.
Cong. Record. 69 Cone.. 1 Sese., p. 8765.
m C o n ~ Record.
.
69 Cong., 1 Sea., p. 9876.
lbid., p. 9666.
252
Indiana Magazine of History
pense, it would be pleasanter to have it done with some neatness and
as to conceal the cheapness of its style.31
80
Beveridge acquiesced in the demands of the House and the
packers after he found out that i t was impossible to have the
Senate provisions relating to the dated labels and cost reinserted. He also recommended that the Senate agree to the
House bill, for i t was, with but two exceptions, as good, if not
a better bill than the one which they had formerly agreed to.
In conclusion he thus stated his views :
I n the interests of practical legislation, and, I may say, of any legislation at all upon this critically important question, I trust the motion of
the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Proctor) be immediately agreed to for it
is the best that we can do.
I n all great reforms,-for this is one of the greatest of practical reforms which has been legislated upon by the American Congress in a
quarter century-it is the duty of those who propose the reform to fight
for every essential provision; but not to imperil the life of the measure
itself. And in all reforms it is the testimony of all human experience
that everything at first proposed cannot be at first secured, although in
the end all that is at first proposed usually is finally secured.32
Other Senators did not acquiesce so easily. Senator Nelson
emphatically denounced the packers and their influence on legislation. He saw that the Senate had been defeated by them,
and openly admitted it when he made his estimate of the proceedings :
Other Senators expressed similar views in
8' Cong Record, 59 Cong.. 1 Seea., p. 9656.
regard to these telegrams, only a few of which were sent in by the live-stock producers on
their own initiative. The othere clearly showed that there was m e generid power directing the whole scheme. For the most part these telegrams were charatterbed by the Senators without being read, but Senator Hansbrough read a few that he had received from
his eection of the country to prove his point:
St. Paul, Minn.
June 27. 1906.
''The live stock interesta ask that you support amendment to meat bill placing aoat of
inspection on Government. We are especially interested in this feature."
(Signed by) President Charles L. Hans
South St. Paul Stock Exchange
Ashley, N. Dakota
June 28. 1906.
"We urge supmrt of Wadsworth meat-bill, including Government inspection a t Government expense"
(Signed by) Charles A. Hans
First State Bank of Ashley, N. D.
Condo. N. Dakota
June 28, 1906.
"Think i t is to interest of Northwest to support Wadsworth meat. bill, including Government inspection at Government expense.''
(Signed by a Banker of Condo, North Dakota. who was
known personally by Mr. Hansbrough. but the Senator did not reveal the name).
81 Cong. Record, 59 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 9657.
In pursuance of this policy Beveridge tried
again in 1907, and a second time in 1908 to get the label and cost provisions passed by
Congress. He did not succeed in either instance. Cong. Record, 59 Conp., 2 Sess., P.
2933, 3870 : and Cong. Record. 60 CoQg., 1 Sess., p. 6648-9 : 6739 if. respectively.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
263
We have expended $3,0o0,000 in inspecting the products of the packers, and then the people are not to get the full benefit of the protection.
When we come here and ask for the plain privilege of having the canned
goods labeled, 80 that the American wnsumer can tell whether he is buying a fresh product or not, the packers and the men who repreeent them
get upon their hind legs and say, “You cannot have it. We arc omnipotent.”sa
Senator Porter J. McCumber of North Dakota was no less
emphatic when he expressed his sentiments in his usual clever
way. He openly admitted that the Senate had been defeated :
At the close of any great battle it is fitting that we send back to the
people whom we represent, in terse form, the results of that conflict. I
think we can epitomize the result in a very few words, “we have met the
enemy and we are theirs-indemnity
$3,000,000.” That is the result of
this legislation.34
The Senate agreed to the House amendments on June 29.
The bill was signed by the President on June 30,and went into
effect on July 1, 1906.36 Thus one of the most important measures ever passed to promote the general welfare of the people
as a whole was adopted.
Several men played important parts in securing the enactment of this legislation. Beveridge and Proctor were outstanding in the Senate, while Wadsworth, Adams, Cannon, and
others were closely associated with the progress of the bill in
the House. Due credit must be given to Rcmwvelt for his strategy in the use of the Neill-Reynolds report. Had it not been
for this report, and his recommendation, the bill probably
would have been chloroformed in the committee room. Beveridge thus characterized Roosevelt’s part in the formulation of
the bill :
And such improvement over the first House proposition %B we now
have, such restoration of the Senate provision as we now have, we owe to
the courage, determination, and the absolutely unselfiah devotion to the
interest of the people of President Roosevelt. From the beginning of the
opposition to the Senate bill he has advocated the most rigid and scientific
inspection, and it is chiefly to him that we owe the fact that we have as
excellent a bill as we do have.
We have secured for the American people as complete a meat-inspection
bill as is now on the statute books of any nation in the world.38
t-~Cong. Record, 69 Cong., 1 Seas.. p. 9567. Nelson waa correct stressing the question
regarding the date on the label. To force the packer8 to adopt this prnctIw WIU more Important than to require them to Day the mat of inspedion.
” I b i d . , p. 9661.
The text of this bill m a y be found in ibid., pp. 9791-2.
sa Cong. Record, 69 Cong.. 1 Seas., p. 8767.
Indiana Magazine of Histow
254
Roosevelt refused to accept all credit for the bill as given
him by Beveridge. On the day after he signed the bill, he
wrote Beveridge :
You were t h e man, who f i r s t called my attention to t h e abuses. You
were t h e legislator who d r a f t e d t h e bill which in i t s substance now appears i n the amendment t o t h e Agriculture bill and which will enable u s
to p u t a complete stop to t h e wrong doing complained
Along with the Meat Inspection act came the Pure Food and
Drug act. Attempts to get such a law passed had been numerous, but each had failed, because the business interests affected by the bill were so large, and the lobbyists so numerous
and so strong that action had been prevented. The most recent attempt to have such a law passed was made in February
of 1906. Senator Weldon B. Heyburn of Idaho, who was in
charge of the bill, believed that this effort was also blocked.
However, this bill was made possible when the opposition in
the Senate collapsed, due to the fact that the American Medical Association brought pressure to bear on Senator Nelson W.
Aldrich, who was opposed to the bill.38 President Roosevelt
had appealed t o Aldrich to withdraw his o p p o ~ i t i o n . ~When
~
Aldrich told Beveridge that he would not object to the Pure
Food bill, Beveridge immediately went t o Heyburn and told
him to call up his measure instantly, for there was now no opposition to it. Heyburn could hardly believe what he heard,
but he finally mustered enough courage to bring it up again
when Beveridge promised to defend and be responsible for t h e
measure.'O On February 21, 1906, the bill passed the Senate
with only four votes cast against it.41 The bill was then sent to
the House and referred t o the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce of which William P. Hepburn, of Iowa, was
chairman. On March 7, the bill, with amendments in the nature of a substitute, was reported back to the House by the
Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union.42 On March
29, the House agreed to Hepburn's motion to have the bill made
a special order on April
However, consideration of this
Quoted in James Ford Rhoda. The M c K i n l e y and Roosevelt Administrations, p . 335.
Sullivan, o p cit., pp. 663.
l b i d . , p. 633, footnote.
*) Ibid., pp. 633-534.
" C o n g . Record, 69 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 2775.
C m g . Record, 59 Cong., 1 Sesa. p. 8494.
Y I b i d . , p. 4466.
87
88
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
266
bill was not to interfere with appropriation bills, or other matters of legislation which always had privileged position under
the rules. The House considered the Post Office appropriation bill on April 10, thus delaying the Pure Food bill again.
Undaunted by the failure of this attempt to get the House to
consider the bill, Hepburn moved, on May 7, to have the bill
placed in privileged order on the calendar. The House agreed
to the motiont4 but of course, the bill was still at the disposal
of the Committee on Rules. Very little, if anything was done
in regard to the bill until the middle of June. It was reported
that Cannon did not want it to be referred to the House
for fear that it would be defeated when a vote was taken
thereon.46 When Roosevelt sent his message to Congress, together with the Neill-Reynolds report on June 4, his influence, although brought forward especially for the benefit of
meat inspection, created enough public sentiment for pure
foods to force the prompt consideration of this question as
well. Those in favor of legislation in this field saw that the
time was opportune for making the necessary effort. As a result, the Committee on Rules submitted a report which provided for immediate c o n ~ i d e r a t i o n . ~The
~ previous question
was ordered, the report was agreed to, and the House proceeded to consider the measure. It was passed on June 23 by a
vote of 241 to 17.47 This bill was different in many respects,
from the one passed by the Senate. The House bill was accepted in conference, and both Senate and House adopted the
conference report. The President affixed his signature to it
on June 30.48 These two laws passed in the first session of the
fifty-ninth Congress were second only in importance in the
arena of economic legislation to the interstate commerce
Although Beveridge was not as closely connected with action on the Pure Food bill as he was with the Meat Inspection
act, his work on the one aided the other materially. The influences which prompted the final action on both were so interlocked that they cannot be easily disassociated.
The attack of Ida M. Tarbell on the Standard Oil Company,
together with the efforts of the various “Muckrakers,” forciZbid., p. 6469.
a New York T i m e , June 24, 1906.
MCong. Reocrd, 69 Cong., 1 Seas., p. 8886.
47 Zbid., p. 9076.
‘SIbid., p. 9801.
‘ORhcdes, o p . cit., p. 336.
44
256
Indiana Magazine of Histopy
bly brought to light the evils that had grown up under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. President Roosevelt had been
cognizant of these abuses for several years and had recommended that action be taken by Congress to correct them; but
he had failed to obtain an effective response.sO He was now
determined, even if he had to overstep the traditional power
of the Executive to influence legislation, that something should
be accomplished to correct the existing evils in the long session
of the fifty-ninth Congress. Congress, realizing the need of
correcting the evils, chief of which were the rebates, the private car system,61high freight rates, and free passes, began to
work soon after the beginning of the session of 1905-1906 on a
measure to supplement the Act of 1887. On February 8,1906,
the House passed the Hepburn bill by a vote of 346 to 7.52
Senator Benjamin R. Tillman, a Democrat from South Carolina, reported the Hepburn bill back to the Senate from the
Committee on Interstate Commerce, on February 26.68 Thereupon, long and heated debates were engaged in. Foraker and
Beveridge clashed when Beveridge tried to get the pipe-lines
that carried natural gas under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, as were the oil lines. He could
not see the difference betwen the two, though there seemed a
vital difference to Foraker, because a gas line was being constructed by a private company to furnish Cincinnati, his home
city, with natural gas from West Virginia. He did not want
this line to be put under the jurisdiction of the Commission, for
it was a local project to supply local needs;therefore, it could
not be considered as a common carrier.5* Other similar
clashes were frequent between the various Senators over details of the bill under consideration. LaF01lett.e~~
and the
Democrats, in general, were opposed to the "Old Line" Republicans, while some of the more progressive Middle-Westerners
w An explanation of this delay is given by Cullom, op. cit.. pp. 327-990 : for reeommendations by the President. see Conu. Record, 57 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 7-8; Cow. Record,
58 Cong.. S Seas., p. 1 2 : Conu. Rseord. 59 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 91-98. Same given in Addresses and Papers of Theodme Rooaevelt. Willis F. Johnson. Editor.
U'McCumber believed that this was more intolerable than rebates for it was in fact a
system of legalized discrimination of the mmt offensevie nature. Conu. Record. 69 Conp.,
1 SeSS.. D. 4331.
"Ibid.. p. 2803.
Ibid., p. 2968 : for the circumstances which caused the bill to be reported at this
early date, and the reaaon far putting Tillman i n charge see cltllom. op. oit., pp. SS1-2;
also Newland's speech, Cong. Record, 61 Cong., 1 Sess.. p. 1789.
"Conu. Record, 69 Cong.. 1 Sess., p. 6999.
M LaFollette stood in a class all by himself because of his opposition t o the "Old
Guard" and by the number of amendments he submitted and had rejectmd. For a detailed
pnalysis of this statement see ibid.. p. 7083.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
257
switched from one side to the other according to the nature of
the questions under consideration.
In this legislation, Beveridge played a minor r61e for he was
busy with other matters of legislation. He confined his activities, for the most part, to the questioning of Senators who
were advocating amendments in order to clarify specific
points. However, he did not hesitate to express his views on
any phase of this legislation. He especially condemned the issuance of free passes, saying :
The pass evil, is a real evil; but it is a broad evil and no doubt the
injury worked through it is as great or greater in other direction8 than
it ie here (in Congress).
I shall vote freely on this
subject, because I have never yet, while I have been in public life, taken
or used a pass of any kind on any railroad, or any frank of any telegraph
company.6’
.
.
However, he could not see the justice of specifically naming
Senators, Representatives, and other Government officials as
Senator Charles W. Fulton proposed in his amendment. He
emphatically asserted that “to say that a few men should be
subject to this provision and that other men shall not, is a
proposition not supported by one single reason or one single
fact.”rj’
On the various amendments Beveridge voted, in general,
for those amendments which were in accordance with Room
velt’s views on railway rate legislation. He was ever eager to
extend the power and jurisdiction of the national government
as f a r as possible, for he believed that these evils could only be
remedied, and the people properly protected through strict, national supervision. He was then an ardent advocate of the
new nationalism.
Foraker and Lodge were, to a certain extent, opposed to
this extension of the powers of the national government. Foraker expressed his opposition when he attacked the general
nature of the Hepburn bill :
It ie 80 contrary to the spirit of our institutions, and of such drrrrtie
and revolutionary character that, if not in ita immediate effeet, at I&
as a precedent, the consequenaa are likely to be most unusual and f a r
reachfng.68
Coru. R w d , 68 Cene.. 1 k.
p. 8848.
” IW.,I. 694a.
” C o w . Rssord, 69 Cong., 1 Bese.. p. 3107. For a Wiled -t
JtiCS re0 hb book, N&
of
&ur U t e , 11, PD. 218 ff.
of Faraku’m
mb
258
Indiana Magazine of H k t o y l
Lodge was opposed to Legislation which he chose to think
of as tending too strongly toward socialism, but he blamed big
business for the demands that had arisen. He expressed himself in this way:
I have no sympathy whatever with the socialistic movements that are
going on to take possession of all sorts of business and all so called “public utilities.” Whether state or national, I believe the movement, if successful, means the destruction of the government, which we reverence and
love and which it has taken us a hundred years to build up.
I say in all seriousness that
those owners of the Standard Oil and these packers in Chicago have done
more to advance sociabm and anarchism, and unrest, and agitation than
all the socialistic agitators who stand today between the oceans.60
The Hepburn bill was amended by the Senate and passed by
a 71 to 3 vote.6o In regard to this economic reform, which was
designed for the benefit of the people in general, Beveridge, as
well as many other Senators did not see the value of being a
strict partisan. Consequently, party lines were not strictly
drawn on the various amendments. Lodge submitted a n amendment which put corporations or persons engaged in the transportation of oil or other commodities, natural gas or water for
municipal purposes excepted, by means of pipe lines, under the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. This
was passed 75 to 14,eight Republicans and six Democrats voting against the
Sixty-seven Senators voted for the
commodity amendment, which was submitted by Stephen B.
Elkins of West Virginia, while four Republicans and two Democrats voted against
The votes on the other amendments,
for the most part, were similarly nonpartisan. After much
wrangling over the bill in conference, it was agreed to by both
houses on June 29, and was approved by the President on June
30.8a
It is not possible to give any one man or any one group of
men the credit for this important measure. Many,of the Senators played important r6les in securing this legislation, but no
one was quite so indispensable to the success of the bill as was
“‘Cmg.Record, 59 Cong., 1 Seas., p. 8769.
W O b i d . , p. 7088. Just before the vote was taken Senator Tillman remarked: “I am
very glad that my responsibility. small as it has been, merely in charge of a bill without a
committee behind me, here ends, and while I cannot congratulate the Senate on anything
much in connection with the bill, I do congratulate that we are about to reach a vote.”
Conp. Record, 59 Cong., 1 Sea., p. 6576.
ca Ibid., 9. 6670.
Q‘Ibid.. 9. 9666.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
259
President Roosevelt. “Had it not been for the earnest advocacy of railroad rate regulation by President Roosevelt”, says
Cullom, “the Hepburn bill would never have been passed.”64
Senator Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, however, expressed a different view in regard to the success of the
bill. While speaking to the Senate on May 6, 1909, he gave the
following account of the proceedings :
I could review numerous instances during the past four years when
progressive reformative action has been absolutely forced by the Democratic party, both in the House and Senate. There are numerous cases
when Democratic support placed upon the Statute books reform measures.
The vote was
nearly unanimous on the rate bill, but the men in this body who are
familiar with legislation know that the rate bill and other reform measures were opposed by the majority of the Republican party, though supported by a minority of the party until the bitter end, and they only
joined in a record vote with a view of letting it appear to the country
that a measure whose passage was inevitable and which had the support
of the entire country, had the unanimous approval and verdict of the
Republican party in the Senate.65
It is evident that Newlands was trying to prove that the
Democratic minority had some power and influence in the
Senate. The circumstances which prompted this utterance
prove that this was his motive. He was extending an invitation to the progressive Republicans to join with the Democrats
in order to secure a tariff bill in accordance with the principles
for which they were striving. Some of his statements are too
general to be conclusive, but, discounting this, it seems that he
diagnosed the situation rather correctly. Furthermore, his
statments were not challenged by any Senator, a very unusual
occurrence, unless the statements happen to be well founded.
The accomplishments of the first session of the fifty-ninth
Congress were of great importance to the welfare of the Nation.
Few periods, if any, in the annals of our country exceed thi3
one in the development or extension of natiwal control of business.
Beveridge was not content with this extension of the power
of the national government, nor was he satisfied with abolition
of illegal trusts. He wanted the government to go farther in
its crusade against corrupt practices and in its “moral regenCullom. op. cit., P. 329.
“Conn. Record, 61 Cong., 1 Sess., B. 1790.
260
Indiana Magazine of Histor#
eration of business” as he called it.6e The great problem of the
regulation of child labor needed to be solved. Therefore, he
recommended that a national child labor law be passed, for the
State laws, efficient though some of them were, were not capable of dealing successfully with this great evil. There was
great variation in legislation, while in some States no regulation had been attempted. The only remedy was to put control
in the hands of the national government.
His interest in child labor and the evils thereof did not
come suddenly, nor was he moved to get up and denounce it
according to Quaker principles. He had been interested in the
awful conditions under which children labored for years, and
had been earnest enough to spend nights, days, weeks, and
months accumulating testimony relating thereto. He had also
appealed to the American people all over the country in the
campaign of 1906 in behalf of child labor legislation.6T His interest was prompted not only by sympathy for those children,
but for the future of the Republic; for with the coming of so
many foreigners, and the dilution of the original American
stock,because of child labor, the entire character of the American people would be changed, and American institutions as well
would be in danger of being undermined.o*
A child labor bill for the District of Columbia had been introduced in the session of 1906-1906,but it failed to get much
consideration. This reform was again presented to the Senate
on December 10,1906,in House Resolution 17838. After some
discussion of this resolution during the month of January 1907,
Beveridge submitted an amendment to it which provided for a
national child labor policy.ee
His three-day speech, given on January 23,28,and 29,was
a 1~1888of statements, all of which were supported by affidavits, revealing conditions as they actually existed in the cotton
mills of the South, in the mines, and in the sweat-shops of the
country.To He brought forth conclusive evidence against all
employers of child labor without fear or favor, to such an ex-
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
261
tent that a Washington correspondent of the Independent marvelled at his c0urage.7~
This writer characterized Beveridge and his speech in this
way :
Into his attaek the Senator put almost cyclonic energy. But cyclonic
energy is natural to him. He put the same thing into his statehood
speeches last session. He wags his head, shakes his fists, slaps his hand,
bangs his desk, and tests the capacity of his vocal organ in a way utterly
to exhaust his listeners, if not himself. Yet, there is method in hia madness. His physical and mental pyrotechnics keep good tune and time.
His fists follow his tongue, instead of trying to do the work for it.72
It is easy to see a priori that there would be an enormous
amount of opposition to this national child labor bill. The o p
position of those industries which used child labor was inevitable, although all of them did not oppose it, for a few stab
lishments were forced to use child labor, because those with
whom they had to compete were using it.Ts In addition to this
several Senators opposed the bill on the ground that their State
laws were sufficient, and no interference in their domestic affairs by the Federal government was
Beveridge based his argument in answer to the contention
that the State laws were strong enough to cure the evil, on the
inadequacies of State legislation, and on the equality of business opportunity. The essence of his argument on the latter
point is contained in these words which were uttered in answer to a Senator who wished to guard the rights of the States :
If one State has good laws, and enforces them, and a n adjacent State
doee not, then business men in the former State a r e at a disadvantage
with the business men in the latter State.
The Senator will agree that i t is common
sense as well as Americanism that every business man beneath the flag
ought to have equal opportunities in so f a r aa the law can give them to
him.76
262
Indium Magazine o f History
Senator Tillman of South Carolina interrupted Beveridge
during the course of his speech, to express the hope that he,
(Beveridge) would not omit to get all well authenticated facts
into the Record so that he, on his return to South Carolina,
might have sufficient ammunition with which to begin a crusade to keep his legislature from being influenced by northern
millionaires who had gone down there and built mills and made
industrial slaves out of white children instead of the chattel
black slaves of the old days. He also stated that he would join
Beveridge in making a national law, if he would show him how
it could be done constitutionally.7e
The constitutionality of the bill, according to Beveridge was
based on the right of Congress to regulate commerce. Congress was to exercise the power to prohibit goods produced by
child labor from entering into interstate commerce. To prove
the constitutionality of such an act, and to show that Congress
had earlier exercised its power in a similar way, Beveridge
read section 31 of the McKinley tariff law. This provided “that
all goods, wares, articles, andmerchandisemanufactured wholly
or in part in any foreign country by convict labor shall not be
entitled to entry at any port of the United States.”” In the
light of this law he saw no constitutional restrictions on his
bill, for if Congress had the power and right to prohibit convict made goods from entering into interstate commerce, it
could prohibit child made goods as well. It was then, not a
question of power, nor of the right of Congress to pass such a
law, but simply a question of policy. To Beveridge i t was not
only a good policy, but a duty for the National government to
pass a child labor law in order to end this infamy which existed
in America as extensively as it had in England more than a
hundred years earlier.78
Although the majority of Senators believed in child labor
legislation, they believed in it as a matter of local concern.7e A
few others who realized the need of a national law gave Beveridge their moral support, but as yet, they were not ready to
stand out boldly for the measure which he was advocating.
Cone. Record, 69 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1801.
Zbid., p. 1822.
781bid.. p. 1833.
7DSomeidea of the extent of this feeling is shown by the vote on the child labor bill
for the District of Columbia. It passed the Senate on May 6, 1908 without a roll call and
May 9, the ‘House passed with 200 yeas, 178 not voting and 9 answered present. Ca.
Record, 60 Cons.. 1 Sesa., P. 6803. 6030, respectively.
Coffin: Senatoh1 Career of Albert J . Beveridge
263
Dolliver of Iowa was probably as sympathetic as anyone, but
he excused his lack of loyal support on constitutional grounds.8o
Consequently, the bill did not get much consideration at this
time. The importance of this movement lies in the fact that it
was the beginning in the Senate, of the agitation for a national
child labor law which culminated in the proposed but unsuccessful Twentieth Amendment of recent years.
The attitude of the press, in general, can best be summarized by a statement made at a Gridiron Club dinner to the effect that it was fortunate for the man behind the child labor
bill that he got himself elected to the Senate before advocating
his theory.*l
Beveridge’s interest in the conditions of labor was not confined to the field of child labor. He was always in favor of
any legislation which would be beneficial to the laboring man.
Consequently, he favored the employers liability bill that was
passed by Congress in 1906. This act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on June 6, 1908, because its
provisions applied to all common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, regardless of the fact that injuries might
often happen to employees of such carriers who were not actively engaged in forwarding interstate commerce.82 On April
9 [1908], a similar bill, drafted in accordance with the ruling
of the Supreme Court, was up for consideration in the Senate.83
Before recording his vote, Beveridge expressed his opinion of
the bill : “I am in favor of the strongest law we can pass.
I hoped that the Act of 1906 would stand ; it
failed. This act must not fail. It is humane, just, and necessary.”84
Foraker again emphatically denounced this type of legislation, because the government was about to take another step in
its paternalistic progress. He thought that the government had
already gone too f a r in this direction, and if the process was
persisted in there would be no end t o the furtherance of government control. He thus stated his views :
The most important question lying behind all this legislation is the
question whether Congress has the right to regulate t h e relation between
“ I b i d . . p. 6786.
m Independent, LXII. p. 581. February 14. 1801.
81 Cong. Record, 60 Ccn., 1 Sesa.. p. 4627.
For a te.xt of the bill see ibid., p. 4426. This act was passed and approved by the
President on April 22, 1908.
M Ibid., p. 4642.
264
Indiana Magazine of Hiatoory
master and servant. If we have the right to regulate those relations in
one respect unquestionably we would have a right to say that an employee
shall have a right of action against his employer without regard to the
question of negligence or contributory negligence; we have a right to say
that a common carrier shall pay an engineer $160 a month wage or a
brakeman $40 a month, or to do anything else by a statute enacted by
Congrese that would bear upon the relations of employer and employed.*s
Beveridge was not antagonistic to combinations of capital,
commonly called trusts. He tried to walk along the uncharted
line of distinction between good and bad trusts, as many others,
including President Roosevelt, were attempting to do. It was
impossible to have a complete consensus of opinion on which
trusts were good and which were bad. However, as long as
capital was confined to industry, and was honestly employed,
there was no room for complaint; but when it went beyond
these limits, vehement condemnation and rigid proeecution
were justifiable. So thought Beveridge and Roosevelt.
In his speeches and writings Beveridge clearly expressed
his views regarding combinations of capital. His philosophy
in regard to them may be gleaned from these utterances. He
believed that great combinations of capital, as well as of labor,
were based on fundamental principles of progress, and that
their development was a natural consequence of industrial development. Corporations were as logical and as beneficial as
simple partnerships between men, for they were simply numerous partnerships ; and if partnerships buy out partnerships,
why not corporations buy out corporations? They should if
their directors were wise and honest, and their purposes beneficenL8* Numerous benefits had been derived from these combinations. Taking it by and large, combinations of capital had
been indispensable to the development of America. However,
along with the growth in combinations of capital had grown
certain evils and crudities. Some of these evils could be tolerated in order to receive the numerous benefits, but when such
things 88 the arbitrary raising and lowering of prices, and the
unjust exactions of unfair profita from the consumers were
practiced, then thaw who were guilty of such dishonesty should
be prosecuted.*’
Beveridge had also worked out a philosophy of congreaM U . R 6 H . @ M g . . 1 8eaS.. D. 4611.
m ’ ~ 6 o d r rmooodns, x, D. 4s.
mIb(d., D. 9. A. I . Bwerldpc. Chieuge S
&
Febnury 22. 1802. D. 8 .
Coffin: Senutmial Career of Albert 1. Beveridge
265
sional action to cure these evils. This can best be presented by
using his own words :
But the benefits [of the trusts] are fundamental, and the evils incidental. You cannot ahear away the good from the bad by Borne important
measure evolved over night from an excited brain and adopted the next
day as a party measure to carry the election the day after.
Measurea should be taken and a policy adopted, [but] those
measures and that policy should be well considered, cautiously adopted
and executed with sanity and judgment.88
Beveridge firmly believed, and he held it as one of the fundamental principles of his political career, that corporation finance should not permeate the field of political activity. Because of the conviction, he refused to accept any campaign contributions from corporations or large business enterprises. He
also refused them, because he was ever desirous of having a
free hand to do, and to say, and to vote according to his best
judgment, and not according to the dictates of some special interest. He frequently received campaign contributions from
these sources, but in every instance, so f a r as known, he returned the checks, together with a courteous reply, to the contributors.*g
Senator Henry C. Hansbrough of North Dakota introduced
a resolution on January 22,1908, the purpose of which waa to
expedite the prosecution of the International Harvester Company as an unlawful trust. This Company had also been interfering in North Dakota politics. In the debate which ensued
Beveridge clearly expressed his views in regard to such practices in this way:
In any such fight I would stand with the Senator (Ransbrough) or
any other honest man against the interference, by any corrupt power,
with the politics of any American commonwealth.
If it be true that this trust or any other financial power has invaded the
politics of a state, it has committed a greater crime against our institutions than it has an offense against our laws. There are too many interferences in politics by Corporations, which, for their own purposes,
wish to control public office; too many instances where States are
flooded with money by men and corporations outside a State and inside
a State for the purpose of controlling primaries, conventions, and elec-
* I b i d . , p. 10.
89 Judge Martin. Interview : John C. Shaffer, in Addreat8 in Honor of A . J . BsorrF e b w r v 6 , 1917, D. 26.
idge,
Indiana Magazine of History
266
tions. And whenever this infamy is attempted it should be defeated an(
those who practice it punished.90
Beveridge’s philosophy in regard to labor organizations and
financial combinations can best be summarized by using his
words :
Orgaizations of labor are cognate to the organizations of capital.
Each is the outgrowth of that principal of cooperation which is the very
spirit of civilized society.
Neither labor organizations, nor those of capital are unnatural or harmful. But the tyranny of greed may pervert the one; the tyranny of passion may ruin the other. Considerate moderation is the safety of both.
There is no place in the country for the absolutist of capital. There is no place in the country for the absolutist of
riot.91
.
It may be added that this was a period in which much progressive legislation was accomplished. The power and protection of the National government was extended. Nationalism
was the dominant note; but behind this nationalism was the
impelling force of the people and their general welfare. In this
latter respect there is a striking similarity, although not a perfect comparison, between this period and the period when Andrew Jackson was President. It was, in both instances, the
spirit of the West, the importance of the common man, a democracy for the people and not for privileged classes or vested
interests, rising up to impel, permeate, and mold the policy of
the government. It is best typified in the names, “Andy”
Jackson and “Teddy” Roosevelt.
TARIFF VIEWS AND PROGRESSIVISM OF BEVERIDGE
Volumes could be written on the old and often discussed
question of the tariff; theories might be discussed and explanations attempted ;a defense of our tariff policy might be written
as well as a condemnation of it ; but none of these fall within
the province of this section. The purpose is simply to discuss
the tariff in relation to the part i t played in bringing on or influencing Republican insurgency and the schism of 1912 which
resulted in the short-lived Progressive party.
Few men, if any, advocated and worked for tariff reform
more earnestly and untiringly than did Senator Beveridge. It
YS.
Cong. Record, 60 Cong.. 1 Sess., p. 967.
91
Beveridge, Chicapo Speech, February 22, 1902, R. 12
C o f f i n : Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
267
is true that several other Middle-Western Senators cooperated
with him and worked just as diligently in the special session of
1909, to secure a just revision of the tariff, but none of them
played a greater part than he, in originating and advocating
the principles and methods of tariff revision. Beveridge did
not believe, whole heartedly in a high protective tariff, neither
was he an advocate of a mere tariff for revenue. Instead, he
thoroughly believed in a mobile tariff schedule-one that could
be easily adjusted to changing conditions ; in reciprocity-common sense agreements with our neighbors among the nations
by which the surplus of American products could be taken
across the seas. This was what he termed “common sense
statesmanship”.’
On September 26, 1906, Beveridge called on President
Roosevelt, and, in the course of their discussions, talked about
the tariff. Roosevelt, in writing to Senator Lodge gave a short
account of this discussion :
Beveridge was out here yesterday and added very slightly to my
troubles by announcing that in his judgment popular feeling was against
“standpatism” and in favor of immediate revision of the tariff, and that
we ought at once to declare for it. I asked him to consider two facts:
first, that we must under no circumstances promise what we do not intend
to perform; and second that as a corollary to the first, he ought seriously
to consider whether there was any chance of revising the tariff before the
Presidential election, whether he could get the Republicans to entertain
the idea at all, and whether if they did entertain it, it would be possible
to have a revision without inviting disaster to the Presidential election.
He treated both of these considerations as irrelevant.*
This recommendation by Beveridge was, of course, premature, and serious consideration of tariff revision really inexpedient at that time. However, the idea developed to such an
extent that in the next two years even the most conservative
“standpatters” realized that revision was inevitable. It was as
much a psychological as an economic development.
In the meantime, Beveridge continued his crusade against
the existing tariff and the methods by which tariff schedules
were made. His most notable contribution was his “magazinearticle” debate with William J. Bryan in 1907. In these articles, published in the Reader Magazine, he characterized the
existing tariff classification as old, obsolete, and no longer
* Beveridge, Chicago Speech.
Feb. 22, 1902. p. 16.
* Roosevelt to Lodge, Oyster Bay, September 27,
1906. in Cmreepmdmws, 11, p. 288.
Indiana Magazine of History
268
useful, for there were numerous articles now on the market
which were not even mentioned in the schedules. A new tariff
law should be made which would reclassify all the articles that
entered into our trade. This revision should also provide for
the opening of foreign markets to our surplus produce. This
could only be accomplished by a maximum and minimum rate
provision which would enable us to lower the bars to those
countries which gave us concessions and raise them to those
countries which did not. He firmly believed that the tariff
should be reduced in some instances, but reduced only when we
get something in exchange for that reduction. Furthermore,
he contended that the tariff should be taken out of politics in
the sense that it should not be made the football of politicians
to be kicked hither and yon as their temporary and selfish interests might dictate. To remedy these evils and to secure
these ends, he advocated, that a tariff commission, composed
of well qualified and specially trained men should be established to study not only local conditions which affected the
tariff but conditions in foreign countries 85 well.
In order to get more businesslike and scientific methods
into our tariff legislation, and to get legislation dealing with
great economic questions removed from politics as much as
possible, Beveridge introduced a bill, on January 7,1908, which
provided for the creation of a tariff commission.* According
to his plan this commission w w to be composed of seven members appointed by the President,'by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, solely with a view to their qualification
and without regard to political affiliations. This committee
was to investigate immediately the cost of production of all
articles covered by the tariff, as well as other factors entering
into and necessary for the formulation of equitable rates.
These findings were to be tabulated and submitted to Congress
to serve as a partial basis for tariff legislation. They were to
study recent classifications adopted by other nations, and report this to Congress together with a draft of a scheme for
scientific classification of our tariff schedules.'
On February 5, Beveridge made another one of his long
speeches in which he explained the purpose of and the need for
a non-partisan tariff commission. He severely attacked the
existing system of tariff legislation, and showed how utterly
8
4
Cong. Record. 60 Cong.. 1
Ibid., pp.. 1677-8.
SW.,
p. 604.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J. Beve+idge
269
impossible it was for the committee on finance to investigats
and formulate a good tariff schedule even if the members
thereof were well trained and qualified to deal with economic
He did not criticise the members of the committee,
individually, for they did the best they could under the circumstances, but it was the loose methods which were employed by
them in the formulation of schedules that were 80 obnoxious,
and which he severely denounced.b His statements in favor of
the maximum and minimum rate principIe were unqualified,
for it was the only means by which America could get for her
producers the same favors that the producers of other nations
had. He was not against tariff for protection, but he was
more especially in favor of a tariff for trade; trade for prosperity; and common sense methods for both.?
Senator Charles A. Culberson congratulated Beveridge because he had, to some degree at least, joined the army of revisionists.* This brought forth the following fiery retort:
I have always belonged to such an army; but I have not joined, and
I never will join any organization which makes the American tariff the
football of partisan politics, and that is precisely the difficulty over
which we must get in this congress. We have got to get away from the
time that every great question which comes up in this body is considered
by the leader of either side with reference to what advantage they think
there may be in it for their party in the coming campaign.
The time has come when the old
and outgrown methods of dealing with public questions should be abandoned, and when we in Congrese should be as earnest, as up-to-date and aa
non-partisan, if I may say it, in the doing of the nation's business aa the
great body of American people who have sent us here to do their business
are with reference to their affairs.*
Many of the Senators saw the need for and the justice of
this policy. Some of his colleagues expressed themselves in
favor of the commission plan, for if the Government had commissions ta investigate and get facts on trusts, railroads, industries, merchant marines, and interstate commerce, surely
'The Committee which made the Dingley bill w a s composed of one editor. one wood
manufacturer, and all the others were lawyers. The Committee of 1908 was cornpared of
one lumberman, one having no occupation at all, and all others were lamem. This would
be a sod legislative group, no doubt, but not especlallb mod. nor well trained for ecanomle investigation and legidation. Cong. R m d , 60 Cone., 1 Sean., 0. 1679.
8 For a detailed deacription of the procea~ of tariff making and diffiwltlea unda
which the c?rndttee haa to labor see ibid, p. 1680 if: also see his article in the Anrda
of the Amencan Academy, XXXII, entitled, "A Permanent Tarlff Cammiasion". PP. 40%
428.
7Conu. Recurd, 60 Cons.. I Seas., B. 1688.
elbid.. p. 1688.
'Carcu. Rwmd 60 Cons., 1 h,
p. 1618.
270
Indiana Magazine of History
there should be a commission to deal with the tariff when it
affects all of the people instead of just a part as the other corn
missions do.’O The majority of the Senators, however, wen
not willing to follow such a progressive program, preferring to
stick with the old methods, and to consider the tariff as a political question. Consequently, when Beveridge found out that
it was impossible to get the Senate to consider his bill seriously, he let the matter drop for the time being.
Beveridge, of course, was not the only one who agitated
tariff revision. Many others both in the legislative and executive departments of the government had advocated i t as well.
The tariff as an issue had entered into the State elections of
Iowa, Wisconsin and Massachusetts, especially.” Now it developed into a nation-wide issue.
The Republican National Convention met in Chicago on
June 16,1908. The platform as adopted on June 19 contained
this provision :
The Republican party declares unequivocably for a revision of the
tariff by a special session of Congress immediately following the inaugurI n all tariff legisation of the next President.
lation the true principle for protection is best maintained by the imposition of such duties as will equal the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad, together with a reasonable profit t o American industries. We favor the establishment of maximum and minimum
rates to be administered by the President under limitations fixed by 1aw.12
In accordance with the declaration of the Republican platform, President Taft issued a proclamation on March 6, 1909,
calling Congress to convene on March 15 at 12:00, noon.ls In
his message to Congress on March 16, he stated :
I have convened Congress in this extra session in order to enable it to
give immediate consideration to the revision of the Dingley tariff act.
Conditions affecting production, manufacture, and business generally
have so changed in the last twelve years as to require a readjustment and
revision of the import duties imposed by that act. More than this, the
present tariff act, with other sources of government revenue, does not
furnish income enough to pay the authorized expenditures.14
lo Ibid., P. 1678.
Senator Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, a Democrat, wa9 eapecldlg
in favor of Beverldge’s proposal.
2 1 Standwood. o p . cit.. p. 162.
1%Ibid., p. 178.
* Cong. Record. 61 Cong., 1 Seaa, 9. 16.
1’Cong. Record, 61 Cong., 1 Seu., p. 40.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
271
The House Committee on Ways and Means anticipating an
extra session to consider the tariff, had, during the summer
and winter of 1908-1909, investigated conditions, and had partially completed a new tariff schedule. When the special session of Congress convened, the House immediately set about to
conclude its hearings, and to complete its schedules.16 when
this was done, the House passed the tariff bill on April 10, and
sent it to the Senate. Senator Aldrich, chairman of the Committee on Finance, reported the bill back to the Senate, together with the Committee’s amendments, on April 12.18 A
heated debate lasting approximately four months ensued.
If all the details of this long controversy were to be given,
it would result in a treatise as voluminous as the Congressionat
Record itself. It is, therefore, only possible to summarize, and
to give the general trend of the discussions, as well as some of
the most salient points brought out in the debates.
The attack on the tariff schedules as presented by the
Senate Committee on Finance, came from within the ranks of
the Republican party, for the most part. Albert B. C u m i n s
and Jonathan P. Dolliver of Iowa, Joseph R. Bristow of Kansas, LaFollette and Beveridge were the leaders. Some of the
Democratic members opposed the bill as well, but others seemed
content to have the battle waged by the Middle Western Republicans, There were a few Democrats, however, who even
assisted Aldrich, at times, for they had votes to trade, and he
could marshal1 the greatest number.
The two chief reasons for this Mid-Western revolt were:
(1) They were desirous of making a good t a r i f f - o n e that was
based on fact and not on fiction; (2) The schedulesaspresented
by Aldrich did not, on the whole, accomplish a downward but
a n upward revision. Thus the bill was not in accordance with
the spirit and pIedge of the RepubIican party platform of 1908.
Aldrich and his followers, of course, defended their schedules, but they did not indulge in flowery bits of eloquence, nor
engage in lengthy speeches, in support of their amendments.
They were sure that they could maintain their schedules without such. They took the position that if a schedule was not
right, then it was up to those who opposed it to investigate and
to prove to the Senate that it was unsound if they wanted it
16 Twelve volumes of tcaiimony were taken snd each schedule was Bone Over as carefully aa pce8ible. Ibid., p . 1852.
lalbid., p . 1862.
Indiaora Magazine of History
272
changed. If this could not be done, the schedule should stand
as the Committee had made it. This is the reason, therefore, for
the numerous lengthy speeches made by those who opposed the
Committee’s recommendations.
If a new kind of tariff act was to be framed the reformers
must win a majority for their policy.
Beveridge was a most persistent and severe critic of the
soundness of the tariff schedules as they came before the Senate. He repeatedly asked the Committee why they had changed
different schedules when facts were not given to prove that
the changes were necessary or expedient. It appeared to him,
as well as to the other ,’Progressives,” that these changes in
the rates were made to suit the Committee’s own fancy, or for
the benefit of some special or vested interest.
Senator Eugene Hale, a member of the Committee, explained after Beveridge had made one of his frequent attacks
of this sort, that they had been investigating the House schedules for months before the formal bill was presented. He further added: “Our time was all engrossed, confiscated, everything else abandoned, while we considered the propositions.
of the House bill.”17
Beveridge considered this argument of Hale as beside the
point, as he had not criticised the Committee for lack of consideration, especially, but for the fact that information was
not given to substantiate the changes. Beveridge clearly expressed the pith of his contention when he said :
.
There has not been one single additional fact shown to have been before the Senate Committee that was not before the House Committee. In
other worda, no new information has been given to the Senate to justify
the enormous difference in the differential. That is the point.18
On several other occasions Beveridge tried to thwart the
attempts of the Finance Committee to rush the bill through.
He repeatedly proposed that the Senate should meet at twelve
o’clock instead of ten or eleven, as they had been doing, in order
to enable those who wished to investigate the schedules more
time in which to do it. He warned, on one occasion, that it be17Con~.
Recurd, 81 Cong., 1 Seas., p. 1858. For Lodee’a ststement on this point see
RmaeveltLodge. Corrsepondsnsa. 11, pp. 831 and 538.
‘8Cong. Reasrd, 61 Cons., 1 Seas., p. 1868. When Beveridge made a similar attack on
the tarrif wbedulea on M a y 1% Aldrich defended the Committee. In the course of his remarks, Aldrioh referred to the Wd-Western Senatora an “progremivea”. This w a ~an
early, if not the firat time that they had been called ‘*progressives”on the noor of the
Senate. It WM uml frequently thereafter. Ibid, p. 1887.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
278
hooved those who were up for rdlection in 1910 to investigate
the proposed schedules thoroughly, and to make the tariff
measure as satisfactory as possible, so that they could before
the people in the next campaign and defend it with good grace
and vigor.1g
It did not take much investigation to prove conclusively to
the “Progressives” that the schedules, as a whole, constituted
a revision upward and not downward. Therefore they began
to denounce the “standpat” Republicans who were in favor of
the bill for breaking the pledge of the Republican party. Denunciation of this group meant that they were also criticising
President Talf, in a way, since he was refusing to make any
recommendations for downward revision. This inactivity of
President Taft came as a result of his attitude W a r d his
office. He asserted that he believed in a constitutional President-a President to act only as an Executive, and not to overstep his powers by trying to influence the course of legislative
action. This attitude of the President was thoroughly satisfactory to the conservatives.
The question naturally arose, “Did the Republican party
pledge a revision downward?” In attempting to answer that
question it is natural to consult first the platform of 1908.
The only thing contained therein to guide the Republican party
in making the tariff was the provision: “That the true principle of protection is best maintained by the difference between
the cost of production at home and abroad, together with a
reasonable profit to American industries.”
The party unequivocally pledged a revision of the tariff on
the basis of this principle. But what kind of a revision did
this mean, and how was it interpreted at the time that it was
first declared? It is obvious that nothing is expressly stated
in the wording of the platform to convey an idea of revision upward or downward. John C. Burrows, of Michigan, the temporary chairman of the Convention, who gave the keynote
speech, acknowledged that the party was pledged for a revision, but stated that the cardinal principles of protection to
home industries and labor should be kept in mind when making
that revision. He definitely asserted :
Whatever revision or readjustment takes place under the control of
the Republican Party, it will give just and adequate protection to Am&10 Ibid.,
pp. 1742-8.
274
Indiana Magazine of Histow
can industries and American labor and defend the market against the
unjust and unequal agression from whatever quarter they may come.*o
The Review of Reviews regarded the platform declaration
as purely a protective plank, and that the only significant thing
about it was that a general overhauling of the tariff was promised. What kind of a revision might be expected was a matter
that must be taken on faith.21 The Worlds Work stated: “We
are on the eve of a pretense and perhaps an effort to reform
the tariff.”22
The Indianapolis News did not regard this plank as being
an unusual one, nor did it contain a promise for a radical revision. In fact it was considered as quite inoffensive even to
the “standpatters”, because the last phrase-“Reasonable profit to the producer”-was very indefinite, and under it anything might happen.28
However, the New York Times expressed a somewhat different view. “Logically construed, according to known facts,
the tariff plank proposed for the Republican convention is a
free trade plank as to a very large portion of our actual and
possible foreign commerce.”**
As the campaign of 1908 progressed, there were no doubts
in the minds of the people in regard to the proper interpretation of the tariff plank in the platform. William Howard Taft,
the Republican nominee for President, repeatedly stated in his
western speeches prior to his election that the tariff pledge as
he conceived it meant a substantial revision downward. If the
“standpatters” then believed otherwise, they considered that it
was inexpedient to contradict Taft’s utterances. The party
needed the western votes in order to be successful in the fall
elections. Beveridge, who toured the entire country in the interests of the party in 1908, expressed similar views, as well as
many other Middle Western campaign speakers. As a result,
it was almost universally accepted that the party as a follower
of Taft was pledged to a downward revision with but few increases.
When the cotton schedules were attacked by the Progres* Chicago Record-Herald,
June 11, 1908.
Reuiew of Reuiewr, XXXVIII. p. 14. (July 1908)
(July 1908).
0 Worlds Work. XVI, p. 10410.
5 Indianapolis News, June 19. 1908.
New York Timas, June 16, 1908.
I
Coffin: Senatorial Career of .Albert JI Bevem’dge
276
sives for being too high, Lodge defended the Committee’s recommendations. Before he began his defense of the Committee,
as well as of the manufacturing interests of his State, he stated
what he believed to be the true nature of revision with which
Congress was charged, because he thought that the cotton
schedule was a fair sample of what a proper revision ought to
be. He thus gave an account of his views :
Early in this debate the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Aldrich)
and I happened to state incidentally that the Republican declaration of
principles contained no pledge or promise for a revision downward o r a
revision upward. For that statement we were severely criticised. We
could not have been more severely criticised if we had uttered a falsehood
instead of stating, as we did, the exact truth. I desire, therefore, to call
attention very briefly to what was actually said and done by the Republican national convention at Chicago. I had the honor to preside three
days a t that convention after it was organized. I had been at Chicago
for ten days previously, in attendance upon the national committee. I
think I saw and spoke with as many delegates as anyone there. I am
certain that I followed all the proceedings of that convention with the
closest possible attention. If the words “downward revision” or “upward
revision” occurred in any official utterance, or were suggested by any
delegate, they entirely escaped my notice: but as memory is fallible, I
have taken occasion to look over the official stenographic report of the
proceedings of the convention. The officers of the convention who spoke,
and who in a sense, I suppose, may be considered to have expressed the
views of the convention and the policies of the party, as they understood
them, were the temporary and the permanent chairman. The temporary
chairman, the senior Senator from Michigan (Mr. Burrows) in referring
to the tariff.
made no allusion to what direction the tariff should take. The permanent chairman [Senator Lodge himself] made not allusion to the tariff
whatever in his speech. He dealt with other question$.
Lodge then referred to the platform and the plank regarding the tariff. He briefly stated in his own words what the
paragraph declared and then asserted : “It said nothing as to
what the revision should be or what direction it should take.”
Henry Allen Cooper of Wisconsin submitted a minority report on the tariff to the Republican national convention which
was rejected by a vote of 962 to 28. Lodge thus summarized
Cooper’s report : *
This minority report on the tariff repeated the protection principle
set forth in the majority report and differed only in advocating the use
of the tariff or, rather, the free list, in order to reach trusts and combinations.
276
Indkm Magaxins of History
Other than this there was no further allusion to the tariff in the proceedinge at Chicago.
Lodge, however, accepted Taft’s interpretation of the meaning of the platform which implied a downward revision of
many schedules, and quoted from his speech of acceptance delivered at Cincinnati on July 28, 1908. The President had
asserted :
The tariff in a number of the schedules exceeds the difference between the cost of production of such articles abroad and at home, including a reasonable profit for the producer. The excess over the difference
serves no useful purpoae, but offers a temptation to those who would
monopolize the production and sale of such articles in this country to
profit by the excessive rate. On the other hand, there are some few
other schedules in which the tariff is not sufficiently high to give the
measure of protection which they should receive upon Republican principles, and as to those, the tariff should be raised.
Lodge then explained the origin of this Republican idea of
the tariff. In concluding his argument in regard to what the
Republican party pledged, he definitely stated :
The principle of providing in tariff rates for the difference in labor
costs is the sound principle laid down by the Republican party by which
all tariff changes must be controlled. Beyond this the Republican convention did not go. They said that they would revise the tariff on this
principle, and stopped then. What, then, does revision mean and who is
to decide as to its character or extent? Revision means going over the
whole subject, reviewing it, leaving unaltered what is good, making
changes where changes are needed. It does not mean that all the
changes in the rates should be downward, for that would not be revision,
but reduction. It does not mean that all changes should be upward, for
that would be advance and not revision. It does not mean to exclude
classifications where an old classification is imperfect.
Revision covers all of these things and is confined to no
one of them. As for revision downward, although there was no promise
or pledge by the party for that any more than a revision upward, it is no
doubt expected that the result of revision would be more reductions than
increases. That is the precise view expressed by the President. That
was the view generally taken. But the question of what the reductions
should be, and what increases, if any, was one for the majority of the
House and the Senate to decide. Wb were not pledged to meet the view
as to a downward revision held by one Senator or group of Senators, or to
accede to the demand for increases.
It is for the majority in both Houses to decide what constitutes a proper
revision in all directions.26
6
CWO. Record, 61 Cone., 1 Ses~.,PP. 2629-2680.
Coffin: SenatMial Career of Albert J. Beveridge
277
Nevertheless Lodge boasted of the fact that a great many
reductions had been made, and immediately following the above
given statements he carefully pointed out the number of reductions in comparison with the number of increases. He also
stated :
The general feeling that revision of the tariff would result in reductions and not in advances is absolutely carried out in this bill, and the
contrary impression which has been given out here and sedulously BEcepted and fostered by a portion of the press is unfounded and untrue.P6
In the opinion of Senator LaFollette, Beveridge rendered
the country a distinct service when he brought together, in
logical order, the declaration of President Taft on tariff revis i ~ n .These
~ ~ excerpts from the President’s speeches during
the campaign of 1908 were collected and read to the Senate in
order to prove conclusively that there was a definite downward
revision sentiment, being clearly expressed by the President
himself, and that the “Progressives” were justified in fighting
for this sort of a revision. These compiled statements also
justified the charge that the spirit of the RepubIican pledge
for a downward revision was being broken, for the party as
followers of Taft had promised this kind of a revision.
In his speech at Cincinnati on September 22,1908, Taft had
stated:
The movement in favor of revision has risen within the Republican
party and is pressed forward by members of the Republican party.
The revision which they desire is a revision which shall reduce the
excessive rates and at the same time preserve the industries of the country. I wish there to be no doubt in respect to tariff revision. I am a
tariff revisionist and have been one since the question has been mooted.’*
He spoke in Milwaukee on September 24,1908, expressing
his views in this way :
The tariff is greater than the differential between the cost of production at home and abroad, and that it should therefore be reduced.
I can say that our party is pledged to a genuine revision and as temporary head of that party, and President of the United Ststes, if it be
successful in November, I expect to use all of the influence that I have by
calling immediately a special session and secure a genuine and honest
revision of the tariff in accordance with the principle laid down in the
platform.
“Cong. Record, 61 Gong., 1 Seas., p. 2681.
n Ibid., p. 2661.
a8
Cincinnati laq&er, September 28, 1908. Quoted in ibid., p. 4868.
Indiana Magazine of History
278
It is my judgment that a revision of the tariff in accordance with
the pledge of the Republican party will be, on the whole a substantial
revision downward, though there probably will be a few exceptions.28
At Des Moines, Iowa, on September 26, 1908, Taft expressed similar views :
I expect to use all the influence that I have by calling immediately a
special session and by recommendations to Congress to secure a genuine
and honest revision of the tariff in accordance with the principle of protection laid down in the platforu, based upon the examination of appropriate evidence and impartial between the consumer and the manufacturer.
It is my judgment that a revision of the tariff in accordance with
the pledge of the Republican party will be, on the whole, a substantial revision downward.
As the temporary leader of the party I do not hesitate to say with all
emphasis of which I am capable that if the party is given the mandate of
power in November it will perform its promises in good faith.*’J
It is obvious that the tariff plank was put in the platform in
order to get votes. It is also just as apparent that there was a
difference of opinion in regard to the meaning of the declaration, for each person interpreted it as it would best serve his
local interests. The Middle Western Senators honestly believed
that a downward revision was pledged, but it was to their
interests to do so and they thought that it was the intention
of the party. The “standpatters” maintained that the plank
contained no definite pledge for a downward revision, because a high tariff would be beneficial to their constituents.
However, all were agreed on the principle that the tariff schedule would be fixed at a level, no higher than necessary to equalize the cost of production at home and abroad, and to insure a
reasonable profit to the American producers.
In an address to the Ohio Society of New York on December 17,1908, the President stated : “Better have no revision at
all, better that a new bill should fail, unless we have an honest
and thorough revision on the basis laid down and the principles outlined in the party
In his inaugural address President Taft reiterated his view
of the tariff revision. This is the most important of all his
-Milwaukee SmtineI, Sept. 26, 1908: quoted in Cm8. Record, 61 Cone.. 1 Sess., p.
2868.
10
Q
Des Moines Regietsr and Leader. SeBtember 26. 1908. Quoted in ibid., p. 2869.
New York Tribune, quoted in ibid., p. 2369.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beuem’dge
279
statements in respect to the tariff for he was now President
and was giving out an official statement.
It is thought that there has been such a change in conditions since
the enactment of the Dingley act.
that the
measure of the tariff stated (in the platform) will permit the reduction
of rates in certain schedules and will require the advancement of few,
if anyP
Beveridge also referred to a statement made by Porter J.
McCumber of North Dakota, a member of the Finance Committee. At the beginning of a speech, in which he attacked the
lumber schedule, McCumber had stated :
Tariff revision this year is universally understood to mean a revision
downward. The public expect, and have a right to expect, from every
public address made in that last political campaign, and that there will be
a general reduction in our tariff duties.88
Several other Senators, in the course of the debates in the
Senate, stated that the pledge as they understood it was for a
revision downward. In this group are to be found the namles of
Cummins, Moses E. Clapp, LaFollette, Nelson, Dolliver, Norris,
Brown, Coe I. Crawford, Elmer J. Burkett, Joseph L. Bristow,
Borah and others.
Beveridge made an excellent summary of the issue when
he declared :
The differences [between the two factions in the Senate-the ((progressives” and the “standpatters”] are differences in the degree of reduction, differences in the degree of rates. There is no difference in
principle.
But it is not fair to say, and it will not be permitted that it shall be said
that those who believe as the President has said, that “rates are excessive” or some of them, and therefore ask that they be reduced, shall be
condemned as being any less earnestly protectionists than others; for we
think we are equally earnest and more wise protectionists. That we are
equally earnest, we know; that we are more farseeing and more wise protectionists, time will show.S*
Senator Cummins of Iowa was accorded the leadership of
the Republican “Progressives,” if such a distinction could be
given to any one man, in the attack on the various schedules.
Opposition to the tariff was not a new thing for him, for he
p
Gong. Record, 61 Cong., 1 k.,
P. 2869.
p. 2360.
Con#. Record. 61 Con& 1 Sess., P. 2360.
* Xbid.,
280
Indiana Magazine of H h t o r y
believed, and had been insisting for seven years, that the schec
ules of the law of 1897 were too high and should be revim
It was because of this, that he had been elected to the %nab
He now continued to defend his belief with all the vigor an(
earnestness of which he was capable.s8 He was so severe in hi1
attack on the steel, wool, and window glass schedules that Ald.
rich questioned his Republicanism. This brought forth this
fiery retort from the Iowa Senator :
Is it to be tolerated that a Republican.
coming from the ranks can not differ from the judgment of the FinanCommittee without incurring the penalty of having his republicanism
challenged time and time again?
The Finance Committee composed of honorable,
intelligent broad-minded, experienced men, is still not the ark of the cove
nant of Republican faith. Inasmuch as the revision of the tariff as demanded in the Republican platform last year came from a demand on the
part of these same people whose courage I helped to sustain and whose
energies I helped to direct, I have a right to stand here and assert that
these schedules do not represent the only Republican doctrine known
among men.
.
Senator Dolliver took it upon himself to investigate the
textile schedules. The provisions relating to silk, wool, and
cotton were the chief point of his attack.sd LaFollette severely
criticised the bar-iron schedule on May 14: and on June 1and
2, he attacked the cotton schedule with so much fewor and
earnestness that he completely exhausted himself .s7
While LaFollette was making his speech on the bar-imn
schedule Senator Elihu Root became quite restless. He was
disgusted with the “Progressives” in general for their extended
attack on the methods of the Finance Committee. He decided
that it would be wise as well as beneficial to defend the Senator
from Rhode Island and his committee, and censure the Wisconsin Senator for his long windedness. He, therefore, proceeded
to inform the Senate, but in particular Mr. LaFollette, that
they should use business-like methods and statements instead
of declamations and orations for use back home.as LaFollette
of course answered him, saying, “I will be the judge for myself
of the share I take in the discussions of measure^."*^
I b i 4 D. 1776-1776.
lecord, 61 Cong.. 1 S~SB.,p. 1759 ti.
81 New York Timed, June 3, 1909.
=Gong. Record 61 Cong., 1 Sesa., D. 2088: 8048.
Ibid., p. 2044.
M Cong.
Coffin: Senat&
Career of Albert 1.B e v e d g e
281
Senator Root’s criticism of the procedure and methods used
by the Senate was not becoming to him as a new Senator, and
it was not taken with good grace by many of the members.
Senator Hernando D. Money of Mississippi, on May 14, took it
upon himself to discipline his noted colleague. He instructed
this eminent lawyer and former cabinet member that he had
delivered a lecture to the Senate as to how it should conduct its
business, and how individual Senators should conduct themselves and then delivered his rebuke :
When he (Wr. Root) has got fairly warm in his seat and has learned
a little more about the Senate he will not indulge himself in any lectures
oh this subject (laughter), for two reasons: First, because they are utterly ineffectual curtain lectures, and they are generally the outcome of
a brand-new Member; and, in the next place, they are utterly unnecessary. He will understand, also that the most unfortunate thing that has
happened to the Senate is having a new Senator come in here and do
We want a man,
things on “business” methods.
when he comes here, to drop his business methods at the door and adopt
the legislative and senatorial methods or the best way for transacting the
public business.
After commenting on various subjects Money again returned to the subject of Mr. Root and his “business methods”
speech, saying:
It doea not become a man, however important he may consider himself, or whatever position the world may give him, to come into the
Chamber of his peers and tell us that we can not talk, or that we ought
to talk or that we ought to do business in this way or that way which may
happen to be approved by his judgment or his taste, or his habits, or his
opinion, or anything else that concerns him. We come here to do exactly
as we please, each one responsible to his constituents, and to no one else
in this world.40
McCumber severely attacked the lumber schedule, while
Bristow opposed the lead schedule. Democratic Senators, of
course, challenged the schedules at various times, as did other
Republicans, when their local interests demanded a change in
the rates. This indicates that the tariff was in some respects
a local interest rather than a national one and that revenue for
the government was of secondary importance, while local pro* Conp. R e c h i , 61 Cong.. 1 Seas., p, 2046. This speech is &en here In order to show
the Senate’s attitude on attempta to change the methods and to limit debates. It partially
explaina why Wee-President Daaea did not pet any farther than he did in his recent
attempt to reform the Senate.
Indiana Magazine of History
282
tection was the paramount consideration to a number of individual membefs.
Amendments were submitted, discussed, and voted on from
May 5 until July 8. A survey of the votes cast on the various
schedules shows that Beveridge, Brown and Burkett of Nebraska, Bristow of Kansas, Cummins and Dolliver of Iowa, LaFollette of Wisconsin, and Nelson of Minnesota were the most
consistent in their voting against the committee recommendations and in favor of revisions downward. Clapp of Minnesota and Robert J. Gamble and Crawford of South Dakota rank
next in the constancy of their opposition. Borah of Idaho,
Charles E. Curtis of Kansas, and McCumber and Martin N.
Johnson of North Dakota frequently changed sides according
to their interest in the commodities affected. However, that
statement also applies to certain “Progressives,” f o r when it
came to duties on local commodities some of them voted in
favor of maintaining the Commitbe’s schedules if not for
higher rates.
Some of the Democrats had no scruples against voting with
the “standpatter$’ when it was to their interests t o have a high
tariff rate. Twelve Democrats voted with the Committee to
pass the lumber ~ c h e d u l ewhile
, ~ ~ the coal schedule was passed
with ten Democrats voting in favor of it.42 Other Demucrats
voted consistently against the Republicans because of their love
for opposing them or because of traditional antagonism to the
policy of protection, while several others were so disinterested
that they failed to vote on many occasions. On the whole, the
votes indicate that the divisions on the tariff schedules were,
for the most part, based on economic considerations rather
than on strict political affiliation^.^^
Beveridge’s general opposition to the “standpatters” was
probably the most outstanding characteristic of his course during this great tariff controversy; but he was not merely an
opponent of the Committee. On May 14, he submitted an
amendment which provided for an internal revenue tax on tobacco, especially on high priced cigars. He also asked, by
means of a resolution, for all information collected by the Department of Commerce in regard to tobacco prices and the
Conn. Record. 61 Cong., 1 Sm.,p. 4809.
Ibid., p. 4809.
For a brief of all the v o t e cast from M a y 6 to July 8 on the various amendments
see ibrd.. PD. 4792-4818.
‘I
@
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
283
operations of corporations and others dealing in the growth,
manufacture, and sale of tobacco.44 This information was submitted to him (Senate Document No. 78), and by thoroughly
studying the statistics contained therein he obtained the basis
for his attack on the American Tobacco Company on June 24.
In this speech Beveridge brought to light the workings and
the exact nature of this tobacco trust. The facts which he
brought out were astounding, and they thoroughly convinced
the majority of the Senators that remedial legislation was necessary. He revealed that in the last eight years, on the authority of Congress, the tobacco trust had been allowed to collect
on an average of twenty millions of dollars annually in excess
profits. To be exact, in eight years the company had received
$184,090,557.43which should have flowed into the treasury of
the United States.45 He then explained just how this was done.
In 1898,when the government had imposed a war tax on tobacco, the manufacturers had been permitted to sell smaller
packages for old prices rather than increasing the price of the
package. This enabled the public to pay the same amount of
money for a package as they formerly had done, but they actually obtained less tobacco. This differential, then, was sufficient to pay the tax. It was simply an indireet method of
taxing the people. In the session of 1901-02,this war tax had
been removed by Congress, but no statement was made in regard to the weight of the packages. In fact Congress did not
have the right to stipulate that a certain amount of tobacco
should be put into a package, and that a certain price should be
received for it, because this would have been price fixing pure
and simple. As a result the manufacturers continued to put
the same amount of tobacco in their packages as they had during the Spanish-American war, and retained the same price
level. In this way, then, the tobacco companies, and especially
the American Tobacco Company, which Beveridge asserted was
the most compact and effective private monopoly in existence,'"
had been drawing into their coffers millions annually. Since it
was not in the province of congressional legislation to dictate
prices, the only thing to do, as Beveridge saw it, was to reestablish a tax on tobacco and turn this stream of money into
the proper channel-the Government Treasury. If the people
44
Xbid., R. 2028.
* Con& Record, 61 Cung., 1 sesb, PP. 2022 ff.
Cow. Record. 61 Cong.. 1 Sees., P. 2024.
284
Indiana Magazine of Hiato?,
were to be taxed as they were being taxed under the Government’s authority, then the money should go into the official
trea~ury.~’Other portions of the speech were made in explanation and support of the various parts of this amendment. On
the whole it was a most complete indictment of the tobacco
trust based on facts as taken from their records in the Department of C~mmerce.’~“This exposition of the history of the
tobacco taxes”, says the Review of Reviews, “was the one conspiciously strong piece of purely budgetary analysis and argument made during the entire session in either house.”40 As a
result, Beveridge won the eternal enmity of the tobacco trust.
On July 8, Senator Aldrich “called up” Beveridge’s amendment and after Senator Reed Smoot, a member of the Committee on Finance had proposed several changes in the form of
additional
a vote was taken. The amendment was
passed 52 to 25.61
Under the maximum and minimum rate clause of the tariff
bill the Committee on Finance had inserted the following provision :
To secure information to assist the President in the discharge of the
duties imposed on him by this section, and information which will be useful to Congresa in tariff legislation and to the officers of the Government
in the adminiatration of the customs laws, the President is hereby authorized to employ such persons as may be required to make thorough investigations and examinations into the production,commerce, and trade of the
United States and foreign countries, and all conditions affecting the
same.**
This provision, as accepted by the Senate, was the result of
the co6perative work of Aldrich and Beverdige. When Beveridge had explained his proposal for a tariff commission in the
Senate on February 5, 1908,6sAldrich had been but slightly
interested ;but at the beginning of this session, when Beveridge
presented Aldrich with his original bill for consideration, he
agreed that some such provision was necessary. However, Aldrich would not accept the plan “in toto”, so he drafted a bill and
L1 Ibid., R. 8741.
a Ibid., PP. 8725-8748.
(0 Review of Rsviewr, XV, p. 189.
W I b i d . , p. 4246.
6’ Rettiew of Reviews, XV, p. 4264.
Many d the teeth were b k e n out of this law by
the conference on the tariff by the Senate and the House conferees. For fuller explanation
see Beveridge’s speech in Indianapolis News, April 6 , 1910.
Cong. Record, 61 Cong., 1 8eSs.. P. 4888.
See Ibid., 60 Cong., 2 Sess., under drte mentioned.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
285
submitted it to Beveridge. It was not as broad as Beveridge
thought i t should be, so on the suggestion of Aldrich, he redrafted his original bill. Even this was too broad for Aldrich
to accept. This process of drafting and counter-drafting, lasting about two weeks, finally produced the draft which was
passed by the Senate.a4 In the conference of the House and
the Senate on the tariff bill this provision was made still more
general, giving the President greater discretionary powers in
regard to the work which the tariff commission was to perform
and putting it at the disposal of the President entirely. Beveridge opposed this change for it was his intention to have this
commission investigate conditions which affected the tariff
and report their findings to Congress to be used as a basis for
the formulation of correct tariff schedules. According to this
modified provision the commission could only report to the
President, and would only be of benefit to Congress through
the President's recommendations.
Beveridge had not expected to get his original tariff commission bill adopted by the Senate, for it was his policy in all
great reforms to get the principle established, if possible, and
settle on the details at a later date. This provision of the
Payne-Aldrich tariff act, although quite different in details
from Beveridge's recommendation, established the principle of
a commission composed of experts to assist in the formulation
and administration of the tariff laws. Due credit must be
given Beveridge for promoting, if not originating, the idea of a
tariff commission.
The tariff bill was passed by the Senate on July 8 by a vote
of 45 to 34.55 Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana, Joseph L. Bristow of Kansas, Norris Brown and Elmer J. Burkett of Nebraska, Moses E. Clapp and Knute Nelson of Minnesota, Coe I.
Crawford of South Dakota, Albert B. C u m i n s and Jonathan
P. Dolliver of Iowa, and Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin,
were the ten Republican Senators who voted against the bill.
These men had put forth their utmost efforts to get the rates of
the various schedules reduced. They had not succeeded, for
almost every committee recommendation had been adopted by
a comfortable majority. They firmly believed that the party
had pledged a revision downward, and their constituents had
voted for Taft on November 3, with that belief; but this tariff
SI
Cong. Record. 61 Con&?., 1 Sess., P. 4861.
Record, 61 Cons., I Sess., P. 4316.
"Gong.
286
Indiana Magazine of History
bill was not a fulfillment of that pledge. Therefore, in order to
register their final disapproval of the proceedings in the Senate
and to keep faith with the pledge of 1908, they voted “nay”.
A plot of this Senate vote shows the general distribution as
well as the geographical divisions on this economic question.
New England and the Far West united to pass the schedule
while ten Republicans voted with the Democrats in opposition
to the bill. The States in the Mississippi valley, with the exception of Illinois, were almost unanimous in their opposition
to the bill and the principles for which it
The significance of this vote lies in the fact that the majority of the States of the West which gave Taft electoral votes in
1908, had now lost confidence in him; that the agricultural
West was in revolt against the commercial domination of the
East ; “progressivism” was revolting against “standpatism” ;
and the States of the Great Valley whether Republican or
Democratic were in earnest and ready to revolt against the
doctrine of special privilege for which Aldrich stood, and
against the party denomination of Speaker Cannon.
The House refused to concur in the Senate amendments, and
according to regular procedure, the bill went into conference.
The House conferees, headed by Sereno E. Payne of New York,
included six Republicans and three Democrats, while the
Senate members of whom Aldrich was chairman, included
five Republicans and three Democrats. Some of the disagreements between the two houses codd be settled without much
difficulty, while other questions presented graver problems.
The President was invited by the Conference Committee to express his views or to act as arbiter between the two houses. It
was here that he first used his influence, to any great extent, to
obtain lower rates. It seems that he did all he could at this late
hour, single handed, to secure reductions, for he favored the
lower rates in each schedule. But his hands were tied, in many
respects, because the established conference rules prohibited
the making of new rates. After the bill was in conference
new rates could be secured only by concurrent resolutions
passed by both houses. Therefore, the President could only
choose between the House and Senate schedules. If he belived that neither was satisfactory he could now do nothing
whatever. Aldrich and Cannon, who represented in fact, the
“All of the Republican Senators who voted lury represented North Central S t a h
Only Beveridge and LaFollette Lived east of the Ybeisdppi.
Coffin: Senatorial Careey of Albert J . Beveridge
287
real power behind the conferees, were fairly certain that the
bill would not be vetoed no matter what happened or did not
happen while the measure was in conference. They felt certain that the President was especially pleased with four of the
provisions of the bill-to-wit, the corporation tax, the customs
court, the tariff commission, and the maximum and minimuprate provision-and would not veto it on this account. Consequently, Aldrich, as well as the House conferees who were in
favor of high rates, was rather uncompromising at times ; and
Taft, although he made many recommendations, was neither
firm enough nor domineering enough to force Aldrich and the
“standpatters” to acquiesce in many instances. The President
was more of an arbiter than a commander. As a result, according to the New York Times, out of one hundred ninety-nine
cases where Taft made recommendations eighty-three of the
higher rates were agreed upon, seventy-nine of the lower rates
were accepted, and the two houses compromised on thirty-seven
points.67 However, the number of reductions or increases is
not a true index of the significance of reductions or increases
made. This must be determined by the volume of the trade
engaged in in each community under consideration. A comparison on this basis only would give a n accurate estimate of
the results.
The conferees agreed on a report on July 30. The House
accepted this conference report on July 31, but the Senate considered the report more seriously. However, on August 5, it
was accepted by a vote of 47 to 33L6*after the passage of a
concurrent resolution amending the rates in the leather schedule by both houses. Beveridge, Bristow, Clapp, Cummins, Dolliver, LaFollette, and Nelson were the Republicans who were
still dissatisfied with the bill. They were not soothed by the
belated action of the President, and these seven “Progressives”
courageously voted against the bill in its final form.
The President approved the bill soon after i t was presented
to him. He then gave this estimate of the bill :
I have signed the Payne Tariff bill because I believe it to be the result of a sincere effort on the part of the Republican Party to make a
downward revision, and to comply with the promises of the platform aa
67 New York Timea, July 81, 1909.
@Gong. Record, 61 Cons. 1 Seas., P. 4949. Brown and Burkett of Nebraska, and
Crawford of South Dakota, Republicans, who had voted against the bill on July 8, voted
in favor of the mmsure
288
Indiana Magazine of History
they have been generally understood, and as I interpreted them in the
campaign before the election.
The bill is not a perfect tariff bill or a complete compliance with the
promises made, strictly interpreted, but a fulfillment free from criticism
in respect to a subject matter involving many schedules and thousands of
articles could not be expected.
There have been few increases in the bill, (wines and luxuries excepted). There have been a great number of real decreases in the
rates and they constitute a sufficient amount to justify a substantial revision downward, and a reduction of the excessive rates.69
The Payne-Aldrich law was at once closely scrutinized and
severely criticised by press and people throughout the Nation.
Some pronounced i t the worst tariff law that had ever been
passed, because a few of the schedules, as they viewed them,
were atrocious, unfair, or made for the benefit of some special
interest. Many of the people thought that the special session
of Congress had not been worth while, for they had made a
vain attempt to remedy the tariff, and in the process had
broken the pledge of the Republican party for a downward revision. Not only had Congress repudiated this pledge, but they
had entirely disregarded, and had failed to apply, for the most
part, the principle set forth in the platform as to what constituted the true basis for a tariff revision-to-wit, the difference
between the cost of production at home and abroad. They could
not apply this principle, because they had made very little actual effort, if any, to find out what this differential was.
However, there were many who upheld the President and admired him for his efforts during the conference, and who
thought that the Payne-Aldrich tariff was a n admirable one.
The Outlook definitely stated its opinion of the President and
the new law. “He [the President] has succeeded, and the bill
in final form is by f a r the most enlightened protectionist meas,’OO
ure in the history of our country.
The Nation, although it severely denounced several of the
schedules, thought the bill as a whole was a n admirable one.
After reviewing the entire matter this conclusion was presented to readers :
It is only just to admit that the President’s insistence did wring something from the high-tariff extortionists. Bad as the final bill is in many
N e w York Times, August 6, 1909.
~ o O u t b o kXCII,
.
P. 873. (Aug. 14, 1909). This view is based upon the special pm
vision contained in the Act-ta-wit, the corporation tax, oustoms court, tariff commission,
and maximum and minimum rates.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridge
features it still has to be said of it.
the best tariff law ever enacted by the Republican party.61
289
that it is
The Worlds Work, The Review of Reviews, The Independent, and many others could not see that the new tariff law
was as good as they and the country had been justified in expecting. The big question was, why did Taft withhold his
recommendations for so long? The Independent on July 29,
expressed its view of the situation and clearly stated the point
in this way while the conferees were at work:
It is difficult to understand why the President, who is so actively insisting on reduction at this late day, and 50 persistently exerting his influence to obtain them, not only made no effort whatever for a downward r e
vision throughout the weeks and months he could have accomplished some
thing, because the insurmountable difficulties which now confront him did
not exist, but permitted the insurgent Republican Senators, 88 they were
exposing the uneqaitable rates, to believe that their movement had his dieapproval.62
It seems reasonable to believe that if President Taft had
disregarded some of his constitutional scruples at an earlier
date, and had insisted on his views, if he had any, as every
other President has had to do, that a real downward revision
might have been accomplished. It is rather obvious that he
thought that he would lose the support of the conservative majority by aiding the progressive minority, and that if he remained relatively quiet and let the legislative body solve their
own problems that party harmony might be maintained. Whatever course he chose to follow, his action or inaction was sure
to cause dissatisfaction within the Republican ranks. He chose
to remain quiet and as inoffensive as possible, and as a result
he definitely identified himself with the “standpatters”. It
seems logical to believe that his activities before the conference
committee was an attempt to win oack the progressive element
of the West. But he had waited too long. By this delay he
lost his opportunity to live up to his campaign promisespromises so easy to make, but very difficult to fulfill after the
bill had been passed by the Senate.
Is i t any wonder, then, that the progressive Republicans
thought that Taft had betrayed their confidence, after having
made definite promises in his campaign speeches, in the
m The Nation. LXXXVIII,p. 112 (Aug. 6 , 1909).
0’ Ildepmdent, LXVII, pp. 260-261 (July 29, 1909).
Indiana Magazine of History
290
one at Milwaukee in particular; after having failed to make
recommendations to assist them in their struggle for lower
rates while the bill was in the Senate; and after later having
made a speech at Winona, Minnesota, in defense of the tariff in
which he declared without hesitation that the Payne-Aldrich
Act was the best tariff measure that the Republican Party had
ever
After this a break in the Republican party was
inevitable.
This rift in the Republican party, already quite obvious, became more pronounced in 1910 when a bill providing for a
United States Court of Commerce was up for consideration.
The purpose of the bill was to expedite the settlement of cases
arising under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and all
amendments thereto. Under the old system of District Court
and Circuit Court jurisdiction it was thought that there had
been too much delay in the court proceedings on account of the
volume of other business with which each of these courts had
to deal. It was therefore considered expedient to establish this
special court to deal with commerce cases alone.
Senator Cummins again led the attack against the “standpatters” who were favoring the bill. He was satisfied with the
system then in operation, and showed, by a review of all the
cases brought before Federal courts in the past four years, that
the United States District Courts and Circuit Courts were efficient and handled the cases with a minimum amount of delay. In fact, they had been disposed of with more celerity than
any other cases in the circuit courts of the United States. Furthermore, only twenty-eight cases had been brought before the
courts the previous four years, and even with the cases that
might arise under the increased powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, there would not be a large enough number
of litigations to warrant the expenditure of $150,000 a year
for salaries and other expenses connected with the proposed
Beveridge was not opposed to a separate court. In fact he
favored such specialization, but he could not see the value of
creating this court when there was no work for it to perfrom
which was not already easily, quickly, and satisfactorily performed by the nine Circuit Courts. Consequently, he voted for
the Cummins amendment, which was to strike out those secpre%idmtiii Message8 and Skrte Pape+s, of William H w o r d Taft, p. 226.
u Cong. Rscord. 61 Gong., 2 Sess., pp. 6526-6528.
88
Coffin: Senatom'al Career of Albert J . Beveridge
291
tions of the bill creating this special court. The other Republican Senators who voted for the amendment were: Borah,
Bristow, Clapp, Crawford, Cummins, Dolliver, and LaFolletteeB5 On the other proposed amendments this division remained practically the same.O6 All of these Senators, however,
voted for the bill when it came before the Senate for a final
consideration. The vote stood, yeas 50, nays
A resolution to create permanently and define the duties of
a Tariff Board was submitted to the House on January 30,
1911. Mr. Dalzell explained that in accordance with a clause
in the maximum and minimum rate provision of the PayneAldrich tariff act, President Taft had appointed three men t o
assist him in the administration of this tariff law. These men,
organized as a tariff bureau, had been known as a Tariff
Board ; but there were no specifications as to the duties which
they were to perform. This bill, drafted in accordance with
the President's recommendation, increased the membership of
the Board from three to five and defined its powers and duties.
After some discussion, the bill was passed by a vote of 186 to
93.86
When the bill came before the Senate for consideration
Beveridge was one of its chief defenders, because it was in substance the same bill which he had advocated in 1908. After
minor amendments were agreed to, the Senate passed the bill
on March 4, 1911, by a vote of 56 to 23.69 It was then sent to
the House and was referred to the Committee on Ways and
It failed to get any further, because there was no
time before adjournment in which to consider the Senate
amendments.
Another important activity in which Beveridge participated
was the promulgation of the proposed amendment for the direct election of Senators. He had advocated this amendment in
the Senate as early as 1908," but the proposal at that time received very little serious consideration. It was now a more
a tbid., p. 6342.
88 A survey of the yeu and nay votes take. on the proposed amendments show that
Beveridge, Borah, Ddliver and LaFollette voted against the "standpat" Republicans eight
times : Bristow and Clapp, seven times : Crawford. six times : Bourne, Cummins, Burkhart
and Dixon, five times : and Brown, three times. Eleven votes were taken.
For a brief survey of the bill and the
07 C m g . Recoyd, 61 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 7375.
changes made by it see LaFollette's survey, P. 7873.
~ 8 C o n gRecord,
.
61 Cong., 3 Sess., p. 1709.
* Xbid., p. 4286.
' 0 Zbid., p. 4337.
'1Cong. RecoTd, 60 Cong., 1 Sess., P. 6806.
Indiana Magazine of Histow
292
pertinent question, because several States had passed resolutions asking Congress to submit such an amendment for ratification. On February 10, 1911, Beveridge severely criticised
Senator Root, who had just made a speech against the amendment, for his conservatism and his distrust of the popular
will, and ably defended the amendment as well as the character and intelligence of the American people.72 In direct opposition to Root he declared : “I have no greater reverence for anything on earth than I have for the intelligence and conscience
of the combined millions that make up the American people
them~elves.”?~The resolution was lost because the required
two-thirds vote was not obtainable. Fifty-fodr Senators voted
for and thirty-three against the proposed amendment.?’
In the Congressional elections of 1910, the Democrats won
a large majority in the House in spite of the able work of
Roosevelt, Pinchot, Beveridge, and others during the cam~ a i g n .Dissatisfaction
~~
with the tariff of 1909, the increase in
the cost of living, and the disorganization of the Republican
party were largely responsible for Republican defeats. Republicans lost their majority in the State Legislature of Indiana,
and Senator Beveridge was succeeded by John W. Kern in
1911. Beveridge had worked hard for the success of the party
during the campaign. He did not have much to say in regard
to the results of the election. He only gave out this brief, characteristic statement : “Fortunes of war ; it is all right ; twelve
years of hard work ; clean record ;I am content.”T8
Throughout his entire political career Beveridge was an
enthusiastic political leader, but he was never regarded as an
entirely certain party man. He was a Republican, yet he did
not believe implicity in the sanctity of all Republican doctrines.
He was a greater admirer of certain leaders within the party
than he was of the party itself. Roosevelt was especially admired, and, in turn Roosevelt thought a great deal of Beveridge. Roosevelt was once asked why he entertained such high
regard for Beveridge. This was his answer: “He never an-
’’ Cow. Record. 60 Cong., S Sess.. pp. 2251-2259.
Ibid., p. 2258.
’ d l b l d , . p. 8634.
Beveridge in a speech to the Republican State Convention on April 5. 1910. clearly
and boldly s t a t e d why he opposed the Payne-Aldrich tariff. The keynote of his action
WBS that he WBS striving for right and Justice in the tariff rates.
He antagonized the
interests by many of his actions in the Senate and they, no doubt plaJed a large pnrt ln
the Republican defeat of 1910. in Indiana Indianapolis News, April 6. 1910.
Indianapolis J o v r n d November 12. 1910.
Coffin: Senatorial Career of Albert J . Beveridgc
293
noys me with small politics. His mind is devoted entirely to
great public questions.”” His freedom from petty politics was
made possible, in a way, because of the facts connected with his
election to the Senate. He was elected to that body as a result
of the efforts of his friends. They were, of course, within the
party, but they were not the recognized leaders of the Republicans of Indiana at that time. Since the “old line” Republicans
were not directly responsible for his election he therefore felt
that he had few party obligations to fulfill. Consequently, he
did not have to bother with petty politics nor worry about
limiting his actions or making them conform to strictly party
principles. He was thus relatively free to exert his efforts in
order to secure legislation which would benefit the whole nation and which would further the general welfare of the people.
This was his chief motive, for he had a greater respect for and
more faith in the people than he had in the Republican party as
an organization.
Beveridge was an ambitious man as well as a politician.
He had ability and an unlimited amount of perseverance and
industry. He was f a r above the average in his intellectual
capacity; and he desired above all things, to be intellectually
free, and to be able To act at all times according to the dictates
of his own judgment and conscience. In accordance with this.
principle he refused to accept any large campaign contributions
from large business concerns ; and because he did not, he w w
independent of them. In this respect he was “above board”,
and cannot be criticised adversely on the grounds of monetary
infuences guiding his actions.
He was a man who was courageous ; one who stood for his
convictions and advocated them without fear of consequences.
For this, he was greatly admired. Senator Mark Hanna was
captivated by Beveridge when he made his first set speech in
the Senate. Soon thereafter, the great boss approached Beveridge and asked him to make a speech in favor of his ship subsidy bill. When Beveridge told him that he had not even read
the bill and, therefore, was not ready to answer him, Hanna insisted that he promise to speak for it. To this the young Senator from Indiana replied :
I will not make that speech for you; I will not even pledge to vote for
the bill, but I will agree to this; if you will send to my room everything
n
Noel, Addresaes, P. 16.
294
Indiana Magazine of History
that has been written and printed in England and Germany on the question
of ship subsidies, I will give thirty days of honest study to the question,
and at the end of that time will tell you what I will do.78
Senator Hanna sent him two stacks of books as high as a
table. Beveridge studied the question thoroughly, and as a result, he did not make a speech for the bill neither did he vote
for it. Nevertheless, he won the respect of Senator Hanns,
who ever after considered him as one of his special friends.
When Hanna was asked by H. H. Kohlsaat why he thought so
much of Beveridge as to give him a standing invitation to his
Sunday morning breakfasts, while others had to be specially invited, he replied: “Beveridge always rings true. He is either
for you or against you. You never have to look under the table
to find out where Beveridge stands on any important questi~n.”‘~
Beveridge was progressive because of his independent
spirit and because of his intimacy with other “Progressives”
and with Roosevelt.80 In fact he was so progressive that many
people considered him more a theorist than a constructive politician. Yet, this is not true, for in reviewing his work it is
surprising to note how many of the things he advocated early
that were finally enacted by Congress. In this respect, he was
f a r in advance of his party.
Beveridge is to be admired most, perhaps, for the earnestness, industry and perseverance with which he entered into
the duties and the work open to a Senator. He is above all to
be greatly admired for his independence. He stood on his own
two feet, for the most part, doing, voting, and advocating what
he, in his own judgment, thought best.
Shaffer. in Addresaea, pp. 25-26.
in Addresses, D. 26.
80 Whenever Roosevelt was criticised in the Senate, Beveridge was always eager to defend him. He also ardently advocated and defended the meaSures which Roosevelt recommended. One of the best examples of this is his advocacy and defense of Roosevelt’s naval
program on April 24 to 28. 1908.
Is
Shaffer,