China on Korean Reunification:
Spoiler, Beneficiary, or Something in
Between?
Gregory Macris
U.S. Department of State
China’s position on reunification of the Korean peninsula is clear: it would support a reunified
Korea as a peaceful, independent nation.
-- Chinese President Hu Jintao, November 16, 2005
L
acking the rhetorical dash of Ronald Reagan’s “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this
wall!” President Hu’s remarks before the Republic of Korea (ROK) National
Assembly produced a similar standing ovation from the partisan crowd. For the
first time, a Chinese leader had gone on record supporting reunification, long the
goal of both Koreas.1 But was Hu serious or disingenuous in his statement? And was the
audience myopic in focusing on “support a reunified Korea” and not on “as a peaceful,
independent nation” which China analysts deem shorthand for a Korea bereft of U.S. troops and
under Beijing’s influence?
A growing chorus of academics, diplomats and strategists conclude President Hu spoke
straightforwardly in Seoul with no hidden messages.2 A reunified Korea would further a range of
Chinese interests from reducing wasteful subsidies to Pyongyang to creating a massive market
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within /luce.nt/ are those
of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval War College, the
Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or any other
branch or agency of the U.S. Government.
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for Chinese exports. However, other China experts dismiss this thinking as Pollyannaish. A
divided Korea provides Beijing a useful buffer zone, they contend, and keeps U.S. forces a safe
distance away. Further, the Kims’ unpredictability ensures ROK, US, and even Japanese security
planners sleep fitfully to China’s benefit. Whose contention is correct, and how might China
react should an external shock, internal upheaval, or unexpected diplomatic breakthrough put
the Koreas on a path to union? This paper identifies the arguments of the pro- and antireunification camps, analyzes which might prevail with senior Beijing leadership depending on
various scenarios, and recommends actions the United States and ROK should take to spur
Chinese acceptance of a unified, democratic, and Western-aligned Korea—a US policy priority in
northeast Asia.
Agreement on End-state Desirability, Discord on Methods and Approach
Most nations involved in the Korea dispute, including the United States, support a onestate political solution, viewing the peninsula’s current division as a historic anomaly. To
illustrate, Article III of the ROK constitution says, “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall
consist of the entire Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands,”3 while current U.S. policy
envisions “a durable peace on the peninsula which leads to peaceful reunification on the
principles of a free democracy and market economy.”4 North of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ),
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) seeks to foster “the complete victory of
socialism and the revolutionary goal of national liberation in the entire area of the country” and
thus complete “the supreme national task”—a different vision of reunification, but desirous of
one Korea nonetheless.5 Each nation believes its interests are better met by a durable peace on
a reunified peninsula than via the current stalemate, although all are cognizant that the longer
the Koreas are separated, the more unlikely is their eventual reunification.
China’s stance and interests are more difficult to define. Hu’s 2005 clarification
seemingly put China in the pro-unification camp. So, too, does the country’s continuing support
for denuclearization discussions under the Six-Party process, whose roadmap envisions a
normalization regime that constitutes a tacit step toward reunification.6 Yet the Chinese
president recently has flip-flopped in public statements, enunciating China’s priority on the
peninsula alternatively as “denuclearization” (in line with the United States and ROK positions
and seemingly pro-unification) and “peace and stability” (the status quo and supportive of the
DPRK’s continuing existence). China hands reasonably question whether Beijing, for decades the
DPRK’s only strong ally, would support any reunification scenario at odds with Pyongyang’s
“Viva la Revolución!” model.
Emergent Vanguard Argues China Should Support Korean Reunification
An increasing number of analysts are challenging the assumption that Korean union
harms Chinese interests. Buoyed by the possibility that imminent leadership turnover in Beijing
might foment a policy review, they are trumpeting the benefits Korean reunification would bring
to China and urging Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials to take tentative steps to prepare
the ground.7
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Economic and commercial benefits figure high in reunification proponents’ talking
points. The ROK is already China’s fourth-largest trading partner, with two-way trade reaching
$207 billion in 2010.8 Conglomerates such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai operate subsidiaries in
China and source components from Chinese firms such as Huawei and Beijing Automotive
Industries. All would thrive from Korean reunification. ROK economists estimate reunification’s
ultimate cost at $2.1 trillion, a public works and investment bonanza that Chinese companies
would be well-poised to exploit.9 They would also benefit from serving the expanded Korean
market when the country’s population rises from forty nine to seventy two million overnight
after reunification. Additionally, rising wealth in the north would unleash pent-up demand;
beneath the DPRK’s territory lie minerals valued in the trillions, attractive to a Chinese
government whose foreign policy imperatives include scouring the globe for reliable sources of
raw materials. Reunification would also enhance regional transportation networks. Rail and road
connections for China and Russia through the unified peninsula would open. Korea would have
access to the Trans-Siberian Railroad and easier links to Europe, while pipeline traffic from China
and Russia to Korea and Japan would also be a possibility.10 Finally, positive economic spillover
from reunification would benefit neighboring Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, poor provinces
comprising what one analyst deemed “Chinese Appalachia.”11 The resulting economic growth
would help close the yawning wealth gap between regions and promote social stability, both
high CCP priorities.
Reunification would free China from supporting an economy it considers anachronistic
and transfer those costs to the ROK and the West, its principal economic competitors. While
Beijing lately has replaced cash subsidies with sanctions-busting-trade arrangements that
benefit DPRK state-owned companies and otherwise unprofitable Chinese firms, the cost to
Beijing’s treasury remains in the billions per year.12 China provides an estimated ninety percent
of DPRK energy imports, and it must deliver food aid continually to prevent a repeat of the mid1990s famine.13 Further, Chinese recommendations to liberalize the DPRK economy under the
Deng Xiaoping model continue to fall on deaf ears, as the Kim regime fears any step that could
undermine its political control.14 Only radical external shocks and subsequent regime change in
the DPRK will spur meaningful economic reform, reunification proponents assert.
China increasingly treads the world stage and must worry about its reputation. The
country’s enviable economic prowess and cash reserves, backed by a growing military, provide
robust coercive potential, but its “soft power” account lags considerably. Partly to blame are the
relationships China maintains with a host of international pariah states, from Iran to Sudan, vital
in satisfying its voracious and growing energy requirements. But what does China gain from
supporting the DPRK, whose Mafia-like character has earned it the sobriquet a “[Tony] Soprano
state?”15 Proponents of reunification assert China’s strong support for it would break this
detrimental codependence and buttress the country’s reputation as a rising and responsible
superpower.
Above all, China requires geopolitical stability to foster economic growth and ensure the
CCP’s hold on power. Threatening this stability is continued DPRK brinkmanship the CCP
tolerates without significant rebuke. Can Beijing be certain DPRK WMD are not pointed north as
well as south, for example, or that its existing influence could prevent a simmering situation
from boiling over? As to the latter, one RAND Corporation analyst argues that China no longer
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plays Gepetto to the DPRK’s Pinocchio; the relationship better approximates that of the United
States and Israel, with the same inherent tensions and differing evaluations of current threats.16
China was livid over the DPRK’s nuclear test in 2006, not on substance but because Kim Jong-il
had not first informed Beijing. Particularly worrisome to Chinese policy makers is a DPRK
provocation so grave that Japan abandons its “no nuclear weapons” pledge.17 Reunification
would eliminate this dangerous, unpredictable threat to regional stability.
Strategists who argue that unification furthers Chinese interests point last to the U.S.
military presence on the peninsula, which Beijing deplores. How might Washington justify its
continuance, with the threat from the Kim regime eliminated and domestic calls to “bring the
troops home” growing louder? Visible Chinese backing for the political process of reunification,
with matching financial assistance, could leverage latent anti-American sentiments amongst
South Koreans in spurring the unified national government to reduce or even terminate the 60year U.S. role. No longer “contained” in its northeast, China’s strategic maneuverability would
increase, reunification proponents contend.18
Counterpoint: Realists Insist the Status Quo Serves China Just Fine
Beijing leadership not only seeks stability but actively avoids change, claim mainstream
China experts who doubt a major turn in Korea policy will occur soon. Reunification implies a
type of political chaos which could derail the economic modernization and job creation
necessary to keep the Chinese countryside quiet.19 Traditionalists argue that patience and
pragmatism, not rashness and risk-taking, characterize “the Chinese way” and demand an
incrementalist approach on Korea. President Hu’s heir-apparent, Xi Jinping, will likely not
approve major policy turns early in his tenure, nor will the CCP apparatus wish to dump
additional stress on new DPRK leader Kim Jong-un as he solidifies his power base in Pyongyang.
Chinese support for Korean union, tacit or express, would engender DPRK pushback, the
“stand pat” crowd asserts. Much depends on the scenario driving unification. Were it a bottomup, Arab Spring-type situation, Kim would seek a Chinese lifeline, if not militarily, then
diplomatically á la Syria. Xi would prefer not having to answer Kim’s call so early in his tenure.
Mass migration pressures would ensue in this and most other unification scenarios,
producing a flow of North Korean refugees which worst-case computer modeling estimates at
three million.20 Desperation might force some across the mine-strewn DMZ, but a significant
portion would flee to Jilin or Liaoning, already intolerant of the long-settled ethnic Korean
minority. China hopes to prevent a repeat of the early 1980s, when war with Vietnam and a
resulting refugee crisis forced it to construct temporary shelters which morphed into permanent
and expensive camps.21 Closing the border outright to North Korean migrants would generate an
equally unpalatable result: global condemnation for China’s failure to honor its international
humanitarian commitments, further reducing its soft power. An inexperienced Xi again would
confront a decision he would rather avoid.
China long has derived strategic comfort from the DPRK buffering it from prosperous,
politically open, and militarily threatening ROK and its U.S. bases. Traditionalists, citing classical
hegemonic theory which demands great powers keep their neighbors weak or divided, reckon
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China should never acquiesce to Korea’s unification lest it lose this protection. Further, longpracticed Chinese geopolitics mandate vassal state or suzerain arrangements for the “periphery
peoples” surrounding the ethnic Han core, meaning Beijing should oppose a unified, strong
Korea and instead support the DPRK in perpetuity. In the realists’ worst-case scenario, a rising
Korea that maintains U.S. forces and inherits Kim’s WMD arsenal becomes a strategic near-peer,
the long-feared “dagger to the heart of China and traditional route for Japan to invade.”22
Korean unification might also prove bad for Chinese business, counter the naysayers.
Faced with a $2 trillion tab for national union, Seoul’s economic and commercial focus would
turn inwards, disrupting existing trade and investment patterns with China. Necessary transfers
of high technology would diminish, slowing Beijing’s turn toward more value-added industrial
and commercial processes. The need to employ millions of unskilled North Korean laborers
might drive the unified government to protectionism and restrictions on foreign companies
bidding on reconstruction contracts. Further in time, a reunified peninsula employing South
Korean capital and high-tech and cheap North Korean labor represents a formidable commercial
force whose growth, from a zero sum-thinking realist perspective, could derail Chinese
economic development and stability. Traditionalists argue, why take the chance?
Who’s Right? Reunification Specifics, not Concept, Likely Drive Chinese Policy
Recent developments seemingly torpedo optimists’ hopes for imminent union on the
Korean Peninsula. From the DPRK’s 2010 sinking of the ROK warship Cheonan and months later
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island to its continued nuclear and ballistic missile activities in
contravention of UN sanctions, a unifying thread emerges: a DPRK unready to capitulate
politically to the more powerful South, acting in ways that make analysis of the Chinese position
on reunification an academic exercise at best. Yet might an “outlier” be lurking? In 1989, few
analysts were predicting the fall of the Berlin Wall, collapse of the Soviet Union, and decline of
the then roaring Japanese economy. It therefore behooves China to evaluate its position and
policy options for Korean reunification irrespective of likelihood or timing; the United States and
South Korea should attempt to shape this debate.
Assume for analytical purposes an external shock or internal upheaval in the next two to
five years that puts the Koreas on a path to union. Who would win Xi Jinping’s policy ear, the
vanguard espousing unification’s net gains or the realists arguing to keep the peninsula divided?
Much depends on catalyzing factors. Take the least plausible reunification scenario imaginable:
a) Six-Party talks proceed in a manner exceeding optimists’ predictions, leading to deal on
denuclearization; b) an interim period follows in which the Koreas exchange official delegations
and the United States opens a mission in Pyongyang; and c) the sides agree voluntarily to a
merger of sovereign states.23 In this scenario, China would assent to the process, “spinning” a
future of economic growth and regional stability for its domestic audience. In a similar fashion,
China would support reunification under two currently implausible outcomes: peaceful export
of the Stalinist political-economic model from North to South, and forceful imposition of the
DPRK system via the invasion and/or annihilation of the ROK.24
Worthy of greater study would be China’s behavior in reaction to the Kim regime’s
implosion, a failed succession spawning internecine clashes, or a North-South war, scenarios
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that should produce a reunified Korea in Seoul’s (and the US) orbit. Remembering the carnage
of 1950-53, China would refrain from intervention unless violence threatened to spill over the
border from the DPRK.25 However, it might not enjoy such freedom to abstain. In the
aforementioned developments, either Kim or an opposition faction (or both) would play the
China card, potentially forcing the CCP to take sides. The possibility of choosing the wrong one
gives party strategists fits.26 Yet so would witnessing a “friendly” DPRK disappear due to
Beijing’s inaction replaced by a unified Korea dominated by Seoul, aligned with Washington, and
armed as far north as the Chinese border.
Concluding Thoughts: Moving the Chinese in Our Direction
Certainty is scarce as regards Korean reunification, and policy makers should question
even the best analysts’ predictions of future developments. Two absolutes concerning China’s
stance are apparent, however. The Communist Party will seek to manage the process and
dictate outcomes, a disappointment to those seeking parallels in German unification when a
dying Soviet Union acquiesced to US and West German primacy. And realpolitik and suspicion
toward US/ROK intentions will color Chinese thinking.
Denuclearizing and thereby defanging the rogue DPRK constitutes America’s preeminent
security challenge on the Korean Peninsula and is best achieved and sustained through union.
CCP leadership, however, believes a Korea reunified under most plausible scenarios furthers the
strategic interests of only the United States and ROK. Underpinning this position is a fear the
allies would exploit the DPRK’s demise and the peninsula’s reunification to contain China. As
detailed earlier, a number of Chinese and non-partisan strategists have debunked this “no
benefits for us” assumption, but they are not yet ascendant. While the reunification positions of
China and the U.S./ROK might ultimately prove unbridgeable, the parties’ high-level politicalmilitary engagement would help to alleviate fears and correct misconceptions.
Officials could begin by discussing future force levels and military posture on the
peninsula. CCP leaders are not so naïve to believe a reunified Korea under Seoul’s control and
lacking a DPRK threat would immediately oust American forces. Yet accepting the US troops as
part and parcel of reunification exacts domestic Chinese political costs without corresponding
benefits. A proactive information-sharing policy and a handful of reassurances from Washington
and Seoul could assuage many of Beijing’s concerns.
The United States and Republic of Korea might agree publicly to establish no new bases
north of the 38th parallel, an approach similar to Washington’s commitment to Moscow in 1989
to base no NATO forces in the former East Germany. Along similar lines, the two nations could
invite China to comment on an issue bound to provoke heartburn north of the DMZ: the
impending transfer to South Korea of operational control over U.S. forces on the peninsula.27
Last, allied leaders might engage Chinese counterparts on alleged US/ROK operational plans to
secure DPRK WMD, as divulged recently by Wikileaks and its copycat websites.28 They could
brief unclassified versions of these plans, promising that military forces would avoid areas
abutting the Chinese frontier and withdraw immediately once weapons sites are neutralized.
Such measures, none damaging to core U.S. interests, could build confidence and test long-held
assumptions that Chinese positions on Korea are entrenched.
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1
Author’s interview with Mr. Seok-in Hong and Ms. Jong-joo Lee, Counselor and Reunification
Ministry attaché respectively, Korean Embassy, March 2, 2012.
2
Ibid.
3
Courtland Robinson, “North Korea: Migration Patterns and Prospects,” Policy Forum Online,
The Nautilus Organization for Security and Sustainability (www.nautilus.org), January 4, 2010.
4
U.S.-Korea 2009 Joint Vision Statement, June 16, 2009 (as found on whitehouse.gov).
5
Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign
Language Publishing House, 1998), preamble and p. 2.
6
Author’s interview with John Park, Korea analyst, U.S. Institute for Peace, March 8, 2012. The
six parties to the negotiation are China, the United States, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South
Korea.
7
Zhang Quanyi, “What Korean Reunification Means to China,” Policy Forum Online, The Nautilus
Organization for Security and Sustainability (www.nautilus.org), October 12, 2007.
8
China Worldwide Trade Statistics, U.S.-China Business Council website (www.uschina.org).
9
“Sudden Reunification Would Total $2.1 Trillion,” The Chosun Ilbo Online Edition, November 4,
2011.
10
Editorial comments, Professor Terence Roehrig, U.S. Naval War College, October 17, 2012.
11
Op. Cit., Park.
12
Ibid.
13
Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations Online
(www.cfr.org), October 7, 2010.
14
Richard Weitz, “Why Give North Korea Aid?” The Diplomat Online (www.the-diplomat.com),
September 12, 2011.
15
Op. Cit., Park.
16
Author’s interview with Ely Ratner, RAND Corporation analyst currently seconded to the State
Department’s Korea Desk, February 24, 2012.
17
Author’s interview with Cynthia Watson, professor, National War College, March 7, 2012.
18
Op. Cit., Zhang.
19
Op. Cit., Watson.
20
Op. Cit., Robinson.
21
Ibid.
22
Tsunetoshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “China a Unified Korea, and Geopolitics,” presented
to the Southern Political Science association January 6, 2005 (www.allacademic.com).
23
Op. Cit., Park.
24
Victor D. Cha, “The End of History: Neojuche Revivalism and Korean Unification,” Orbis Online
(www.fpri.org/orbis), February 11, 2011.
25
Author’s interview with Bonnie Glaser, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 9,
2012.
26
Op. Cit., Glaser.
27
Author’s interview with LTC David Gigliotti, USA, Korea Foreign Area Officer (FAO), March 22,
2012.
28
Op. Cit., Glaser.
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