THIRD
EDITION
International Relations Theory
Realism, Pluralism, Globalism,
and Beyond
Paul R. Viotti
Mark V. Kauppi
Allyn and Bacon
Boston
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V ice P resíd en t and E d ito r-in -C h ie f: Pau l E. Sm ith
Ed ito rial A ssistant: K athy R u b in o
C o m p o sitio n Buyer: Linda C o x
E d ito ria l-P ro d u c tio n Serv ice: Susan M cN ally
C o v er A d m in istrato r: Jen n y H art
M a n u fa ctu rin g Bu yer: M eg an C o ch ran
M ark etin g M an ag er: Susan O gar
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
V io ttí, Paul R.
In te rn a tio n a l relation s th eo ry : realism , p lu ralism , globalism /
Pau l R. V io tti, M ark V . K aup pi.— 3rd ed.
p.
cm .
In clu d es bib lio g rap h ical references and index.
IS B N 0 -2 0 5 -2 9 2 5 3 - 4
1. In te rn a tio n a l relation s. I. K auppi, M ark V . II. T itle.
JZ 1 3 0 5 .V 5 6 1998
3 2 7 — dc21
9 8 -2 6 4 8 1
C IP
P rin ted in the U n ited States o f A m erica
10
9
8
7
03
02
To Linda and Kathleen
280
OLE
R.
HOLS TI
/ C ris is D e c is ió n M a k in g
14. N ational Broadcasting C om pany, “Cuba: The
M issile C risis” (m im eo . transcript, Februarv 9, 1964),
3. Sheldon J. Korchin, “Anxiety and C ogn ition ,” in
Constance Sheerer (ed.), C ogn ition : Theory, Research,
Prom ise (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 63.
4. Charles £. LindbJom, T h e P olicy-M akin g Process
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 22.
5. C. D. Sm ock, “The lnñuence o f Psychological Stress
on the ‘Inlolerance o f Ambiguity,’ ” Jou rn al o f A bn orm al
a n d Social Psychology 50 (M arch 1955): 177-182.
6. Leo Postman and Jerom e S. Bruner, ‘'Perception
under Stress,” Psychological R eview 55 (1 948): 322.
7. jerom e Bruner, cited in Louis C. Gawthrop,
B u reau cratic B ch av ior in th e Exccutive B ran ch (New
York: Free Press, 1969), p. 113.
8. Theodore C. Sorensen, D ecision-M aking in the W hite
H ou sc (New York: Coium bia University Press, 1964),
p. 38.
9. Korchin, “Anxiety and C ognition,” p. 63.
10. Prince Bernhard von Bülow, M em oirs ofP rin ce von
Bulow, 3 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1932), III: 166; and
Alfred von Tirpitz, M y M em oirs (London: Hurst and
Blackett, 1919), p. 280.
11. Schelling, The Strategy o f C on flict (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 137-138.
12. Douglas D illon, quoted in Elie Abel, T he M issile
Crisis (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966), p. 48.
13. Theodore Sorensen, D ecision-M akin g in the W hite
H ou se (New York: Coium bia University Press, 1963),
p .3 l.
P l 2 ‘
15. Coium bia Broadcasting System, “C onversation
with President Kennedy” (m im eo. transcript, D ecem ber
17, 1963), pp. 2 -3 .
16. A rthur M . Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousarui Days (New
York: H oughton M ifflin, 1965), p. 804.
17. l b id .,p . 808.
18. C BS, “Conversation with President Kennedy,” p. 4.
19. Ibid.
20. N BC, “C uba,” p. 17.
21. Q uoted in Snyder and Diesing, C on flict A m on g
N ations, p. 301.
22. N BC, “C uba,” p. 42.
23. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: N or­
ton, 1969), p. 127.
24. C BS, “Conversation with President Kennedy,” p. 3.
25. T heod ore Sorensen, K en n ed y (New York: Harper
& Row, 1965), p. 726.
26. Janis, V ictims o f G rou p th in k; and Roland L. Frye
and T h o m asM . Stritch, “Effects o fT im ed vs. N on-tim ed
D iscussion Upon M easures o f Influence and Change in
Small G rou ps,” Jo u r n a l o f Social Psychology 63 (June
1964); 139-14 3 .
27. Dean G. Pruitt, “ Problem Solving in the D epart­
m ent o f State” (unpublished paper, Northwestern U ni­
versity, 1961).
Conceptual Models and the Cuban
Missile Crisis
GRAHAM
T.
ALLISON
T he au th or presen ts three m odels o f the foreig n p o l k y d ecision -m ak in g process.
T h efirst ( th e ra tion al actor m odel) tends to d o m ín a te the realistperspective. T he
org an ization al process a n d bu reau cratic politics m odels, reflectin g w hat we cali a
p lu ralist p erspective, raise questions concerning the appropriaten ess o f relying
exclusively on the ra tion al actor m o d el to ex p lain foreig n p o licy choices. The
fo cu s in this n ow elassie article on institutional ethos, p ro ced ares, an d processes
is consistent w ith p resen t-d ay ap p roach es t h a tp la c e ren ew ed em phasis on institutions.
Reprinted by permission o f the American Political Science Association from A m erican Political Science
R eview 63 (September 1969): 689-718.
G RA HAM
T.
ALLI S ON/
C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls a n d th e C u b a n M is sile C ris is
The Cuban m issile crisis is a seminal event. For
thirteen days o f O ctober 1962, there was a higher
probability that m ore human lives would end
suddenly than ever before in history. Had the
w orst occurred, the death o f 100 m illion Americans, over 100 million Russians, and m illions o f
Europeans as well would make previous natural
calam ities and inhum anities appear insignificant. Given the probability o f disaster— which
President Kennedy estimated as “between 1 out
o f 3 and even”— our escape seems aw esom e.1
This event symbolizes a central, if only partially
thinkable, fact about our existence. T hat such
consequences could follow from the choices and
actions o f national governments obliges students
o f governm ent as well as participants in governance to think hard about these p ro b lem s.. . .
The general argum ent can be summarized
in three propositions:
1. Analysts th in k about problem s o f foreign
and m ilitary policy in terms o f largely im plicit
conceptual models that have significant conse­
quences for the content o f their thought.2
Though the present product o f foreign p o l­
icy analysis is neither systematic ñor powerful, if
one carefully exam ines explanations produced
by analysts, a num ber o f fundam ental sim ilarities emerge. Explanations produced by particu­
lar analysts display quite regular, predictable
features. This predictability suggests a substructure. These regularities reflect an analyst’s
assum ptions about the character o f puzzles, the
categories in which problem s should be considered, the types o f evidence that are relevant, and
the d eterm inants o f occurrences. T h e first
proposition is that clusters o f such related as­
sum ptions constitute basic frames o f reference
or conceptual m odels in term s o f which analysts
both ask and answer the question: W hat happened? W hy did the event happen? W hat will
happen?3 Such assum ptions are central to the
activities o f cxplanation and prediction, for in
attem pting to explain a particular event, the
281
analyst cannot simply describe the full State o f
the world leading up to that event. The logic o f
explanation requires that he single out the rele­
vant, im portant determ inants o f the occurrence.
M oreover, as the logic o f prediction underscores, the analyst m ust sum m arize the various
determ inants as they bear on the event in ques­
tion. Conceptual m odels bo th fix the mesh o f
the nets that the analyst drags through the m ate­
rial in order to explain a particular action or
decisión and direct him to cast his net in select
ponds, at certain depths, in order to catch the
fish he is after.
2. M ost analysts explain (and predict) the behavior o f national governm ents in term s o f var­
ious form s o f one basic conceptual m odel, here
entitled the Rational Policy M odel (M odel l ) . 4
In term s o f this conceptual m odel, analysts
attem pt to understand happenings as the m ore
or less purposive acts o f unified national gov­
ernm ents. For these analysts, the point o f an
explanation is to show how the nation or gov­
ernm ent could have chosen the action in ques­
tion, given the strategic problem that it faced.
For example, in confronting the problem posed
by the Soviet installation o f m issiles in Cuba,
rational policy m odel analysts attem pt to show
how this was a reasonable act from the point o f
view o f the Soviet U nion, given Soviet strategic
objectives.
3. Tw o “alternative” conceptual models, here
labeled an Organizational Process M odel (Model
II) and a Bureaucratic Politics M odel (M odel
III) provide a base for im proved explanation
and prediction.
Although the standard fram e o f reference
has proved useful for many purposes, there is
powerful evidence that it must be supplemented,
if not supplanted, by frames o f reference which
focus upon the large organizations and political
actors involved in the policy process. M odel I ’s
282
G R A H A M
T .
A L L I S O N / C o n c e p tu a l M o ile ls a n d th e C u b a n M is síle C ris is
im plication that im portant events have im portant causes, i.e., that m onoliths perform large
actions for big reasons, m ust be balanced by an
appreciation o f the facts (a) that m onoliths are
black boxes covering various gears and levers in a
highly differentiated decision-m aking structure,
and (b) that large acts are the consequences o f
innum erable and often conflicting sm aller
actions by individuáis at various levéis o f bureaucratic organizations in the service o f a variety of
only partially compatible conceptions o f national
goals, organizational goals, and political objectives. R ecent developments in the field o f organization theory provide the foundation for the
second model. According to this organizational
process model, what M odel I categorizes as
“acts” and “choices” are instead outputs o f large
organizations functioning according to certain
regular patterns o f behavior. Faced with the
problem o f Soviet missiles in Cuba, a M odel II
analyst identifies the relevant organizations and
displays the patterns o f organizational behavior
from w hich this action emerged. T he third
model focuses on the internal politics o f a governm ent. H appenings in foreign affairs are
understood, according to the bureaucratic poli­
tics m odel, neither as choices ñor as outputs.
Instead, what happens is categorized as ou tcom es
o f various overlapping bargaining games am ong
players arranged hierarchically in the national
governm ent. In confronting the problem posed
by Soviet missiles in Cuba, a M odel III analyst
displays the perceptions, m otivations, positions,
power, and maneuvers o f principal players from
which the outcom e emerged.5
A central m etaphor illum inates differences
am ong these models. Foreign policy has often
been com pared to moves, sequences o f moves,
and games o f chess. If one were limited to observations on a screen upon w hich m oves in the
chess game were projected w ithout inform ation
as to how the pieces carne to be m oved, he
would assume— as M odel I does— that an indi­
vidual chess player was m oving the pieces with
references to plans and m aneuvers toward the
goal o f w inning the game. But a pattern o f
moves can be imagined that would lead the serious observer, after w atching several games, to
consider the hypothesis that the chess player was
not a single individual but rather a loose alliance
o f sem i-independent organizations, each o f
w hich m oved its set o f pieces according to stan­
dard operating procedures. For exam ple, m ovem ent o f separate sets o f pieces m ight proceed in
tu rn , each accord ing to a routine, the king’s
rook, bishop, and their pawns repeatedly attacking the opponent according to a fixed plan. Furtherm ore, it is conceivable that the pattern o f
play would suggest to an observer that a num bcr
o f distinct players, with distinct objectives but
shared power over the pieces, were determ ining
the moves as the resultant o f collegial bargain­
ing. For exam ple, the black rook’s move might
contribute to the loss o f a black knight with no
com parable gain for the black team, but with the
black rook becom ing the principal guardian o f
the “palace” on that side o f the b o a rd .. . .
M odel I: R ation al P o lic y .. . .
The U.S. Blockade o fC uba: A First Cut6
T h e U.S. response to the Soviet U n io n ’s
em placem ent o f missiles in Cuba must be
understood in strategic term s as simple valuem axim izing escalation. Am erican nuclear superiority could be counted on to paralyze Soviet
nuclear power; Soviet transgression o f the
nuclear threshold in response to an Am erican
use o f lower levels o f violence would be wildly
irrational since it would m ean virtual destruction o f the Soviet Com m unist system and Russian nation. Am erican local superiority was
overwhelm ing: it could be initiated at a low level
while threatening w ith high credibility an ascending sequence o f steps short o f the nuclear
threshold. All that was required was for the
United States to bring to bear its strategic and
local superiority in such a way that American
d eterm ination to see the missiles removed
would be dem onstrated, while at the same tim e
O. R A H A M
T .
ALLISON
/ C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls a n d th e C u b a n M issile C risis
283
allowing M oscow tim e and room to retreat
without hum iliation. The naval blockade—
euphem istically nam ed a “quarantine” in order
to circum vent the niceties o f international law—
did just that.
T h e U.S. governm ent’s selection o f the
blockade followed this logic. Apprised o f the
presence o f Soviet missiles in Cuba, the President
assembled an Executive Com m ittee (ExC om ) o f
the National Security Council and directed them
to “set aside all other tasks to make a prom pt and
intense survey o f the dangers and all possible
courses o f action .”7 T his group functioned as
“fifteen individuáis on our own, representing the
2. D iplom atic pressures. Several form s were
considered: an appeal to the U.N. or O.A.S. for
an inspection team , a secret approach to Khrush­
chev, and a direct approach to Khrushchev, perhaps at a sum m it m eeting. The United States
would demand that the missiles be removed, but
the final settlem ent might include neutralization
o f Cuba, U.S. withdrawal from the Guantanam o
base, and withdrawal o f U.S. Júpiter missiles
from Turkey or Italy.
President and not different departm ents.”* As
one of the participants recalls, “T he remarkable
aspect o f those m eetings was a sense o f complete
equality.”9 M ost o f the time during the week that
Each form o f the diplom atic approach had
its own drawbacks. T o arraign the Soviet Union
before the U.N . Security Council held little
followed was spent canvassing all the possible
tracks and weighing the arguments for and
against each. Six m ajor categories o f action were
considered.
1.
Do nothing. U.S. vulnerability to Soviet
missiles was no new thing. Since the U.S. already
lived under the gun o f missiles based in Russia,
a Soviet capability to strike from Cuba too made
little real difference. T h e real danger stemmed
from the possibility o f U.S. over-reaction. The
U .S. should ann ou nce the Soviet action in a
calm , casual m anner thereby deflating whatever
political capital Khrushchev hoped to m ake o f
the missiles.
T his argum ent fails on two counts. First, it
grossly underestim ates the military im portance
o f the Soviet m ove. Not only would the Soviet
U n io n ’s missile capability be doubled and the
U.S. early w arningsystem outflanked. The Soviet
U nion would have an opportunity to reverse the
strategic balance by further installations, and
indeed, in the longer run, to invest in cheaper,
shovter-range rather than m ore expensive longerrange missiles. Second, the political importance
o f this move was undeniable. The Soviet U nion’s
act challenged the Am erican President’s m ost
solem n warning. If the U.S. failed to respond,
no American com m itm ent would be credible.
prom ise since the Russians could veto any proposed action. W hile the diplomats argued, the
missiles would becom e operational. T o send a
secret emissary to Khrushchev demanding that
the missiles be withdrawn would be to pose
untenable alternatives. O n the one hand, this
would invite Khrushchev to seize the diplomatic
initiative, perhaps com m itting him self to strate­
gic retaliation in response to an attack on Cuba.
O n the other hand, this would tender an ulti­
m átum that no great power could accept. T o
co nfron t Khrushchev at a sum m it would guarantee dem ands for U.S. concessions, and the
analogy between U.S. missiles in Turkey and
Russian missiles in Cuba could not be erased.
But why n o t trade U .S. Jupiters in Turkey
and Italy, which the President had previously
ordered withdrawn, for the missiles in Cuba?
T h e U .S. had chosen to withdraw these missiles
in order to replace them with superior, less vul­
nerable M editerranean Polaris subm arines. But
the middle o f the crisis was no tim e for conces­
sions. T he offer o f such a deal might suggest to
the Soviets that the W est would yield and thus
tem pt them to demand m ore. It would certainly
confirm European suspicions about American
willingness to sacrifice European interests when
284
GRAHAiM
T.
ALLISON
/ C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls a n d th e C u b a n M issile C risis
the chips were down. Finally, the basic issue
should be kept clear. As the President stated in
reply to Bertrand Russell, “I think your attention might well be directed to the burglars rather
than to those who have caught the burglars.”10
3. A secret approach to Castro. T h e crisis provided an opportunity to separate Cuba and
Soviet Communism by offering Castro the alter­
nativas, “split or fall.” But Soviet troops transported, constructed, guarded, and controlled
the missiles. Their removal would thus depend
on a Soviet decisión.
4. Invasión. The United States could take this
occasion not only to rem ove the missiles but
also to rid itself o f Castro. A Navy exercise had
long been scheduled in which M arines, ferried
from Florida in naval vessels, would liberate the
imaginary island o f Vieques.11 W hy not simply
shift the point o f disembarkment? (The Pentagon’s foresight in planning this operation would
be an appropriate antidote to the C IA ’s Bay o f
Pigs!)
Preparations were m ade for an invasión,
but as a last resort, American troops would be
forced to confront 20 ,0 00 Soviets in the first
Coid W ar case o f direct contact between the
troops o f the super powers. Such brinksmanship
courted nuclear disaster, practically guaranteeing an equivalent Soviet move against Berlin.
5. Surgical air strike. T h e missile sites should
be removed by a clean, swift conventional attack.
This was the effective counter-action which the
attempted deception deserved. A surgical strike
would remove the missiles and tlius elimínate
both the danger that the missiles might becom e
operational and the fear that the Soviets would
discover the American discovery and act first.
The initial attractiveness o f this alternative
was dulled by several difficulties. First, could the
strike really be “surgical”? T h e Air Forcé could
not guarantee destruction o f all the m issiles.12
Som e m ight be fired during the attack; some
m ight not have been identified. In order to
assure destruction o f Soviet and Cuban means
o f retaliating, what was required was not a sur­
gical but rather a massive attack— o f at least 500
sorties. Second, a surprise air attack would o f
course kill Russians at the missile sites. Pressures
on the Soviet U nion to retalíate would be so
strong that an attack on Berlin or T urkey was
highly probable. Third , the key problem with
this program was that o f advance warning.
Could the President o f the United States, with
his m em ory o f Pearl H arbor and his visión o f
future U.S. responsibility, order a “Pearl H arbor
in reverse”? For 175 years, unannounced Sunday m orning attacks had been an anathem a to
our tradition .13
6. Blockade. Indirect m ilitary action in the
form o f a blockade becam e m ore attractive as
the ExCom dissected the other alternatives. An
em bargo on m ilitary shipm ents to Cuba
enforced by a naval blockade was not without
flaws, however. Could the U.S. blockade Cuba
w ithout inviting Soviet reprisal in Berlin? The
likely solution to jo in t blockades would be the
lifting o f both blockades, restoring the new sta ­
tus quo, and allowing the Soviets additional time
to com plete the missiles. Second, the possible
consequences o f the blockade resembled the
drawbacks w hich disqualified the air strike. If
Soviet ships did not stop, the U nited States
would be forced to fire the first shot, inviting
retaliation. T hird , a blockade would deny the
traditional freedom o f the seas dem anded by
several o f our cióse allies and m ight be held ¡Ile­
gal, in violation o f the U .N . Charter and international law, unless the U nited States could
obtain a tw o-thirds vote in the O .A.S. Finally,
how could a blockade be related to the problem ,
namely, som e 75 missiles on the island o f Cuba,
approaching operational readiness daily? A
blockade offered the Soviets a spectrum o f
delaying tactics with which to buy tim e to co m ­
GRA HAM
T.
ALLt S ON/
C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls a n d th e C u b a n M is sile C risis
píete the missile installations. W as a f a i t accom p li not required?
In spite o f these enorm ous difficulties the
blockade had comparative advantages: (1) It was
a middle course between inaction and attack,
aggressive enough to com m unicate firm ness o f
intention, but nevertheless not so precipitous as
a strike. (2) It placed on Khrushchev the burden
o f ch oice concerning the next step. He could
avoid a direct rnilitary clash by keeping his ships
away. His was the last clear chance. (3) No possible rnilitary confron tation could be m ore
acceptable to the U.S. than a naval engagement
in the Caribbean. (4) This m ove perm itted the
U .S., by flexing its conventiona! m uscle, to
exploit the threat o f subsequent nonnuclear
steps in each o f which the U.S. would have significant superiority.
Particular arguments about advantages and
disadvantages w ere powerful. The explanation
o f the American choice o f the blockade lies in a
m ore general principie, however. As President
Kennedy stated in drawing the moral o f the crisis:
A bove all, w hile d efending o u r ow n vital in terests, nuclear pow ers m ust avert those co n fro n ta tio n s w hich b rin g an adversary to a ch o ice o f
eith e r a h u m iliatin g retreat or a nuclear war. T o
adopt that kin d o f co u rse in the n u cle ar age
would be evidence only o f th e b an k ru p tcy o f our
policy— o f a collective death wish for the w orld .14
T h e blockade was the U nited States’ only real
option.
M odel II: O rganization al P rocess
For som e purposes, governm ental behavior can
be usefully sum m arized as action chosen by a
unitary, rational decisionm aker: centrally controlled, com pletely inform ed, and valué m aximizing. But this sim plification m ust not be
allowed to conceal the fact that a “governm ent”
consists o f a conglom érate o f sem i-feudal,
loosely allied organizations, each with a sub-
285
stantial life o f its own. G overnm ent leaders do
sit formally, and to som e extent in fact, on top o f
this conglom érate. But governm ents perceive
problem s through organizational sensors. G ov­
ernm ents define alternatives and estím ate consequences as organizations process inform ation.
Governm ents act as these organizations enact
routines. G overnm ent behavior can therefore be
understood according to a second conceptual
m odel, less as deliberate choice o f leaders and
m ore as outputs o f large organizations functioning according to standard patterns o f behavior.
T o be responsive to a broad spectrum o f
problem s, governm ents consist o f large organi­
zations am ong which primary responsibility for
particular areas is divided. Each organization
attends to a special set o f problem s and acts in
quasi-independence on these problem s. But few
im portant problem s fall exclusively within the
dom ain o f a single organization. Thus govern­
m ent behavior relevant to any im portant problem reflects the independent output o f several
organizations, partially coordinated by govern­
m ent leaders. G overnm ent leaders can substantially disturb, but not substantially control, the
behavior o f these organizations.
T o perform com plex routines, the behavior
o f large num bers o f individuáis m ust be coord i­
nated. Coordination requires standard operating procedures: rules according to which things
are done. Assured capability for reliable perfor­
m ance o f action that depends upon the behavior
o f hundreds o f persons requires established
“program s.” Indeed, if the eleven m embers o f a
football team are to perform adequately on any
particular down, each player m ust not “do what
he thinks needs to be done” or “do what the
quarterback tells him to do.” Rather, each player
m ust perform the maneuvers specified by a previously established play which the quarterback
has simply called in this situation.
At any given tim e, a governm ent consists o f
existing organizations, each w ith a fix e d set o f
standard operating procedures and program s.
T h e behavior o f these organizations— and con-
286
C. R A ti A M
T .
A L L I S O N / C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls a n d th e C u b a n M is sile C ris is
sequently o f the governrrient— relevant to an
issue in any particular instance is, therefore,
determ ined prim arily by routines established in
these organizations prior to that instance. But
organizations do change. Learning occurs gradually, over tim e. D ram atic organizational
change occurs in response to m ajor crises. Both
learning and change are influenced by existing
organizational capabilities.
Borrow ed from studies o f organizations,
these loosely form ulated propositions am ount
simply to tendencies. Each m ust be hedged by
m odifiers like “other things being equal” and
“under certain co n d ition s.” In particular instances, tendencies hold— m ore or less. In specific situations, the relevant question is: m ore or
less? But this is as it should be. For, on the one
hand, “organizations” are no m ore hom ogeneous a class than “solids.” W hen scientists tried
to generalize about “solids,” they achieved sim i­
lar results. Solids tcnd to expand when heated,
but som e do and som e d on ’t. M ore adequate
categorization o f the various elem ents now
lumped under the rubric “organizations” is thus
required. O n the oth er hand, the behavior o f
particular organizations seem s considerably
m ore com plex than the behavior o f solids. Additional inform ation about a particular organization is required for further specification o f the
tendency statem ents. In spite o f these two
caveats, the characterization o f governm ent
action as organizational output differs distinctly
from M odel I. A ttem pts to understand p ro b­
lems o f foreign affairs in term s o f this fram e o f
reference should produce quite different expla­
nations. . . ,15
“C hairm an Khrushchev halt and elim ínate this
clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to
world peace.”16 This decisión was reached at the
pinnacle o f the U.S. G overnm ent after a critical
week o f deliberation. W hat initiated that precious week were photographs o f Soviet missile
sites in Cuba taken on O ctober 14. These pietures might not have been taken until a week
later. In that case, the President speculated, “I
d on’t think probably we would have chosen as
prudently as we finally did.”17 U.S. leaders m ight
have received this inform ation three weeks earlier— if a U -2 had flown over San Cristóbal in
the last week o f Septem ber. W hat determ ined
the context in which A m erican leaders carne to
choose the blockade was the discovery o f missiles on O ctober 14.
T here has been considerable debate over
alleged A m erican “intelligence failures” in the
Cuban m issile crisis.18 But what both critics and
defenders have neglected is the fact that the dis­
covery took place on O ctober 14, rather than
three weeks earlier or a week later, as a consequence o f the established routines and procedures o f the organizations which constitute the
U .S. intelligence com m unity. These organiza­
tions were neither m ore ñor less successful than
they had been the previous m onth or were to be
in the m onths to follow.
T he notorious “Septem ber
estím ate,”
approved by the U nited States Intelligence
Board (U SIB ) on Septem ber 19, concluded that
the Soviet U nion would not introduce offensive
missiles into C u ba.19 No U -2 flight was directed
over the western end o f Cuba (after Septem ber
5) before O ctober 4. No U -2 flew over the west­
The U.S. Blockade o fC u b a :A Second Cut
ern end o f Cuba until the flight that discovered
the Soviet m issiles on O ctober 14. Can these
“failures” be accounted for in organizational
O rg an ization al In tellig en ce. At 7:00 p . m . on
O ctober 22, 1962, President Kennedy disclosed
the American discovery o f the presence o f Soviet
strategic m issiles in Cuba, declared a “strict
quarantine on all offensive m ilitary equipment
under shipment to C uba,” and demanded that
terms?
On Septem ber 19 when U SIB met to consider the question o f C uba, the “system ” contained the following inform ation: (1) shipping
intelligence had noted the arrival in Cuba o f two
large-hatch Soviet lum ber ships, which were rid-
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ing high in the w ater; (2) refugee reports o f
countless sightings o f missiles, but also a report
that C astro’s prívate pilot, after a night o f drinking in Havana, had boasted: “W e will fight to
the death and perhaps we can win because we
have everything, including atom ic w eapons”;
(3) a sighting by a CIA agent o f the rear profile
o f a strategic missile; (4 ) U -2 photos produced
by flights o f August 29, Septem ber 5 and 17
showing the constru ction o f a num ber o f SAM
sites and oth er defensive missiles. Not all o f this
inform ation was on the desk o f the estimators,
however. Shipping intelligence experts noted the
fact that large-hatch ships were riding high in
the water and spelled out the inference: the ships
m ust be carrying “space consum ing” cargo.
These facts were carefully included in the cata­
logue o f intelligence concerning shipping. For
experts sensitive to the Soviets’ shortage o f ships,
however, these facts carried no special signal.
T h e refugee report o f C astro’s private pilot’s
rem ark had been received at Opa Locka, Florida,
along with vast reams o f inaccurate reports generated by the refugee com m unity. This report
and a thousand others had to be checked and
com pared before being sent to W ashington. T he
two weeks required for initial processing could
have been shortened by a large increase in resources, but the yield o f this source was already
quite m arginal. T he CIA agent’s sighting o f the
rear profile o f a strategic missile had occurred
on Septem ber 12: transm ission tim e from agent
sighting to arrival in W ashington typically took
9 to 12 days. Shortening this transm ission tim e
would im pose severe cost in term s o f danger to
sub-agents, agents, and com m unication networks.
On the inform ation available, the intelli­
gence chiefs who predicted that the Soviet
U nion w ould not introduce offensive missiles
into C uba made a reasonable and defensible
judgm ent. M oreover, in the light o f the fact that
these organizations were gathering intelligence
not only about Cuba but about potential occurrences in all parts o f the world, the inform a-
287
tional base available to the estim ators involved
nothing out o f the ordinary. Ñor, from an orga­
nizational perspective, is there anything startling
about the gradual accumulation o f evidence that
led to the form ulation o f the hypothesis that the
Soviets were installing missiles in Cuba and the
decisión on O ctober 4 to direct a special flight
over western Cuba.
T h e ten-day delay between that decisión
and the flight is another organizational story. At
the O ctober 4 m eeting, the Defense Departm ent
took the opportunity to raise an issue im portant
to its concerns. Given the increased danger that
a U -2 would be downed, it would be better if the
pilot were an officer in uniform rather than a
CIA agent. T hu s the Air Forcé should assume
responsibility for U -2 flights over Cuba. T o the
contrary, the CIA argued that this was an intel­
ligence operation and thus within the C IA ’s
jurisd iction. M oreover, CIA U - 2 ’s had been
modified in certain ways which gave them
advantages over Air Forcé U - 2 ’s in averting
Soviet SA M ’s. Five days passed while the State
D epartm ent pressed for less risky alternatives
such as drones and the Air Forcé (in D epart­
m ent o f Defense guise) and CIA engaged in ter­
ritorial disputes. O n O ctober 9 a flight plan over
San Cristóbal was approved by C O M O R , but to
the C IA ’s dismay, Air Forcé pilots rather than
CIA agents would take charge o f the m ission. At
this point details becom e sketchy, but several
m em bers o f the intelligence com m unity have
speculated that an Air Forcé pilot in an Air Forcé
U - 2 attem pted a high altitude overflight on
O ctob er 9 that “flamed ou t”, i.e., lost power,
and thus had to descend in order to restart its
engine. A second round between Air Forcé and
CIA followed, as a result o f which Air Forcé
pilots were trained to fly CIA U - 2 ’s. A successful
overflight took place on O ctober 14.
This ten-day delay constitutes some form o f
“failure.” In the face o f well-founded suspicions
concerning offensive Soviet missiles in Cuba that
posed a critical threat to the United States’ most
vital interest, squabbling between organizations
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C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls a n d t he C u b a n M is sile C risis
whose job it is to produce this inform ation seems
entirely inappropriate. But for each o f these orga­
nizations, the question involved the issue: “ W hose
jo b was it to be?” M oreover, the issue was not
simply, which organization would control U -2
flights over Cuba, but rather the broader issue o f
ownership o f U -2 intelligence activities— a very
long standing territorial dispute. Thus though
this delay was in one sense a “failure,” it was also
a nearly inevitable consequence o f two facts:
many jobs do not fall neatly into precisely defined
organizational jurisdictions; and vigorous orga­
nizations are imperialistic.
O rganizational O ptions. D eliberations o f
leaders in ExC om m eetings produced broad
outlines o f alternatives. Details o f these alternatives and blueprints for their im plem entation
had to be specified by the organizations that
would perform these tasks. These organizational
outputs answered the question: W hat, specifically, could be done?
Discussion in the ExCom quickly narrowed
the live options to two: an air strike and a b lo ck ­
ade. The choice o f the blockade instead o f the air
strike turned on two points: (1) the argument
from m orality and tradition that the United
States could not perpétrate a “Pearl H arbor in
reverse”; (2) the belief that a “surgical” air strike
was impossible. W hether the U nited States
m ight strike first was a question not o f capability
but o f morality. W hether the United States cou ld
perform the surgical strike was a factual ques­
tion concerning capabilities. T he m ajority o f the
m em bers o f the ExC om , including the Presi­
dent, initially preferred the air strike. W hat
effectively foreclosed this option, however, was
the fact that the air strike they wanted could not
be chosen with high confidence o f success. After
having tentatively chosen the course o f prudence— given that the surgical atr strike was not
an option— Kennedy reconsidered. O n Sunday
m orning, O ctob er 21, he called the Air Forcé
experts to a special meeting in his living quarters
where he probed once m ore for the option o f a
“surgical" air strike. General W alter C. Sweeny,
Com m ander o f Tactical Air Forces, asserted
again that the Air Forcé could guarantee no
higher than ninety percent effectiveness in a sur­
gical air strike. T h at “fact” was false.
T h e air strike alternative provides a classic
case o f military estim ates. O ne o f the alterna­
tives outlined in the E xC om was nam ed “air
strike.” Specification o f the details o f this alter­
native was delegated to the Air Forcé. Starting
from an existing plan for massive U.S. military
action against Cuba (prepared for contingencies
like a response to a Soviet Berlín grab), Air Forcé
estim ators produced an attack to guarantee suc­
cess. T his plan called for extensive bom b ard m ent o f all m issile sites, storage depots, airports,
and in deference to the Navy, the artillery batteries opposite the naval base at Guantanam o.
M em bers o f the ExCom repeatedly expressed
bewilderment at military estim ates o f the num ber o fso rties required, likely casualties, and collateral damage. B ut the “surgical” air strike that
the political leaders had in m ind was never carefully exam ined during the first week o f the crisis.
Rather, this option was sim ply excluded on the
grounds that since the Soviet M R B M ’s in Cuba
were classified “m obile” in U.S. m anuals, exten­
sive bom bing was required. During the second
week o f the crisis, careful exam ination revealed
that the missiles were m obile, in the sense that
small houses are m obile: that is, they could be
m oved and reassembled in 6 days. After the missiles were reclassified “m ovable” and detailed
plans for surgical air strikes specified, this action
was added to the list o f live options for the end
o f the second week.
O rganizational
Im plem entation. ExCom
m em bers separated several types o f blockade:
offensive weapons only, all arm am ents, and all
strategic goods including POL (petroleum , oil
and lubricants). But the “details” o f the operation were left to the Navy. Before the President
ann ou nced the blockade on M onday evening,
the first stage o f the Navy’s blueprint was in
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289
m otion, and a problem loom ed on the horizon.
T he Navy had a detailed plan for the blockade.
T h e President had several less precise but
equally determ ined no tio ns concerning what
should be done, when and how. For the Navy
the issue was one o f effective im plem entation o f
the Navy’s blockade— w ithout the m eddling
and interference o f political leaders. For the
President, the problem was to pace and manage
events in such a way that the Soviet leaders
would have tim e to see, think, and blink.
A careful reading o f available sources uncovers an instructive incident. O n Tuesday, the
British Ambassador, O rm sby-G ore, after having
attended a briefm g on the details o f the blockade,
suggested to the President that the plan for inter-
stationed along the Navy’s original are which
extended 500 miles out to sea from Cape Magsi,
C uba’s eastern m ost tip. The blockade line was
n ot m oved as the President ordered, and the
accounts report.
W h at happened is not entirely clear. One
can be certain, however, that Soviet ships passed
through the line along which A m erican destroyers had posted themselves before the official
“first co n tact” with the Soviet ship. On O ctober
26 a Soviet tanker arrived in Havana and was
honored by a dockside rally for “ru nning the
blockade.” Photographs o f this vessel show the
ñam e Vinnitsa on the side o f the vessel in Cyrillic letters. But according to the official U.S. position, the first tanker to pass through the
cepting Soviet ships far out o f reach o f Cuban
jets did not facilítate Khrushchev’s hard decisión.
W hy not make the interception m uch closer to
Cuba and thus give the Russian leader m ore
time? According to the public account and the
recollection o f a num ber o f individuáis involved,
Kennedy “agreed imm ediately, called M cNam ara and over em otional Navy protest, issued
the appropriate instructions.”20 As Sorensen
records, “in a sharp clash with the Navy, he made
certain his will prevailed.”2' T he Navy’s plan for
the blockade was thus changed by drawing the
blockade m uch closer to Cuba.
A serious organizational orientation makes
one suspicious o f this account. M ore careful
exam ination o f the available evidence confirm s
these suspicions, though alternative accounts
must be somewhat speculative. According to the
public chronology, a quarantine drawn cióse to
Cuba became effective on W ednesday m orning,
the first Soviet ship was contacted on Thursday
m orning, and the first boarding o f a ship
occurred on Friday. A ccording to the statem ent
by the D epartm ent o f Defense, boarding o f the
M arcu la by a party from the John R. P ierce “took
place at 7:50 A .M ., E .D .T ., 180 miles northeast o f
N assau.” T he M arcu la had been trailed since
about 10:30 the previous evening. Sim ple calculations suggest that the P ierce must have been
blockade was the B ucharest, which was hailed by
the Navy on the m orning o f O ctob er 25. Again
sim ple m athem atical calculation exeludes the
possibility that the B u charest and the V innitsa
were the sam e ship. It seems probable that the
Navy’s resistance to the President’s order that
the blockade be drawn in closer to Cuba forced
him to allow one or several Soviet ships to pass
through the blockade after it was officially operative.
T his attem pt to leash the Navy’s blockade
had a price. On Wednesday m orning, O ctober
24, what the President had been awaiting o c ­
curred. The 18 dry cargo ships heading toward
the quarantine stopped dead in the water. This
was the occasion o f Dean Rusk’s rem ark, “W e
are eyeball to eyeball and I think the other fellow
just blinked.” But the Navy had another interpretation. The ships had sim ply stopped to pick
up Soviet subm arine escorts. T he President
becam e quite concerned lest the Navy— already
riled because o f Presidential m eddling in its
affairs— blunder into an incident. Sensing the
President’s fears, M cNamara became suspicious
o f the Navy’s procedures and routines for m aking the first interception. Calling on the C h ief o f
Naval Operations in the Navy’s inner sanctum ,
the Navy Flag Plot, McNamara put his questions
harshly. W ho would make the first interception?
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W ere Russian-speaking officers on board? How
would subm arines be dealt with? At one point
McNamara asked A nderson what he would do if
a Soviet ship’s captain refused to answer questions about his cargo. Picking up the M anual o f
Navy Regulations the Navy m an waved it in
M cN am ara’s face and shouted, “ It’s all in there.”
T o which M cN am ara replied, “1 d on’t give a
damn what John Paul Jones would have done; 1
want to know what you are going to do now .”
T he encounter ended on A nderson’s rem ark:
“Now, M r. Secretary, if you and your Deputy will
go back to your office the Navy will run the
blockade.”
M odel III: B u re a u cra tic Politics
The leaders who sit on top o f organizations are
not a m onolithic group. R ather, each is, in his
own right, a player in a central, com petitive
game. T he ñam e o f the game is bureaucratic
politics: bargaining along regularized channels
am ong players positioned hierarchically within
the governm ent. G overnm ent behavior can thus
be understood according to the third conceptual
model not as organizational outputs, but as outcom es o f bargaining games. In contrast with
M odel I, the bureaucratic politics m odel sees no
unitary actor but rather m any actors as players,
who focus not on a single strategic issue but on
m any diverse intra-national problem s as well, in
term s o f no consistent set o f strategic objectives
but rather according to various conceptions o f
national, organizational, and personal goals,
m aking governm ent decisions no t by rational
choice but by the pulling and hauling that is p o l­
itics.
The apparatus o f each national governm ent
constitutes a com plex arena for the intranational game. Political leaders at the top o f this
apparatus plus the m en who occupy positions
on top o f the critical organizations form the circle o f central players. Ascendancy to this circle
assures som e independent standing. The necessary decentralization o f decisions required for
action on the broad range o f foreign policy
problem s guarantees that each player has c o n ­
siderable discretion. Thus power is shared.
The nature o f problem s o f foreign policy
perm its fundam ental disagreement am ong reasonable m en concerning what ought to be done.
A nalyses yield conflicting recom m endations.
Separate responsibilities laid on the shoulders o f
individual personalities encourage differences in
perceptions and priorities. But the issues are o f
first order im portance. W hat the nation does
really m atters. A w rong choice could m ean
irreparable damage. Thus responsible m en are
obliged to fight for what they are convinced is
right.
M en share power. M en differ concerning
what m ust be done. T he differences matter. This
m ilieu necessitates that policy be resolved by
politics. W hat the nation does is som etim es the
result o f the trium ph o f one group over others.
M ore often, however, different groups pulling
in different directions yield a resultant distinct
from what anyone intended. W hat moves the
chess pieces is not simply the reasons which support a course o f action, ñor the routines o f orga­
nizations w hich enact an alternative, but the
power and skill o f proponents and opponents o f
the action in question.
This characterization captures the thrust o f
the bureaucratic politics orientation. I f p ro b ­
lem s o f foreign policy aróse as discreet issues,
and decisions were determ ined on e game at a
tim e, this account would suffice. But m ost
“issues,” e.g., V ietnam or the proliferation o f
nuclear weapons, em erge piecem eal, over tim e,
one lum p in one context, a second in another.
Hundreds o f issues com pete for players’ attention every day. Each player is forced to fix upon
his issues for that day, fight them on their own
term s, and rush on to the next. Thus the character o f em erging issues and the pace at which the
game is played converge to yield governm ent
“decisions” and “actions” as collages. Choices by
one player, outcom es o f m inor games, outcom es
o f central games, and “foul-ups”— these pieces,
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when stuck to the sam e canvas, constitute governm ent behavior relevant to an issue.
T he concept o f national security policy as
political ou tcom e contradicts both public
imagery and academ ic orthodoxy. Issues vital to
national security, it is said, are too im portant to
be settled by political games. T hey must be
“above” politics. T o accuse som eone o f “playing
politics with national security” is a most serious
charge. W hat public conviction demands, the
academ ic penchant for intellectual elegance
reinforces. Internal politics is messy; m oreover,
according to prevailing doctrine, politicking
lacks intellectual content. As such, it constitutes
gossip for jou rnalists rather than a subject for
serious investigation. O ccasional m em oirs,
anecdotes in historical accounts, and several
detailed case studies to the contrary, m ost o f the
literature o f foreign policy avoids bureaucratic
politics. T he gap between academ ic literature
and the experience o f participants in governm ent is now here wider than at this point. . . .
The U.S. Blockade ofC uba: A Third Cut
T h e P o litics o f D iscovery. A series o f overlapping bargaining games determined both the date
o f discovery o f the Soviet missiles and the im p act
on this discovery on the Adm inistration. An
explanation o f the politics o f the discovery is
consequently a considerable piece o f the expla­
nation o f the U .S. blockade.
C u ba was the Kennedy A dm inistration’s
“political A chilles’ heel.”22 T he m onths preceding the crisis were also m onths before the C ongressional elections, and the Republican
Senatorial and Congressional Campaign C om m ittee had announced that Cuba would be “the
dom inant issue o f the 1962 cam paign.”23 W hat
the ad m inistration billed as a “m ore positive
and indirect approach o f isolating Castro from
developing, d em ocratic Latin A m erica,” Senators Keating, Goldwater, Capehart, Thurm ond,
and others attacked as a “d o-nothing” policy.24
In statem ents on the floor o f the House and Sen-
291
ate, cam paign speeches across the country, and
interviews and articles carried by national news
media, Cuba— particularly the Soviet program
o f increased arms aid— served as a stick for stirring the dom estic political scene.
These attacks drew blood. Prudence demanded a vigorous reaction. T he President
decided to m eet the issue head-on. The Adm inistration m ounted a forceful campaign o f denial
designed to discredit critics’ claims. The Presi­
dent him self m anned the front line o f this offen­
sive, though alm ost all Adm inistration officials
participated. In his news conference on August
19, President Kennedy attacked as “irresponsib le” calis for an invasión o f Cuba, stressing
rather “the totality o f our obligations” and
promising to “watch what happens in Cuba with
the closest atten tio n .” On Septem ber 4, he
issued a strong statem ent denying any provocative Soviet actton in Cuba. On Septem ber 13 he
lashed out at “loose talk” calling for an invasión
o f Cuba. T he day before the flight o f the U -2
which discovered the missiles, he campaigned in
C apehart’s Indiana
against those “selfappointed generáis and admirals who want to
send som eone else’s sons to war.”
O n Sunday, O ctober 14, just as a U -2 was
taking the first pictures o f Soviet missiles,
M cGeorge Bundy was asserting:
1 know that there is no present evidence, and I
think that there is no present likelihood that the
Cuban government and the Soviet government
would, in combination, attempt to install a
major offensive capability.25
In this cam paign to puncture the critics’
charges, the Adm inistration discovered that the
public needed positive slogans. Thus, Kennedy
fell into a tenuous sem antic distinction between
“offensive” and “defensive” weapons. This dis­
tinction originated in his Septem ber 4 statement
that there was no evidence o f “offensive ground
to ground m issiles” and warned “were it to be
otherw ise, the gravest issues would arise.” His
Septem ber 13 statem ent turned on this distinc-
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tion between “defensive” and "offensive” weapons
and announced a firm com m itm ent to action if
the Soviet U nion attempted to introduce the latter into Cuba. Congressional com m ittees
elicited from adm inistration officials testim ony
which read this distinction and the President’s
com m itm ent into the C ongressional R e c o r d }b
W hat the President least wanted to hear, the
CIA was m ost hesitant to say plainly. O n August
22 John M cC one m et privately with the Presi­
dent and voiced suspicions that the Soviets were
preparing to introduce offensive missiles into
Cuba. Kennedy heard this as what it was: the
suspicion o f a hawk. M cC one left W ashington
for a m on th’s honeym oon on the Riviera. Fretting at Cap Ferrat, he bom barded his deputy,
G eneral M arshall Cárter, with telegrams, but
Cárter, knowing that M cC one had inform ed the
President o f his suspicions and received a coid
reception, was reluctant to distribute these
telegrams outside the CIA. O n Septem ber 9 a
U -2 “on loan ” to the Chínese Nationalists was
downed over m ainland China. The Com m ittee
on Overhead Reconnaissance (C O M O R ) convened on Septem ber 10 with a sense o f urgency.
Loss o fa n o th e r U -2 m ight incite world opinion
to demand cancellation o f U -2 flights. The Pres­
ident’s cam paign against those who asserted that
the Soviets were acting provocatively in Cuba
had begun. To risk downing a U -2 over Cuba
was to risk chopping o ff the limb on which the
President was sitting. T hat m eeting decided to
shy away from the western end o f Cuba (where
SAMs were becom ing operational) and modify
the flight pattern o f the U -2 s in order to reduce
the probability that a U -2 would be lost. U SIB's
unanim ous approval o f the Septem ber estímate
reflects sim ilar sensitivities. O n Septem ber 13
the President had asserted that there were no
Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba and com m itted
his A dm inistration to act if offensive missiles
were discovered. Before Congressional co m m it­
tees, Adm inistration officials were denying that
there was any evidence whatever o f offensive
missiles in Cuba. The im plications o f a National
Intelligence estím ate which concluded that the
Soviets were introducing offensive missiles into
Cuba were not lost on the men who constituted
A m erica’s highest intelligence assembly.
The O ctober 4 C O M O R decisión to direct a
flight over the western end o f Cuba in effect
“overturned” the Septem ber estímate, but with­
out officially raising that issue. T he decisión represented M cC on e’s victory for which he had
lobbied with the President before the Septem ber
10 decisión, in telegrams before the Septem ber 19
estímate, and in person after his return to W ash­
ington. Though the politics o f the intelligence
com m unity is closely guarded, several pieces of
the story can be told. By Septem ber 27, Colonel
W right and others in DIA believed that the Soviet
U nion was placing missiles in the San Cristóbal
area. This area was marked suspicious by the CIA
on Septem ber 29 and certified top priority on
O ctober 3. By O ctober 4 M cCone had the evi­
dence required to raise the issue officially. The
m em bers o f C O M O R heard M cC one’s argument, but were reluctant to make the hard deci­
sión he demanded. T he significant probability
that a U -2 would be downed made overflight of
western Cuba a m atter o f real concern.
T h e P olitics o f Issues. The U -2 photographs
presented incontrovertible evidence o f Soviet
offensive m issiles in Cuba. This revelation fell
upon politicized players in a com plex context.
As one high official recalled, Khrushchev had
caught us “with out pants dow n.” W hat each o f
the central participants saw, and what each did
to cover both his own and the A dm inistration’s
nakedness, created the spectrum o f issues and
answers.
At approxim ately 9:00 A .M ., Tuesday m o rn ­
ing, O ctober 16, M cG eorge Bundy went to the
P resident’s living quarters with the message:
“M r. President, there is now hard photographic
evidence that the Russians have offensive
missiles in C u ba.” M uch has been made o f
Kennedy’s “expression o f surprise.”27 but “surprise” fails to capture the character o f his initial
G R A H A M
T.
ALLI S ON
/ C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls a n d th e C u b a n M is sile C r is is
reaction. R ather, it was one o f startled anger,
m ost adequately conveyed by the exclam ation:
“He can ’t do that to me!" In term s o f the Presi­
den t’s atten tion and priorities at that m om ent,
Khrushchev had chosen the m ost unhelpful act
o f all. Kennedy had staked his full Presidential
authority on the assertion that the Soviets would
not place offensive weapons in Cuba. M oreover,
K hrushchev had assured the President through
the m ost direct and personal channels that he
was aware o f the President's dom estic political
problem and that nothing would be done to
exacerbate this problem . T he Chairm an had lied
to the President. K ennedy’s initial reaction
entailed action. T h e missiles must be removed.
T he alternatives o f “doing nothing” or “taking a
diplom atic approach” could not have been less
relevant to his problem .
These two tracks— doing nothing and tak­
ing a d iplom atic approach— were the solutions
advocated by two o f his principal advisors. For
Secretary o f D efense M cN am ara, the missiles
raised the spectre o f nuclear war. He first framed
the issue as a straightforward strategic problem .
T o understand the issue, one had to grasp two
obvious but difficult points. First, the missiles
represented an inevitable occurrence: narrowing
o f the m issile gap. It simply happened sooner
rather than later. Second, the United States
could accept this occurrence since its consequences were m in or: “seven-to-one missile
‘superiority,’ o n e -to -o n e m issile ‘equality,’ oneto-seven m issile ‘inferiority’— the three postures
are identical.” M cN am ara’s statem ent o f this
argum ent at the first m eeting o f the ExC om was
summ ed up in the phrase, “a missile is a missile.
It makes no great difference,” he m aintained,
“w hether you are killed by a m issile from the
Soviet U nion or C u ba.” The im plication was
clear. T h e United States should not initiate a cri­
sis with the Soviet U nion, risking a significant
probability o f nuclear war over an occurrence
which had such small strategic im plications.
T h e perceptions o f M cG eorge Bundy, the
President’s Assistant for N ational Security
293
Affairs, are the m ost difficult o f all to reconstruct. There is no question that he initially
argued for a diplom atic track. B ut was Bundy
laboring under his acknow ledged burden of
responsibility in Cuba I? O r was he playing the
role o f devil’s advócate in order to m ake the
President probe his own initial reaction and
consider other options?
T he President’s brother, R obert Kennedy,
saw m ost clearly the political wall against which
Khrushchev had backed the President. But he,
like M cN am ara, saw the prospect o f nuclear
doom . W as Khrushchev going to forcé the P res­
ident to an insane act? At the first m eeting o f the
E xC om , he scribbled a note, “Now I know how
T ojo felt when he was planning Pearl H arbor.”
From the outset he searched for an alternative
that would prevent the air strike.
T he initial reaction o f T heodore Sorensen,
the President’s Special Counsel and “alter ego,”
fell somew here betw een that o f the President
and his brother. Like the President, Sorensen felt
the poignancy o f betrayal. If the President had
been the architect o f the policy w hich the m issiles punctured, Sorensen was the draftsm an.
K hrushchev’s deceitful m ove demanded a
strong counter-m ove. But like R obert Kennedy,
Sorensen feared lest the shock and disgrace lead
to disaster.
T o the Joint Chiefs o f S taff the issue was
clear. N ow was the tim e to do the jo b for which
they had prepared contin gency plans. Cuba I
had been badly done; Cuba II would not be. The
missiles provided the occasion to deal with the
issue: cleansing the W estern Hem isphere o f Castro ’s Com m unism . As the President recalled on
the day the crisis ended, “An invasión would
have been a mistake— a wrong use o f our power.
But the rnilitary are mad. T hey wanted to do
this. It’s lucky for us that we have M cN am ara
over there.”
M cC on e’s perceptions flowed from his confirmed prediction. As the Cassandra o f the incident, he argued forcefully that the Soviets had
installed the missiles in a daring political probe
294
G RAHAM
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A L L I S O N / C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls a n d th e C u b a n M is sile C ris is
which the United States must m eet with forcé.
T he tim e for an air strike was now.
T h e P o litics o f C hoice. T he process by which
the blockade emerged is a story o f the m ost subtle and intricate probing, pulling, and hauling;
leading, guiding, and spurring. Reconstruction
o f this process can only be tentative. Initially the
President and m ost o f his advisers wanted the
clean, surgical air strike. On the first day o f the
crisis, when inform ing Stevenson o f the missiles,
the President m entioned only two alternatives:
“I suppose the alternatives are to go in by air and
wipe them out, or to take other steps to render
them inoperable.” At the end o f the week a sizeable m inority still favored an air strike. As
Robert Kennedy recalled: “T he fourteen people
involved were very significant. . . . If six o f them
had been President o f the U .S., I think that the
world inight have been blown up.” W hat prevented the air strike was a fortuitous coincidence o f a num ber o f factors— the absence o f
any one o f which m ight have perm itted that
option to prevail.
First, M cN am ara’s visión o f holocaust set
him firm ly against the air strike. His initial
attem pt to fram e the issue in strategic terms
struck Kennedy as particularly inappropriate.
O nce M cN am ara realized that the ñame o f the
game was a strong response, however, he and his
deputy G ilpatric chose the blockade as a fallback. W hen the Secretary o f Defense— whose
departm ent had the action, whose reputation in
the Cabinet was unequaled, in whom the Presi­
dent dem onstrated full confidence— marshalled
the arguments for the blockade and refused to
be moved, the blockade becam e a form idable
alternative.
Second, Robert Kennedy— the President’s
closest confidant— was unwilling to see his
brother becom e a “T o jo .” His arguments against
the air strike on m oral grounds struck a chord in
the President. M oreover, once his brother had
stated these arguments so forcefully, the Presi­
dent could not have chosen his initially preferred course w ithout, in effect, agreeing to
becom e what RFK had condem ned.
The President learned o f the missiles on
Tuesday m orning. O n W ednesday m orning, in
order to m ask our discovery from the Russians,
the President flew to C onn ecticu t to keep a
cam paign co m m itm en t, leaving RFK as the
unofficial chairm an o f the group. By the tim e
the President returned on W ednesday evening, a
critical third piece had been added to the pieture. M cN am ara had presented his argum ent
for the blockade. Robert Kennedy and Sorensen
had joined M cN am ara. A powerful coalition o f
the advisors in w hom the President had the
greatest confid ence, and with whom his style
was m ost com patible, had emerged.
Fourth, the coalition that had form ed
behind the President’s initial preference gave
him reason to pause. W ho supported the air
strike— the Chiefs, M cC on e, Rusk, Nitze, and
A cheson— as m uch as h ow they supported it,
counted. Fifth, a piece o f inaccurate in form a­
tion, which no one probed, permitted the blo ck ­
ade advocates to fuel (potential) uncertainties in
the President’s m ind. W hen the President
returned to W ashington W ednesday evening,
RFK and Sorensen m et him at the airport.
Sorensen gave the President a four-page m em o­
rándum outlining the areas o f agreem ent and
disagreement. The strongest argum ent was that
the air strike simply could not be surgical. After
a day o f prodding and questioning, the Air Forcé
had asserted that it could not guarantee the success o f a surgical air strike lim ited to the missiles
alone.
Thursday evening, the President convened
the ExCom at the W hite House. He declared his
tentative ch oice o f the blockade and directed
that preparations be m ade to put it into effect by
M onday m orning. Though he raised a question
about the possibility o f a surgical air strike subsequently, he seems to have accepted the
experts’ op in ion that this was no live option.
G R A H A M
T.
ALLI SON/
C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls an d th e C u b a n M issile C risis
295
(A cceptance o f this estím ate suggests that he
may have learned the lesson o f the Bay o f Pigs—
“Never rely on experts”— less well than he supposed.)28 But this inform ation was incorrect.
That no one probed this estím ate during the first
week o f the crisis poses an interesting question
for further investigation.
A coalition, including the President, thus
tional change should afford greater understanding o f why particular problem s and SOPs are
m aintained by identifiable types o f organiza­
tions and also how a manager can improve orga­
nizational perform ance. M odel III tells a
fascinating “story.” But its com plexity is enorm ous, the inform ation requirem ents are often
overwhelm ing, and m any o f the details o f the
emerged from the President’s ¡nidal decisión
that som ething had to be done; M cN am ara,
Robert Kennedy, and Sorensen’s resistance to
the air strike; incom patibility between the Pres­
ident and the air strike advocates; and an inaccurate piece o f inform ation.
bargaining m ay be superfluous. How can such a
model be m ade parsimonious? T he three m od­
els are obvtously not exclusive alternatives.
Indeed, the paradigms highlight the partial
emphasis o f the framework— what each emphasizes and what it leaves out. Each concentrates
on one class o f variables, in effect, relegating
C o n c lu s ió n .. . .
The prelim inary, partial paradigms presented
here provide a basis for serious reexam ination o f
many problem s o f foreign and m ilitary policy.
Model II and M odel III cuts at problem s typically treated in M odel 1 terms can perm it significant im provem ents in explanation and
prediction. Full M odel II and III analyses
require large am ounts o f inform ation. . . .
T he present form ulation o f paradigms is
simply an initial step. As such it leaves a long list
o f critical questions unanswered. Given any
action, an im aginative analyst should always be
able to construct som e rationale for the governm ent’s ch oice. By im posing, and relaxing, constraints on the param eters o f rational choice (as
in variants o f M odel I) analysts can construct a
large num ber o f accounts o f any act as a rational
choice. But does a statem ent o f reasons why a
rational actor would choose an action constitute
an explanation o f the occu rren ce o f that action?
How can M odel I analysis be forced to make
more system atic contribu tions to the question
o f the d eterm inants o f occurrences? . . . The
world is contiguous. But governm ents som etim es m ake sharp departures. Can an organiza­
tional process m odel be m odified to suggest
where change is likely? A ttention to organiza­
other im portant factors to a ceteris paribu s
clause. M odel I concentrates on “ market fac­
to rs”: pressures and incentives created by the
“international strategic m arketplace.” Models II
and III focus on the internal m echanism o f the
governm ent that chooses in this environm ent.
But can these relations be more fully specified?
Adequate synthesis would require a typology o f
decisión and actions, som e o f which are more
am enable to treatm ent in terms o f one model
and some to another. . . .
N otes
1. Theod ore Sorensen, K en n ed y (New York, 1965),
p. 705.
2. In attem pting to undersund problem s o f foreign
affairs, analysts engage in a num ber o f related, but
logically separable enterprises: (a) description, (b) expla­
nation, (c) prediction, (d) evaluation, and (e) recom mendation. This essay focuses primarily on explanation
(and by im plication, prediction).
3. In arguing that explanations proceed in terms o f
im plicit conceptual models, this essay makes no claim
that foreign policy analysts have developed any satisfactory, empirically tested theory. In this essay, the use o f
the term “ m odel” without qualifiers should be read
“conceptual schem e.”
4. Earlier drafts o f this argument have aroused heated
arguments concerning proper ñames for these models.
T o choose ñames for ordinary language is to court co n ­
fusión, as well as familiaríty. Perhaps it is best to think o f
these models as I, II, and III.
296
G RAHAM
T.
A t t l S O N /
C o n c e p tu a l M o d e ls a n d th e C u b a n M is sile C ris is
3.
In strict terms, the '‘outcom es" which these three
models attem pt to explain are essentially actions o f
national governm ents, i.e., the sum o f activities o f all
individuáis employed by a governm ent relevant to an
issue. These models focus not on a State o f affairs, i.e., a
full description o f the world, but upon national decisión
and im plem entation. This distinction is stated clearly by
Harold and Margaret Sprout, “Environm ental Factors
on the Study o f International Politics,” in James Rosenau
(ed .), In tern ation al Politics a n d Foreign Policy (Glencoe,
Illinois, 1961), p. 116. . . .
^
6. As stated in the introduction, this “case snapshot”
presents, without editorial com m entary, a Model l analyst’s explanation o f the U.S. blockade. T he purpose is to
illustrate a strong, characteristic rational policy model
account. This account is (roughly) consistent with prevailing explanations o f these events.
7. Theodore Sorensen, op. cit., p. 675.
8. Ibid., p. 679.
9. Ibid., p. 679.
10. Elie Abel, The M issile Crisis (New York, 1966), p.
144.
11. Ibid., p. 102.
12. Sorensen, op. cit.y p. 684.
13. Ibid., p. 685. Though this was the form ulation o f
the argument, the facts are n ot strictly accurate. O ur tradition against surprise attack was rather younger than
175 years. For example, President Theodore Roosevelt
applauded Japan’s attack on Russia in 1904.
14. N ew York T im es, June, 1963.
15. The influence o f organizational studies upon the
present iiteraiure o í foreign affairs is minim al. Specialists
in international politics are not students o f organization
theory. Organization theory has only recently begun to
study organizations as decisionm akers and has not yet
produced behaviorai studies o f national security organi­
zations from a decision-m aking perspective. It seem s
unlikely, however, that these gaps will rem ain unfilled
m uch longer. . . . The “decisionm aking” approach represented by Richard Snyder, R. Bruck, and B. Sapin, F or­
eign P olicy D ecision -M akin g (G len coe, Illinois, 1962),
in corporates a num ber o f insights from organization
theory.
16. U.S. D epartm ent o f State, B ulletin, XLV1I, pp.
7 1 5 -7 2 0 .
17. A rthur Schlesinger, A T h o u san d Days (B o ston :
1965), p. 803.
18. See U .S. Congress, Senate, C om m ittee on Armed
Services, Preparedness Investigation Subcom m ittee,
In terim R eport on C u ban M ilitary Bu ild-up, 88th C ongress, lst Session, 1963, p. 2; Hanson Baldwin, “Growing
Risks o f Bureaucratic Intelligence,” T he R epórter {August
15, 1963), 4 8 -5 0 ; Roberta W ohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl
H arb or,” F oreign A ffairs (luly, 1965), 706.
19. R. H ilsm an, T o M ove a N ation (New York, 1967),
pp. 1 7 2 -1 7 3 .
20. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 818.
21. Sorensen, K enn edy, p. 710.
22. Sorensen, K ennedy, p. 670.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid-, pp. 670ff.
25. Cited by Abel, op. cit., p. 13.
26. Senate Foreign Relations C om m ittee; Senate
Armed Services C om m ittee; House C om m ittee on
A ppropriations; House Select C om m ittee on Export
C ontrol.
27. Abel, op. cit., pp. 44f.
28. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 296.