146
147
A Descriptive Review of the Use of CCTV in Flemish
Municipalities
17
Tom De Schepper and Paul De Hert
Abstract
The use of CCTV-surveillance by Flemish municipalities is increasing. A newspaper analysis,
complemented with other information gives a first indication about the developments in this field
and shows an evolution in the implementation of CCTV in Flemish municipalities. In the
beginning CCTV was used to protect spots where public services are delivered. In a next phase, a
reduced number of Flemish municipalities turned to CCTV to protect public spaces. Thereafter, a
highly reduced number of cities and municipalities started searching for more advanced CCTVsystems, in view of combatting certain specific phenomena. In this phase, the demand is more
likely to come from local police forces that increasingly turn to policing methods inspired by the
policing concept of ‘nodal orientation’. The last phase consists of a reduced number of
municipalities in search of cooperation and integration of CCTV-systems, mostly for traffic
management purposes (use of ANPR systems). Only a strict minority of the Flemish cities and
municipalities showed reluctance towards the use of CCTV. Our data provided, allows an
explanation of what factors have impacted on the attitudes of local authorities. The use of CCTV
can be related to the geographical location of the municipality. All of the large cities as well as
most of the medium and coastal cities in Flanders make use of it. Population density and a lack
of sufficient police capacity in the community can be important. Political colour of local
administrations did not prove to be a decisive factor. After adding these and other factors to an
explanatory empirical model, we proceeded to predict correctly the odds for implementing
ANPR-cameras for 60.3 per cent and the odds for implementing CCTV-cameras for 81.2 per
cent of the Flemish municipalities. We found that the factors influencing the implementation of
CCTV differed from the factors influencing the implementation of ANPR.
1.
Introduction
In the Flemish region of Belgium, the use of diverse types of cameras by municipalities is on the
rise. A recent attempt to map these evolutions by the Belgian Ministry of Internal Affairs led to
predictions about the implementation of CCTV by Belgian municipalities (Internal Affairs:
2011). A descriptive review of the implementation of CCTV in the Flemish part of the country
by the Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities (VVSG: 2011) complemented the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17
Tom De Schepper, Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities, Belgium, and Paul De Hert, Vrije University,
Belgium
picture by gathering more in-depth information about the number of municipalities with open
street cameras (CCTV) and number plate recognition schemes (ANPR) in public spaces.
This paper discusses these findings and relates them to research in other countries. After a brief
introduction of the results found by the VVSG, we identify some major factors that led to the
implementation of CCTV and ANPR in Flemish municipalities. We are aware of the fact that the
implementation of CCTV is often the result of a complex interplay of specific factors and that no
uniform international trends are at work. Speaking for Spanish CCTV, Galdon has found
relations to social, economic and demographic factors and political configurations based on
historical factors and internal dynamics of power (Galdon, 2011). Other authors advance an
explanatory model and see the implementation of CCTV mostly as the result of moments, crises
and particular events (e.g. terrorist attacks 9/11, school room killings) where politicians have to
be seen to be doing something (Norris et al. 2004; McCahill and Norris, 2002). Still others
underline that manufacturers, local and national politicians and local media should all be seen as
drivers for the deployment of CCTV (Hempel and Töpfer, 2004; Groombridge, 2008; Webster,
2009). Taking stock of these explanatory schemes, we will focus in this paper, on six factors (1)
transit and motorway access, (2) transit and country border, (3) political affiliations, (4)
population density, (5) police capacity and (6) transit and public transportation. Factor (6) will be
looked at in conjunction with factors (1) and (2), since all three relate to location and transit.
In the next section we first explain our method used to gather data about the implementation of
CCTV and ANPR in Flemish municipalities. In section 3 we introduce Belgian federalism and
the organisation of Belgian police. In the fourth section we give an aggregated analysis of our
data. Sections 5 to 8 follow a discussion on the impact of the factors that we identified above.
Section 8 proposes a data model to predict the use of CCTV and ANPR systems by Flemish
municipalities. In section 9 we briefly conclude.
2.
Methodology
Our key data were gathered in 2011 according to an analysis of the regional pages in the major
Flemish newspapers. This technique, newspaper analysis, was chosen for the following reason:
an earlier CCTV study in 2010 by the Belgian Ministry of Internal Affairs based on response of
589 Belgian municipalities via a voluntary on-line survey did not produce satisfactory data
(Internal Affairs: 2011). An alternative method was therefore warranted. The newspaper analysis
method had also been used by other researchers to collect data and to test similar research theses
(Galdon: 2011; Hempel and Töpfer: 2004). Aware of the fact that the use of the newspaper
analysis technique raises certain questions about the reliability of the collected data. To increase
the reliability of the obtained data, the Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities has
therefore tried to adjust and double-check them with her members, being a major part of 308
Flemish municipalities and 117 Flemish local police forces (‘inside information’). Even with this
extra measure, the research did however not always produce usable data that allowed a
categorisation as binary variables. Newspapers mostly deliver a range of articles about the
implementation in one single municipality because of the policy process or the public debate that
is still going on (e.g. story of the opponents and story of the proponents). When the content of
these articles, even when adjusted by inside information, was not of a nature that it could allow
148
us to have a clear answer about the implementation of CCTV, we did not take it into account in
our dataset. (This resulted in a lack of data from 129 Flemish municipalities - 41.88% of the
research population - this data was registered in our dataset as ‘missing values’).
3.
Description of Belgian State Structure and Policing Models
Before describing the implementation of CCTV in Flanders, it is important to give a short
overview of the structure of the Belgian federal state and Belgian police models. As the result of
multiple initiatives to regionalise the competences of policy of the federal government, the three
regional governments (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) are competent for economic and cultural
policy matters in their region (e.g. traffic management). However, the federal government still is
competent for some trans-regional policy matters, of which public safety (Ministry of Internal
Affairs), justice (Ministry of Justice) and privacy (Belgian Data Protection Authority, which is
related to the Ministry of Justice) are important in relation to the content of this paper. In 1992, a
national Privacy Act was voted in the Belgian Federal Parliament, containing a general
framework for privacy principles. In 2007, the Belgian Federal Parliament voted a national
Camera Act, which added specific rules for the use of public and private use of CCTV. After this
Act was adapted by parliament in 2009, the Belgian Minister of Internal Affairs declared in
parliament that this Act also regulates the use of ANPR cameras.
In 2001, Belgian police was restructured and became one organisation with two levels. On the
local level, 308 Flemish municipalities are in charge of 117 local police forces, which are
competent for general police tasks. Local police forces can require specific assistance from the
Belgian federal police force (the second level). In the years after the introduction of this police
structure, Belgian federal government published several documents about the policing models
that should also be used by the local police forces. In 2003, the concept of ‘community policing’
was introduced. It refers to a way of delivering services to citizens that is based on a problemsolving way of acting and accountability of police officers. In the same period, the concept of
‘intelligence led policing’ was introduced promising a more efficient way of using information
for operational and strategic police actions. More recently, the concept of ‘nodal orientation’
(also referred to as ‘infrastructure policing’) has found its way in police dictionaries. The concept
refers to ‘the surveillance of infrastructure, or rather, of flows of people, goods, money and
information that use the infrastructure to move from one place to another’ (Board of Chief
Commissioners of Dutch Police: 2005; Van Ooijen: 2009). This concept is often invoked when
local police forces defend the implementation of automatic number plate recognition systems for
the surveillance of transnational transits on the surface of the police force. These systems are
considered to be a useful tool to fight cross-bordered criminality on the surface. The
implementation of the concept of ‘nodal orientation’ nowadays is mostly driven by local police
forces and not by the municipalities of which they consist. Because of this, the implementation
of the concept ‘nodal orientation’ still is characterized as ‘island innovation’, a collection of so
far unconnected projects (Van Ooijen, 2009; Bekkers and Van Sluis, 2009).
149
4.
Data on CCTV-Implementation in Flanders
The available data, based on the study made by the Belgian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the
VVSG study, shows that the use of diverse types of cameras by Flemish local governments is on
a rise, not only in the major cities and regional cities , but also in coastal cities and towns
(Internal Affairs: 2012). With 6-year-cyclus local elections to come in 2012, the number of
implementing cities and municipalities is still increasing. The VVSG study contains data on the
implementation of CCTV in 179 (58.12%) of Flemish municipalities, and shows resistance
towards any type of CCTV in 28 Flemish municipalities (9.09%). This widespread use of CCTV
in Flemish municipalities can partly be understood following Norris’s four-stage diffusion theory
(Norris et al. 2004). In a first stage, CCTV makes its mark in the private sector, particularly in
banks and the retail sector. These systems tend to be small and relatively unsophisticated and
there is often no continuous monitoring of the cameras by dedicated staff. In a second stage, we
see the diffusion of CCTV into key institutional areas of the public infrastructure. Outside of the
transport sector, many of these systems are technologically simple and many have no dedicated
personnel continuously monitoring the system. In a third stage, there is limited diffusion in the
public space, mostly town centre and city streets. They are mostly funded from the public purse
and generally run by city authorities of local police. They vary in organisation. In the last stage,
CCTV can almost be called ubiquitous. Cameras are placed on a large scale, with often blanket
coverage of whole areas of a city. There is also a tendency towards large-scale system
integration. The systems can provide a whole range of functions such as traffic control or ANPR.
In Flanders, not every municipality had reached the same stage of implementation at the moment
of our data gathering. In a first and a second stage, CCTV is driven by private and institutional
diffusion. Municipalities having any type of CCTV are being considered as having CCTV on
public and not-for-public accessible locations. So, having information about 179 Flemish
municipalities, we consider them all having CCTV on public and not-for-public accessible
locations (e.g. public buildings and premises). In many of these cases, we could find more
specification about the location. For the third and the fourth stages of implementation, our data
gathering produced detailed information about the implementation of CCTV on public spaces
(115) and information about innovative CCTV, mainly ANPR cameras (59) and intelligent
cameras (19). These results can be compared with the official statistics produced by the Belgian
Data Protection Authority during the period 2008-2012 (CBPL: 2008-2011), which are listed in
Figure 1.
Source: CBPL: 20082011
(N.A. = not available)
Number of registered
CCTV-systems
in
Belgium
* Public and not-forpublic
accessible
locations
* Public spaces
2008.09.08
2009
2010.06.11
2011.02.25
2011.08.12
1,687
(since
2007)
1,653
(since
2007)
34
(since
2,806
(since
2007)
N.A.
8,298
(general)
16,790
(general)
18,382
(general)
8,186
(general)
15,113
(general)
16,394
(general)
112
(general)
225
(general)
261
(general)
36
(since
150
*
Locations
employment
2007)
of N.A.
2007)
N.A.
151
N.A.
1,452
(general)
1,727
(general)
Figure 1. Figures about the registration of cameras in the public data register of the Belgian
Data Protection Authority according to the Belgian Camera Act (2008-2011).
The statistics show that about 1.5% to 2.0% of officially registered camera systems in Belgium
are used on public locations (mostly real-time CCTV on streets by 589 municipalities).
The results of our data gathering, compared with the official statistics produced by the Belgian
Data Protection Authority, give a first indication of the implementation of diverse types of
cameras in Flemish municipalities. In the following figures, the data is presented according to the
type of camera (fixed on one place in the municipality, or transferable from one place to another
in the municipality) and the type of place where they were installed. With regard to CCTV
installed in public spaces, we have the following outcome:
CCTV public spaces
Source: VVSG: 2011
Fixed – open place or open street
Fixed – public park
Transferable – events and happenings
Transferable – police interventions
Transferable – waste disposal and incivilities
Fixed – events and happenings
Fixed – waste disposal and incivilities
N = 71 cases out of 115 municipalities
(61.74% cases)
36.70%
14.68%
12.84%
10.09%
9.17%
8.26%
8.26%
Figure 2. Figures about the type of camera and the type of phenomenon for which CCTV in
public spaces in Flemish municipalities is mainly used (VVSG: 2011).
Fixed cameras on public spaces are used for surveillance on open places, open streets or public
parks in half of the cases (51.38%). Municipalities also use them for temporary surveillance on
events and happenings or to manage police interventions (31.19%). Fixed and transferable
cameras to gather evidence in illegal waste disposal and other incivilities are on the rise
(17.43%). Figure 3 reproduces the data with regard to CCTV installed in public accessible
locations.
CCTV public accessible locations
Source: VVSG: 2011
Fixed CCTV – public administrative building
Fixed CCTV – sports building
Fixed CCTV – bike parking
Fixed CCTV – juvenile building
Fixed CCTV – recreation area or beach
Fixed CCTV – car parking
Fixed CCTV – religious building or graveyard
N = 69 cases out of 179 municipalities
(38.55% cases)
25.00%
20.37%
13.89%
10.19%
9.26%
7.41%
5.56%
Fixed CCTV – school building
Fixed CCTV – recycling park
4.63%
3.70%
Figure 3. Figures about the type of camera and the type of location for which CCTV in public
accessible locations in Flemish municipalities is mainly used (VVSG: 2011).
Fixed cameras are installed in a different range of public accessible locations, mostly as a
response to a recent event (e.g. burglary or criminality). In most cases, they are used to protect
public administrative buildings (25%) (e.g. town hall or police headquarters), leisure-use
buildings (39.82%) (e.g. sports, juvenile and recreation centres) and parking areas (21.30%).
In explaining his ‘four-stage theory’, Norris underlines that the progress from one stage to
another depends on a complex interplay of socio-economic, legal, fiscal and political factors. In
this set of factors attention should be given to increasingly important public-private partnerships
with regard to CCTV. Other authors have already stated that the spaces in a city being equipped
with cameras mostly have a private-like character. This could be the result of actions taken by
organised neighbourhood or shop-owner confederations, being the main proponents and
beneficiaries of CCTV (Galdon, 2011). In Belgium, at the federal level, no grants are given for
the implementation of open-street CCTV or ANPR to local government. Shop-owners and
privately-owned corporations however, do receive subsidies by the federal government for the
protection of their premises and goods. These subsidies can also be used to install cameras in or
nearby shops. Hence we see that in Flanders, CCTV can be implemented by shop-owners and
private-owned corporations with federal government funding. Some still plea for more advanced
public-private partnership schemes between private actors and municipalities and local police
forces. In these proposed schemes, CCTV images would be viewed by police officers and no
longer by the shop-owners themselves. A similar development has been described in other
international research. Some groups, particularly retailers, have been key players in the
installation of CCTV in Australia. Their involvement ranges from offering support through full
responsibility for funding (Wilson and Sutton, 2003).
A similar trend towards advanced public-private collaborations can be found with regard to the
implementation of ANPR-cameras. In some Flemish areas, neighbourhood confederations or
privately-owned corporations have pleaded for the implementation of ANPR on access points of
their street or area. Police forces check licence plates with central databases, while the
confederations pay for the installation and processing of the system. As a result, we can
summarise these trends for demanding CCTV as ‘please in my backyard’ phenomenon
(PIMBY), which is contrary to the well-known ‘not in my backyard’ phenomenon (NIMBY).
5.
Transit Factors (factor 1 and factor 2 and factor 6)
The Flanders region has an important position in the transnational European transit network. The
region has an extensive motorway network (6 European motorways link the major cities and
relate them to the French, Dutch and German border), an extensive railway network (with highspeed connections to Amsterdam, Cologne, Paris and London) and 4 seaports. In our data, we
have added three indicators that can relate the transit location of a Flemish municipality to the
152
Figure 4 gives us an overview of the main motorways in Flanders and the locations of the
CCTV-type of cameras installed by the Flemish Traffic Centre on these motorways (Flemish
Traffic Centre: 2012). The Centre, which is located in Antwerp, is mandated to manage and
control international traffic on the major motorways. The Centre makes use of three types of
cameras to fulfil this task. As can also be seen by this figure, a major part of the Flemish
municipalities is crossed by one of the main motorways (52.92%) and an important part of them
has even got a motorway entrance or exit on or nearby the surface of the municipality (48.05%).
This is part of a local strategy, because many municipalities gain by international transportation
when developing local industrial and shopping zones nearby these entrances of international
motorways. But they also lose by it, because it makes them vulnerable to cross-border
criminality, mainly with connections to Eastern Europe or the north of France. These
municipalities were related to transit factor 1 (motorway access). A smaller, but not unimportant
part of the municipalities has got a direct border with a French or Dutch municipality (13.64%).
These municipalities were related to transit factor 2 (country border).
Some previous statistical tests on our data do not indicate a strong relationship between
municipalities that use CCTV or ANPR and the transit indicators that were already discussed.
The relationship is weak in relation to the border of the municipality with a French or Dutch
municipality, but is stronger in relation to the motorway access on the border of a municipality.
This can be declared by the fact that more than half of the Flemish municipalities have a
motorway on their surface, while less than twenty per cent of them make use of CCTV or ANPR.
NORTH SEA
NETHERLANDS
ANTWERP
GHENT
BRUSSELS
GERMANY
implementation of CCTV and automatic number plate recognition. These factors are the access
to an international motorway on or nearby the surface of a municipality (factor 1), the connection
of one of the borders of this municipality with a country border with France or the Netherlands
(factor 2), and the implementation of a social security charter between the municipality and the
Belgian federal railway cooperation (factor 6). As the implementation of CCTV in Flanders
municipalities is mainly used for public space surveillance and crowd-management, we cannot
expect a strong relationship with this type of camera. As the implementation of an ANPR-camera
is mainly used to register licence plates of vehicles, we can expect a stronger relationship with
the transit indicators. Hereafter, we will discuss the relationship of the three transit factors in
relationship to the implementation of CCTV and ANPR cameras in Flemish municipalities.
153
FRANCE
Figure 4. Implementation of traffic control CCTV on main motorways in Flanders. Source:
2012, Vlaams Verkeerscentrum (Flanders region), Mobiris (Brussels region) and PEREX
(Walloon region).
Our last transit factor is related to the implementation of a social security charter between the
municipality and the Belgian federal railway cooperation. Figure 5 shows the existence of a
complex railway network in Flanders, with important connections to major cities in the
surrounding countries by high-speed railway networks (e.g. Eurostar to London, Thalys to Paris,
Cologne and Amsterdam). Most of the Flemish railway stations are therefore places of
connection to other transportation systems (e.g. buses, trams and underground networks) and
places of meetings and conflicts. As a result of some dramatic incidents which have recently
occurred in and on public transport (e.g. the robbery and killing of passenger Joe Van Holsbeek
during rush hour in Brussels Central Station on April 12th, 2006; violence that led to the death of
bus-passenger Guido De Moor in the inner city of Antwerp on June 24th, 2006; and violence that
led to the death of public transport controller Iliaz Tahiraj during his notification of a car-hit-bus
accident on April 7th, 2012) the use of CCTV has increased in and on public transport. Other
research has already found that transport locations in general seem to be a preferred point for the
implementation of CCTV. Some countries throughout Europe (e.g. Norway and Germany) have
even been introducing CCTV nearby these locations (Hempel and Töpfer, 2004) or nearby
underground stations, mainline railway systems and airports (McCahill and Norris, 2002).
Surveillance-cameras in Belgium are mostly installed by the transport network provider and not
by local police forces. Local police forces and municipalities make agreements with these
providers to view the images. These are mostly made by federal or local governments. The
decentralised federal railway cooperation (B-Holding) has the intention to install CCTV on all of
the major Belgian stations by 2020 and is thinking about installing CCTV for onboard
registration in new passenger trains (Gazet van Antwerpen, 2012a). The Flemish bus and tram
cooperation (VVM-De Lijn) has the intention to install CCTV on all of the vehicles by 2015. By
2012, twenty-five per cent of public buses should be equipped with CCTV (Gazet van
Antwerpen, 2012b). Both public transport organisations have recently been working on an
integrated security plans, by making agreements with local governments, local police forces and
154
other local partners. These plans can be linked to the introduction CCTV but, as is stated in press
releases, should not necessarily be the main purpose of the charters. The implementation of
CCTV in and on public transport as described in this section cannot be related to a certain
municipality. This makes it difficult to add this factor to our dataset. However, we can add the
implementation of a social security charter by a municipality and the Belgian railway
cooperation, in which both have made agreements about the security in and around stations to the
implementation of CCTV (factor 6).
Figure 5. Map of railway network in Flanders. Source: 2012, B-Holding.
6.
Political Strategy or Incidental Response (factor 3)
The political party system in Belgium is, as a result of the high degree of regional autonomy,
diversified. As described in section 3 of this paper, the Flanders, Brussels and Walloon region
are competent for a large number of different policy matters. The federal government faces
different appreciations of citizens and political parties according to its security policy. Citizens in
the northern part of the country (Flanders) tend to vote more for right-wing parties with more
radical views on security and migration, while citizens in the southern part of the country
(Wallonia) tend to vote more for left-wing parties with softer views on security and migration.
None of the major political parties in Flanders has a pronounced statement about the
implementation of CCTV-cameras. On the federal level, some statements can mainly be found in
parliamentary documents in preparation of the federal Camera Act in 2007 (Hearings
Commission of Internal Affairs: 2006).
Figure 6 summarises the answers of the four major Flemish political parties to questions in
preparation of a general legislation concerning CCTV-use in 2006. This law has been prepared in
the Federal Parliament by Flemish and Walloon political parties. We see differences in the
statements by the Flemish (less reluctant) and Walloon (more reluctant) parties, even if their
ideology is connected to each other. As can be seen from the answers to the first three questions
in the table, the extremist (Vlaams Belang) and Christian-democrats (CD&V) did not plead for a
new legislation. On the contrary, the liberal-democrats (VLD) and the socialists (SP.A-Spirit)
155
have made detailed statements about the new legislation. Liberal-democrats (right-wing party)
plead for more possibilities and a less restrictive law, referring to the concept of ‘intelligence led
policing’ (e.g. unlimited storage terms and police accessibility). Socialists (left-wing party) plead
for more specific legislation, referring to the concept of ‘community policing’ (e.g. types of
cameras, non-changeability of images, short storage terms, restrictive police accessibility and
administrative fines). Difference in view by right-wing and left-wing parties can also been found
in other research (Galdon, 2011).
VL.
BELANG
YES
VLD
CD&V
SP.A-SPIRIT
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
-
YES
(if adapted)
-
YES
(if adapted)
-
YES
Security
-
YES
Security
-
YES
-
YES
-
NO
-
YES
-
NO
(exceptions)
NO
-
NO
(exceptions)
NO
Pictogram/Sig
n
Police forces if
public spaces.
Private
security on
private spaces.
Can be
changed.
None
(exceptions by
Privacy Act).
Other term.
-
Primary question 1.
Is Privacy Act sufficient?
Primary question 2.
Need for general
legislation?
Primary question 3.
Need to incorporate specific
legislation in general
legislation?
Privacy Act principles to be
transferred to general
legislation?
Need of new principles?
Aim of new general
legislation?
Standards for cameralocations?
Standards for cameratypes?
Can citizens film public
spaces?
Film citizens without
restrictions?
How to inform citizens?
-
Who can access images?
-
Can images be adapted?
-
Who else has access to
images?
-
How long can images be
-
-
-
-
-
Pictogram/Sig
n
Police forces if
public spaces.
Private
security on
private spaces.
Keep them
intact.
None (except
for
responsible).
Max. 8 days.
156
stored?
Access for police to
images?
Should general legislation
be enforced by licensing
system?
Control by Data Protection
Authority?
Should general legislation
be enforced by penalties?
-
-
Unlimited
access.
NO (local
council for
local public
place,
declaration for
private place)
NO (good as
is)
YES (fines by
the penal law)
157
-
Need of a rule.
-
NO (local
council for
local public
place, selfregulation for
private place)
NO (int.
affairs)
YES (fines by
the
administration)
-
Figure 6. Given answers by four major Flemish political parties in the Belgian Federal
Parliament to questions in preparation of a general legislation concerning CCTV-use (Hearings
Commission of Internal Affairs: 2006).
These differences in statements could also be expected to have consequences for the general
attitude by local municipalities towards the use of CCTV. At the local level however, a federal
party can have another form or coalition or the main party can be a strictly local party. Figure 7
shows no clear relative difference between left-wing coalitions (SP.A-Spirit and SP.A) and rightwing coalitions (Open VLD and Open VLD-Vivant) on the local level. It is important to relate
this conclusion to the socio-economic status of the municipality. The left-wing coalitions deliver
the mayor in two thirds of the largest cities and twenty per cent of the medium cities. The rightwing parties deliver the mayor in none of the largest cities, but they do so in nearly forty per cent
of the coastal towns. Although their federal party has not made clear statements about CCTVuse, Christian-democratic coalitions (CD&V and CD&V/N-VA), radical parties
(environmentalists Groen! and Flemish-nationalists N-VA) and strictly local parties (lokaal)
make relatively less use of CCTV on public spaces. It is important to notice that the Christiandemocratic coalitions deliver the mayor in more than fifty per cent of the medium cities and
coastal municipalities and in three forth of the regional cities.
As a result of what has been described above, we could expect the political factor not to be
significant in the declaration of the implementation of CCTV in Flemish municipalities.
Although left-wing parties have more concerns about CCTV, they deliver the mayor in the
largest cities in which the need for it can be higher. Although right-wing parties are more freeminded about CCTV, they deliver the mayor in a lot of coastal towns, in which the need for it
can also be higher. We could expect that the implementation of CCTV on public spaces in
Flemish municipalities is more related to factors of a local context (e.g. number of criminality
and pressure-groups) than it is part of a national view of the political party.
Figure 7. Political coalitions in Flemish municipalities and implementation of CCTV.
7.
Local Population (factor 4) and Police Capacity (factor 5)
The Flanders region in Belgium is known to be ‘overbuilt’, not only in the larger cities but also
in more rural areas. The region has a high population density. This factor can lead to an
increased risk for social conflicts in the densest places (e.g. Brussels or Antwerp). As a result of
this, local and federal governments have made statements about strengthening their security
policy, and often an increase in CCTV-cameras has been taken into consideration. As a result, a
relationship between population density (which is the result of a division of the surface of the
municipality and the number of citizens living on this surface) and the implementation of CCTV
can be expected.
158
Figure 8. Population of Flemish municipalities by 2012-01-01, clustered according to the
number of executive counselors in the municipality (Belgisch Staatsblad: 2012) (N = 308;
including the missing values).
Figure 8 shows that the more dense a municipality is, the more these municipalities are likely to
make use of CCTV (the number is increasing by municipalities with 200 citizens per square
metre to municipalities with 3,000 citizens per square metre). Other research has also pointed out
a relationship between population density in municipalities and the implementation of CCTV. In
the Spanish region of Cataluña, CCTV could be mostly found in middle-sized towns, with less
than 25,000 inhabitants (Galdon, 2011). Figure 9 gives an overview of the implementation of
CCTV and number plate recognition cameras according to the socio-economic status of the
municipality (clustered by Dexia Bank: 2007).
Figure 9. Implementation of public space CCTV and ANPR in Flemish municipalities according
to socio-economic status of the municipality (N = 79; including the missing values).
The figures indicate that all of the large cities and more than seventy per cent of the coastal
towns and medium cities make use of CCTV. Speaking for coastal towns, our figure fits with the
results of previous research from the UK, France, Germany and Spain in which it was found that
coastal towns and their surrounding towns mostly are early adopters in the implementation and
often have an over-concentration of cameras (Hempel and Töpfer, 2004; Galdon, 2011). We also
found some evidence that smaller and more rural municipalities make more and more use of
cameras. As in 2011, nearly ten per cent of them make use of it. This has also been stated by
research from other countries, where this trend was linked to blind reliance by the local
government on the advice of security consultants (Wilson and Sutton, 2003). For the rural and
residential municipalities, the implementation of automatic number plate recognition is also
increasing.
The number of residents in a municipality also impacts on the police capacity needed in a
municipality. Belgian police is structured on two levels. On the local level, 308 Flemish
municipalities are in charge of 117 local police forces, which are competent for general police
159
tasks. Local police forces can require specific assistance from the Belgian federal police force.
Local forces can recruit police officers autonomously, but the selection of these officers is done
by the federal government. This affects police capacity in the municipalities.
In 2007, the Belgian Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to limit the number of police recruits to
1,000 per year. According to local police forces and police labour unions, however, a yearly
input of at least 1,400 is needed for the replacement of retiring police officers in the local forces.
The situation is even more dramatic for the replacement of police officers of the Belgian federal
police (Federal Police Council, 2009). As a result of the decreasing police capacity, the actual
police capacity of the local forces can no longer fulfil the statistical police capacity that has been
accorded to the forces by the federal government in 2001 (Federal Police, 2011). With no
structural solution to solve this problem and even more budgetary restraints in the local and
federal police forces to come, we can expect (expensive) police officers to be replaced by
CCTV-cameras, which are perceived to be less expensive, in order to fulfil the same basic police
services towards citizens.
Figure 10. Missing police capacity by Flemish local police forces by 2010-12-31, clustered
according to the result that was gained by subsiding the statistical police capacity of a force by
the actual police capacity of a force (N = 308; including the missing values).
Figure 10 shows that the higher the deficit of police officers in a Flemish municipality is (which
is the result after subsiding the actual police capacity of the statistical police capacity), the more
they make relatively use of CCTV (the number is increasing by municipalities with a deficit of 1
or 2 officers to municipalities with a deficit of 100 to 113 officers). This finding contrasts with
other research, which sees the typical CCTV-seeking municipality as having above average
police deployment (Galdon, 2011).
8.
Empirical Model and Estimation Technique
For our empirical model, we have used the data that was gathered by the Association of Flemish
Cities and Municipalities (VVSG, 2011). The data that was gathered was too restrictive to
160
161
develop into an empirical model in which we can predict a numeric output concerning the
implementation of CCTV or ANPR in a Flemish municipality (e.g. number of cameras placed in
municipality being dependent of other factors). For the development of this model, we have
developed a categorical/interval model in which the implementation of CCTV and ANPR can be
the result of other factors, which have been listed in the previous parts of this paper. We already
noticed that the influence of these factors on the implementation of CCTV can be different from
the influence of these factors to the implementation of ANPR. Because of this, we have
developed two different models.
C
p yes
p no
A p yes
i,t =
b0 + b1 MTA bin i,t + b2 CTB bin i,t + b3 LPP bin i,t + b4 DEN i,t+1 + b5 DFP i,t-1 + b6 RSC bin i,t
i,t =
b0 + b1 MTA bin i,t + b2 CTB bin i,t + b3 LPP bin i,t + b4 DEN i,t+1 + b5 DFP i,t-1
p no
Where i is the implementation of CCTV (C) or ANPR (A) by a municipality in year t expressed
as a binary bin variable (this can also be noted as the odd p to implement cameras by the odd p
not to implement them). The b0 is representing the constant (intercept) in our model. Two factors
that can test the transport these according to the concept of ‘nodal orientation’ were added to the
model. We can expect that the odds to implement ANPR increases by the fact that a municipality
has got a motorway access on its surface (MTA) and by the fact that a municipality has got a
border on its surface that is connected to France or the Netherlands (CTB). The odds to
implement cameras could differ between right-wing and left-wing political parties (the political
views of these parties is more contrary than it is for other parties). Because of this, we have
added this factor to the model (LPP) for 6 political parties being active in Flemish municipalities.
Population density (DEN), as a result of a combination of the surface and the number of
residents of the municipality, could be a better factor than the overall socio-economic status of
the municipality because the latter consists of a lot of other factors which could all have a small
effect on the odds to implement cameras. The lack of sufficient police officers (DFT), at least
according to norms defined by the federal government, can also increase these odds. At last, a
municipality having a charter with the Belgian railway cooperation to increase social security in
and around stations (RSC) could be expected to have more of a chance to implement CCTV
(which is not the case for the implementation of ANPR, which we have excluded as a factor for
ANPR). We now try to estimate the declarative power and significance of each of the factors.
For this, we have chosen for the binary logistic regression estimation technique.
9.
Results
We have generated four models to estimate the declarative power and significance of each of the
factors that have been listed above to explain the implementation of CCTV and ANPR in
Flemish municipalities. These are listed in figure 11:
ANPR
Model 1
Model 2
CCTV
Model 3
Model 4
MTA
(factor 1)
CTB
(factor 2)
LPPright
(factor 3a)
LPPleft
(factor 3b)
DEN
(factor 4)
DFT
(factor 5)
RSC
(factor 6)
B
-1.441
***
Exp(B) B
-1.557
0.237
**
Exp(B)
B
Exp(B)
0.211
-0.266
0.766
0.081
1.085
0.584
1.793
-0.843
0.430
1.018
2.768
0.411
1.508
-1.588 * 0.204
-0.085
-4.3E06
0.918
0.360
-2.4E04
1.433
-0.477
0.621
1.000
0.001
1.001
1.000
B
-0.900
***
-0.983
**
-0.909
**
Exp(B)
-0.554
3.73E04
0.575
0.406
0.374
0.403
1.000
0.012
1.012
-0.002 0.998
0.003
1.003
0.021
1.021
not
not
-3.131
-1.618
not
not
included included included included ***
0.044
***
0.198
-2.327
5.541
1.869
Constant **
0.098
-0.153 0.858
***
254.906 **
6.481
Model 1: Nagelkerke pseudo R² = .166 (Model 2: Nagelkerke pseudo R² = .105)
Model 4: Nagelkerke pseudo R² = .226 (Model 3: Nagelkerke pseudo R² = .348)
Significance: * p<.10; ** p<.05; ***
p<.01
Figure 11. Results of the four empirical models that were developed to test the described factors
in this paper.
In models (2) and (4) we have used data of 308 municipalities, considering the municipalities
with missing values as not having CCTV or ANPR. Only the model for CCTV (4) was sufficient,
because the number of missing values was low. This made us generate new models (1) and (3)
for which we have used restricted data of 58 (1) and 86 (3) municipalities of which we have
sufficient information about the implementation of CCTV and ANPR. The results of this model
(1) were more sufficient to analyse the implementation of ANPR. Our models can predict the
odd to implement for 60.3 per cent (1) and 81.2 per cent (4) of municipalities that use CCTV or
ANPR. As a result, we neglect the results of models (2) and (3) and use the results of models (1)
and (4).
Except for the constant factor b0, the RSC (railway security charter) factor, the MTA (motorway
access), the CTB (country border) and the LPPright (right-wing political party) factor, all of the
factors were not significant in our models (1) and (4). A positive factor by DEN (population
density) and DFT (default of police officers) can be found for the odds to implement CCTV,
while a negative factor can be found for MTA (motorway access) and LPPleft (left-wing political
party) for the odds to implement CCTV and ANPR. Our factors are more likely to be positive for
the implementation of ANPR than they are for the implementation of CCTV. The odds to
implement cameras increases in both models as the default of police officers increases. Because
a lot of Flemish municipalities have a motorway access on their surface, the odds to have
installed cameras decreases as more of them are added to our models (1) and (4). This is stronger
162
for our model (1). Note that a nearby country border (CTB) can increase the odds to install
ANPR more than CCTV. The odds of having a social security charter between a municipality
and the Belgian railway cooperation can be related to the implementation of CCTV (negative
factor). In general, a nearby country border, a high population density and a high default of
police officers can have the highest influence on the odds of implementing CCTV or ANPR in
Flemish municipalities.
10.
Conclusion
This paper has tried to map the factors that had and have an impact on the implementation of
CCTV and ANPR cameras in Flemish municipalities. Two new empirical models were
developed. Literature shows that the implementation of CCTV and ANPR cameras is the result
of a complex interplay of a range of specific factors, for instance social, economic, demographic
and political. We have tried to relate these factors to the data of preliminary research by the
Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities (VVSG). Next, we have tried to measure the
impact of particular events in the recent Belgian public safety history and the influence of public
institutions and private interest groups on the implementation of CCTV and ANPR on public
transport. These factors were adjusted by three transit indicators, which might indicate a
relationship between the implementation and the geographical location of a municipality. We
found that the factors influencing the implementation of CCTV differ from the factors
influencing the implementation of ANPR. Most significant factors are the connection with a
main motorway on the surface of the municipality (for ANPR systems) and the adoption of a
social security charter between the municipality and the Belgian railway cooperation (for CCTV
systems). Political background of local authorities does not seem to have a measurable impact on
the implementation of CCTV and ANPR. Factors such as population density and lack of
sufficient police capacity have a higher impact.
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