Blair: the record, the legacy

Blair: the record, the legacy
Blair: the record, the legacy
Blair: the record, the legacy
Blair:
the record, the legacy
Julian Astle and
Alasdair Murray
Blair: the record, the legacy
Julian Astle
Julian joined CentreForum as Director in October 2005. Between 2000
and 2005, he worked as an advisor on post-conflict reconstruction in the
UN mission in Kosovo, in the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and for the Ministry of Defence, the Department for
International Development and the Foreign Office in London. He has
also worked as political advisor to Paddy Ashdown MP in the Liberal
Democrat leader’s office, and for other members of the Liberal Democrat
shadow cabinet. His previous publications include ‘Open Universities:
a funding strategy for higher education’ (2006), ‘Britain after Blair: a
liberal agenda’ (2006) and ‘The surest route: early years education and
life chances’ (2007).
Alasdair Murray
Alasdair Murray joined CentreForum in January 2006 as Director. Previously he was Deputy Director at the Centre for European Reform writing
widely on all aspects of European politics and economics. Before that
Alasdair worked as a journalist for The Times, serving as the Brussels
and economics correspondent, and a business reporter on the Mail
on Sunday. His previous publications for CentreForum include ‘Britain
after Blair: a liberal agenda’ (2006), ‘Keeping up with the pack: can
government reduce health inequality?’ (2006) and ‘From boom to bust?
Fertility, ageing and demographic change’ (2007).
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Blair: the record, the legacy
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Contents
Summary
4
The economy 7
Social justice 16
Quality of life 26
Security
32
The environment
38
Democracy
43
International affairs
47
Notes 53
Blair: the record, the legacy
:
Summary
Tony Blair’s government had a full decade to put its mark on the country.
This audit provides a snapshot of how Britain has changed (or failed to
change) since 1997, and highlights the key challenges posed for Blair’s
successors.
Economy
Overall, the UK economy has performed relatively well during the Blair
years with solid growth, high employment levels and low inflation. Any
future government will inherit an economy boosted by the labour market
reforms of the Thatcher years and stabilised by the monetary policies
of the Blair years. But key weaknesses remain. These include a lack
of fiscal transparency; potential sources of instability, such as asset
bubbles (particularly the housing market); rising levels of consumer debt;
low productivity levels linked to low skill levels; a complex and inefficient tax system; and a dependency ratio between workers and nonworkers that is set to worsen in the coming years.
Social Justice
Britain is wealthier today than it was in 1997. There are fewer people
living in poverty – children and pensioners in particular – and the rapid
growth of income inequality that characterised the Thatcher years has
been arrested, if not yet substantially reversed. Furthermore, Labour has
tackled the chronic underinvestment in Britain’s core public services,
particularly in schools and hospitals, reducing some long-standing
problems – such as NHS waiting lists. Nonetheless, serious social
problems remain: wealth inequality, fuelled by the housing boom, is
higher even than in the 1980s; there are persistent pockets of poverty
and social exclusion; and social mobility has declined. The key social
policy challenge for any post-Blair government will be reducing the still
high levels of educational underachievement that reinforce and exacerbate these inequalities.
Blair: the record, the legacy
Quality of Life
The average Briton is living longer than a decade previously. The government has made some progress in tackling traditional causes of ill-health
and premature mortality, such as cutting smoking, and has invested
heavily in the NHS, building new facilities, recruiting more doctors and
nurses, increasing the number of operations and cutting waiting lists and
waiting times.
But new threats to public health are emerging, particularly in Britain’s
most deprived communities, such as the rapid growth of obesity and
rising levels of mental illness. While Britons are now on average wealthier
than they were a decade ago, surveys suggest that they are less happy,
less trusting and less able to balance work and family commitments.
Security
Since the attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in
September 2001 the public has become increasingly anxious about
security. Opinion polls show that immigration/race relations and defence/
terrorism now regularly feature among the list of issues of greatest
concern to the public – a list previously dominated by the economy,
health and education. Immigration levels have risen steeply in the past
decade, but asylum rates are not high by international standards. Racial
tensions appear to have increased recently, especially between Muslim
and non-Muslim communities. By contrast, the security risks posed by
Northern Ireland’s paramilitary organisations, both in Ulster and in the
rest of Britain, have been dramatically reduced as a result of the peace
process that began under John Major and continued under Tony Blair.
The government has had some success in tackling overall crime levels.
However, violent crime – the public’s main preoccupation – has
continued to rise, despite the prison population reaching record levels.
The government has aggressively sought to tackle anti-social behaviour,
but it remains unclear whether the Prime Minister’s Respect agenda is
having a significant impact.
Environment
The government has enjoyed some success in pushing environmental
issues up the international agenda, but it has failed to live up to its green
rhetoric at home. While the UK is on course to meet its Kyoto commitments, it is falling short on its other climate change targets – carbon
dioxide emissions are higher now than in 1997. The inexorable rise in
emissions from transport is particularly concerning, although domestic
and industrial emissions remain serious problems. With fossil fuel prices
rising, and the UK increasingly reliant on stocks from volatile third
countries, the next government faces a major task to ensure the country
has sustainable and secure energy supplies.
Blair: the record, the legacy
Democracy
The UK has undergone substantial constitutional reform in the past
decade, including the creation of a devolved parliament in Scotland and
an assembly in Wales; the introduction of proportional voting systems
for Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish (prior to Stormont’s suspension) and
European elections; the introduction of freedom of information legislation; the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights
into British law; and the abolition of most hereditary peerages in the
House of Lords. However, these reforms have failed to reinvigorate
British democracy: voter turnout has slumped to record lows. And
despite devolution, the country remains among the most centralised
in the world. It is not the case that voters are uniformly apathetic –
informal political participation remains high. Blair’s successors face the
key challenge of harnessing this energy and restoring confidence in the
mainstream political system.
International affairs
The Blair government will be remembered for its highly interventionist
approach to international affairs. In particular, the disputed decision
to support the US invasion of Iraq may have done irreparable damage
to voters’ trust in the Prime Minister. The British government has also
supported a series of other military operations that enjoyed wider public
and political support: against the Taliban in Afghanistan; in Sierra
Leone; and in Kosovo. Tony Blair’s successor faces the tricky challenge
of deciding when and how to withdraw troops from such unstable
hotspots.
Blair has been no less energetic in his attempts to lead international
efforts to eradicate world poverty – particularly in Africa. Progress
towards these goals has inevitably been slowed by the machinations of a
multilateral trade system bedevilled by vested interests. But the government has secured key advances on aid and debt forgiveness. It has been
less successful, however, in meeting its stated aim of recasting Britain’s
relationship with its European partners. The government played its part
in steering the EU towards enlargement from 15 to 27 member states,
and has won a few battles when pushing its economic reform agenda.
However, the EU remains deeply divided over foreign and economic
policy, budget reforms (particularly the Common Agricultural Policy),
the collapsed European Constitution and the prospect of further enlargement. Meanwhile, British public opinion remains resolutely Eurosceptic.
Blair: the record, the legacy
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The economy
Growth
OECD data show that GDP growth averaged 2.8 per cent between
1997 and 2006, compared with 2.1 per cent during the 16 full years
of Conservative government (1980–96). This compares favourably with
the growth rates of key competitors.
Figure 1 Average real and per hour GDP growth, 1997-2005, %
3.5
Average real GDP
growth 97-05
Average GDP per hour
growth 97-05
3.0
2.5
%
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
EU15
France
Germany
Source: OECD, 2006
UK
US
Blair: the record, the legacy
However, overall GDP growth is flattered by two factors – population growth (mainly through immigration) and the UK’s culture of long
working hours (Eurostat data show the average working week is 43.1
hours compared with 41.7 hours in the eurozone). GDP growth per
hour worked stands at 2.1 per cent under Labour, barely higher than in
France at 1.9 per cent. Growth has also not been balanced, both across
the various regions of the country and between the public and private
sectors. In London, for example, private sector growth totalled 4 per
cent between 1997 and 2003 compared with just 1.3 per cent in the
North East, 1.5 per cent in Scotland and 1.6 per cent in Wales.1
However, the North East enjoyed an average public sector growth rate
of 4 per cent, Scotland of 3.4 per cent and Wales of 4.2 per cent,
compared with 3.2 per cent in London. In total, the private sector was
responsible for 80 per cent of national growth during this period but just
66 per cent of growth in Wales and the North East, and 72 per cent in
Scotland.
Employment
The employment rate (the most reliable measure of jobs in the economy)
rose from 69 per cent in 1996 to stand at 74.4 per cent in January
Figure 2 Employment growth by sector, 1997-2005
Private sector
Total employment
Public sector
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
%
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
-2.0 Office of National Statistics (ONS), 2006
Source:
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Blair: the record, the legacy
2007, the same level as at the peak of the last economic cycle, on the
OECD’s measure of employment. Employment growth averaged 0.41
per cent between 1997 and 2007. This figure is much higher than the
average of 0.24 per cent achieved in the previous eight years, but only
the same rate as the EU-15 average.
Since 2000, the rate of employment growth has been fastest in the
public sector as Figure 2 shows. In the six years to 2006, public sector
employment increased by 637,000 to 5.83 million, a rise of 10 per cent.
In contrast, private sector employment rose by just 2.8 per cent.
A number of regions are heavily reliant on the public sector as a source
of employment – most notably Northern Ireland, where the public sector
rate is 29 per cent, and Scotland and the North East at around 24 per
cent.2
The relatively high employment level also disguises a number of pockets
of economic inactivity, most notably incapacity benefit levels – 2.7
million people of working age claim incapacity related benefit, at a
cost of £12.5 billion per year.3 The employment rate for single parents,
although significantly higher under Labour, remains much lower than for
other groups in society.
Figure 3 Employment rates of lone parents and working age
population, 1997–2006
All
80
Lone parents (working age)
%
70
60
50
40
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source: ONS, 2007
Blair: the record, the legacy
Stability
Labour’s decision in 1997 to grant the Bank of England independence has
been a success. Inflation, on the consumer price index (CPI) measure,
has averaged 1.5 per cent over the past ten years, compared with 4.3
per cent in the previous ten.4 In March 2007, however, inflation hit
3.1 per cent, forcing the Governor of the Bank of England to write an
explanatory letter to the Chancellor for the first time since the inflation
target was established.
Not all parts of the economy have behaved in such a stable fashion. The
stock market, buffeted by global trends, has endured a roller-coaster
ride since 1997. A substantial rise in consumer debt could be storing up
problems for the future. By the end of February 2007, consumer debt
stood at £1.3 trillion. In the final three months of 2006, nearly 30,000
people declared bankruptcy – more than in the whole of 1997.
Figure 4 Consumer debt, 1997-2006
1000
Billions £
800
600
400
200
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source: Bank of England, 2006
Public sector
The government has increased total tax revenues from 37 per cent of
GDP in 1996–97 to 39.3 per cent in 2005–06 to fund the expansion
of the public sector – the equivalent of an increase in tax payments
of approximately £1,150 per household.5 Treasury figures show that
10
Blair: the record, the legacy
in real terms, public sector spending (on a total managed expenditure
basis) increased, in 2005-06 prices, from £356.6 billion in 1997-98,
to £497.6 billion in 2007-08 - an increase of almost 40 per cent. As
a proportion of GDP, this represents an increase from 38.3 per cent in
1996–97 to 39.5 per cent in 2007–08.
The budget deficit and overall national debt levels have started to rise
again as a result of this increased government spending. The National
Debt hit a low point of 30.4 per cent of GDP in 2001–02 but had risen
to 37.4 per cent by the end of the 2006–07 fiscal year. The budget
deficit reached a peak of 3.23 per cent of GDP in 2005. The Public
Sector Net Cash Requirement (PSNCR), meanwhile, has grown from a
low point of £6 billion in 1998–99, to reach £35.1 billion in 2006–07.
The Chancellor has succeeded in staying within his self-imposed fiscal
borrowing rules only by continually tweaking the Treasury’s definition of
the ‘economic cycle’, to the detriment of fiscal transparency. Moreover,
the extra billions pumped into the public sector have not helped bolster
productivity. There are still problems in accurately assessing productivity data in the public sector. But almost all credible measures show
productivity in key services declining, most notably in the National
Health Service (see Figure 5).
Figure 5 NHS productivity, ONS index, 1997-2004
105
ONS index, 1999=100
104
103
102
101
100
99
98
97
96
95
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Source: ONS, 2005
Aside from the productivity dilemma, there is the question about
whether the increase in spending on public services has delivered
value for money. The government can point to some improvements in
public sector performance, such as reduced hospital waiting times and
improved exam results, as evidence that the money has been well spent.
However, opinion polls suggest that voters are unconvinced that public
11
Blair: the record, the legacy
service delivery has greatly improved under Labour. The government
itself appears uncertain about the performance of key public services.
In the late 1990s it swept away many market-oriented reforms initiated
by previous Conservative governments, such as the internal market in
health. However, in recent years it has tried to inject a greater degree
of competition between providers and offer increased choice for service
users, particularly in education and health. Many of these reforms have
subsequently been watered down in the face of threatened back-bench
rebellions.
Productivity and innovation
The public sector is only partly responsible for the UK’s poor overall
productivity record. Experts point to a number of other factors –
including Britain’s poor skills base, cumbersome planning restrictions
and congested transport infrastructure – that contribute to the country’s
weak record. The Chancellor has made improving productivity a priority.
However, Gordon Brown’s interventions so far have had little effect. UK
productivity per hour continues to lag substantially behind key competitors such as France, Germany and the USA. Annual productivity growth
has accelerated from 1.3 per cent of GDP in 1997 to 2.3 per cent in
2006. However, the USA achieved faster growth – from 1.5 per cent in
1997 to 3.1 per cent in 2004.6
Figure 6 Productivity per hour worked index, 2004 (UK = 100)
140
Index (UK=100)
130
120
110
100
90
80
France
Germany
Japan
Source: ONS, 2005
12
UK
USA
G7
Blair: the record, the legacy
The UK’s research and development record is also poor by international standards. Research and development (R&D) expenditure – 1.89
per cent of GDP in 2003 – is the second lowest in the G7 group of
countries. Japan, by contrast, spends 3.15 per cent of GDP on R&D.
Other measures of innovation capacity, such as patenting rates, tell the
same story. At 37 patents per 1 million inhabitants, the UK patenting
rate stands well below the OECD and EU-15 averages.
Figure 7 R&D spending as a percentage of GDP, 1997-2003
3.3
3.1
2.9
2.7
%
2.5
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.7
1.5
EU15
France
Germany
Japan
UK
US
Source: OECD Science and Technology Scoreboard, 2005
Transport infrastructure
Businesses argue that the state of Britain’s transport infrastructure is
one of the principal obstacles to improved productivity, along with the
country’s weak skills base (see education and skills section on pages 2223). A survey for the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), found 51
per cent of companies claimed that the reputation of the UK as a place
to do business was being significantly harmed by transport problems,
while 48 per cent said that their company’s reputation had suffered as a
result. Over the past 25 years, Britain has invested less in its transport
infrastructure than its main competitors.7 For example, Germany has
spent two-thirds more per person, while France has invested 50 per cent
more. Average daily car commuting times in the UK, at over 45 minutes,
are the highest in the EU-15.8
13
Blair: the record, the legacy
Demography and pensions
Britain’s population is still growing – primarily as a result of immigration. Between 2001 and 2005, net migration accounted for two-thirds
of the population change, resulting in an annual average increase of
182,000 people.9 As Figure 8 shows, immigrants are making a growing
net contribution to the public purse.
Figure 8 Migrants’ share in government revenue and
expenditure
10.5
Revenue
Expenditure
10.0
%
9.5
9.0
8.5
8.0
7.5
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
Source: Institute for Public Policy Research, ‘Paying their way: the fiscal contribution of
immigrants in the UK’, 2005
The population also continues to age, albeit at a slower rate than in
several other EU countries. If employment patterns remain constant,
this will result in a significantly worse dependency ratio of non-workers
to workers, placing greater strain on wealth creators.
However, a substantial part of the population is still not making any
form of private provision for their old age. The Turner Commission on
the future of pensions found that 46 percent of the workforce – 15
million people – were not contributing to a private pension in 2003–04.10
The government’s decision to abolish the dividend tax credit in 1998
has also made it more expensive for workers to save for retirement,
costing pension holders on average £5 billion a year. While damaging,
the negative impact of this policy decision is small compared to other
14
Blair: the record, the legacy
factors such as market turbulence and accounting changes (which mean
companies must now carry the full future liabilities of their pension
schemes on their balance sheets). In combination, these have led to a
collapse in private sector defined benefit (‘final salary’) pension schemes.
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) calculates that the number of
private sector defined benefit occupational schemes has virtually halved
from 34,700 in 2000 to 18,100 in 2004. On the other hand, the government has so far shied away from making any significant reforms of the
generous final salary schemes in the public sector. The Turner Commission report predicts that with no further reform, government expenditure
on public sector pensions will rise from 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2003–04
to 2.3 per cent in 2033–34.
Figure 9 Number of people of retirement age (60/65+) for every
100 people of working age
50
40
30
20
10
0
1961
1971
1981
1991
2001
2011
2021
2031
Source: ONS, Government Actuary’s Department, 2003-based predictions
15
2041
2051
Blair: the record, the legacy
j
:
Social justice
Wealth and poverty
GDP per head has increased from £22,500 to £30,832 in the past
decade. Median income has risen by an average of 1.8 per cent each
year between 1996-97 and 2005-06, to reach £362 per week.11
Labour has made some inroads into reducing poverty: there are 12.8
million individuals living in poverty today (defined as an income below
60 per cent of the median after housing costs) compared with 14 million
in 1996-97.
The government has made particular progress in reducing the number
of pensioners and children enduring poverty. In July 2006, 1.8 million
pensioners were living in relative poverty, a third fewer than in 1996–
97 when the figure stood at 2.9 million, according to the Institute for
Fiscal Studies (IFS). Some of this decline is accounted for by increases
in pensioner benefits, such as the pension credit and the winter fuel
allowance. But much of it is the result of demographics, as older, poorer
pensioner cohorts are replaced by younger, richer cohorts reaching
retirement age.
There are 3.8 million children living in poverty today, compared with 4.3
million in 1998–99. This reduction is welcome but still falls short of the
government’s own child poverty reduction target (see Figure 10). With
the growth in public spending set to fall, it will inevitably become even
harder to meet this target in the coming years.
The government has found it difficult to tackle residual pockets of
poverty. Persistent poverty is a particular problem for Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African and Black Caribbean groups, which have higher
rates of unemployment and lower incomes than the white population
and other ethnic minorities. More worryingly, the educational performance of children in these groups suggests that these inequalities may
become further entrenched in the future.
16
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 10 Child Poverty as number of children living below 60
per cent of median household income (after housing costs),
1998-2011
3.5
Progress to date
Required path
Child poverty
Projected path
under current
policies
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: IFS, 2007
Figure 11 Attainment of five or more GCSE grades A* to C (or
equivalent) by ethnic group, 2005
100
80
%
60
40
20
0
e
es
in
Ch
ian
Ind
h
Iris
W
h
ite
sh
iti
Br
d
17
e
lad
ng
Ba
Source: DfES, 2006
i
sh
ixe
M
ni
n
ta
P
is
ak
k
ac
Bl
a
ric
Af
k
ac
Bl
n
ea
ibb
r
Ca
Blair: the record, the legacy
Inequality and social mobility
Income inequality is no lower than when Labour came to power, but
its seemingly inexorable rise has been halted. As Figure 12 shows, the
spoils of high growth in the Thatcher years never did ‘trickle down’ to the
poor, as her supporters promised they would, while the Major government presided over a period of only modest growth for all. The Blair
government, by contrast, has succeeded in delivering balanced income
growth. However, wealth inequality has continued to rise under Labour,
largely as a result of the booming housing market (see Figure 13).
Figure 12 Real income growth 1979-2005 by income quintile group
Thatcher
(1979-1990)
Average annual income gain (%)
4.0
Major
(1990-1996/97)
Blair
(1996/97-2004/05)
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Poorest
2
3
4
Richest
Source: IFS, 2006
Figure 13 Wealth Inequality, 1979-2005
Thatcher
Blair
Major
Gini Coefficient
(greater inequality)
0.4
0.3
0.2
1979
1983
1987
1991
Source: IFS, 2007
18
1996-97
2000-01
2004-05
Blair: the record, the legacy
There is also evidence that social mobility has declined in Britain over
recent years. People born in the UK in the 1950s have been more socially
mobile than those born in the 1970s.12 A Joseph Rowntree Foundation
study on persistent poverty suggests that the chances of a poor child
growing up to become a poor adult are still growing.13 The UK performs
poorly in terms of social mobility in international comparison. A league
table of eight developed states found only the USA has lower social
mobility than the UK. In contrast, the four Scandinavian countries, along
with Canada, are all almost twice as socially mobile as Britain.14
Taxes, benefits and redistribution
The Blair governments have sought to redistribute wealth from rich
to poor. This has reduced poverty and halted the growth of income
inequality. As Figure 14 shows, those on low incomes have fared
considerably better under Blair than under Thatcher, when reductions
in the top rates of income tax, increases in more regressive indirect
taxation, and real and nominal freezes on a number of different benefits
all contributed to rising inequality.
Figure14Realincomegrowth1996-2006
5
Income growth 1979-1996/97
Average annual income gain (%)
4
3
2
1
0
10
-1
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Percentile point in income distribution
-2
Source: IFS, 2007
This government’s redistributive instruments of choice have been
means-tested benefits and tax credits. The complexity of the resulting
system, however, has created new problems, such as the £4 billion of
tax credits that were overpaid between 2003–04 and 2004–05, and
the billions more that should have been paid, but were never claimed
(see Figure 15).
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 15 Value of unclaimed means-tested benefits, 2003-04
4000
Upper estimate
3500
Lower estimate
£ Millions
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Income
Support
Minimum
Income
Guarentee
Housing
Benefit
Pension
Credit
Council
Tax
Benefit
Incomebased
JSA
Source: DWP, 2006
The progressive intent behind much of the government’s approach to
tax and benefits has been further frustrated by the Council Tax, which
has on average doubled since 1997.15 Figure 16 demonstrates that the
tax impacts more heavily upon those on lower incomes. Council Tax
Benefit reduces its regressive nature only for the two poorest deciles on
the income distribution scale.
Figure 16 Net council tax as a proportion of income 2002-03
4.5
4.0
3.5
%
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
poorest
2
3
4
5
Source: IFS, 2005
20
6
7
8
9
richest
Blair: the record, the legacy
Early years and life chances
The government has significantly increased the financial support and
services available to young children and their parents. In particular, it
has provided subsidised part-time early education places for all three
and four year olds, created a childcare tax credit for working parents
on modest incomes, and established over 1,000 ‘Sure Start’ centres
offering integrated care and support services to families with young
children. But Britain was still ranked 14th out of 23 OECD countries in
its total expenditure on pre-primary education in 2005.16
Figure 17 Early years education expenditure by central and local
government, England, 1995-2005
£ million in 2004-05 prices
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
-96
-97
-98
-99
-00
-01
-02
-03
-04
-05
Source: DfES, 2005
Average rank in test score distribution
Figure 18 Average rank of test scores at different ages by
socio-economic status (SES) of parents and early rank position
100
low SES, high early ranking
high SES, low early ranking
80
60
40
20
0
22 28 34 40 46 52 58 64 70 76 82 88 94 100 106 112 118
months
Source: L. Feinstein, ‘Inequality in the early cognitive development of British children in the
1970 cohort’, Economica, 70(277), 2003
21
Blair: the record, the legacy
Despite the government’s efforts to give children a better start in life,
class and wealth remain key determinants of British children’s educational prospects. Research has shown that in the UK today, a bright
child from a poor family is likely to be overtaken by less bright children
from more affluent families by the age of six (see Figure 18).17
Education and skills
The government has invested significant funds in Britain’s school system.
Per pupil spending increased by one-third in real terms between 1997–
98 and 2004–05.18 The number of children achieving the expected
standard in reading at age seven rose from 80 per cent in 1998 to 85
per cent in 2005.19 For maths, the proportion achieving government
standards rose from 84 per cent to 90 per cent. As children move from
primary to secondary school (where British schoolchildren still underachieve compared with those elsewhere in the EU), results are noticeably
worse, although better than they were a decade ago.20 The number of
pupils achieving five good GCSEs at age 16 increased from 45 per cent
in 1997 to 57.3 per cent in 2006 (although when English and maths
results are included, the number drops to 44 per cent). But these figures
mask the inequalities that continue to undermine educational performance. Low attainment levels among the lower social classes remain a
serious problem (see Figure 19).
Figure 19 Attainment of 5 or more GCSE grades A* to C by
social class, 2004
80
70
60
%
50
40
30
20
10
0
Higher
Professional
Source: DfES,
2004
Lower
professional
Intermediate
22
Lower
supervisory
Routine
Blair: the record, the legacy
The transformation of higher education, from an elite to a mass system,
has continued under Labour. Department for Education and Skills (DfES)
figures show that 44 per cent of 18 to 30 year olds now enter university, up from 41 per cent in 2000. The proportion of 18 to 21 year olds
in higher education in 1980 stood at 12 per cent. It will require a further
increase in school participation rates at age 17, where the UK still lags
behind its competitors, to bolster university numbers.
The UK has a comparatively low sixth form ‘staying on’ rate (see Figure
20). This is largely accounted for by the fact that only 31 per cent of
16 year olds whose parents are in routine occupations are currently
studying for ‘A’ level or equivalent, compared with 74 per cent of 16
year olds whose parents possess higher professional qualifications.21
Furthermore, the proportion of 16 to 18 year olds not in education,
employment or training (NEET) has remained at 10 per cent for the past
decade – the highest rate in the European Union.
Figure 20 OECD participation rates for 17 year olds, 2004
120
Net enrolment rates
100
80
60
40
Source: OECD, 2007
23
d
Gr
ee
ce
la
n
UK
Ire
Be
lg
iu
m
Sw
ed
en
Ja
pa
n
Ge
rm
an
y
Fr
an
ce
De
nm
ar
k
0
US
20
Blair: the record, the legacy
Housing
The government has made good progress in improving the quality of
Britain’s housing stock. Between 1996 and 2003 the number of nondecent homes in England fell from 9.1 million to 6.3 million (just under
half to just under a third of all dwellings).22 But the concentration of
non-decent homes varies by the level of neighbourhood deprivation and
tenure. In 2004, 30 per cent of all non-decent social housing stock was
located in the 10 per cent most deprived areas.
Competition for housing – private and social – has become more intense
under Labour. While demand has continued to rise (as a result of population growth and an increase in single person households), supply has
fallen. The number of houses built in the past decade fell by 12.5 per
cent compared with the previous decade – to stand at its lowest rate
since the Second World War. There are currently 1.63 million families
on the waiting list for social housing (council/housing association), up
from 1 million in 1997.23 According to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), in March 2006 there were 97,680
households living in temporary accommodation. This is an increase of
137 per cent since March 1997. Homelessness increased until 2004 but
has since returned to 1997 levels: the number of homeless households
defined as ‘priority need’ by local authorities decreased from 102,430 in
1997-8 to 100,170 in 2005-6, but stood at over 135,000 in 2003-4.24
Figure 21 Total social housing dwellings completed by
Registered Social Landlords and local authorities, 1994-2005
70,000
Local Authorities
60,000
RSLs
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
1994- 1995- 1996- 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2002- 2003- 200495
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
Source: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), 2006
24
Blair: the record, the legacy
First-time buyers are finding it harder to get on the ‘housing ladder’. The
average age of a first-time buyer rose to 34 in 2005, compared with 30
a decade ago.25 First-time buyers on average pay a deposit equivalent
to 19 per cent of the value of the house, compared with 10 per cent in
1997.26 Overall, there are now 1 million more homeowners than in 1997
– a rise of nine per cent.27 In 2005, 70 per cent of people owned their
homes. The government forecasts that the number of households is set
to increase by 4.8 million, from 20.9 million in 2003 to 25.7 million in
2026. This represents an annual increase of 209,000, putting further
pressure on the supply of new houses. There has also been a major
increase in single person households, which are projected to make up
38 per cent of all households by 2026, compared with 29 per cent in
2006.28
Figure 22 Average dwelling prices, 1980-2006
First-time buyers
All buyers
200
£ hundreds of thousands
150
100
50
0
1994 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Source: Halifax house price index, 2007
25
Blair: the record, the legacy
:
Quality of life
Health
The century long rise in longevity has continued in the past decade.
Average male life expectancy has increased from 74.5 years in 1997
to 77 years today, and female life expectancy has climbed by 1.5 years
to 81 (all figures from the Department of Health). However, the government has failed to stem the long running trends towards worsening
health inequalities. The gap between the richest and poorest areas in the
country is even more apparent. Life expectancy for men in Kensington
and Chelsea was 11.5 years greater than in Glasgow City in the period
2002–2004, compared with a gap of 9.7 years between the top and
bottom local authorities a decade earlier.
Figure 23 Gap in male life expectancy by local authority,
1997-2004
Average life expectancy for top ten local authorities
Average life expectancy for bottom ten local authorities
80
75
70
1997-99
1999-2001
Source: Department of Health (DoH), 2005
26
2001-03
2002-04
Blair: the record, the legacy
This increase in longevity is mirrored by a steady decline in mortality
rates for ‘big killers’, such as heart disease and cancer. The number of
deaths from cancer per 100,000 people in England and Wales fell from
199 in 1997 to 183 in 2003, and deaths from heart disease fell from 63
per 100,000 to 41 over the same period. The government has also made
some progress in tackling one of the main causes of ill health: smoking.
The male smoking rate decreased from 30 per cent in 1998 to 25 per
cent in 2005, while the female rate fell from 29 per cent to 23 per cent,
though the gap in smoking prevalence between manual and non-manual
groups has not changed significantly. A smoking ban in public places
has been introduced in Scotland and Wales, and will come into force in
England on July 1st 2007.
Figure 24 Mortality rates from cancer and circulatory diseases,
1995-2004
150
Cancer mortality rates
Circulatory disease mortality rates
120
90
1995
-97
1996
-98
1997
-99
1998
-00
1999
-01
2000
-02
2001
-03
2002
-04
Source: DoH, 2005
At the same time new threats to public health are emerging. In terms
of obesity, the UK is rapidly catching up with the USA, where some
experts have warned the problem is so severe it could start reversing
the rise in life expectancy.29 The percentage of obese (defined as a body
mass index of greater than 30) UK adults has risen from 7 per cent in
1980 to 23 per cent in 2003. The rise in the number of obese children in
the ten years from 1995 suggests this trend could accelerate further.
27
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 25 Obesity in children aged 2-15, 1995-2004
Girls 2-15, obese
%
20
Boys 2-15, obese
15
10
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: DoH, 2005
The rate of mental illness has also increased substantially according to
the British Medical Association. Studies suggest that one in six adults
and one in ten children now suffer from some form of ‘clinically recognisable mental health disorder’.30 The number of people receiving incapacity benefit as a result of mental illness has risen by two-thirds since
1995 to reach 1.03 million in 2004, representing around one-third of all
claims.31
The prevalence of mental health problems is highest among children in
families where neither parent works at 20 per cent, compared with less
than 10 per cent in families where both or one parent works. Similarly,
16 per cent of children from families with a weekly household income
of under £100 suffered from mental health problems, compared with
just 5 per cent in families with a weekly household income of more than
£600, as Figure 26 shows. Children brought up in local authority care
are particularly at risk of poor mental health. In England in 2003, 45 per
cent of 5 to 17 year olds in care had a mental health disorder, compared
with 10 per cent from private households.
28
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 26 Prevalence of mental disorders among children by
income, 2004
20
% with disorder
15
10
5
0
Under
100
100199
Source: ONS, 2004
200299
300399
400499
500599
600770
Over
770
Gross weekly household income (£)
Work/life balance
Britons increasingly report difficulties balancing their work and home
lives: some 58 per cent find their work stressful and 66 per cent have
time problems at home as a result of their working hours.32 A growing
number of employers have tried to respond to these concerns in part by
offering their workforce more flexible hours. For example, 82 per cent
of employees can now claim a form of flexible working, compared with
68 per cent in 1994.
Significant problems remain, particularly for working mothers who make
the greatest use of flexible working arrangements but, according to the
British Social Attitudes Survey, report the most stress and the least
job satisfaction. The government has recently intervened to address
this issue by increasing the right to time off for pregnant women and
new mothers, and by raising maternity payment rates. In 1997–98,
women were entitled to 18 weeks leave – 6 at 90 per cent of average
earnings and 12 at £55.70. This entitlement has now increased to 39
weeks’ leave – 6 at 90 per cent of average earnings and 33 at £108.85,
increasing to £112.75 in April 2007.33
29
Blair: the record, the legacy
Family
The transformation of the traditional family unit in Britain has continued in
the past decade. The number of births outside marriage stands at record
levels and is set to become more common than births within marriage in
the near future. Britain tops the international tables of teenage pregnancies, although the long term growth in the number of teenage mothers
(and teenage abortions) has levelled off in recent years.34
Britain also has a higher number of single parent families than its international peers. In 2001, the UK had the second highest rate of single
parent households in the EU (see Figure 28). Furthermore, the divorce
rate in Britain is among the highest in the EU.
Living habits are changing too – more Britons of all ages are living alone.
In 1970 just two per cent of 25 to 44 year olds lived alone, whereas
today the figure is over ten per cent.35 Among the retirement age population, single occupancy rates are even higher, particularly among older
pensioners. In 2005, 29 per cent of men over the age of 75 lived alone,
as did 60 per cent of women – a change which could lead to a significant reduction in the supply of ‘informal’ care by family members in the
final years of life.
Figure 27 Fertility rates of 15-19 year olds
0.12
Total fertility rate
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.00
UK
Hungary
Portugal
Estonia
Slovakia
Lithuania
Ireland
Malta*
Latvia
Austria
Poland
Germany*
Luxembourg
Greece
Czech Republic
France
Finland
Belgium
Spain**
Netherlands
Italy**
Sweden
Denmark
Slovenia
Cyprus
0.02
* = 2000 data
**=2001 data
Source: European Commission, European Community Health Indicators, 2006
30
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 28 Lone parent households in the EU 15, 2001
25
20
15
10
5
Source: Eurostat, 2002
31
Spain
Portugal
Italy
Greece
Luxembourg
Denmark
Ireland
Austria
Germany
EU15
Finland
France
Belgium
Netherlands
UK
Sweden
0
Blair: the record, the legacy
0
:
Security
Civil liberties and security
In response to the terrorist attacks in September 2001 in the USA, and
the London bombings in July 2005, the government introduced a range
of measures aimed at strengthening the UK’s national security. These
include new police powers to detain suspects for up to 28 days without
charge (twice the previous limit, but a third of the 90 days the government proposed); the use of control orders to limit the movement and
communications of suspects; extended powers of stop and search; and
legislation banning the ‘glorification of terrorism’. Critics of the government’s approach question whether they have got the balance right
between preserving civil liberties and strengthening national security.
Many fear that the UK may be relinquishing the very freedoms that set
it apart from those who wish to attack it.
The government has also introduced a vast number of reforms designed
to clamp down on crime and anti-social behaviour (more than 50 bills
and 3,000 new criminal offences since Labour came to power). Many
of these, such as the use of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), the
abolition of trial by jury for complex fraud cases and the promised introduction of a compulsory scheme of national ID cards, represent a radical
departure from the established legal and constitutional traditions of the
UK. The Prime Minister is unapologetic, however, claiming that what is
needed is ‘a profound rebalancing of the civil liberties debate’.36
Immigration and asylum
Labour has presided over a rapid increase in the pace of immigration. Net
immigration, at 185,000 in 2005, is now the highest in the country’s
history. Despite its positive economic impact (see page 14), opinionpolling shows that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the public
now believe there are too many immigrants in the country.37
32
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 29 Percentage of people listing crime, defence/terrorism
and race relations/immigration as being among the most
important issues facing the country, 1997-2006
40
Crime
35
Defence/Terrorism
Race Relations/Immigration
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source: MORI, 2006
Figure 30 Net UK Immigration, 1996-2005
600
Inflow to UK
Outflow from UK
500
Net flow
400
300
200
100
0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: ERSC, 2007
33
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 31 Asylum seekers per 1,000 population in the EU, 2005
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Italy
Spain
Poland
Greece
Hungary
Germany
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Netherlands
UK
Denmark
France
Finland
Ireland
Belgium
Malta
Slovakia
Austria
Sweden
Luxembourg
Cyprus
0
Source: Home Office, 2006
By international standards, the UK does not bear a disproportionate
burden of asylum seekers. In 2004, there were 0.7 asylum applications
per 1,000 of population compared with 1.1 in France and 3 in Austria.38
Nor was the UK particularly generous in granting refugee status. Just
0.19 asylum seekers achieved refugee status per 1,000 of population
in 2005, less than one-third of the number granted by the Netherlands
or Sweden.
Race relations
Although serious racial tensions, such as those that sparked the riots in
Bradford and Oldham in 2001, remain rare, there are signs that racial
intolerance is on the rise. Over a quarter of Britons describe themselves
as racially prejudiced, according to the British Social Attitudes Survey.
Much of the concern about race relations is directed at the Muslim
community. Half the population believes further Muslim immigration will
cause Britain to lose its identity while a slightly higher proportion (56 per
cent) believes there is ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ serious conflict between Muslims
and non-Muslims in Britain.39
Equally, there are concerns over the attitudes of Muslims towards Britain,
and towards British foreign policy in particular. The Pew Global Attitudes
Project found that British Muslims are among the most anti-Western in
34
Blair: the record, the legacy
Europe. Only 32 per cent of British Muslims have a favourable opinion
of Jews (compared with 71 per cent of French Muslims), and just 17
per cent believe Muslims to be responsible for the 9/11 attacks – a far
smaller proportion than elsewhere in Europe.40
The racist British National Party has taken advantage of heightened
ethnic tensions in some parts of the country, although it remains a small,
fringe grouping which wields no formal power at any level. Nonetheless,
it has made some gains during the past few years, securing 192,850
votes at the 2005 general election (compared with 35,832 in 1997)
and, more worryingly, 800,000 votes in the 2004 European elections
(up from 100,000 in the 1999 European elections). It has also strengthened its position in local government, securing 40 council seats in 2006
(compared with none in 1998).41
Northern Ireland
Until the 1990s, the troubles in Northern Ireland represented the priority
for Britain’s security services. But the peace process, which began under
John Major and has continued under Tony Blair, has changed the situation
dramatically. The political process has stuttered on several occasions
since the signing of the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ in the spring of 1998.
But the good news still outweighs the bad: the IRA has officially called
an end to its armed campaign, the bombings and sectarian violence of
recent decades have all but ended, and the recent agreement between
Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley represents an historic step towards lasting
political stability for Northern Ireland.
Crime and punishment
Home Office recorded crime figures show that the total number of
criminal offences has declined in recent years but remains at higher
levels than when the government took office. The separate British Crime
Survey (BCS), which includes crimes reported to the survey but not
necessarily to the police, shows a more positive trend. According to
the most recent BCS figures, the overall number of crimes has fallen to
10.9 million in 2005–06, down from a peak of 19.4 million in a decade
earlier.42 Much of this reduction is accounted for by the substantial
drop in house burglaries and vehicle crimes, both of which have halved
since 1996–97 (to 300,000 and 721,000 respectively), in large part
because of improvements in house and vehicle security. Violent crime,
by contrast, is rising rapidly. Recorded violent crime levels have more
than tripled since Labour came to power, according to Home Office
figures. Over the period 1998–99 to 2005–06, the use of handguns
in crime rose by 73 per cent, while the number of serious injuries from
firearms incidents rose by 193 per cent.43
35
Blair: the record, the legacy
Street crime and mugging incidents rose by 8 per cent in the past year
– driven by a 16 per cent increase in London. Drug usage, up by 11 per
cent between 1996 and 2005, increased by a massive 23 per cent in
2006. However, this is explained in large part by the increase in official
warnings for carrying cannabis – up from 88,000 to 120,000 in 2006.
The government has sought to tackle crime through tougher sentencing.
England and Wales now have a record prison population of 145 per
100,000 people, compared with 120 per 100,000 in 1997 – the highest
level in western Europe.44 The number of convicted criminals receiving
prison sentences has risen by 53 per cent in a decade.45 But the vast
majority of crimes are not detected or prosecuted. The proportion of
crimes detected and followed up (through charges, summonses, cautions,
etc.) in 2005–06 stands at 27 per cent (17 per cent for robbery, 13 per
cent for burglary, 42 per cent for violence against the person and 31 per
cent for sexual offences).46 The proportion of crimes that are successfully prosecuted is also low, particularly for violent and sexual crimes. In
2005, police recorded nearly 13,000 rapes – double the total for 1997
– yet the conviction rate fell from 9.2 per cent to 5.5 per cent. Similarly,
the conviction rate for serious wounding fell from 14.8 per cent to 9.7
per cent and for robbery from 10.2 per cent to 8.9 per cent between
1997 and 2005.47
Moreover, the effectiveness of prison as a rehabilitation tool is still in
doubt. Over three-quarters of people convicted for crimes such as theft,
burglary and car crime will reoffend within two years of release. Overall,
according to the Prison Reform Trust, 66 per cent of convicted criminals
will reoffend within two years of release, compared with 56 per cent
in 1995. In contrast, 53 per cent of those given community sentences
commit new offences.
Social trust and anti-social behaviour
The government has sought to place the issues of social trust and
anti-social behaviour higher up the political agenda through its Respect
campaign. British citizens have among the lowest levels of social trust
when compared with citizens in other developed countries. Fewer than
30 per cent of people believe ‘most people can be trusted’, less than half
the figure for Scandinavian countries.48 People in deprived areas trust their
neighbours least, despite having more contact with them. According to
the ONS, just 40 per cent of people in the most deprived wards consider
most or many of their neighbours to be trustworthy, compared with
73 per cent in richer areas. The government has sought to try to curb
low-level anti-social behaviour through a series of measures, but most
notably the introduction of ASBOs. Nearly 4060 ASBOs were issued
in England and Wales in 2005 (the last available data). But their usage
varied dramatically from 456 in Greater Manchester to just 15 in Dyfed
36
Blair: the record, the legacy
Powys. There are also doubts about their effectiveness – according to
the 2004–05 British Crime Survey, just 8 per cent of people thought
there had been a decrease in anti-social behaviour in the previous two
years.
Figure 33 EU prison population per 100,000 total population,
2006
350
300
250
200
150
100
0
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Hungary
England & Wales
Luxembourg
Spain
Scotland
Netherlands
Portugal
Austria
Germany
Italy
Greece
Belgium
France
Ireland
Sweden
Denmark
Cyprus
Finland
Malta
Slovenia
50
Source: Home Office, 2006
37
Blair: the record, the legacy
j
:
The environment
Climate change
The UK is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 12.5
per cent under the Kyoto Protocol. It is currently on track to meet this
target – in 2004 greenhouse gas emissions were 14.6 per cent lower
than in 1990 (the base year for Kyoto calculations) and are forecast to
be as much as 19.4 per cent lower by 2010, according to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). However, the
government has fared less well in its attempts to meet its secondary
target of a 20 per cent cut in carbon dioxide emissions (CO2 is the
main greenhouse gas) from 1990 levels by 2010. Overall carbon dioxide
emissions were 5.6 per cent lower in 2004 than in 1990 – but were 5.5
per cent higher than when Labour came to power.49 The government
has sporadically sought to employ the tax and regulatory systems to
help meet its climate change targets. However, the proportion of ‘green
taxes’ has actually declined from 3.6 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 2.9
per cent in 2005.
Million tonnes of carbon equivalent
Figure34Emissionofgreenhousegases,1997-2004
800
Basket of greenhouse gases (CO2 equiv)
700
Kyoto target
by 2008-12
(CO2 equiv) *
600
500
400
Carbon Dioxide
Domestic
CO2 target
by 2010
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Source: DEFRA, 2005
Blair: the record, the legacy
Transport
Transport has now overtaken industry as the biggest source of carbon
emissions – and the gap is set to widen in the coming years.
Since 1997, road traffic has increased by 9 per cent, yet road building
has increased by less than 1 per cent.50 At the same time, the cost
of motoring has fallen significantly both in real terms and relative to
other forms of transport.51 The result is that Britain has the second most
intensely used road system in Europe (after Spain) and is now the most
congested country in Europe.52
It was this fact that led Mayor Ken Livingstone to introduce a £5 (recently
increased to £8) congestion charge in central London where, by 2000,
the average vehicle speed had slowed to nine miles an hour.53 The results
have so far been positive: congestion levels in 2005 were 22 per cent
lower than in 2002 before the scheme was introduced. Air quality has
also improved with the most harmful vehicle emissions decreasing by 13
to 15 per cent and cycling levels rising by 43 per cent.54
Figure 35 UK Carbon dioxide emissions by end user 1970
- 2004
100
Industry
Domestic
Million tonnes (carbon equivilent)
Transport
80
Other
60
40
20
1971
1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
Source: Natural Environment Technology Centre (Netcen), 2005
39
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 36 Passenger travel by mode, 1997-2005
Air
Rail
All road
800
Billion passenger kilometers
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Source: Dept of Transport, 2006
Energy
The energy sector remains a major source of harmful emissions, despite
a substantial reduction over the past few decades. The government will
need to maintain pressure on the energy sector if it is to meet its carbon
and greenhouse gas emission targets. But the industry has also reached
a critical strategic juncture. Over the next decade, the UK will rapidly
move from being a net exporter of gas and oil to a net importer as North
Sea production dwindles.55 This will leave the country reliant on supplies
from distant and often unstable parts of the world – most of the world’s
proven oil and gas reserves are concentrated in Russia and the Central
Asian states, the Middle East and North Africa. By 2020 the UK is likely
to be importing around three-quarters of its primary energy.
Currently, 39 per cent of UK’s primary energy needs are met by gas,
compared with 35 per cent from oil, 15 per cent from coal, 9 per cent
from nuclear and 2 per cent from other sources.56 Gasfired power plants
are also the main method of power generation, meeting 40 per cent of
the UK’s electricity requirement, compared with 33 per cent from coal,
19 per cent nuclear and 4 per cent from renewables.57
40
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 37 Total UK continental shelf oil and gas production,
1999-2030
Million barrels of oil equivalent / day
5
Slower Decline Case
Actual/Base Case
4
3
2
1
0
1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 2026
2030
Source: DTI . United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, 2006
Figure 38: Percentage shares of fuel consumption for energy
use by source, 1970-2005
50
Coal
Hydro electricity
Petroleum
Net electricity imports
Natural gas
Renewables & waste
Nuclear electricity
40
%
30
20
10
0
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002
Source: DTI, 2006
41
2005
Blair: the record, the legacy
By 2010, it is estimated that the UK will be 50 per cent dependent on
imported gas, rising to 80 per cent by 2020.58 This shift from domestic
gas surplus to import dependency leaves the UK more vulnerable to
supply interruptions and gas price fluctuations. The sharp hike in gas
prices during the winter of 2005–06 can in part be attributed to supply
bottlenecks into the UK. Two new pipelines, which will more than double
import capacity, are currently under construction. The government’s July
2006 energy white paper made clear that it expects nuclear and renewables, such as wind and tide power, to play a bigger role in meeting energy
needs in the future. As Figure 39 shows, the UK’s renewables sector is
small by international standards. It also remains uncertain whether the
private sector is willing to finance a new generation of nuclear reactors
to replace Britain’s rapidly ageing stock. In particular, the government
will have to resolve issues related to the planning regime and the responsibility for the disposal of waste to reassure potential investors of the
economic viability of nuclear power stations.
Figure 39 Percentage of renewables in primary energy supply,
1996-2003
Renewables as percentage of total energy supply, 2003
Rise in percentage of renewables in total energy supply, 1996-2003
50
40
%
30
20
10
0
-10
Canada Denmark France Germany
Source: IEA, 2004
42
NZ
Norway
UK
USA
Blair: the record, the legacy
j
:
Democracy
Formal democracy
Voter turnout in all forms of elections has slumped sharply since 1997.
In 2005, turnout for the general election totalled just 61.3 per cent,
compared with 71.4 per cent in 1997 and 77.7 per cent in 1992.58
The share of the electorate which backed the winning party has fallen
from 31 per cent in 1997 to 21 per cent in 2005 (down from a high
point of 40 per cent in 1951).60 Yet this declining share of the vote is
still translating into comfortable governing majorities. In 2005, Labour
won only 35.2 per cent of the vote but elected 55.1 per cent of the
MPs. In contrast, the Liberal Democrats secured 22 per cent of the vote
but gained only 9.6 per cent of the MPs.61 As Figure 41 shows, it took
nearly twice as many votes to elect a Conservative as it did to elect a
Labour candidate in 2005, and nearly four times as many votes to send
a Liberal Democrat to Westminster.
Figure 40 Turnout and winning party’s share of the electorate,
1979-2005
Share of the electorate who
backed the winning party
35
Turnout
80
25
70
20
15
60
10
5
0
1979
1983
1987
1992
Source: Rallings and Thrasher, 2005
43
1997
2001
2005
50
% Turnout
% Share of electorate
30
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 41 Number of votes to elect one MP, 2005
100000
Votes cast
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
Labour
Conservative
Liberal Democrat
Source: Electoral Reform Society, 2005
This decline in voting participation is also reflected in the steady fall in
political party membership. In the 1960s over 3 million Britons were
members of a political party. Now the number is barely half a million.62
Labour Party membership has halved in the time that Blair has been
in power – from over 400,000 to around 200,000.63 Yet the amount
spent by the parties on election campaigns has risen dramatically,
leaving the parties increasingly reliant on wealthy individuals for their
funding. It was this reliance on private donors that lay behind the allegations that peerages have been promised in return for donations to the
Labour Party. As part of the recently concluded investigation into the
so-called ‘cash for peerages’ affair, Tony Blair became the first sitting
prime minister to be questioned as part of a criminal investigation. While
the Crown Prosecution Service is yet to decide whether charges will be
brought against any of the prime minister’s colleagues, public opinion
has already hardened: a majority of people believe that the government
accepted donations in return for peerages.64
Informal democracy
Despite this decline in participation in formal democracy, informal political
activity is still strong. There is no sign that people are more apathetic
about individual political issues than in the past. The level of interest
in politics has remained remarkably consistent since the mid-1970s.65
The period since 1997 has also witnessed the revival of direct action
through major demonstrations, such as those opposing the Iraq war or
the hunting ban. Campaigns, such as Live 8 and Make Poverty History,
have attracted huge support. In 2000, 81 per cent of the population said
44
Blair: the record, the legacy
they had signed a petition compared with 23 per cent in 1974. Half the
population claims to have volunteered (formally or informally) at least
once a month. The number of people participating in a consumer boycott
has also increased from 6 per cent in 1974 to 17 per cent in 2000 – one
survery has estimated that such actions cost targeted businesses £3.2
billion in 2003.66 All three main political parties are now considering
how to tap into this latent political energy, as urged by the recent Power
Commission report.
Figure 42 Political party membership and general election
expenditure, 1987-2005
Membership of three
main parties
General election expenditure
60
1.5
1.2
40
0.9
30
0.6
20
Party members (millions)
£ millions
50
0.3
10
1987
1992
1997
2001
2005
0.0
Source: Electoral Commission, ‘Fifth report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life’,
October 1998; D Beetham, ‘Democracy under Blair’, Democratic Audit, November 2002
Centralisation
One of Labour’s first acts was to grant limited devolution to Scotland
and Wales. But Britain remains one of the most highly centralised states
in the world. The UK raises and distributes 94 per cent of total tax
revenues centrally, compared with an EU-25 average of 52 per cent
and just 40 per cent in the USA.67 Only 25 per cent of local government
expenditure is funded from local taxation. Furthermore, there are three
times as many centrally nominated quango positions as there are locally
elected councillors – some 5,000 appointed bodies with over 50,000
positions.68
45
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 43 Percentage of total tax revenues paid through central
government
100
80
%
60
40
20
0
Spain
USA
France EU (15) EU (25)
Italy Germany
UK
Malta
Source: European Commission, 2005
Government performance
Blair’s government has sought to ensure the delivery of its political objectives through the use of performance targets and a system of Public
Service Agreements (PSAs). It has also sought to make government
more productive through the so-called ‘Gershon reforms’, a package of
efficiency measures designed to save £20 billion a year – including the
introduction of new IT systems, better public procurement procedures
and 84,000 civil service job cuts.
Nevertheless, examples of institutional dysfunction still abound. Inland
Revenue tax credits, the Post Office benefits swipe card, the Passport
Office and the Criminal Records Bureau have all suffered IT failures
in recent years. There are signs that the new NHS computer system
– intended to link 30,000 GPs to 300 hospitals by 2014 – is also
running over budget and over time. Administrative failures have led to
the effective collapse of the Child Support Agency. Meanwhile the new
Home Secretary, John Reid, has described his own department as ‘not
fit for purpose’ after his officials admitted to mistakenly releasing foreign
criminals into the community and failing to identify and deport illegal
immigrants and asylum seekers.
46
Blair: the record, the legacy
j
:
International affairs
Iraq, Afghanistan and the war against global terrorism
When George Bush’s then economic adviser, Lawrence Lindsey, suggested
the cost of the war in Iraq might reach $200 billion, the White House
promptly fired him. Yet, even on conservative estimates, that figure has
already been exceeded. While the USA has borne the brunt of these costs,
the UK bill is mounting. The amount spent in Iraq by the UK’s Ministry of
Defence, Department for International Development and Foreign Office
stands at around £4.5 billion.69 The human cost of the war and subsequent occupation has been far higher. By the end of April 2007 135
British and 3,252 U.S. servicemen and women have been killed, while
in October 2006 the Lancet medical journal controversially estimated
that 655,000 Iraqis had been killed.70 More than 300 foreigners have
been taken hostage, of which 54 – like Britain’s Ken Bigley and Margaret
Hassan – were subsequently killed. The fate of 89 is unknown.71
Public support for the war has fallen steadily in the UK, from a high point
of 66 per cent on April 10th 2003 (as US troops entered central Baghdad)
to 33 per cent in March 2006.72 In an ICM poll in the summer of 2003,
two-thirds of respondents said that the government had deceived the
public about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
61 per cent believed that the intelligence-based dossier on Iraq’s WMD
had been embellished; and 58 per cent trusted the government less as
a result.
Operation Telic in Iraq (where the UK has 7,100 military personnel, down
from 10,000 in 2003) is the UK’s biggest military operational deployment, ahead of Afghanistan where some 5,600 troops are stationed,
mostly in the southern province of Helmand. In both cases, UK forces
are engaged in providing security to allow for the rebuilding of the host
country’s institutional and physical infrastructure. The ‘exit’ plan for
Iraq and Afghanistan is linked to the pace at which domestic forces are
able to take over the task of guaranteeing security and applying the rule
47
Blair: the record, the legacy
of law. Although the Iraqi armed forces now number 250,000, there
are signs that the both the army and the police have been infiltrated,
or captured, by factional interests and militias. Despite this, Tony Blair
recently announced that that the number of troops in Iraq would be cut
to 5,000, with the expectation that further withdrawals will follow after
the summer. The government has no such plans for Afghanistan, where
President Karzai’s government remains almost entirely reliant on international forces to impose its political will.
Whether or not UK forces are suffering ‘overstretch’ is the subject of
much debate. As the map opposite shows, in addition to the 11,700
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the UK has service men and women on
operational postings in Northern Ireland, the Balkans and on UN missions
in Georgia, Ethiopia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The rest are on non-operational deployment in Germany (many of whom are involved in NATO’s
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps of which Britain is the lead nation), Cyprus,
the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar.
Trade, aid and global poverty
Tony Blair used the UK Presidency of the EU and the G8 to push the
issue of global poverty – and African poverty in particular – towards the
top of the international agenda. At their summit in Gleneagles in July
2005, the G8 leaders pledged to double the size of Africa’s economy
and volume of trade by 2015.73 But the Doha round of World Trade
Organisation (WTO) talks, which is supposed to turn many of these
promises into reality, has broken down.
Total Gross Public Expenditure on Aid
Figure 45 UK expenditure on overseas aid, 1994-2004
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
-96
-97
-98
-99
-00
-01
-02
-01
-04
-05
-06
Source: Department for International Development, 2006
48
Source: BBC News
Figure 44 Distribution of UK troops overseas, 2006
Blair: the record, the legacy
49
Blair: the record, the legacy
The G8 also pledged at Gleneagles to provide an extra £35 billion in aid a
year by 2010, with half of this sum going to Africa. OECD figures show
that in 2005 the amount of aid paid by G8 countries increased substantially by £11.4 billion, or 37 per cent above 2004 levels, although the
figure is inflated by including debt write-offs to Nigeria and Iraq as aid
(together, they account for 80 per cent of the total). Without this sum,
the amount of aid provided from the developed world actually fell by
5.1 per cent in 2006.74 For its part, the UK government is on course to
meet the UN target of spending 0.7 per cent of national income as aid by
2013, a level met at present by just five countries (Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).75
International aid is crucial to fulfilling the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These ambitious targets, agreed by world leaders
in 2000, include halving global poverty, ensuring universal access to
education, halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and
other major diseases and reducing the child mortality rate by twothirds.76 Debt cancellation is also an essential part of the overall aid
strategy pursued by the British government. At the end of 2003, the
total debt of developing and emerging countries was estimated to be
$2,554 trillion, of which $2,152 trillion is medium-term and long term
debt.77 In 2003, approximately $68 billion was given in aid to developing
countries – just 3 per cent of their total debt.78 The Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative is designed to write off the debts of 43
countries to international financial institutions, subject to the candidate
nations implementing poverty reduction strategies and wider economic
reforms.79 So far, the HIPC initiative has led to the entire debts of 20
countries being written off, 14 of them in Africa.80 The British government worked with the Nigerian government to deliver the largest ever
debt cancellation for an African country, £2.8 billion of which was
forgiven by the UK.
The European Union
The Labour government arrived in office in 1997 promising a radical
change in its approach to the European Union after the euroscepticism
of the Thatcher and Major years. However, the government has failed to
provide a consistent pro-European lead or affect a change in the deeply
ingrained anti-European attitudes of the British public.
The government’s European policy has enjoyed some successes. Britain
has long championed the enlargement of the European Union to the
east. In 2004, ten new countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) joined
the 15 existing members of the European Union. Although Romania
and Bulgaria followed on January 1st 2007, Blair’s successor will find
it much more difficult to persuade other EU members of the benefits
50
Blair: the record, the legacy
Figure 46 EU budget, 2007-2013
Economic competitiveness
Cohesion funds
Natural resources
Agriculture
Security and justice
External
Administration
Source: European Commission, 2006
of further expansion to include Croatia and Turkey. Public and political
opinion against enlargement is hardening in several member states (most
notably Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands). Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia are also prospective members
in the long term. Should all these countries join, the EU would have
another 78 million Muslims in its population, and its borders would reach
Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria.
The Blair government was also instrumental in developing the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – something given form and
substance by the deployment of a 7,000 strong European Union military
force (EUFOR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2004. The
government’s strong support of the EU’s economic reform agenda has
also resulted in some modest successes, such as the passage of the
services directive in 2006, which should partially open up services to
cross-border competition.
In 2005, the European Constitutional Treaty – which was designed to
streamline the EU’s cumbersome decision-making procedures – was dealt
a fatal blow by the voters of France and the Netherlands in referendums.
This saved the British government from what all opinion polls predicted
would have been an even more decisive rejection in the promised referendum in the UK. However, any post-Blair government has to face up
to the tricky task of negotiating some form of new EU Treaty to prevent
the EU’s decision-making apparatus grinding to a halt.
Tony Blair came to power promising to take Britain into the European
single currency when the economic circumstances were right. Ten
years later, the pound remains, and the prospect of Britain embracing
51
Blair: the record, the legacy
Economic and Monetary Union has further receded as British public
opinion remains steadfastly opposed.
Another unfulfilled ambition articulated in the 1997 Labour manifesto
was to lead the process of reform in Europe. Blair broke with 20 years
of British diplomacy when, during the British Presidency of the EU in
2005, he offered to trade the British budget rebate for a radical overhaul
of the EU budget. In particular, he argued for far-reaching reform of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which still accounts for 45 per cent
of the total EU budget. Opponents of the CAP argue that it distorts
the single market, fails to increase the efficiency of European farming
and principally benefits the biggest farms in the richest EU countries,
including Britain (The Duke of Westminster, for example, one of Britain’s
richest men and 14th on the Forbes list of world billionaires, receives
£326,000 in CAP subsidies).81 However, the powerful coalition of forces
lined up behind the status quo, led by the French, has prevented radical
budgetary reform during Blair’s decade as prime minister.
52
Blair: the record, the legacy
j
:
Notes
1. C Giles, ‘A tale of two Britains’, Financial Times, March 2006.
2. Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2007.
3. Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), figures for November 2005.
4. ONS, 2007. Figures for 1987 and 1988 are the composite price index.
5. M Brewer et al, ‘Better or worse off? More or less heavily taxed?’, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS),
2005.
6. OECD productivity database, January 2006.
7. CBI/GfK NOP, ‘The business of transport’, November 2005.
8. Commission for Integrated Transport, ‘Annual report 2002’, November 2003.
9. ONS, April 2007.
10. Lord Turner et al, ‘A new pensions settlement for the twenty-first century’, Pensions Commission,
November 2005.
11. M Brewer et al, ‘Poverty and inequality in the UK: 2007’, IFS, 2007.
12. J Blanden et al, ‘Intergenerational mobility in Europe and North America’, Centre for Economic Performance/Sutton Trust, April 2005.
13. J Blanden and S. Gibbons, ‘The persistence of poverty across generations’, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, April 2006.
14. J Blanden et al, ‘Intergenerational mobility in Europe and North America’.
15. G Berman, ‘Council tax 2006–07’, House of Commons library, May 2006.
16. OECD, ‘Education at a glance 2005’, June 2005.
17. L Feinstein, ‘Inequality in the Early Cognitive Development of British Children in the 1970 cohort’,
Economica, 70(277), 2003.
18. HM Treasury, ‘Spending review: new public spending plans 2005–2008’, July 2004.
19. DfES, February 2006.
20. Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, ‘Strategic audit: progress and challenges for the UK’, February 2005.
21. ONS, ‘Social trends 36’, 2006.
22. ONS, ‘English house condition survey’, 2004.
23. Hansard, written answers, Yvette Cooper, DCLG, 26 March 2007.
24. Crisis, ‘Statistics about Homelessness’, October 2006.
25. DCLG, ‘Regulated mortgage survey’, June 2006.
26. ONS, ‘Social Trends 37’, 2006.
27. G Brown, ‘Homebuy: expanding the opportunity to own’, HM Treasury, April 2005.
28. ODPM, ‘Affordability and the Supply of Housing Third Report of Session 2005–06, Vol. 1’, May 2006.
29. D Ludwig and S Olshanksky, ‘A potential decline in life expectancy in the United States in the 21st
Century’, New England Journal of Medicine, March 2005.
30. BMA, ‘Child and adolescent mental health – a guide for healthcare professionals’, June 2006.
31. OECD, 2006.
32. National Centre for Social Research, ‘British social attitudes, the 22nd report’, November 2005.
33. Directgov, 2007.
34. ONS, 2004; Eurostat 2006.
53
Blair: the record, the legacy
35. Institute for Public Policy Research, ‘Unilever family report 2005: home alone?’, October 2005.
36. T Blair, speech, May 15th 2006.
37. YouGov/Migration Watch, February 2005 and YouGov/Economist, December 2004.
38. Home Office, 2004.
39. National Centre for Social Research, ‘British social attitudes survey’, 2003.
40. Pew Global Attitudes Project, ‘The great divide: how Westerners and Muslims view each other’, 2006.
41. Electoral Commission, May 2006.
42. British Crime Survey, July 2006.
43. Home Office, ‘Violent crime overview: homicide and gun crime 2004–2005’, February 2006; Home4Office, ‘Crime in England and Wales 2005–2006’, July 2006.
44. International Centre for Prison Studies, 2006.
45. Prison Reform Trust, ‘Bromley briefings factfile’, April 2006.
46. British Crime Survey, July 2006.
47. D Rose, ‘Crime rate soars as criminals walk free’, Observer, May 28th 2006.
48. ‘World values survey’, World Values Survey Organisation, January 2003.
49. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), ‘Climate change: the UK programme
2006’, March 2006.
50. Department of Transport, ‘Transport statistics 2005’, July 2006.
51. J Burnham, ‘Report on the cost of motoring’, Middlesex University, 2001.
52. Commission for Integrated Transport, ‘Annual report 2002’, November 2003.
53. Hansard, November 20th 2002.
54. Transport for London, July 2006.
55. DTI, ‘The energy challenge – energy review’, July 2006.
56. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘The future of UK gas supplies’, October 2004.
57. DTI, ‘Our energy challenge – securing clean, affordable energy for the long term’, January 2006.
58. ibid.
59. M Leeke, ‘UK election statistics: 1945–2003’, House of Commons library, July 2003.
60. C Rallings and M. Thrasher, ‘British electoral facts: 1832–1999’, Electoral Commission, 2000.
61. Electoral Reform Society, ‘The UK general election of the 5th May 2005’, June 2005.
62. D Beetham et al., ‘Democracy under Blair’, Democratic Audit, November 2002.
63. ibid.
64. ICM Poll for Sunday Telegraph, May 2006.
65. MORI/JRRT/Electoral Commission/Times/FT survey, June 1973–April 2005.
66. Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, ‘Power to the people’, March 2006.
67. European Commission, ‘Structures of the taxation systems in the European Union: 1995–2004’,
2005.
68. Joseph Rowntree Foundation, quoted in ‘The Quango Debate’, House of Commons library, April 2005.
69. Iraq Analysis Group, March 2006.
70. S Boseley, ‘635,000 Iraqis killed since invasion’, Guardian, October 11, 2006
71. The Brookings Institution, ‘Iraq index’, February 2007.
72. YouGov, Iraq tracking poll, 2006.
73. Oxfam International, ‘The view from the summit - Gleneagles G8 one year on’, June 2006.
74. L Elliot, ‘Blow to Blair as western aid falls for first time in 10 years’ Guardian, April 3, 2007.
75. United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human development report 2005’, 2005.
76. United Nations, ‘UN Millennium Development Goals’, 2000.
77. Paris Club, ‘The debt of developing and emerging countries’, 2005.
78. UK committee for UNICEF, ‘0.7%: international aid’, October 2005.
79. World Bank, ‘Steps of the HIPC initiative’, 2006.
80. DfID, ‘G8 Gleneagles one year on: turning talk into action’, June 2006.
81. Oxfam, ‘Spotlight on subsidies’, January 2004.
54
Blair: the record, the legacy
55