Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 2010, 37, 182-193
© 2010 Human Kinetics, Inc.
The Genius in Art and in Sport:
A Contribution to the Investigation
of Aesthetics of Sport
Teresa Lacerda and Stephen Mumford
This paper contains a consideration of the notion of genius and its significance to the
discussion of the aesthetics of sport. We argue that genius can make a positive aesthetic contribution in both art and sport, just as some have argued that the moral
content of a work of art can affect its aesthetic value. A genius is an exceptional innovator of successful strategies, where such originality adds aesthetic value. We argue
that an original painting can have greater aesthetic value than an exact replica, merely
because it is the original. By parity of reasoning, a successful innovation in sport has
additional aesthetic value just because it is a new creation. The genius is one who can
provide this extra aesthetic pleasure and on that basis is rightly valued. The genius
need not be conscious of how they achieve such innovations and thus find their own
genius to be something they cannot explain but only demonstrate. In sport, innovations that offer new ways of playing or solving problems can produce competitive
success which demands instant recognition and rewards.
The Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa (1888–1935) said that what the genius
can expect from their contemporaries is to be despised, and “In every case, the
nobler the genius the less noble the fate” (17: p. 202). Although society has
changed much since Pessoa wrote this, and some artists now also have celebrity
status, there is still at least some truth in his idea. But what Pessoa said fits much
better with the genius in art than with sport for in sport the genius can expect
instant fame and adulation. In the art world, in contrast, recognition of genius
tends to be a retrospective, even a posthumous assessment. In general, the concept
of a genius has fallen out of use in contemporary philosophy of art though older
thinkers did have something to say about it. In sports, however, the notion of
genius is still used and arguably over-used. In this paper, we intend to take the
notion of genius philosophically seriously once more. It may have fallen into
disuse on the assumption that it has no theoretical value. If that is so, we wish to
question the assumption.
We will aim to exonerate the notion of genius in part by connecting it with the
features of originality and creativity and also with success. While our understanding of genius is one that comes at first from an artistic context, such features
The authors <[email protected]> are with the Dept. of Aesthetics of Sport, Faculty of Sports,
University of Porto, Porto, Portugal, and <[email protected]> with the Dept. of
Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK.
182
Investigating Aesthetics of Sport 183
clearly lend themselves to an application within a sporting context. We wish
mainly, however, to consider the notion of genius as an aesthetic category. The
works of genius, we argue, have an additional aesthetic value. They are creative,
original, even unique, and all these things enhance aesthetic value. The genius is
one who is appreciated as an exceptional innovator, one who flouts conventions
but in a successful way. Sports spectators and art appreciators alike have a fascination with the genius and we argue that such fascination is not irrational but can
instead be grounded in valid aesthetic considerations.
2. Art and Sport
During the 70s and 80s there was a vibrant debate concerning the relation of sport
to art. The debate became polarized along the lines of those who thought sport
was art (1; 13; 21; 3) and those who thought it wasn’t and could never be (23; 12).
This debate, however, we think can be obstructive to a proper investigation of the
aesthetics of sport. The study of the aesthetics of sport qua sport, rather than qua
art, is a legitimate concern in itself. The debate over whether sport is also art is
redundant to this. The study of aesthetics goes beyond reflections of the nature of
art and, indeed, some theories of art are detached from aesthetic notions, such as
the institutional theory (5).
The aesthetic value of sport clearly does not depend upon whether it is included
within the domain of art, as others have already noted (2; 16; 22). As Witt (22)
argues, the world of sport is a world of aesthetic values, where every situation can
produce moods, feelings and impressions that allow for aesthetic experiences,
sometimes profound. For many, this is what fascinates them about sport. Takács
(20) even argues that sport opens up the need for new aesthetic categories to accommodate its special features. With this view, we believe that sport may offer its own
aesthetic qualities and categories that are not always to be found within art. The
immediate interaction with an audience of spectators may be indispensable to the
realization of these aesthetic values. We know that many rule changes, such as in
football, are designed to make the sport more attractive to watch, by stopping timewasting, for instance. They have, thus, primarily an aesthetic rationale.
The central issue of this paper, however, is the role of genius and we ourselves are not immune to referring back to the role of the genius in art. Art was,
after all, the area in which the notion of genius was born. But this should not be
taken as an attempt to subsume sport to art. Our aim is to promote the notion of
genius as a useful and respectable aesthetic category, and one that has particular
theoretical utility in the aesthetics of sport. Furthermore, as we will argue, there
appears to be a distinct reception of the genius in sport that a genius in another
context might not be able to expect, as illustrated in the case of art by Pessoa (17).
We will now make a start on substantiating some of these points by first indicated
what we take the genius to be.
3. Defining the Genius?
What do we mean by genius? The term is often used in relation to two different
things: first, it is used in relation to individuals and, second, it is used in relation
184 Lacerda and Mumford
to particular acts. A genius, we might say, is someone who is highly creative of
successful strategies, which can thus become new orthodoxies in the relevant
domain. Success in the original artistic context could mean that the genius innovates some new technique, movement or style in art. It does not entail that they
have financial or critical success: at least not immediately and possibly not in
their own lifetime. In the case of sports, however, the genius is one who creates
new sporting strategies that tend toward competitive success and, because of the
immediacy of sporting victory, this can bring instant recognition, wealth and
acclaim.
We need not, however, restrict genius to individual people, as if they can be
divided into those that are geniuses (presumably rare) and those that are not. Individual acts could also be described as genius and someone may display genius in
one domain but not in others. This seems to be the view given in a standard reference work, the Encyclopedia of Aesthetics (10), where the use of the term genius
is said to “refer precisely to that region of the human spirit that enables the individual to produce the works that are received as creative and original” (p. 287).
Individuals who are said to be geniuses would thus be those who tended to produce some original and successful innovation regularly or perhaps they could be
someone who produced just a single such innovation but one that was so significant and so successful that they are called a genius just because of that single act
or creation. Such an attribution could well be right and proper. We deliberately say
that such strategies only tend toward success: they dispose toward it without
necessitating it. The better player does not always win though they will tend to do
so. As well as tending toward success, there is a separate aesthetic value that the
genius can also bring. Their creativity, originality and innovation brings value to
sport, sometimes simply in terms of beauty (e.g., harmony, balance, rhythm, elegance, and so on), and at other times in terms of more contemporary aesthetic
categories (e.g., contrast, opposition, surpassing, strength, and so on). The innovations of the genius, therefore, would be ones that disposed in the direction of success and toward enhancing aesthetic value.
Creativity and innovation are the hallmarks of the genius but we do not want
to offer this account as a strict definition, in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions for instance. To do so would be to suggest that there could be rules for
how to be a genius. But the genius is supposed to be someone who defies all existing rules, who flouts the current conventions and transcends their epoch. Rorty’s
notion of the ‘strong poet’ bears similarities, which has already been discussed in
the context of sport by Burke (4) and Roberts (18) (though see also Dixon [6]).
Nietzsche’s übermensch is also pertinent (14). According to Pessoa (17), the
genius is one who is able to break out from the existing chains of convention. The
genius is a creator of new orthodoxies or, as Kant said, “Genius is the talent (natural endowment) which gives the rule to art” (9, Pt I, Bk ii, 46, p. 168). The genius
isn’t a follower of rules: he or she is a creator of rules. The innovations introduced
must be seen as positive, however. Flouting orthodoxy is not a good thing in itself.
Anyone can defy convention in any old childish way. Because the innovations of
the genius tend toward success, however, they are emulated by others seeking that
same success. Hence, the sporting genius will set a new trend, attracting numerous
followers or imitators. The genius is a leader rather than a follower.
Investigating Aesthetics of Sport 185
4. Genius in Sport and the Issue of Competition
On the grounds of being especially innovative and influential, examples of genius
in the arts would be found in the likes of Leonardo, Mozart, or van Gogh. But
what is it to be a genius in sports and do we have any plausible examples? Any
sporting exemplar will be controversial because everyone has an opinion and a
favorite. Diego Maradona, for instance, is an interesting example. For what he did
on the soccer field, he is almost universally admired. In most polls, either he or
Pelé frequently come out as the greatest footballer of all time. In Argentina, he is
idolised yet he has been in part discredited for a few incidents of cheating, one
involving a performance enhancing drug at the 1994 World Cup Finals. At the
1986 World Cup, however, his impact was phenomenal. If there was ever a case of
one player winning a World Cup for his country, this was it. At the peak of his
form, he was able to defeat opponents with ease, seeming to drift past them effortlessly while they attempted to use every means to stop him, legal and illegal. He
scored two spectacular goals, one against Belgium and one against England, the
latter being judged by many as the greatest goal of all time. For this few weeks,
Maradona was not just the best player in the world, but he was also so far ahead
of any of his rivals and it was arguably the best series of matches any player has
ever put together. The rest of the Argentinian team were strong, but it has to be
doubted that they could have succeeded had Maradona been absent. His genius, if
it truly was, consisted in his vision, anticipation of the game, and his ability to
control the ball. Many would want to emulate him, but very few could. It did,
however, change many people’s perceptions of what a great footballer could be.
He was very small for a player at only five feet and five inches tall. But this ‘disadvantage’ was something he turned to his advantage—using his low center of
gravity to shrug off tackles—and thus set a new example for a generation of
shorter players.
There are examples of less famous athletes who are nevertheless considered
geniuses within their own disciplines and we can offer examples where genius is
particularly associated with innovation. Elena Schuschunova, the Russian gymnast who won Olympic gold in 1996, created a new combination of elements in
floor routine, which is now included as a difficulty in the Code of Points in women’s artistic gymnastics: a straddle jump to land in front lying support, also with a
half turn. The possibililty of such a routine was of course open to anyone before
but it needed Schuschunova’s vision and ability in order to become a reality. Jan
Boklöv created a new technique for ski-jump which seemed completely counterintuitive. During the jump, the skis are held in a V-shape rather than parallel. This
sounds aerodynamically wrong but it actually increases the length of the jump by
10%. Dick Fosbury was an example of an exceptional innovator in high-jump,
coming up with an entirely original way of getting over the bar. Fosbury saw a
completely novel solution to a problem others had wrestled with for years. The
innovation tended toward success, not just in his own case but for any others who
gained mastery of the technique. Anyone who learnt how to execute it could jump
higher than before and thus the innovation was emulated. Now, it is almost
unknown for any high-jumper at any decent level of competition to use any other
jump—straddle, for instance—than the Fosbury flop. The same thing happened
with Boklöv’s V-style ski jump.
186 Lacerda and Mumford
The example of Fosbury raises the question of just how innovation relates to
aesthetics. When Fosbury created the technique, he was not worried about the
aesthetics of high jumping. He just wanted to jump higher. And the name ‘flop’,
used to describe the jump, seems to suggest that it is a graceless and cumbersome
technique. Perhaps, then, the new technique had negative aesthetic value. Some
draw a distinction between purposive and aesthetic sports and it could be alleged
that in the case of the high-jump all that counts is getting over as high a bar as
possible, whether one does so beautifully or clumsily. What counts, one may
think, is the competition. In sport, the goal is to win, and unless it is one of those
sports in which points are given for aesthetic value, aesthetics count for nothing.
The matter is not quite so simple, however. As Boxill (3) has argued: “the desire
for victory does not subordinate aesthetics; it often enhances it” (p. 515). Even if
the athlete’s sole aim is to win the contest, it does not mean that they are not at the
same time creating something of aesthetic value. Their desire to win is often what
makes the sport a pleasing spectacle to the observer because it functions as a catalyst to the best performance. A victory can seem beautiful or dramatic because of
the maximum effort and focus of the athlete, even though they have no desire to
produce beauty or drama. Sport’s aesthetic value derives frequently from situations where athletes are confronted by their limits, and their attempts to surpass
themselves is one of the most appreciated aspects of sport. Examples come to
mind of Bernard Hinault, finishing a stage of the Tour de France with blood
streaming down his face and of Gabriela Andersen-Schiess, who entered the Los
Angeles Olympic stadium at the end of the 1984 marathon staggering and struggling to finish the competition. Such cases show the ability of sport to turn the
ugly into the beautiful and profound.
In addition, we note that the aesthetic appreciation of genius at work can be
in any case distinct from the aesthetic appreciation of the physical act carried out.
Many of Fosbury’s imitators have perfected the technique even better than he did.
Some may have more elegant bodies and smoother motion over the bar. But the
aesthetic appreciation of genius can be abstracted away from the qualities of the
jump itself. Fosbury’s first success with his new jump could be appreciated
because it was its first, rather than because of any beauty or grace it had. The novelty of an innovation can be enjoyed for its own sake and is undoubtedly one of
the reasons we admire genius. To make a comparison with the arts, many painters
could be trained to paint like van Gogh and, no doubt, they could paint a fair replica of his Sunflowers. But the original painting is enjoyed and appreciated far
more by us because it was the original, created in a moment of rare inspiration
with no precedent rather than as a reproduction. Among other things, this shows
us that the aesthetic qualities of a painting do not supervene just on the physical
structure of the object as the original and replica may be prima facie indistinguishable but the original seems to have a far greater aesthetic value. A parallel argument will shortly be offered for the case of sport.
5. Creativity and Freedom
Before we return to the issue of the aesthetic value of genius, there are two special
issues we need to touch on that concern creativity and why it is something so
Investigating Aesthetics of Sport 187
valued, particularly in sport. This will help us to understand the appeal of genius,
given that creativity is such an important part of it. The first issue concerns how
creativity relates to freedom, especially within a sporting context.
Creativity and freedom interrelate in that creativity is the product of freedom
but also freedom is a product of creativity. To create, one must be free to do so and
the genius is understood as one who has conspicuous freedom because of their
natural ability. Creativity arises from thinking freely: from setting aside conventional wisdom, from thinking “outside the box”, from having the physical abilities
that opens up new possibilities. The genius can put together seemingly unrelated
ideas to find new solutions to the existing problems. These solutions can come
from free association where different notions are put side by side. The bicycle
kick in football, for instance, was an innovation that combined the idea of kicking
a football with that of pedalling a bicycle in order to solve the problem of shooting
when one’s back is toward the goal. One must have, therefore, certain capabilities—some physical and some mental—in order to create, and one must be free to
exercise those capabilities.
In the second place, one needs creativity in order to be free or, rather, creativity in sport gives freedom to the athlete because it provides them with something
extra, not possessed by their opponents. To have such extra capabilities, including
the capability of creating, is to have extra freedom. The high-jumper who can
jump 2.4 meters has greater freedom than one who can jump 2.3 meters for there
is more that they are able to do. Similarly, the footballer who can think their way
out of tight defensive situation, and has the physical ability to do so, has greater
freedom than one who can’t. Takács’s (20) is one who has focused on the relation
between beauty and human freedom, and for him all kinds of sports are suitable to
express human freedom.
Watching an athlete freely in control of their abilities provides a beautiful
experience for the spectator because it can be seemingly effortless and gracious as
opposed to awkward and strained. A golfer who has mastery of their swing, and
can use it in a variety of different circumstances to hit a perfect shot every time,
provides us with a greater aesthetic experience than one whose swing is unreliable
and uncontrolled. The superior athlete has more freedom because of his of her
greater abilities. They are able to do certain things that inferior athletes cannot and
thus they have a greater realm of possibilities open to them. Michael Phelps, the
2008 Olympic swimming champion provides another example, even though
swimming might be considered by many as quite a “closed” sport, in which there
is no place for freedom. Phelps showed, in an exceptional and masterly way, his
body’s freedom to deal with and conquer space under the constraint of time and
the pressure of his opponents. Someone who wins eight gold medals in one Olympics, as Phelps did, is a freer swimmer than someone who won just one or none at
all. Similarly in a team sport, Cristiano Ronaldo’s skill in conducting the ball in
the direction of the goals, tricking his opponents and pursuing the purpose of scoring, might also be mentioned as an instance of the genius’s freedom, of their
capacity to generate creative, unpredictable shots, and of their contribution to the
aesthetics of sport.
In emphasizing creativity, however, we do not want to ignore the importance
of technique. The genius is often someone who can deploy it as they wish in order
to solve problems and succeed over their opponents. The opera soprano Edita
188 Lacerda and Mumford
Gruberova said of her singing “Technique is what gives me freedom”, which we
think applies very well to the cases of athletes and their technique. Sporting genius
displays such bodily excellence that freedom is opened up: freedom to interpret
the sporting techniques and impose individual style.
6. Creativity and Intuition
It has been said that the genius creates new rules and new orthodoxies and that
they conquer space and time through their actions. But the genius need not themselves completely understand what they are doing in these terms. Instead, genius
is intuitive. Rather than being a part of their conscious thought processes, the
genius’s actions are more a matter of instinct and intuition. Quoting again the poet
(17), “The genius is intuitive and uses his intelligence to serve his intuitions” (p.
123). Although a deep knowledge of the sport is required by the genius, creative
movements and good shots do not typically arise through conscious deliberation
but instead by sudden intuition and this gains the genius the mastery of space and
time that they use to succeed.
Again, according to Kant (9, Pt I, Bk II, §46), the genius doesn’t know how
the ideas come to their mind, and so it is not possible to communicate them such
as in prescriptions to others. Rosa Mota, the 1988 Olympic gold-winning marathon runner, arguably had been a genius of athletics. She retired from her sporting
career some years ago but has been playing a role promoting and disseminating
sporting values in general and, in particular, those of athletics. She spends time in
schools and clubs speaking and participating in different activities with young
people, which is considered of great importance in the promotion of athletics.
Nevertheless, to illustrate Kant’s point, there hasn’t yet emerged in Portugal
another talent such as hers. Regardless of her great efforts, she cannot communicate her genius in words but can only show it. Paul Gascoigne was the greatest
English footballer of his generation, able to fool opponents to create goal-scoring
opportunities, and yet sadly he was a relatively inarticulate individual. Although
he inspired many to take up the game, he was almost totally unable to communicate his exceptional talent to them verbally. It is doubtful that even he knew
exactly how he was able to succeed on the pitch.
There are, nevertheless, those who specialize in training and communicating
successful techniques and practices within sport. High-level sporting performances are nowadays achieved through training programs that are highly specialized and controlled. Top athletes and teams are surrounded by an assemblage of
sport science professionals whose job it is to communicate their wisdom to the
younger, fitter and more able. They have some successes, as not all success
requires creative genius, but genius itself seems something that they cannot “manufacture”. Our notion of genius seems to include the idea that it is something that
cannot be taught. As Kant said of art, and we may assert the same of sport, “he
does not himself know how the ideas … have entered into his head, nor has he it
in his power to . . . communicate the same to others as would put them in a position to produce similar products.” (9: Pt I, Bk II, §46, p. 169). Thus as well as
coaching and training programs, we must also emphasize the importance of discovery and selection—finding the raw talent that may contain genius—casting a
Investigating Aesthetics of Sport 189
net for them. The role of the trainer is then to create all the ideal circumstances
that will allow the genius to emerge, flourish and manifest itself. Like all abilities
and dispositions, genius will display itself only in the right conditions. The trainer’s role is to provide those conditions.
Creativity is of particular importance to success in sport. As Suits defined it
succinctly, sport is “the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles”
(18, p. 55). Sometimes those obstacles are known in advance, sometimes they are
unpredictable, and sometimes they are created by opponents. The genius can find
new ways of overcoming these obstacles or can respond to their unpredictability
through their creative acts. There is a problem-solving aspect in sport, which
demands original and unexpected answers, improvised and innovative solutions.
In team sports, the team as a whole will have to work together to provide
these solutions. The Galacticos generation of the Real Madrid football team, for
instance, was the greatest-ever assemblage of individual talent in a club football
side—Zinedine Zidane, Luis Figo, Ronaldo, David Beckham and Raul—yet they
were generally regarded to have underachieved. A creative team is not necessarily
just a collection of individual geniuses but the team itself needs to manifest collective genius. In contrast, the Barcelona side of 2008/09 was regarded to be
greater than the sum of its parts. It was not that the team had a collective consciousness, nor that any individual understood how the team worked. And while
not underestimating the value of good coaching, and so on, it was rather that they
just ‘gelled’ and intuitively understood how best to play with each other.
7. Creativity as an Aesthetic Category
We return now to the main theme, which is the defense of genius as a useful aesthetic category, particularly in the case of sport, where the genius is understood as
an exceptional innovator of successful strategies. Several authors such as Aspin
(1), Kuntz (11), Takács (20) and Hyland (8), already testify to the importance of
creativity in the aesthetic appreciation of sport. In this section, we will defend the
idea that such successful creativity always adds aesthetic value. We argue for this
via a thought experiment, which we touched upon in the case of art with the
example of the painting van Gogh’s Sunflowers and its replica. It was argued that
the original has additional aesthetic value (as well as monetary value) that the
imitation does not add. By parity of reasoning, we will argue that sporting acts of
creativity also have this additional aesthetic value and are thus rightly appreciated
more.
The thought experiment is based on a real case that is arguably an example of
genius in sport, namely the “Cruyff turn” that Johan Cruyff first exhibited while
playing for the Netherlands in the 1974 World Cup against Sweden. This was a
kind of move or technique that was innovated and executed successfully to gain a
game advantage. Cruyff feigned to make a pass with his right foot but instead
trapped the ball under his standing foot and dragged it back behind him. The feign
was so convincing that the defender marking him was completely fooled, chasing
where the ball would have gone, and Cruyff was now in the penalty area with ten
yards of free space before him.
190 Lacerda and Mumford
An important point that comes from the Cruyff example is that, while there is
no denying that the swift and gracious movements displayed in making a perfect
Cruyff turn have their own aesthetic merits, the creativity manifested by Cruyff in
making the innovation, on that first time it was publicly displayed to a global audience, give it additional aesthetic value. To support this claim, we offer the thought
experiment that were an imitator to mimic in detail every movement made originally by Cruyff, perhaps even with a body that looks like Cruyff’s and in the same
color shirt against the same kind of opponent, their turn could recreate many of
the aesthetic values of the turn but not the aesthetic value the first instance had in
virtue of being the original creative act. This thought experiment corresponds to
the replica of van Gogh’s Sunflowers, which we claimed did not have the same
aesthetic value as the original. While it is hard to replicate paintings in every
detail, it is even harder to replicate sporting events. In this case, therefore, we ask
only that it be considered in the imagination. We nevertheless argue to the same
effect, that if a duplicate of that first Cruyff turn were per impossible to occur, that
was visually indistinguishable from the original turn Cruyff executed against
Sweden, the original would still have greater aesthetic value. We have argued that
this greater aesthetic value stems from the fact that the first Cruyff turn was an
original act of creativity, a successful innovation, of which the later exemplars
were merely imitations, born of mimicry rather than imagination.
The conclusion of this argument should be generalizable to other areas of
aesthetic value, and we have already seen that it is plausible in the case of painting. In more conceptual art, for instance, the same point could be made. I might
find a urinal that is indistinguishable from Duchamp’s, for instance, and put it on
display. But critics would rightly say that it was not as valuable artistically as
Duchamp’s original exhibit. Indeed, mine would be pretty valueless. For the same
reason, we have less respect or even scorn for books that merely reproduce an
already-existing plot or a piece of music that copies the melody of another, however unconsciously (George Harrison’s My Sweet Lord and The Chiffons’ He’s So
Fine being a good example).
The idea that two physically indistinguishable objects or events could differ
in their aesthetic qualities may sound counter-intuitive. Nevertheless, we seem
ready to allow that an original and its forgery could differ radically in their monetary value so why not in their aesthetic value also? What is suggested is some
kind of contextualism about value where aesthetic and other values supervene not
just on the other, nonaesthetic properties of the object or event but also on wider
contextual matters. For the purposes of the present argument, the relevant context
is being the first exemplar, produced as a novel solution to a sporting (or artistic)
problem.
The point is taken by many in aesthetics generally when it concerns a different kind of context. An artwork that in all other respects might meet the accepted
standards of beauty within its field, might nevertheless be less aesthetically valued
because of a moral flaw (see 7: pp. 432–4). A famous example of this is Leni
Riefenstahl’s film The Triumph of the Will. Although the film contains a number
of images that would otherwise be regarded as beautifully composed and edited,
the film is in fact a homage to Adolf Hitler and the ideals of Nazism. The point of
the example is that this moral flaw ruins the artwork: it actually detracts from its
aesthetic value. This suggests that morality can itself be an aesthetic category,
Investigating Aesthetics of Sport 191
which may add to the value of an artwork if it is morally good, and detract from
its value if it is morally bad. One could imagine, for instance, that Leni Riefenstahl made a similar film in praise of Mahatma Gandhi. The film may duplicate
many of the filmic qualities and yet be of far superior aesthetic value simply in
virtue of its subject matter, which is no longer morally reprehensible. In the case
of sport, values can also affect our aesthetic enjoyment. The beauty of a winning
100 meter sprint can be flawed for us, for instance, if it then emerges that the
winner had taken performance enhancing drugs. To be truly beautiful, the win
must be fairly achieved and so, the moral quality of the performance adds to its
aesthetic value.
What this shows is that there is much more to the aesthetic than just the visual
(or auditory, etc.) image. There are reasons to have a broader notion of the beautiful where our aesthetic enjoyment depends on wider contextual matters. The
moral content can affect our aesthetic evaluation, as illustrated in the case of sport,
for instance, where a footballer is revealed to have dived to win a penalty or, on
the positive side, an athlete such as Lance Armstrong overcomes personal adversity to nevertheless succeed. It can then be regarded as relatively uncontroversial
to allow that creativity adds aesthetic value and, once that is granted, we can
understand better why genius is so prized and so fascinating to us.
We can now revisit and address a problem discussed above where it was
objected that the athlete’s only interest is usually in winning and they are far more
happy to “win ugly” than to “lose beautifully”. Such an objection misses the point,
however. Whether the sporting act is a beautiful or an ugly one, the Cruyff-turn
thought experiment shows that original creativity of a successful strategy always
adds aesthetic value. Even if the Fosbury flop is ungracious (which is controversial), it would not stop us appreciating Dick Fosbury’s genius in innovating it. And
this, we maintain, is a distinctly aesthetic appreciation. Originality is not simply
something additional to, but outside of, the aesthetics of sport: it actually brings
aesthetic value. It is hence plausible to maintain that the first turn produced by
Cruyff himself could indeed be more beautiful than subsequent turns produced by
imitators, even if the imitator has managed to mimic exactly and duplicate Cruyff’s
original turn flawlessly. But this is not to deny that subsequent athletes could not
go on to develop and improve on the original, and that doing so might improve the
overall aesthetics of the turn or even itself be an act of genius. The claim is only
that if two turns were visually indistinguishable, then if one is the original it can
have greater aesthetic value for that reason alone.
8. Conclusion
We have argued in this paper for a reconsideration of the notion of genius as a
valid aesthetic category, especially in the case of sport. While the notion of the
genius is taken from the world of art, it is of particular interest in sport, where,
contrary to the romantic conception of the artist as an outsider, the sports star is
someone involved with, engaged in, and recognized by the global sport phenomenon. The genius is an exceptional talent who is able to innovate new successful
strategies that have an influence on those who follow and try to emulate them. In
the world of sport it can be far clearer what the successful strategies are and who
192 Lacerda and Mumford
was the creative originator than in the world of art, where some new approach or
technique can take time to have an influence and be a matter of judgment and
taste. The genius in sport can, because of these reasons, expect an immediate fame
and recognition that the artist cannot always expect. But this is not irrational from
the point of view of the aesthetically-minded observer. We have argued that the
genius brings something of genuine aesthetic value when they create something
new. Sport has a potential for the introduction of new elements, or new relations
between existing elements, and from the orthodox sporting techniques it is possible for originality and innovation to emerge. Such creation is often the work of
the sporting genius.
An act of creativity carries an extra aesthetic value. Seeing something allows
us to experience its aesthetic features but seeing it for the first time gives us something that is not in the subsequent encounters. The genius at work provides us with
such experiences when few others would be able to do so. This appreciation of the
new—of novel successful strategies—is what rationally grounds our fascination
with genius.
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