Title: Nixon in China 1972
Author: Mischa Snaije
Date: March 28, 2012
Institution name/journal where submitted: McGill University
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1
Nixon in China 1972
Nixon’s visit to China between the 21st and 28th of February 1972 can be seen as one
of the turning points of the Cold War on account of the dramatic shift in the international
order that it caused which would shape the remainder of the conflict. What focused attention
on the problem was the outbreak of fighting between the Chinese and Soviet forces along the
Ussuri River in March 1969, followed by discreet inquiries from Moscow as to what the U.S.
response would be should the Kremlin authorise a pre-emptive strike against China.1 The
Nixon administration acted on National Security Advisor Kissinger’s theory that in the
triangular relationship between Russia, China and the USA it would be more beneficial to
side with the weaker force, since it was believed that the Soviet Union ‘gobbling up China’
would shift the balance of powers to its favour and threaten the U.S. national security.2 Thus
the US gained a stake in the survival of China regardless of the regime in power, which
formed the basis for Kissinger’s secret visit to Peking in July 1971 to set the groundwork for
Nixon’s subsequent visit. The point was as much to make Moscow think that a
rapprochement was under way as to achieve one.3 The legacy of Nixon’s trip was a tenuous
but sustainable relationship with China grounded in the rhetoric of concession of the
Shanghai Communiqué. The impacts of the visit were far reaching and instantaneous,
especially on the triangular relationship with Russia. For the first time since the Korean War,
it was Russians, and not Americans, who faced rivals more determined to contain them than
to contain each other; and this achieved the desired goal of ‘maximum deterrence at
minimum cost’.4 The new relationship with China also had major repercussions on the
margin of U.S. manoeuvrability in Vietnam. While they had previously been forced to hold
1
Strategies Of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis, Oxford University Press 2005, p296
Ibid p296
3
Ibid p297
4
Strategies Of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis, Oxford University Press 2005, p297
2
2
back for fear of provoking Chinese intervention, they were now able to operate much more
freely which allowed greater results with fewer resources.5 One can thus see how the new
relationship with China allowed for a practical application of the Nixon Doctrine: the U.S.A.
was able to reduce its commitments in the world without conveying the appearance of
weakness, for the uncertainty that the Nixon’s voyage created in the world order became a
form of deterrence in itself.6 Finally, interests were able to shape commitments rather than
the other way around.
5
6
Ibid p298
Ibid p298
3
Part One: Newspaper coverage of the event
The plans for President Nixon’s visit to China were first officially reported in July
1971, shortly after news came of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s ‘secret’
meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai a few days before. Newspapers in the U.S. took a charitable
stance on the upcoming trip, unanimously agreeing that 'Mr Nixon's immediate objective is to
make his trip to China a genuine turning point in American diplomacy and not just a stunt for
political and propaganda effect'.7 However, they were also quick to point out the potential for
U.S. interests that could emerge from the visit, such as how 'The new relationship with
Peking could also improve chances of resolving the conflict in Vietnam'.8 It was also obvious
from the outset that President Nixon would have to relax his stance on Taiwan in their
dealings with China, and one newspaper reported that ‘the minimum price of relations with
the mainland has always been a willingness to let the Chinese settle the Taiwan dispute
among themselves'.9 In a televised statement following the announcement of the trip, Nixon
declared that 'I have taken this action, because of my profound conviction that all nations will
gain from a reduction of tension and a better relationship between the United States and the
People's Republic of China'.10 In his speech he attempted to downplay the diplomatic
ramifications of the upcoming visit to China, and the L.A. Times astutely remarked that his
‘statement that the hope-for new relationship with Peking "will not be at the expense of our
old friends" was construed as reassurance both to Taipei and to other non-Communist Asian
7
Nixon's China Goal: Genuine Diplomatic Turning Point, July 23 1971, New York Times, Page 2
Nixon To Visit China Before Next May: Accepts Chou's Invitation, Hopes to Normalize Ties, July
16 1971, Los Angeles Times, Page 1
9
Nixon's China Goal: Genuine Diplomatic Turning Point, July 23 1971, New York Times, Page 2
10
Nixon To Visit China Before Next May: Accepts Chou's Invitation, Hopes to Normalize Ties, July
16 1971, Los Angeles Times, Page 1
8
4
capitals that Washington will not forget them'; and that 'when Mr Nixon said the move "is not
directed against any other nation" he could well have been talking to the Soviet Union’.11
In the two months preceding his departure, many newspapers commented on how
Nixon’s historic voyage tied into the context of the upcoming Presidential elections, but most
gave him the benefit of the doubt, one declaring that 'He may be playing politics at home
with the Peking trip but mainly he is searching for a new discussion and a new order in the
Pacific… and he has the overwhelming support of the American people'.12
Many newspapers remained sceptical of the prospects for success of the trip however,
one predicting that 'on Taiwan and Vietnam there will probably be no agreement'.13 The
media showed an awareness that the very nature of the trip would thaw out Sino-American
relations, and ‘(Mr. Nixon) knew that for this flight, no matter what else occurred, he would
always be remembered'.14 However, there was a dual response in China to the President’s
upcoming visit, with newspapers ‘emphasising the difference between the "friendly"
American people, and the "unfriendly" American Government'15, but it seemed that
ultimately 'the Chinese are prepared to accept Nixon as a reformed American reconciled to
realism, a pragmatist, which of course he is'.16
Attention was also drawn to the secrecy of the details of the trip, which was used ‘to
keep the Russians wondering so as to heighten their interest in further accommodations
elsewhere'.17 Moscow responded by moving to ‘mend their fences with Yugoslavia and, less
11
Nixon To Visit China Before Next May: Accepts Chou's Invitation, Hopes to Normalize Ties, July
16 1971, Los Angeles Times, Page 1
12
President Nixon and China, Feb 16 1972, New York Times, Page 39
13
President Nixon and China, Feb 16 1972, New York Times, Page 39
14
Historic Visit by an Unlikely Guest: Nixon to China, Feb 20 1972, New York Times, Page E1
15
Nixon's Trip to China - What Can We Expect?, Feb 20 1972, Boston Globe, Page F4
16
Nixon's Trip to China - What Can We Expect?, Feb 20 1972, Boston Globe, Page F4
17
Historic Visit by an Unlikely Guest: Nixon to China, Feb 20 1972, New York Times, Page E1
5
so, with Rumania in their effort to isolate Peking' in order to 'show Washington that whatever
the rhetoric, there are still really only two centres of decision that count'.18
During Nixon’s week-long stay in China, what pervaded in news reports was an atmosphere
of optimistic uncertainty as the talks between the leaders were kept unofficial; Max Frankel,
who won the Pulitzer Prize for international reporting for his coverage of the event, stated
that ‘much of the visit can be judged only by its visual and public aspects'19. Uncertainty was
also present amongst the U.S. - Chinese parties, and Nixon explained how 'Because of a lack
of communications, we are a mystery to them as they are a mystery to us’20.
However it was very clear that 'The trip is a psychological tie that burns away much
of the past animosity in Sino-American relations'21. It represented 'A step towards loosening
the ties of China with North Vietnam, and the United States with Taiwan' and was 'A
powerful impetus to a negotiated reconciliation between Taiwan and the Mainland'22.
The advances in media technology and distribution, particularly the
commercialisation of the television, allowed 'for the story of this historic visit to be read, seen
and heard by more people all over the world than on any previous occasion in history'23. This
was connected again to the upcoming Presidential elections, in which 'President Nixon
caught the attention of the American public with his televised Oriental tableau.'24, but more
importantly contributed towards ‘fuller and freer information about China...everywhere in the
Western World; the effective end of China's near-total isolation'25
The only concrete legacy of Nixon’s trip to China, ‘already richly adorned by
18
Soviet Acts to Counter Nixon's Trip to China, Feb 15 1972, New York Times, Page 4
New Page No Matter What Else Happens: Nixon in China, Feb 27 1972, Page E1
20
Reporter's Notebook: Now, the New China Hands, Feb 21 1972, New York Times, Page 12
21
Nixon and China: a great leap forward, Feb 27 1972, The Sun, Page K1
22
Some Results of Nixon Trip to China Already Realized, Feb 27 1972, The Hartford Courant, Page
31A
23
New Page No Matter What Else Happens: Nixon in China, Feb 27 1972, Page E1
24
Nixon and China: a great leap forward, Feb 27 1972, The Sun, Page K1
25
Some Results of Nixon Trip to China Already Realized, Feb 27 1972, The Hartford Courant, Page
31A
19
6
interpretation, is an artful Nixon-Chou communiqué pledging coexistence'26. Newspapers
commented extensively on the rhetoric of the Shanghai Communiqué in the weeks following
the trip, noting the purposeful ambiguity of how 'The most delicate passages deal with
Taiwan in a way that allows each side to claim concessions by the other.'27 The extent of the
concessions made on both parts was also brought into sharp focus, with Nixon pledging as
‘his "ultimate objective" the withdrawal of all American forces and military installations
from Taiwan'28 and the U.S. officials ‘impressed that the Chinese would sign any statement
of common principles while American soldiers remained in Taiwan and while American
planes were bombing North Vietnam'29. Max Frankel concluded from this flexibility in
negotiations that 'The President now knows that we have all been paranoid about the Chinese
- they care much more for their principles and their dignity than for conquest'30.
On the surface, the world media reacted rather mildly to the Shanghai Communiqué,
with the Japanese Foreign Minister stating it was "nothing more than I had expected" and the
official Soviet agencies having ‘no comment’31. However the Soviet Union accused China of
'entering a dangerous plot with the ruling circles of the U.S.A.'32 and Taiwan predictably
stated that ‘Chiang Kai-shek's government cannot forgive him (Nixon) for negotiating with
Communist China'33. Overall however, 'The communiqué reaffirmed the Nixon Doctrine
aimed at easing tensions and reducing American commitments in Asia'34, and as a newspaper
rightly pointed out, the 'full results of President Nixon's trip to China may not be known for
26
Assorted Thoughts On China Trip: Facts and Fancies, March 8 1972, The Times India, Page 8
27
Assorted Thoughts On China Trip: Facts and Fancies, March 8 1972, The Times India, Page 8
Whole China Communiqué Was Intensely Negotiated, March 2 1972, New York Times, Page 1
29
Whole China Communiqué Was Intensely Negotiated, March 2 1972, New York Times, Page 1
30
Assorted Thoughts On China Trip: Facts and Fancies, March 8 1972, The Times India, Page 8
31
World Reacting Calmly to Nixon-China Report, Feb 28 1972, The Hartford Courant, Page
32
Russ Score Nixon China Trip, Accuse U.S - Peking of Plotting, March 1 1972, Los Angeles Times,
Page A1
33
Call Nixon's China Talks a Sellout, March 1 1972, Chicago Tribune, Page B1
34
World Reacting Calmly to Nixon-China Report, Feb 28 1972, The Hartford Courant, Page 2
28
7
years'35.
Part Two: What the Original Documents reveal on the event
The original documentation of President Nixon’s trip to China from the Foreign
Relations of the United States (FRUS) and the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA)
grants access to the classified communications between Nixon and his officials, as well as the
conversations between the U.S. and Chinese camps during the week of the President’s visit.
This provides insight into the unofficial rhetoric used by both parties during the event, which
differs in many regards from what the media was able to report from the public statements
issued.
Before Nixon’s departure for China the 21st of February 1972, his exchanges with
National Security Advisor Kissinger reveal the general approach that the U.S. camp would
take in its discussions with the Chinese. Kissinger advised to be ‘firm with them.’ since he
believed that ‘they will only respect strength and resoluteness.’36 This anticipates the
importance of the appearance of credibility during the subsequent negotiations, which
Kissinger emphasised when he said that 'The reason we had to be so tough in India–Pakistan,
for example, is to prove to them that we could be relevant in Asia. On the one hand, they
want us out of Asia as a threat. On the other, they need us close enough so that they know we
can do something'37. This last part also highlights the importance of establishing a
relationship based on mutual interest with China. Nixon and Kissinger also discussed the
35
Some Results of Nixon Trip to China Already Realized, Feb 27 1972, The Hartford Courant, Page
31A
36
Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to
President Nixon, February 19 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 193
37
Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, February 14
1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 190
8
pragmatic benefits of the voyage for the U.S. both domestically through the ‘tremendous
coup in public opinion, which is an important weapon in this war.'38; and internationally
through the ability to ‘use it (China) as a counterweight to Russia.'39
However Nixon and Kissinger also showed an acute awareness of the controversial
nature of the trip when the President told Mao that ‘we know you and the Prime Minister
have taken great risks in inviting us here. For us also it was a difficult decision’40. With such
controversy would come the ‘danger that some people can interpret it as a tacit Sino-U.S.
alliance'41. The U.S. camp seemed to have little faith regarding the ability to tackle the
problem of Taiwan, which Kissinger expressed when he said that 'to get a Chinese
commitment that they will not use force in the settlement of the dispute… is almost
inconceivable'42. Combined with the fact that ‘they (the Chinese) will need to show some
immediate results for their domestic audience’43 there seemed to be little optimism in the
U.S. government as to the concrete results of the trip. Kissinger also pointed out that should
the basis for a genuine relationship with China fail to be established, ‘they could turn sharply
away from us in subsequent months'44 which would undoubtedly represent a major threat to
the U.S. national security.
Thus the U.S. took measures to promote trust between the two countries prior to
38
Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, February 14
1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 190
39
Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, February 14
1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 190
40
Memorandum of Conversation, February 21 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
194
41
Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, February 14
1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 190
42
Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, February 14
1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 190
43
Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to
President Nixon, February 19 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 193
44
Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to
President Nixon, February 19 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 193
9
Nixon’s departure through a statement that ‘the U.S. side has voluntarily undertaken to keep
the People's Republic of China informed of significant events that could affect…China’45.
Once in China, Nixon emphasised this tenuous trust with pacifist rhetoric, stating that
‘neither China nor the United States…want to dominate the world. Because our attitudes are
the same on these two issues, we don't threaten each others' territories’46, which also exposes
the undercurrents present between the two sides. To further dissipate this underlying tension,
Nixon gave ‘assurances that the U.S. would oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to
engage in an aggressive action against China’47. Nixon explained the possibility for a U.S.Chinese relationship in terms of the new world order, claiming that ‘What brings us together
is a recognition of a new situation in the world and a recognition on our part that what is
important is not a nation's internal political philosophy.’48 Both sides thus pragmatically
agreed that ‘with the new balance of power in the world, there is no reason for the People's
Republic of China and the U.S.A to be enemies, and there are many reasons why (they)
should work together for a peaceful Pacific and a peaceful world’49. There was thus no
illusions on either side as to the purely mutualistic nature of their relationship, expressed by
Nixon when he stated that ‘We are not talking in terms of being philanthropic—it is in our
own self-interest… that China be a strong independent country’50. However this cold
pragmatism was grounded in a genuine willingness for cooperation, with the Chinese Foreign
Minister agreeing that ‘the matter of trade between our two countries would be helpful to the
45
Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of
China, February 16 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 191
46
Memorandum of Conversation, February 21 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
194
47
Memorandum of Conversation, February 23 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
197
48
Memorandum of Conversation, February 21 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
194
49
Memorandum of Conversation, February 21 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
195
50
Memorandum of Conversation, February 23 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
197
10
promotion of the normalization of relations between our two countries’51. Willingness to
collaborate in other fields such as science were also expressed by both parties, because
according to Nixon research ‘should not be for one country but for all the countries of the
world.’52
The flipside to this promising rhetoric, but also possibly the biggest success of the trip
was a clear awareness on both the U.S. and the Chinese sides of the limitations of their
tentative relationship. Nixon best expressed this fact when he openly stated that ‘you can't
build a bridge covering 16,000 miles over 22 years in one week’53. But the constraints on the
Sino-American relationship seemed to stem mainly from the conflict of interests that arose
from the U.S. involvement in the Asia, and Premier Zhou declared himself ‘extremely sad
that North Vietnam has been bombed in the period just before and during your visit here.’54
He cast a shadow on the future of the countries’ relationship when he said that ‘if the war in
Vietnam …does not stop …it will be impossible to relax tensions in the Far East. And we
will be forced to continue aid to their just struggles’55. The issue of Taiwan was also seen as
‘the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United
States’56, but on this front the countries were able to work out a suitable compromise through
51
Memorandum of Conversation, February 26 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
201
52
Memorandum of Conversation, February 23 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
197
53
Memorandum of Conversation, February 26 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
201
54
Memorandum of Conversation, February 28 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
204
55
Memorandum of Conversation, February 28 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
204
56
Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People's Republic of China, February
27 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 203
11
a U.S. acknowledgement ‘that…there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China,’57
and a Chinese promise to not use force in the resolution of the conflict. However, shortly
after the trip there were rumours of a secret ‘agreement between Peking and Taipei that
Taiwan will come under Communist China control after the death of Chiang Kai-shek'58. The
impact of the Nixon trip on the triangular balance of powers with the Soviet Union was also a
subject of tension, and the President had to clarify that ‘it was not in the interest of the United
States to have war between the Soviet Union and China’59, which he explained by the fact
that Russia had previously ‘welcomed an antagonistic relationship between the United States
and the People's Republic of China’60.
Overall the rhetoric emerging from the week of negotiations was one of genuine
cooperation and goodwill, and Nixon declared that ‘as we issue our statement at the end it
will reflect honestly what the talks were, rather than the usual kind of communiqué in which
you have diplomatic double-talk to cover up what may be serious differences of opinion’61. A
much needed secret channel of communication was established, and ‘the two sides agreed
that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the
principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression
against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and
57
Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People's Republic of China, February
27 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 203
58
André Malraux's Comments about China, March 1 1972, DNSA, KA07548
Memorandum of Conversation, February 23 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
197
59
60
Memorandum of Conversation, February 25 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
200
61
Memorandum of Conversation, February 26 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc
201
12
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence’62, which reflected a predominant desire for a
peaceful world order over state ideology in the new Sino-American relation.
Part Three: Comparison of the accounts given in Parts One & Two
The perceptions of Nixon’s trip to China in 1972 presented by the newspaper coverage and
the original documents predictably contrast on many accounts due to the difference in
emphasis of the two medium. While the original documents focus primarily on the
complexities of forging a sustainable Sino-American relation, the newspapers centred on how
this relationship would shape the international order and what its response would be.
However, the discrepancy between the two accounts is ultimately quite small, suggesting a
high level of transparency in the Chinese-American negotiations.
One of the points on which the two accounts diverge most strongly is the degree of optimism
regarding Nixon’s visit to China. Newspapers at the time seemed to believe that the very
nature of the trip would ‘thaw out’ relations between the two states. The original documents
show that Nixon and Kissinger were much more weary as to their expectations for the trip,
62
Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People's Republic of China, February
27 1972, FRUS, China 1969-1972, Volume XVII, Doc 203
13
with Kissinger remarking that a failure to establish a strong relationship could lead to a
further distancing between the U.S.A and China, which would potentially be a major setback
to American interests. While both accounts recognised the need for a consensus to be reached
regarding Taiwan, newspapers simply remarked that Nixon would have to compromise on the
matter whereas the President and his National Security Advisor expressed doubts (which
would later be proved unfounded) that the Chinese would make concessions. The
newspaper’s optimistic stance reflects the public’s hopeful expectations for the trip, whereas
the White House’s scepticism stems from the 22 years of U.S. non-diplomacy with China.
However both the newspapers and the original documents reveal an understanding of the
huge potential benefits to U.S. interests that the trip entailed, particularly regarding the
containment of Russia in the triangular balance of powers between the U.S.A, China and the
Soviet Union.
It is also interesting to note that major newspapers unanimously gave Nixon the benefit of the
doubt regarding the context of the upcoming Presidential elections, whereas Nixon himself
fully expressed the domestic as well as international benefits of the voyage.
Both the newspapers and the original documents implicitly agreed that the trip would
effectively end China’s isolation from the rest of the world, although they disagreed on how
these barriers would be dissolved. Newspapers attributed this phenomenon to the advances in
media, particularly the role of television, which made the historical visit accessible to the
entire world; whereas the conversations between Chinese and American officials focused on
China’s reintegration through cooperation in trade, science and culture. These different
perspectives originate from the differences in the nature of the media, with the newspapers
focusing on the role of the public while the original documents concentrate on politics.
Another important difference between the two media is their depiction of the basis for the
Sino-American relationship. Newspapers explained it mainly in terms of a ‘psychological tie’
14
that was intrinsic to Nixon’s symbolic presence in China, whereas the original documents
offer a much more in depth understanding of the relationship focused on mutual interests in
the context of a need for the readjustment of the balance of powers.
The original documents also reveal a much greater emphasis on the limitations, as well as the
possibilities, of this new relationship. Newspapers were particularly oblivious to the tense
rhetoric used by the Chinese regarding the U.S. involvement in Asia, and the risk it posed to
the Sino-American relation in the original documents. Instead they focused on accounts of
U.S. officials ‘impressed’ at the Chinese concessions despite the American policy in the
Pacific. This is partly due to the fact that reporters at the time did not have access to the full
accounts of the discussions between American and Chinese officials, but can also be
explained by the West’s hope for a breakthrough in diplomacy between the two states, and
the newspapers’ according response to these expectations.
Newspapers, however, took a more sceptical approach to the Shanghai Communiqué than
was perhaps hoped for from what the original documents suggest. The latter implied that the
Communiqué was meant to represent a balanced but genuine view of the discussions between
the two states, but newspapers almost unanimously picked up on the ambiguity of the
language, especially regarding Taiwan. This is once again symptomatic of the nature of the
media that is written for the general public and will tend to idealise expectations while
doubting concrete documentation.
Thus overall, the newspaper coverage and original documentation on Nixon’s trip to China
both share many similarities regarding their analysis of the consequences of the event. Both
established the vital importance of the relationship with China to U.S. interests and a
generally more stable world order. Where the two media mainly differ is in their
characterisation of the subtleties of the Sino-American relations, which the newspapers were
15
not able to adequately portray on account of their restricted access to the content of the
discussions that occurred.
16