ACTA
UNI VERSITATIS
F O L IA H IS T O R IC A
LODZIENSIS
3 0 , 1987
D a vid G. LaFrance
GERMANY, REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM ,
A N D THE DOWNFALL OF PRESIDENT FRANCISCO I. MADERO:
THE CO VAD O N G A KILLINGS'
During the night of 12— 13 July 1911 in the c ity of Puebla, the
capital of the state of Puebla, M exico, a bloody clash b etw een e x -d i­
ctator Porfirio D iaz1 federal forces and Francisco I. M adero's revolu tio­
nary troops resulted in the deaths of sev era l d ozens of insurgents and
their fam ilies. M any of the M aderistas w ere m achine-gunned in the
city bull ring as they w aited to g reet M adero w ho w as scheduled to
v isit the city the follow in g day. In the w ak e of the infamous battle
that lasted until dawn, out-gunned revolu tion aries fled to safety in
the surrounding countryside. On group, led by the M ethodist-m inister-turned-rebel, E enigno Zenteno, passed by the C ovadonga, textile fa c­
tory located to the north of the city near the T laxcala state line. The
Spanish m anagers of the plant, fearing an attack, fired on the fleeing
M aderistas. The factory's defenders, outnum bered and left w ithout g o ­
vernm ent help bacause of a dispute b etw een the governor and the
federal zone com mander in Puebla, w ere soon overw helm ed by the
insurgents w ho w ere joined by the local citizen ry including many of
the m ill’s workers. In the tw o-day sacking that follow ed, a Spaniard
and four Germans (three m ale technicians and one of their spouses)
em ployed by the factory w ere murdered1.
*
An
re n c e
on
w o u ld
lik e
s ta n c e
in
1
to
von
v e rs io n
A m e ric a n
th a n k
tra n s la tin g
A rc h iv
M in is try
b a ld
e a rlie r
L a tin
des
A rc h iv e ),
Beth mann
of
T hom as
th e
th is
S tu d ie s ,
W.
w o rk
P a rk
w as
C ity ,
B a r łe n b a c h
re d d
at
U ta h ,
14
and
W a lte r
M ountain C on fe­
1983. T h e author
R e d m o n d for t h e i r a s s i ­
th e
R ocky
April
G e rm a n .
A u s w ä rtig e n
W haddon
H a ll,
H o llw e g ,
A m te s ,
E n g la n d ,
19 J u ly
1 8 6 7 — 19 2 0 ,
M ic ro film ,
1911, r o l l
14:
L a te in a m e rik a
Paul
doc.
von
504
(G e rm a n
H in tze
(h e re a fte r
to
Foreign
T heo­
c ite d
as
A utón o m a d e M e x i c o , M e x i c o C i t y , Eduardo R e y e s lo A g u s tin d e l Pozo, 15 J u ly 1911, caja
2 8 : e x p e d i e n t e 15 d o c . 3 1 7 ( h e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s A G M ) ; A G M , Raiael C a ń e t e to Fran­
c isco León d e la Barra, 15 J u ly 1911, 17: 10: 4 9 6 ; A r c h i v o d o F r a n c i s c o I. M a d e r o ,
A A A ); A r c h iv o
P a rtic u la r d e
G ild a rd o
M a g a n a , A rc h iv o
H is tó ric o , U n iv e rs id a d
The death of foreigners in M exico during the revolu tion w as not
an unusual occurrence g iv en the v io len ce of the period and the n atio­
nalistic tone of the upheaval. A lthough foreign governm en ts gen erally
v ig o ro u sly protested such incidents, seldom w ere they able to do an y­
thing con crete to force M exico to capture the perpetrators or to re­
com pense the fam ilies of victim s of any g iv en incident. G iven the
chaotic situation and the M exican governm ent's lack of m oney, other
countries u su ally added the n ew est statistic to their grow in g lists and
looked forward to the day w h en an overall settlem ent, u sually in the
form of a claim s com m ission, could be w orked out w ith M exico C ity2.
Ramo do P résid en tes, A rch ivo G onera! de la N ación , M exico C ity, C a n e t e to E m i l i o
V a z q u e z G ô m e z , 15 J u l y 1911, caja 17: no carpeta number: no folio num ber (he­
reafter cited as A G N /A FM ); A rch ivo do F rancisco V äzq u ez G óm ez, Southern Illin ois
U n iversity, C arbondale, H i l a r i o G . M a r q u e z Io F. V a z q u e z G ó m e z , 18 J u l y 1911,
b o x 14: folder 7: doc. 1521 (hereafter cited as AFVG); A rch ivo H istórico de la
S ccrełaria de R elacion es E xteriores, M exico C ity, M. C a s t e la z o F. — r e p o r t e , 4 Se p t .
1911, o xp ed ien te 242.5(43: 72) leg a jo 12—0 — 20 (hereafter cited as SRE); SRE, C a r ïe t e
to S e c . d e R e l a c i o n e s E x t e r io r e s , 15 J u l y 1911, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 20; SRE, J u a n
d e V e l a s c o to V i c e c ô n s u l a l e m à n e n P u e b l a , 19 J u l y 1911, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 20;
E. C. y T o r r e s , D i c c i o n a r i o b i o g r à l i c o d e P u e b la , vol. 1— 2, P uebla 1973, Pue.:
C e n t r o d e E s t u d io s H i s t ó r i c o s d e P u e b l a , p. 716— 717; M. A. P e r a 1, L o s q u e lu e r o n a la r e v o l u c i o n , M exico C ity 1976, (PAC), p. 144; D. G. L a F r a n с e, A p e o p l e
b e t r a y e d : F r a n c i s c o I. M a d e r o a n d th e M e x i c a n r e v o l u t i o n i n P u e b la , Ph. D. d isser­
tation, Indiana U n iversity-B loom m gton 1984, p. 166— 168. C ovad on ga w a s founded
in 1898 by the Spanish ind ustrialist and hacondado, José D iaz Rubin. In 1906 it
w as ta k e n o ver by his son s, A n g el, León, Enrique, and Francisco w ho w ere the
o w n ers at the tim e ol the m assacre; se e R. E. U r r o z N u e v a s m a q u i n a s , m e n o s
h o m b r e s : L a m o d e l n i z a c i ó n d e u n a e m p r e s a t e x til e n P u e b l a : L a C o v a d o n g a , Puebla
1984, p. 7— 10, un pu blished ms. C ovad on ga had been the site of severaf v io ­
len t en countors sin ce the beginn in g ot the rev o lu tio n in N ovem b er 1910 in clu d in g
the sack in g and burning of parts oi the factory o n tw o earlier o c ca sio n s. Reports
ind icate C ovad onga w ork ers had poor r elation s w ith their Spanish b o sses and that r e ­
vo lu tio n a ry bands found the m ill hands e a sy recruits; se e C o le cc ió n porfiro Diaz, Universid ad do las A m ericas, C holula, P uebla, M icrofilm , J u a n d e la F u e n t e P a r r e s
to P. D ia z , 12 D e c . 1910, rollo 367: doc. 6180; A rch ivo de la R ev o lu cio n M exican a,
C om pilado por el Patronato de la H istoria de Sonora, Instituto N acion al de A n tro­
p ologia e H istoria, M exico C ity, M icrofilm , R e l a t o - s u c e s o d e la C o v a d o n g a , 3 A u g .
1911, rollo 35: vol. 60: p. 227; R ecords of the Foreign S erv ice P osts of the D e­
partm ent of State, Record Group 84, C orresp ond en ce w ith C onsular A g e n c ies, A m e­
rican C on su late G eneral, M exico C ity, N ation al A rch ives, W ash in gton , D. C. W i l ­
li a m S. C h a m b e r s to A r n o l d S h a n k l i n , 8 M ay 1911, vol. 1911; „M exican H erald"
5 XII 1910,- „El Pais" 8 II 1911.
2
Spaniards in P uebla as w e ll as other parts of M exico and A m ericans' su ffe­
red much m ore lo ss of life and property dam age than did ahe G erm ans buł w ere not
n early as a g g r essiv e as the G erm ans in pursuing M exico for com pensation. Both
cou n tries loft their g riev a n ces to be se ttled by claim s com m ission s in later years.
As ol A u gu st 1982, Spain's claim s had still not been se ttled e v id e n tly b ecau se of
the break in diplom atic relation s w ith M exiico from 1939 to 1977.
The aftermath of the C ovadonga killings, how ever, did not follow
this general pattern. The German governm en t refused to file aw ay for
future negotiation the deaths of its four citizens, and Berlin's minister
M exico City, Admiral Paul von Hintze, c e a se le ssly pursued the M exi­
can authorities from July 1911 to early 1913 in an attem pt to gain
a satisfactory con clu sion to the problem. The German pressure placed
the Francisco León de la Barra and then the M adero governm en t in
a dilemma with grave con seq u en ces for the latter adm inistration. On
the one hand, the M exican governm ent could not ignore the German
en treaties g iv en M exico City's desire to maintain satisfactory relations
w ith Berlin. This p olicy w es deem ed n ecessary as a m eans to create
som e independence in its international politics by p layin g Germ any
off against Britain, France, and the U nited States w ho w ere already
ill-disposed toward M adero and his revolution and too clo se to the
cientificos
to be of help3. N ot w anting to antagonize the Germans
León de la Barra and then M adero made the p olitically unpalatable
d ecision to prosecute the rebel perpetrators as Berlin demanded. On
the other hand, capturing and punishing the culprits proved nearly
im possible as neither president w as able to gain the full cooperation
of state and local authorities in order to carry out the task. The p resi­
dent’s lack of effectiv e control over officials in Puebla and T laxcala
was exacerbated by the populace's n egative reaction to their efforts
to punish popular revolutionary leaders-m en w ho had made M adero's
rise to pow er possible, and w ho had, at least in the public's mind, on ­
ly justifiably defended th em selves against counterrevolutionaries as
w ell as foreigners. The regim e's n early futile efforts to control its fol­
low ers con vinced the Germans and other outsiders of its w eak n ess
internally. A t the sam e time, steps to catch and prosecute the gu ilty
alienated k ey elem en ts w ithin M adero's revolutionary coalition w ho
felt that he w as capitulating to the dem ands of a foreign power. To
m ake m atters w orse, m any p eop le suspected the governm ent of using
Covadonga to p ersecu te dissenting revolutionary officers rather than
the truly culpable. U nable to extricate him self from this double-edged
political dilemma, M adero lost valuab le support both internationally
and dom estically. In the en d C ovadonga greatly contributed to his
dow nfall as his d isillusioned adherents (as w e ll as exp ed ien t co n ser­
s F. K a t z , D eutschland, Diaz un die m e x ik a n is c h e R e v o l u t i o n : Die d e u tsc h e
Politik in M e x ik o , 1870 1020, Berlin 1964, Vob D eu tsch er V e rla g der W issen sch a ften ,
p. 207; F. К d t z, The secret w a r in M exico: Europe, the U n ite d S ta tes and the
M e x ic a n re v o lu tio n , C h icago 1981, U n iv ersity of C h icago, p. 88. The c ie n tific o s w ere
a cliq u e of D iaz supporters and advisoTs in clu d in g form er cabinet m inisters w ho
ad v o ca ted a p o sitiv ist econ om ic and social p h ilo so p h y and w h o still w ie ld ed a great
deal oi in flu en ce and pow er.
v a tiv e opponents taking advantage of the situation) took up arms
against him, and the German governm ent cooperated dith other foreign
nations in pushing for the coup d'état of V ictoriano Huerta and F élix
Diaz that ousted M adero from power.
THE LEON DE LA BARRA GOVERNM ENT
The killings, occurring on the day of M adero’s scheduled v isit to
Puebla in celebration of his recen t victory over Diaz, w ere roundly
condem ned by the M aderista leadership. M ill ow ners, too, joined in
the protest by shutting dow n their factories and threatening to put
their thousands of em p lo y ees perm anently out of w ork if social peace
w ere not restored. The German m inister journeyed to Puebla w here
he m et with both G overnor Rafael C ańete and M adero to press his
governm ent's claim s for com pensation and the caputre of the killers,
in response, M adero's brother, Raul, and another important M aderista,
Eduardo Hay, w ere instructed to in vestigate the matter w h ile authori­
ties arrested Zenteno and several other insurgent officers for having
initiated the attack. M adero prom ised the factories s e c u r it y ordered
the rebels around Puebla C ity to withdraw to the nearby tow ns of
A tlixco and Cholula, and sent one thousand additional troops to Pue­
bla to help en su re peace. León de la Barra, at H intze's behest, provi­
ded a special m ilitary guard to accom pany the German survivors of
C ovadonga to the port of Veracruz w here they em barked for hom e4.
The German m inister w as not satisfied to let the M exican legal s y s­
tem run its course, h ow ever, and he therefore constantly applied p res­
sure on the León de la Barra governm en t to so lv e the case quickly.
Covadonga was H intze's first real test since taking up his post in M e­
xico City only two months earlier, and he doubtless felt the need to
prove him self for several reasons. Hintze, a career naval officer, had
*
G ó m e z , 15 J u l y 1911, 14: 5: 1441; AGM,
17: 10: 489; Indice dcl A rch ivo H istórico do la Secrçtarfa dc Id D efensd N acion d l, Serie XL/481.5, C om pilddo por Luis
Muro, El Co leg i о de
M ex ico , M exico C ity, L u i s V a l l e to S e c . d e G u e r r a , 15 J u l y
1911, caja A-2 (hereafter cited ag ILM); F oreign O ffice, G eneral C orresp ond en co-P olitical-M exico, Series 371, Public Record O ffice, London, M icrofilm , T h o m a s B e a u ­
m o n t H o h l e r to E d w a r d G rey Bart, 27 J u l y 1911, file 1150: doc. 26 (hereafter cited
as GBFO); SRE, H i n t z e to B. C a r b a j a l у R o s a s , 24 J u l y , 21 A u g . 1911, 242.5(43: 72):
12— 9 —20; P u e n t e s p a r a la h i s t o r ia d e la r e v o l u c i ô n m e x ic a n a , ed. M. R a m i r e z ,
vo ls 5, M exico C ity 1954— 1957, Fondo de Cultura E conóm ica, vol. 4, p. 250__251;
„M exican H erald'' 16, 17 VII 1911; „ D ian o del H ogar” 29 VIII, 10, 21 IX 1911;
„Im parcial" 16, 17 VII 1911.
M a d ero
AFVG ,
to
León
J.
de
1.
la
M o re no
B a r ra ,
to
13
F.
J u ly
Vazquez
1911,
only been part of the German diplom atic corps sin ce 1908 when, w hile
servin g as the K aiser's aide-decamip, he w as nam ed the German em ­
peror's personal represen tative to the court of Czar N ich olas II of
Russia. His lack of time in the foreign serv ice also m eant that he had
a lim ited base of institutional support w ithin the Berlin bureaucracy.
Kard Btinz, his pred ecessor, had left M exico City in N ovem ber 1910,
leavin g the m inistry in the hands of subordinates during the critical
ea rly m onths of the M exican revolution. The kaiser's nam ing H intze
admiral and appointing him to M exico dem onstrated both the German
leader s confidence in H intze as w ell as Berlin's concern w ith e v e n ts
in M exico. Finally, the German press added to the pressure on H intze
by calling on the governm en t to protect German citizen s in M exico
and to see that those responsible for C ovadonga w ere prosecuted.
C onsequently, the forty-seven -year-old bachelor, whom his diplom a­
tic co llea g u es described as straightforward and strong, y et cautious
and shrewd, faced the greatest ch allen ge of his young diplom atic car­
eer®.
C ovadonga also threatened German p olicy toward M adero’s M exi­
co. Berlin, b elievin g that on ly the dynam ic m iddle and upper cla sses
could govern, favored M adero since h e cam e from one of M exico's
w ealth iest entrepreneurial fam ilies. It w as thought that by making
a few minor changes in the political system M adero woulfi p rove to
be better able to govern than e v e n Diaz him self. In return for b ac­
king Madero, Berlin hoped to benefit financially by increasing its e c o ­
nomic ties with M exico6. Suddenly, h ow ever, C ovadonga stood in the
w ay such an arrangem ent. Therefore, H intze im m ediately and force­
fu lly dem anded that the León de la Barra governm ent clear up the
m attei. He e v e n offered to pay an award to an yon e w ho provided
information leading to the capture of the culprits saying sarcastically
,,I h ave been assured that for m oney e v e n the assassins' relatives
.would be capable of turning them in"7.
» GBFO, Francis Slron ge to G r e y Bari, 10 A p r 1912, 1397: 68- GBFO H o h l e r
to G r e y Bart, 26 M a y 1911, 1 1 4 9 : 5 2 5 , SR E Francisc o A. d e Ic a z a to Sec', d e R e ­
laciones E x ïeü o re s, 26 Jan. 1911, no e x p e d ien te number: 11— 14— 1 63; S R E E R h o m berg to León de la Barra, IS Apr. 1911, 111/323(43: 7 2 )1 : 4 2 — 1 6 - 1 3 2 ; S R E , Ic a z a to
Carbaial, 21 Ju ly 1911, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 1 2 - 9 - 2 0 , K a t z ,
T h e secret..., p. 7 5 - 7 6 P.
C a l v e r t , T he M e xica n re v o lu tio n , 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 1 4 : The d i p lo m a c y o l A n g l o - A m eric an conflict, Cam bridge 1968, C am bridge U n iversity, p . 1 20__ 12 1 ; P E H a ley,
R e vo lu tio n a n d in ter ve n tio n : T he d i p lo m a c y ol Tail a n d W i l s o n w i th M e x i c o ,
1910— 1917, C am bridge 19 7 0 , M . I. T ., p. 1 2 5 ; „ E l M u n d o " 31 I I I 1914.
6 K a t z Deutschland, p. 2 0 7 , i d e m , The secret..., p. 74 , 88.
7 S R E , H in tze to Carbajal, 24 J u ly 1911, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12__ 9— 20.
In response to H intze's h ea v y pressure and the desire to conclude
w ith the potentially dam aging incident, León de la Barra took several
steps to aid and speed up the investigation in Puebla. T hese m easures
included setting up a special telegraph line b etw een M exico City and
Puebla, and sending p olice agents, a ju d ge/investigator, and a pro­
secutor to assist G overnor C an ete8. The interim president e v e n prom i­
sed H intze the ca se would be cleared up within tw o w eek s and that
ten to fifteen su spects w ould be ex ecu ted for the crim e ,,w hether g u il­
ty or n ot”9.
León de la Barra's actions and attitude helped to substantiate char­
g es that those insurgent officers arrested in the days follow ing the
crim e w ere not responsible but in fact scap egoats whom the Maderista leadership w anted rem oved becau se of their active opposition to
the new governm ent due to th e slow progress of revolutionary change.
G overnor C anete helped confirm the accusations w hen he told the
president as w ell as the secretary of exterior relations that the a ssa i­
lants, made up m ainly of people livin g near the factory, could not be
identified becau se of their large number and the fact that the factory's
su rvivors k n ew none of them. To the secretary of g o b e r n a c i ó n
(interior affairs) he op en ly declared that the k illings w ere not committed
by insurgent troops. Even H intze adm itted to Berlin that he doubted the
truly gu ilty would be found sin ce the Germans saw nothing, there
ex isted a ^ f a te of anarchy in the state, and governm ent officials ad­
m itted they w ere p ow erless to do anything. Also, Zenteno, one of the
arrested officers, w as released for lack of ev id en ce only to be rearres­
ted shortly thereafter, ev id en tly on M exico City's orders. Later, when
sev era l of the encarcerated officers w rote a letter to the M exico City
daily, D i a r i o d e l H o g a r , p rotesting their innocence and claim ing
governm ent collu sion against them, the judge, in order to silen ce them,
placed them in solitary con fin em ent10.
8
fre d o
AAA,
R o b le s
H in tze
to
D o m in g u e z ,
Bethmann
A rc h iv o
H o llw e g ,
G e n eral
de
24
la
J u ly
1911,
N a c ió n ,
14:
482,
M e x ic o
A rc h iv o
C ity ,
de
A l­
M ariano
X i c o y to R o bles D om ingu ez, 1 Aug. 1911, t o m o 2 : e x p e d i e n c e 8: f o l i o 9 0 ; A G M ,
L. H. G u ajardo to León d e la Barra, 28 J u ly 1911, 17: 10: 508,- A G M , León d e la
Barra to C a n e te , 24 Aug. 1911, 17: 10: 511,- S R E , León d e la Barra to C a n e te, 21,
22 J u ly 1911, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 72).- 1 2 - 9 — 20,- S R E , C a n e t e to León d e la Barra, 21 J u ly
1911, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9— 2 0 ; „ N u e v a E r a " 3 V I I I 1911.
“ A A A , H in tze to B eth m ann H o llw e g , 19 Ju ly 1911, 14: 5 0 4 ; A G N /A F M , H in tze
lo M a de ro , 12 N o v . 1912, 17: 4 1 7 — 1: — ; K a t z , Deutschland, p . 208.
10
A A A , H in tze to Bethmann H o llw e g , 19 J u ly 1911, 14: 5 0 4 , A G N / A F M , C a ­
n e t e to Emilio V a z q u e z G ó m e z, 15 J u ly 1911, 7 7 : — : — ; S R E , J e su s Flores
M agón t o Sec. d e Justicia, 27 Sept. 1911, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9 — 6 ; S R E , H in tze to
Carbajal, 24 J u ly 1911, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12 — 9 —-20; S R E , C a n e t e to Sec. d e Rela ciones
E xteriores, 15 J u ly 1911, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— -9— 2 0 ; S R E , C a n e t e to León de la Barrs,
By early A ugust, the special federal in vestigator, L. H. Guajardo,
had provided the Puebla judges, h e claim ed, w ith en ou gh information,
including nam es and other con crete evid en ce, to facilitate a rapid con ­
clusion to the case. N ev erth eless, the actual capture of the rem ainder
of the susipec ts and their prosecution ran into a w all of official and
unofficial opposition in Puebla and Tlaxcala. G iven the instability of
his governm ent and the threat of provoking m ore violen ce, G overnor
C anete w as v ery reluctant to p rosecute revolutionary officers (w hose
a lleg ed crim e had been to attack foreigners) w ithout having thoroughly
exam ined the incident and p roven beyond a doubt the culpability of
the suspects. S en sitive to outside intrusion in state affairs, he only
reluctantly accepted León de la Barra's aid and w h en pressured to
m odify the la w to a llo w sp ecial au xiliary judges to be nam ed to help
with the case, he m oved slo w ly to m ake the change. H e also refused
to allow in vestigators to en ter the C ovadonga factory w h ile a strike
w as taking p lace in A ugust and Septem ber. A lthough C anete k n ew the
w hereabouts of m any of those who had robbed the mill, h e refused to
m ove against them. Puebla judges, reluctant, too, to p rosecu te the case,
took the maximum tim e under the law and e v e n allow ed Z enteno's
defending law yer to m ake an appeal all the w ay to the state suprem e
court. In early N ovem ber, one of the principal attorneys quit the case,
further delaying the process. The underm anned Puebla p olice force
also show ed little enthusiasm in pursuing the culprits11.
1911. 242.5(43: 72): 12— Э— 20; F. V.
G ó m e z , M e m o r ia s p o liticos, 1909—
M exico C ity 1933, M undial, p. 347; „Diario del H ogar" 29 VIII, 10, 21 EX
1911, 23 IV 1912; „ N u eva Era" 3 VIII 1911. H in tze also to ld Berlin that he did
not respond to C arbajal's ad m ission of p o w er lessn e ss so that M exico cou ld not
later u se it as an e x c u se for not havin g done an yth in g about C ovad onga.
^ AGM , G u a j a r d o t o L e ó n d e la B a r r a , 28 J u l y 1911, 17: 10: 508, 4 A u g, 1911,
4: G— 3: 311; AGM , C a n e t e to L e ó n d e la B a r r a , 2 S e p t . 1911, 15: 5: 313, 19 Sept.
1911, 12: С —2: 330; AGM , H i n t z e to L e ó n d e la B a r r a , 17 S e p t . 1911, 3: H— 4:
560; A rch ivo del C on greso del Estado, Libros de los Expedienten, Puebla, Ern esto
S o l i s et al. to C a n e t e , 31 A u g . 1911, vol. 190: exp ed ien ce 9165; A rch iv o Judicial
del Estado de Puebla, Instituto N acion al de A n trop ologia e H istoria, C entro R e­
gional, P uebla, J o a q u i n Ib a n e z Jr., to T r i b u n a l S u p r e m o , 2 A ug . 1911, paq u ete 1911
(hereafter cited as AJE) INAH ); A JE/IN A H , J e s u s
Z.
М огело to J u e z lo
de
lo
C r im in a l,
3 Nov.
1 9 1 1 ; SRE, J. F l o r e s
M agón
to
Sec.
de
J u stic a ,
27
S e p t . 1911, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 6; SRE, H i n t z e to C a r b a j a l , 24 J u l y , 7, 13 Sept.
1911, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 20; SRE, C a r b a j a l to S e c . d e J u s t i c ia , 13 Sep t. 1913,
242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 20,- SRE, M a n u e l C a l e r o to S e c . d e R e l a c i o n e s E xterlo res, 26
S e p t . 1911, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9 — 20; C o r r e s p o n d e n t D iplom ätica H ispan o M exican a,
1826— 1917, El C olegio de M exico, M exico C ity, M icrofilm , J u a n S â n ch ez A z c o n a
to S e c . d e G o b e r n a c ió n , 2 6 J u l y 1911, rollo 45: caja 281: le g a jo 1: num éro 37;
„N u eva Era” 30 VIII 1911.
21
J u ly
— 1913,
Canete, hardly a radical or a cham pion of the left-w ing of the
M aterista m ovem ent, w as clearly acting in such a dilatory manner in
the face of pressure from H intze and León de la Втггга both out of
p olitical n ecessity and the fact that he could not control state a n i
local officials no less the gen eral public in his state. R esistance to
the prosecution of the C ovadonga attackers w as w idespread promp­
ting Canete, at H intze's behest, to double the guard at the city jail and
the penetentiary and to put the prisoners in solitary confinem ent r e ­
portedly in order to prevent an escap e attempt. Street dem onstrations
and delegations to M adero (who refused to interfere) protesting the
process took place. G overnm ent officials, the German consul in P u e­
bla, and potential w itn esses regularly received threats. A t least one
policem an in volved in the probe w a s killed. A uthorities in the n eigh ­
boring state of T laxcaia, a haven for many of the suspects, also refu­
sed to coop erate w ith the federal governm en t12.
Hintze, increasingly disturbed over the slow -m oving process and
w hat he saw as the M aderista leadership's h ollow prom ises, urged
that a state of sieg e be declared in Puebla, that suspects already held
be im m ediately tried collectiv ely , not one at a time, and that the fe ­
deral governm ent take direct responsibility for the investigation. After
considering the legal and political ram ifications of such action, León
de la Barra refused to take th ese step s13.
In retaliation, Berlin refused to form ally recognize the interim g o ­
vernm ent by not answ ering the notification of change in adm inistrations
follow in g Diaz' fall to M adero’s forces in late M ay 1911. León de la
Barra called the bluff by threatening to reveal publicly German non>* AGM , G u aja rdo to León de la Barra, 28 J u ly 1911, 17: 1: 94, 4 Aug. 1911,
G— 3: 311, 22 A ug. 1911, 4: G— 3: 419; AGM, H in tze lo León de la Barra, 17
Sep!. 1911, 3: H— 4: 560; SRE, H in tz e l o Calero, 7 N o v . 1911, 242.5(43: 72) 12— 9— 20;
SRE, C a ń e t e to Sec. d e R eiaciones E xterio res, 29 Sept., 15 N o v . 1911, 242.5(43: 72):
12— 9— 20; SRE, H in tze to Carbajal, 24 July, 13, 26 Sept. 1911, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9—
— 20; SRE, A n ó n im o to C laude V oigh t, n.d., 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 20; SRE, J. Flores
M a gón to Sec. d e Justicia, 27 Sept., 14 Ocl. 1911, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 6. A n other
reason tor the relu ctan ce of T laxcalan o fficials to coop erate w ith th e federal g o ­
vern m en t m ay h a v e been due to a d isp u te w ith P uebla o ver ju risd iction of the
m ill. Built in an area w h ere the lin e b e tw e en th e tw o sta tes w a s in q u estion ,
the federal govern m en t in 1899 aw arded the lan d to Puebla thexeby deprivin g
T laxcaia of im portant tax reven u es. The incident rem ained a sore point b e tw e en
the tw o states; se e A rch ivo G eneral de N otarias del Estado de P uebla, Puebla,
Protocolización..., 21 Jan. 1907, notaria Puebla 5: afio 1907: vol. 1: doc. 3 4 ; V. L. G.
О j e d a, Perlil d el e m p r e s a ria d o d o m in a n te en la indu strie t e x t i l de Puebla, 1906—
— 1929, M.S.S. th esis, U n iversidad A u tónom a de Puebla 1982, p. 33.
13
A A A , H in tz e lo Bethmann H o llw e g , 30 Aug. 1911, 14: 566, 14 Oct. 1911,
14: 598; AGVf, H in tze to León d e la Barra, 17 Sept. 1911, 3: H— 4: 560, GBFO, H ohler
t o G r e y Bart, 16 Oct. 1911, 1150: 125; K a t z , Deutschland, p. 208.
recognition w hich would have seriou sly jeopardized the D eutsch-Süda­
m erikanische Bank's p rivileged position in M exico. The bank had had
a c lo se relationship with the M adero fam ily even providing it with
m oney during the revolution against Diaz. In the autumn of 1911 it
planned a large investm ent in an industrial developm ent project along
with the M aderos in northeastern M exico and the creation of a m ortga­
g e bank in Brussels with Sw iss and B elgian partners. This latter v en tu ­
re w as designed to take advantage of the M exican governm ent's plan
to float bonds worth 100 m illion pesos for irrigation and other agricu l­
tural im provem ents. N ot w illin g to risk its econ om ic ob jectives in
M exico over C ovadonga, the German foreign office soon after took the
step to recognize León de la Barra's governm ent despite H intze's op po­
sitio n 14.
THE
M ADERO
GOVERNM ENT
U ltim ately, the responsibility for resolvin g the ca se fell on M adero,
who assum ed the presidency in early N ovem ber 1911, and on his n ew
governor in Puebla, N icolas M aléndez. M aléndez, M adero's favorite,
assum ed office in late D ecem ber follow ing a d iv isiv e election that
w eakened the regim e's hand in the state and co n seg u en tly its ability
to deal with C ovadonga. H intze warned the M adero governm ent of the
need to rem ove this „fatal” obstacle that threatened am icable relations
betw een the tw o countries. In turn the president made it im m ediately
clear to M aléndez that he w anted the matter g iv en first priority b e ­
cause the German pressure w as an em barrassm ent to M exico15.
In Puebla, how ever, the judicial process made little progress despite
the German consul's alm ost daily visits to M eléndez. Legal m an eu ve­
ring involvin g the right of defendents t0 reject judges, the right of
prosecutors to operate in courts other than the on e to w h ich they w ere
assigned, whether the su spects should be tried together or separately,
the right of defending law yers to see prisoners in solitary confinem ent,
and the length of time each of the accused should h ave to prepare his
d efense all prolonged the case. M eléndez cau tiou sly attem pted to speed
14 A A A , León de la Barra to K aise r W ilh e lm II, 25 M a y 1911, 14: 58 8 - A A A
Rhom berg to Beth mann H o llw e g , 12 Apr. 1911, 14: 3 1 8 , A A A , H m t z e to Bethmann
Hollw pg, 22 J u ly 1911, 14: 5 1 4 , 16 Sept. 1911, 14: 55 5 , 14 Oct. 1911, 14: 508,- 15 Oct.
1911, 14: 5 9 1 , A A A , A llr e d v o n K i d e r le n - W a c h te r to K aiser, 13 Oct. 1911, 14: 587
К d t z, Deutschland, p . 2 0 4 — 2 0 5 , 2 0 8 ; K a t z , The se c ret, p . 74, 8 5 — 86.
15 A G N / A F M , M a d e ro to M e lén d ez , 8 Jan. 1912, 5 7 : 1: 166, S R E , H in tz e to
Sec. de Rela ciones Exteriores, 2 Jan. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9 — 8 , L a F r a n c e ,
Л people..., p. 190— 193.
things up but advised M adero that the n ecessary time had to be taken
to ensure that the p roceed in gs w ere le g a lly sound16.
A s the C ovadonga matter dragged on into M arch 1912, H intze re­
p eatedly warned federal authorities that a break out of the suspects
w as contem plated and called for tighter security. N everth eless, on 15
March tw en ty-on e of the accused m anaged to tunnel to freedom most
lik ely w ith the aid of p enetentiary personnel and outsiders. The escape
w as a set back to the M aderista governm en t esp ecia lly since it cam e
in the m idst of a seriou s rebel insu rgency in central and northern
M exico. Indeed, in Puebla, the Zapatistas had set up a second state
governm en t in the southern town of P etlalcingo and at the tim e of the
escap e had Puebla City surrounded and w ere calling for its surrender.
S peculation existed that there w as a con n ection b etw een the Zapatista
threat and the prisonbreak e sp e c ia lly sin ce Benigno Zenteno and s e v e ­
ral others w ho fled the pen etentiary joined up w ith the Zapatista
fo rces17.
T he incident also helped ju stify recent security m easures taken by
the already nervous German com m unity in M exico. Under H intze's
direction it organized itself into d efense and selfhelp com m ittees to
ward off any attackers and to place pressure on the governm ent to
provide more protection. H intze e v e n persuaded M adero to m ake an
ex cep tio n to his governm ent's ban on arms imports allow ing the G er­
man co lo n y to purchase in N ew York City five hundred carbines and
fifty thousand rounds of amm unition to be distributed to German na­
и A G N /A FM , M e lé n d e z to M adero, 10 Jan. 1912, 3: 77: 2285, A G N /A FM , H in tze to
19 Jan. 11912/, 17: 417-— 1: — ; A G N /A FM , Fe derico G o n zä le z Garza to M e ­
lé n d e z , 12 Mar. 1912, 57: X: 145; A JE/IN A H , J u z g a d o 2° de lo Criminal, Puebla
Y n c id e n t e relativo..., 12 Jan. 1912-, SRE, H in tze to Sec. d e R eia c ion e s E x te ­
r io r e s , 2 Jan. 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 8; SRE, M e m o r a n d u m -- c o n v e r s a c i o n con
H i n t z e , 27 Feb. 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9—8; SRE, M e l é n d e z to Calero, 6 Mar. 1912
242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 8.
17
A G N /A FM , H in tze to M adero, 15 Mar.- 1912I, 17: 417— 1: — ; A JE/IN A H ,
Barlos / s i c j A r t e s a n o s to Carlos A ld e c o , 16 Mar. 1912; GBFO Stra n g e to
G r e y Bart, 16 Mar. 1912, 1397: 20; R ecords ol the D epartm ent ol State R elating
to th e Internal A lfairs o l M exico, 1910— 1929, Record Group 59, N ation al A rch i­
v e s, W ash in gton , D. C., M icrofilm , F re d e rick A. Lendrum to C lau d e E. G u yan t,
20 A p r. 1912, roll 17: doc. 1355— 56 (hereafter cited as RDS/59); SRE, H in tze to
Calero, 31 Jan., 24 Mar. 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 6; SRE, M e l é n d e z t o Calero,
в, 15 M a i. 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12—9— 6; SRE, M an ue l Pińa to J. Flores Magon,
16 Mar. 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 8; L a F r a n c e , A people..., p. 255— 257; „Diario,
del H ogar" 16 III 1912; „ N u ev a Era” 16— 17 III 1912.
M a d ero ,
tionals in M exico. By doing so, M adero im plicity adm itted his go v ern ­
m ent’s inability to protect foreigners1*.
The escap e was a sev ere blow to the governm ent's im age am ong the
foreign diplom atic com m unity and put M adero in an ev en more v u ln e ­
rable position v is-à -vis Hintze. A s the su spects scattered in all d irec­
tions, som e to join the Zapatistas, other the r u r a l e s , and even
others to T laxcala w h ere they w ere out of the im m ediate reach of the
Puebla authorities, H intze greatly increased his pressure on the p resi­
dent. C oncerned about calls in the A m erican and German press for
an invasion and succum bing to H intze's threat to order Germans to
lea v e M exico for their safety as the British and U nited States g o v er n ­
m ents had done, M adero not only ordered the firing of the prison offi­
cials and several guards but also M eléndez' gen eral secretary w ho
a lleg ed ly sym pathized w ith the prisoners, perm itted lax security at the
penetentiary, and tried to im pede their recapture. In addition, M adero
placed d etectives at H intze's disposal, sent a special investigator and
a fifty-m an federal rural force to Puebla, and allow ed H intze person ally
to rev iew the Puebla penal facility and to recom m end ch an ges in s e ­
curity m easures. He also ordered M eléndez to establish a reward of
up to one thousand p esos for the capture of the escapees. Distrustful
of M eléndez and to pacify Hintze, he also sent G eneral Ju ven cio Robles
to Puebla to keep an e y e on the governor. Finally, M adero p erson ally
prom ised H intze that an yone caught w ould im m ediately be shot on the
sp ot19. M adero did, h ow ever, stop short of acced in g to the German mi­
18 A A A , H in tze to Bethmann H o llw e g , 6 Apr. 1912, 15: O i l , A G N /A F M , Maclero to Hintze, 11 Mar. 1912, 57: 1: 4 3 5 ; A G N /A F M , Baraquiel M. A la tr is te to
M adero, 3 Mar. 1912, 6: 140— -1; 4 1 2 4 ; L a F r a n c e ,
A people..., p . 2 6 7 ; K a t z ,
Deutschland, p . 2 1 3 ; K a t z , The secret..., p. 89.
18
A G N /A F M , H in tze to M adero, 29 Mar. 1912, 17: 4 1 7 — 1: — , 4 Dec. 1912,
70: 6: — ; A G N /A F M , M a d e ro to H in tze, 19 Mar. 1912, 5 7 : 1: 5 0 0 , 30 Mar. 1912,
57: 2: 2 5 ; A G N / A F M , M a d e ro to M e lén d ez , 2 7 Mar. 1912, 3: 77 : 2 2 2 9 ; AG N /A FM ,
Luis G r a ja le s - -m e m o r a n d u m , 31 Mar. 1912, 16: 3 9 9 — 1: 1 2 9 7 5 ; G o b e r n a c i ó n , Ramo
d o G o b e r n a c i ó n , A r c h i v o G e m r a l d e la N a c i ó n , M e x i c o C i t y , Julio Barcia to Sec.
de Gobernación, 19 Mar. 1912, o x p e d i e n t e 4», 9 1 1 — 1 2 (1 0 ), 1 ( h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as
R G /G ) ; SRE, C alero to M e lé n d e z , 16 Mar. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 :7 2 ): 1 2 — 9 — 6 ; SRE, M e ­
lé n d e z lo Calero, 18 Mar. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9— 6 ; SRE, J. Flores M agon to
Sec. d e R elaciones E x terio res, 27, 30 Mar., 16 M ay 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9 — 6 ;
S R E , H in tze lo Pedro Lascuräin, 9 Aug. 1912, 242.5(43,- 7 2 ): 12 — 9 — 7,- N. M a l e n (1 e z, 400 inlorm e que el j e le d e l d e p a rta m e n to e j é c u t i v o re m ile a la legislatura
d e l estado... / 1 J u ly 1912/, P u e b l a 1 9 1 2 P u e .: Escuela d e A r l e s y O licios d e l Estado,
p. 11 — 12,- M em oria d e la Secreta ria d e G obe rn ació n c o r r e s p o n d ie n te al p é r i o d e
c o m p r e n d id o el / ° d e julio de 1911 y el 20 d e leb r er o d e 1913, M é x i c o , . Secretaria
d e G o b e r n a c i ó n , M e x i c o C i t y 19 1 3 , T a l l e r e s G r â f i c o s d o l a N a c i ó n , J. Flores M agón
to M e lé n d e z , 30 Mar. 1912, p . 2 6 2 , D o c u m e n te s históricos d e la r e v o lu c iô n m exicana,
nister's requests that M eléndez b e fired, the federal governm en t send
Puebla authorities a n ote from H intze condem ning their handling of the
case, the sp ecial federal in vestigator intervene d irectly in the Puebla
courts, and su spects captured in Puebla and surrounding states be trans­
ferred to M exico C ity for interrogation. Federal officials cited separa­
tion of state and federal governm en tal functions w h en refusing H intze
these latter dem ands20.
Still not satisfied w ith the M exicans' con cession s, H intze then d e­
manded 500.000 German marks in com pensation for the C ovadonga
k illin gs in order to q uiet German public opinion and threats of retalia­
tion from the Reichstag. H e also stipulated that talks concerning the
m oney be conducted on a governm ent-to-governm ent basis and not
through any arbitration or claim s com m ission. M exico, in turn, offering
little resistance, su ggested 300.000 marks, but w ith the condition that
the governm ent w ould not accept respon sibility for the attack. F ollo­
w in g a few short w e ek s of talks, the tw o governm en ts settled on
400.000 marks, and the sum, in cash, was im m ediately paid to Berlin
making G erm any the on ly country, according to that nation's press,
to r e ceiv e such a com pensation from M exico21.
H intze's diplom atic su cce sse s using hard-line tactics w ere not lost
on the other m em bers of the diplom atic corps in M exico. O ne British
observer com m ented that H intze had done more than any other g o ­
vernm ental represen tative to protect its citizens in M exico; som e eighty
A m ericans and forty Spaniards had been k illed and neither g o v ern ­
m ent had m anaged to g et the M exicans to punish the gu ilty or pay an
ed s.
I.
and
Fondo
J. E. de F d b e l a, vols, 27, M exico C ity 1960— 1970, Jus
E conóm ica, vol. 7, M a d e ro to H in tze, 30, 31 Mar. 1912,
p . 2 6 3 2 6 5 . O t h e r d i p l o m a t s i n th c M ex ica n capital w ece a l s o priv a tely inform ed
t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t f a v o r e d th e exp ed ien t a l b e i t ille g a l p o licy o f sh o o tin g su sp ects
o n t h e s p o t ; s e e GBFO, S tron g e to G r e y Bart, 16 Mar. 1912, 1397: 20.
*° R G /G , A l io n s o M . M a n d o n a d o to Sec. de Gobern ación, 4 M a y 1912 4«
Fa b e l a
do
and
C u ltu ra
9 1 1 — 1 2 (1 0 ), 1.
S1 GBFO, S tron g e to G r e y Bart, 7 June 1912, 1397: 30; SRE, Icaza to Sec de
R eia c ion e s E xterio res, 7 M ay 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 1 2 - 9 — 7; SRE, H in tz e t o Calero,
1 Apr. 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 6; SRE, H in tz e to l a sc u rà in , Apr. 1912, 242.5(437 2 ): 12— 9— 6; SRE, Lascuràin to M inistro m ex ic a n o en Berlin, 6 M a y 1912, 242.5(437 2 ): 1 2 — 9— 6: SRE, Lascuràin to Sec. d e Hacięnda, 10 M a y 1912, 242.5(43: 72):
12 9 6; K a t z , D eutschland, p. 211. M adero prom ised the C h in ese govern m en t
c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r t h e k illin g of C h in ese c itizen s in Torreón, C oalm ila, in M ay 1911,
b u t it ds n o t clear w h eth er the p aym ents w e re ever m ade; se e A A A , F. A lbert
to G. P agen stecher, 25 A p r 1912, 15: 065; A A A , H in tze to A u s w ä r t i g e A m t, 12 M a y
1912, 15: 04 5 .
indem nization. Indeed, M exico City ignored M adrid's dem ands for treat­
ment equal to Berlin's as outlined by international law*2.
M adero hoped that the paym ent w ould satisfy the Germ ans and re­
liev e him of a particularly sen sitiv e and increasingly debilitating situ a­
tion23. Berlin's d issatisfaction m erely accentuated M adero's already
poor international standing w h ile his con cession s to H intze’s pressure
underm ined support for him among his nationalistic follow ers, esp ec ia l­
ly at the local level.
G overnor M eléndez, much like his predecessor, Rafael Canete,
exp ressed his desire to cooperate with federal authorities in the case,
but in prąctice his ability to do so w as strictly lim ited by the w id es­
pread pro-rebel sentim ent in the state and his sen sitivity over the in­
terference of M exico City in local affairs. Im m ediately after the March
break out, for exam ple, M eléndez vow ed to h ave any recaptured pri­
soner shot on the spot. W hen one of the suspects, who had been ser­
ving as a sargeant in the r u r a l e s , w as apprehended, M eléndez re­
fused, h ow ever, to h ave him execu ted as H intze dem anded. The g o v e r ­
nor took this stand ev en though the man, M anuel V illegas, had admitted
to taking part in the killing of the Germ ans and m ay have raped and
sex u a lly m utilated the woman. Indeed, the federal governm ent even
had to urge M eléndez to transfer V illegas to the state p enetentiary
from the city jail for safer k eep in g24.
M eléndez also dem onstrated his independence and concern for the
local p olitical situation in other w ays. W hen federal authorities infor­
med the governor that they w ere sending a sp ecial investigator, M anu­
el Sanchez G avito, to Puebla and asked the governor for his coop era­
tion in the name of ,,national décorum", M eléndez replied that he w ould
com ply ,,but on ly as long as the referred to law yer, in the carrying out
of his com m ission, did not attack the so v ereign ty of the state”*5. In
another instance, the secretary of g o b e r n a c i ó n , at H intze's behest,
** GBFO, W. L. G osch en lo G r e y Bari, 11 June 1912, 1397: 26; SRE, Bernardo
J. C ó loga n lo Lascuràin, 24 Auq. 1912, 111/242(46: 72)/44: 12— 11— 55; V . G. L e s c e r t a l e s , La colo nia esp a ù o la d e M e x ic o d urante la re v o lu c iô n m aderista , 1911— 1913,
„ R e v i s t a d o la U n iv e r s T d a d C o m p l u t e n s e " 1977, №
26, p. 107, 362. T h e Spaniards,
o f e x a m p l e , s u f f e r e d a t l e a s t & d e a d a n d 5 w o u n d e d i n t h e s-ta.te s i n c e t h e s p r in t)
o f 19U .
23 S R E , Lasc uràin to Ica/a, 3 Aug. 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9—8.
« A G N /A F M , H in tze to M adero, 15 Mar., 11 M a y 1912, 17:417— 1: — ; SRE,
J. Flores M agón to Sec. d e Rela ciones E x te n o re s, 16 M a y 1912, 242.5(43: 72):
12— 9— 6; Memoria..., G o b e r n a c i ó n , Garcia lo Sec. d e Gob ern ación, 14 M ay 1912,
p. 2 6 4 — 266. H i n t z e c l a i m e d t h a t V i l l e g a s i n s e r t e d a b o t t l e in t h e worab of t h e
G e rm a n w o m an .
25
Memoria..., G o b e r n a c i ó n , J. Flores M agón to M e lé n d e z , 30 Mar. 1912, p. 262.
M e lé n d e z to Sec. d e Gobern ación, 11 Apr. 1912, p. 262— 63.
urged M eléndez to travel to M exico C ity for an au dience w ith the
German m inister. The governor refused claim ing that to get authoriza­
tion from the legislatu re and then lea v e the state w ould cau se political
panic. A t another point, M eléndez publicly declared that the in vestiga­
tion had been closed w ith no results, but he soon after denied having
made such a statem ent26.
W h ile M eléndez assum ed a p olitically cautions stan ce vis-a-vis C o­
vadonga, the recapture of the esca p ees and the investigation of the
break out made only lim ited progress. The special agents and rural
force m anaged to apprehend or shoot a handful of men (som e w hile
servin g w ith rural contingents fighting Zapatistas in M orelos), but the
m ajority rem ained at large. Indeed, press reports claim ed that Benigno
Zenteno even appeared in Puebla C ity but w as not arrested27.
In T laxcaia, federal authorities also found little cooperation. G over­
nor A ntonio H idalgo, an ex-factory w orker and radical, helped only
to the lea st e x ten t possible. He reportedly refused to assist a reservo
police force capture suspects, arrested som e p olice w ho did not have
proper orders, and protected the j e f e p o l i t i c o of Z acatelco w ho
harbored su spects in his home. O ne escap ee alleg ed ly w as ev en w or­
king as a con sierge in the T laxcaia state capital building w h ile another
served as the municipal president of San Pablo del M onte28. An indi­
cation of the slo w n ess of the investigation can be seen in the fact that
the Sanchez G avito report, w hich w as to h ave been out in April, still
had not appeared by m id-Septem ber29.
In M ay 1912, as som e of the esc a p e es w ere recaptured, the judicial
process begun the p revious year resum ed. A gain, h ow ever, legal ma­
n euverin g by the defendents and their ’law yers and the reluctance of
26 A G N /A F M , H in tz e to M a de ro , 29 Mar. 1912, 17: 4 1 7 — 1; — , S R E , H in tze
t o Lascuràin, 6 Aug. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12 — 9 — 7 ; S R E , J. Flores M a g ó n to Sec.
d e Reia ciones Exteriores, 26 Aug. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 1 2 — 9— 7.
27 A G N / A F M , J. Flores M a g ó n to M e lén d ez , 4 Sept. 1912, 8 4 : — ; — ; S R E ,
J. Flores M a g ó n to Lascuràin, 3 N o v . 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9 — 8,- „ N u e v a E r a "
1 V I I 1912.
*s A G N /A F M , Grajaies- -m em o ran d u m , 31 Mar. 1912, 16: 3 9 9 — 1: 1 2 9 7 4 ; R G /G ,
Garcia to Sec. d e Gobern ación, 19 Mar. 1912, 4 a , 9 1 1 — 1 2 (1 0 ), 1; R G /G , A n to n io
H idalgo to Sec. d e Gobern ación, 28 Mar. 1912, 4 a , 911 — 12 (1 0 ), 1; R G /G , Man uel
San ch ez G a v i to to Sec. de G obernación, 3 A pr. 1912, 4», 9 1 1 — 1 2 (1 0 ), 1; S R E , H in tze
to Lascuràin, 26 A pr. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12 — 9 — 6 ; S R E , M e m o randu m anónimo,
26 Mar. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9— 6 ; S R E , H in tz e to Lascuràin, 19 Sep!. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 :
7 2 ): 12 — 9— 7; Memoria..., G o b e r n a c i ó n , Garcia to Sec. de G obern ación, 27 Apr. 1912,
p . 2 6 3 — 6 4 ; R. T h . J . B u v e ,
El m o v i m ie n t o re v o lu cio n a r io de T laxcaia, 1910 — 1914:
Sus o rlge n e s y de sarrollo an te de la gran c risis de 1914: La rebelión arenista, ,,H u m a n k l a d e s A n u a r i o " 1 9 8 1 — 1 9 8 3 , N o 7 , p . 152— 153.
** SRE, H in tz e
to Lascuràin,
8 Aug.,
Il
Sept.
1912, 42.5(43:
72):
12— 9— 7.
M eléndez and the Puebla courts to prosecute the alleged culprits, esp e­
cia lly w ithout incontrovertible ev id en ce, slow ed the process to a crawl.
Indicative of the situation in Puebla w as the courts' first con crete
action — the releasing on bail of the director of the p enetentiary and s e ­
veral guards accused of aiding in the 15 M arch break out. This action
w as taken e v e n though the law proscribed bail for indicted p risoners80.
The drama in the Puebla courts m ainly revolved around the second
crim inal judge for the district of Puebla, C elerino Flores, and the prin­
cipal defending law yer, Francisco G. Luque. Flores, in charge of the
case, made little effort to see its conclusion. W hen deprived (for w hat
reason is not clear) of his au xiliary judge, he dism issed H intze's efforts
to make him name another saying the still-at-large su spects the G er­
man had named had nothing to do w ith the case, thereby im plying he
did not need the help of another judge. At another point, w hen accu ­
sed of inhibiting the location and capture of the suspects, Flores respon­
ded that the police, not he, w ere in charge of that end of the p rocess31.
Luque and other defending law yers in turn found the Puebla courts
am enable to delays. W hen the three-day period for exam ining the e v i­
dence against each su spect w as about to expire, the law yers' perem p­
tory ch allen ge to Flores w a s readily accepted thereby transferring the
ca sses of sev era l men to another judge. In turn this latter judge w as
also challenged and a third one then becam e in volved in the p rocee­
dings. The law yers then com plained that they could not ad equately d e­
fend their clien ts if they w ere tried in the courts of more than one
judge. On another occasion, Luque filed an appeal for a m p a г о (re­
prieve) w hen the hiring of a M exico City law yer by several defendents w as disallow ed by the first crim inal judge. In early N ovem ber,
w hen the in vestig a tive period w as again about to end, Luque appealed,
this time to the state suprem e court, claim ing his clien ts had been
tortured in jail to con fess and that he n eeded more tim e to gather and
present additional evid en ce. This step gained him an extra m onth32.
30 A J E / I N A H , J u zga do 2° d e
lo Criminal, Puebla, Contra M a n ue l Ram irez
Y socios..., 8 June 1912, S R E , H in tze to Lascuràin, 22 June, 7 Sept. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 72:
2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : *72): 12— 9— 7.
31 S R E , H in tz e to Lascuràin, 10, 11 Sept. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ):
12— 9 — 7 ; S R E , J. Flo­
de R ela ciones Exteriores, 3 Oct. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9— 7.
3S
A G N /A F M , Crispin Ram os to J. Flores M a g ó n . 19 Sept. 1912, 31 : 8 6 3 : — ;
A J E / I N A H , Diego M. M artin ez to Jue z 2° Crim inal de Puebla, 28 Sept. 1912:
A .I E /1 N A H , Luis Espinosa to Juez 3° Crim inal de Puebla, 12 Oct. 1912; A J E /
/ I N A H , Ju zg ado 1° de lo Criminal, Puebla, Causa 2 9 8 ,
R e la tivo al..„ 2 6 Oct
1912; S R E H in tze to Lascuràin, 23 Sept., 19 N o v . 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9 — 7 ; S R E ,
J. Flores M a g ó n to Lascuràin, 9 N o v . 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9— 7 ; S R E , M e lé n d e z
to Garcia, 9 Dec. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 1 2 — 9 — 7 :
re s
M agón
to
Sec.
W hen the trial fin ally began in early Decem ber, one of the trial judges
reportedly acquitted the su spects under his jurisdiction b ecau se of the
lack of merits. This action con seq u en tly placed in doubt the outcom e
of the w h ole process, but before the trial could continue a bitter guber­
natorial electio n dispute in the state and the h oliday season postponed
the procedings until the n ew y e a r 33.
Luque, not m erely content to prolong the process, also took his case
to the public and m ay h ave e v e n p lotted to help the prisoners e s ­
cape. On 17 N ovem ber, in a w ell-attended cerem ony at A quiles Serdân's
g ra v e to honor the fallen revolutionary hero, Luque denounced the im ­
prisonm ent of the C ovadonga suspects, claim ed they w ere political
scapegoats, and praised them as true revolutionaries. Both M eléndez
and the j e f e p o l i t i c o of Puebla w ere in attendance. Later, Luque
was caught inside the p en etentiary receivin g plans of the prison’s \
layou t from the prisoners in what w a s seen as an escape plot34.
As ev en ts dragged on in Puebla, H intze, w h o w as receiv in g pressure
from both the German com m unity in M exico and at hom e to bring the
C ovadonga ca se to a satisfactory conclusion, becam e in creasin gly im­
patient w ith the M exican governm ent. For his critics, m onetary com ­
p ensation w as not enough, he also had to accom plish the culprits' cap ­
ture and punishm ent.
In M exico, H intze faced the determ ined opposition of the self-appoin­
ted leader of the German colon y, G. Pagenstecher. A m edical doctor
w ith b usin ess interests in M exico, Pagenstecher w a s accustom ed to
a clo se and ev en indulgent relationship w ith the German m inistry as
he pursued his personal financial and political interests. In the period
b etw een the departure of H intze's p redecessor and the m inister's arri­
val in M exico in 1911, Pagenstecher ev e n took it upon him self unoffi­
cia lly to represent the German com m unity before the M exican go v ern ­
ment. Hintze, unlike other German m inisters to M exico, refused to have
anything to do w ith Pagenstecher and ev e n , h e claim ed, turned down
an illegal b usin ess offer made to him by the doctor in conjunction with
other German busin essm en 35.
P agenstecher took offense at his treatm ent b y H intze and vow ed
to make the m inister pay for his actions. H e seized upon C ovadonga
A people..., p . 2 9 1 — 2 9 9 ; „ N u e v a E r a " 2, 4 X II 1912.
H in tze to M adero, 4 Dec. 1912, 70: 6: — ; S R E , M e lé n d e z to
Raiael H ern an d e z, 17 Dec. 1912, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12— 9— 7 ; S R E , H in tz e lo Garcia,
4 Jan. 1913, 2 4 2 .5 (4 3 : 7 2 ): 12 —9 —7; „ N u e v a E r a " И X I I 1912.
15
A A A , H in tz e to Bethmann H o llw e g , 12 Mar. 1912, 14: 7 2 5 , 7 J u ly 1912, 15:
180,- A A A , P a g en stec h e r о Flöckher, 2 7 Mar. 1912, 14: 7 7 0 ; G B F O , G osch en to G r e y
Bart, 11 June 1912, 1397: 26,- K a t z , D eutschland, p. 209.
33 L a F г a n с e ,
34 A G N /A F M ,
and used it to try to g et H intze recalled. If the C ovadonga incident in
itself w as not originally an e sp ec ia lly seriou s concern am ong the G er­
man colon y outside Puebla, P agenstecher m ade it into one. A s early
as January 1912, at a cerem ony to com m em orate K aiser W ilhelm II's
birthday, Pagenstecher called for the use of warships against M exico
and attacked both the governm en t and H in tze for their faint-hearted
attitude toward M exico. P agenstecher not on ly carried on his anti-H intze
cam paign in M exico (including traveling outside M exico City to
v isit p erson ally Germans in other M exican cities), but h e also w rote
articles to the German press and took ad vantage of his con tacts in the
governm ent in Berlin to try to underm ine H intze36.
H intze countered P agenstecher's charges b y threatening to su e him
and to take aw ay his title of Sanitätzrat (a title conferred on German
m edical practitioners) and his Cross of the Red Eagle, Fourth Class,
ousting him from the N aval Officers' Society, and p ublicly branding
him an am bitious, unscrupulous, g en etic a lly d efectiv e half m ulatto from
H aiti w ith no support am ong the German colon y. P agen stech er fin ally
agreed to drop his cam paign on ly after H intze persuaded M exican
exterior relations secretary Pedro Lascuràin to call the doctor into the
m inistry for an interrogation concerning his role in attacking M exico
o v er C ovad on ga37.
H intze also receiv ed a great deal of pressure from Germany, much
of it becau se of the doctor's efforts. H is new spaper articles aroused
German public opinion including the influential naval officers' clubs
w h ile his contacts in the German governm en t also proved useful. Hintz e’s im m ediate predecessor, Karl Bünz, whom H intze accused of ma­
king 100.000 pesos in an alleged illegal b usin ess d eal with Pagenstecher, now headed the M exican desk in the foreign m i n i s t r y A lready
ill-disposed toward H intze becau se of his non-diplom atic background,
Bünz m ade things difficult for Hintze. A nother former m inister to Me
xico and business partner of Pagenstecher, v on Richthofen, now ser­
ving in the Reichstag, played a role in persuading that b ody to p ress­
ure the state departm ent and Hintze. J n A u gu st 1912, for exam ple, the
M exican m inister to Berlin, Francisco A. de Icaza, w as told by the
subsecretary of the German state department, Arthur Zimmermann,
36 A A A , H in tz e to B eth m ann H o llw e g , 12 M a r . 1912, 14: 7 2 5 ,
1912, 15: 122; A A A , P a g e n ste c h e r to F l ö c k h e r , 27 M a r .
D eutschland, p. 209— 210.
37 A A A , H in tz e to Beth mann H o llw e g , 15 A p r . 1912, 15: 021,
S7 M ay 1912, 15: 109, 7 J u ly 1912, 15: 180; A A A , C l i p p i n g t r o m
25 M ay 1912, 15: 070; K a t z , Deutschland, p. 211— 212.
1 June
21 M a y
1912,
1912, 15: 0 9 0 ,
14: 770,-
21 M a y
1912,
,,F r a n k f u r t e r
Katz,
15: 090,
Z e it u n g ''
that the governm ent w anted a solution to the case before the opening
of the n ext session of the R eichstag38.
Hintze, under fire from hard liners at hom e and w ithin the German
com m unity in M exico, could not be con tent until all th e esc a p e es
w ere recaptured and punished. Throughout the rem ainder of 1912, as th e
effort to locate the su spects dragged on w ith only partial su ccess, he
becam e increasin gly frustrated. His correspondence to M exican offi­
cials, now m ostly w ritten in the more formal French (rather than G er­
man or Spanish), turned more and more sarcastic increasingly im p ly­
ing that M adero and other federal officials and not just state and
local authorities w ere responsible for the delays. In his zeal, he b yp as­
sed regular diplom atic channels, ignoring the secretary of exterior
relations, and w ent directly to the secretary of g o b e r n a c i ó n and
M adero w ith his com plaints. H e tried to invok e the 1882 T reaty of Friend­
ship, Com m erce and N avigation b etw een M exico and German that
forbid extraordinary prolongation of justice. H e dem onstrated his con ­
tempt for M exican leg a l norms by claim ing that the law s of a „state
as sm all as Puebla” should not block such an important case as C o­
vadonga and su ggestin g that the C ovadonga suspects be treated like
any com mon crim inal who, he claim ed, w ere dispatched ev ery w h ere
e ls e in M exico w ithout regard to legal form alities. N ot satisfied with
M adero's verbal prom ise to h ave suspects shot upon capture (which
state authorities seldom carried out in practice), H intze attempted to
force the governm en t to sign an a i d e - m e m o i r e authorizing the
same. This step M adero also prom ised to take, but it w as n ever carried
out due to resistance by the secretary of exterior relations, Pedro
Lascuràin39.
38
G rey
AAA,
B a rt,
11
H in t z e
June
to
1 9 1 2,
B ethm ann
1397:
26;
H o llw e g ,
SRE,
7 J u ly
lc a z a
lo
1912,
15: 180; GBFO,
L a sc u rà in ,
26,
31
G o schen
Aug.
1912,
242.5(43: 72): 12— 9—8; SRE, L a s c u r à i n to lc a z a , 3 A u g . 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 8;
K a t z , D e u t s c h l a n d , p. 209— 210.
38 AG N /A FM , H i n t z e lo M a d e r o , 5 A u g . , 12 N o v . 1912, 17: 417— 1: — , 4 D e c .
1912, 70: 6: — ; RG/G, G a r c i a to S e c . d e G o b e r n a c i ó n , 14 M a y 1912, 4я, 911— 12(10),
1; SRE, L a s c u r à i n to lc a z a , 3 A u g . 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9—-8; SRE, H i n t z e to L a s ­
c u r à in , 9, 24 A u g . , 19 N o v
1912, 14, 30 J a n . 1913, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9 --7 ; SRE, L a ­
s c u r à i n to H i n t z e , 16, 31 J a n . 1913, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 7. C ultural d ifferences, too,
m ust h ave p layed a part in the grow in g antagon ism b e tw e en M adero and H intze.
For exam p le, in April 1912, M adero w rote to H intze ap o lo g izin g for th c d elay in
a n sw erin g one of H intze's letters. M adero said that Easter w e e k had interfered,
and he added that there w a s a sa y in g in Spanish that w en t „M as v a le tarde que
nunca" [Better late than n e v e r ). O ne m ust w on der how H in tze, a German with
a m uch different con cep t of tim e, r eceiv ed such an e x cu se; se e AG N/AFM , M a d e r o
to H i n t z e , 16 A p r . 1912, 57: 2: 76.
to
In Puebla, H intze accused M eléndez of m asterm inding the efforts
not on ly to im pede the arrest of the culprits, but also of protracting
the legal p rocess in order to allow the su spects to again escap e. The
German consul in the state capital, Claude Voight, becam e so close
to the special p olice agent in charge of the investigation, José H er­
nandez, that inform ation concerning the case reached H intze before
the authorities in M exico City. W hen H intze su ggested that state offi­
cials w ere acting in flagrant contradiction of M exico City's desires,
the subsecretary of g o b e r n a c i ó n , Julio Garcia, adm itted the fact.
The governm ent, in d efense of its poor record, how ever, repeated ly
claim ed it could not intervene in state affairs and that M exican legal
procedures w ere inherently slow . In reality M adero culd not control
e v e n ts in Puebla and T laxcaia, and his protestations to the contrary
increasin gly fell on deaf ea rs40.
D esperate to recoup his seriou sly dam aged standing w ith G erm any
and perhaps fearful that the n ew state governm en t w hich w as to take
office on 1 February 1913 might, in a bid to boost its public appeal
after a h igh ly d iv isiv e election , d ecid e to g iv e am nesty to the pri­
soners, M adero took the initiative. In a m ove to prepare public o p i­
nion in Puebla for direct federal governm ent intervention in the case,
he issued a puiblic statem ent calling the su spects not revolutionaries
but crim inals. Indeed, to support his view , M adero e v e n w ent so far
as to tw ist the history of his ow n m ovem ent by saying that follow in g
the aborted rebellion of A q u iles Serdân in Puebla in late N ovem ber
1910, there w as no revolutionary m ovem ent in the state until May
1911 w hen the p eace treaty n egotiation s in Ciudad Juarez w ere alrea­
dy under w ay. Then, according to M adero, rebel groups formed in
the state, not to fight for the cause, but to take advantage of the g e ­
nerous dem obilization conditions that M adero had offered his troops.
It was, he concluded, one of these illegitim ate groups, led by Benigno Zenteno, that attacked C ovadonga41.
N ext, M adero sent the federal attorney general, A dolfo V alles, to
Puebla to organize and o v ersee a trial of those su spects alread y in
40 A G N /A F M , H in tze to M a de ro, 11 M ay , 25 J u ly 1912, 17: 417— 1: — ; A G N /
AFM, S a n ch ez A z c o n a to M e lé n d e z , 13 Jan, 1913, 56: 24: 412; A rch ivo dc Fran­
c isco I. M adero, In stitute N a cio n a l dc A n trop ologia с H istoria, M exico C ity, Micro*
film , M a d e ro to H in tze, 9 Dec. 1912, rollo 11: doc. 224 (hereafter cited as IN A H /
AFM); SRE, H in tz e to Lascuràin, 1, 13 M a y 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 6, 11 Sept.,
3 O ct. 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 7; SRE, Garcia to H in tze, 17 Sept. 1912, 242.5(43:
72): 12— 9— 7; SRE, J. Flore s M a g ó n to Sec. d e R e ia c io n e s E x terio res, 16 M a y 1912,
242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 6; SRE, Icaza to Lascuràin, 31 Aug. 1912, 242.5(43: 72): 12—9 — 8.
41 IN A H /A FM , M a d e ro to Hintze, 9 Dec. 1912, 11: 224; SRE, H in tz e to Lascuràin,
30 Jan. 1913, 242.5(43: 72): 12 -9— 7; „N u eva Era" И XII 1912.
custody. M eanw hile, authorities captured three additional escap ees.
Taking advantage of the suspension of constitutional guarantees ed ict
in effect in parts of the state (a step M adero had p reviou sly refused
to take claim ing C ovadonga occurred before the im position of martial
law), M adero ordered the latter three tried by a m ilitary court; they
w ere condem ned to death, and the president denied their appeal for
clem ency. Before the civil trial ended and the ex ecu tio n s cou ld take
place, how ever, M adero w as overthrow n42.
The new chief ex ecu tiv e, V ictoriano Huerta, did not disappoint
Berlin. He, too, ignored the condem ned men's pleas, and they w ere
shot in ea rly March with the German consul as 'witness. Hintze, p lea­
sed with the turn of even ts, w as fin ally able to report to his superios
that M exico had m anaged to punish at least som e of the culprits. Be­
fore ta.king a five-m onth lea v e (for health reasons) to Germany, he
urged the German com m unity to aid Huerta in bringing p eace to M e­
x ico 48. In April, four other su spects w ere tried and condem ned to
death. In the Puebla courtroom w here the trial took place, the G er­
man consul and his legal counselor w ere g iv en seats of honor at the
front along with the judge, law yers and defendents. The condem ned
w ere finally ex ecu ted in Septem ber, but the m ost-w anted suspect and
alleged ningleader of the m assacre, Benigno Zenteno, rem ained at large
fighting w ith the Z apatistas44.
CO NC LUSIO N
The ev id en ce con vincingly dem onstrates that the León ele la Barra
and M adero adm inistrations b etw eeen July 1911 and February 1913
w ere able to do little toward solving the C ovadonga k illings to the
satisfaction of the German governm ent, and what efforts they did make
only antagonized regim e supporters in Puebla and Tlaxcala. The
result w as an underm ining of critical dom estic and international bac­
A A A , Aufzeic h n u n g ü b e r das S lra iv er la h re n in d e r C o v a d o n g a a n g e le g e n h e it,
31 Mar. 1913, 15: 601; A G N /A FM , S an ch ez A zcon a to M e lén d ez , 13 Jan, 1913, 56:
24: 412; AG N/AFM , San ch ez A z c o n a to Ramos, 10 Jan. 1913, 56: 2: 52; 1LM, M e ­
lén d ez lo M adero, 7 Feb. 1913, A —-3; SRE, Lascuràin to Hintze, 31 Jan. 1913, 242.5
(43: 72): 12—S— 7; „lm parcial" 4 111 1913; „M exican H erald" 25 1 1913; „N u rva Era"
25 I 1913; „El Pais" 25 I, 5 III 1913.
« SRE, León de la Barra to H in tze, 5 Mar. 1913, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 7; SRE,
H in tze to León de la Barra, 6 Mar: 1913, 242.5(43: 72): 12— 9— 7; „El Diario" 14 III
J913.
41 SRE. León d e la Barra to Rudoll von Kardorli, 22 A pr. 1913, 242.5(43: 72):
12— 9— 7, „El Diario" 20 III 1913; „Imparcial" 9, 14 IV 1913; „M exican H erald"
12 IX 1913.
king that M adero n eed ed to su rvive. A final issu e or q uestion that
must be addressed is to w h at ex ten t did the C ovadonga con troversy
directly contribute to M adero's downfall?
In regard to the public in Puebla and T laxcaia the anti-M adero atti­
tude en gen d ered by the federal governm ent's intervention in the Co­
vadonga affair and allegation s that revolutionary officers w ere made
scaipegoats contributed in part to the form ation of anti-governm ent
con sp iracies and armed m ovem ents during 1911 and 1912. A lthough
none of these efforts w ere d irectly linked to the coup that overthrew
M adero in M exico City in February 1913, th ey helped create an atm o­
sphere of discontent and instability and m ilitarily w eak en ed the g o ­
vernm ent m aking the efforts of F élix Diaz and V ictoriano Huerta
much more fea sib le45.
A s for the German governm ent and its m inister in M exico, Paul
vo n Hintze, there e x ists strong circum stantial e v id e n c e that C ovadonga
p layed a k ey role in persuading Berlin to d irectly participate in M a­
dero's overthrow . E very account of the ,,Decena Trâgica" (the ten
days of fighting, 9— 18 February 1913, that brought dow n the M adero
governm ent), for exam ple, w hether by participants or historians, c lea ­
rly and u n eq u ivocally link H intze intim ately to the m achinations of
the United States ambassador, H enry Lane W ilson, in his efforts to
overthrow M adero46. W ilson, in his m em oires, for exam ple, sa y s the
follow ing about Hintze:
45, L a F r a n с e, A people..., chapter 4, p. 6— 7.
46
GBFO, S tio n g e t o G r e y Bart, 21 Feb. 1913, 1671: 6: RDS/59; H e n ry Lane W i l ­
son to Sec. ol State, 14 Feb. 1913, 23: 0308,- L. L. B l a i d s d c l l , H e n r y Lane W i l ­
son and the o v e r th r o w ol M ad ero , „S ou th w estern Social S c ien ce Q uarterly" 1962,
N o 43, p. 2, N o 130, p. 34, С. В 1 a s i e r, The U n ite d S ta le s and M adero, „Journal
of Latin A m erican Studies" 1972, N o 4, p. 2, 207— 231; P. A. R. C a l v e r t , Francis
Stro n ge y la Decena Trdgica, „H istoria M exicana" 1965, N o 15, p. 1, 47— 68; C a l l
v e r t , The Mexican..., p. 131— 150; F a b e l a and F a b e l a, D o c u m e n to s, C ó lo g a n
— ,,Por la verdad", 2 Aug. 1914, 9: 225— 227; I. F a b e l a , H istoria d ip lo m ä tic a
d e la re v o lu cio n m exicana, vols. 2, M exico C ity 1958, Fondo de Cultura Econôm ica,
vol. 1, p. 43, 86; H d i e y , Revolution..., p. 66; К a t z, D eutschland, p. 218— 229f
К a t z, The secret..., p. 92— 112; J. P. H a r r i s o n , H e n r y Lane W ilso n : El trdglco
de la decena, „H istoria M exican a" 1957, N o 6, p. 3, 383— 387; M. M. S e r l i n g ,
Los Ultimos dlas del p r é s id e n te M a dero: Mi ge stio n d ip lo m â tic a e n M e x ico, H avana
1917, S iglo XX, p. 413— 508; M. C. M e y e r , H u e r ta : A p o litical portrait, Lincoln
1972, U n iversity of N eb rask a, p. 52— 54, 76— 77; B. U l l o a , La r e v o lu c j ô n Interv en ida: Reia ciones d ip lo m â tic a s en tre M exico y Estados U nid os, 1910— 1914, M exico
C ity 1971, El C o leg io de M éxico, p. 79— 84; H. L. W i l s o n , D iplom a tic e p i s o d e s
in M e xico , Belgium and Chile, N e w York 1927, G arden C ity, D ou bled ay, P age and
Co., p. 254— 262; H. L. W i l s o n , H is to r y o l the M e x ica n re v o lu tio n , u n pu blished
ms., 1928, p. 27—28.
I formed a high opinion of Adm iral V on [sic] H in tze Irom the first m om ent of our
acq u ain tan ce and this opinion. I had no o cca sio n to m odify su b seq u en tly. Through
all the trying hours of the rev o lu tio n against D iaz [sic] and M adero, culm inating
in the bom bardm ent ol the C ity of M exico, his sym p athy and ad v ice w ere ol in ­
finite valu e. W h ile the bom bardm ent w a s in progress he w a s e sp e c ia lly a c tiv e and
supported ill" in ev er y crisis w ith u n sw ervin g cou rage and ab sou te disregard of
e v e r y co n sid era tio n e x ce p t the faithful perform ance of the du ties p ertain in g to his
high o ffice 47.
Indeed, by February 1913, H intze's dislike for M adero ran so d eep ly
that he ev en refused asylum for the president's parents w h en th ey
sought refuge in the German legation during the „D ecena Trâgica".
O ne report also claim ed that the b ulletin announcing M adero's 18 F e­
bruary resignation w as posted in the German m inistry as early as
14 February48.
A ccording to Friedrich Katz, H intze and his superiors, up to mid-1912, had been w illin g to m ake an attem pt to forbear M adero in or­
der to further G erm an-M exican econom ic ties. Indeed, G erm an-M exican
trade did reach an all-tim e high under M adero, but Berlin's tolerant
attitude w ilted as conditions in M exico deteriorated. A s 1912 p rogres­
sed, H intze began to take a harder lin e against M exico. A t the sam e
tim e he cooperated more and m ore c lo sely w ith the A m ericans and
British, e v e n planning strategy w ith H enry Lane W ilson on h ow to bring
pressure on M adero. In the spring of 1912, for exam ple, H intze threate­
ned to order Germans to le a v e M exico for their sa fety (W ashington
and London actually ordered their citizen s to leave). In O ctober in the
w ake of the F élix Diaz rebellion in Veracruz, Berlin sen t the w arship
„Victoria Luise" to M exican w aters to join th e U.S.S. „Des M oines" as
a sh ow of force, and the three pow ers cooperated in providing safety
for ea ch other's citizens. M eanw hile, H intze w as predicting that M adero
would be the victim of a m ilitary coup in the not too distant future,
and he su ggested that V ictorian o H uerta w a s the right person to
replace the president49.
E xactly h ow much C ovadonga had to do w ith this ch ange in p olicy
toward M adero and H intze's subsequent direct participation in his dow n­
fall is difficult to say, y et circum stantial ev id en ce clearly indicates
47 W i l s o n , D iplomatic, p. 183.
4® A rch ivo de F élix Diaz, Centro de Estudios de H istoria de M ex ico (Condum ex), M ex ico C ity, E ntry in a n o n y m o u s diary, 14 Feb. 1913, carpeta 1: doc. 70;
K a t z , D eutschland, p. 219; К a t z, T he secret..., p. 589.
41
A A A , A l v e y A. A d e e to Daniel v o n Haim hausen, 19 Oct. 1912, 15: 299; A A A ,
Philander C. K n o x to H aim hausen, 28 Oct. 1912, 15: 306; A A A , Stron ge to H in tze,
31 Oct. 1912, 15: 319; K a t z , Deutschland, p. 213— 214; K a t z , T he se c re t, p. 74,
88— 92.
a connection. O ver the m onths from July 1911 to February 1913, H intze
spent a significant p ercen tage of his tim e d ealing w ith C ovadonga. H e
w rote many dozens of letters to and talked w ith large num bers of
M exican officials, made several trips to Puebla, and oversaw th e G er­
m an consul's tenacious pursuit of the case. H e also m ade clear his
d isgust over C ovadonga not on ly to his superiors and M exican authori­
ties, but to other m em bers of the diplom atic corps as w ell. H enry Lane
W ilson, in his cam paign to represent M exico C ity's diplom atic com m u­
nity before the M adero governm ent, e v e n urged H intze to allow him to
use C ovadonga as an argum ent in his exh ortations to the president.
H intze also rem ained on the d efen siv e over the issu e due to bitter at­
tacks on his handling of the affair from p ersonal opponents both at hom e
and in M exico. Finally, th e sw itch to an in creasin gly hard-line stan ce
toward M adero and a closer coop eration w ith U nited S tates and
British diplom ats during 1912 coin cid ed w ith the frustration over the
prison escape and its afterm ath as reflected in a m ore biting and ev e n
insulting tone in H intze's letters to M adero concerning C ovadonga. Gi­
ven these factors, it is alm ost certain that C ovadonga contributed in
a significant w a y to H intze's d ecision to collaborate in bringing about
M adero's dow nfall50.
The k illing of four German citizen s at the C ovadonga tex tile facto­
ry near Puebla City in July 1911, then, had far-reaching dom estic and
international repercussions for the M adero regim e. German demands
that the president so lv e the case and local resistan ce to that en d eavor
p laced the León de la Barra and then the M adero governm en t in a no-win situation in w h ich the M aderista m ovem ent lost valu ab le and criti­
cal support among its follow ers in Puebla and T laxcala as w e ll as in
the foreign diplom atic com m unity. This loss certain ly contributed to
the atm osphere leading to M adero's dow nfall in February 1913, and
there is little doubt that the furor over C ovadonga prom pted H intze to
take part in planning and execu tin g the su ccessfu l coup d'état that
brought the German m inister's favorite, V ictoriano Huerta, to power.
K ansas State U n iv ersity
50 GBFO, Stro n ge lo G r e y Bart, 30 Mar. 1912, 1397: 23, 22 Jan. 1913, 1670: 209;
C a l v e r t , Mexican..., p. 127.
D a v id G. LaFrance
NIEMCY, NACJO NALIZM REW OLUCYJNY I UPADEK
PREZYDENTA FRANCISCO I. MADERO:
M ORDERSTW A W C O V A D O N G A
W n o cy z 12 na 13 lip ca 1911 r., w m ieście Puebla, sto lic y stanu Puebla w M e­
ksyku , starły się siły o b alon ego dyk tatora P orlirio D iaza z rew o lu cy jn y m i odd zia­
łami F ran cisco I. M adero, p rzyw ód cy lib erałów , który w tym że roku obrany został
p rezyd en tem M ek syku . W c za sie ty ch zam ieszek żołn ierze Diaza sk iero w a li ogień
k arabin ów m aszyn ow ych na tłum ludzi zeb ran ych na a ren ie korridy i o c ze k u ją ­
c y ch za p o w ied zia n eg o przybycia F rancisco I. M adero. Z gin ęło parę d ziesiątk ów
łudzi sp ośród zw o len n ik ó w M adero i ich rodzin. Jeden z w y c o fu ją c y ch się z m ia­
sta odd ziałów r ew o lu cy jn y ch , pod w od zą Bonigno Zentano, przechod ził koło te k sty l­
nej fabryki C ovad onga p ołożon ej w p ółn ocn ej dzieln icy. D yrek tor labryki obaw iając
się, że odd ział ten zaatak u je fabrykę rozk azał straży fabryczn ej o strzela ć rew o lu ­
cjon istów . W y w ią za ła się w alka. R e w o lu cjo n iści w sp om agan i przez m iejsco w y c h
z w o len n ik ó w M adero — w tym i przez c zę śc załogi fabryki — zd ob yli C ovad on gę
i urządził w niej rzeź, w c za sie której z g in ęli m. in. jed en o b y w a tel hiszpań sk i
i czterech o b y w a teli n iem ieck ich .
Z abójstw a ob cych o b y w a t.li nie n ależały w tych n iesp o k o jn y ch czasach w M e­
k sy k u do rzad kości, jed n ak że naw et n a jostrzejsze p rotesty od p ow ied n ich rząd ów nie
o d n o siły w ię k sz y c h sk utk ów . N ie u d aw ało się od n aleźć w in n y ch zbrodni, a rząd
m ek syk ań sk i nie był sk ło n n y w y p ła ca ć od szk od ow ali rodzinom pom ordow anych.
N atom iast w przypadku C ovad on gi rzecz przybrała inny obrót. G dy w iad om ość
o za b ó jstw ie czterech o b y w a teli n iem ieck ich dotarła do N iem iec, tam tejsza prasa
nadała sp raw ie duży rozgłos, a rząd n iem ieck i, m ając za sobą poparcie op in ii pu­
blicznej, zażąd ał od M ek syku p rzyk ład n ego ukarania sp raw ców zab ójstw a i w y p ła ­
cen ia od szk od ow an ia rodzinom pom ordow anych. W y k o n a w cą n ie m ie ck ieg o d e m a r ­
che stał się m inister p ełn om ocn y R zeszy w M ek syk u , adm irał Paul v o n H intze,
c zło w iek tw ard ego charakteru, k tórego d ziałan ie c ec h o w a ły bardziej upór i b ez­
w zg lęd n o ść, aniżeli zd o ln o ści dyp lom atyczn e.
Dla rządu m e k sy k a ń sk ieg o i sam ego p rezyd en ta M adero spraw a b yła n iełatw a,
zw a ży w sz y na sk om p lik ow an ą sy tu a cję w ew n ętrzn ą. P rezydent zn ajd ow ał się pod
n acisk iem m ocarstw a, na którym M ek sy k o w i zarów n o ze w z g lęd ó w gosp od arczych ,
jak i p o lity cz n y c h bardzo zależało. Z drugiej strony m iał zbyt m ało autorytetu
w stosun ku do w ład z lok aln ych Pueblo, aby w ym óc en ergiczn e p ostęp ow an ie. Spra­
w ę d od atk ow o kom p lik ow ała ok o liczn o ść, że m ordercam i b yli przecież zw o len n icy
rew olu cji, która w y n io sła M adero na sta n o w isk o prezyd en ta.
Spraw a c iągn ęła się dw a lata i jej przeb ieg stan ow i przedm iot artykułu, który
sz c ze g ó ło w o om aw ia działania obu stron oraz pod aje ch a ra k tery sty k ę o so b y adm i­
rała v o n H in tze i sto su n k ó w n iem ieck o-m ek syk ań sk ich . Jej ep ilogiem b yło n ie ty l­
ko u jęcie w reszcie w in n y ch mordu i sk azan ie ich na śm ierć (przy czym głó w n i
sp raw cy uszli sp raw ied liw ości). Zdaniem autora casu s C ovad on ga p rzy czy n ił s ię do
n astęp n ego przew rotu „D eccna Tragica", g d y po d ziesięciu dniach w a lk , 9— 18 lu ty
1913, prezyd en t M adero zrezy g n o w a ł ze sw eg o stan ow isk a na rzecz V ictoriano
H uerta, pop ieran ego na sk u tek z a leceń adm irała v o n H in tze przez rząd niem ieck i.
A utor ok reśla H uerta jako faw oryta n ie m ie ck ieg o m inistra p ełn om ocn ego. A rtyku ł
zaopatrzon y jest w bardzo bogatą d o k im e n ta c ję arch iw aln ą i bibliograficzną.