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Consolidating Power: The Making of
Modern Colombia After the Panama
Debacle
Jorge L. Sarmiento
After more than eighty years as a part of Colombia, the Republic of
Panama declared its independence on November 3rd, 1903.1 To this day,
the memory of this loss continues to haunt Colombian historiography.
When analyzing the Panama controversy, Colombian historians and
political scientists tend to agree on the fact that this was one of the most
important events in Colombian history. However, their reasons for
attributing such importance to Panama’s secession differ; some focus on
the strategic territorial loss, while others highlight the change it incited in
Colombian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the immediate loss of revenue,
as well as the economic chaos and restructuring that affected the
Colombian government, are two of the few facts around which there is
an established consensus.
Another point of agreement is that the United States’ economic
hegemony played a fundamental role in the separation of Panama from
Colombia and furthermore, that this intervention was an imperialist act. 2
I hope to unsettle the latter. Although it is tempting – and certainly not
out of fashion in the popular press – to present Colombia as the victim
of U.S. imperialist ambitions, this view is problematic in certain respects.3
1
Ernesto J. Castillero and Enrique José Arce, Historia de Panama (Panamá: R. de
P, 1955).
2
Teresa Morales de Gómez, Historia de un despojo: el tratado Urrutia-Thomson,
Panamá! y el petróleo (Bogotá! , D.C.: Editorial Planeta Colombiana 2003)
3
Enrique Santos Molano, 1903, adiós Panamá: Colombia ante el Destino Manifiesto
(Bogotá! , D.C., Colombia: Villegas Editores, 2004).
94 | Consolidating Power: The Making of Modern Columbia
Analyzing U.S.-Colombian relations and their consequences through an
anti-imperialist lens takes away agency from the smaller actor and
obscures other consequences of Panama’s secession. The role of the
United States is certainly a force that has shaped Colombia’s history;
however, it is not the only one, and I would argue, not the most
important one when it comes to the aftermath of Panama’s secession.
Panama’s separation did more than bring economic doom and
political shame to Colombia. The political and economic consolidation of
the Colombian nation-state were facilitated by this international incident.
To explain this assertion, it is crucial to have a clear understanding of
what nation state means. In fact, a critical reading of Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism provides a helpful
framework with which to analyze the development of the nation and
nationalism that is essential to understand the Colombian situation.
Although Anderson’s analysis is helpful, when applied to Spanish
America, it has a major shortcoming: it fails to account for the intranational economic divisions that became problematic later on as the new
republics tried to consolidate their power. A look at what became of
Bolívar’s Gran Colombia is enough to realize that vice-royal territorial
divisions, print capitalism, and a sense of otherness are not enough to
account for Spanish-American state formation. Even as a smaller political
unit, Colombia still struggled to become a ‘nation’ and to create a strong
state. The most salient example of this state of affairs is the Panamanian
secession, which proved just how weak the Colombian nation-state was
until that point.
It is equally important to highlight several key aspects of the
politico-economic situation in Colombia between 1810, when it first
attempted to gain independence, and 1902, which marked the end of
Colombia’s last civil war. This is necessary in order to demonstrate that
there were more important factors at play, other than U.S. imperialism,
which contributed to Panama’s separation. At this point, the role of the
United States in the conflict will be considered to present a holistic
picture of Panama’s secession in 1903. Once this has been established,
the aftermath of Panama’s secession will be analyzed, beginning with
Rafael Reyes’s presidency in 1904 and culminating with the ratification of
the Thompson-Urrutia Treaty in 1921. The treaty settled any pending
issues between Colombia and the United States regarding Panama’s
secession. In this last section, the paper intends to demonstrate the
strengthening of the ‘nation-state’ both as a result of economic
development that was national – rather than regional – in scope and of
nationalist political rhetoric that U.S. intervention prompted. With this in
mind, I hope to reset the traditional anti-imperialist narrative given that
its limited scope renders it inadequate for any analysis of the
consequences of Panama’s secession. By presenting Colombia solely as a
Ezra’s Archives | 95
victim of empire, Colombian historiography obscures, perhaps
intentionally, the way in which the centralist Bogotá elite used the
aftermath of the secession to finally consolidate its power.
Inside Colombia: 1810-1902
With a history of territorial disconnect and internal conflicts,
Colombia as a fragile whole had not confronted the changing continental
economic reality – increasingly dominated by the United States – until
Panama’s secession in 1903. Throughout the 19th century, the Colombian
political landscape was characterized by civil war and internal strife as
members of the Liberal and Conservative parties competed for the
control of national politics.
In order to demonstrate just how fragmented Colombia really
was, it is important to talk about a period that historians have come to
identify as la Patria Boba (the Foolish Fatherland). Traditional Colombian
historiography identifies the Patria Boba as the period between 1810,
when Colombia first declared its independence, and 1816, when the
Spanish led a temporarily successful effort to re-conquest.4 This period is
identified as ‘foolish’ because of the fact that during those four years,
internal squabble within neo-Granadine territory did not permit the
formation of an organized resistance to maintain independence.
According to David Bushnell, the situation was somewhat inevitable
given New Granada’s topography and the distribution of its population.
He maintains that, “geographic separation thus came to reinforce all the
basic socioeconomic and cultural differences among major regions, and
the result was an intense sectionalism that vastly complicated the first
efforts at political organization.”5
One must pay careful attention to the denomination of the
conflict within the territory of New Granada as ‘sectionalism.’ As such, it
implies a certain unity that has been broken, or sectionalized, and this can
been used as a tool to justify the existence of the Colombian nation. This
is evident in Bushnell’s work when he speaks of the “internal disunity”
that led New Granada to declare independence in a “piecemeal fashion,”
meaning that different provinces declared independence at different
times, culminating with the establishment, in 1811, of a “general
government of sorts under the United Provinces of New Granada.”6 This
traditional history creates a scholarly body of work that traces the
4
David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself.
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), 36.
5
Ibid., 37.
6
Ibid.
96 | Consolidating Power: The Making of Modern Columbia
existence of the Colombian nation to the very beginning of the wave of
independence movements that swept across Spanish America. It is
equally important to note what this history does not do: it does not
mention that the rivalry within the different provinces in the Viceroyalty
of New Granada was caused by forces greater than topography alone. As
historian Alfonso Múnera points out, Foolish Fatherland is an allinclusive term that implies the false notion that the internal disunity
within what today is Colombia was a result of the inexperienced elite that
led the independence movement.7
The misleading nature of the concept becomes clear when one
considers that during the Patria Boba, the governing junta of Cartagena
de Indias – arguably one of the most important commercial and military
centers of the Spanish Empire – established the independent Republic of
Cartagena of the Indias, wishing to remain autonomous from Bogotá (in
the province of Cundinamarca).8 A closer look at the differences between
Cundinamarca and Cartagena – and the subsequent conflict between
them – is essential to understand the regionalism that has been such a
salient characteristic of Colombian history. With disparate economic
realities and dissimilar social make-ups, the early dispute between
Cartagena and Cundinamarca marked the beginning of Bogotá’s long and
arduous nation-building mission.
One of the most important contributing factors to the
opposition between Cartagena and Bogotá was the distinct nature of their
economies. Because of its location in the Caribbean, Cartagena served as
one of the busiest ports in Spanish America.9 The Cartagena merchant
elite organized the Commerce Consulate of Cartagena, which advocated
for free trade in the Caribbean Sea and pushed particularly for trading
wheat flour from the United States. The Caribbean elite’s economic
project was a direct threat to the economic growth of Bogotá and its
surroundings. As an important agricultural center, this region of
Colombia cultivated wheat and other staples. Cartagena’s project would
jeopardize the relative economic stability of the Andean region.10 Thus,
the conflict that emerged between Bogotá and Cartagena during the
period of independence was not a result of simple political inexperience
but rather the clash between two regions with distinct economic priorities
that necessitated different policies.
7
Alfonso Mu! nera, "El Caribe colombiano en la república andina: identidad y
autonomía política en el siglo XIX" (Caribbean Studies. 29 (2): 1996), 213-237.
8
Ibid., p. 243.
9
Miguel Malagón Pinzón, “El Consulado de Comercio de Cartagena” (Revista
Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, 3 (2): 2001), 51-57
10
Múnera, “El Caribe colomiano,” 220.
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Society too proved to be an important barrier for the integration
of these two regions. Cartagena was a crucial port for the importation of
African slaves and this led to the development of a population that was
heavily made up by people of African descent. This was in sharp contrast
with Cundinamarca, where the population was more homogeneous and
the majority of inhabitants were the descendants of Spaniards.11 In
Cartagena, racial mixing eventually gave birth to a prominent mulatto
merchant class. Political activity there was “dominated to a great extent
by mulattos and negroes” whose freedom within the new political order
was guaranteed.12 This, however, did not sit well with the ideological
currents of the time, when people of color were seen as inferior and
many argued that tropical climates were not conducive to the
development of civilization.13 Political leaders in Bogotá were very
outspoken about their disdain, referring to mulattos and blacks in the
Caribbean coast as savage and undisciplined. Thus, it should not come as
a surprise that the inhabitants of the province of Cartagena were so
determined in their mission to maintain autonomy. In Múnera’s terms,
“Cartagena’s independence effectively eradicated the possibility of
peacefully integrating both provinces under one nation.”14 Both
provinces remained independent from each other until the Spanish dealt
a decisive blow from which Cartagena never truly recovered. Bogotá
opted to let the province fall to make it easier to impose control from the
Andean capital.
Unlike traditional historiography maintains, the Colombian
nation was not truly a nation since its beginning. The ruling classes of
several provinces had very different projects in mind that, as
demonstrated, pitted those within the ‘nation’ against each other.
Cartagena and Bogotá were by no means the only provinces with
differing economies and societies. Nevertheless, theirs is an iconic
example of the pervasive disunity that has characterized a significant
portion of Colombia’s history. By 1821 – only a few years after the Patria
Boba – an army led by Simón Bolívar managed to liberate all of the
Viceroyalty of New Granada, which included modern-day Colombia,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama and the Mosquito Coast in present-day
11
Ardila Urrego and Miguel Angel, Intelectuales, estado y nacio! n en Colombia: de la
Guerra de los Mil Di! as a la Constitucio! n de 1991 (Bogota! , D.C.: Universidad
Central, Departamento de Investigaciones, 2002), 62.
12
Múnera, “El Caribe colomiano,” 229
13
Urrego, Intelectuales, estado y nacion en Columbia, 62.
14
Múnera, “El Caribe colomiano,” 222.
98 | Consolidating Power: The Making of Modern Columbia
Nicaragua.15 The Province of Panama later issued a decree by which it
officially joined Gran Colombia, Bolívar’s dream republic. Recall the
‘piecemeal’ fashion with which Bushnell described Colombia’s
independence. This stands in sharp contrast with the notion espoused by
some Colombian historians that Panama was an organic part of
Colombia.16 Since writing a history is a crucial endeavor for the creation
of a nation-state, the existence of such narratives is not unexpected.
However, it is certainly surprising that one hundred years after Panama’s
secession, some historians continue to promote the notion of a
Colombian nation-state beyond the borders of the current one.
The Gran Colombian experiment went ahead, with internal
disunity and regionalism making an appearance once again. With a
weaker Cartagena, the protagonists of this second clash were the elites of
Bogotá and Caracas as the engineers of independence sought to create a
unified political entity out of the newly liberated territory.
Despite great efforts to set up this new republic, Gran Colombia
was doomed since its official establishment in 1821 by the same debate
between federalism and centralism that affected present-day Colombia
throughout much of its history. Under the authority of Francisco de
Paula Santander, Gran Colombia underwent a series of liberal economic,
educational, and religious reforms. Discontent throughout Ecuador and
certain sections of Venezuela caused by those reforms precipitated a
constitutional convention during which Venezuelan General Antonio
Páez declared Venezuela’s independence, followed shortly by Ecuador.17
The resulting constitution was approved only in the provinces of New
Granada and Panama. They went on to write yet another constitution in
1832, when the Republic of New Granada was officially established.
The republic of New Granada was divided into sixteen provinces
that largely obeyed the territory’s topography. The difficult topography
and the precarious state of the economy made it extremely difficult to
move from one province to the other. In some cases, it was even difficult
to move within provinces.18 Even with fewer regions to worry about after
Gran Colombia’s disintegration, the Neo-Granadine state struggled to
maintain its hold over a vast territory that was not easily navigable.
Flirtation with federalism kept alive the provincial hopes of a more
15
Navarro Figueroa, Dominio Y Sociedad En El Panama! Colombiano (1821-1903):
escrutinio sociolo! gico, (Panama! : Impresora Panama! , 1978).
16
Gustavo Montañez, “El Istmo de Panamá y Colombia: de Puente natural a
juego geopolítico de la unión” in Colombia y Panamá: la metamorfosis de la nación en el
siglo XX ed. Heraclio Bonilla and Gustavo Motañez, (Bogotá: Universidad
Nacional de Colombia, 2004), 177 – 200.
17
Bushnell, The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself, 70 – 72.
18
Ibid., 75.
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autonomous government that would allow each one of the provincial
elites to pursue their interests. In this newly established Republic of New
Granada, one could speak of the existence of the Colombian state only
because of the constitution.
Economic integration proved even more difficult. The provinces
in the interior continued to be distinct from those in the Caribbean where
(instead of agriculture) trade was the means of subsistence. Given the
difficult topography of the nation, the Republic of New Granada was
more of a collection of provinces rather than a unified state. Because of
the poor state of the economy, the state had basically no means with
which to actively enforce and oversee the creation of a stronger state.
The nation was conspicuous by its absence.
The period between the creation of the Republic of New
Granada (1832) and the separation of Panama from the Republic of
Colombia in 1903 show this. Within this timeframe, the fragile State
experienced seven civil wars and two name changes, a situation so grave
that it resulted in the temporary secession of provinces like Cauca and
Panama, among others.19 After its final and deadliest civil war, The
Thousand Day’s War (1899-1902) centralism became, once and for all,
the underlying premise of the Colombian state. This structure would also
become that of the nation.20
As evidenced by this overview of the ninety-two years
encompassed between 1810 and 1902, the Colombian state was
characterized by its weakness and its consistent inability to maintain the
central government’s authority vis-à-vis the differing interests of its
provinces. The end of the Thousand Days’ War, showed the vulnerability
“of the concept of a Colombian nation, with a political system that did
not have the capacity to negotiate the most urgent problem of the
country’s international agenda: devising a treaty whereby the United
States acquired the rights to build, through Colombian territory, a canal
that would join the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.”21 This demonstrates that
19
Arango de Restrepo and Glora Mercedes, “Estado Soberano del Cauca:
asociaciones católicas, socioabilidades, conflictos y discursos politico religiosos,
prolegómenos de la Guerra de 1876,” in Ganarse el cielo defendiendo la religion:
Guerras civiles en Colombia, 1840-1902, ed. Luis Javier Ortiz Mesa et al. (Medellín:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2005), 329.
20
Brenda Escobar Guzmán, “La Guerra de los Mil Días vista a través de las
memorias,” in Ganarse el cielo defendiendo la religion: Guerras civiles en Colombia, 18401902, ed. Luis Javier Ortiz Mesa et al. (Medellín: Universidad Nacional de
Colombia, 2005), 250.
21
Thomas Fischer, “Antes de la separación de Panamá: la guerra de los Mil Días,
el contexto internacional y el canal,” (Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de
Cultura 25, 1998), 73. Translation mine.
100 | Consolidating Power: The Making of Modern Columbia
the concept of a Colombian nation-state did not exist since the first
declarations of independence in 1810. Furthermore, the problems of
integration faced during the Patria Boba and again during the existence of
Gran Colombia, albeit nuanced, exhibit a certain degree of thematic
continuity. The relative geographic isolation of each province made it
difficult to undertake a nationalizing project, exacerbated by the lack of
government revenue. The role of historians in creating the Colombian
nation-state needs to be emphasized once again. Throughout the years,
they have provided the country with a history of unity that, as
demonstrated, was not the case. Many of the works were quick to blame
the United States and failed to recognize that the state was not very
present in Panama, and that there were many other factors that were (at
best) problematic in order to maintain Panama as a part of Colombia. 22
Global Geopolitics and Panama
The Province of Panama did not prove easier to integrate into
the Andean republic, whatever its name was. In fact, before it declared its
independence once and for all in 1903, the province had already
entertained the idea four times. The last attempt, in 1840, lasted a year,
after which the commercial elite agreed – under the promise of greater
independence to set economic policy – to be a part of the Republic of
New Granada.23 Panama’s population and weather were not very
different from that of Cartagena. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
rulers in Bogotá were not too preoccupied with the province itself if one
keeps in mind the social ideologies previously discussed.
Panama did not represent much, economically or socially, for the
government in Bogotá. During its brief period of independence in 1840,
Panama had approached Great Britain with the hope to either become a
22
“Much has been written about Panama – its canal, and its separation from
Colombia – around the world. But very little has been written in Colombia, for it
seems like Colombians have refused to systematically analyze this regrettable
event… There are only three works that study this incident panoramically and
systematically. Alvaro Rebolledo’s Book, Reseña politico-histórica del Canal
Interoceánico, published in 1930., Antonio José Uribe’s Colombia y los Estados Unidos,
and Oscar Terán’s Del Tratado Herrán-Hay al Tratado Hay-Bunau-Varilla […]
Without a doubt, these are inspired by the highest sense of Colombian
patriotism. However, they are at fault for lacking the impartiality and objectivity
that such an analysis calls for, and that cannot be asked of any of its authors:
Rebolledo belonged to a generation that was too close to the drama, Uribe
participated in it and Terán was one of the antagonists” –Eduardo Lemaitre,
Panama y su separacion de Colombia, (Bogota! : Banco Popular, 1972), 2-3.
Translation mine.
23
Ibid., 27 – 32.
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part of the British Empire. Although Panama’s elite later integrated the
province back into New Granada, the idea of a possible British intrusion
did not sit well with Santander’s government in Bogotá.24 This led
Santander to search elsewhere in a preventive effort to protect New
Granada’s sovereignty.
Serendipitously, the United States was expanding to the West,
thereby making transit through the isthmus a necessity as it exploited the
mineral resources in California.25 A treaty with New Granada proved
most convenient. First of all, passage through the isthmus would
significantly cut the distance traveled by sea to the West Coast (the
alternative was around Cape Horn). Second, U.S. engagement in the
region would check the ambitions of the British. It was this set of
circumstances that led to the Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty of 1846. Through
this treaty, the Republic of New Granada granted the United States
significant transit rights over the isthmus. In exchange, the United States
was to guarantee New Granada’s sovereignty and property rights over the
isthmus as well as its political neutrality.26 This treaty was the start of the
stormy relationship between Colombia and the United States that ended
in a highly publicized international incident.
The negotiations between New Granada and the United States
worried a British Empire that still had Caribbean ambitions. It was in the
spirit of avoiding future confrontation over such a crucial waterway that
the United States and Great Britain signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
whereby they agreed that undertaking the building of a canal would only
be considered as a joint enterprise between the two powers.27 The
strategic position of Panama had become evident to the largest world
powers.
Two events in 1869 clearly showed for the united states of both
Colombia and America that a canal must be built through the isthmus.
First, there was the completion of the transcontinental railroad in the
U.S.; this dealt a devastating blow to the isthmian economy that had, up
until then, depended on the transit of Americans and their merchandise.
The Colombian government realized that a canal had to be built to
restore economic prosperity to the region. The second event was the
completion of the Suez Canal; the United States government was newly
determined to build a canal through the isthmus that would not only
24
Andres Celestino Arauz and Patricia Pizzurno Gelos, El Panama colombiano
(1821-1903), (Panama: Primer Banco de Ahorros y Diario La Prensa de Panama,
1993), 127-128.
25
Julie Greene, The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal.
(New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 17.
26
Araúz and Pizzurno, El Panama! colombiano, 130.
27
Ibid., 131.
102 | Consolidating Power: The Making of Modern Columbia
facilitate American expansionism but also keep British economic rise in
check; or at least compete with it.28 In order to justify its constant – and
sometimes unwanted – interventions in Colombian territory during the
many civil wars, the United States used the clause of the MallarinoBidlack Treaty that called for the United States to maintain the neutrality
of the isthmus. The Colombian government was eager to renegotiate a
treaty in order to avoid further unwanted intervention. Renegotiation
attempts failed, and the lack of a new agreement meant maintaining a
status quo that the Colombian government was no longer willing to
accept; it sought France as an ally. However, the French enterprise failed
and that, coupled with a British Empire focused in Asia, left the United
States as the only nation with enough capital to build the canal as well as
the desire to build a hemispheric economy that rivaled that of Britain.
The interest of the United States in the canal became even greater in 1898
when the U.S. acquired Guam, the Philippines, and Hawaii.29 Because
Great Britain had a vested interest in total control of the Suez Canal, it
was not difficult to renegotiate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with the
United States. This meant that negotiations between Colombia and the
U.S. could start.30 The treaty that resulted from these negotiations was
the Hay-Herrán Treaty, which granted the United States rights over a
zone of the isthmus to build the canal. One of the most controversial
stipulations of that treaty was that it granted the U.S. perpetual rights
over the canal zone. This, among other things, led the Colombian
government to reject the treaty, a measure that the Panamanian elite, the
Frenchmen, and Theodore Roosevelt did not appreciate. The secessionist
voices in Panama became louder, arguing that as a part of Colombia
Panama was economically doomed. A confluence between French
entrepreneurial interests, Panama, and Roosevelt’s resolve proved
stronger than Colombia’s sovereignty and on November 3rd, 1903, just a
year after the end of the Thousand Days’ War, Panama declared its
independence. The Colombian government sent troops to put down the
rebellion but the Panama Railroad Company refused to transport them to
the other side of the isthmus.31 Two days after the secession, the U.S.
government recognized the new republic and a treaty quickly granted the
U.S. perpetual rights over the canal zone. Panama was lost.
28
Ibid., 179.
Greene, The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal, 19.
30
Araúz & Pizzurno, El Panama! colombiano, 285.
31
Ibid., 288 - 292
29
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After Panama's Separation: The Birth of Columbian Nation-State,
1904-1921
Until Panama’s secession, Colombia had maintained a colonial
infrastructure that was adequate for a colonial economy of imports and
exports rather than for fostering a unified national market.32 Although it
is not certain whether or not this concern was already being discussed by
the government before Panama’s secession, its aftermath provides ample
evidence that Colombian leaders wanted to focus on reshaping the
economy in order to establish a strong state. Rafael Uribe Uribe, a
notable Colombian general and intellectual, observed that:
“Without a squadron, without an army, without industries, and without
diplomacy, we lack all that is necessary to ensure that a country is heard
in the international arena. It can almost be said that such a country
loses the moral right to autonomy in the midst of countries that are
strong and civilized.”33
The words are harsh, but they show that he, like many others in the
government in Bogotá, were aware of Colombia’s challenges in the
international arena. Sparked by Panama’s secession, the central
government knew that it had to take action in order to prevent other
provinces from following Panama’s example. The changes that Colombia
underwent from 1904 to 1911 were crucial for the creation of the nationstate that the Bogotá elite had longed for.
Starting with President Reyes in 1904, the national government
undertook reforms that, although modest, were veritable efforts to build
a strong state and the capacity to build an imagined community (or at the
very least, prevent the secession of other provinces). During his
presidency, Reyes aimed to empower the central government and build a
national economy at the expense of the regional economies that fractured
the state. One of the first things he did was change the way in which
public administrators were selected. For the first time, Reyes required
that the candidates show expertise in the area of policy that they expected
to be a part of. Another move to expand the power of the central
government was the nationalization of the slaughter tax. His government
also sought to stabilize Colombian currency, which suffered an inflation
rate of 2,500 percent. This effort to maximize the government’s solvency
was undertaken partly to finance an infrastructural expansion. The
32
Darío Mesa, “La vida política después de Panamá, 1903 – 1922” in Manual de
Historia de Colombia: Tomo III, ed. Santiago Mutis Durán (Bogotá, Círculo de
Lectores, 1982).
33
Uribe Uribe, quoted in Ibid., 95. Translation mine.
104 | Consolidating Power: The Making of Modern Columbia
process of funds allocation for public infrastructure, mainly railroads and
roads, was also streamlined to give more power to central government.34
In a country prone to civil war, it is perhaps unexpected to see the
implementation of such centralist reforms. Indeed, it is worth noting that
these reforms encountered resistance from many who did not wish to see
their regional autonomy reduced. However, the majority of congress
agreed to Reyes’ reforms because they were aware that if something was
not done, secessionist tendencies in other parts of the country could
become a reality. Reyes went farther than expected, dividing certain
departments in order to prevent the concentration of power at the
regional level, which led to the disruption of traditional regional
allegiances.35 Finally, a central bank was re-established in order to regulate
the fragmented monetary markets that existed in the country.36
Reyes recognized that the economic resources with which to
carry out infrastructural reform were limited. Therefore, he also took
steps to ensure that Colombia was once again attractive to foreign
investment. Among other things, he resumed service of Colombia’s
foreign debt, and accepted most the creditors’ demands. Although
Reyes’s dictatorial powers were controversial, his decision to negotiate a
treaty with the United States for the loss of Panama was even more
polemical. He was aware that normalizing relations with the United States
would open Colombia once again to American investment. However,
Reyes encountered insurmountable opposition with regards to this, and
by 1909 he had to leave office.37 Although his presidency was slightly
unconventional, in the words if historian Darío Mesa, “Reyes explained
Colombia’s problem as two-fold: first, building the material foundations
of the modern State to then exercise as much State sovereignty as those
foundations permitted.”38
Though implementing reforms motivated by Panama’s secession,
Colombian government officials rarely discussed the incident.39 One
34
Ibid., 99-100.
Ibid., 101.
36
Carlos Eduardo Valencia, “Los costos fiscales para Bogotá de la pérdida de
Panamá” in Colombia y Panamá: la metamorfosis de la nación en el siglo XX, ed.
Heraclio Bonilla and Gustavo Motañez (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de
Colombia, 2004), 177 – 200.
37
Bushnell, The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself, 160
38
Mesa, La vida política después de Panamá, 1903 – 1922”, 118.
39
Such reforms included the redistribution of Colombian states, renamed
departments, which were broken up in order to debilitate “the power of these
territorial, subnational entities in order to avoid separations like Panama’s”.
Montañez, “El Istmo de Panamá y Colombia: de Puente natural a juego geopolítico
de la unión.” 150.
35
Ezra’s Archives | 105
historian has noted that, “paradoxically, after Panama’s separation, the
governing elite was more interested in allowing the incident to fall into
obscurity… They opted instead for silence, promoting a subtle national
amnesia with regards to that subject.”40 The silence was broken in 1911 at
the University of California, Berkeley, where ex-president Roosevelt
made controversial remarks that brought the Panama incident to the
center of the international spotlight. In his speech, Roosevelt asserted, “I
took the Canal Zone, [my emphasis] and let Congress debate, and while the
debate goes on the canal does also.”41 Roosevelt also wrote an editorial
for The Outlook in October 7, 1911 in which he described Colombia as
“utterly incompetent to perform the ordinary governmental duties
expected of a civilized state,” described its government officials as “a
succession of banditti,” and further justified his actions by claiming that
the U.S. “did harm to no one save as harm is done to a bandit by a
policeman who deprives him of his chance of blackmail.” The
controversial public conversation that ensued was not very consequential
in the sense that it did not help Colombia regain lost territory. However,
the controversy did have a very important effect: it was a factor that
helped legitimize – nationally and internationally – the existence of a
Bogotá-led Colombian nation-state that had struggled to exist for almost
a century but was now well on its way to building a strong state. Partially
because of Panama’s separation, several key political differences were
resolved, leading to a peaceful period in which capitalism expanded
largely due to coffee exports.42 The humiliation of losing national
territory made it evident to Colombian politicians that internal strife
could lead to more territorial loss, and that was a price they were no
longer willing to pay.
Panama’s separation represented a flagrant disregard for
Colombian sovereignty and a significant loss of revenue. As expected,
Colombian government officials rushed to qualify Roosevelt’s remarks as
an imperialist affront. Francisco Escobar, the Colombian Consul-General
for the United States, immediately wrote a letter to Roosevelt which was
published by the New York Times and other newspapers. Although
certainly scathing towards Roosevelt, certain passages provide us with a
glimpse of the complicated relationship between Colombia and the
United States:
40
Montañez, 199.
Anonymous, 1911. “’I took the Isthmus’; ex-President Roosevelt’s confession, Colombia’s
protest, and editorial comment by American newspapers on "How the United States acquired
the right to build the Panama canal." New York: [M.B. Brown Print. Co.].
42
Charles Bergquist, “Panamá y los orígenes sociales del imperialismo
norteamericano,” in Colombia y Panamá: la metamorfosis de la nación en el siglo XX,
177 – 200.
41
106 | Consolidating Power: The Making of Modern Columbia
Sir: former presidents of the United States have stepped down from the
highest position attainable by mortal man to again become private
citizens of this great Republic, and have carried with them … the
dignity of their office and the respect of their fellow-countrymen. You
have elected a different course and … have forfeited the consideration
due to the high office you once held. You can now pretend only to
such respect as you as a man deserve. I say this to make it quite clear
that I am addressing you as an individual, and do not wish to reflect
either upon the Government or the people of the United States, for
whom I have the deepest respect and regard …
In default of argument, such is the unseemly language [presented
above] you use to justify the rape of the Isthmus and refute the oftrepeated charges that you deal unfairly with Colombia; that you violated
a public treaty [Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty] … as to permit your friends
who were interested in the Panama Canal Company to put through
their $40,000,000 deal … that you prostituted the navy of the United
States to the same end … You hurl insults and slanders at the
unfortunate country that you robbed of her most valuable
possession…
In the introduction, Escobar takes care to make it clear that he is
insulting Roosevelt and not the government of the United States.
However, it is important to keep in mind the reforms that the Colombian
government was trying to achieve. Although President Carlos Restrepo
was now in power, he was just as committed as Reyes to continue
strengthening the Colombian state. The fiscal reforms encouraged by
Reyes did create more revenue, but the expansion of the national
infrastructure envisioned by the president still required foreign
investment. The weight of this consideration is evident in the consul’s
letter. By explicitly stating that he does not mean to insult the U.S.
government, he is avoiding detrimental consequences for Colombia’s
relationship with the United States.
Another salient characteristic of Escobar’s letter is the language
with which he victimizes Colombia. In addition to referencing rape, he
speaks of Roosevelt’s unfair treatment towards Colombia, which is
described as an unfortunate victim of robbery. Based on the state of the
Colombian economy, the country did not have the means to go to war
against the United States. The only option left was to take the United
States to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and allow international law
to do justice by the “raped republic.” The United States never agreed to
arbitration. Under those circumstances, there was little that the
Colombian government could do but assimilate its loss.
Despite the fact that Colombia did not recover its territory, one
must be careful to not dismiss the consequences of the 1911 debate. In
Ezra’s Archives | 107
fact, a New York Times editorial read, “Why arbitrate a dispute as to
which any just tribunal would certainly find against us? … There are a
great many people of the United States who would like to be able to look
South America in the face without blushing.”43 Together with the
strengthening state, the international recognition of Colombia’s
complaint legitimized the Colombian nation both to its inhabitants and
around the world. The United States – partially seeking to ameliorate its
image in Latin America and partially seeking to exploit Colombia’s
coffee, oil, and other agricultural goods – sought to normalize relations
with Colombia in 1914. This effort was welcomed by Restrepo’s
administration. In the resulting Thompson-Urrutia Treaty, Colombia
would agree to recognize Panama’s sovereignty in exchange for $25
million in compensation, the right to transport its military through the
canal, and the right to transport commercial goods through the canal
subject to the same fees as the United States.44
Before the U.S. government was able to ratify this treaty, World
War I started and American participation delayed its ratification. The
Thompson-Urrutia Treaty was finally ratified in 1921, which brought a
much-needed cash injection to Colombia. The fact that Colombia had
access to the canal drastically altered economic patterns in its Pacific
coast and the Valle del Cauca regions. Here, coffee exports benefited
relations with the U.S., because access to the canal meant quick access to
the American markets.45 Additionally, transportation costs decreased
further thanks to the new railroads funded by the Colombian
government. This prompted the emergence of new economic patterns
that, coupled with the other reforms, reduced economic regionalism in
the country.
The efforts to consistently attract American investments were
motivated by both the desperate economic situation of the country and
the desire to acquire enough economic capital to actually build a nationstate. These efforts defined, for the first time, the foreign policy of the
nascent Colombian nation-state. Given Colombia’s internal problems, its
foreign policy was rather limited. It is true that there was commerce with
Great Britain, the United States, and France, among others.46 However,
43
Anonymous, 1911. “’I took the Isthmus’; ex-President Roosevelt’s confession, Colombia’s
protest, and editorial comment by American newspapers on "How the United States acquired
the right to build the Panama canal." New York: [M.B. Brown Print. Co.].
44
Morales de Gómez, Historia de un despojo: el tratado Urrutia-Thomson, Panamá! y
el petróleo, 115.
45
Montañez, El Istmo de Panamá y Colombia: de Puente natural a juego geopolítico
de la unión”, 151.
46
Charles Pepper, Report on Trade Conditions in Colombia (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1907).
108 | Consolidating Power: The Making of Modern Columbia
the most notable acts in the international sphere had to do with the
Panama Canal, starting with the Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty in 1846. It was
then that the Colombian government started trying to organize its foreign
policy.47 In fact, several political scientists of different backgrounds have
identified Panama as the guiding factor of Colombian foreign policy
citing that year as a starting point.48 However, it isn’t until Panama’s
secession that an identifiable effort to build an organized foreign policy is
conceived.
This what political scientist Martha Ardila argues in ¿Cambio de
norte? Momentos críticos de la política exterior colombiana. In her book, Ardila
argues that Panama’s loss was a catalyst in Colombian foreign relations as
there was an effort to organize a policy that was, up until then, poorly
defined. Ardila argues that Colombia has been in a position that she
terms “active subordination.” She characterizes the period from 1914 to
1930 as a pragmatic effort to approach each other almost entirely for
economic reasons: the U.S. looking for raw materials, Colombia for
foreign capital with which to push forward its project to build a modern
nation-state (proyecto modernizador del Estado).49
This distinct form of Colombian foreign policy has been
identified by Colombian academics as “réspice polum,” looking towards
the North Pole. In her description of this period, Ardila maintains
Colombia’s foreign policy in terms of an economic exchange – one where
the United States has the economic capital Colombia needs to modernize.
This reality drives foreign policy towards the northern neighbor.
Although her analysis provides a helpful frame with which to understand
this “opportunistic” view, it is narrow insofar as it excessively treats the
State as an actor, which at some point lessens the responsibility of
individual policy makers in Colombia. The policy of réspice polum was
driven by the Bogotá elite that, as has been demonstrated, needed to
build a nation-state. Additionally, the growing influence of the coffee
producing elite, which would certainly benefit from an increasing
relationship with the United States, was another factor driving the foreign
policy decisions of Colombian presidents and diplomats.
47
Benjamín Ardila Duarte, “El área económica en las relaciones
internacionales,” in Revista Credencial Historia (Bogotá, Colombia. Edición 220.
Agosto de 2006).
48
See Stephen J. Randall, Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and
Interdependence (Athens, G.A.: University of Georgia Press, 1992) and Martha
Ardila, ¿Cambio de norte? Momentos críticos de la política exterior colombiana. (Bogotá,
Colombia : UN, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales:
Tercer Mundo Editores, 1991).
49
Ardila, ¿Cambio de norte?.
Ezra’s Archives | 109
Although Colombia’s access to the Panama Canal altered many
of the regional economic patterns that were once damaging for national
unity, the influence of exports on the nation’s economy was ever
increasing. The coffee-growing elite had a growing influence in
Colombia’s foreign policy as they looked to expand coffee’s international
market. This displaced earlier regional conflicts with different economic
dynamics within the country. The development of Colombia’s foreign
policy can be seen as one more step towards the establishment of the
Colombian nation, this time in the international arena.
The period of 1904 to 1921 was crucial not only for the
economic development of the state and a defined foreign policy but also
for the development of the ‘model’ Colombian citizen. By 1903, Bogotá’s
failure to create a nation-state was evident. Thus, the same time period in
which the government oversaw the emergence of the Colombian state
also oversaw the foundation of the nation. The ideology of the time
viewed white as the desirable race. Panama, mostly inhabited by blacks
and Native Americans, never really had a place in the national image of
the Bogotá elite. Panama’s separation made Colombia slightly more
homogenous, and thus easier to imagine as one nation. 50 Nevertheless,
Colombian intellectuals continued to attribute part of the country’s woes
to its racial make-up. In his book Fronteras imaginadas: la construcción de las
razas y de la geografía en el siglo XIX colombiano, Alfonso Múnera describes
the way in which the Bogotá ruling class envisioned the Colombian
citizen. Citing a prominent Colombian intellectual, Múnera shows how
the elite viewed Bogotá as the cradle for the best elements of civilization.
This of course meant that the ideal Colombian citizen under Bogotá’s
leadership was white and ‘civilized,’ a concept that marginalized other
groups within the nation while at the same time forcing them to be a part
of it.51 It was during this period of time that the image of the Bogotano
prevailed in the Colombian imaginary as the ideal citizen, an idea
reinforced by Bogotá’s increased dominance of the state since 1904. This
is, once again, evidence of a silencing of sorts that served a nationbuilding purpose.
Given the historiographical trajectory of the nation state, it may
seem surprising to hear historians like Gustavo Montañez say that, “the
greatest loss from Panama’s separation was human, Panamanians
themselves, whose talent, cultural diversity and potential is
50
Bushnell, 154.
Alfonso Munera, Fronteras imaginadas: la construccion de las razas y de la geografia en
el siglo XIX colombiano (Bogota: Planeta, 2005).
51
110 | Consolidating Power: The Making of Modern Columbia
unquantifiable.”52 On a superficial level, his statement represents the
development of racial tolerance and appreciation for diversity that
characterized the end of the 20th century. However, his work, one
hundred years after Panama’s separation, is still reluctant to accept
Panama’s loss. Indeed, he goes as far as suggesting that both countries
should “owe each other a second chance and should start thinking about
Colombia and Panama as one country.”53 This pervasive unwillingness to
accept Panama’s separation as definitive speaks to a body of work that
imagines a nation-state beyond its capacity to govern.
Conclusion
Neither the nation nor the state is organic. Therefore, the nationstate is not organic either; instead, it is built by groups of people who
make a conscious effort to define what the nation state is and is not. In
the process, certain characteristics become a part of the national image
while others are excluded from it. This is certainly the case for Colombia,
which, despite gaining definitive independence from Spain in the 1820s,
had consistently failed to establish a nation-state until after the separation
of Panama in 1903.54 The loss Panama was largely an imperialist affront
orchestrated by the United States. However, the fact that the idea
resonated within the Panamanian elite so long after Colombia’s
independence from Spain is further evidence of the Colombian nationstate’s failure.
Colombian historiography, even today, continues to victimize
Colombia in 1903. The subsequent years, until 1921, are presented as a
period in which the country had no choice but to seek the United States
in order to ameliorate its economic problems. This narrative is
52
Montañez. El Istmo de Panamá y Colombia: de Puente natural a juego geopolítico
de la unión.” In Colombia y Panamá: la metamorfosis de la nación en el siglo XX.
Edited by Heraclio Bonilla and Gustavo Motañez, 149.
53
Ibid., 153. Original quote: “Parece cuestión de simple dignidad histórica que
nuestros pueblos ensayen una segunda oportunidad y comiencen a pensar que
Colombia y Panamá puedan volver a ser un solo país en el futuro.”
54
“La separación de Panamá fue un hecho inequívoco que demostró el fracaso
del Estado Colombiano y de sus gobiernos en relación con la búsqueda de
alternativas viables y dignas para el asunto del canal. Fracasó el Estado porque en
los términos de su significación formal, en aquella época, una de sus funciones
fundamentales era el mantenimiento de la unidad territorial. [The separation of
Panama unequivocally demonstrated the failure of Colombian state and its
government in relation to the search for viable alternatives for the canal project.
The state failed because, in the terms of its legal responsibilities, one of its
fundamental functions was the maintenance of territorial unity].” Montañez, El
Istmo de Panamá y Colombia: de Puente natural a juego geopolítico de la unión”, 151.
Ezra’s Archives | 111
problematic because, in portraying Colombia as a victim, it obscures the
fact that Panama’s separation facilitated the consolidation of power in
Bogotá at the expense of other regions in the country. While it is true
that losing Panama to unrestrained imperialism highlighted the absence
of a strong nation-state, this phenomenon, in and of itself, is not
necessarily a guarantee of future political unit. In Colombia’s case,
Panama’s secession meant that the province that could rival Bogotá for
control of the state was out of the union, effectively leaving the Andean
capital as the unrivaled center of power in the country.
Determined to not allow another secession to happen – an idea
certainly entertained by other provinces – the government in Bogotá
spearheaded a series of reforms meant to consolidate its power and
dismantle the ever-disharmonious influence of regional concentrations of
power. This change was further facilitated by the opening of the Panama
Canal and the subsequent normalization of relations between the U.S.
and Colombia by means of the Thompson-Urrutia Treaty. These helped
the Colombian state acquire the revenue necessary to build a modern
state while altering the economic landscape of the country in a way that
eased regional tensions between Bogotá and the rest of the republic.
Colombia was the victim of empire; but its ruling class used the
confusion that ensued to secure the nation-building project that it had
been unable to maintain until then. Without Cartagena, without Caracas,
and without Panama to resist, the Colombian nation-state was built from
Bogotá. However, when the country as a whole is viewed as a victim, it is
difficult to point to the actions of the central government as a steady
effort to neutralize rivaling regions. Instead, the government’s actions are
written into history as somewhat heroic, ignoring the fact that in the
process of building a nation-state in the image of Bogotá, other regions in
Colombia continue to be marginalized.
Although American imperialist intervention as it regards
Colombia and Panama has been amply discussed, the power shift that
allowed the Bogotá elite to once and for all lead the nation-building
project has not received much attention. Given the scope of American
imperialism, this project may perhaps help raise questions about the
consequences of American intervention in other countries.
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