The European Union seen from the “top”. National elites views towards the politico-institutional
future of the EU in time of crisis.
Francesco Marangoni
Università degli studi di Siena
([email protected])
Federico Russo
Università del Salento
([email protected])
Paper presented at the XXX SISP annual conference. Milan, 15th-17th September 2016. Section:
Politica e politiche dell'Unione europea (Politics and policies of the European Union), panel: parties
and policies in the European crisis.
Introduction
Saying that political elites played a central role in the European Integration process is so obvious to
be hardly worth mentioning. European integration has been characterized as a fundamentally elite
driven project, and this claim is confirmed by recent comparative surveys which analyze the
attitudes toward integration among masses and national elites (Sanders, Magalhaes, and Toka 2012;
Best, Lengyel, and Verzichelli 2012). Direct comparisons confirm that elites are generally more prointegration than ordinary citizens (Sanders and Toka 2013), but this is in no way a surprising
phenomenon. The disjunction between elite and mass opinion became politically relevant in recent
years, when European Integration became contested at the national level and anti-integration
positions were included in the electoral manifestos of some national parties: the traditional
“permissive consensus” (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993) was replaced by a “constraining dissensus”
(Hooghe and Marks 2008). The new fact is that national elites can no longer afford to ignore the
popular discontent on the state of integration if they want to maintain citizens’ support.
The recent financial, economic and then fiscal crisis which invested the European Union at the end
of 2008 seriously eroded citizens’ support for the integration project, perhaps because the EU was
seen more as an obstacle than an opportunity to adopt effective remedial measures. This is
especially true in countries which had to implement harsh austerity measures, where popular
1
discontent caused the punishment of all incumbent governments (Bellucci, Costa Lobo, and LewisBeck 2012) and challenger parties emerged or gained electoral momentum. In this context,
Schimmelfennig (2014) noted a striking puzzle: in spite of unprecedented social discontent,
politicization, and loss of popular support for the EU integration process, the crisis has produced
major new steps of integration, at least on a technical ground. New mechanisms where established
to ensure financial assistance to countries in difficulty (e.g. the ESM), European powers to
coordinate national budgets increased (e.g. the Fiscal Compact), some steps forwards were taken
to constitute a banking union etc. In the multi-layered structure of the current EU, this phenomenon
was especially evident for the countries included in the Eurozone. We already know that this has
happened in stark contrast with citizens’ attitudes, but we know much less about the position of
national elites. How do they see the future of EU integration? Did they suffer these steps as an
unavoidable necessity or warmly endorsed them as positive developments? This question is
especially relevant for both empirical and theoretical reasons. Firstly, as elites have traditionally
been the engine of European integration, their opinions constitute a good indicator of the direction
of future integration efforts. Secondly, it is not clear what the impact of the crisis should have been.
On the one hand, quite intuitively, we might expect that politicians of the countries which were
severely hit by the crisis developed a certain degree of hostility towards the EU. The liberal
intergovernmental theory offers a compelling reason to expect a plunge in elites’ support for
integration. According to this tradition integration in nothing but a strategy chosen by national
elites to pursue national interests in a changing international environment (Haller 2008; Moravcsik
1993). Was the imposition of austerity measures to countries which were already in recession
sufficient to alter the perceived cost-benefit balance of integration? There is, however, a second
mechanism that might have cooled down politicians’ enthusiasms for European Integration. The
literature shows how in the current phase the positions held by elites and masses are not
independent (Sanders and Toka 2013), but tend to influence each other. Public opinion research
showed that “the most pronounced increase in Euroscepticism has taken place in the countries most
affected by the crisis” (Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia 2013, 51), and with popular Euroscepticism
on the rise, also parliamentarians’ attitudes might be affected. This could have happened in two
ways: firstly, traditional elites might have changed their opinion under the influence of popular
discontent; secondly, representatives of traditional parties might have been replaced by an influx of
more Eurosceptic colleagues.
2
However, on the other hand, the crisis could have reinforced the perceived necessity of building a
more integrate Europe. Indeed, one of the propositions put forward to make sense of the slowness
of the EU to react to the economic crisis is exactly the still insufficient state of its integration. In line
with the neo-functional argument (Haas 1958), we might expect that the crisis could have triggered
a spillover effect by demonstrating that more integration is needed. According to this perspective
there are problems that should be solved at the European level just because they transcend national
borders (Sinnott 1995; Wessels and Kielhorn 1999). Delegation of powers to a supranational
authority in these fields would reduce the transaction costs caused by painstaking negations among
several states.
There is one reason, however, making this alternative between more or less Europe an
oversimplification. Past research has shown that national parliamentarians do not think about the
European integration process in terms of Euroscepticism and Europhilia. Rather, they articulate their
support or opposition to the EU into several dimensions (Russo and Cotta 2013; Cotta and Russo
2012). A fundamental distinction can be traced between the institutional structure of the European
polity and its scope of governance. The first dimension has to do with the identity and relative
powers of the several institutions constituting the architecture of the European Union, and the
relative importance of the supranational and intergovernmental principles. The second dimension
concerns the policy fields for which responsibility should be delegated to the European level. In
principle the two dimensions are independent, because the policy making process can take place at
the European level either with a supranational or with an intergovernmental structure. National
elites, more than ordinary citizens, are believed to be primarily moved by pragmatic and
instrumental motivations more than by affective attitudes. If we believe that parliamentarians
develop their positions according to a cost-benefit analysis, then we cannot exclude that the crisis
had independent effect on the two dimensions of support for EU integration.
When forming expectations, we should bear in mind some important features of this economic and
political crisis, most notably that its impact has been asymmetric, hitting different groups of
countries to a different degree (see table 1). In general, member states with high public debt or
where the national banking systems needed a bail-out suffered a fiscal crisis which caused the
necessity to implement austerity measures. However, those countries participating in the Eurozone
had to face additional constraints, in the form of a close monitoring of their budgets by the European
Commission. Some of them (namely Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) needed financial
3
help form an ad hoc borrowing mechanism comprised of the International Monetary Fund, the
European Commission and the European Central Bank, the so-called Troika, which required harsh
economic reforms in return. It has been argued that the crisis, and the actions implemented to face
it, altered the power balance within the EU because the economic weaknesses of large countries
such as France, Italy and Spain reinforced the hegemonic role of Germany (Schweiger 2014). In
addition, countries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe have been subject to a peripheralisation
process which is expected to have lowered the perceived benefits of being a member of the
European Union (Magone 2014). Whether and to what extent these phenomena had an impact on
the opinions of national parliamentarians will be assessed in the following sections.
This chapter opens by analysing how national elites evaluate the advancements of European integration, and
what they expect from the future evolution of the European polity building. We consider two main
dimensions, which are objects of two separate sections. The first section provides a preliminary assessment
of the attitudes of the political elites towards the status quo of the European supranational integration. The
following section gives a picture of the prospective judgements on what should be the developments of the
European Union institutional structure and of the role of the EU vis-à-vis national governments in the time
ahead. In the third section we shift our focus to the preferred policy scope of the Union. The European
integration effort was marked by a progressive, albeit discontinuous, process of policy delegation from nation
states to the supranational level. Understanding how the crisis impacted on the opinion of national political
elites constitutes an indication of the possible steps that will be taken in the next years. Finally, the conclusion
discusses the results.
Table 1. GDP per capita, Eurozone membership and intervention of the Troika in the countries
included in the Enec study
GDP per capita (currrent price)
Eurozone
Troika
Country
2007
2014
2014 - 2007
Bulgaria
4300
5900
+37,21%
No
No
Germany
31000
36000
+16,13%
Yes
No
Greece
21100
16300
-22,75%
Yes
Yes
Spain
23900
22400
-6,28%
Yes
Yes
France
30400
32200
+5,92%
Yes
No
Croatia
10200
10200
+0,00%
No
No
Italy
27400
26500
-3,28%
Yes
No
Lithuania
9000
12400
+37,78%
No*
No
4
Hungary
10100
10600
+4,95%
No
No
Portugal
16600
16700
+0,60%
Yes
Yes
Slovenia
17400
18100
+4,02%
Yes
No
Source: Eurostat
*Lithuania joined the Euro on the 1st January 2015
Evaluation of the process of European integration (so far)
Our analysis begins by looking at the attitudes of the elites towards the European integration process from,
let us say, an «instrumental» perspective. The question, namely, is whether (and to what extent) national
political elites consider that the European membership has had beneficial effects for their (respective)
countries. Table 2 compares the overall percentage of positive answers (i.e. «My Country has benefited from
being member of the EU») to this questions in the 2007, 2009 and 2014 surveys.
Previous analyses had already emphasized how both before (2007) and at the beginning of the great
economic and financial crisis (2009), political elites showed almost no doubts on the beneficial effects of the
European membership for the countries they represented (Cotta and Russo 2012). This conclusion holds
apparently still true in 2014, though we find some evidences of a first (very) slight weakening of the «granitic»
positive (instrumental) feelings of the national political elites towards the European membership. As a matter
of fact, the percentage of MPs who believe that their respective countries have taken advantage of being
member of the European Union has decreased by five percentage points from 2009 (when it was around
95%) to 2014, although remaining at a significantly high level (around 90% in 2014)
It has to be noted that, for the sake of comparison, the 2014 percentage does not take into consideration
Croatian and Slovenian MPs, as Croatia and Slovenia are covered only by the Enec survey, being not surveyed
by the Intune project. Should we consider also these two countries, the aggregate percentage of positive
answers would be even lower (around 88%), due, in particular, to the relatively low record in Croatia (69%).
This last consideration suggests us to have deeper look at country by country data. Table 1 reports the
percentage of MPs who are convinced of the advantageous effects of the European membership in each
country covered by the 2014 survey, together with the 2014-2009 and 2014-2007 variation (in percentage
points). With two (or possibly three) main exceptions, we do not see, indeed, large deviations across time.
Interestingly enough, however, the two main exceptions are Greece and Italy, two countries severely touched
by the economic and financial crisis, where the rate of positive evaluations of the effects of the EU
memberships has decreased by (around) 20 percentage points in the five-year period (of great economic
depression) between the 2009 and 2014 surveys. With all the evidence, this is largely due to the progressive
5
weakening (in terms of seats in parliament) of the mainstream (and traditionally pro-European) parties, and
to the emergence of more «criticizing» political forces, like Syriza in Greece or the 5 Stars Movement in Italy1.
The same holds true in Hungary (the third partial exception) where the absolutely negative attitudes towards
EU Membership by the openly Eurosceptic Jobbik’s MPs, make the overall percentage of favourable answers
dropping by almost 10 percentage points between 2009 and 2014.
Other two countries deeply affected by the economic crisis, like Spain and Portugal, show indeed a rather
stable pattern of relatively high support towards the EU membership, although this is probably due to the
timing of the last survey that has not yet captured the positions of «latest comer» parties like Podemos in
Spain, or renewed (and strengthened) parties like the Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal.
Table 2. Views on EU membership. Percentage of MPs who strongly or somewhat believe that their own
country has benefited from being member of the EU (and variation in percentage points between 2014 and
2009 and between 2014 and 2007 surveys)
2014
2014 – 2009
2014 - 2007
N
Bulgaria
90,6
+0,3
-5,7
53
France
100
+7,4
+8,8
45
Germany
100
+1,3
+2,6
70
Greece
80,3
-19,7
-15,3
71
Hungary
80,4
-9,8
-6,8
56
Italy
76,3
-19,4
-20,1
80
Lithuania
100
+1,4
+2,6
54
Portugal
88,9
-3,8
-3,6
81
Spain
96,3
+1,2
-1,6
81
Croatia
69,1
-
-
68
Slovenia
95,8
-
-
48
We might now try to go beyond a purely instrumental perspective, by looking at more general attitudes of
the national political elites towards the «state of the art» of the European institution building. In doing so we
have chosen to analyse the answers to a question on the overall assessment of the «functioning» of the
1
Around 90% of the 5 Stars Movement’s MPs, and almost 50% of Syriza’s MPs, surveyed in 2014 believe, respectively,
that Italy and Greece have not taken advantages by the European membership.
6
European Union political and institutional system as a whole. The question, in particular, is to what extent
national politicians are satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU.
The overall percentage of MPs who declare themselves (very or somewhat) satisfied with the EU democracy
falls around 50% in 2014 (again, not considering Croatia and Slovenia) while it was equal to almost 63% in
2009 (this question was not included in the Intune 2007 questionnaire). Such decrease, as we can see with
2009
SLOVENIA
CROATIA
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
LITHUANIA
ITALY
HUNGARY
GREECE
GERMANY
FRANCE
BULGARIA
0
20
40
60
% satisfied
80
100
figure 1, was quite evenly distributed across countries, although it was more marked in some of them.
2014
Figure 1. Satisfaction with EU democracy (% of MPs who declare to be very or somewhat satisfied)
Italy and Greece (together with Hungary) are again the countries where the overall satisfaction with the
functioning of the EU has declined the most in relative terms2. But also the other southern countries, Spain
and Portugal, show similar patterns. The previous (relatively) positive attitudes of the national political elite
towards the European democracy seems in particular to be «freezing» in Portugal (passing from few less than
60% in 2009, to around 42% in 2014), while it is relatively more stable in Spain (where the percentage of
satisfied MPs has declined by 6 percentage points, from 67% to 61%, between 2009 and 2014). In this case,
however, even a country like France that, at least in comparative terms, endured the economic crisis
relatively well, shows a significant decline of the (admittedly already quite low) level of satisfaction with the
EU democratic system (passed from barely 34% in 2009 to only 20% in 2014). Only in Germany, maybe
2
From 60% to less than 38% in Italy; from 56% to 36% in Greece (and from 64% to around 37% in Hungary).
7
reflecting the awareness of its new hegemonic leadership (Schweiger 2014), the rate of satisfaction has
slightly increased (from 53% to almost 59%) between the two surveys. Quite interestingly (with the
Hungarian exception) the political elites of the new member countries show the highest degree of satisfaction
with the way democracy works in the EU3.
The views on the future of institutional integration
So far we have analysed the attitudes of the national political elites with regard to the past and the present
of the European Union. We now turn our attention to the stances of elites about the future of the EU. The
first, in a sense natural and preliminary, question to be addressed is: should the process of unification be
stopped (because it has gone too far) or, rather, it has to go further and be strengthened?
There are few doubts that there is (still) a majority of national politicians sharing the view that the European
integration needs to go further. The average score, on a 0 (unification has already gone too far)-10
(unification should be strengthened) scale, is around 7 in the 2014 survey. Table 3 shows also how this
conviction was rather homogeneously distributed across all countries covered by the survey, and how it
remained quite stable across time (and across surveys), with the one main exception of Hungary, where the
average level of favour towards further integration has drastically declined (by more than 2 points) in more
recent years.
Table 3. Views about the future of EU on a 0 (unification has already gone too far)-10 (unification should be
strengthened) scale. Average score and standard deviation (between brackets)
2014
2014 - 2009
2014 - 2007
N
Bulgaria
6.9 (2.7)
+0.2
0.2
53
France
6.8 (2.8)
+0.0
+0.3
43
Germany
7.7 (1.9)
+0.1
+0.3
68
Greece
7.0 (2.8)
-0.2
-0.6
71
Hungary
4.9 (3.1)
-2.2
-1.5
54
Italy
7.7 (2.5)
+0.7
+0.0
76
Lithuania
6.2 (2.2)
-0.1
-0.1
54
Portugal
6.6 (2.7)
+0.2
-0.1
80
Spain
8.0 (1.6)
-0.1
-0.1
80
3
Well beyond 60% in both Croatia, Slovenia, Lithuania and Bulgaria (although with a tiny reduction between 2009 and
2014 in the two latter cases).
8
Croatia
6.9 (2.2)
-
-
68
Slovenia
6.6 (2.0)
-
-
47
Quite obviously, views about an even more integrated European polity might differ with regard to the kind
of European Union political elites have in mind. Table 4 provides some evidences concerning the opinions of
national politicians on the «vertical dimension» of the integration, that is on the distribution and allocation
of powers among different institutions and, in particular, among the European Commission, the European
Parliament, but also the national governments (which are crucial actors of the European decision-making
process through the European Council and the Council of Ministers).
From this point of view, political elites reveal what has already been defined as a not fully consistent position
(Cotta and Russo 2012). On one hand, indeed, the great majority of national politicians continue to believe
(strongly or somewhat) that member states ought to remain central actors in the decision-making of the
Union. The overall percentage of MPs sharing this view is pretty stable during time (it passed from about 72%
in 2007 to few less than 74% in 2014, not considering Slovenia and Croatia)4. On the other hand, they are
largely in favour of strengthening the powers of a peculiarly supranational institution like the European
parliament (the percentage of MPs who believe that the powers of the European Parliament have to be
increased persists around 80% in all the three surveys of 2007, 2009 and 2014)5. The position of the elites
towards the European Commission is in a sense more balanced, with an overall (stable) majority of around
58% supporting the idea that the European Commission should become the true government of the EU6.
Table 4. Views about European Institutions (percentage of MPs who strongly or somewhat agree)
2014
The member states ought to remain the central actors
74.0
2014 -
2014 -
2009
2007
+3.5
+2.1
N
577
of the European Union
44 There are, however, some relevant country-by-country differences. The support for a central role of national
governments has decreased (from 2007 to 2014) in countries like Spain (about -4 percentage points) and, in particular,
Italy (-12 percentage points). A decrease that is counterbalanced by a significant increase in countries like Bulgaria (+ 11
percentage points), Hungary (+ 18 percentage points) and Lithuania (+ 10 percentage points)
5
With, again, some deviations on country bases. The percentage of MPs in favour of the reinforcement of the European
Parliament, for instance, has significantly decreased in Hungary (passing from 72% in 2007, to around 45% in 2014).
6
Country-by-country differences are however even more pronounced. In Hungary, for instance, the percentage of MPs
supporting (strongly or somewhat) the central role of the European Commission has passed from 67% in 2007 to 43%
in 2014. The same percentage has decreased by more than 10 points (from 69% to almost 58%) in Bulgaria, while it has
increased by 20 percentage points in Portugal (from 42% to 62%).
9
The European Commission ought to become the true
59.1
+0.7
+0.5
571
79.8
-2.0
+1.0
567
government of the European Union
The powers of the European Parliament ought to be
strengthened
Following again previous analyses by Cotta and Russo (2012), we can now use these data to move a step
further in exploring the attitudes of political elites towards different models of the institutional system of the
European Union. Focusing on views towards the role of the member states and of the European Commission
(the two actual main «pillars» of the European institutional architecture), in particular, Cotta and Russo have
defined four different conceptual institutional models for the EU: 1) a federalist position (the positive answer
to the question ‘The European Commission should become the true government of the EU’ is combined with
the negative answer to the question ‘Member states ought to remain the central actors’); (2) an
intergovernmentalist position (a negative answer to the first question is combined with a positive one to the
second); (3) a position of support for a ‘compound institutional model’ (when the answer is positive to both
questions); and (4) a double negative position, which combines the two negative answers and probably
reflects a full rejection of the EU.
The results of the 2014 (see table 5) survey are largely consistent with past results, with national elites quite
predominantly distributed among the first three models. On one hand, therefore, the “full rejection”
position, continues to be rather residual. On the other hand, only a minority (around 21% in 2014) of the
political elites seems to be ready to embrace and support more innovative solutions (as the federal model)7.
There is, indeed, a relatively relevant quota of politicians defending the traditional and central role of
member states, that is however (more than) counterbalanced by a relatively wide «acceptance of a mixed
system, which would strengthen the arrangement that currently governs the Union» (Cotta and Russo 2012,
65).
Table 5. Views about alternative EU institutional models
2014
2014 – 2009
2014 - 2007
Federalism
20.7
-1.5
+0.7
Negative position
8.1
-2.0
-2.7
7
Interestingly enough, the percentage of federalists is relatively higher in countries severely touched by the economic
crisis, as Portugal (around 22%), Spain (slightly more than 34%) and, in particular, Italy (about 45%). It is, on the contrary,
pretty residual in new comer countries like Bulgaria (2%), Lithuania (2%) and Croatia (around 6%),
10
Compound Model
38.4
+2.2
-0.2
Intergovernmentalism
35.5
+1.3
+2.2
11
The future of policy delegation
In the previous section we have analyzed the support found among national elites for the process
of EU integration, and especially for its institutional aspect. In the countries which are object of this
study the support for further integration has remained quite strong even after the crisis. This finding
demonstrates that despite the obvious difficulties caused by the hybrid nature of the EU, which
complicated the adoption of effective measures to control the economic crisis, national elites are
generally convinced that more integration, and not less, is needed. In this section we consider
another important aspect of support of integration, that is, the policy responsibilities that should be
given to the European Union. This question is not less important than the previous one: since the
Treaty of Rome European integration can be described as a process of constant reallocation of policy
making competences from member states to the supranational level. It can be said that the
European supranational community was conceived as a policy driven enterprise. It is especially
interesting to study the position of national parliamentarians because any transfer of policy
competence from the national to the supranational level is likely to diminish their leverage over the
decision making process. However, their willingness to grant additional responsibilities to the EU
level can also be seen as rational as long as they believe that in a global world national states are no
longer able to formulate and implement effective policies by their own. Previous research (RealDato, Göncz, and Lengyel 2012) based on the Intune survey gives a rather complex picture. Support
for policy integration was shown to vary according to at least three factors:
1) respondents’ nationality
2) policy sectors
3) time perspective
The general level of support for European integration, which is heavily dependent on nationality,
has a clear influence also on the more specific support for policy integration. With regard to policy
sectors, national elites were proved to be in favour of giving (exclusive or shared) responsibility to
the EU for those policy issues which have a transnational nature such as environment, immigration
or crime. On the contrary, their support for delegating traditional policies which defined the
development of nation states (taxation, fighting unemployment, health care) was fond to be much
less robust. However, when national elites were asked similar questions with a long-term
perspective (“in ten years”) a relative majority of respondents was found to support integration also
in the fields of taxation and social security. In this section we rely on the Enec survey to explore
12
national parliamentarians’ opinions over the scope of EU governance. When combined with
previous comparable researches, the present survey enables us to appreciate the effect of the crisis,
and of its differential impact, over national preferences.
A preliminary question concerns the opinions of national political elites about the fundamental goal
of the EU (table 6). Respondents were asked whether they think that the main goal of the EU should
be “to make the European economy more competitive or to provide better social security for its
citizens”. In general, a plurality of respondents assigns to the EU the goal of improving the welfare
for its citizens (about 40%). The percentage of parliamentarians favoring the goal of building a more
competitive economy is only slightly lower (31%). About one third of the respondents could not
make a choice between these two competing aims. This overall result is important in at least two
respects: firstly, it should be noted that the most popular choice is in contrast with the original aim
of the European integration effort, which was to create a broader market. Secondly, it is worth
noting that this question produces wide differences among countries. In all new member states,
with the only exception of Croatia, parliamentarians are more attracted to the perspective of
building a competitive economy. By contrast, in old member states there are more preferences for
a social Europe: this phenomenon reach its extreme in Southern European countries (Portugal,
Spain, Italy and Greece). Finally, a comparison with previous surveys shows that on average in the
last five years, at least with regard to the countries that have been covered by both the Intune and
the Enec surveys, preferences for the social option gained momentum. The countries in which the
proportion of supporters of a socially oriented Europe has increased more are, perhaps
unsurprisingly, two of those most hit by the crisis: Italy (+34 percentage points) and Greece (+19
percentage points).
Table 6. The main goal of the EU (%)
More competitive
Better social
Economy
Protection
Bulgaria
34.6
France
Country
Both
DK
N (valid)
15.4
46.2
3.8
52
27.3
25.0
47.7
0.0
44
Germany
38.6
50.0
8.6
2.9
70
Greece
13.5
43.2
43.2
0.0
74
13
Hungary
59.6
10.5
22.8
7.0
57
Italy
14.8
55.6
28.4
1.2
81
Lithuania
61.1
33.3
5.6
0.0
54
Portugal
18.5
51.9
27.2
2.5
81
Spain
17.3
50.6
28.4
3.7
81
Croatia
27.5
52.2
18.8
1.4
69
Slovenia
54.0
18.0
28.0
0.0
50
Total
31.0
39.7
27.2
2.1
713
The Enec survey includes several more specific questions on the scope of European governance. The
set of questions on the preferred level of competence for different policy areas takes on great
importance to uncover the views about the desired configuration of the European policy. Though
these questions, whose results are presented in table 7, respondents were asked at which level
(European, national, regional or combinations of them) several policies should be dealt with.
Previous elite surveys revealed how national parliamentarians used to discriminate between
different kind of policies: for some of them, those which are more traditionally linked to the nation
state, most respondents objected a transfer of sovereignty toward the European level; on the
contrary, for newer policy domain, those with a clear transnational character, a majority of
parliamentarians supported the involvement of the EU. To a certain extent, these results mirrored
the actual policy competences of the EU. Having systematic data on three points in time it is possible
to assess the stability of national parliamentarians’ preferences. This comparison is especially
interesting because the two waves of the Intune survey respectively cover the pre-crisis period
(2007) and a period in which the crisis was only beginning to display its first effects (2009). By
contrast, the fieldwork of the Enec survey took place when European countries had already lived
with the crisis for several years. As it was already mentioned, Croatia and Slovenia were not covered
in 2007 and 2009: a correct comparison could only be made on a country basis or removing those
two countries from the Enec survey. Thus, in all the following aggregate tables Croatia and Slovenia
are excluded from the analysis.
This set of questions reveals one important change (table 7): namely, the percentage of
parliamentarians supporting the involvement of the EU level in fighting unemployment has
dramatically increased and now vastly exceeds the absolute majority. With regard to healthcare, a
14
clear majority still prefer a national or sub-national solution. By contrast, Immigration, Environment
and Crime are still seen as fields on which the EU level should make policy, either alone or together
with national or subnational authorities. The Enec survey also included a new question aimed to
assess the level of support for European involvement in banking and financial sector regulation and
surveillance. More than 8 respondents out of 10 expressed support for giving at least shared
responsibility to the European level. The picture emerging from this set of questions is, in general,
one of satisfaction with the status quo. The EU has important competencies for dealing with
immigration, environment and crime and recently, since when the European Council paved the way
for a banking union in 2012, it acquired growing responsibilities in the field of banking surveillance.
The responses given with regard to unemployment are perhaps more interesting because they
highlight a misalignment between the way policy responsibilities are actually distributed among
different levels and how national elites want them to be distributed. Dealing with unemployment is
currently a mainly national responsibility, though the EU has recently launched a residual plan to
tackle youth unemployment (the Youth Guarantee, proposed by the Commission in 2012 and
adopted by the EU’s Council of Ministers in 2013). The Enec survey shows that national
parliamentarians are ready to share their competency in this policy are with the EU level in ways
that were not even imaginable only five years before. There is agreement among scholars on the
idea that national parliamentarians favour policy integration in those policy domains in which
cooperation among states is seen as essential to effectively solve problems: this phenomenon is
often related to the “globalization of problem hypothesis”, and especially to the sub-hypothesis on
the cross-border character of certain issues (Wessels and Kielhorn 1999). In this light, the high
support for a European level intervention in the field of unemployment poses some interpretative
problems calling for a country by country analysis.
Table 7. The EU should have some responsibility in the following policy areas
2014
2014 – 2009
2014 -– 2007 N
Health
30.8
+0.8
+2.5
597
Unemployment
64.3
+28.6
+22.6
595
Immigration
83.1
+5.1
+8.7
597
Environment
84.3
+4.9
+5.4
594
15
Crime
63.6
Banking
81.8
+3.1
+3.1
595
595
Note: questions asked the preferred level of responsibility for several policy areas: cell entries are
percentages of respondents indicating that the EU should have exclusive or shared responsibility.
As it is well known, the crisis hit member states with different severity, widening the gap between
countries at the core and countries at the periphery of the EU. In this context we might expect that
only parliamentarians belonging to the countries which were most severely affected by the crisis
increased their support for solidarity measures. With regard to unemployment, if we assume that
national parliamentarians adopted an instrumental logic, we should expect that support for a
European level intervention is higher when the economy is doing worse than average. Figure 2
shows the percentage of respondents in favour of giving EU shared or exclusive responsibility for
fighting unemployment in different countries and periods. By looking at this figure we can give a
more nuanced interpretation of the changing attitudes of national elites. Before the crisis (2007 and
2009) this question sharply divided countries between those supporting a European intervention in
this policy field (France, Greece, Portugal and, though to a lesser extent, Italy) and those objecting
it. In 2014 the proportion of respondents who are willing to give responsibility to EU level increased
in all countries. It is especially impressive the leap made by Germany, where in 2009 only a small
fraction was in favour of a EU involvement in fighting unemployment: in 2014 German respondents
are split into two comparable camps between those favoring and those objecting such change. As it
was perhaps expected, in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain the crisis further increased the support
for shifting competences to the EU level. However, a similar increase (despite starting from much
lower levels) can be observed also in some newer member states such as Bulgaria, Hungary and
Lithuania. Also in Croatia and Slovenia, which were not covered by previous surveys, there is an
absolute majority of respondents looking with favour to a European intervention in this policy field.
How can we interpret this somehow surprising trend? A possibility is that the crisis convinced a
considerable proportion of national parliamentarians that, given at the current state of integration,
a common strategy should be applied in all countries. Perhaps, this would entail also a strengthening
of the redistribution measures among member states.
16
80
60
40
SLOVENIA
CROATIA
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
LITHUANIA
ITALY
HUNGARY
GREECE
GERMANY
FRANCE
BULGARIA
0
20
% EU level
2007
2014
2009
Figure 2. EU should have policy responsibility for fighting unemployment
A direct question on the opportunity to financially support country in difficulties confirms that a vast
majority of national MPs look with favor on the necessity to help weaker member states. Even in
Hungary and Lithuania, where the proportion of respondents agreeing with such statement is
lowest, there is a solid absolute majority in favor of financial aids for countries in difficulty. This
question was only asked in 2014, ruling out the possibility to make any comparison with the precrisis situation. At present, however, the overall picture is one of uncontested backing for this kind
of schemes.
17
100
80
60
SLOVENIA
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
LITHUANIA
ITALY
HUNGARY
GREECE
GERMANY
FRANCE
BULGARIA
0
20
40
% agree
Figure 3. Do you think it is appropriate that the EU financially supports countries in difficulty?
Previous research (Real-Dato, Göncz, and Lengyel 2012) showed that the support for a policy
integration in the long term is even more enthusiastic than in the short-term. In order to measure
it, both the Intune and the Enec survey have a set of questions designed to tap parliamentarians’
opinion on the desirability of having common policies within the next ten years (table 8). Both
surveys contained questions regarding the Europeanization of taxation, social security, foreign
policy along with a question on increasing support for the regions in economic or social difficulty.
On the one hand all these questions confirm that most MPs are supportive of further integration.
On the other hand, however, they also signal a certain decline of the proportion of national
parliamentarians who declare to be at least “somewhat” in favour of having common policies. In
2014 a question on the opportunity that the EU could issue Eurobonds was also included. As it was
the case also in previous surveys, there is a clear absolute majority in favour of all those common
policies, provided that the questions concern the EU long-term evolution. Still, there is room for
variation. The consensus is overwhelming for helping regions in difficulty and having a single foreign
policy. By contrast. the response is more lukewarm with regard to having a unified tax system. The
questions on a common social security and the issuance of Eurobonds are in between the two
18
extremes. Not surprisingly, the support for having Eurobonds is stronger in high debt countries (in
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain the percentage of respondents in favour exceeds 75%) and
much lower in Germany (only about 50%). What is to some extent puzzling is the decline which
touched most questions. How can this be interpreted? The explanation is extremely simple, as it
regards only one country in which the attitudes of national parliamentarians became much less
supportive on long-term policy integration: that country is Hungary. Once removing Hungarian MPs
from the sample, the level of support having common policies in ten years is virtually unaltered.
Table 8. Long-term (in 10 years) policy making preferences (% strongly or somewhat in favour)
2014
2014 - 2009
2014 – 2007
N
Unified tax system
65.4
-3.7
-4.4
593
Common social security
70.5
-5.3
-10
590
Single foreign policy
84.5
-7.8
-6.3
595
More help for regions
94.1
+2.1
+1.5
597
Issuance of Eurobonds
73.3
591
The crisis has called for the adoption of several measures aimed at reducing its impact. In both 2009
and in 2014 national parliamentarians were asked to rate several alternatives to face the crisis from
the most to the least preferred. Table 9 presents the four alternatives presented in the survey along
with the percentage of first choices received. In 2009 a large plurality of respondents declared to
see “a coordinated action of national governments” as the most preferred way to overcome the
crisis, while all other options received much less support. After five years of crisis, in which several
measures of all kinds were actually adopted, the opinions of national parliamentarians have
considerably changed. In 2014 there is no longer a single alternative receiving considerably more
support than others: rather, first choices are evenly distributed among the three following options:
“an intervention of the EU”, “a coordinated action of national governments” and “an autonomous
action of your national government”. The preferences expressed for an intervention of international
financial institutions almost halved in five years. This drop is especially significant because, starting
in 2010, the International Monetary Fund actually provided financial help to three Euro area
19
members (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal). These results are evidence that, after six years from its
inception, there is not consensus on the most appropriate way to tackle the crisis.
Table 9. Preferred alternative to reduce the impact of the crisis (% of first choices)
2009
2014
An intervention of international financial 19.4
10.2
institutions
An intervention of the European Union
21.8
31.0
A coordinated action of national governments
47.5
28.1
An autonomous action of your national 14.6
32.3
government
N
625
717
Conclusion
The results of our analyses show both elements of continuity and change, over the years of the
economic crisis, on the views of national political elites towards the possible future development of
the European Union.
No doubt, at an aggregate level, that national politicians continue to share an almost unanimous
conviction that taking part to the European Union is still beneficial to their own respective country.
The diachronic differences the disaggregate analysis has revealed on country basis, indeed, reflect
the «indirect» impact we have argued the crisis might have had on the opinions of the elites: by
changing the partisan composition of national elites in favour of more Eurosceptic (or, say, less
unconditionally Euroenthusiastic) political forces. This seems to be the case, in particular, in Greece
and Italy, where the percentage of MPs who declare themselves convinced of the beneficial effects
of EU membership has drastically declined in more recent years.
On one hand, thus, we might conclude that the economic crisis has not (generally) altered the
perceptions of the political elites on the «need of Europe». At the same time, however, we found
evidence of an increased dissatisfaction with the current performances of the European political
20
and institutionalsystem. The percentage of national politicians who declare themselves satisfied
with it has significantly decreased between 2009 and 2014, following a rather homogeneous pattern
across all surveyed countries.
As already noted in the past, political elites seem to be generally convinced of the necessity to move
the process of European integration further ahead, even though they tend to see this process as
mainly based on the central role of national governments (in purely intergovernmental or in more
mixed institutional arrangements), instead of tending towards a more genuine federal model.
The economic crisis, moreover, seems to have somewhat altered the vision of the «mission» political
elites assign to the European Union. With few exceptions, we have indeed noticed an increasing
quota of national politicians asserting that the main goal of the EU should be to improve the welfare
for its citizens (instead of granting more economic competitiveness): being this the case, in
particular, in those countries that have suffered more severe crisis.
Even more surprisingly (but coherently with the latter consideration), the crisis seems to have
convinced political elites of the opportunity to «share» (at the European level) the efforts to solve
common problems, starting from the unemployment: the policy domain, indeed, in which the level
of support towards European cooperation and integration has remarkably increased over more
recent years.
More in general, the large majority of surveyed politicians agree that the EU should (continue to)
support member states in economic difficulties. One might question whether this reflects rather
instrumental attitudes, as many of the countries covered in the Enec survey have encountered (or
are encountering) economic problems. No doubt, mechanisms of this kind might be at work here.
We observed the same pattern, however, even in countries that have done better from an economic
point of view, like Germany, possibly reflecting, therefore, a more genuine «solidaristic» idea of the
European Union.
21
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