Canada and the United States
is that some scholars claim murderous lynch law to
have been strictly a post-Civil War phenomenon. Tragically, it was not, as Grimsted's own descriptions of
mobbings attest. Moreover, Grimsted mocks the notion that the code of honor figured much in outbrcaks
of public violence. He asserts rather awkwardly, "the
recent kettle of Southern violence features a dash of
bloodily Celtic or Sicilian spice in the older Sir Walter
Scott stew" (p. 86). Contrary to his gratuitous oversimplification, mob action, at least in the South, could
become almost religious in character. The purpose was
to sacrifice an alleged offender against community
values or racial rules as a means to exorcize aberrant
behavior and thereby cleanse the polity. Charivari or
shivaree, to use the anglicized term, receives no notice.
Yet, forcing victims to ride rails, whipping them unmercifully, or tarring and feathering them were not so
rare occurrences as their absence from Grimsted's
index might suggest. In addition, he oddly finds John
Brown's murdcrousncss in Kansas unexceptional, as if
mutilation of the corpses at Pottawatomie were a
common feature of American violence. Although not
himself guilty of committing the offense, Brown, as
leader, held the responsibility. In dealing with Brown's
cmotional lifc, Grimsted seems unaware of the complexities involved. The author betrays a lack of anthropological and psychological sophistication.
Nonetheless, Grimsted's materials are superb both
statistically and descriptively. Apart from the criticisms
mentioned, this book is the fullest study of American
public violence likely to appear fur many years ahead.
It deserves careful study by scholars, students, and
general readers. The book brilliantly illuminates just
how violent our social order once was-and, unhappily, continues to be.
BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN
University of Florida
CHARLes M. HUBBARD. The Burden of Confederate
Diplomacy. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
1998. Pp. xvii, 253. $38.00.
The failure of Confederate diplomacy during the
American Civil War has been the subject of debate for
more than one hundred and thirty years. Charles M.
Hubbard's excellent study offers succinct yet thorough
insight into Southern diplomatic problems and questions at the center of that debate.
Too often, the debate has been fueled by students
isolating and homing in on the pros and cons of
specific aspects of Civil War diplomacy to the neglect
of the total efforts of all the players and factors
involved. Fur Hubbard, however, there is little ground
for debate.
Confederate diplomacy, which sought both European recognition and intervention, was flawed from
the beginning because it focused on the inaccurate
assumption lhal collon was king in Europe as it was in
the southern slates. Their singular faith in cotton did
not allow members of the Confederacy to take into
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
1305
account the diverse economy and political stability in
Great Britain. Their narrow view reflected a southern
appreciation of the commodity rather than its value to
Europeans.
Yet, it is difficult to compare Hubbard's work with
Frank L. Owsley's definitive study, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of
America (1936). Although Hubbard agrees with Owsley's conclusions, he does not endeavor to duplicate
the latter's exhaustive, classic study. His scope is much
more limited. He does not include an in-depth analysis
of Confcdcratc trade. Instcad, Hubbard has produced
a masterful narrative and evaluation of the diplomatic
burdens with which the southern leadership struggled.
Where the federal diplomatic team of President
Abraham Lincoln, Secretary of State William H.
Seward, and Minister to England Charles Francis
Adams was creative and flexible, the southern diplomatic team of President Jefferson Davis, a series of
secretaries of state, and inept ministers in Europe
remained stubbornly determined to use cotton to force
European cooperation.
Hubbard advances seven reasons for this inflexibility
in the southern cotton diplomacy: they futilely counted
on a British government response to their unemployed
textile workers who, in reality, were not a large enough
voting bloc to vote officials out of office; they miscalculated lhal the British economy was overwhelmingly
dependent on Southern cotton; they errantly thought
that New England commercial and banking interests
were dependent on the southern cotton trade and
would force lhe Lincoln administration to accept
peaceful coexistence; they mistakenly believed that
British material interests would override their antislavery and free trade principles; they failed to understand their own vulnerability to a slowdown in the
cotton trade; Confederate diplomats failed to take
advantage of British neutrality but instead continued
to demand intervention; and southern diplomats overlooked the potential weakness within Seward's strategy
and failed to exploit the opportunity to identify Seward
as a manipulator attempting further to divide the
British and French.
Hubbard briefly rcvicws thc Confederate efforts
with the Indians of the trans-Mississippi territories,
Henry Hotze's work in Europe, the Henri Mercer
mission to France, the Matamoros trade, the Caleb
Huse and Baron Elmile Erlanger loan efforts, the
Laird Rams dispute, and the failed Duncan F. Kenner
miSSIOn.
This book is of interest and importance to both the
scholar and casual reader of Civil War history. Hubbard has pulled together an excellent bibliography
including the classics as well as the latest sources on
the subject. He has included a good selection of
documents and manuscripts. Both his bibliography and
notes reflect a thoroughly researched monograph. His
OCTOBER
1999
1306
Reviews of Books
interpretation is solid, well supported, and touches all
of the major aspects of Confederate diplomacy.
JAMES W. DADDYSMAl'
Alderson-Broaddus College
Grass-Roots Reconstruction in
Texas, 1865-1888. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1997. Pp. x, 251. $35.00.
RANDOLPH B. CA'vlPBELL.
Hoping, in part, to disabuse Texans of their belief that
Reconstruction was "one of the darkest pages in their
state's history" (p. 232), Randolph B. Campbell detailed six county histories to show how Reconstruction
issues "came home to people at the local level" (p. 1).
In so far as Campbell demonstrates that Reconstruction meant "progress" (0 many groups. while no(
generally displacing old economic elites, he does· a
convincing job. This well-documented study shows that
the impact Reconstruction had on the lives of people
at the grass roots varied considerably, depending on
many local factors. Despite this variety, however,
Reconstruction was "largcly democratic" and "nonrevolutionary" for the freedpeople. While perhaps not
revolutionary, Reconstruction "contained much that
was positive" (pp. 230-31).
To achieve his purposes, Campbell proceeds county
by county, presenting a chronological history of the six
Texas counties he selected as representative of the
different rcgions across the state. Politically, Campbell
provides a detailed account of who ran in and who won
each election held in the counties from 1865-1880,
with as much biographical information as he could
find; who got appointed and removed from office
during each Reconstruction period; the percentage of
each population group registered at different times;
and the successes of the different political parties,
along with an attempt to explain these successes amI
failures by examining factionalism within the ranks.
Although he provides rich detail of political races and
leaders, Campbell rarely talks of policies and programs. He often labels political leaders "conservative,"
"liberal," and "radical" but fails to give the reader any
sense of what it would mean if a "liberal" won over a
"radical" in terms of policies and programs. Moreover,
Campbell fails to discuss how, if at all, blacks were able
to translate their majorities at the polls into meaningful programs to help them improve their lives.
Beyond this political history, Campbell provides the
reader with a sketch of grass-roots life. Economically,
Campbell details the increase in property taxes in each
county under Republican rule. He does an excellent
job of explaining why taxes increased, detailing the
cost of free public education, railroad subsidies, repair
of roads and bridges, and the like. But the reader finds
little about the economic life of individuals at the grass
roots. Relying solely on the 1880 census, Campbell lists
the percentage of freedpeople farming and how much
property each owned. Relying on the same source, he
also shows the persistence of the economic elite in
each county. But when using the census, Campbell
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
focuses solely on those engaged in farming. Even in
Harrison County, a heavily rural county, this focus
raises questions. Campbell reports that sixty-two percent of Harrison County blacks engaged in farming.
Sixty-two percent for a "heavily" rural county seems
quite low. What did the other thirty-eight percent do?
Were they unemployed') Did they hold jobs in urban
areas? For Jefferson County, the figures tell us even
less. In that county, only fourteen black household
heads engaged in farming. Almost three-quarters of
the blaek population lived and worked in Beaumont.
While Campbell lists their occupations, he provides no.
information on their wealth or economic independence.
Finally, while Campbell concludes that blacks
throughout Texas "worked ... to improve their economic status and stabilize basic social institutIOns" (p.
230), he provides little evidence. Again relying only on
figures from the 1880 census, he lists how many black
children attended some school and the percentage of
blacks living in nuclear families. We know nothing
about black fraternal organizations, churches, schools,
celebrations, or any other community institutions. We
also know little about the personal security and legal
rights of blacks. Campbell does examine the impact the
Freedmen's Bureau had during the times soldiers were
present in each county, summarizing the level of
violence and mistreatment against freed people and
Unionists that the Bureau's agents reported. Rut
Campbell rarely uses court records to examine the type
of crimes blacks and whites were arrested for and the
quality of justice blacks could expect. For example, did
the level of justice improve once blacks could serve on
juries?
Although H. Carl Moneyhon's Republicanism in
Reconstruction Texas (1980) and William L. Richter's
The Army in Texas During Reconstruction 1865-1870
(1987) fill in some of the gaps about party policies, the
position of various factions, and attitudes toward the
military and the level of violence that plagued the
state, the economic and social history of Texas still
needs to be written.
ROBERTA SUE ALEXANDER
University of Dayton
CANTER BROWN, JR. Florida's Black Public Officials,
1867-1924. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
19lJK Pp. xiii, 252. Cloth $44.95, paper $22.50.
Undeterred by complaints about the dearth of sources,
imaginative and persistent scholars have located more
and more of the materials necessary for the recovery of
the African-American past. One of these scholars is
Canter Brown, Jf. He is the author of several earlier
books on Florida history, including a biography of the
Reconstruction governor Ossian Bingley Hart, from
which his new book evolved.
Brown's book begins with a short, five-chapter narrative. Tn Republican factional politics, the first black
politicians were Baptist ministers, more militant Afri-
OCTOBER
1999