Neoliberal Governance, lobbying and post-democracy
David Miller
University of Strathclyde
Paper for The First Global Conference on Transparency Research.
Rutgers University-Newark on May 19-20, 2011
This paper assesses the development of lobbying in the context of the
assent of neoliberal ideology and the implementation of neoliberal
governance. The analysis traces the parallel emergence of theorising
about lobbying, focusing on the dominance of public choice orthodoxy in
relation to academic research on lobbying. The limitations of this
approach are discussed in the context of an interdisciplinary
understanding of lobbying as elite communication located in researchable
power structures and networks. The empirical evidence underpinning
this paper draws on original research on the lobbying industry in the UK
and the efforts of professional lobbyists to resist regulation and scrutiny.
The paper examines the new avenues opened up by investigative research
to academics interested in research and reform around lobbying
transparency
Of all the nations of Western Europe lobbying is the most developed in Britain.
For this reason the story of how lobbying has infiltrated the corridors of power
in the UK is of particular interest. This paper examines the rise and
contemporary practice of lobbying in the UK. The industry today faces a number
of challenges not least of which are questions of conflicts of interest, secrecy,
privileged access and undue influence which increasingly lead to calls for greater
transparency.
Theorising Lobbying
Any theory of lobbying must be able to understand the who, what, where and
why of lobbying in the context of wider questions of power and resource
distribution. Most writing on lobbying in political science or by lobbyists
themselves tends to stick with the specific, the immediate, the micro and often
tend towards the atheoretical. The bulk of writing in the area by political
scientists has been in relation to work on the ‘group theory of politics’ (Milbraith
1963: 13) with a focus on interest and pressure groups (e.g. Jordan 1991; Grant
1995). Lobbyists themselves have also tended to work within this paradigm
albeit with a tendency to paint a rosier picture of the practice of lobbying. (Greer,
1997, John, 2002; Miller 1990)
Other approaches to lobbying, which factor in context and wider power issues
tend either to utilise the concept of the public sphere or some version of public
choice theory in which lobbying is analysed using mathematical or economic
concepts. The operating assumptions of the latter are that markets work in ways
predicted by neoliberal economists (such as Friedman, Hayek, Buchanan and
Tullock). Underlying such writing is the notion that all humans operate to
maximise their own interests: lobbying is simply an inescapable and
unexceptional part of human society. One version utilises the concept of ‘rent
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seeking’ in which it is assumed that the seeking of advantages through
governmental decision making rather than market efficiencies is a means of
introducing corruption and inefficiency into market societies. Sectional business
lobbying for government contracts or more favourable regulation and campaigns
for increased worker protection or environmental legislation are thus no
different and both should be resisted to keep the market free.
We reject public choice approaches as inherently ideological (as evaluating all
data in terms of a prior principle of understanding – which is in any case false)
and failing to explain (or even note) how lobbying really works or who actually
benefits from it. In our view it is indispensable to see lobbying not simply as part
of some rational calculus in which interests somehow ‘speak through’ human
agents but as part of the battle for ideas which moves a society one way or
another. In other words our approach sees lobbying as a communicative
process.
Accordingly we find the theory of the public sphere useful to understand both
the ideal type of free and open communications and their degraded actually
existing forms in the ‘neoliberal public sphere’. The model draws on Habermas
(1989) and sees the operation of an ideal public sphere as one of the key
liberatory tenets of the enlightenment. The public sphere is not as has
sometimes been assumed just the sphere of media and communication, but the
whole range of ways in which political space is created and used in a given polity.
In practice, however, the public sphere does not live up to its theoretical billing,
yet we can use the idea as a heuristic device to evaluate the actually existing
public sphere.
But as well as conceiving of the space of political and social activity - the
‘structure’ -of the public sphere - we need to have an understanding of ‘agency’,
how the public sphere works in practice. In which case we need to understand
how the space is used and how this relates to decisions and outcomes. For this
we need to draw on theories of ideology and in particular on Gramsci’s theory of
hegemony. This has the advantage of foregrounding relations between ideas and
practice thus avoiding the errors of those approaches which see decisions made
in advanced capitalism as the product of the invisible hand of the market
(whether neoliberal or neo-Marxian) and those which seem only to be able to
comprehend the role of ideas in pushing history forward (such as in
postmodernism and poststructuralism). A more nuanced conceptualisation of
lobbying requires an empirical focus on outcomes, meaning that as well as the
space of political contest and the battle for ideas we need to examine the results
in decision making and the distribution of resources.
In our view the use of the concept of hegemony needs some explication as it is
not often used to describe or understand lobbying activity. More often it is used
to explain the alleged role of the media in securing popular consent for advanced
capitalism. We do not dismiss this as a possible use of the theory, but in our view
the concept is best used in a wider frame to examine the ways in which conflicts
over ideas emerge and are played out. This means in particular that the question
of ‘leadership’ for allied classes and fractions is more important when discussing
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lobbying than the question of popular consent. In what follows we focus mainly
on how consensus and agreement are organised in British public life, and how, in
other words, hegemony is secured by leadership and elite consent rather than
through popular consent (see Miller and Dinan 2008).
Media Studies
Media Studies tends to reify communication as separate from structure and
action and thus tends to ignore lobbying as a communicative activity. While
there has been a growing attention to the ‘source strategies’ of political actors
this has concentrated largely on the question of the mass media and mass
audiences rather than on ‘elite communication’ circuits. Lobbying is largely
ignored and left to the political scientists.
Sociology
Though it has engaged much more fully with the questions we focus on here
about the relationship of transparency and power relations, Sociology has also
arguably underplayed lobbying as a research focus. Central to the flourishing of
sociology in the latter half of the Twentieth century and in particular since the
1960s has been the tradition of Power structure research - from Mills to Domhoff
and Scott. This is of signal importance in understanding and analysing power
structures in society and in particular in examining the apex of economic and
political power. Both radical and Weberian approaches are concerned with this,
though Weberian approaches discuss ‘elites’ as opposed to the ‘capitalist class’ –
and more recently the ‘Trans-National Capitalist class’ discussed by Marxian
scholars. The rise and decline of power structure research has been noted, but
the recent resurgence of work in this tradition, revitalised by the new
possibilities of using digital data in large scale Social Network Analysis is a sign
of its continuing importance. The tendency to focus on the structure of
corporate interlocks in such work has also been acknowledged. But this
tendency is being overtaken by significant new studies focusing on policy
planning networks and the like (eg Carroll 2010). Nevertheless there remains a
tendency in such work to underplay the collective action the ‘agency’ of class,
corporate or elite power; to underemphasise, in a word – Lobbying.
Political science
Much mainstream political science on lobbying or on ‘interest representation’
has a micro focus on the ‘policy process’. It is typically neutral or supportive of
lobbying. It typically sees lobbying as not very powerful or important. It tends to
have little conception of corporate power or of the context of power relations in
general or the specific historical circumstances in which lobbying takes place and
flourishes. There is also little conception or utility for concepts such as ‘ideology’
or the ‘third face’ of power. There are two exceptions to this. Both are described
as involving differing kinds of political economy. The first is a Marxian or often
neo-Gramscian global political economy, which draws on much of the
sociological literature noted above. The second is the brand of economic theory
called political economy and associated with the defence of the free market:
Public choice, to which we now turn.
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Economics
The main work in Economics which deals with questions of lobbying stems from
Public Choice theory. This sees all bureaucrats as self interested and the ‘public
interest’ as literally an unintelligible concept. Lobbying is ‘rent-seeking’ the
seeking of favours and contracts as opposed to relying on market competition.
Rent-seeking (eg lobbying, advertising) is a form of inefficiency. As is well known
Public choice has become an important body of doctrine in economics and in
pioneering the ‘economic’ analysis of politics. It is worth focusing on the
implications as a result.
Public choice
According to Buchanan Public choice rests on a
hard core of presuppositions that impose limits on the domain of
scientific inquiry while, at the same time, insulating such inquiry from
essentially irrelevant criticism. The hard core in public choice can be
summarized in three presuppositions: (1) methodological individualism,
(2) rational choice, and (3) politics-as-exchange. Buchanan (2003:1)
Later he elaborates a distinction brought into public choice by himself and drawn
from the study of the law between ordinary politics and constitutional politics (ie
the ‘rules of the game’). Such a distinction is useful for understanding the
political system in public choice theory says Buchanan. We agree that it can be
useful for that purpose but that it can also be applied to the distinction between:
1. the constitutional presuppositions of public choice theory and the
‘ordinary’ politics of their conjectures and hypotheses.
2. The distinction between lobbying to change the architecture of the global
system (the ‘constitution’ of the global market) and lobbying for sectional
or even class wide advantage as pursued in local, national, regional or
global arenas by the corporations.
In both cases we find that if the constitutional issues are bracketed off the theory
of public choice makes much more sense that it does if the constitutional
questions and the processes by which these are established are opened for
investigation.
In summary, each of the three suppositions are invalid and unwarranted
suppositions, neither supported by evidence of how the world is, nor reflecting
any more than crude ideological blinkers.
In the case of lobbying, the processes by which the WTO, GATS, and indeed US
hegemony are put in place are themselves the result of lobbying and it is these
which provide the context in which ‘rent seeking’ occurs. So even if rent seeking
was an appropriate model for understanding politics as exchange, we would still
need to know how and why this had been established - and in whose interests. If
the rules of the game are fixed by special interests (eg the capitalist class or the
military industrial complex or even the trades unions) then rent seeking is a sub
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problem not the main problem. In addition rent seeking is the consequence of
the fixing of the rules rather than a spontaneous ‘market’ response to
constitutional frameworks which are either assumed to be neutral or are
positively valorised by the theorists – for example when Buchanan champions
the American constitution at the end of his 2003 talk.
Buchanan acknowledges two criticisms of public choice theory: that it is
ideological and that it is immoral. His defence is interesting for the concessions
it appears to give. Taking the first criticism he relies on the founding principles
of Public Choice being neutral and not ideological. On the second he claims that
they do not ruled out disinterested action, merely that they have factored in self
interest. But if that is the case then self interest becomes merely one variable
amongst potentially many such as disinterested action, ideological action,
socially patterned actions, obedience etc. If these are allowed in then we have
moved away from Public Choice and in fact undermined its presuppositions.
We note above that it ‘appears’ to give these concessions because Buchanan’s
position in this article is noticeably different to that given elsewhere. For
example Buchanan in an interview broadcast on The Trap (Curtis 2007) talks
specifically about the need to eliminate those who act in the public interest.
There’s certainly no measurable concept that’s meaningful that could be
called the public interest, because how do you weigh different interest of
different groups and what they can get out of it? The public interest as a
politician thinks it does not mean it exists. It’s what he thinks is good for
the country. And if he’d come out say that that’s one thing, but behind this
hypocrisy of calling something THE public interest as if it exists…
Because of this radical inability to think about collective interests, says
Buchanan:
We’re safer if we have politicians who are a bit self interested and greedy
than if we have these zealots. The greatest danger of course is the zealot
who thinks that he knows best or she knows best for the rest of us. As
opposed to being for sale, so to speak.
The difficulty with the ‘zealot’ is that he or she ‘is not nearly as readily influenced
by monetary incentives or incentives of office or rents as the non-zealot. So you
don’t want too many zealots in there.’
According to the theory, bureaucrats are inevitably self interested, but if they
adhere to an ideology of ‘public service’ they are not self-interested enough.
They are he says the ‘fanatics’ and the market in politics as exchange can only
work if everyone can be bought and sold without the ideological ‘fanaticism’ of
‘public service’ getting in the way. In other words Public Choice relies on the
destruction of all conceptions of the public or general interest as these are highly
ideological as opposed to the pursuit of self interest which is not. The naivety of
imagining that politics could either be abolished or reduced to economic
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processes without ‘politics’ is one thing. More important is the question of which
of these views is the authentic public choice position?
Lobbying as communication in Political Science
An early and in some way unusual account of lobbying as a communicative
practice is Lester Milbraith’s, 1963 The Washington Lobbyists. This book is a
valuable corrective to later work that neglects the specifically communicative
dimension of lobbying. According to Milbraith:
If the political process is made up of actors who are functionally related in
a system, one method for tracing out their relationships would be to
follow the flow of communications from actor to actor.(Milbraith,
1963:19)
‘There are no objective (real) connections that tie men into a political system’,
writes Milbraith. Instead any given decision by any given official ‘will be
consonant with his perception of his political world’.(p. 184) The ‘only way’ to
influence decisions, then, is to ‘influence the perceptions’ of decision makers.(p.
185) Furthermore the only way to influence perception is ‘communication’ and
so lobbying is ‘totally a communication process’.(p. 185)
Milbraith gives the example of changing ‘objective reality’ (p. 185-6) to change
perceptions, but this departs from his model of total communication.
Communication in other words is less than the sum of the policy process. It is
not just a matter of the differential availability of resources with which to play
the communicative influence game but a matter of a structured system of power,
influence, inequality and conflict.
All of this is missing from Milbraith – and from most of the policy process
oriented political scientists coming after him. The term ‘Power relationship’ is
reserved for the formal political relationships leading from voters to elected
officials and finally outcomes. Meanwhile other avenues of potential influence
are assigned merely a ‘message transmission’ role.(p. 181) The model of power
in operation here is similar to the first dimension identified by Lukes. The
problem of this approach most fundamentally is that communication is seen
almost as an antonym of power. He concludes: ‘If we had no lobby groups and
lobbyists we would probably have to invent then to improve the functioning of
the system’ (p. 358)
History of lobbying in the UK
For Jordan (1991: vii, viii) a proper understanding of contemporary British
politics is impossible without examining lobbying. Austin Mitchell MP remarked
in the early 1990s that ‘in reality, lobbying has increased, is increasing, and is not
going to be diminished… our vaunted constitution is really a framework of
lobbying; for the constitution is, essentially, whatever governments can get away
with. Lobbying, persuasion and opinion manipulation are the tugs at the sleeve
of power’ (ibid: 3). The power and discretion of executive government in the
British system is indeed crucial to understanding the nature of lobbying.
Interestingly, Mitchell also claimed that Americanised, high powered strategic
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lobbying, that meshed political and corporate interests had yet to be imported to
the UK. This claim was made precisely at the time when Ian Greer and his
associates were doing exactly that on behalf of a range of blue chip corporations
at Westminster (Greer 1997).
A Financial Times poll in 1985 found that 41% of 180 major British corporations
surveyed were using political consultants, paying them an average of £28,000
p.a. Over a quarter (28%) of the 180 corporations used PR companies for
government relations work, paying an average fee of £33,000 (cited in Jordan
1991: 20,21). The scale and ubiquity of such lobbying activity can be seen as ‘in
part a logical response to the Government’s discretion on purchasing, in creating
product legislation, in setting the regulatory frameworks, and establishing the
relevant tax regimes for companies. For these reasons ostensibly private
companies are very often effectively ‘Government controlled’’ (ibid: 21). It
remains the case that corporate interests continue to make most use of
commercial consultants, in tandem with their own in-house public affairs
capacity (John 2002: 12-14).
Finer (1958) in his classic study of the history of lobbying in Britain, suggested
that lobbyists cannot ‘pressure’ government: they simply argue and make
requests, because they lack a credible or effective sanction. However, in the
contemporary globalised and deregulated era the corporate threat of exit is
serious and carries considerable political weight. By virtue of employing a large
workforce (who are also constituents of elected representatives) large TNCs
certainly do carry a credible sanction. The same is more difficult to say for trade
associations, trade unions, and NGOs, and therefore it is necessary to distinguish
the political activity of corporations from that of other actors.
Useem (1984: 3) describes a distinctive form of corporate lobbying, undertaken
by an "inner circle" of corporate leaders acting on behalf of class-wide interests.
This group are far more important than commercial lobbying consultants. They
are: ‘rooted in inter-corporate networks through shared ownership and
directorship of large companies in both countries [the US and UK], this politically
active group of directors and top managers gives coherence to the politics of
business’. Jordan (1991) claims this ‘politicised cadre’ of big business play a key
role in defending the interests of TNCs.
Finer saw the relationship between lobbyists and civil servants as one of ‘mutual
accommodation’ (1958: 22). The lobbyist is but one voice in the policy dialogue
or policy community. Far from pressuring government, established lobbyists
with credentials and contacts are sought out for advice and consultation by civil
servants. Indeed, the relationship between companies and their ‘sponsor’
departments in Whitehall is often depicted as mutually beneficial, in terms of
consultation, information exchange and ‘partnership’. This close co-operation is
deeply entrenched in the British system of governance and ‘will not be
eradicated instantly by ministerial edict’ (Jordan 1991: 32).
Nevertheless the rise of lobbying in the UK has a historical dimension. The
neoliberal revolution ushered in by the Thatcher government (1979-90) was its
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most obvious political expression and it was this that allowed the incremental
dismantling of social protections and the advancing power of business to
flourish.
Buying influence in British politics – the emergence of ‘Sleaze’
The infamous ‘cash-for-questions’ affair in the 1990s was triggered by
revelations in The Guardian that MPs had been paid in cash and in kind to ask
parliamentary questions on behalf of commercial interests. The scandal centered
on payments made by Mohammed Al-Fayed (via the IGA political lobbying firm)
to MPs Neil Hamilton and Tim Smith.
Prime Minister John Major set up the (ad hoc) Committee on Standards in Public
Life (CSPL) in October 1994, in direct response to the cash-for-questions affair.
Under the chairmanship of Lord Nolan, the committee reported within six
months. Despite evidence that confidence in the probity of the political process
was being seriously eroded, Nolan decided against the regulation of lobbyists
themselves, arguing that the creation of a public register would become a
marketing device for lobbyists. On this analysis, regulated lobbyists would claim
official status, and this in turn would create the impression that to approach MPs
and ministers successfully, members of the public, or organised outside interests,
must procure the services of registered public affairs consultants (Nolan 1995:
36). Thus the emphasis of the Nolan report was to fall upon regulation of
legislators.
Nolan recommended that the Register of [MPs] Interests should be more
informative, that the rules governing conflicts of interest should be set out in
more detail, that a code of conduct for MPs should be drawn up, and that an
independent Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards should be appointed.
These recommendations were adopted by the House in July 1995 (Doig 1998:
44). Significantly, Nolan also recommended that the Commissioner for Standards
should have ‘the same ability to make findings and conclusions public as is
enjoyed by the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Parliamentary
Commissioner for Administration’ (Nolan Committee 1995: 43). This
recommendation was not adopted.
The election of the New Labour administration over a decade ago had a
significant impact on the lobbying landscape in Westminster and Whitehall,
particularly with the appointment of a series of special advisers to Labour
ministers. Many of these appointees had previously worked for commercial
interests and for the opposition Labour front bench. Special advisers and party
advisers-turned-lobbyists quickly became embroiled in controversy regarding
their ability to gain access to ministers on behalf of commercial interests.
The cash-for-access (aka ‘lobbygate’) scandal of July 1998 was the result of a
‘sting’ operation by The Observer newspaper. Posing as a US business
representative, journalist Gregory Palast secured offers of access to cabinet
ministers from Derek Draper and Roger Liddle. Both Draper and Liddle had
previously been partners in the lobbying firm Prima Europe. At the time, Draper
(a former aide to Peter Mandelson) was working as a lobbyist for GPC Market
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Access (which had taken over Prima Europe) while Liddle was employed as a
special adviser in the Number Ten policy unit (Liddle is currently working in
European trade commissioner Mandelson’s cabinet). Draper resigned from GPC,
although Liddle remained in post. Within a few weeks, the government had
announced the tightening of rules governing the conduct of special advisers and
civil servants (Hencke 1998: 3).
Derek Draper, the disgraced lobbyists at the centre of the sleaze allegations, later
remarked that:
The most worrying thing that is ever sold is information, a little light
thrown on how things work ... I suspect that the close relations which
exist between some politicians, advisers and lobbyists (who are often old
colleagues) do mean that certain information which should be either
public or totally private is passed on. The danger is that one day that
information could, literally, be worth a fortune to somebody. Guarding
against this danger isn’t easy but the intertwined relationships must be
disentangled. (Draper 1999: 26)
Given the continuing political salience and sensitivity of commercial lobbying
under New Labour the Committee on Standards in Public Life, under the
chairmanship of Lord Neill of Bladen, reconsidered the issue of lobbying.
Concerns regarding the relationships between the public and private sectors
under New Labour rule were captured by the term ‘cronyism’, which suggested
that a new elite was emerging in British public life, based almost exclusively on
the patronage of Prime Minister Blair and other senior New Labour politicians
(Cohen 2003).
The sixth report of the CSPL published in 2000 reviewed the implementation of
the original Nolan report. In the process of gathering evidence it became clear
that a ‘fresh enquiry’ was necessary in relation to the status and regulation of
special advisers, rules governing the sponsorship of government activities, and
the lobbying of ministers and civil servants (Neill 2000: 9). The main thrust of
the Neill report was to suggest that there had been considerable improvements
in the perception of probity in public life, but that more should be done.
The Neill committee’s view regarding the regulation of the lobbying industry
reaffirmed the orthodoxy established by Nolan. Recommendation 26 of their
report states ‘There should be no statutory or compulsory system for the
regulation of lobbyists. The current strengthening of self-regulation by lobbyists
is to be welcomed’ (Neill 2000: 4). The Neill committee shied away from a
lobbying register as the believed it might inhibit access to parliament: ‘The
democratic right to make representations to government - to have access to the
policy making process - is fundamental to the proper conduct of public life and
the development of sound policy. The committee is opposed to anything which
fetters that right without the very strongest reasons’ (Neill 2000: 86).
In the opinion of the Committee, the weight of evidence is against
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regulation by means of a compulsory register and code of conduct.
Lobbyist regulation schemes can help make government more open and
accountable, providing useful information about influences on decisionmaking. But we believe that the amount of information that could be
made available through a register would not be proportionate to the extra
burden on all concerned of establishing and administering the system.
There is also still force in the Committee’s original objection, that such a
system could give the erroneous impression that only ‘registered
lobbyists’ offer an effective and proper route to MPs and Ministers’ (Neill
2000: 89).
The committee placed a considerable degree of faith in self regulation by
lobbyists, notwithstanding the evidence submitted by public affairs bodies
(notably by the APPC and IPR) in favour of statutory regulation. In addition, the
Neill committee proposed no solution to concerns regarding those lobbyists who
choose not to join self-regulatory schemes and the entrance into the unregulated
lobbying market of lawyers, accountants, and management consultants.
Yet in the eight years since the Neill report lobbying scandals have continued to
happen and it is clear that the issue will not go away. In 2005 there was an
inquiry on the use of All Party groups by lobbyists. It followed exposure in the
press and a formal complaint from a newspaper that ‘named All Party Groups
(APGs) had breached the rules requiring groups for which secretariat services
are provided by a public relations company to name in their entry in the Register
of APGs the ultimate client of the company which is meeting the cost of this
assistance.’ (House of Commons Committee on Standards and Privileges, 2006)
The Committee report failed to remedy the issue and lobbyists continue to run
All Party Groups. The most recent official inquiry at Westminster was also
prompted by press revelations and as the Public Administration Select
Committee noted, is the ‘first Parliamentary inquiry on lobbying since the 1991
report from the Select Committee on Members’ interests’ (PASC 2007). At the
time of writing the outcome is unknown. However, the inquiry comes at a time
when lobbying regulation is on the political agenda all across Europe. In April
2008, for example, the European Parliament Constitutional Affairs Committee
called for a mandatory register of lobbyists to include financial disclosure and
think tanks and legal firms. (Jones 2008)
Lobbying today
Lobbying today is a multimillion pound business. Lobbyists are on hand to
pursue the interests of individual corporations, industrial sectors and the generic
interests of the corporations. Lobbying is clearly about more than sectional
interests of particular capitalists and is also about the restructuring of the way in
which capital is or is not regulated. The fact that big business was able to put in
place the architecture of neoliberalism (through NAFTA, Maastricht, the final
round of the GATT, the creation of the WTO etc) is an indication of the necessity
of lobbying for the corporations, and of the inability of ‘public choice’ models to
account for the lobbying of which the theorists of public choice approve.
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The academic literature on lobbying is extensive. Much of it situates itself in the
context of studies of the ‘group theory of politics’ as an early US account put it.
(Milbraith 1963:13) UK studies have tended to focus on interest and pressure
groups. (Grant 1995) There are surprisingly few book length or even extended
empirical studies of lobbying in the UK. Those that do exist include the classic
early account by Samuel Finer, Anonymous Empire (published in 1958) and an
edited collection in response to the emergence of ‘sleaze’ as a political issue in
the 1980s. (Finer 1958a, 1958b; Jordan 1991; Moloney 1996) Other accounts
have either been written by lobbyists themselves, with a tendency to paint a rosy
picture,(Miller 1990; Greer 1997; John 2002)or by journalists, who tend to
highlight cases of apparent misbehaviour. (Hollingsworth 1991; Leigh and
Vulliamy 1997) One reason for this apparent gap in the literature in the UK –
compared with the US for example – is that lobbying has been less of a problem
in the UK in the past. All observers agree that lobbying has hugely expanded in
the UK in the past two decades.(Parvin 2007) This has been as a direct result of
the business-friendly policies pursued by successive governments. It is the
enhanced role of business in government more than anything which has made
the issues of transparency and conflict of interest more prevalent and pressing.
While the lobbying industry has indeed grown significantly, there has been little
in the way of book length academic studies on it in the UK.
The British lobbying industry is estimated to have doubled in size since the early
1990s and there are said to be 3000 full time lobbyists (consultants and inhouse) in the UK.(Thompson and John 2002: 4-5) This may be something of a
conservative estimate. A survey published by the Chartered Institute of Public
Relations (CIPR) in 2005. (Chartered Institute of Public Relations 2005: 6, based
on research conducted by the Centre for Economics and Business Research
(CEBR))
indicated some 47,800 people employed in public relations in the UK. Just over
80% of these were identified as working ‘in-house’ (i.e. working directly for
corporations, charities and public bodies) with an even split between those
employed in the public and private sectors. If we accept there is something of a
blurring between lobbying and PR, and if we include lobbyists working in-house,
rather than in consultancies, then the number of professional communicators
engaged in lobbying and related activities is quite significant. That there is no
reliable register of what these people are doing in public affairs is properly a
matter of public concern.
Issues with lobbying
The main issues relating to lobbying today relate to the structure of the public
sphere - in particular transparency and accountability - and to the questions of
hegemony and outcomes. This includes the narrow ambit of policy discussions,
privileged access to decision makers for the corporations and their lobbyists and
undue influence in decision making. Some examples follow.
The British Lobbying system: Westminster and Whitehall
Charles Miller (1990; 1998; 2003), a professional lobbyists, and sometime public
spokesman for the industry in the UK, casts the rise of lobbying in Britain as a
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product of an increasingly democratic and meritocratic society. Miller stresses
that ‘what you know’ in lobbying is more important than ‘who you know’, yet
there is ample empirical evidence to suggest that the latter is vital to ‘doing’
public affairs. How else can one explain the efforts lobbies go to in securing face
time and networking opportunities with decision makers? Miller rightly notes
that politicians are now more professional, but fails to acknowledge that this can
breed a set of ‘professional concerns’ and habits, among which may be (the
normalisation of) customs and attitudes toward relations with outside interests,
including consultant lobbyists. This contradicts the pluralist meritocratic
description of the policy process advocated by Miller and others, who can be said
to have a vested interest in painting a benign picture of the ways pressure is
applied and decisions are taken by government.
Nevertheless, Miller correctly diagnoses that a ‘misdirection of [lobbying] effort
has been prompted by an exaggerated media interest in Parliament (which is
easy to report) compared with what is invariably the real policy making centre of
Whitehall (which is far less accessible). Almost every analysis of pressure group
and corporate lobbying activity has been conducted by those outside
Government: by academics or journalists with no first hand experience and only
rarely an understanding of its real workings…For politics, in their eyes, is about
parties; and without party activity, they cannot recognize the submerged mass of
the iceberg of politics’ (Miller 1991: 55-6).
We can discuss these by focusing on a number of areas of the corridors of power
including Parliament and Executive (including both civil servants and ministers).
Transparency
The first thing to note about lobbying is the lack of information available about
lobbyists and their clients. Jordan notes: ‘On the whole the [lobbying] industry
likes to keep quiet about who works for whom. In part this is seen as discretion
on behalf of clients, but it is also through an unwillingness to draw attention to
the fact that influence is being exerted in a way that fits uneasily with the picture
book version of our democracy’ (1991: 28).
Lobbyists often do not declare their clients. Under pressure from lobbying
scandals the industry has created lobbying organisations which introduces a
‘voluntary register’. In the UK the main organisation is the Association of
Professional Political Consultants. Its register features only a list of clients.
There is no information about finance or about the purposes or techniques
involved in lobbying. Even then there have been examples of lobbyists who have
neglected to name all their clients.
But the main issue is who is not covered by such a register. A significant number
of lobby firms refuse to sign up so they can keep their clients secret. But in
addition, none of the wide range or other organisations involved in lobbying are
members. The most obvious case is that of ‘in-house’ lobbyists for the big
corporations, an unkown but very large number of people. In addition, the many
and various legal and accountancy firms, think tanks, temporary lobby groups,
12
trade associations and other policy planning initiatives are not part of the
lobbyists lobby group.
The problem here is not simply a question of openness about clients, but that
many mainstream lobbying techniques are at best deceptive and depend on
secrecy. In particular the third party technique is a favourite with many
variations. This involves an organisation setting up or taking over another
organisation which can appear to be independent but which in reality will
pursue the interests of its sponsors. The tobacco industry is perhaps the most
well know example of this in its decades long campaign to pretend that science
was on its side. But almost every industry under threat resorts to such tactics.
Often the organisations will adopt an independent sounding name including
seemingly detached or authoritative words like Foundation, Commission,
Institute or Trust. Taking the example of the food industry we can point to front
groups using each of these names, like the British Nutrition Foundation – a front
for the UK food industry, the Agricultural Biotechnology Council - a front for the
GM industry, the International Life Science Institute – a front for the
international food industry or The Obesity Awareness and Solutions Trust
(TOAST).
The example of TOAST is instructive and not unusual. It used a PR agency called
The Whitehouse Consultancy to recruit parliamentary 'patrons' and to raise the
issue of obesity at Westminster. TOAST admitted on its own website that it was
engaged in lobbying, noting that it had been 'extremely successful'. As a charity it
claimed to be ‘completely independent’ and to ‘derive its income from individual
donations and membership fees’. However, an investigation by Spinwatch
revealed that almost all of it funding came from a diet company called
LighterLife. In addition two of Lighterlife’s directors were also directors of
TOAST. TOAST was in other words a kind of ‘front group’. No fewer than nine of
the twenty one parliamentary patrons then went on record stating that they
were not told of the links between TOAST and Lighterlife. Dr Ian Gibson MP
stated ‘I was absolutely not aware of this connection and my initial reaction is to
be pretty cheesed off.’
The obvious conclusion from this affair is that lobbyists come in may guises and
do not always disclose their links, clients and motives even to the MPs and others
who they recruit to support them. A voluntary system of self-regulation as
proposed by the leading UK lobbying trade organisation, the Association of
Professional Political Consultants (APPC), would do nothing to solve such
problems. The lobby firm involved with TOAST is an APPC member and it
discloses in the APPC register that it has TOAST and Lighterlife as clients, but not
the relation between them. The case of TOAST also shows why it is important
not only to regulate lobbying firms but also campaigning groups and even
charities. (Miller 2008)
Undue or privileged access
The lack of transparency is compounded by the issues of undue or privileged
access. In the United Kingdom decision-making has become increasingly
centralised, with power concentrated around Downing Street. Therefore, access
to politicians and advisors close to Downing Street is highly prized by lobbyists.
There are several ways in which lobbyists secure such access. One important
means is to simply employ advisers, retired politicians and those with access to
13
influentials. When Anji Hunter, Blair’s diary secretary and close confidant of
many years, was hired as a director of corporate communications for BP in 2001
many inside and outside the corporation understood this as a means to ensure
political influence. BP was often thereafter referred to as ‘Blair Petroleum’. With
Blair out of office, and after a boardroom coup inside BP, Anji Hunter was
deemed surplus to requirements as BP’s new chief executive sought to distance
the company from the Blair administration (Macalister 2007).
In another striking example, shortly after the new Scottish Parliament opened in
1999 the son of the then Secretary of State for Scotland, who was working as a
lobbyist, was secretly recorded boasting of his links to a series of high-profile
political figures (all those mentioned would go on to lead the Labour party in
Scotland, and three served as First Minister).
Three or four of [the Scottish Executive’s] special advisers are close
personal friends of mine ... I worked for Jack [McConnell] and for Wendy
[Alexander] and for Henry [McLeish] and for Donald [Dewar] on a one-toone basis [in] the Labour Party media monitoring [team] ... I know the
Secretary of State very well because he’s my father, so I know him … But
I’m not going to promise you access to people because of who I am and
who I know. Certainly as you know, in the business of politics, you have a
relationship, it makes things easier. (Observer transcript 1999: 6; emphasis
added)
While revelations of the links between the Labour party and the lobbying
industry in Scotland triggered an early scandal for the new Scottish Parliament,
routine contacts and access to decision makers by big business rarely attracts
critical scrutiny. Business will usually take the opportunity to place personnel on
official taskforces or government appointed inquiries and partnerships with the
private sector. There are also multiple opportunities for business to secure
access to decision-makers. The sponsorship of events at party conferences,
award ceremonies, corporate social responsibility programmes and charity
events all offer the chance for corporate lobbyists to cultivate relationships and
press their case with ministers and their advisers. One in-house lobbyist
described why his company invested in sponsoring such events:
Well the benefit is that… we want to speak to people, MPs and MSPs
[Members of the Scottish Parliament], and if we sponsor it we say, we
would like to sit somebody down next to the speaker. So you’ve got an
opportunity to chat to them for an hour [or so], that’s what it’s all about,
making contact and networking. So the opportunity for our senior
manager at that event to sit next to a senior politician and discuss
whatever the issue might be, albeit on a fairly informal basis, is quite
useful. But that’s why we do these things, there’s no such thing as a free
lunch’ (interview with WD, March 2002. Emphasis added)
Lobbyists will seek to access decision makers and policy actors across all levels
of government. While face-time with senior ministers and civil servants in much
sought after corporations with a sophisticated lobbying strategy will not neglect
14
other avenues. Several corporations have invested substantially in educational
schemes that bring business managers into contact with elected representatives.
The Industry and Parliament Trust (IPT) at Westminster is one such vehicle, as is
the Scottish Parliament Business Exchange (SPBE), which has been dogged by
controversy since its inception over the role of parliamentary lobbyists in
running a ‘non-partisan, non-lobbying’ organisation. (see Miller 2004)
Participation in all-party groups (or cross party groups as they are called in
Scotland), and securing Parliamentary passes are indicative of the more lowlevel ways in which outside interests interact with elected representatives. While
it is important that such fora are available to allow elected representatives and
decision makers to deliberate on policy with expert and informed input, it is
inherently anti-democratic if such groups are simply fronts for organised
interests, or penetrated and used by lobbyists for their clients interests. A recent
report by the Standards Commissioner, Sir Philip Mawer, for the Committee on
Standards and Privileges (2006) highlighted the link between all party groups
and public relations and public affairs agencies. Approximately 10% of these
groups at Westminster received support or assistance from lobbyists and PR
firms (CSP 2006: 9, 10). A complaint from the editor of the Times against the AllParty groups on Intellectual Property, Patient Safety and Pharmacy over
breaches of Parliamentary rules and lack of transparency about the clients and
interests involved was upheld by the Standards Commissioner (CSP 2006: 18). In
the wake of concerns about the transparency of relations between outside
interests and Parliament the Commissioner emphasised an important principle
that applies beyond the particular issue of all-party groups.
Transparency would undoubtedly be assisted if all [lobbying]
consultancies named their clients, and when considering whether or not
to accept assistance from a consultancy, officers of APGs may wish to
check whether or not the consultancy does so. (CSP 2006: 22)
And, further ‘The court of public opinion should be the final control. “As long as
we know the funding source then people can make their own minds up”’. (Evans,
cited in CSP 2006: 29). While we would be very wary of allowing the lobbying
industry’s self-regulatory system becoming a de-facto accreditation regime we
whole-hearted endorse the sentiment expressed in the report that once there is
transparency around funding and outside interests the public will be in a much
better position to properly scrutinise the policy-making process. This is the key
to opening up and democratising the UK’s corridors of power.
Aviation
The case of the aviation industry also exhibits similar features. A request under
the Freedom of Information Act for details of any Department for Transport
Ministerial meetings – held between January 2006 and June 2007 – with British
Airways, British Airports Authority, environmental NGOs and development NGOs
revealed a huge disparity in access to senior decision-makers.
The two companies had many more meetings with the Secretary of State or
15
Under Secretary of State compared to environmental NGOs. With BAA securing
12 Ministerial meetings and BA 6, and the various environmental NGOs
managing just 7 between them, the figures themselves suggest that a level
playing field does not exist.
The lobbying efforts of BAA and BA, and their access to Ministers has not
escaped the notice of Parliamentarians. In a debate in the House of Commons on
the Planning Bill last year (10 December 2007), John McDonnell, Labour MP for
Hayes & Harlington also drew attention to BAA’s lobbying efforts after the
inquiry into terminal 5 at Heathrow.1 He said that decision-making at Ministerial
level had been “unduly influenced by the aviation industry”.
According to McDonnell, “the aviation White Paper was drafted and dominated
by the aviation industry lobbying the former Chancellor. The consultation paper
that will be out for the next few months was drafted and virtually dictated by
BAA, with the evidence modeled by BAA – that is the information that we have
received under the FOI Act 2000.” The detailed map of the relationships between
1
John McDonnell MP, House of Commons debate on the Planning Bill, 10 December 2007.
16
BAA, their retained lobbyists and PR consultants, and government (Figure 2)
The links outlined here were established using a number of sources of
information and methods. It took ten months, using FOI and other means, to
assemble this information. Under a mandatory lobbying register, with online
reporting and updated every 6 months, this information would have been easily
available in the public domain.
With the information on a register – out in the open – it would also mean there
was less public and media suspicion and speculation. The current strength of
opposition to Heathrow expansion, for example, has been fueled in part by the
secrecy and accusations of undue influence by the aviation industry. Had the
information been in the public domain, via a lobbying register, media reporting
could not have proceeded without some recourse to official, reliable information.
17
Figure 2 Easy access: the aviation web of influence
Privileged Access: Parliamentary passes
The concern about whether having a parliamentary pass gave someone “extra
power” or particular advantage has been raised during evidence to the
Committee. Perhaps this question can be answered by two recent cases that
highlight how passes can be abused.
In July 2007, it was revealed that some peers were allegedly handing out
exclusive access to the Houses of Parliament to lobbyists and pressure groups,
for which they received thousands of pounds a year.
Parliamentary passes intended for researchers and secretaries were being given
out to representatives of the defence, transport, freight and legal industries. For
example, an investigation by the Times newspaper found that Lord Howie of
Troon, gave a pass to Doug Smith, a Westminster lobbyist who is chairman of
Westminster Advisers, whose clients include French multinationals Sodexho and
Accor. Lord Berkeley gave a pass to Neil Stevens, from the Rail Freight Group,
whose clients include Maersk, the container shipping line.
Gill Morris, head of the APPC told the paper: “Having a pass to the Palace of
Westminster and its facilities has clear advantages.”(Coates 2007)
Three months later, in October 2007, it was also alleged that a Labour peer, Lord
Hoyle, had taken money to introduce an arms company lobbyist to the
government Minister in charge of weapons purchases.(Leigh and Evans 2008)
The lobbyist is said to have paid cash for an introduction to Lord Drayson, the
Defence Minister in charge of billions of pounds of military procurement.
The lobbyist, Michael Wood, had access to the Palace of Westminster because he
has a security pass as a research assistant to another MP. While “cash for
18
introductions” is forbidden by lobbyists' trade body the APPC, Wood is not a
member,(Leigh and Evans 2007) showing that self-regulation does not work.
Undue influence
Almost all writers on corporate power or interest groups now agree that
corporation have increased their power over political decision-making in the
past twenty years – the period since the electoral victory of neoliberalism in
1979. For example the leading political scientist Wyn Grant noted in 1995 that
‘business interest have tended to strengthen their privileged position in the
1980s and 1990s’. One reason for this, he notes was a government which ‘sought
to promote business interests’(Grant, 1995: 161). Since then relations with
business have only been enhanced by the Labour administrations of Blair and
Brown, of which Grant (2000) notes ‘consultation is close, frequent and intense.
Concessions are often given, if less frequently publicised’. Grant notes and does
not demur from the judgement that the Blair government ‘was the most probusiness government Britain had ever had’. Other writers from across the
spectrum of political science go further. Colin Leys refers to ‘market driven
politics’, Philip Bobbitt, a former US presidential advisor, describes British
governance as an example of the ‘market-state’, while Colin Crouch refers to the
contemporary period as the era of ‘post-democracy’.(Bobbitt 2003; Leys 2003;
Crouch 2004) Each description acknowledges the increase in the power of
business.
The power of business is such that it has been able to put in place the
architecture of neoliberal globalisation – from the campaign to introduce NAFTA
in the US to the creation of the WTO in 1997. Each of these ‘architectural
reforms’ have affected the context in which business operates within nations like
the UK. Inside the UK the process is the same with coalition of business interests
forming to push the collective interests of the corporations.(Miller and Dinan
2008) It is no coincidence that the Blair government was closer to elite business
lobby groups and the ‘inner circle’ of CEOs of transnational corporations than to
traditional trade associations. Multinational Chairmen’s Group
The example of the obscure and generally secretive Multinational Chairmen’s
Group illustrates this. The Guardian recently reported how a small lobbying
group of businessmen, including Lord Browne, then of BP, Arun Sarin of
Vodafone, Sir John Bond, then of HSBC, and Sir Christopher Hogg, then of
GlaxoSmithKline, were able to use their privileged access to then Prime Minister,
Tony Blair ‘to protect the pensions of the ultra-rich.’(Cookson et al 2008) The
group ‘meets informally three times a year and has an annual meeting with the
Prime Minister’.(Gribben 2003) ‘This discreet club takes pride in its privacy’,
reports the Sunday Times. (Lorenz 2000) ‘Outside the small circle of its members,
it is little known even within the upper echelons of the Confederation of British
Industry, under whose auspices it meets.’(Lorenz 2000) Details about the MCG
meetings only came to light after a long struggle by the Guardian to get hold of
documents under Freedom of Information legislation went all the way to the
Information Commissioner. The Group – of less than ten – includes the heads of
some of the biggest firms in the UK including BP, Diageo, Unilever, HSBC, Shell,
Vodafone, GlaxoSmithKline, Rio Tinto and British American Tobacco (BAT). Its
19
tactics include threatening ‘exit’ from the UK if the government does not do what
it wants. To ensure the government got the message the press were briefed and
reported as follows: ‘Business leaders are warning they're not bluffing. The very
real scenario he is facing is of an industrial and corporate Britain without many
of the huge multinational players. The spectre of Britain being an outpost…is
haunting Blair.’(Porter 2003)
Documents show that BAT ‘was able to put private pressure on Tony Blair and a
Cabinet Minister who wanted to hold an inquiry into allegations that the firm
was colluding with criminals’. After behind-the-scenes lobbying, via the MCG,
plans for an inquiry, ‘which could have published a highly damaging report’,
were ‘dropped.’ ‘Instead’, the Guardian reported, ‘MPs were told that a watereddown inquiry would be conducted in secret. Its activities were ‘buried’ for almost
four years, after which it emerged that no action was to be taken. BAT was so
pleased with the eventual form the inquiry took that their lobbyists described it,
in a private note, as "not a problem".’(Evans et al 2004)
The group also ‘outmanoeuvred Gordon Brown, then chancellor, to shield ‘fat cat’
pensions from his proposals to tax them more heavily’:
The lobbying, allied with protests from other business groups, forced
Brown to rethink. Within a few months, he had loosened the proposed cap
on their pension pots so that more of their money would escape the tax
net. The extra tax will only be payable on pension savings over £1.8m, not
the originally proposed £1.4m, and will not come in until 2010. He
delayed the start date of the new regime to give the rich more time to rearrange their finances. He also reduced the tax rate from 60% to 55%. The
super-rich can thus shelter an extra £400,000 from the taxman – at
Brown's original proposed 60% tax, that sum would have incurred a
£240,000 tax bill.(Cookson et al 2008)
The Guardian states that Downing Street only released the heavily censored
documents after Richard Thomas, the Information Commissioner, ruled that the
public had a right to know how lobbyists influenced Ministers.(Cookson et al
2008)
In his ruling he said: “In relation to policy discussions with external stakeholders
the Commissioner takes the general view that the likelihood of those parties
being deterred from freely expressing their views is diminished when they are in
effect being given an opportunity to lobby the policy-makers, as in this case.”
He continued: “Furthermore, the Commissioner notes that there is a strong
public interest in informing public debate … In addition, he considers that there
is a public interest in facilitating understanding of how government formulates
policy, and also in increasing public confidence that decisions are properly
made.” 2
2
FOI Act Decision Notice, Information Commissioner‟s Office, 30 July 2007. (Reference:
FS50086299)
20
Only a register of lobbying can only help facilitate a proper understanding of how
government works, and thereby increase public confidence that decisions are
being made properly and in the public interest. In a climate of skepticism and
suspicion (which is not simply attributable to the media or watchdog groups)
transparency offers the best means of restoring trust and confidence in public
affairs.
But the power of direct corporate lobbies is also intensified by the increasing
marketisation of government - meaning a series of changes in the personnel and
practices of government. First is the direct involvement of business people as
ministers. The appointment of business leaders on Task Forces, as special
advisers, as ministers (e.g. the appointment of the former head of the main
British business lobby (the CBI) Digby Jones as a minister in the Department for
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform), raises all sorts of conflict of
interest questions. However, the process is not all one way. Many of the people
at the top of New Labour have moving with speed from the party through think
tanks, lobbying and PR firms, industry and back to government again.
Ministers are also increasingly taking up highly paid positions in the industries
that they have helped to open up to the market. The obvious example is Tony
Blair whose appointment to to JP Morgan for a reported £500,000 salary
undermines any remaining confidence in the integrity of British public life. Blair
will be allowed to lobby the Government on behalf of the bank. The Advisory
Committee on Business Appointmentrs (ACOBA), which vets the jobs of former
ministers advised Blair he could take up the job immediately ‘but for one year
after leaving office he should not be personally involved in lobbying government
ministers or officials on behalf of his new employer or its clients’ (Miller 2008).
This of course misunderstands lobbying which does not need to involve
‘personal’ contacts. ‘Blair is on course’, reports The Times ‘to become the richest
former premier in recent history’ (Coates 2008). Such relationships of which
Blair’s is but one are increasingly commonplace.
These examples from the top are replicated further down with the revolving
door spinning ever faster. Civil servants, MPs and advisers move to the private
sector and at the same time business people are ‘seconded’ into government,
sometimes to positions where they can make a material difference to the
company where they owe their primary loyalty. All of this is part of a wider
process of opening up and privatising the very apparatus of government.
Functions previously thought of as inherently public are being carved out and
served up to private corporations through the phenomenon of ‘shared services’
and via contracting out.
All of this is evidence of the ineluctable process of creeping business takeover of
government functions and business influence on government. Discussion of the
‘success’ of lobbying seriously underestimates the significance of the changes.
Nevertheless, it is clear that business in the UK is now able to exert considerable
influence over government decision making.
Conflicts of interest: the Revolving Door
21
The increasing involvement of business in politics gives added potential for
conflicts of interest. There is now a wealth of evidence showing that there is a
problem with the so-called ‘revolving door’. This refers to the interchange in
jobs between lobbyists, corporate staff and Ministers, special advisers and senior
civil servants. The potential for conflict of interest arises especially when public
servants take up posts in the industry they were previously responsible for.
However, the opposite can also be the case where lobbyists or corporate staff are
seconded into government departments or even appointed as Ministers. Given
the increasing trend of such movements, it makes sense to consider how such
conflicts can be handled. As evidence of the trend we note some recent examples
from the nuclear industry.
Ex-Ministers and MPs taking jobs in the nuclear industry
Recently two senior ex-government Ministers have moved into lucrative jobs
within the nuclear industry. This has happened at the same time as the
government has been undertaking a public consultation on the issue and has
recently given the go-ahead to proceed with a new generation of nuclear power
plants.
Ian McCartney, the former chairman of the Labour Party and former Trade
Minister, is now paid up to £115,000 to act as a senior adviser to the Fluor
Corporation. Although the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments gave
McCartney permission to take the appointment it was on condition that he did
not lobby the government for a year.3
One part of lobbying is gaining privileged access to MPs. In November 2007, the
press reported how McCartney was spotted in the Commons ‘entertaining an
executive from a controversial US nuclear company’. The person concerned was
Flour’s UK boss, Ian Thomas, who said that he was there on a “social visit”.(Oliver
2007)
But this is surely part of what lobbying involves – access and influence. Flour is
on a shortlist of four seeking to win an £18 billion contract for decommissioning
the Sellafield nuclear power site and is expected to be heavily involved in any
future nuclear revival.
Richard Caborn, the former Sports Minister and former chairman of the Trade
and Industry Select Committee is another ex-Minister with nuclear interests. In
November 2007, the Financial Times reported how Caborn had ‘joined the
growing band of former Ministers and Labour MPs who have taken lucrative jobs
in the nuclear industry.’ (Eaglesham 2007)
Mr Caborn, was appointed as an adviser to ‘Amec, the British engineering
services group that is part of a consortium bidding for a £5 billion contract to run
3
Employment declared on the Register of Members‟ Interests, session 2007-08.
22
Sellafield, the UK's biggest nuclear site.’ According to the Register of Member’s
Interests, Caborn is paid up to £75,000.4
Even if these positions are cleared by the Advisory Committee on Business
Appointments, it seems difficult to reconcile MP’s commercial interests with the
spirit of Rule 10 of the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament: “No Member
shall act as a paid advocate in any proceeding of the House.”5
These two are not the only MPs and Lords who have taken lucrative positions
within the nuclear industry:
Ex-Ministers who are no longer MPs
Brian Wilson is a former Labour MP and Energy Minister, who left parliament in
April 2005. On 26 October 2005, he was appointed non-executive director of
AMEC Nuclear Holdings Ltd, the nuclear services arm of AMEC plc. The
announcement boasted that the firm is the UK's largest private nuclear services
business. “It is vital to have a British company of AMEC Nuclear's standing
involved in every aspect of the industry,” Wilson said. “There is a huge amount of
essential work to be done at both home and abroad, including clean-up and
decommissioning, and I want to see the maximum level of participation from the
UK in that process.”6
Ex-MPs
Lord O’Neill of Clackmannan (Martin O’Neill) was a Labour MP for 26 years, until
he stood down at the 2005 general election. He is now chair of the Nuclear
Industry Association.7
Lord Cunningham of Felling is one of the Honoury Legislative Chairs of the
Transatlantic Nuclear Energy Forum (TANEF) that “aims to address key industry
concerns and foster on-going strong relationships amongst nuclear energy
companies and between the nuclear energy industry and governments,
legislators and regulators based in the European Union and North America.”8
The PR and lobbying company Sovereign Strategy, which has strong ties to the
Labour Party, not only lists TANEF as a client, it acts as TANEF’s secretariat and
registered its website.9 Cunningham was a non-executive director of Sovereign
Strategy from 2002-2005, whilst still an MP. Cunningham is now a partner in the
political consultancies Brinkburn Associates and Anderson MacGraw, whose
clients remain unknown. 10
4
Register of Members‟ Interests, session 2007-08
Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament
6
Press release from AMEC, „Rt Hon Brian Wilson and Neville Chamberlain CBE appointed nonexecutive directors of AMEC Nuclear‟, 26 October 2005
7
NIA website, „Our People‟ (accessed April 2008)
8
TANEF website (accessed April 2008)
9
Sovereign Strategy website, „Our Clients (accessed April 2008); Robert Winnet, “Revealed:
Minister's Links To Nuclear Lobby”, Sunday Times, May 14, 2006, p1
10
Register of Lords‟ Interests (as at 15 April 2008)
5
23
Sovereign and TANEF were also caught up in a ‘sleaze row’ in 2006 with the
revelations that Sovereign Strategy boss – Alan Donnelly – had helped to pay for
the refurbishment of then Environment Secretary David Miliband's constituency
party headquarters in Newcastle. Sovereign Strategy also represents the US
multinational Fluor, which Ian McCartney now works for.(Winnet 2006)
The Guardian also reported recently that Lord Cunningham is paid £36,000 a
year by the City of London Corporation to give political advice.(Evans and
Hencke 2008) According to the report this includes: advising the Corporation on
how to present its case at meetings with Ministers and the government, the best
time to speak to politicians, and general political advice. It also involves calling
Ministers to arrange meetings with the authority when it is having difficulty
securing access.
Documents obtained by the Guardian under the Freedom of Information Act also
show that Cunningham has given the corporation confidential advice about two
bills going through Parliament which affected the authority. The newspaper
reports that Cunningham was hired by the corporation in September 2006. In
the first year, the corporation paid £48,000 for this work to him and lobbying
firm, Sovereign Strategy, of which he was a director. In the Lords register,
Cunningham declared his financial ties with Sovereign Strategy and Brinkburn,
but makes no mention of the City of London Corporation, meaning that anyone
reading the register would be unaware that he is currently working for it.
A lobbying register would help address these gaps in reporting and
transparency. Under the obligations of becoming an MP, members are required
to sign the Register of Interests. According to the Office of Parliamentary
Standards, every MP since Enoch Powell has filled in the Declaration. Although
the Office itself does not proactively police the Register, if a complaint is made
against an MP with sufficient evidence, then the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Standards can conduct an investigation.
If an MP is found to be in breach of their obligations, penalties include an apology
to the House of Commons; the withholding of a Member’s salary for a specified
period; and suspension of the Member from the House, which includes loss of
pay.11 The Register of Members Interests offers a useful model which a Lobbying
Register might follow, especially in regard to the regular updating of this
information. The online Register is now updated twice a month.
Conflicts of interest: Rules on commercial activities of MPs
We believe there needs to be a tightening of rules governing the business
activities and outside interests of MPs. In 2005 it was revealed that Ken Clarke
MP was using House of Commons facilities to undertake his business role as
Deputy Chair of British American Tobacco.(Rowell 2005)
11
House of Commons Guide, Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards
24
According to Sir Philip Mawer “modest” use of a PA, as well as the House of
Commons facilities such as faxes and phones for MP’s commercial interests is
allowed. However, as Sir Philip says “drawing the line between what is
Parliamentary and what is non-Parliamentary is not always easy”.
The rules currently seem - at best - opaque, as does the process by which Sir
Philip conducts his own investigations as his meetings are not minuted and
cannot be scrutinized by the public.(Mawer 2005a, 2005b)
The need for transparency
Lobbying is a potential problem for democracy because it has the potential to
substitute special interests for the interests expressed by the people in elections.
The problem is exacerbated by a lack of transparency, meaning that knowledge
of the activities of lobbyists is not sufficiently available to allow scrutiny or
informed democratic decision making. Even if it were, however, the problem of
privileged access and undue influence would not be automatically solved. It is
this which underlies the main cause of popular disenchantment with the
democratic process and – similarly- is why the lobbyists defend their position so
heartily. The transition from social democracy to neoliberalism has significantly
heightened the problem of lobbying because it has triggered a massive increase
in the practice. The perception and the fact of undue corporate influence has
thereby increased. In terms of our theoretical understanding of this we can say
with some confidence that the ‘neo-liberalisation’ of the public sphere has
progressed further in the UK than in other European countries such as Germany
and France and that this has meant the quality of democratic process has been
undermined. Moreover, it has meant that the hegemony of neoliberalism has
been strengthened. In our view this is a process of the active production of elite
or ‘ruling class’ unity as opposed to popular consent. For us lobbying is one of
the key mechanisms by which elite consensus is fostered as well as the means by
which sectional corporate interests are pursued.
To shed light on the corridors of power will not be easy but it is necessary if we
are to move towards a more democratic political system and to disrupt the cosy
consensus which tends towards the capture of the political system in the UK’s
‘market democracy’.
The evidence taken by the committee to date suggests there are significant and
worrying gaps in the oversight of lobbying by the self-regulatory bodies such as
the APPC. There is also the obvious issue of those lobbyists who choose not to
join trade and professional associations that promote codes of conduct. There is
simply no way to assure that such lobbyists behave ethically or transparently.
There is also the problem of oversight and compliance by those companies
notionally covered by a code of conduct. The committee has heard evidence that
it is likely that the code is often breached. This raises serious questions about the
reliability and credibility of the self-regulatory model.
A related concern is the question of transparency and accountability. With the
accuracy of the self-regulatory register under question, elected members, public
servants and the wider public are entitled to query if the information currently in
25
the public domain is a true reflection of lobbying activity: is the information
available complete, accurate, or sufficient to secure transparency and
accountability around lobbying? We believe it is not possible to answer
affirmatively to any of these questions at present. Currently there is a dearth of
information in the public domain regarding how lobbying interests seek to shape
policy and legislation. A mandatory lobbying register is the only viable means to
secure compliance, transparency and public trust. It appears to us that the status
quo is an unattractive option. Given the secrecy that surrounds lobbying it is
likely that there will continue to be suspicion around attempts by outside
interests to shape policy. This suspicion is damaging for the entire political class,
and undermines confidence in public affairs and elected representatives. The
gravity of this erosion of trust requires serious remedial action, of which a
lobbying register is an important element.
A common objection raised against a mandatory register of lobbyists is that it
would be too costly and cumbersome to manage. We think these concerns are
overplayed. The lessons from the introduction of Freedom of Information are
perhaps instructive here. One of the main issues that has to date been pursued
through FOI requests has been the question of relations between ministers,
officials and outside interests. If all such information was made available
routinely through a lobbyist register then it is very likely that FOI applications
for such information would be unnecessary, thereby saving the public purse and
public officials time and effort.
Another criticism of a lobbying register is that it involves disproportionate
record keeping on the part of outside interests. We would note that for the global
professional lobbying and public relations firms there appears to be little
problem complying with the register under the lobbying Disclosure Act in the US.
In fact the LDA shows that all sorts of outside interests, from multinational
corporations to non-governmental organisations, can easily meet the disclosure
requirements. In addition, it would appear that some lobbying organisations
already privately maintain databases with information about contacts with
elected representatives. The APPC in Scotland keep an internal register of
contacts between members and MSPs at cross party group meetings, and a
record of the capacity in which member lobbyists attend such meetings: this
information is apparently circulated to officials in Scottish government but not
published or made public.(Nove 2007) This example illustrates that detailed
record keeping is already taking place and could be made public.
A mandatory register of lobbying can only help facilitate the understanding of
how government works and increase public confidence in the political process.
The House of Commons already has the Commissioner for Standards. It appears
to us logical to extend such vigilance to outside interests. The creation of an
independent body to oversee a lobbyists register is both timely and necessary.
The long term damage to the political system of a drip-drip feed of lobbying
scandals should not be underestimated. A mandatory lobbyists register is not a
sledge-hammer to crack a nut: rather it is potentially an essential tool for
restoring trust in politics.
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