STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS
ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER
(START)
IB82114
AUTHOR:
Harry W r e n n
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
T H E L I B R A R Y OF C O N G R E S S
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM
COMPLIMENTS O F
DATE ORIGINATED 11/02/82
DATE UPDATED 12/08/82
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700
1208
CRS- 1
ISSUE DEFINITION
On June 2 9 , 1 9 8 2 , t h e United S t a t e s and
t h e S o v i e t Union began n e w
negotiations o n controlling strategic nuclear weapons, t e r m e d Strategic Arms
Reduction T a l k s (START!.
T h e Reagan Administration's b a s i c approach i s to
seek deep c u t s i n strategic nuclear arsenals.
START raises a number of issues:
--
Will the Administration's proposal lead to
meaningful reductions?
--
H o w does t h e S T A R T proposal relate to t h e Administration defense programs and strategic doctrine?
--
Are there alternatives which better s e r v e U.S.
interests?
--
What a r e known or likely Soviet reactions?
BACKGROUND AND POLICY A N A L Y S I S
START:
Description a n d Evolution
T h e Reagan Administration's S T A R T proposal envisions t w o steps t o w a r d s
a r m s reductions (though not necessarily two s e p a r a t e agreements).
In t h e
first phase, the Soviet Union and the United S t a t e s would
reduce s t r a t e g i c
missile warheads to a b o u t 5,000 o n no more than 8 5 0 intercontinental
land-based and sea-based missjles (ICBMs and SLBMs).
No m o r e than half
of
these warheads could b e o n ICBMs.
In t h e second phase, t h e aggregate m i s s i l e
throw weight (i.e., t h e useful payload potential of a m i s s i l e booster) would
be equalized a t a l e v e l n o greater than t h e a g g r e g a t e t h r o w weight of t h e
present U.S. ICBM f o r c e (approximately 4 million pounds).
According
to the
following reductions:
Administration,
these
proposals
would
require
the
To reach t h e limit o f 5,000 deployed strategic m i s s i l e warheads, t h e
S o v i e t Union would have to eliminate 2,400 warheads, and t h e United S t a t e s ,
2,452.
To reach the limit o f 8 5 0 strategic missiles, t h e S o v i e t s
eliminate 1 , 4 9 8 missiles, a n d the United S t a t e s , 746.
would
have
to
To achieve the 2,500-warhead sub-ceiling on I C B M s , t h e S o v i e t s would h a v e
to reduce their currently deployed
ICBM warheads
(5,500) by 3,000.
In
contrast, the United S t a t e s would n o t be required to r e d u c e t h e number of
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currently deployed ICBM warheads (2,152) because they total less than 2,500.
However, the United States would
have to reduce t h e current number of
warheads deployed in SLBMs (5,300) by 2,452 n o t to exceed the 5,000 overall
i n the number of
warhead ceiling.
T h e r e would not be a similar reduction
Soviet warheads deployed on S L B M s , because their total i s currently below
2,500.
If the missile throw weight limit were set at or near the current U.S.
level of approximately 4 million pounds, t h e Soviet Union would have t o
sacrifice approximately 7 million pounds of i t s current t h r o w weight total af
approximately 1 1 million.
T h e following c h a r t summarizes these reductions:
START Limit
5,000 Warheads
Eliminations Required
of U.S.
of U.S.S.R.
2,452
2,400
746
1,498
2,500 ,ICBM Warheads
0
3,000
2,500 SLBM Warheads
2,452
0
8 5 0 Missiles
4 million pound throw weight
0
7 million
The Evolution of START
START'S Deginnings are to be found in t h e demise of S A L T I1
(Strategic
Arms Limitations Talks), and t h e positions candidate R e a g a n and many of his
supporters took during that process.
Reagan deemed SALT I1 to be
"fatally
flawed."
With like-minded c r i t i c s , he a'rgued that the a g r e e m e n t would merely
codify the a r m s r a c e and not actually reduce the threat posed
by
strategic
nuclear weapons; that SALT I1 could not be confidently
verified; t h a t i t
would concede t h e U.S.S.R.
a major and threatening advantage i n ICBMs; and
that i t would l e a v e the U.S.S.R.
in a position to f u r t h e r increase i t s
strategic a d v a n E a g e when the agreement expired in 1985.
Reagan believed that
the United States had agreed t o this "unequal b a r g a i n w because
i t was
negotiating from a position of strategic inferiority.
From this he Concluded
that for the immediate future the United
States must
look to a stronger
defense program f o r its security and only
subordinately
to strategic a r m s
control.
H e d i d , however, l e a v e the door open to negotiations o n c e the
United States had taken steps t o remedy i t s strategic deficiencies.
After assuming office, President Reagan Confirmed the rejection of S A L T 11
and began a substantial arms build-up (though he has ultimately agreed
that
the United States will "not u n d e r c u t w the t e t m s of SALT I1 a s long a s the
Soviets exercise similar restraint.)
But h e a l s o indicated a readiness to
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negotiate a new treaty that would provide f o r deep reductions.
H e initiated
a comprehensive review of a r m s control policy "to learn the lessons of t h e
past in order to a c h i e v e more lasting p r o g r e s s in the future."
Subsequently, Europe and the United S t a t e s both s a w t h e growth of popular
movements strongly critical of Administration policy with regard to nuclear
weapons.
In E u r o p e , t h i s took the form of a n "anti-nuclearn movement opposed
t o NATO plans to deploy new intermediate r a n g e nuclear systems o n European
soil.
In the United S t a t e s , there were demands for a complete "freeze" on
all nuclear weapons deployments.
These n e w political f o r c e s appear to have
played a significant part i n inducing t h e Administration to move m o r e quickly
beyond study and into a c t u a l negotiations with t h e Soviet Union.
T h e f i r s t initiative c a m e in November
1981, when t h e Administration
proposed t h e "zero option" formula for limiting intermediate range nuclear
forces (INF) in Europe, by which the U.S. proposes to scrap plans for n e w
in Europe if t h e
missiles (Pershing I1 and Ground Launch C r u i s e Missiles)
Soviets take o u t all existing missiles in t h e U.S.S.R.
targetted
on Western
Europe.
[ S e e C R S Issue Brief 81128:
NATO
Theater
Nuclear
Forces:
Modernization and Arms Control.]
S i n c e t h e n , the Administration has a l s o
taken new initiatives i n t h e Mutual and Balanced F o r c e Reduction Talks (MBFR)
that have been going o n between NATO a n d t h e Warsaw Pact since 1973.
During
the winter and spring of 1 9 8 2 , the o v e r a l l strategic a r m s control program
took s h a p e , and it w a s m a d e public by t h e President i n a n a d d r e s s a t Eureka
College o n May 9.
T h e START Proposal
T h e notion that shapes t h e Administration's S T A R T proposals i s that t h e
most important weapons t o c o n t r o l and r e d u c e a r e those that a r e potential
f i r s t strike weapons, i.e., that can quickly destroy hardened
targets l i k e
mi.ssile silos.
Of special concern i s t h e Soviet Union's f o r c e of large
ICBMs, which many believe h a v e acquired t h e capability to destroy the U.S.
ICBM f o r c e in a. first s t r i k e , giving r i s e to the "window o f vulnerabilityt*
problem.
There i s a l s o t h e m o r e ' g e n e r a l consideration that the l e s s
vulnerable the missiles o f both sides, t h e smaller t h e temptation of either
power to launch them preemptively i n a crisis.
Consequently, in the S T A R T
prOpOSalS, missiles a r e included while bombers a r e n o t , s i n c e the former c a n
strike quickly while the latter take several hours to reach their targets a n d
a r e essentially retaliatory.
Also, s i n c e SLBMs a r e currently l e s s lethal
against hard targets than I C B M s , the special sub-ceilings a r e only included
for ICBMs. T h e Administration justifies formulating a proposal t h a t requires
larger S o v i e t reductions by noting that t h e Soviet Union has a larger number
o f destabilizing (i.e., f i r s t strike) weapons.
T h e two-phase approach t o S T A R T has l o s t some of i t s currency a s t h e
negotiations have proceeded.
It reportedly derived from inter-departmental
bargaining
within
the Administration over the terms o f
its
initial
negotiating proposal.
T h e Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of
Defense seem to have favored a new a p p r o a c h to a r m s control in which t h e
"unit of a c c o u n t " would be t h r o w . w e i g h t rather than launchers a s i n SALT.
Former Secretary of S t a t e H a i g reportedly argued successfully for an opening
proposal m o r e consistent with past p r a c t i c e o n grounds that this would
be
more acceptable to S o v i e t negotiators.
T h e U.S. proposal thus concentrates
f i r s t on trying to lower t h e number of missiles and warheads to equal levels
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while reserving the more difficult question of equalizing
throw weight f o r
later. The two phases a r e conceived a s parts of
" a single negotiation",
however, and though the door i s left open t o a first phase a g r e e m e n t , t h e
Administratioc reportedly envisions only o n e treaty.
More details of the Administration's S T A R T position have been reported i n
the press a s negotiations h a v e proceeded, and there is evidence
of
flexibility, especially a s regards weapons
such a s cruise missiles and
bombers which are not included in the original U.S.
proposals.
Reportedly,
the Administration would be willing to limit long-range
bombers
to current
levels (but just what types of aircraft t h e s e l e v e l s might include i s n o t
clear, though apparently it will insist that Soviet Backfire bombers, which
have a limited capacity to strike the United
States but were not counted
under SALT, be included in these ceilings).
T h e Administration has a l s o
shown willingness to discuss cruise missiles (though ground-launched
cruise
missiles currently fall under t h e rubric of t h e INF talks mentioned above.)
Nevertheless, the U.S.
START position
remains incomplete.
When
the
Administration announced its S T A R T proposal i n May 1 9 8 2 , it acknowledged
it
had yet to work out positions on important matters such a s verification a n d
missile reloads. Critical choices still l i e ahead for both
co'untries, a s
each unveils and refines its position and
responds t o counter-initiatives.
This could slow the pace of negotiations.
On the other h a n d , the two chief
negotiators, Edward Rowny and V.P. Karpov, k n o w each other and the issues
well, and many thorny technical matters -- definitions, counting rules, a n d
were resolved during the SALT negotiations, and will be carried
the like
over to START.
--
The issue of "linkage" merits mention.
T h e Reagan Administration
has
decided to proceed with strategic a r m s negotiations despite Soviet behavior
in Afghanistan, Poland and elsewhere.
T h i s i s a significant departure from
the position that a r m s control should be used a s carrot a n d stick t o moderate
inappropriate Soviet behavior.
Whether t h e Administration perseveres in t h i s
approach i s probably contingent upon the extent to which the U.S.S.R. engages
in future activities that provoke strong U.S. public condemnation.
Analysis of U.S.
Proposals
Summarized below a r e the major criticisms of the
proposals and the Administration's public responses.
three categories:
--
--
Administration's
START
Criticisms fall i n t o
Some see t h e proposals a s unrealistic, either
because they a r e lacking in significant components
or because they a r e founded on incorrect assumptions;
these critics argue t h a t such problems raise serious
questions about the sincerity of t h e Administration's
approach.
For different reasons, others see t h e proposals a s
failing to offer a r e a l prospect f o r meaningful
arms control; these critics a r g u e that START'S
framers have not thoroughly understood certain
intractable problems t h a t became evident in t h e
SALT process.
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--
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Yet o t h e r s see a n a g r e e m e n t based o n START a s
undesirable; these critics a r g u e that a START
a g r e e m e n t might destabilize rather than stabilize
the strategic nuclear situation; some also a r g u e
t h a t S T A R T i s inconsistent with general Reagan
Administration defense policy which seeks a rapid
build-up i n the U.S. nuclear capability.
(1) Administration Negotiating Sincerity
A major criticism i s that the proposals a r e one-sided.
S T A R T puts t h e
greater burden of reductions o n the Soviet U n i o n , and permits the U.S. to g o
ahead with a l l of
i t s currently planned
counterforce-capable
strategic
systems, requiring reductions only i n older systems that would have to be
retired in several years anyway.
It permits the deployment of l a r g e
quantities
of
ALCMs
(air-launched
cruise
missiles)
and
SLCMs
(submarine-launched cruise missiles) that for the moment have n o S o v i e t
counterpart.
Critics d o u b t Moscow's willingness to seriously consider neutralizing i t s
own strength i n I C B M s and begin competing from a position of weakness
in
other areas, a n d t o "trade the present for the f u t u r e w by cutting i n t o i t s
existing f o r c e s in a n effort t o stop a U.S. build-up that i s only now g e t t i n g
underway. T h e s e c r i t i c s wonder whether i n drawing u p i t s proposals
the
Administration g a v e sufficient attention to the divergent interests o f t h e
t w o parties.
T h e S o v i e t Union a n d t h e United States h a v e different
security
requirements, m a k e different assumptions a b o u t how they a r e to be m e t , a n d
consequently, f o r q u i t e legitimate reasons, have developed asymmetric f o r c e
structures. P r a c t i c a l expectations for negotiation requires that t 9 e s e
differences be taken i n t o a c c o u n t i n some fashion. In this regard, equality
o f sacrifice may a p p r o a c h equality of r e s u l t a s a factor in arms control.
T h e Administration's response i s two-fold.
First, i t points out that i t s
proposals f o c u s on those weapons generally considered to be t h e m o s t
destabilizing; a t t h e same t i m e , it has expressed willingness to discuss t h e
other systems i n t h e strategic arsenal if Moscow i s a l s o willing
to d o so.
S e c o n d , i t s e e s Moscow a s perfectly capable of recognizing and defending i t s
own interests in t h e negotiations and argues that,
therefore,
U.S.
negotiators o u g h t to elucidate positions that advance U.S.
interests.
An
ancilliary a d v a n t a g e i s presumably that a one-sided opening bid will
signal
S o v i e t leaders t h a t t h e current Administration
i s not s o eager to g a i n
agreement that it will sacrifice vital U.S.
security interests.
A second criticism made of t h e S T A R T proposals i s that they contain n o
provisions f o r verification.
T h i s i s a special concern since S T A R T places
n e w burdens on monitoring capabilities.
By changing the unit of account f r o m
something that i s relatively difficult to conceal
(e.g.,
silos and o t h e r
(e.g.,
missiles themselves,
m i s s i l e launchers) to something less visible
deployed warheads, a n d missile throw weight), the monitoring and verification
problem becomes much more complex. T h e Administration's response i s t h a t
t h i s i s a matter s t i l l under internal discussion, and o n e which i s relatively
incidental t h i s early i n the negotiations.
It has indicated, however, t h a t
i t will insist upon s o m e form of on-site Verification to supplement n a t i o n a l
technical means (NTM)
.
A third criticism of the S T A R T proposals i s that they a r e based o n
"incorrect a s s u m p t i o n s n about t h e strategic balance.
D e b a t e continues o v e r
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Administration claims that the Soviet Union now holds important strategic
advantages including a capability to eliminate the U.S. Minuteman force with
a first-strike.
Some experts suggest that this vulnerability
is
a
theoretical one without practical significance.
If this is the case, then
large reductions in Soviet ICBMs may not be required and a major
rationale
for the Administration's START
proposal
is
thus
undermined.
The
Administration finds the evidence of U.S.
strategic vulnerability
to be
persuasive with important implications for U.S.
force
structure
and
modernization plans.
These three criticisms are cited as evidence that the Administration's
START proposals are nothing more than a ruse to mollify
critics and
side-track arms control negotiations while the United States rearms.
These
critics see the outlook for arms control based on current policy as further
clouded by other factors. The Soviets may prefer to wait and see whether
popular anti-nuclear sentiment succeeds in softening the U.S.
position.
Critics also fear that the U.S. strategic build-up will increase the appetite
of Soviet military planners, whose demands are more likely to be honored a s
their favor is courted during the coming Soviet succession struggle.
The Administration's response is that START is a negotiable proposal with
a good chance for producing a useful arms control agreement.
It argues that
flagrant Soviet intransigence would adversely affect Western and Third World
public opinion, presumably a development Soviet leaders would prefer to
avoid. The Administration does not see time as being on the Soviet side.
It
arms build-up which,
also posits a Soviet desire to preempt a major U.S.
given the exorbitant cost of new weapons, could be costly for both sides, but
especially for the Soviet Union, already under serious economic strain.
Unrest among Soviet nationalities and i n Eastern Europe only adds to Soviet
hopes for a period of calm in its superpower relations, in the Administration
view. The Administration does not deny the priority it places on defense
policy and the need for a defense build-up, but contends that useful arms
Control can proceed within this framework.
It also argues that the school of
thought exemplified by its critics, though Well intentioned, has been tested
over the past decade and in practical effect reduced the U.S.
position from
strategic strength to inferiority.
(2) Promise for Useful Arms Control
Other critics, while not necessarily questioning the intentions of the
Administration,'feel that START is not likely to lead to useful arms Control
because it does not reflect a n understanding of the limitations of the SALT
process.
Arms control analysts point to several such limitations, of which
the following are the most salient.
First, START like SALT fails to address significant "gray areav problems.
It ignores a n intimate relationship between theater and strategic forces that
bears directly on Soviet calculations of the nuclear threat. This deficiency
is generally acknowledged, and some Administration Spokesmen have suggested
the possibility of merging the START negotiations with
the negotiations on
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) currently under way in Geneva.
Second, some argue that START like SALT adopts the wrong unit of account,
Critics point out that to limit only deployed warheads preserves
significant
U.S. advantages in stockpiled warheads.
The Administration's response is
that the START categories are distinct improvements over SALT, and that
CRS- 7
whatever t h e merits of adopting other units of
approach offers the best chance o f producing
control agreement.
IB82114
UPDATE-12/08/82
account, S T A R T ' S two-phase
a balanced strategic a r m s
T h i r d , some argue that START l i k e SALT i s inadequately framed to deal. with
the t h r e a t posed by evolving weapons technology.
As S A L T I 1 failed to
contain MIRV technology, so START could fail with regard t o cruise missiles
and the improving counterforce capabilities of SLBMs.
S T A R T supporters
acknowledge the difficulty of constraining w e a p o n s technology, b u t a d d that a
beginning has to be made somewhere and that t h e START proposal
provides t h e
means to channel dangerous developments in w a y s that will strengthen rather
than undermine strategic stability.
( 3 ) Implications for Stability
T h e third set of criticisms f o c u s e s on t h e extent to which a n agreement
based o n t h e START proposals would promote
stability in the strategic
relationship.
Stability has been assessed i n different ways.
[See article
by Leon Sigal cited i n the bibliography.]
It can derive from each side's
confidence in the survivability of its second strike capability
(termed
Strategic stability).
Stability a l s o results when neither s i d e has reason t o
Another
expect a n attempt a t a preemptive strike (termed Crisis stability).
type i s a r m s race stability, which exists when neither side i s concerned t h a t
the o t h e r i s trying t o build weapons that threaten i t s second s t r i k e
capability or crisis stability. Administration critics have a r g u e d that a n
a g r e e m e n t based on S T A R T could seriously erode some or all of these factors.
S o m e h a v e pointed o u t that a S T A R T agreemhnt would not halt the a r m s race.
Under S T A R T , the United States would be a b l e t o modernize each leg of t h e
strategic triad with MX, Trident submarines, Trident I .and 1 1 , c r u i s e
P r e s u m a b l y , the S o v i e t s would b e
m i s s i l e s , a n d B - 1 and Stealth bombers.
allowed similar "non-destabilizingM deployments.
T h e Administration r e s p o n s e
is that there i s n o quick fix to t h e nuclear dilemma and that a S T A R T
a g r e e m e n t would help deescalate t h e a r m s r a c e a n d promote c r i s i s stability.
lessen the number o f weapons
It stresses that a S T A R T agreement would
deployed and required for nuclear
security.
It notes furt,her that U.S.
modernization programs g o hand-in-hand with negotiations, being a convincing
demonstration of U.S. will to maintain secure second strike f o r c e s with o r
without a n a r m s control agreement.
Some a r g u e t h a t START focuses too much
on equalizing numbers w h i l e
neglecting the more important g o a l s - of balancing force asymmetries a n d
preventing destabilizing surprises.
The Administration response i s t h a t
instability already exists resulting directly from u n e q u a l numbers of
counterforce-capable ICBMs.
A r e l a t e d argument made against START is that reductions, while good i n
principle, increase t h e "breakout" danger.
A relatively s m a l l number o f
hidden weapons could dramatically alter the strategic balance a s the overall
totals d e c l i n e - T h e Administration's response i s that this problem a r g u e s
persuasively for strong verification measures
but
not
against
the
desirability of reductions.
Another problem posed by the specific reductions formula called for i n t h e
START proposals i s that it does n o t solve the ICBM vulnerability problem.
Currently, the Soviets a r e able to target each U.S. land-based missile s i l o
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UPDATE-12/08/82
with a b o u t f o u r w a r h e a d s ; under the proposed formula t h a t r a t i o would
not
diminish and could w e l l increase t o 6 to 1 or even 1 2 to 1 , depending on the
particular f o r c e mix each side chooses under t h e START ceilings.
[For an
a n a l y s i s of this a s p e c t of the START proposals, see C R S White Paper:
P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s START Proposal:
Projected
U.S./U.S.S.R.
Ballistic
T h e Administration
Missiles F o r c e s , by A.A.
T i n a j e r o , J u n e 9 , 1982.1
a c k n o w l e d g e s this defect, but a r g u e s that a survivable basing mode for ICBMs
c a n be devised that alleviates the vulnerability problem.
In t h e debate o v e r START, other measures have been considered,
some of
which might be adopted if there is not a very high degree of c o n f i d e n c e i n
the survivability of a new ICBM basing mode.
One i s to put a higher portion
of U.S.
warheads on ICBMs than currently a p p e a r s likely under START.
But
s i n c e this would
mean fewer submarines a t s e a , the task of
Soviet
anti-submarine warfare may be eased, with
t h e possible
n e t effect of
increased SLBM vulnerability, currently the most survivable l e g of t h e U.S.
strategic triad. Another option would be to deploy ABMs, though t h i s would
require c h a n g e s t o t h e ABM Treaty. Some critics a r g u e that a dangerous n e w
a r m s r a c e might begin if the ABM
limit:
in t h e current agreements were
significantly loosened.
Another
more radical solution i s
to
forego
altogether land-based
ICBMs a n d place a l l warheads i n air-launched or
submarine launched systems.
Extensive arguments a r e made a b o u t t h e merits of
[ s e e C R S Report 81-222F, Assessing
each o p t i o n , which a r e not covered here.
t h e O p t i o n s f o r Preserving ICBM Survivability, by Jonathan M e d a i a , September
1 9 8 1 ; a n d a r c h i v e d C R S Issue Brief
7 7 0 4 6 , U.S.
Strategic Nuclear F o r c e
O p t i o n s , by J o h n Collins and Elizabeth S e v e r n s ; l a s t update 01/04/82.]
The
f o r e g o i n g simply highlights the point that START does n o t solve t h e ICBM
vulnerability problem and that the Administration has pursued other measures
t o Solve that p r o b l e m , some o f which would pose n e w problems of their own.
T h e Administration
acknowledges that to ensure
total
and
mutual
invulnerability i s beyond the s c o p e o f current technology and a r m s control,
a n d t h a t t h e s u c c e s s o f a START proposal would be in creating t h e next best
t h i n g , namely equality of vulnerability.
[ s e e U.S.
and S o v i e t Views F a r
Apart a t Opening of Arms Talks T o d a y , in New York T i m e s , J u n e 2 9 , 1982.1
Its
a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f t h i s point a n d o f the pertinence of a
survivable basing
m o d e to t h e ICBM vulnerability
problem h a s brought
it closer to the
mainstream of a r m s c o n t r o l of t h e 1970s.
S o m e a r g u e that a n y arms control agreement based o n current f o r c e s would
be destabilizing.
T h e y argue that arms control Will l i m i t the capabilities
of U.S. f o r c e s a n d sacrifice important n e w programs a s "bargaining chips" a t
a t i m e when t h e U.S.S.R.
enjoys clear strategic superiority and exhibits more
i n t e r e s t i n formalizing i t s supremacy than in promoting stability.
Many of
t h e s e c r i t i c s a r e one-time Reagan supporters who feel t h a t their t r u s t i n the
Administration h a s been betrayed by i t s pursuit o f a n a r m s control agreement.
T h e y see S T A R T a s inconsistent with earlier Administration policy t h a t sought
explicitly to r e l e g a t e arms control policy to a status subordinate to defense
A related argument made by some i s that
policy (i.e., a r e m e d i a l build-up).
t h e S o v i e t Union d o e s not share t h e interest of the Western a r m s control
community i n promoting stability, a s the Soviets goal i s unchallengeable
supremacy.
T h e Administration's response i s that t h e START proposals a r e consistent
with i t s d e f e n s e policy. Any agreement embodying the S T A R T proposals would
s t i l l permit t h e modernization of t h e U.S. arsenal.
Such a n a g r e e m e n t , t h e
Administration a r g u e s , would facilitate t h e primary goal o f Reagan
strategic
policy by permitting t h e U.S. t o redress deficiencies in i t s capabilities,
CRS- 9
IB82114
UPDATE-12/08/82
thus enhancing survivability and therefore deterrence, while hindering
Soviet Union from enhancing those a r e a s where it c u r r e n t l y has a n edge.
the
Soviet R e s p o n s e
9 speech
The f i r s t official Soviet response t o President R e a g a n ' s May
announcing START was made by Soviet P r e s i d e n t Brezhnev o n May 1 8 , and i t set
Brezhnev
the critical y e t cautious tone of subsequent S o v i e t statements.
approved o f U.S.
willingness to r e s u m e negotiations
but was c r i t i c a l of
START'S main points a s "absolutely unilateral". H e m a d e o b l i q u e r e f e r e n c e to
the departure from SALT ("We should try to preserve everything t h a t h a s been
achieved.") and proposed adoption of a f r e e z e on development and
deployment
of new types of strategic weapons to commence c o n c u r r e n t l y with
t h e talks.
Subsequently, Soviet spokesmen have portrayed the U.S. proposal a s lopsided
and a s deliberately ignoring those systems in which t h e United S t a t e s and i t s
allies possess major strengths. They have argued t h a t t h e proposal f a i l s to
meet the basic requirement that a n y a g r e e m e n t should o b s e r v e t h e p r i n c i p l e of
equality.
In a n unexpected move, the Soviet Union made a counterproposal b e f o r e the
mid-August recess, offering t o reduce strategic f o r c e s to a common ceiling of
1,800 long-range missiles and bombers.
T h i s offer s e t s ceilings 20% below
those provided for i n S A L T 1 1 , and i s remarkably s i m i l a r to the proposal made
by the Carter Administration in early 1977.
T h e n e t effect w o u l d b e to
reduce t h e Soviet missile and bomber f o r c e by approximately 26% a n d t h e U.S.
arsenal by a b o u t 7%. T h e proposal would n o t greatly
r e d u c e t h e n u m b e r of
warheads, however, since missiles could still be MIRVed
in l a r g e numbers.
Reportedly, t h e proposal a l s o calls f o r c u r b s on T y p h o o n and T r i d e n t class
ballistic missile submarines, a ban o r l i m i t s o n c r u i s e m i s s i l e s , a n d a n
extension o f "confidence-building measures". T h e f r e e z e on d e v e l o p m e n t a n d
deployment of n e w systems proposed by t h e S o v i e t s t o r u n concurrently with
the talks i s not explicitly linked to t h e counterproposal. c e i l i n g s , a n d t h e
Soviets reportedly acknowledge that s o m e accommodation will have t o be made
on the modernization issue.
There a r e competing perceptions of the significance o f the S o v i e t proposal
and the nature of Soviet intentions.
S o m e a n a l y s t s h a v e interpreted
the
Soviet f a i l u r e to reject the U.S.
proposal o u t of hand a s a sign o f S o v i e t
willingness to negotiate seriously; o t h e r s see t h e counterproposal a s a
public relations ploy aimed a t currying favor with public opinion i n t h e West
and Third World.
Some have termed t h e S o v i e t counter-proposal
"surprisingly
forthcoming" and a r e encouraged by a stated ~ o v i ' e twillingness to m o d i f y S A L T
I 1 i n t h e general direction envisioned by t h e Reagan Administration.
Others
s e e the Soviet proposals offering very
l i t t l e p r o m i s e of o v e r c o m i n g the
profoundly different assessments each side makes o f t h e current s t r a t e g i c
nuclear balance and what constitutes a f a i r agreement.
Other Approaches to Arms Control
In t h e interregnum following the d e m i s e of S A L T 1 1 , a number of proposals
were advanced f o r getting a r m s control n e g o t i a t i o n s back on track.
Critics
of current policy have pressed various o f t h e s e s u g g e s t i o n s a s a l t e r n a t i v e s
to the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s START proposal.
Some of t h e concepts might be
seen
a s potential s u p p l e m e n t s to the Administration's a p p r o a c h , that i s , a s
additional negotiating tracks.
A
sampling of o t h e r approaches includes:
A Nuclear Weapons Freeze:
There i s substantial public sentiment f o r , a n d
some congressional interest i n , a f r e e z e o n strategic nuclear weapons.
The
essential point that distinguishes a freeze approach from S A L T or S T A R T i s
that a f r e e z e would c a p growing numbers of nuclear weapons before proceeding
to the m o r e difficult task of restructuring or r e d u c i n g strategic forces.
[ s e e C R S I s s u e Brief 82059:
Nuclear Freeze: Arms C o n t r o l P r o p o s a l s , by Mark
Lowenthal.]
Ratify S A L T G: Calls continue f o r the ratification of S A L T 1 1 .
Advocates of this position argue t h a t despite i t s f a u l t s , S A L T 11 would
enhance U.S. security, and has t h e added advantage t h a t i t has already been
negotiated.
They a l s o note that the Administration concedes that t h e r e a r e
of s t r a t e g i c
no near-term
conflicts between S A L T I 1 and i t s program
rearmament. [ S e e statement of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger i n
Strategic Weapons Proposals:
Hearings Before the S e n a t e Foreign R e l a t i o n s
If S A L T I1 were r a t i f i e d ,
Committee, Nov. 3 , 4, and 9 , 1 9 8 1 , p.5.1
reductions a n d other Administration g o a l s could t h e n b e effected
through
amendments to the b a s i c agreement.
However, parts of t h e S A L T I1 Treaty h a v e
already expired and would require renegotiation.
Other Reduction Proposals:
S o m e strategic f o r c e a n a l y s t s have suggested a
graduated approach to a r m s cuts i n t h e form of a n n u a l percentage reductions.
Rep. A l b e r t G o r e , D-Tenn., has applied t h i s c o n c e p t i n a n elaborate s c h e m e
for t h e phased elimination of all MIRVed
ICBMs.
[ S e e Congressional Record
Mar. 2 2 , 1 9 8 2 , p. H 9 9 4 , and Aug. 1 0 , 1 9 8 2 , p. H5605.1 T h e Soviets have hinted
interest i n this proposal.
Others would go further by
eliminating I C B M s
altogether.
C o n c l u d e " P e r i p h e r a l m Negotiations:
Proponents of this o p t i o n a r g u e t h a t
the stability of t h e central strategic balance
could b e enhanced through
agreements related t o other areas of a r m s competition.
They would
resume
negotiations for a Comprehensive T e s t Ban T r e a t y , dropped when negotiations
were c l o s e to c o m p l e t e ; pursue ratification of treaties
t h a t the US h a s
signed o n P e a c e f u l Nuclear Explosions and a Threshold T e s t B a n ; o p e n
bilateral n e g o t i a t i o n s o n a treaty eliminating chemical weapon
stockpiles
that h a v e n o t been taken up by the Reagan Administration; a n d a s s e s s n e w
areas o f a r m s Confrontation to consider the extent t o which
they might
effectively b e controlled
(e.g.,
space-based weapon
systems, especially
antisatellite systems).
Confidence-building Measures:
Many a r g u e t h a t a n o t h e r way
to m a k e t h e
central strategic b a l a n c e more manageable is to t a k e s t e p s to increase t h e
transparency and predictaSility of each side to t h e other.
T h i s could r e d u c e
fears a n d perceptions of threats s o that crises a r e l e s s likely occur and a r e
more manageable when they do.
Advocates of t h i s a p p r o a c h argue t h a t
confidence-building measures a r e a promising o p t i o n s i n c e they can r e s u l t
from i n f o r m a l bilateral understandings a n d unilateral initiatives a n d a r e
thus n o t burdened by t h e formal and comprehensive treaty negotiation process.
In t h e s p r i n g of 1 9 8 2 , t h e Reagan Administration proposed to negotiate w i t h
the S o v i e t s o n notification of strategic missile test l a u n c h e s and expanded
exchange of strategic f o r c e data.
Brezhnev h a s expressed a willingness
to
expand o t h e r kinds of confidence-building measures, such a s troop movement
-
notification.
P u b l i c evidence, however,
either proposal.
has
not
indicated
follow-ups
to
ROLE OF CONGRESS
F o r m a l l y , Congress becomes involved i n international a g r e e m e n t s o n l y a f t e r
they have been negotiated and signed by t h e Executive.
T h e r e a r e t w o types
of international agreements invoking different f o r m s of
congressional
involvement: executive agreements and treaties.
T h e Arms C o n t r o l a n d
Disarmament Act requires that any agreements (other than treaties) t h a t limit
US forces require t h e approval of both the S e n a t e and H o u s e , by a
simple
majority. ~n the case of START, a n executive a g r e e m e n t i s c o n s i d e r e d a n
unlikely form of agreement, though it w a s used
for t h e S A L T I interim
agreement and was considered but dropped by President C a r t e r f o r S A L T 11.
Treaties require the consent of just the S e n a t e , by a v o t e of two-thirds.
[N.B.:
strictly speaking, this process of congressional a d v i c e a n 8
consent does not constitute "ratification". A treaty i s ratified w h e n
the
signatories exchange instruments of ratification (generally a p r o t o c o l a n d
the treaty itself), which occurs after each party has g i v e n legitimacy to the
commitment according to its own laws.
In t h e c a s e of
t h e United
States,
Senate approval a l l o w s the ratification process to proceed.]
Practically; however, Congress often takes a hand
i n t h e p r o c e s s much
earlier.
It can bring its influence to bear through h e a r i n g s o n a r m s c o n t r o l
and strategic a r m s policy, through the exercise o f i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
prerogatives with regard to the appointment o f a r m s C o n t r o l policy m a k e r s ,
could
and by granting or witheholding funds f o r strategic a r m s programs w h i c h
weaken o r bolster t h e President's bargaining position i n negotiations.
Conceivably, Congress might a l s o pass i n t o l a w i n i t i a t i v e s t h a t w o u l d push
the Executive toward a particular U.S. policy o n s t r a t e g i c issues.
A case in
point i s the well-known
"Jackson Amendment" of 1 9 7 2 , which
"urges and
r e q u e s t s w that a n y f u t u r e treaty "not l i m i t t h e United S t a t e s t o l e v e l s of
intercontinental strategic forces inferior to t h e l e v e l s provided
for the
Soviet Union."
By these means, Congress is likely to b e closely i n v o l v e d i n t h e S T A R T
process.
Testimony was given to Congress by U.S.
negotiators
a f t e r the
first round of negotiations, a form of consu1tatio.n t h a t will probably
continue.
The Administration i s a l s o likely t o court c o n g r e s s i o n a l s u p p o r t
a s (and if) a n agreement begins t o look promising, for many
contend
that a
major factor i n S A L T 11's demise w a s t h e Carter Administration's
f a i l u r e to
manage adequately t h e domestic politics of arms c o n t r o l , t h u s losing
congressional support.
The Administration h a s apparently
decided, however,
not to follow occasional past practice of according f o r m a l observer s t a t u s to
members of Congress interested in following t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s closely.
It
has, though, indicated that it would welcome congressional v i s i t s t o G e n e v a
where f u l l briefings could be provided.
i s s u e , and
if S A L T I 1 i s a n y
Arms control i s a highly politicized
indication, S T A R T i s likely to become a significant i s s u e hotly d e b a t e d in
Congress and a major factor in c o n g r e S S i ~ n a l - e ~ e c ~ t relations.
i~e
HEARINGS
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
Committee on Foreign Relations.
Nuclear arms reduction proposals.
Apr. 29-May 1 3 ,
1982. Hearings, 97th Congress, 2d session.
Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 4 0 2 p.
REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS
U.S.
Congress. House.
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on and
reductions in nuclear weapons and for approval of the
SALT I 1 agreement; report, together with minority and
supplemental views, t o accompany H.J.Res. 521.
July
1 9 , 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
21 p.
(97th Congress, 2d session.
House.
Report
no. 97-640)
U.S.
Congress.
Senate.
Committee on Foreign Relations.
Nuclear arms reductions; report, together with minority
and additional v i e w s , to accompany S.J.Res. 212.
July
1 2 , 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982.
8 2 p.
(97th Congress, 2d session.
Senate.
Report
no. 97-493)
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
12/06/82
--
12/02/82
--
The strategic a r m s reduction talks recessed a t
Geneva.
11/26/82
--
The Soviet party newspaper Pravda charged that Dense
Pack would violate SALT I and SALT I1 prohibitions
on the construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers.
11/23/82
--
The Soviet news agency T a s s denounced President
Reagan's Dense Pack deployment decision a s a "new
dangerous s t e p n that would raise the a r m s race to a
"higher, more expensive and dangerous level."
11/22/82
--
The Administration announced that i t had decided t o
deploy 1 0 0 MX missiles in the Closely Spaced or
Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov denounced the U.S.
Dense Pack deployment scheme for MX a s a "gross
violationn of existing a r m s Control agreements, which
pledge t5e parties "not to develop additional
stationary launching installations for intercontinental
missiles."
He a l s o warned that the Soviet Union was
prepared to deploy a new ICBM of equivalent capability.-
"Dense P a c k v basing scheme.
In a speech announcing
the decision, President Reagan argued that MX
deployment would g i v e the Soviet Union incentive t o
negotiate significant strategic a r m s reductions.
The President a l s o announced t h a t he had proposed new
"confidence-building measures" t o the Soviet
negotiators at Geneva.
In a news conference, Defense
Secretary Weinberger contended t h a t t h e MX D e n s e
Pack deployment was consistent with t h e terms o f
SALT 1 1 , which prohibits the construction of
additional fixed launchers of ICBMs.
10/06/82
--
START negotiations resumed.
08/12/82
--
START negotiations recessed.
07/12/82
--
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported o u t
S.J.Res. 212, a nuclear arms reduction
resolution which a m o n g other things stated:
T o provide a basis f o r progress during the START
negotiations, the United States shall continue
to refrain from actions which would undercut
the SALT I and SALT I1 agreements, provided the
Soviet Union shows equal restraint.
06/29/82
--
START talks between the United S t a t e s and the
Soviet Union began i n Geneva.
Both sides agreed
to k e e p the contents of the talks confidential.
05/31/82
--
During a Memorial D a y speech, President Reagan
announced that the S T A R T talks would begin J u n e
29. As regards U.S. policy o n S A L T compliance,
the President said:
As for existing strategic
a r m s agreements, we will refrain from actions
which undercut them so long a s t h e Soviet
Union shows equal restraint.
--
The United States a n d the Soviet Union issued
a joint announcement on the starting date for
the strategic a r m s control negotiations.
05/18/82
--
Soviet President Brezhnev responded to President
Reagan's START proposal.
He described Reagan's
call f o r the resumption of talks a s " a step in
the right directiontt but criticized t h e
specifics of t h e proposal a s "absolutely
unilateral in n a t u r e w . He proposed a
U.S.-Soviet freeze o n strategic weapons t o take
effect "as soon a s the talks begin'' a n d called
for modernization of such weapons to be "limited
to the utmostw.
05/11/82
--
In testimony before the Senate F o r e i g n Relations
Committee, Secretary of State Haig said "we
consider SALT I1 to be dead.
We have so
informed the Soviet Union."
05/09/82
--
During a commencement address a t Eureka College
i n I l l i n o i s , President Reagan announced h i s
plan for strategic a r m s control. The President
proposed phased reductions aimed a t "the most
destabilizing systems, t h e ballistic missilest1:
--
--
-01/24/82
--
11/18/81
--
11/04/81
--
" A t t h e first phase, or t h e end of the f i r s t
phase of START, I expect ballistic missile
w a r h e a d s , the most serious threat w e f a c e ,
to b e reduced to equal l e v e l s , equal ceilings,
a t l e a s t a third below t h e current levels. T o
enhance stability, I would ask that no more
than half of t h o s e warheads be land-based."
" I n a second p h a s e , we'll seek to a c h i e v e a n
equal ceiling on other elements of our strategic
nuclear forces including limits on the ballistic
missile throwweight a t less than current
American levels."
T h e President expressed the hope that the S T A R T
negotiations would begin by the end of June.
It w a s confirmed that the Administration had
decided not to s e t a starting date on strategic
a r m s reduction talks to impress upon the Soviets
t h a t "we're not doing business a s usual a s l o n g
a s repression i s under way i n Poland."
P r e s i d e n t Reagan announced h i s "Zero option"
position for upcoming Geneva talks on
medium-range n u c l e a r weapons in Europe.
On
s t r a t e g i c a r m s control, h e said:
"The United
S t a t e s proposed t o open negotiations on
s t r a t e g i c a r m s a s soon a s possible next year.
I h a v e instructed Secretary Haig to discuss
t h e timing of such meetings with Soviet
representatives....
We c a n a n d should attempt
major qualitative a n d quantitative progress
[ w i t h the goal o f ] truly substantial reductions
i n o u r strategic arsenal's."
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
C o m m i t t e e , Secretary Haig commented on t h e
timetable for starting the next round of S A L T
negotiations:
---''We h o p e that negotiations c a n began a s early
a r m s control negotiations
a s n e x t Spring.
But
c a n n o t b e conducted in a political vacuum."
...
10/19/80
--
G o v e r n o r Reagan described t h e S A L T I1 treaty a s
"basically flawed" because i t does not reduce
a r m a m e n t s and stated:
" A s president, I w i l l
immediately open negotiations o n a SALT I 1 1
treaty. My g o a l i s to begin a r m s reductions.
My energies will be directed a t reducing
destructive nuclear weaponry in the world
-- a n d doing i t i n such a way a s to protect
fully the critical security requirements of
our nation."
01/03/80
--
President Carter requested that the Senate delay
consideration of the SALT I1 treaty because
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES
The future of arms control:
a glass half
Burt, Richard.
empty.
Foreign policy, no. 36, fall 1979: 33-48.
Gelb, Leslie.
The future of arms control:
a glass half
full. Foreign policy, no. 3 6 , fall 1979: 21-32.
Lodal, Jan M.
Finishing START.
fall 1982: 66-81.
Foreign policy, no. 4 8 ,
Nye, Joseph. Restarting arms control. Foreign policy,
no. 4 7 , summer 1982: 98-113.
Sigal, Leon V.
Warming to the freeze.
no. 4 8 , fall 1982:
54-65.
Foreign policy,
U.S.
Library of Congress.
Congressional Research Service.
Chronology of major events in U.S. SALT and START
policy, by Judith Freedman.
[Washington] July 1982.
-----
NATO theater nuclear forces: modernization and arms
control, by Stan Sloan.
[Washington] 1982.
(Regularly
up'hated)
CRS Issue brief 81128
-----
Nuclear arms limitations and the effects on the arms
race:
an annotated bibliography with selected
art one), by Julia Carlson. [washington]
quotations
July 1982.
CRS Report no. 82-121L
-----
Nuclear freeze: arms control proposals, by Mark
Lowenthal.
[washington] 1982.
(Regularly updated)
Issue brief 82059
-----
President ~ e a g a i l sSTART proposal:
projected
U.S./U.S.S.R.
ballistic missile forces, by A.A.
June 9 , 1982.
(Washington) 1982.
Tinajero.
-----
SALT 11:
1981.
-----
SALT negotations:
recent developments in U.S. and
Soviet policy, by Charles Gellner and Judith Freedman.
Jan. 4 , 1982.
[Washington] 1982.
CRS Issue brief 81072
a bibliography.
[Washington]
Revised Oct. 1 3 ,
-----
T h e Soviet response to t h e U.S. START proposals, May
1982: a n a n a l y s i s , by S t u a r t Goldman.
May 2 4 , 1982.
(Washington) 1982.
-----
T h e START proposal:
verification issues, by Mark
Lowenthal. J u n e 25, 1982.
(Washington) 1982.
-----
Strategic Arms Control:
Reagan Administration policy,
by Charles Gellner. Jan. 4, 1982. (Washington) 1982.
C R S Issue brief 8 1 1 2 9
-----
T h e threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions
background treaty provisions, and pro-con
treaties
a r g u m e n t s , by Judith Freedman.
Sept. 1 , 1981.
[ w a s h i n g t o n ] 1981.
C R S Report no. 81-206s
--