International Phenomenological Society
Passion
Author(s): R. Lawrie
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 41, No. 1/2 (Sep. - Dec., 1980), pp.
106-126
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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PASSION
Verylittle,so far as I know,has been writtenon our ordinary
uses of the term'passion.' Possiblythisis because it has tendedto be
taken as a classificatory
termunderwhicha varietyof otherterms,
such as 'emotion,''desire,'and 'feeling'can be subsumed,and taken
in such a waythat analysishas seemedmorerequisiteto theselatter
termsthan to the term'passion' itself.I shall argue however,that
'passion'has a connotationspecificto itself,and thatthishas important implicationsforthe explanationof a certainclass of actions.
1. As a means of introducingthe notion of passion withwhich I
shall be primarilyconcerned,it willbe helpfulto considersomerelevant commentsby R. S. Peters.' He distinguishes
"the philosophical
conceptionof'passion'as something
whichprovidesan inducementto
act,"2from"theordinaryusage of 'passion'whichsuggestssomekind
of turbulenceor stateof heightenedfeeling."By wayofexemplifying
"the philosophicalconception"referenceis made to Hume who saw
passions,in Peters'expressionofhim,as "psychologicalentitieswhich
movepeople to act."3The secondconcept,on the otherhand, is said
to be the one in questionin the case of the"'natural'passionssuch as
fear, anger and sexual desire."4Having introducedthe distinction
betweenthe two concepts,Petersasks
When a passion,in the philosophicalsense,would normallybe referred
to as a passion in ordinarylanguage. When for instance, would a
concernforfairnessor an abhorrenceof irrelevancebe referredto as a
passion? Usually, surely,when looking at a situationin a way which
warrantsthe term 'fair' or 'irrelevant',is connected with thingsthat
come over us, whichwe may not be able to control.To have a passion
fortruthsuggestsmorethenjust caringabout it. It suggeststhatwe are
stronglyaffectedby disregardof evidence,inaccuracyand deceit. We
are subject to.strongfeelingsif truthis desregardedin any way. This
linksthe use of 'passion'withthe Latin patior fromwhichit is derived.
It suggestsbeing subject to something,being masteredor overpowered
2
1 R. S. Peters,"Reason and Passion," in Royal Instituteof PhilosophyLectures, Vol. 4 (1969-70).
2 Op. cit., p. 138.
3 Op. cit., p. 137.
4 Op. cit., p. 153.
106
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PASSION
107
The sortofthingPetersmeanswhenhe talksabout someonehavinga
concernor care fortruth,and so a passionforit "in thephilosophical
sense,"is indicatedby his statementthat
anyonewho is concernedabout truthmustbe concernedabout correctness-about gettingthe factsright;he mustcare about consistencyand
he
clarity;he must abhor irrelevanceand otherformsof arbitrariness,
mustvalue sincerity.And so on.5
Accordingto Petersthen,the"usual" use oftheterm'passion'in
ordinary language is restrictedto cases where "things .
.
. come over
us, whichwe may not be able to control."Althoughthe phraseused
hereis 'maynotbe able to control'ratherthan'cannot,'thereference
to 'thingscomingoverus,' whichwould presumablybe instancedby
the case wherewe say 'I don't knowwhatcame overme,' impliesan
actual loss of control.But Peters'thesisin that case would seem to
overlooka: perfectly
usual and veryimportantuse of the word 'pascan
sion,' accordingto which'passion,'farfrombeingoverpowering,
actuallyfacilitatethe thinking,feeling,acting,judging,or whatever
is in question. A veridicalexample will help to bringout the point
here.An ex-boxer,VictorHermann,has been reportedin thepressas
I achievedin thegame camefroma passionfor
sayingthat"Anything
fighting.When I was youngand knockedoverone boyafteranotherI
wouldhavefoughtfornothing.I wouldhave paid thoseboysto getup
so thatI could hitthemagain." (The italicsis mine). It is theitalicized statementwhichis crucial. I quote theothersbywayof emphasizing thatit is indeed a passionthatis in questionhere. Since theboxer
was ofworldclass,theachievements
he referred
to wereconsiderable.
My point thenis that his ascriptionof the passionto himselfwas in
termsof its being somethingfromwhichhis achievements"came,"
whichsuggeststhat in some way, to be examinedfurtherat a later
stage of my discussion,it facilitatedhis control of the relevant
ratherthandisruptedthisor overcamehim.
thoughtsand movements
Althoughhe mightwell have been subject to strongfeelingswhen
preventedfromsatisfying
his passion-for example by feelingsof intenseimpatiencewhen injurypreventedhim fromtakingpart in a
contest-his becoming subject to such feelingswould have been
dependenton, a resultof his alreadyhavingthe passion. It follows
thattheycould not be evenpart ofwhat,at leastprimarily,is meant
hereby 'passion,'althoughtheymightverywellbe a signof it. Comparable pointscould of course,be made in termsof otherpassions,
5 Op. cit., p. 151.
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108
PHILOSOPHY
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for example for painting, servingthe community,truth,or the
woman next door. Dante, forinstance,mightconceivablyhave said
'AnythingI achievedin poetrycame froma passionforBeatrice.'
No doubtin beingpreoccupiedin his analysisofpassionin what
he regardsas the "ordinary"sense, withcases wherethe personis
"masteredor overpowered"byhispassion,Petersis opposingtheseto
situationswhere,in beingmovedto act, we are freefrompassionin
this"ordinary"sense.But to act whilstbeingfreefrompassionin the
ordinarysensedoes notentailbeingwithoutit. This can be seenfrom
the fact that one way of being freefromit is to be dispassionate,
whereas'dispassionate'does not mean 'passionless.'It means,rather,
'freefromcontrolby passion.' Thus VictorHermann'spassion for
boxing did not cease to existwhen he dispassionatelyexecutedhis
skillsin the ring,thoughhe was thenfreefromcontrolby it, freeto
use it in such execution.To be dispassionatein factentailshavinga
relevantpassion forsomething.A passionlessperson,i.e., a person
lacking any passion fora givenobject or typeof object, could not
hope to be dispassionatein relationto it (thoughhe could be impartial), sincethe connotationof theprefix'dis-'is 'apart from'and you
cannot conceivablystand apart fromsomethingwhich you do not
have in the firstplace. I shall revertlaterto the questionof therelationofsuchpassionas I have been discussingto whatone makesofit,
or does withit. Meantime,however,I wantto concentrateon theconcept ofthepassionitself.For thetimebeing,in talkingabout passion
I shallhave in mindthatsenseofthetermaccordingto whichwe can
be said to have a passionfor something.Later, I shall considerthat
otherprominentordinaryuse oftheterm,accordingto whichwe can
be said to 'flyinto a passion,' and will argue in factthatthereis an
elementbasicallycommonto passionin both thesesenses.
2. AlthoughI denythatbeing actuallysubjectto overbearingfeeling, such as a feelingof impatiencewhenthegoal of one's passionis
deniedone, is partofwhatis meantbytheconceptofhavingthepassion, I nonethelessagree withPeterswhenhe saysthatour ordinary
use of 'passion'"suggestsbeingsubjectto something,beingmastered
or overpowered."The firstpointwhichrequiresmakinghere is that
to be subjectto somethingis to be proneor exposedto it,whereasone
can be exposed to somethingwithoutbeing in any waymasteredor
overcomeby it. This distinctiontendsto be lost in Peters'stringing
togetherof 'subject to,' 'mastered,'and 'overpowered'withoutany
comment from him by way of differentiating
them. It is a
characteristicof the cases of passion in which I am especiallyin-
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PASSION
109
terestedhere, that the person is exposed to his passion but not
necessarilymasteredor overcomeby it. I shall go on now to consider
the questionof what it is in such cases, thatone is exposed to. As a
meansofworkingtowardsan answerI shallreturnagain to theexample I gave earlier,of the boxer.
He statesthat"whenI found... thatthelastofthedeep urgeto
fightwas draining away . . . I retired." Before drawing the relevant
inferenceit willbe helpfulto adduce a furtherexample. The television actor, PatrickO'Connell, recentlywalkedout of a starrole in a
successfulcurrentlyrunningtelevisionserial. A friendof his was
reportedin thepressat the timeas havingsaid ofhimthat"Painting
is his passionwithoutwhichhe cannotlive,"whilein explanationof
hisown actionO'Connell, accordingto thereport,statedthat"I have
been paintingas a leisureactivityfora long,long time.But theurge
was too strong,and it was not enoughforme to do it as a hobby. I
had to paint more." The relevantpoint which these examples illustrateis that there is an urge built into having a passion for
something,whichis crucialto it. The passioncan be greator slight,
urge
proportionate
but whicheverit is therewillbe a correspondingly
builtintoit, and it is, I maintain,thisto whichone is necessarilyexposed or subjectwhenone,has a passionforsomething.The examples
I havegivenare ofmajorpassionsbecause thesehighlighttherelevant
pointmoreclearlythan do minorones, and it is a pointwhichis not
takenadequatelyintoaccountby Peters'analysis.It willbe as wellif
at thisstageI proceeddirectlywiththedevelopmentofmyownthesis.
I shall therefore
postponefurthercommenton Peters'analysisuntil
later,includingsubstantiationof myclaim thathe failsto take adequate account of the urge which is built into having a passion for
something.
In orderto open up my discussion,I would like once again to
quote the boxer. "I am not ashamed of mytimein boxing"he said,
"but I sometimeswish that passion-and I keep using the word
because it's the right one-could have been channelled into
I've alwayslovedmusicand maybethat
somethingmoreconstructive.
would have been a better way of expressing intensity....."
The rele-
vantimplicationsof thisstatementare thatthepassionis describable
in termsof "intensity,"
and as somethingwhichcan be "channelled"
into some activityor otherand in factinto alternativeactivities.
It mightbe objected to the last implicationthatpassion in the
sensein questionis a passionforsomeparticularthing,person,activity,or typeof any of these,so that the passion forboxingcould not
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110
PHILOSOPHY
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conceivablyhave been channelledinto music whilstremainingthe
same passion. Given the boxer's virtualequation of 'passion' with
'urge'it mightbe objectedsimilarlythatan urgeis an urgeto do this
or that particular thing, or sort of thing, e.g., box, and not
somethingwhichcould be channelledintoanyone ofa varietyofends
whilstretainingits identity.Since, accordingto the objectionI am
anticipatinghere, the connectionbetweenthe passion in question
and itsobject is presupposedin the-very
idea of itsbeing the passion
thatit is (namelytheman's passionforboxing),it mightbe objected,
further,thatthe veryidea of the passionbeing channelledintoboxing is mistaken,sinceit would seem to implythatthe passionexisted
at some stage independentlyof the activityof boxing (such that it
could thenbe channelledinto it).
BeforeI can statemyownpositionin theface ofsuch comments
I need to analyzethenotionsof'intensity'
and 'urge'as used in theexamplesI have given,and I shall do thatin theremainingpartofthis
section.I need also to discusstherelationbetweenpassionin thesense
in question,and desire,and thisI shall do in sectionthree.
As a means of broachingthe firstpart of the requiredanalysisI
shall examinetherelationbetweenan urgeand theowner'sfeelingof
it. In doing this I shall introduceanothertermwhichis sometimes
used synonymously
with'urgency'in the relevantsenseof thisterm,
and referenceto which will be helpfulwhen I go on to state my
analysisof 'passion' directly.
The term'urge'has whatseemsto be clearlya dispositionaluse,
suchthattheperson'sfeelingofit is a matterofhisfeelingdisposedto
do something.A case in pointwouldhavebeen wheretheboxerspoke
of havingfeltan urge to knockpeople down. But sometimeswe talk
ofsomeonebeing'fullofurgency'whereit is notself-evident
thatthis
is a metaphoricalwayofreferring
to dispositionalfeelings.An example would be a recentstatementin the pressthatthemembersof the
Argentinefootballteam in a match withEngland had been fullof
urgency.I shall contendthatthe phrase'fullof urgency'is not being
used metaphoricallyin such cases, but is in fact to be understood
literally,i.e., in termsof the person'ssystemor naturebeing fullof
somethinghavingthe qualityof 'urgency.'
Instead of talkingof someone being 'full of urgency'we talk
sometimesin a synonymous
wayoftheirbeing'fulloffire,''fire'being
associatedin thesecases withpassion.The followingstateintimately
ment,made in thepressrecently,about a boxercalled David Green,
illustratesthisusage. It was said of him,followinghis involvement
in
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PASSION
III
a nationaltitlefight,that"his passionwas too much forJohnStacey
. . . the fire ... which has taken Green to an unbeaten record of 24
fights,took him into command at the start . . ." In that passion is
equated in such cases witha kind of fire,and in thatthe term'fire'
has a generalconnotationofheat, it is impliedratherthattheagent's
feelingof it is analogousto a sensation.Insofaras it is analogousto a
sensation,the feelingof fireor urgencyis not in itselfa dispositional
feeling,althoughit maywellgiveriseto one, comparablyto theway
in whicha sensationof warmthas you stand in frontof, say, a coal
fire,givesriseto and is therefore
distinctfromanydispositionto move
away fromthe heat. It may be as well to adduce here a veridicalexample of a persontalkingof theirfeelingof passionin termsakin to
sensation,and a case in point would be the descriptiongivenin a
pressinterview
by Pancho Gonzalez,an ex-Wimbledontennischampion, ofthefeelingshe had in hisfirstseniortennistournament,as he
setout in pursuitoftheobjectofhispassion,whichwas to becomethe
greatesttennisplayerin theworld."Deep inside,"he said, "something
seared me with white heat . . . it was like a pilot light, constantly
burning."An exampleof a dispositionarisingfromthefireor urgency of passionwould be what we call 'burningambition.'
What, then,ifanything,could passionconceivablybe, suchthat
it has the characteristics
of intensityand 'fire,'can drain away, be
channelled,or takeus withcommandofa situation,and suchthatwe
can be subjectto it, fullofit, and can feelit in somewayakinto sensation?The answer,I think,is that it is an energy,and one whose
qualitycan reasonablybe describedin termsof 'urgency,'in distinctionforinstancefromenergyhavingthe qualityof heat. As regards
theveryidea ofcallingit an energy,thefollowingsortsofpointshave
to be takenintoconsideration.We do talkofenergyin termsofintenis
sity.For example,in the case of the energywhichis heat, intensity
spokenofas temperature.We also speakofenergyas 'flowing,'forinwhereasonlysomethingwhichflows
stance througha transformer,
could conceivablybe channelled.Again,we sometimestalkofenergy
'drainingaway,'forexamplefroman electricbattery.As regardsthe
idea thatenergycould take us intocommandof a situation,it has to
be borne in mind that we do on occasionstalk of 'summoningour
energies,'when we are inclinedto make an effortof some kind to
enterintocommandof a situation,althoughthe energiessummoned
need notbe onlyofthekindwhichI am nowidentifying
withpassion.
I considertherefore
thatsuch ordinaryusesoflanguage as I havejust
cited,whentakentogetherwiththeordinaryusesoftheterm'passion'
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112
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AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
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of passion as a
which I illustratedearlier,justifythe identification
kind of energy.
By wayof tyingin thisconclusionwithwhatI said earlierabout
theepistemologicalcharacterofthefeelingwe have ofour passion,it
could be put that where energyhaving the quality of heat is experiencedas a sensationofwarmth,theenergywhichis passionis experiencedas a feelingofurgencyor fire,thisfeelingbeingin itselfno
more a dispositionalone than is a sensationof warmth.Where a
dispositionalfeelinghas whatmightbe termeda directivecharacter
to it-in feelingdisposedto do somethingyou directyourthoughts,
feelings,and ultimatelymovementsto the givenend -the feelingof
fireor urgencyreferredto has rathera receptivethan a directive
character.A build up of energyin us is an occurrence,not a disposition, althoughhavingreceivedit we can rapidlybecome disposedto
do somethingwithit.
I shall commentfurtheron the conceptof energyas I go along,
thatI taketheenergywhichis passion
but wantnowto stateexplicitly
to have spatiotemporalexistence,so that the conceptof it is in this
basic respectat least, altogetherunlike Bergson'sconcept of 'Elan
Vital.' The propositionthat passion has spatiotemporalexistenceis
clearlyimplied by a pressstatementabout two footballmanagers,
thatat theend of a game playedby theirtwoteamsthey"exchanged
congratulationswiththe fireof the nightsfootballstillburningin
eyes."The firereferredto is thekindI have been discussing,so
their,
thatthe use made hereof the term'fire'refersto quanta of a certain
typeof energyexistingin specifiedareas of space.
As regardsmygeneralanalysisofpassionas beingan energyit is,
I think,worthnotingthatwe talksometimesofpassionbeing'spent,'
whereaswe also talk on occasions of 'expendingour energies,'on
some undertaking.This is worthnotingbecause thenotionofexpenditurebeingcommonto bothpassionand energysuggestsat leastthat
theyare akin to one another.One contextin whichpassion is commonlyspokenof as being 'spent'is wheretwopeople witha passion
forone anotherhave engagedtogetherin sexual intercourse.Since a
of personsat thatstageof such a relalack of energyis characteristic
tionship,whatis spenthereseemsto be quanta of energyhavingthe
qualityof urgency(operatingprimarilyin the sexual center),so that
the term'passion' is actuallyused here to symbolizethis.
It might be argued that what happens when a passion for
somethingbecomesspentis thattheperson'sinterestin ,theobject,acor otherpersonlapses. This wouldbe true,but it wouldnotbe
tivity,
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PASSION
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damaging to my analysis, since the person's interestwill have
manifestedin termsof thoughts,feelings,and movementsdirected
towardsthe object, and thesewill have been infusedwithenergy,
of
thetypein question,such thattheirinterestwas a passionateone. In
thisway the lapse of interestwould be coterminouswiththe expenditureofenergy,so thatthetwoconceptsare in no wayincompatible.
In writingabout what he calls 'psychicenergy,'CharlesTaylor
identifiesthiswith"what are usuallycalled feelingsor emotions."6
GilbertRyle,on the otherhand, held that"energyis obviouslynot a
feeling,"7his reasonbeing thatwhilethe statement"I feel a tingle"
announces a feeling,the statement"I feel energetic"is not comparable to it in anyrelevantway. I agreewithRyle'sviewthatenergy
is not a feeling,my reason being that since the energyof heat is
distinctfrom
anysensationof warmthwhichmayresultfromit, it is
reasonableto inferthat a comparable distinctionwould hold in the
case of otherqualitiesof energybesidesheat. Energy,then,of which
whichcan be
passionis a type,is nota feeling.It is, rather,something
felt.
3. 'Beforefacingthefactthatwe talkofpassionin thesensein question as a passionfor thisor thatparticularperson,thing,or kindof
thing,withitsimplicationthatthepassionis notsomethingwhich,as
I have impliedso far,can be channelledinto any one of a virtually
unlimitedrange of activitiesor ends, I need to look at the relation
betweenthispassion and desire.
Myfirstcommentis thatit wouldbe inconceivableto have a passionforsomething,and notdesireto pursuetheobjectin somewayor
other. If, for instance,someone has a passion for tennis,it is inconceivablethattheyshouldnot desireeitherto play thegame or to
watch it or whatever,and in fact to desire this passionately.But
althoughtheconceptof 'a passionforX' entailstheconceptof '(passionately)desiringX,' the term'passion'does not itselfsymbolizethe
desiring.Myreasonforsayingthiscan be broughtout byreferenceto
twooverlappingpoints.Firstly,thereis thewidelycanvassedpoint,to
whichI subscribe,that'desire'is a dispositionaltermin thatpart of
whatwe mean byit is a dispositionto bringabout whateverit is thatis
desired,whereasI have argued that passion at least of the typein
questionis not, in itself,a disposition(althoughit can giveriseto a
6 Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour,Routledgeand Kegan Paul,
1964, p. 38.
7 GilbertRyle, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson,1958, p. 101.
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disposition).Being somethingthat builds up in us, it manifests,
rather,the characterof an occurrence.Secondly,thereis a pointto
be made throughreferenceto CharlesTaylor'sremarkthat
'Desirecontainsmorethanthenotionofdisposition,it containsthatofa
'spontaneousdisposition',one which 'comes fromus', as against one
whichis imposed by fate or by others,or by convention,or whatever.8
I agree withthis proposition,and the point which I then want to
make is thatthepassionsomeonehas forsomething,unlikehis desire
forthat thing,does not comefromhim. It does not come fromhim
since, as I argued earlier,the passion is somethinghe is subjectto,
whereaswhatyou are subjectto comesto you ratherthan fromyou.
Comparably,what comes fromyou could never conceivablycome
overyou, whereaswe can certainlybe overcomeor carriedaway by
our passion forsomething.What being overcomewould amountto
hereis thatone'sthoughts,feelings,and movements
relatedto theobject of passionwould become energizedby the passionto the extent
thatone is overcomeby passionatethoughts,feelings,and impulses.
This wouldbe thecase when,forinstance,we becomeobsessedbythe
object of our passion, to the point wherewe ignoreall our responsibilitiesin life.Whereaswe can be overcomeby our passionwe cannot, I maintain,be overcomeby desire,preciselybecause, as Taylor
says, desire "comes fromus." I thinkthat the referencesometimes
made to 'overwhelming
desire'restson a confusionbetweenpassion
and desire. Some desiresbeing passionateones, the person'sbeing
overcomeby his passionis in thesecases, misrepresented
as hisbeing
overcomeby desire.
I conclude,then,thatalthoughthe conceptof 'a passionforX'
entailsthe conceptof 'desiringX,' the term'passion' does not symbolize the desire. It is my furthercontentionthat in the contextof
someonehavinga passion forsomething,the object-directedness
of
of desire.Desireis desireforthisor
passionis due to theintervention
that particularthing,i.e., 'desire' is an intentionalterm,whereas
'passion' is not. Our passion for somethingis the passion which,
throughdesiring,we directto, or use for,a particularend. This is to
say that we do not apply the conceptof 'a passionfor X' until the
desireforX has intervened.A veryimportantsubordinatedistinction
is thereforerequiredhere betweenthe conceptof 'passion in itself,'
and the conceptof 'havinga passionforsomething.'The latterbut
not the formerentailsthe conceptof a desirefora particularthing,
the connectionbetweena givenquantumof passionand a particular
8 Op. cit., p. 51.
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PASSION
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object being purelycontingent.
Because, byvirtueofdesire,we have theconceptof a passionfor
someparticularthingor typeof thing,we talk sometimes,by extensionfromthis,oftheobjectitselfas beingour passion.We mightsay,
forinstance,that 'musicis his passion.' But passion in itself,I have
argued,is actuallya typeof energy.The extensionof the word'passion' to refernot to thepassionitselfbut ratherto itsobject,broadly
parallelsthe case wheresomeoneuses thephrase'mylove' to referto
what is in factnot his love but, rather,an object of it.
Because a desireforX is not the same thingas a passionforX,
GabrieleTaylor and SybilWolframare mistakenwhentheywriteof
thedesireto stayin bed in themorningwhenyouhave workto do, as
beinga passion,9(implyingthatit is a passionforstayingin bed in the
morning). Apart from the reasons I have already given for
desire frompassion in this general sense, the point
distinguishing
wouldarisethatifdesirewerea speciesofsuchpassion,it wouldmake
no senseto talk, as we do, of 'passionatedesire,'withitsimplication
that some desireis not passionate.
I wantnow to elaboratemycontentionthat'desiringX' is a differentconceptfrom'havinga passionforX,' bylookingintothefact
thatwhilewe say 'I desire,'we can onlysay 'I have a passion.' An implication of the word 'have' here is that the passion is something
whichwe own and are thereforedistinctfrom,whilethe term'I' in
thiscase has a purelyreferential
function,indicatingwho theperson
is that is speaking.Desiringon the otherhand is being, at least in
part,as CharlesTaylorputsit, 'spontaneously'
disposedto tryand attain theobjectdesiredsuch thatthedesiring'comesfromus.' In that
it comesfromus, desiringcould be said to be a functionofour power
of agency,and it is mycontentionthattheterm'I' as used in 'I desire
X,' apartfrombeingreferential,
actuallysymbolizes
thispowerwhich
controlsand directsthe relevantthoughtsand feelings.Desiring,as
reflectedbythestatement'I desireX,' is therefore
a directfunctionof
the power which 'I' symbolizeshere, whereas the passion under
discussion,being somethingI have, is distinctfromwhat I am. In
another paper1 I have argued at some length that the term 'I,'
9 G. Taylor and S. Wolfram, 'Virtues and Passions', Analysis, Vol. 31,
(1970-71), p. 77.
10 R. Lawrie, 'Personality,'
Philosophyand PhenomenologicalResearch, Vol.
XXXIV, March 1974.
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besides being referential,sometimes symbolizes a power of direction
and control (whilst I gave quite a differentanalysis of the term
'myself). Perhaps I could just say here that one way in which I
developed my analysis of 'I' ('he,' 'she,' or 'you') in that paper was
through an examination of such a statement as 'He's not all there,'
applied to mentally disturbed persons. I noted that in such cases the
mental processes are chaotic, lacking a controlling center, such that
the term 'he' here symbolizes this center. In a similar vein I drew attention to the statement of a psychiatristabout someone suffering
fromschizophrenia, that "in being with her one had for long periods
that uncanny 'praecox feeling' described by the German clinicians,
i.e. of being in the presence of a human being and yet feeling that
The feeling of there being none there
there was no-one there .
derived, I suggested, from the virtual absence of a controllingcenter
such as, I am now arguing, is symbolized by the term 'I' in the statement 'I desire X.' In my analysis this is the feature of desiring on account of which it is correct to say that desire, unlike passion in the
sense in question, comes from you.'
The distinctionI note between 'I desire X,' and 'I have a passion
for X,' with the implication that the formerbut not the latter use of
'I' is not only referentialbut also symbolic of what might be termed
'will,' accords with the fact that we hold people responsible for what
they desire, but not for having passion in their nature, although we
do hold them responsible forwhat theydo with thispassion, i.e., passion in itself is not subject to rational appraisal. Passion is so appraised only when it is directed, through desire, to an object. As
regards my analysis of desiring as being a function of will, this is
rather similar to Melden's comment that desires are among "those
items that come under the general heading of the term 'will' . . .,"12
though he does not connect the notion of 'will' to the term 'I.' The
sort of reason he has for making this statement is apparent from the
followingcomment which he makes in assessing (and then rejecting)
the notion of wants or desires as internal events and causes.
. . . the whole idea of ... wantingas an internalevent that plays a
causal rolewillnotsquare withour notionthatwantingor desiring,like
doing,is subjectto rationalappraisal ... thereis none of thelogical settingforthe appraisal of desireas reasonable or unreasonable,since as
internalhappeningthe desireoccursin and to one forcauses of itsown
13
I"
12
R. D. Laing, The Divided Self, TavistockPublications,
1960, p. 214.
A. I. Melden, Free Action, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1961, p. 220.
"Opt. cit., pa. 128.
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PASSION
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I agree that we regard desires as subject to rational appraisal. On the
other hand, the advent of the energy which is passion (which then
becomes directed, through desire, to some object or other, such that
we can then be said to have a passion for that particular thing) has
the character of being, not a functionof will, but ratherwhat Melden
calls an 'integral happening,' and it is for this reason that we do not
hold people responsible for having such passion.
Earlier, in Section 2, I noted that the term 'urge' has a dispositional connotation, in that to feel an urge is to feel disposed to do this
or that particular thing or kind of thing. But I also noted that we
speak sometimes of people being 'full of urgency,' where this is not
self-evidentlya metaphorical way of referringto dispositional feelings. The phrase 'full of urgency' has a literal significance, I argued,
since urgency is the quality of an energy which we can be full of. I
refer again to these comments only to add now that, on the other
hand, an urge (to do this or that particular thing or type of thing) is
this same energy as used in the thinking and feeling built into a
desire, (where the desire is a passionate one). i.e. My point now is that
the individualization of urgency is a function of desire.
It is perhaps worth remarking aside here that, as I see it, it is
possible to believe passionately in (or thinkor feel passionately about)
something without necessarilyhaving a passionfor this thing. An example will help bring out the point. It was said recentlythat "The
British Prime Minister passionately believes that just to get some of
the world's leaders talking to one another . .. at number 10 Downing
Street is an achievement in itself,"i.e., a worthwhileachievement in
itself.My point is that I do not thinkwe would talk here of the Prime
Minister having a passion for getting western leaders together at 10
Downing Street, and I thinkthe reason forthis is that we only ascribe
a passion for something where this thing is in itself the relevant
ultimate object of preoccupation as -distinct from being merely a
means to this. What seems likelyto be the relevant passion in the case
I cite would be something like a passion for western democratic institutions,forsustaining the viabilityof which the meeting of western
world leaders would be a means. Nonetheless the thoughts and feelings of the Prime Ministerassociated with his belief would, I consider,
have been infusedwith energyof the type I have been discussing,with
the result that his belief was a passionate one.
In Section 2 I analyzed the concept of passion applied when we
talk of having a passion forsomething, and in this thirdsection, have
discussed the relation between such passion, and desire. In the follow-
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ing sectionI want to examine the relationbetweenpassion of this
kind and the actionswhichmay ensue fromit.
4. As I notedearlier,whensomeoneis movedto act bytheirpassion
forsomethingPeterstalksof passion "in the philosophicalsense,"as
distinctfromthe "ordinary"sense whichhe thinksimpliesa loss of
controland hence an outcomewhichis more a matterof reaction
than action. I thenclaimed thatpassion"in thephilosophicalsense"
is in factpassionin one veryordinarysense.It willbe helpfulto begin
thispart of my discussionby lookingat Peters'account of what it is
thatmovesus to act in the case of the "philosophicalpassions."His
viewis thatwhatmovesus to act hereis our seeingthe situationin a
way"whichis not a matterof indifference
to us." An examplewhich
he gives in this contextis a passion for truth,in which case what
movesus to act mightbe, presumably,our seeingthat certainrelevantfactshave been overlooked,wherethismattersto us a good deal
because we are partialto gettingthefactsrightand abhorintellectual
negligence.The pointI wantto make about thisaccountis thatsomethingneeds adding to it regardingwhatmightbe called the 'quality'
of the seeing. In the case I cited earlierof the boxer David Green
whosepassionforsuccessin his sportwas said to be too much forhis
opponent,what, accordingto the journalist"took him into command" of thefightwas notsimplyseeinghissituationin termsofcertain propositions,for example that he was in danger of failingto
achievehis ambitionwherethiswas (of course)not a matterof indifferenceto him. What, allegedly,tookhimintocommandwas hisfire,
i.e., the energywhich was his passion. Plentyof boxers in such a
predicamentas Green'scould have seen theirsituationin a waythat
was not a matterof indifference
to them,such that theyreallydid
wantto win,but who would have failedto do so because theylacked
fire,or energyoftherequisitetype,i.e., because theydid not actually
have a passionforboxing.What I am arguinghereis notimcompatible withPeters'view,because thefireor urgencywouldenterintothe
person'sseeing of his situation,by way of energizinghis relevant
thoughts,feelings,and perceptions.But actual specificationof this
energyis, I maintain,crucialto anydescriptionofhowwe are moved
by our passionforsomethingto take actionin termsof it, since, as I
argued earlier,the energyis fundamentalto what is meant by the
conceptof such passion.
In sayingthat the fireenergizesthe person'sthoughtsand feelingsI do notmean thattheenergyprovidesthedirectedness
ofthese.
I mean rather that we direct our thoughts,etc., when they are
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PASSION
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directedat all, and use our energies,ofwhateverquality,to do so. It
does costus energyto do things,or at anyrate thatit is the implicationof our talking,forexample,of beingtoo depletedor drainedof
energyto thinkout a problem,or engage our feelingsin some way.
we speak sometimesof 'summoningour energies'
Correspondingly,
whenfacedwithsomedemand, and of 'directing'themtowardssome
objective.For instancea sportscommentatorhas writtenof a runner
in an Olympicrace thathe "summonedhis energiesfora last effort,"
whilean historianhas put it thatforsome long time"the energiesof
European civilizationwere directedtowardsmaking the whole of
realityvisibleto the human eye or the eye of reason."
By way of elaboratingwhat I have said about the relationbetween passion of the kind in question and the action which ensues
fromthis,I would like to considera remarkby Charles Taylor. In
the kind of explanationof behaviorgivenby referenceto
discussing:
desire,and in expoundingthethesisthatdesiresdo notoperateas efficientcauses of the behaviortheylead to, he writesthat "to say of
someonethat he desiressomethingis not to say anythingabout the
'antecedent
antecedentconditionsforthe corresponding
behavior,"914
conditions'signifyingantecedent conditionsconnected only conwiththe behavior,it being part of Taylor'sthesisherethat
tingently
desires are "non-contingently
linked with doing"15whatever is
desired. But whilstI agree that desiresdo not operate as efficient
causes of the behaviortheylead to, the firstpropositionquoted here
is, I think,mistaken,at least in the case of passionatedesire,sinceto
say of someone that he passionatelydesiressomethingimplies the
antecedent-existence
ofpassion.It is, ofcourse,true,as I have argued
myself,that to have a passion for somethingentails (passionately)
desiringit, so thatthisrelationis a logical one. But I drewa distinctionearlierbetweenthe conceptof passionin itself,and the concept
of passion becomingdirectedto a particularthingthroughdesire
such thatwe can then,and onlythen,be said to have a passionfor
thatparticularthing.The phrase'passionin itself,'I said, symbolizes
in anygivencase quanta ofenergy,and thepointI wantto makenow
is thatthisenergyis onlycontingently
connectedwiththe particular
object towardswhich it becomes directedthroughdesire. It could
conceivablyhave been directedto a different
object. I quoted earlier
theboxer'sstatementthathe wishedhe had "channelled"his"intensi14
Op. cit., p. 50.
15 Op. cit., p. 49.
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ty"into some activityotherthan boxing,it being clearlyimpliedby
such a statementthat the intensity
or energywas onlycontingently
connectedwithhis boxing. I considerthisimplicationto have been
philosophicallycorrect,and thinkthereforethat to say of someone
that he passionatelydesires somethingis to say somethingabout
antecedentconditionsconnectedonlycontingently
withcorresponding behavior.
It wouldseemto followfromthis,insofaras thecausal relationis
a contingentone, that passion could operate as a cause of the
behaviorwhichstemsfromit. I wantnow to considerwhetherthisis
in factthe case.
The firstpoint I want to make arisesfromthe fact that where
energyofwhateverqualitybuildsup in a person,it is sometimessaid
to be thenon thepointof 'burstingout.' For example,afterMr. Dennis Potter,televisionplaywright,
had recoveredfroma cripplingillnessof some yearsdurationwhichhad preventedhim fromworking,
hiswifewas reportedin thepressas havingsaid ofhimthat"suddenly
all hiscreativeenergyis simplyburstingto be letout," i.e., theenergy
which,it is implied,throughnot beingused had builtup insidehim.
It was said, similarly,of Mr. Joe Frazier(an ex-worldheavyweight
boxingchampion),aftera longperiodofhistrainingfora worldtitle
fight,that "all the pent-upenergyinside him was burstingto get
out." My pointthenis thatthepressurefromsuch a build-upwillbe
liable to act as an efficient
cause ofthepersonbehavingin someway,
althoughtheparticularformof his behaviorwilldepend on whathe
desiresin thesituation,and consequentlyon his intentions.In saying
that it will onlybe 'liable' to act as an efficientcause of behaviorI
have in mind that throughdesire and intentionthe person may
perhapspreventbehaviortakingplace at all. I do notwantto suggest
here that every action stemming from someone's passion for
somethingis precededby a build-upof the extentcharacterizing
the
twocaseswhichI cited. It is a matterof degree.I do claim thatevery
actionstemmingfromsomeone'spassionforsomethingis precededby
theexistencein himof a quantumoftheenergywhichis passion,and
that if thisis not used it will build up. Where thereis a continuing
build-upthe energywillprogressively
acquire the role of an efficient
cause oftheirtakingplace behaviorofsomekindsince,on accountof
translateinto
it, the person'sfeelingof the energywill progressively
his feelingdisposedto do somethingi.e., anything,althoughwhatin
particularhe does, willdepend, as I have said, on his desiresand intentions.
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PASSION
121
I turnnow to the second pointI wantto make about thesortof
causal influencewhichpassioncould possiblybe said to have on the
action someone takes in order to attain the object of passion. This
veryposingof the question,withitsuse of thephrase'in orderto' incursa notionof finalcausality.But moreneeds to be said herethan
oftheboxerDavid Greenthatitwas hisfire
justthis.Afterremarking
which."took him into command" of the fight,the journalistI have
referredto wenton to say thatit was 'burningambition'which"kept
Greengoing"whenall seemedlost,and itmightseemthata complete
explanationoftheboxerhavingwon afterall could be givenin terms
of his havingacted forthe sake of attainingthe object of his ambition. But such an account,whilsttrue,wouldbe incompletesincethe
assertionwas thatthe ambitionin thiscase was a 'burning'one. The
pointis thatwhatburnsin such a case is the person's'fire,'and that
thisoperatesas a kind of fuelwhich,in theparticularcase in question,enabled theboxerto movearoundtheringboxinghisopponent
thatin everycase ofsomeas effectively
as he did. I contendtherefore
one actingfroma passionforsomething,theirpassionoperatesas a
kindof fuel,such thatanyexplanationof how theyare movedto act
to this.Not to
bytheirpassionwouldbe incompletewithoutreference
takethisfundamentalcharacterofpassionintoaccountin explaining
therelevantkindof actionswouldbe comparableto tryingto explain
how a motorcar moves,withoutmakingany referenceto petrolor
or whateveritsfuelhappensto be, althoughmyanalogyof
electricity,
themotorcar is notmeantto implythatin the case ofhuman action
of final as distinct
the fuel is not used withinan overallframework
frommechanicalcausality.
In discussingthe relationbetweenwantingor desiringand doing,Meldenat one stageusesthephrase'steedsofdesire.'He does not
analyzeout the forceof the metaphorbeyondimplyingthat it is on
accountofthese'steeds'thatdesirecan movea man to do something.
I thinkmyselfthatthemetaphoris quite a good one in thatquanta of
theenergywhichis passioncan carryus to a desiredgoal, or enable us
to attainit. It was, forinstance,as I have noted,passionwhichcarriedtheboxerthrougha difficult
contest;enablinghimto obtainthe
objectofhisdesire.This is to say,then,thatthe'steedsof(passionate)
desire'are in factquanta of passion.
I think,a
What I have arguedin mydiscussionso farconstitutes,
limiteddefenseof Hume's much criticizedaccount of how passions
are related to the actions which ensue fromthem. Accordingto
Peter'sexpressionof him, Hume held that passionsoperate as "psy-
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chologicalentitieswhichmove people to act," implyingalso I think
'move themin acting,'thisbeing a viewwhichPetershimselftotally
rejectsin favorof thetypeof analysiswhichI expositedbrieflyin the
openingparagraphof thissectionof mypaper. But in that passion
has a spatiallyextended characteras instancedby the journalist's
referenceto thefirein thefootballmanagers'eyes,it is reasonableto
conceiveof it in termsof entities;and in thatwe do not ascribepassionsto anythingof a purelyphysicalnature,it is reasonableto conceive them as psychologicalin character.Given these conceptions,
and also thatpassioncan be said, forexample,to 'take'someoneinto
commandof a boxingcontext,it can reasonablybe maintainedthat
Hume was not totallymisguidedin seeingpassionsas psychological
entitieswhichmovepeople to act. To saythis,however,is notto support his identificationof desire as being a passion and his then
presentingdesireas a kindof entitywhichmovespeople to act. As I
have arguedit,desireis not a passion,and is in factofa verydifferent
characterfromit. Again, Hume's view that passions are, to use
Melden'sphrase,'internalcontents'ofthemindi.e., mentalexistents
connectedwiththe actionswhichensuefromthem,
onlycontingently
is not totallymistaken.Passion in itself,I have argued,is onlyconwiththeobjectto whichitbecomesdirectedbytheinterventingently
tionof desire.Desireitself,however,contraryto whatHume held, is
necessarilyand not contingentlyconnected with its object, as is
forcefully
pointedout by Melden.
5. So far I have been concernedwiththatordinaryuse of the term
'passion'bymeansofwhichwe can be said to havepassionsforthings.
I want now to examine brieflythe othermost common use of the
term,accordingto whichwe can sometimesbe said to 'flyintoa passion,'thisbeinga matterofreactingto somethingwithintenseanger.
My intentionhere will not be to offeranythinglike a thorough
analysisof the conceptof anger,but onlyto bringout the respectin
whichit is implicatoryof passion.
In the statementof hiswhichI quoted in the firstsectionof this
paper, R. S. Petersdraws attentionto the etymologicalconnection
between'passion' and the Latin word 'patior'fromwhichit derives,
thelatterworkhavinga connotationofsuffering
and hencepassivity.
He regardsthis connotationas philosophicallyappropriateon the
groundsthatemotionis a matterof passionto the extentthatone is
overcomeby, and so passivelyrelated to it. What exactlyone is
passiveto, in his view,is strongfeelingsof a turbulenttype.On this
accountthen,to flyintoa passionwouldbe a matterofpassionsince
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PASSION
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it would involvebeing carriedaway, such that you are in a passive
ratherthan an activeframeof mind. I agreewiththisaccountso far
as it goes,but I thinkthatthereis moreto be said. What thisamounts
to I shall tryto bringout in thefirstplace by consideringPeters'furtherdiscussion.
Having arguedthatpassionin whathe calls the"ordinary"sense
is a matterof beingpassivelyrelatedto strongfeelingsof a turbulent
kind, he raises the question of whyphilosophershave "referredto
motivesforactionas passions,"i.e., he raisesthequestionofwhatit is
thatis basic to "thephilosophicalconceptionofpassion"whichI contendedin the firstsectionof mypaper is, in fact,one quite ordinary
conceptionof it, an example given by Petersbeing a passion for
truth.He then notes that someone acting froma passion "is not
necessarilysubjectto strongfeelingsor in a turbulentstate." Given
this circumstance,of strongfeelingsof a turbulenttypenot being
whiletheyare basic to
basic to thepassionwe can have forsomething,
the otherkindof passion,Petershas to look elsewhereforthe factor
whichis commonto passionin both the sensesin question.What he
thinksis commonis "the non-neutralappraisal of a situationfrom
whichboth derive."When we are movedto act from,say, a passion
fortruth,or, on the otherhand, whenwe flyinto a passion, Peters
would say that in eithercase it will have been a consequenceof our
havingseen a situation"in a certainlightwhichis not a matterof into us." In the case of flyinginto a passionthe nonneutral
difference
appraisalmightbe, forexample,of someone'sremark,whichwe see
as a personalinsult;whereasin thecase ofsomeone'sbeingmovedto
act froma passion fortruthit mightbe that we see certaincrucial
factsto have been overlookedwherethismattersto us a good deal
sincewe are partialto gettingthefactsright.This nonneutraltypeof
appraisal provides,in Peters'view,"a close enoughconnection"betweenthe two sensesof passion"to explain the use of the term'passion' by philosophersto referto that which moves us to act." I
disagree. Earlier,in discussingthe relationbetweenthe passion we
have forsomethingand' our action whichmay ensue fromit, I rejected Peters'accountofthisrelationas beinginadequate in thesense
What movedthe boxerto act in such a way as to win
of insufficient.
thecontest,I-said,was notjust hisseeinghis,situationin theringin a
to him. What moveshimto
waythatwas not a matterofindifference
act as he did was his'fire.'Plentyof-boxersin hissortofpredicament,
I pointedout, could have seen theirsituationin a waythatwas not a
to them,such thattheyreallydid wantto win,
matterofindifference
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but who would have failed to do so because theylacked the fire,or
energyof therequisitetype,i.e., theydid not actuallyhave a passion
forboxing,and so did not passionatelywantto win. My pointnow is
that in failingto showwhat is basic to the passion we can have for
something,Peters,accordingto his own statementof intention,has
failedto bringout whatis commonto it and to thepassionwe can fly
into,and in failingto do thisit is reasonableto supposethathe may
also have failedto discernwhatis basic to thepassionwe can flyinto.
I shall now argue thathe has in factfailedto do this.
We talk of habituallyangrypeople as being 'fierytempered,'
which suggeststhat the passion we flyinto is not basicallydistinct
from the passion which, throughdesire, becomes a passion for
something,in thatwe qualifybothas havinga characterof 'fire.'But
whereasin actingfroma passionforsomethingwe directour energies
to the end in questionand so use up the givenchargeof passion,in
flyinginto a passion we react ratherthan act, in that the energy,
whichis not used up in action,buildsup in us to a pointat whichwe
can no longercontainit, and we 'explode.' We talksometimesof an
angryperson'blowinga fuse.'This suggeststhatratheras an electric
and so blowa fuse,in
systemcan becomeoverloaded(withelectricity)
some analogous way a person flyinginto a passion has become
overloaded(withunused passion) and so explodesin anger,his passionbeingtherebydischarged.I mean to suggestherethatwe reactin
angerpreciselybecause our actiontakenin pursuitofan objectofour
passion is frustrated,or our prospectiveaction is threatenedwith
so thatwe are thenlumberedwithsummonedbut unused
frustration,
energy,whichwe are unable to contain.In sayingthisI do notmean
to implythatwheneveractiontakenin pursuitof an objectof passion
or prospectiveactionthreatenedwiththis,we flyinto a
is frustrated,
no reverseentailpassion.Whilstangerentailssomesuch frustration,
mentholds. I take a similargeneralviewabout fear,whichis citedby
Petersas beinglikeanger,a matterofpassionin whathe calls the"ordinary"sense. To take an example, a common fear is the fear of
death, and thisI considerto be a reactionto an anticipatedfrustrationof a passionforlife,or ratherof actionstemmingfromsuchpassion.
Whilst I am not attemptinghere anythingremotelylike a
thoroughanalysisof the conceptsof anger and fear, it is perhaps
worthnotingthatmycommentson themare in line withthegeneral
view of emotiontaken by T. Dembo, at least to the extentthat he
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PASSION
125
held, as understoodby Sartre,thatemotionarises"because thepath
to action is blocked."16
Mypointhere againstPetersis, then,thatthe conceptof 'flying
into a passion'cannotbe sufficiently
analyzedin termspurelyof our
being renderedpassiveby turbulentfeelings,sincewhatmakessuch
feelingspassionateis somethingmorethantheirrenderingus passive.
What makesthempassionate,I contend,is whathas been called 'fire'
or 'urgency,'i.e., the energywhichis passionitself.
6. As I have said, passionis not ascribedto purelyphysicalentities.
We do not,forexample,ascribepassionto a stone,or a machine.On
thiscriterion,therefore,
it mightreasonablybe regardedas psychologicalor psychicin character.However,I arguedearlierthatpassion
in itselfis not internally
connectedto an object, and ifintentionality
is held to be a necessaryconditionofsomething's
beingpsychological,
then,on thiscriterion,passionwould not qualify.A more thorough
discussionof whetherpassion is physicalor mental would take me
beyondthe confinesof thispaper. The littleI have said here would
seem, however,to supportthe viewthat the distinctionbetweenthe
physical and the psychologicalis relative rather than absolute,
relative,thatis, to varyingcriteria.
Since thereseemsto be at least some good reasonforregarding
passion as psychological,and since I have held passionin itselfto be
an energy,I am in the positionof employinga conceptof psychic
energy.Insofaras such a concept has been discussedat all in the
literature,it has come in fora good deal of criticism,mainlyin the
formof adversecommentson Freud's use of it. It may be as well
therefore
if,briefly,I differentiate
myuse fromhis, althoughin doing thisI shall not be offeringa systematicdefenseof the notionof
psychicenergy;not, at any rate, beyondincurringthe implications
about such a notionwhicharisefromthe analysisI have givenofthe
conceptof passion. Such-a defensewould requiremuch more space
than now remainsavailable to me in this paper. My firstpoint is,
then, that whereasfor Freud the concept of psychicenergywas a
theoreticalconstruct,forme it is an observationalconcept.Commensurately,passionis somethingthatwe quantify,albeit onlyin a very
crudemanner,as whenwe say,forexample,'He's fullofpassion.'It is
in my view a purelycontingentmatterthat passion cannot now be
more exactlyquantified.Secondly,Holt, amongstothers,has criticized Freud'sviewthatpsychicenergyis directional,in havinga cer16
J. P. Sartre,"Sketchfor a Theoryof the Emotions,"Methuen,1961, p. 44.
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- builtintoit. Whereas
tain kindof end- eithersexual or aggressive
"forceis directional,"Holt remarks,""energyis not." In arguingthat
passionin itselfis not internallyconnectedwithan object or typeof
objectI implythatit is notdirectional.Desire,on theotherhand, accordingto my analysis,would be directional,since it is necessarily
connectedwithan object. In myviewthereforedesire,but not passion in itself,could be regardedas a force.
In callingpassiona psychicenergy,I do notwantto implythatit
is necessarilythe one and onlyenergywhichcould reasonablybe so
called. There maybe others.Furthermore,
so faras anythingI have
had to say goes, it would remain a possibilitythat in given circumstances,passioni.e., energyhavingthe qualityofurgency,could
be transformed
intosomeotherqualityofenergy,or, forthatmatter,
be itselfthe resultof some such transformation.
In sayingthisI have
in mind the factthatthe different
formsof physicalenergy,such as
heat, electricity,
or magnetism,are commonlyheld withinphysicsto
be interconvertible,
and so far as anythingI have had to say goes, it
seemspossiblethatpassion also is convertibleor can be the resultof
conversion.But assessmentof the questionof whetherit is or is not
would require a -systematicexaminationof the concept of psychic
energyand of the relationof psychicto physicalenergy,and this
wouldrequirepassingwellbeyondtherangeofmypresentundertak-
ing.
This undertakinghas been simplyto analyzetheconceptofpassion which we apply in our ordinaryuses of language. The main
pointsin myanalysisofthisconceptare thatpassionis an energy;that
it becomesindividualizedthroughdesiresuch thatwe can then,and
only then, talk of having a passion (for something);that through
energizingour thoughtsand feelings(including, ultimately,our
kinaesthetic
sensations)it enablesus to take actionappropriateto attainingthe desiredobject; and thatwhensuch actionis frustrated
or
threatenedwithfrustration
we maybe unable to containthe passion
whichhas been invoked,so thatit runsawaywithus and we undergo
an emotionalreaction.It is part and parcel ofmyanalysistherefore,
thatthe passionwe can have forsomething,and the passionwe can
flyinto, are one and the same.
POLYTECHNIC
OF NORTH LONDON.
R. LAWRIE.
17 Robert R. Holt, 'Beyond Vitalism
and Mechanism, Freud's Concept of
PsychicEnergy,'in The HistoricalRoots of Contemporary
Psychology,editedby B.
B. Wolman, Harper, New York, 1968, p. 213.
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