Conflict in the Middle East: Investigating the Islamic Civil War By Alexander James Wyatt, B.A. A Thesis In Interdisciplinary Studies Submitted to the Graduate Faculty Of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of Master of Arts Approved Col. Dave Lewis Chair of Committee Dr. Ron Milam Dr. Dennis Patterson Mark Sheridan Dean of the Graduate School August, 2015 Copyright 2014, Alexander Wyatt Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Table of Contents Preface ……………………………………..………………………………… i I. Defining Civil War ………………………………………….……….…..... 1 II. Reasons Behind the Tensions: Sunni – Shia Split ....……………..……..... 4 III. Mapping the Players within the Islamic Sects ….……………………...… 8 IV. Evidence of Sunni – Shia Coalitions and Sectorial Violence .………….. 14 V. Conclusions ……………………………..……………………………….. 22 VI. Policy Advice Dependent on Conclusions ….……………………….….. 25 Bibliography …………………………………………………………….…... 27 ii Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Preface This work, Conflict in the Middle East: Investigating the Islamic Civil War, will attempt to answer a principle question of: ‘Are the current outcroppings of conflicts in the Middle East a symptom of a larger problem of sectarian violence within the Islamic faith?’ It is through the answer to this question that a new academic lens will be formed; this lens will then be used by scholars of both cultural and political studies in order to better determine whether the current views concerning the Middle East, as well as the current overarching views on Islam, are applicable to the current conflicts that have followed the Arab Spring. Also, this work will attempt to answer a secondary question of: ‘if these conflicts are indeed a result of the Sunni – Shia split within the Islamic faith, what can be said for the previously accepted beliefs that modern conflict is simply due to the political divisions made during colonization and western intervention?’ Lastly, this work will provide a brief suggestion in regards to policy changes necessary, in order to provide us with possible solution(s) to the discoveries made within the answers to the principle and secondary questions. In regards to the principle question, this work will explore the background of Civil Wars, the history of the Sunni – Shia split, and the political players involved in the region (Nations, as well as States). It will be through investigating these specific areas that we will be able to understand the nature of civil wars; see mapping of modern conflicts in the region; and whether modern conflicts in the region occur along common borders or within shared borderlands (of both States and Nations). It will be through these investigations that we will then be able to build their conclusions of whether these modern conflicts thus stem from sectarian violence or from other sources. iii Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Next with regards to the secondary question, this work will lead from the principle question to the answer(s) of whether previously held beliefs concerning modern conflict in the region, (as well as the non-western world) are indeed still applicable to understanding the nature of these modern conflicts, or if the nature of understanding the region, as well as that of regional conflicts in general needs to be viewed in a different light. This will be done through the introduction of Marxist views on the subject of colonization and imperialism; the discussion concerning the conclusions drawn from answering the principle question; and lastly through the evidence of Sunni – Shia coalitions, this work will be able to determine whether previously held conventions concerning conflict in the Middle East continue to provide a rational explanation for such, or if the theory of an Islamic Civil War is a better explanation of such. Lastly, based on the conclusions to both the principle, and secondary questions will be provided with policy advice in regards to western interactions within the region. This will be done in order to provide possible solutions through which relations within the Middle East can be further improved upon, and inter-state conflict lessened. This work, Conflict in the Middle East: Investigating the Islamic Civil War, will attempt to answer a principle question of: ‘Are the current outcroppings of conflicts in the Middle East a symptom of a larger problem of sectarian violence within the Islamic faith?’ It is through the answer to this question that a new academic lens will be formed; this lens will then be used by scholars of both cultural and political studies in order to better determine whether the current views concerning the Middle East, as well as the current overarching views on Islam, are applicable to the current conflicts that have followed the Arab Spring. Also, this work will attempt to answer a secondary question of: iv Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 ‘if this conflict is indeed a result of the Sunni – Shia split within the Islamic faith, what can be said for the previously accepted beliefs that modern conflict is due to the political divisions made during colonization and western intervention? Lastly, this work will provide a brief suggestion in regards to policy changes necessary, in order to provide us with a possible solution to the discoveries made within the answers to the principle and secondary questions. v Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Chapter I Defining Civil War Within this work we must first consider what is a civil war, and what a civil war consists of. This will be done through first defining what a civil war is; through discussing the different aspects that make up a civil war; through discussing the interests associated with the potential sides involved in the types of civil wars. All of this will be achieved through use of a main text, DeRouen’s An Introduction to Civil Wars, as it provides keen insight into the nature of nationalistic struggles, and civil wars; it is this work, that will provide a fantastic foundation from which we will garner all the major facets that make up a civil war. It is through an examination of DeRouen’s work, one will be better able to define what a civil war is, and thus, be able to determine if the current conflicts within the middle east qualify under these criteria. DeRouen’s first significant point is that all of the definitions he consults tend to revolve around two specific criteria: “the number of deaths and the identity of the disputants.”1 In regards to number of deaths, four of the five definitions which DeRouen considers list a civil war as having over 1,000 deaths, but the definitions disagree over the time period in question; in regards to the identity of the disputants, DeRouen states that they must both have political agendas (e.g. ~ the cartels of Mexico are for profit, and thus, not engaging in a civil war), and while economics may play a part in the onset as a reasoning, it quickly becomes a secondary issue. 1 DeRouen, Karl. "The Basics of Civil War." In An Introduction to Civil Wars, 4. Los Angeles, California: CQ Press, 2015. 1 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 The second significant point that DeRouen makes is that there are differing types of civil wars: first, war for control over the government (e.g. ~ Chinese Civil War and Bolshevik Revolution); Second, Secessionist Wars (e.g. ~ American Revolution); Third, Internationalized Civil Wars (e.g. ~ American Involvement in Vietnam). By breaking civil wars into these categories, this allows us to understand the influences, concerning the execution of civil wars in way of interests and strategies applied. The third significant point that DeRouen makes is concerning the onset of civil wars. In regards to this, DeRouen states that a civil war can stem from one of three things: first, “citizens’ frustration”2 over perceived grievances, either real or imagined; second, “civil war [as] a result of greed [and/ or] for private gain”3 as a result of a rational calculation based within the cost – benefit analysis made by the rebel faction; lastly, “wars [as a] result from opportunities”4 via having a weakened state, and thus, susceptible to take over by other groups. Through understanding the onset motivations, we can better understand the influences concerning the execution of civil wars in way of interests and strategies applied. Now that we have a more complete understanding of what exactly is a civil war, and what comprises it. This has been achieved through done through first defining what a civil war is; through discussing the different aspects that make up a civil war; through discussing the interests associated with the potential sides involved in the types of civil wars. All of this has been achieved through use of a main text, DeRouen’s An 2 DeRouen, Karl. "The Basics of Civil War." In An Introduction to Civil Wars, 15. Los Angeles, California: CQ Press, 2015. 3 Ibid., 16. 4 Ibid., 16. 2 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Introduction to Civil Wars, as it provides key insight into the nature of nationalistic struggles, and civil wars; it is this work, that has provided us with a fantastic foundation from which they will garner all the major facets that make up a civil war. Now, having considered these points, as presented by examination of DeRouen’s work, are now better equipped to define what a civil war is, and thus, be better able to determine if the current conflicts within the middle east qualify under these criteria. 3 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Chapter II Reasons Behind the Tensions: Sunni – Shia Split Now, having been provided on the basic background information on the subject of civil wars, may now proceed into the background information concerning the history of the Sunni – Shia split within the Islamic faith. In order to better understand the possible roots of conflict between the two sects will need to have a basic overview of the two differing sects, including what they believe in, and the defining differences. This will be accomplished in order for us to understand the far-reaching implications of the two sects’ differences of belief as they apply to modern conflicts within the Middle East. In this way, we will be more able to understand the likelihood of an Islamic Civil War, as well as better understand that current Euro-centric beliefs concerning blame for modern conflicts are misguided, and require reevaluation in order to stay viable as a explanation for modern conflicts. First, we will have to understand the two sects, in order to accomplish this, it is necessary to view the demographics associated within the region; this will assist us later in the reading with the ‘who’ of the conflict. As we have gathered since the beginning of this work, there are two large divisions in the Islamic faith: the Sunni sect, and the Shia sect. The basic population facts, according to the Pew Research Center as of 2009, “of the total Muslim population, 10-13% [~157 million - 204 million] are Shia Muslims and 8790% [~1.365 billion – 1.413 billion] are Sunni Muslims. Most Shias (between 68% and 4 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 80%) live in just four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq.”5 As one can see, according to this data, the Sunni sect of the Islamic faith makes up the vast majority of Islamic adherents worldwide. Moving forward for this, one will be able to delve further into what the two sects believe, and what makes them different. The first sect of the Islamic faith that we will examine further is that of the Sunni sect. The Sunni sect of the Islamic faith believes in two records of the Prophet Muhammad: the Qur’an and his Sunnah (a form of hadith or oral history). The Qur’an is considered the word of Allah, and as "the Prophet Muhammad is seen as the living Qur’an, the embodiment of God's will in his behavior and words,”6 his Sunnah is also revered. As such, the adherents of Sunni Islam “take their name from the sunnah, meaning those who follow the example of the Prophet."7 In this sense, we not only begin to see what the Sunni sect believes, but they may also begin to see the differences between the two sects. The second sect of the Islamic faith that we will examine further is the Shia sect. As with many large religious denominations, it is important to note that Shia Islam also has many divisions within it (one should also note that this work will attempt to stay at a macro level in order to keep the focus on the main differences between the two sects). The Shia sect of the Islamic faith accepts the same Qur’an as the Sunni sect, as well as many similar hadith. However, a main difference in the Shia is that they sect hold their 5 Lugo, Luis. "Mapping the Global Muslim Population." Pew Research Center. October 7, 2009. Accessed April 13, 2015. http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-‐the-‐global-‐muslim-‐population/. 6 Eposito, John. "The Many Faces of Islam, and Muslims." In The Future of Islam, 43. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 7 Ibid. 43 5 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 version of the Hadith concerning Muhammad’s Farewell Sermon, or the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things, that the Prophet Muhammad intended that all his successors be Ahl Al-Bayt or ‘people of the house’ (Muhammad’s family). However, the first caliph following Muhammed was not the appointed one, (according to Shia hadith) Ali ibn Abi Talib, but rather, Abu Bakr was elected. In this way, not only do we begin to see what the Shia sect believes, but they may also begin to see the differences between the two sects. Now, having examined what the two sects believe, will now discuss what the two sects differ on, considering their similar history. As seen above, one can see that the two sects agree on many things including: the entirety of the main text, the Qur’an, as well as many hadiths; however, their disagreement concerning the rightful heir to leadership, based on differences in hadith have caused the original schism between the two sects. This is because the Sunni believe that the words of the prophet are equal to the Qur’an, but are up for interpretation; this is while the Shia sect believes the words of the prophet are to be interpreted in a more literal sense. Considering this, with closer examination of Muhammad’s Farewell Sermon (otherwise called, ‘the Hadith of the Two Weighty Things’), can see that the two sects hold different versions. In the Shia view of the hadith, Muhammad appoints Ali ibn Abi Talib as his successor through the implication of the family of Muhammad being one of the two ‘weighty things’, while the Sunni believe that the passage regarding Ali was simply to instruct the Islamic community to regard him with respect moving forward. Now, having examined what the two sects believe, and what they differ on can now understand the ‘who’, as well as the ‘why’ of the schism between the two sects. 6 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Now that we have a more complete understanding over what exactly are the two sects within Islam, and differences between the two sects leading to the split. This has been achieved through the background concerning the beliefs of the two sects, and a brief discussion over their differences. It is through all this that we will now be more able to understand the likelihood of an Islamic Civil War, and the complications involved in such a reality. 7 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Chapter III Mapping the Players within the Islamic Sects Lastly, having been provided on the basic background information on the subject of civil wars, and basic background concerning the Sunni – Shia split within the Islamic faith, may now proceed onto the mapping of differing ethnicities within the region and the Islamic faith. This will assist us in understanding the possibility that modern conflicts may simply be a continuation of the imperialism undertaken by European states all the way through the mid-20th century. This will be done through a discussion over the tribes of the Middle East, as well as a discussion over tribal power structures before and after European involvement. In this way, we will be more able to understand the likelihood of an Islamic Civil War, and the views by others within the academic community. First, we will need to understand the mass ethnic diversity of the region in order for them to better understand how previous theories concerning colonialism and imperialism are less applicable today. As such, it is important for us to understand that there are more peoples within the Middle East than simply the Arab majority. According to Wheeling Jesuit University, the history of the definition behind the classification of Arab was that the person was one of the “peoples that inhabited the northern and central portions of the Arabian Peninsula.”8 However, this has since been expanded over the course of history to include “those who speak Arabic.”9 With all that under consideration, approximately “60% of the total population in the Middle East… consider themselves to 8 "Middle East -‐ Peoples." Global Perspectives: A Remote Sensing & World Issues Site. 2002. Accessed April 13, 2015. http://www.cotf.edu/earthinfo/meast/mepeo.html. 9 Ibid. 8 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 be [Arab].”10 Of the remaining 40% that are not Arab within the middle east, we will find a mixture of the world’s ethnicities, drawn by the wealth of the region, as well as significant ethnic groupings (e.g. ~ Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Turkey; Bedouins in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan; Assyrian’s traditionally from the Mesopotamian region of the Middle East). This being said, ethnic diversity does begin to blur when it comes to the lines drawn by unique religious divisions, as a person’s parentage strongly influences their affiliations. This can be seen in regards to the Alawite divisions within Syria, as their religious minority is a major player within that state’s future in regards to the current conflict with the Islamic State, but while it is treated as an ethnicity, it is fundamentally part of the Arab ethnicity. In this way, we can begin to understand the mass diversity of ethnicities within the region, as well as have been alerted to a few of the major players associated with the current conflicts underway. Secondly, one will need to understand the tribal power structures within these regions both prior to and post western involvement. Prior to the western involvement within the Middle East, the tribal powers engaged in trade, warfare, and cultural exchange; of course, these tribal or regional powers engaged in trade outside the region (most notably the cultural exchange regarding algebra and gunpowder), however, it is important to note what the metaphorical regional power pyramid was like prior to the European’s interest. As such, one will view a few examples of ethnic and religious 10 "Middle East -‐ Peoples." Global Perspectives: A Remote Sensing & World Issues Site. 2002. Accessed April 13, 2015. http://www.cotf.edu/earthinfo/meast/mepeo.html. 9 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 groups, in order to view the shift of power undertaken following the western involvement. The first example that this work will consider is that of the previously mentioned Alawite population. The Alawites, or Nusayris as they are sometimes known, are a smaller sub-division of the Shia sect of Islam under the branch of the Twelver school. Centered in Syria, and roughly “12% of Syria’s population”11 this population has been regarded as “very liberal… secular… [and] some Muslims consider the Alawites a heretic sect.”12Historically speaking, the Alawite population were oppressed under the Ottoman Empire, and then “Syria’s most repressed and exploited minority”13 until 1970. It was under the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon that true change occurred for the Alawite population. While the Alawites unsuccessfully executed rebellions against their Imperialist overseers, they did demonstrate their exceptional abilities as military commanders; also under the French Mandate, the Alawites were given a semiautonomous state centered on the city of Latakia. Following the conclusion of the Second World War, Syria gained its independence and the country underwent a series of military coups. It was through some brilliant political maneuvering by Hafez al-Assad (father of the current president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad), the Alawite minority ended the both the instability of the country and oppression of the Alawite minority for approximately 40 years. 11 "The 'Secretive Sect' in Charge of Syria." BBC News. May 17, 2012. Accessed March 26, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-‐middle-‐east-‐18084964. 12 Ibid. 13 "Alawi Islam." GlobalSecurity.Org. 2015. Accessed March 28, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-‐alawi.htm. 10 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 The second example that this work will consider is that of the Kurdish ethnic minority. “An Iranian people by language”14 the Kurdish peoples are extremely diverse in the sense that they exhibit many different ethnicities from bordering lands (Most specifically: Arabs, Armenians, Persians, Turks). Geographically speaking they inhabit the northern area of Iraq, southern turkey, and western Iran; accounting for roughly 20% of the populations of both Iraq, and Turkey. It is important to note that this ethno-linguistic group transcends religious tendencies, approximately “98% of Kurds in Iraq identified themselves as [Sunni Muslims, while] only 2% identified as Shia.”15 It is important to note that while the majority of Kurds are Sunni, being Kurdish does not necessarily mean one is an adherent of that particular faith as can be seen through the Shia minority, as well as several other small minorities including the Christian Yazidis. Also important to note, much like the Alawites, this group has been the subject of significant historical oppression by all the states they inhabit at some time or another. Prior to western involvement, the Kurds were a dominated peoples within the region early, with the conquering of them in the 7th century by the Arabs, the Turks in the 11th century, the Mongols in the 13th century, and finally by the Turks under the Ottoman Empire. Following the Turkish defeat in the First World War, the Kurds were emboldened, and the then U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson encouraged selfdetermination for non-Turkish minorities. Following the failure for the Kurds to form an 14 Shoup, John. "Kurds." In Ethnic Groups of Africa and the Middle East: An Encyclopedia: An Encyclopedia, 159. Santa Barbra, California: ABC-‐CLIO, 2011. 15 Mohamed, Besheer. "Who Are the Iraqi Kurds?" Pew Research Center. Accessed August 20, 2014. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-‐tank/2014/08/20/who-‐are-‐ the-‐iraqi-‐kurds/. 11 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 independent state, a series of nationalistic uprisings have occurred cyclically. The only marginally successful of these uprisings were the ones in which European involvement was apparent. An example of this can be seen in the brief existence of a Kurdish Republic following the conclusion of the Second World War with Soviet backing or, following the successful U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, we will see Kurds enjoying just shy of political autonomy, as they hold limited-veto power in the Iraqi government, as well as significant representation. As such, one will see that with the involvement of western powers, the Kurdish minority has made significant strides in their political situation. The final example that this work will consider is that of the Houthi ethnic minority in Yemen. The Houthis are a faction within the Zaydi denomination of the Shia – Islamic sect in Yemen. The Houthis take their name and ideology from their fallen leader, Hussein Badraddin al-Houthi and are a recent faction to take the stage as of 1992; they have only truly become active since the beginning of their 2004 campaign. They reside in the mountainous regions of eastern Yemen. Lastly, we must take note that that while the Houthis are all of the Zaydi minority, not all within the Zaydi minority are part of the Houthis movement. The Zaydis, despite being the largest minority within the region (they “make up about 45 percent of the population”16), and the Zaydi-denomination “ruled Yemen for 1,000 years up until 1962”17 when the current regime took over; during the time in which the Zaydis ruled the region, they fought off many expansionist powers such as Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. It is also important for us to understand the timeline surrounding the 16 "Yemen: The Conflict in Saada Governorate -‐ Analysis." RefWorld.Org. July 24, 2008. Accessed April 20, 2015. http://www.refworld.org/docid/488f180d1e.html. 17 Ibid. 12 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 growth of the Houthi faction. As the Houthi faction grew out of the rise of radicalization following the end of the cold war through the creation of a radical group known as the Believing Youth, but it also only became active with significant involvement in the region following western involvement (the 2003 U.S. – led invasion of Iraq). The leader of the Houthis, despite having no relation to this group, “contributed to the radicalization of some Zaydis”18 through the use of anti-U.S. slogans before his death is 2004. This rise then transformed the majority of the Believing Youth into the now Houthi faction. Now that we have been provided on the basic background information on the subject of civil wars, and basic background concerning the Sunni – Shia split within the Islamic faith, have now witnessed the mapping of differing ethnicities within the region and the Islamic faith (specifically those centered around the modern States of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen). This has assisted us in completing their understanding of the possibility that while modern conflicts may simply be a continuation of the imperialism undertaken by European states all the way through the mid-20th century it is a weak rebuttal to the central idea of an Islamic Civil War, due to the failure to explain the nations involved regardless of direct external involvement (Yemen). This was completed through mapping the tribes of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, as well as by discussing tribal power structures surrounding European involvement. In this way, we are now more able to understand the likelihood of an Islamic Civil War, and the counter-argument opposed as they move forward into the main evidence of this work. 18 “Yemen: The Conflict in Saada Governorate -‐ Analysis." RefWorld.Org. July 24, 2008. Accessed April 20, 2015. http://www.refworld.org/docid/488f180d1e.html. 13 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Chapter IV: Evidence of Sunni – Shia Coalitions and Sectorial Violence Now that we have been provided with adequate background information on the definition concerning what a civil war is, the history behind the Islamic split, and the ethnic-nations at play, they are now better equipped to move on to the arguments surrounding the possibility of an Islamic Civil War. In order to reach viable conclusions over the feasibility of an Islamic Civil war will need to view the evidence both for and against. In this sense, we will be provided with examples of sectorial violence between the two sects; they will be provided with evidence in opposition to the idea of an Islamic Civil war in the form of Sunni – Shia coalitions; they will be provided with evidence in opposition to the idea of an Islamic Civil war in the form of radical Islam as a reaction to power vacuums left following populist uprisings; lastly, we will be provided with evidence counter to the idea of an Islamic Civil War in the form of the previously held explanation of imperialism and colonialism, as seen within Marxist theories. Now, having accomplished this, we will be better able to understand the conclusions reached within this work, and form their own conclusions concerning the theory of an Islamic Civil War. First, we will need to view the acts of sectorial violence committed between the two sects, providing evidence in support of the idea of an Islamic Civil War. This will be seen through examples of violence, and possible proxy wars undertaken within the region. Through this, one will better understand the validity of an Islamic Civil War, transcending ethnic and state boundaries. The first example of sectorial violence, which this work will explore, is that of the execution of Shi’ite men in the town of Tikrit on June 14th, 2014. The New York Times 14 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 published an article on the event in which they stated, “Sunni Islamist militants claimed on Sunday that they had massacred hundreds of captive Shiite members of Iraq’s security forces, posting grisly pictures of a mass execution in Tikrit as evidence and warning of more killing to come.”19 This atrocity’s motive, however, remains unclear, as the audience of the attack remains unclear. This attack could be focused on demoralizing the Iraqi security forces in order to increase shock value in a military setting, or this could be targeted towards the Shiite population, which the Sunni Islamic group considers apostates; in this sense, it is clear that the selection of Shiites was strategic in dividing the pro-government forces. The next example is the Saudi Arabian intervention in Yemen, against the Houthis minority. Houthis, a Zaydi-Shia denomination, have been implementing an insurgency against the Sunni-led government since 2004. Since the successful takeover of the capital, Saana, and the dissolution of the parliament on the 6th of February 2015, there has been significant concern that this will “be seen by the Sunnis in the country as a Shia takeover.”20 There is also concern, that this may be an example of DeRouen’s ‘Internationalized Civil War’ that was mentioned previously; this is due to “Sunni-led Saudi Arabia [accusing] Shia-led Iran of backing the [Shia] Houthis,”21 despite denials 19 Nordland, Ron. "Massacre Claim Shakes Iraq." New York Times. June 15, 2014. Accessed December 16, 2014. 20 "Yemen's Houthis Form Own Government in Sanaa." Aljazeera. February 6, 2015. Accessed March 14, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/02/yemen-‐houthi-‐rebels-‐ announce-‐presidential-‐council-‐150206122736448.html. 21 Bowen, Jeremy. "Yemen Conflict: Saudi Arabia Ends Air Campaign." BBC News. April 21, 2015. Accessed April 21, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-‐middle-‐ east-‐32402688. 15 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 from Iran. If such speculation were the case, this would be a clear indicator of a proxy war between the two sects undertaken by their most powerful states. The third example, which one will examine, is that of the reprisal attacks that Shia militias undertaken against Sunnis within areas brought back under government control. In what is described as blind revenge, Amnesty International claims (as of 14th of October, 2014) that in the mainly Sunni city of Samarra, a staggering “170 Sunni men [have been] abducted since June.”22 In addition to this, “more than 30 were taken… from their homes [on] a single day – June 6th – before being shot dead.”23 This example shows that this is not a simple matter of one side committing the atrocities, or one side instigating the cycle of violence; this demonstrates that both sects are actively engaged in attacks against the other in an attempt to secure power within the religion, and the region. Secondly, one will need to view evidence of Sunni and Shia factions working together, providing evidence counter to an Islamic Civil War. This is due to the prevailing theories used to describe modern day conflict relaying on an ethnic/ nationalist component, or other criteria, relating back in history to Eurocentric ideologies. Through the examination of such examples, and breakdown into component pieces, we will be better able to understand that such coalitions do not actually support these theories, but rather provide evidence in support of the theory of an Islamic Civil War. The first example, which we will examine, is that of the Arab League creating a joint military force in which to combat the Islamic State. The Arab League, for those 22 "Iraq: Shia Militias 'killing Sunnis in Reprisal Attacks'" BBC News. October 14, 2014. Accessed March 21, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-‐middle-‐east-‐ 29603272. 23 Ibid. 16 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 unfamiliar, is a coalition of 22 states dedicated to joint economic, military, and cultural security. Though it is clear that while all the states do not see particularly eye-to-eye, the current conflicts concerning I.S. and the Houthis are deeply concerning to many of these nations. Within the Arab league, there are both Shia - led, and Sunni - led states involved, making this a clear example of the two sects working together to solve a common problem. In regards to the Islamic State, the issue for many of these states is that the rule imposed would threaten the power structure within their own country (notably Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia). This is due to the fact that the Sunni – affiliated Islamic State views the Shia – Alawite government as apostates; the Islamic State wishes to remove the Saudi King from power in order to impose authority under their caliph; lastly, Iraq is struggling in much the same way as Syria, as they have a Shia majority that, following the despotic rule and oppression of the Baath regime under Saddam Hussein, would prefer not to return to such rule. In this sense, the Sunni – Shia coalition forming under the banner of the Arab league is a perfect example counter to the theory of an Islamic Civil War. The second example, which this work will examine, is that of the Shia militias and their tentative alliance to the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government, following the sweeping onset of the Islamic State’s invasion of the Anbar province created ‘popular mobilization units’ or Iranian armed, Shia militias. The government of Iraq is formed out of a series of power sharing deals between the two Islamic sects, as well as the Kurdish minority in the north. The army, and other security forces are formed in much the same way, comprising of both sects. However, the security forces within Iraq, while well supplied and supported via the air by the U.S. – led coalition, have a record of being 17 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 woefully ineffective against the advance of the Islamic State. This is in stark contrast to the Shia militias fueled by Iran, as they have a history of victory against the Islamic State’s onslaught. Whether this is due to their desire to fight being higher, or the support given them by Shia – Iran is more than what the U.S. lends to the Iraqi security forces is still up for debate; however, it is clear that the coalition between the Iraqi’s, the Kurdish forces, and the militias are a strong combination in order to stall the Islamic State’s advance across the northern Middle East. Thirdly, one will need to view evidence in opposition to the idea of an Islamic Civil war in the form of radical Islam as a reaction to power vacuums left following populist uprisings. Following the Arab Spring that began in December of 2010 with the Tunisian Revolution, the period of time known as the Arab or Islamist Winter began. Many explain this period of time, from 2013 to present, as a simple reaction to the power vacuums left behind the collapse of governmental control in particular areas of the Middle East. (e.g. the Islamic State filling the gap left behind by governmental forces losing control over particular areas) While this can serve as an explanation on a case-bycase basis, it does not particularly serve well as an explanation of what is occurring in the region on a whole. This is due to the unique nature of the groups that are filling the proposed vacuum, in addition to the actions that these groups take. Expanding on this, we will see that, through examination of the nature of the Islamic State, and its actions, that the explanation of this group simply acting as a power filler is mistaken. The actions taken by the Islamic State, against the Shia populations mark it as a group born out of Sunni frustrations towards rising Shia power within the region. Their nature as a group comprised of several states’ citizenry, and of different 18 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 nationalities, but all of the same religious affiliations mark this group as a prime example of a group that could fit the proposed explanation on a case-by-case basis, while being an example of how this does not explain the situation of the region as a whole. We will also see that, through the examination of the nature of the Houthi insurgency, and its actions, that the explanation of the Houthis acting as a power filler is mistaken. This is due to the nature of the group being comprised solely of Zaydi Shia’s, attempting to represent a country that is not a majority Shia. Also, the actions undertaken by this group, such as their attacks against the international Sunni terror group, Al-Qaeda, as well as raids across the border into Saudi Arabia due to their accusation against “[Saudi Arabia] of supporting the Yemini government in attacks against them.”24 This example would suggest that on a case-by-case basis, that this example would disprove the belief that these groups are simply acting as vacuum fillers, and point more to a struggle between the two sects of the Islamic faith. These two examples of possible vacuum fillers have demonstrated to us that such an explanation for the conflicts within the Arab Winter is not a valid explanation. Instead the two examples which this work presented, when put into the larger context of the Arab Winter, point towards the explanation of sectarian violence within the Islamic faith. In this way, we will understand that the possible explanation of a vacuum filler left behind in the wake of the Arab Spring is not a valid explanation in which to explain the on-going situation within the Middle East. 24 "Yemen Rebels 'seize Saudi Area'" BBC News. November 4, 2009. Accessed March 21, 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8341875.stm. 19 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Lastly, one will need to view evidence of anti-western sentiment stemming from colonialism and imperialism, providing evidence counter to an Islamic Civil War. Marxist imperialist, and western scholars proposed throughout the 20th century that the root causes of significant conflict within the third world, and lesser-world powers were driven through intervention at one point by an external great power. Marxist writings on Imperialism points to the exploitation during these interventions or occupations as the cause for populous revolutions, such as the Bolshevik revolution, Vietnamese rebellion against the French, and Algerian rebellion. However, Dr. Phares points that such theories had their place in time, and have since passed relevancy. Their stranglehold on the political science field, have long since passes, and that the more applicable lenses “had been suppressed by colonialism and Imperialism for more than a century.”25 Phares argues that the mainstream academic believes that Imperialism and colonialism are much more applicable in explaining modern conflict due to the economics and national interests of the individual situations. This is due to the fact that a rational state (or people), acting rationally would consider their own best interest primarily before acting and the quantifiable variables in which one can measure the likelihood of conflict can be easily found within economics, rather than descriptive variables such as desire for cultural or religious harmony. He argues that “the mainstream thinking [argues] that religious and cultural conflicts have existed for centuries, but modern clashes aren’t about civilizations insomuch as they take place because of 25 Phares, Walid. "Historical Debates." In War of Ideas, 1. New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 20 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 economic and national interests.”26 Rather than using this dated lens, that fails to explain current conflicts within the region, he suggests a jihadist culture emerging out of the desire to define their umma (Arabic for nation) as a whole. This can be applied as a lens to current conflicts, as it explains the international aspect of groups such as al-Qaeda, as well as explains the recent regional struggles with groups/ factions such as I.S., the Houthis, and Kurds. Through examination of the previous historical lenses, such as the Marxist theory of imperialism and that of globalization in a post-colonial world, we will better understand that these theories are no longer universally applicable. Now, having been provided with a preponderance of evidence both for and against the lens of an Islamic Civil War, can now better understand the conclusions reached within the next section. The evidence provided was: examples of sectorial violence between the two sects within the Islamic faith; they were provided with evidence in opposition to the idea of an Islamic Civil war in the form of Sunni – Shia coalitions; they were provided with evidence in opposition to the idea of an Islamic Civil war through the exploration of radical Islam as a reaction to power vacuums left following populist uprisings; lastly, we were provided with evidence counter to the idea of an Islamic Civil War in the form of the previously held explanation of imperialism and colonialism, as seen within Marxist theories.. In this way, we are now more able to understand the likelihood of an Islamic Civil War, and the failings of previous explanations for nationalistic conflict within this region as they move forward into the conclusions reached within this work. 26 Phares, Walid. "Historical Debates." In War of Ideas, 1. New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 21 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Chapter V Conclusions Now that we have been provided with evidence, both for and against the proposed lens of an Islamic Civil War, they are now able to move on to the conclusions extrapolated from the evidence; it must also be said that one must keep in consideration the background information provided, when reviewing this work’s conclusions. The conclusions which those viewing this work will be introduced to will be in regards to the questions raised within the beginning of this work: the primary question of ‘are the current outcroppings of conflicts in the Middle East a symptom of a larger problem of sectarian violence within the Islamic faith’ and that of the secondary question of ‘if these conflicts are indeed a result of the Sunni – Shia split within the Islamic faith, what can be said for the previously accepted beliefs that modern conflict is simply due to the political divisions made during colonization and western intervention?’ Now, having been provided with evidence, background information concerning the region, and information concerning the Islamic faith, can now understand the conclusions reached in regards to the questions postulated within this work. The first conclusion, which we will have our attentions directed towards, is that in answer to the primary question of ‘are the current outcroppings of conflicts in the Middle East a symptom of a larger problem of sectarian violence within the Islamic faith?’ Now, having read the background information, and evidence in support (as well as opposition) to the theory of an Islamic Civil War, understand that while such a topic is a complex arena which to tackle, it is clear that the current theories of imperialism and globalization no longer provide the clarity needed to explain this region, or modern conflict. In this 22 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 sense, we will also agree that the current conflicts on-going within the Middle East during the Arab Winter can best be described as sectarian in nature. Despite evidence of coalitions, that can be described as flimsy at best, it has been seen that the amount of violence targeting peoples of opposing faiths within the region transcends that of ethnic divides, as well as state politics. The only example counter to this would be the Sunni Kurds, an ethnic minority which fights against the Islamic State and alongside the Shia militias; however, as this is easily explained through self-interest based along the desire for that group to have their independence, such a struggle does not compete in a significant manner against the theory of an Islamic Civil War. The second conclusion, which we will have their attentions directed towards, is that in answer to the secondary question of ‘if these conflicts are indeed a result of the Sunni – Shia split within the Islamic faith, what can be said for the previously accepted beliefs that modern conflict is simply due to the political divisions made during colonization and western intervention?’ While these two theories have failed to explain the amount of violence within the Arab Winter, it is clear that these theories have held a place describing conflicts directly following the end of the Cold War. In this sense, they may still be applicable in a limited sense moving forward, though as time goes on to an exponentially lesser degree as conflicts increasingly focus on nations, rather than states, as believed under the dictates under the ‘Peace of Westphalia.’ As such, we will see that this calls for a change within current academic research, as well as a change in how the western world describes what occurs in the former third world. Now, having been provided with conclusions based upon both the primary and secondary questions, can now better understand the policy recommendations reached 23 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 within the next section. The conclusions that were reached were that there is significant evidence of sectarian violence in support of the theory of an Islamic Civil War and that while current theories are not a valid lens in which to view current conflicts within the context of the Arab Winter, they will continue to applicable elsewhere as a lens for some time. In this way, we are now more able to understand the validity of an Islamic Civil War, and the both the strengths/ weaknesses of previous explanations for Idealistic conflict within this region as they move forward into the policy recommendations suggested within this work’s following section. 24 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Chapter VI Policy Advice Dependent on Conclusions Based upon the conclusions reached within this work will now be able to understand the necessity for a policy change within United States policy. This is due to the need for a change in the descriptive lens in which we currently view the Middle East region. With this change, we now understand that the same policy of interventionism will only continue to damage our interests within the region. As such, we will note that such policy change must occur gradually, as instant change is impossible, and such change will create damaging backlash. The first recommendation that this work will propose is a change in the western interventionist policy as set down through the U.S.’ Eisenhower doctrine, which dictates (minus the Cold War mindset), ‘that the region holds a vital national resource, and must be stabilized at any cost.’ In this sense, this work will suggest that it is no longer necessary to intervene in the Middle East, as such interventionism is not only costly in monetary terms, it is also costly in terms of lives spent, going forward. The second recommendation that this work will make is that the western states need to understand that such a religious conflict will have far reaching effects, and as such, prepare for sectarian attacks on their own soils. This is due to the inevitability of conflict spread into areas of high concentrations. As conflict winners are determined within the Middle East’s most current of conflicts, the remnants will spread to areas outside the victor’s zones of control, and conflict will inevitably follow. In this way, it is necessary for western states to control the spread of these conflicts through tighter border 25 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 security in terms of screening, as well as increases in their respective intelligence apparatus’. Now, based upon the conclusions reached within this work now are able to understand the necessity for a policy change within United States policy. This is due to the need for change in the descriptive lens, which we currently use to view the Middle East. With this change, we now understand that the same policy of interventionism, as well as current security measures, will only continue to damage our interests within the region and at home. As such, we will note that such western policy must change, and it must start now. 26 Texas Tech University, Alexander J. Wyatt, August 2015 Bibliography "Alawi Islam." GlobalSecurity.Org. 2015. Accessed March 28, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-alawi.htm. Bowen, Jeremy. "Yemen Conflict: Saudi Arabia Ends Air Campaign." BBC News. April 21, 2015. Accessed April 21, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/worldMiddle-east-32402688. DeRouen, Karl. "The Basics of Civil War." In An Introduction to Civil Wars, 4, 15, and 16. Los Angeles, California: CQ Press, 2015. Eposito, John. "The Many Faces of Islam, and Muslims." In The Future of Islam, 43. 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