Ending Colombia’s Internal Conflict: Prospects for Peace with the FARC
and Beyond*
By Matt Ince and Andrei Gomez-Suarez
Policy Briefing
28 February 2013
Executive Summary
Since October 2012, the government of Juan Manuel Santos and senior representatives of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have been discussing a negotiated solution to almost half a century of
armed conflict in Colombia. Launched in Oslo, talks
talks subsequently moved to Havana where they are still
currently underway. The pace of the Havana talks and dynamics of the armed conflict in Colombia during
the first three months of the Santos-FARC
Santos FARC peace talks, suggest that despite serious challenges, the
th current
attempts to bring to an end the armed conflict between the parties are likely to succeed. The reasons for
such optimism stem from the fact that both parties have recognised that they have found common ground
on thorny issues such as drug trafficking
trafficking and rural development, the FARC’s unilateral two-month
two
ceasefire
has partially appeased concerns about fragmentation, and the noise of the armed conflict has only
marginally affected the Havana negotiations. Yet the continuation of the armed conflict, which prioritises the
demonstration of military strength on both sides, encourages alliances between some fronts of the FARC and
criminal actors and allows right-wing
wing sectors of Colombian society to capitalise on the FARC’s military
attacks. The Santos-FARC
ARC peace talks therefore remain a dynamic highly uncertain process and despite
cautious optimism, the establishment of a meaningful peace agreement is still by no means guaranteed.
Six Reasons for Optimism
1) The willingness of the FARC’s senior leadership
leadership to engage in negotiations demonstrates a
realisation that its agenda for social change cannot be achieved through armed struggle alone and
that, within the current situation, continuing to fight will likely result in the further diminishment of
their military power. While by no means a defeated force, the FARC is considerably weaker than it
was a decade ago; their man-power
man power has been considerably reduced, with its membership now
estimated to total approximately 8,000 (down from about 20,000 in the late 1990’s). They have also
lost the strategic initiative, having been forced out of urban areas and into the country’s
cou
peripheries.
2) The international situation is arguably more conducive to peace than it has been in past peace
processes.. Both Cuba and Venezuela are encouraging the FARC to prioritise a negotiated solution. In
particular, the more constructive relationship that Santos and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez
have rekindled has helped push the FARC towards the negotiating table.
table. Beyond Latin America,
Santos has also received significant support for his desire to reach a negotiated settlement,
particularly from the US, but also from countries such as Norway, Spain and the UK.
3) Because of its improved economic outlook, Colombia is in a better position to fund social
programmes, infrastructural development and agricultural reforms. Therefore, compared to the
1990s, the Colombian state is better equipped to deliver the terms and conditions of a possible
*This briefing paper has been prepared following a half-day
half day Workshop convened at RUSI on Monday 28 January 2013,
which discussed many of the
he themes covered herein (see Annex for the full list of participants).
pants). The analysis contained
in this briefing paper, however, represent the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of RUSI,
SCSR or the participants in the above-mentioned
mentioned event.
event
peace agreement with the FARC. The recent Victims and Land Restitution Law have also provided a
good basis for a meaningful negotiating process, as, in contrast to previous peace negotiations, the
government now has 3 million hectares of land in its possession to implement agrarian reform.
4) Many positive reports from both the FARC and the Colombian government negotiators highlight
the fact that the two parties have found common ground in relation to rural development and
illegal narcotics. The Colombian government is considering passing an anti-drug statute this year
which would contemplate authorising special zones for the cultivation of certain crops, currently
registered as illegal, for medicinal purposes; something which is likely to sit well with the FARC’s
longer running interests in what could be done with the Colombian country-side. Reports suggest
that the FARC’s demands have also been modified, going from an absolutist to a more moderate
position. For example, whereas the FARC previously opposed the existence of all large rural estates,
known as latifundios, now they appear to be more focused on estates that are unproductive or
unused.
5) The FARC’s broad adherence to its recent unilateral ceasefire (undertaken 20 November 2012 to 20
January 2013) suggests that the group’s Secretariat continues to have control over a large part of
the organisation. On this basis, the potential for dissidence appears limited and suggests that the
majority of the organisation may well be inclined to demobilise if a peace agreement was reached.
The unilateral ceasefire therefore suggests that the internal cohesion of the group is stronger than
was perhaps previously perceived.
6) Despite evidence that some organised crime elements remain within the Colombian security sector
and that there are still links between illegal criminal actors and security forces, recent government
efforts to implement anti-corruption mechanisms suggest that it is now more likely to track
members of the armed forces who give backing to neo-paramilitary groups or divert resources to
private groups who take the law into their own hands. Enforcement of the Law 1474 of 2011 has,
for example, led to several anti-corruption initiatives. Furthermore, Colombia has a transparent and
publicly available defence budget; a legal framework regulating the appointments and promotions of
personnel; and legislation dealing with transnational bribes. In addition, less than 1 per cent of the
Colombian defence budget is spent on secret items, auditing of security sector accounts is
transparent, and — by law — there is no off-budget spending.
Four Challenges for Peace
Irrespective of this favourable political backdrop, however, the ability of the current peace process to bring
about an end to Colombia’s internal conflict is not guaranteed, as a number of potential stumbling blocks
remain which could prevent a meaningful agreement from being reached and subsequently implemented.
1) Despite the FARC’s broad adherence to the recent ceasefire, the potential for the talks to bring
about fragmentation within the FARC still exists. Stoking these concerns are a number of issues,
including the growing number of alliances being formed between some members of the FARC and
the so-called bandas criminales or BACRIMs – the umbrella term used by the Colombian government
to refer to a number of serious organised crime groups, some of which comprise illegal criminal
actors that have regrouped in the wake of the paramilitary demobilisation in 2006 and are now
considered the country’s primary drivers of insecurity. Factions of the FARC that pose the largest
threat of not demobilising are those whose interests are tied to Colombia’s illegal drugs trade and
other organised crime activities. A general survey of open source intelligence suggests that at least
thirteen out of sixty-seven of the FARC’s currently active fronts are involved in the illegal drugs trade
– including the 33rd and 10th Fronts operating in the north east of the country; the 16th, 15th and 1st
Fronts in the east; the 29th and 48th Fronts in the south west; the 30th Front in the west; the 18th, 57th
2
and 36th Fronts in the north west; the 6th Front in the south west; and the 44th Front in the east.
Amongst these, the 48th, 29th and 30th Fronts are widely reported to have established connections
with the BACRIMs and transnational crime groups in Central America and elsewhere in South
America. It is also reported that the 36th Front‘s largest source of income now comes from their
involvement in illegal mining.
2) Regardless of Colombia’s improved economic outlook and the introduction of legislation aimed at
compensating victims, a number of question marks still hang over Santos’ ability to deliver
meaningful land reforms. The first among these relates to Santos’ own economic strategy (which is
largely based on the extractive industries and entails selling or leasing out large areas of land to big
land owners and large multinational companies), and whether this is compatible with agrarian
reform and his own rural development plan. Moreover, if the government were to propose
substantial change, for example in the way land is used or some other kind of change to life in the
country-side, there are likely to be many people especially on the right, who may object. While the
Santos government and the political elite in Bogota may well understand the need for reform, hard
line regional elites – particularly large land owners – who believe that the conflict can still be won
militarily, may be less forthcoming. Thus, the issue is whether Santos is able to convince enough of
those regional elites to accept some degree of reform and to not take the law into their own hands
(i.e. by sponsoring paramilitarism).
3) The Santos government faces the significant challenge of establishing appropriate mechanisms for
transitional justice that are accepted by the FARC, while also complying with both international
and domestic legal frameworks, and having sufficient integrity that they are met with sufficient
public acceptance in Colombia. For instance, certain forms of amnesties may not be legitimate for
certain crimes, but others may be in line with generally accepted international criminal law norms.
Current talks are therefore considered much more difficult than previous processes because of the
presence of the International Criminal Court, changes to international criminal law and Colombian
domestic law, which make it more difficult to give amnesties and to offer political participation.
Furthermore, significant pressure from local and global civil-society organisations regarding impunity
limit the number of tools that the government has available to incentivise demobilisation.
4) If an agreement is reached with the FARC, one of the most serious challenges that the Santos
administration will face is its ability to safeguard political guarantees for demobilised FARC
members wishing to enter into the political process. This refers primarily to the right and guarantee
of exercising political opposition for the political groups that already exist and for similar groups that
could be created in the future; the design of democratic mechanisms for civilians participating in
politics; and the design of effective measures to have an impact on local, regional and national policy
making. Throughout the current process, members of the FARC will no doubt be mindful of previous
experiences, most notably the assassination of more than 3,000 members and supporters of the
Unión Patriótica – a political party launched by the FARC in 1985 but which remained in politics after
the FARC’s withdrawal from the party in 1987.
Six Recommendations: balancing challenges and building a safe road to peace
Reaching a peace agreement with the FARC is an essential prerequisite to dealing with the larger problems
at hand in Colombia such as problems of poverty, inequality, corrupt politics, and problems of inefficient
government machinery. These problems are likely to continue holding the country back, both domestically
and internationally, from being able to achieve its full potential in the period ahead. The following
recommendations aim to help prevent a meaningful peace agreement with the FARC from falling short at
the implementation stage. If taken seriously, they could free up time and resources to allow the Colombian
government to focus on reducing other more pressing sources of violence and insecurity.
3
1) The Santos government will need to ensure that efforts to reach a political settlement with the
FARC are complemented by a more integrated approach to combating the BACRIMs. The focus of
such an approach will need to be placed on dismantling criminal networks, improving the rights of
victims and building up military pressure for BACRIMs to surrender. A good place to start would be
to ensure that law enforcement agencies have the necessary resources and incentives to investigate
and prosecute the full spectrum of crimes committed by the BACRIMs and their links with some
state enforcement agents. Such a capacity building exercise should start in the areas of the country
most severely affected. A more integrated approach towards the BACRIMs might also involve a reevaluation of the way in which the government classifies these groups in relation to Colombia’s
internal conflict. Such a re-evaluation would help unveil the connections between both illegal and
legal actors at regional and national levels, rather than continuing to deny that such connections
exist, through the current focus on publicising the opportunistic alliances between illegal actors
(FARC included). Thus the government may be able to ensure that there is clearer recognition of the
gravity of the human rights abuses committed by these groups (including forced displacements and
mass killings), and that their victims are granted access to mechanisms of justice.
2) To ensure that the peace process is met with sufficient public acceptance, it will be necessary to
ensure meaningful civil society participation, particularly among Colombia’s conflict-afflicted rural
and indigenous communities. Public debates and consultations will be important as well as allowing
citizens to submit suggestions on topics such as agricultural reform to the negotiation table and
other initiatives focusing more specifically on the challenges associated with implementing peace.
This will also need to include discussions with victims and their representatives on what they
consider to be appropriate transitional justice mechanisms. A more comprehensive approach would
also require strengthening the Movement for Peace in Colombia, whereby different sectors are
integrated into a solid platform for peace. The peace process is not best served by a passive
citizenry and, as such, a more clearly defined role for civil society needs to be created where civil
society groups are recognised, given space and acknowledged. This will be particularly important
both before and during the post-agreement implementation stage of the process, when structured
discussions and debate about what the future of the country ought to look like, will be necessary to
allow disagreements to be brought to the fore, and in doing so help avoid a return to the Colombia
of the past.
3) A meaningful peace process will depend upon the government’s ability to strengthen the current
process of institutional reform, thereby creating the necessary conditions for peace to flourish.
While Santos has already begun to address rural development and the rights of victims, a significant
amount remains to be done; particularly in relation to land reform and ensuring that current efforts
are as inclusive and far-reaching as possible. International monitoring and verification of the
effective implementation of the Victims and Land Restitution Law and the eventual ceasefire could
be of particular benefit to this process.
4) The adoption of an appropriate mechanism for transitional justice, including prosecutions and
reparations would be integral to any meaningful peace agreement. Such mechanism could offer
conditional amnesties depending on the type of the offences and subject to contributing to the
reparation of the victims. Failure by perpetrators to comply would then result in prosecution,
imprisonment and the maximum extent of the law. In this way, both the domestic and international
demand for prosecutions would be satisfied, but no prison time would be given unless individuals
fail to comply with the terms agreed. The adoption of such a mechanism for transitional justice
should not be a blank cheque for impunity in Colombia. Accountability measures aimed at any
military personnel who have committed human rights violations would also need strengthening in
4
order to ensure that justice policies adopted are fair, equitable and aim towards accountability for
all.
5) Building upon current efforts, the Santos government will have to continue drawing on lessons from
the past to ensure that history does not repeat itself. One of the most important areas in this regard
will be its ability to safeguard political guarantees for guerrillas who are willing to disarm and to
recognise them as legitimate political actors. One way to avoid a repeat of previous experiences
could involve the creation of a specialised protection unit that comprises members of the armed
forces, the police, members of the intelligence services, and former FARC combatants to ensure that
the violence that targeted the Unión Patriótica, and other sectors associated with the peace process
and FARC in the 1980s, is not replicated should a peace agreement be reached.
6) To avoid disappointment and a potential backlash, should talks fail to reach an agreement before
November 2013, Santos will need to keep the expectations of the electorate in check throughout
the remainder of the negotiations. This could be achieved through the design of a more effective
communication strategy centred around disseminating public information in a manner that helps
manage high expectations and enables negotiating teams to deliver concise, frank and transparent
public statements regarding the progress being made. This will help to mitigate attempts to derail
the peace process by hard liners within Colombia who view the decision to negotiate with the FARC
as a sign of weakness on the part of the Santos government.
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About the Authors
Matt Ince ([email protected]) is Project Manager for International Studies at the Royal United Services Institute
for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), specialising in foreign, defence and security policy in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Prior to joining RUSI Matt previously worked for a British Member of Parliament and had
held a number of positions at the University of Sussex. He holds an MA in Geopolitics and Grand Strategy
and a BA (Hons) in International Relations.
Andrei Gomez-Suarez ([email protected]/@AndGomezSuarez) is Associate Researcher at the
University of Sussex and member of the Sussex Centre for Security Research (SCSR). He is Senior Consultant
on Conflict and Development for Signum Consulting (Colombia), with whom he recently finished a
consultancy on Huila and Caquetá. Andrei is Researcher at the Centre for Historical Memory, of the
Department for Social Prosperity of the Colombian Government. His current research focuses on the
genocide of the Unión Patriótica, UP Refugees in Europe, peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction.
Andrei teaches a MA module on Peace Processes and Post-Conflict Reconstruction at Sussex. He has been
lecturer in Politics, International Relations and International Security at the University of Cauca, Externado
University, and the University of Sussex. Andrei studied International Relations (DPhil) and Contemporary
War and Peace Studies (MA) at the University of Sussex and Conflict Resolution (GD) and Political Science
(BS) at the University of Los Andes.
About RUSI
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (www.rusi.org) is an independent think tank engaged in cutting
edge defence and security research. A unique institution, founded in 1831 by the Duke of Wellington, RUSI
embodies nearly two centuries of forward thinking, free discussion and careful reflection on defence and
security matters. Its expertise have been utilised by governments, parliament and other key stakeholders.
RUSI is a British institution, but operates with an international perspective. Satellite offices in Doha,
Tokyo and Washington DC reinforce its global reach.
About SCSR
The Sussex Centre for Conflict and Security Research (SCSR) (www.sussex.ac.uk/scsr) is an interdisciplinary
research centre of the University of Sussex dedicated to supporting research, and informing public and policy
debate, on issues of conflict and security. Its ambition is to advance understanding of, and to challenge
established orthodoxies on, conflict and security, through rigorous and theoretically reflective scholarship
and engagement.
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Annex 1: Workshop Programme
Ending Colombia’s Internal Conflict: Prospects for Peace with the FARC and Beyond
28 January 2013, RUSI, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET, UK
1300-1330 Welcome Tea/Coffee
1330-1345 Opening Remarks
Chair:
Dr Jonathan Eyal, Senior Research Fellow and Director of International Security Studies, RUSI
Speaker:
John Dew, Former British Ambassador to Colombia (2008-2012)
1345-1515 Session One: Colombia’s Peace Process in Context
Chair:
Dr Par Engstrom, Lecturer in Human Rights of the Americas, UCL Institute of the Americas
Speakers:
James Lockhart-Smith, Principal Analyst / Head of Latin America, Maplecroft
Carlos Caicedo, Director of Latin American Forecasting, Exclusive Analysis
Professor Leigh Payne, Professor of Sociology of Latin America and Director of the Latin
American Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford
Dr Andrei Gomez-Suarez, Associate Researcher, University of Sussex
1515-1600 Afternoon Tea/Coffee Break
1600-1730 Session Two: A View to the Future – Prospects for Peace with the FARC and Beyond
Chair:
Matt Ince, Project Manager, International Studies, RUSI
Speakers:
Professor Jenny Pearce, Professor of Latin American Politics, Director of International Centre for
Participation Studies, University of Bradford
Grace Livingstone, Journalist and Author of 'Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War'
Grant Hurst, Political Risk Analyst, Americas, IHS Global Insight
Tobias Bock, Project Officer, International Defence and Security Programme, Transparency
International UK
1745
Workshop Ends
7