Swedish Security
Policy in the Light
of International
Change
The concluding chapter
of a review by the Swedish
Defence Commission
Ministry of Defence, Sweden
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Preface
This booklet contains an unofficial translation of the concluding chapter of the report “Svensk
säkerhetspolitik i ny omvärldsbelysning” (Ds 1998:9) presented to the Minister of Defence by the
Swedish Defence Commission on 20 February 1998.
The Swedish Defence Commission is a forum for consultations between representatives of the
Government and representatives of the political parties in Parliament concerning the long range
development of Swedish defence and security policy.
The Commission is composed as follows:
Chairman:
Ambassador Lars Danielsson, FSP adviser to the Prime Minister
Members of the Commission:
Ms Britt Bohlin, Member of Parliament (Social Democratic Party)
Mr Henrik Landerholm, Member of Parliament (Moderate Party)
Mr Anders Svärd, Member of Parliament (Centre Party)
Mr Lennart Rohdin, Member of Parliament (Liberal Party)
Mr Jan Jennehag, Member of Parliament (Left Party)
Mr Håkan Juholt, Member of Parliament (Social Democratic Party)
Ms Annika Nordgren, Member of Parliament (Green Party)
Secretariat:
Dr Göran Franzén, Head of Secretariat
Mr Ulf Birath, Secretary
Ms Katarina Engberg, Expert
Mr Eino Örnfeldt, Secretary
On some specific issues MPs Landerholm, Rohdin, Jennehag and Nordgren have stated
dissentient views.
Ms Pat Revill assisted with the translation.
The full original report in Swedish can be obtained from the Information Office of the Swedish Ministry of Defence, SE-103 33 Stockholm, Sweden. The text is also available on the Internet;
http://www.sb.gov.se/info_rosenbad/departement/forsvar/forsvar_pressm_info.html
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Swedish Security Policy in the Light
of International Change
A Review by the Swedish Defence Commission
The following is a summary of the Defence Commission’s view of the security policy implications
for Europe of international developments since Sweden’s most recent defence programme was
prepared in 1995 and 1996. The report concludes with a number of questions the developments
raise for Sweden.
Global responsibility a continued necessity
European and Swedish security are closely linked to global developments. The increasing scale of
international cooperation also means greater interdependence. This is particularly the case in the
economic and long-term environmental fields. But local disagreements and conflicts can also have
direct and indirect effects reaching far beyond the actual geographical region.
The warring parties, which can be groups of countries, individual groups or non-governmental
organizations and popular movements, may wish to influence other countries, for example by
disrupting the supply of essential goods and committing acts of sabotage, terrorism and blackmail.
The increasingly sophisticated global communications, the complexity of modern societies, and the
development of new types of weapons and other instruments of influence make it possible for even
a small group to have a great effect over large areas and distances. There is also the risk of unintended
effects on other countries through major radioactive leaks or the interrupted supply of essential
goods as a result of inadequate supervision, fighting or chaotic conditions in a local region. The
extensive movements of people fleeing from war, persecution, starvation and deprivation can also
create enormous humanitarian problems that can only be dealt with through broad international
cooperation.
At the same time, there is a tendency that was already apparent before the last defence
programme, that regional conflicts will continue to be basically regional, and not, as during the
cold war, escalate into conflicts between the major powers. However, this also involves the risk of a
lowering of the threshold at which regional disagreements escalate into armed conflicts. The major
powers are now more likely than before to seek joint solutions to the threats to themselves and to
global stability that local conflicts and high-handed rulers and leaders can present. In particular,
the growing danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of their
falling into the hands of fanatics and ruthless leaders and groups, provide an important incentive
for joint action by the major powers and the global community.
Those instances where the proliferation of such weapons has taken place or is feared to have
taken place can no longer be regarded as solely local or regional threats. If weapons of mass destruction are used, the results will be critical for the security of the entire world. A highly serious
threat to the security of all nations is therefore posed by the states of North Africa, the Middle
East and East Asia striving to acquire non-conventional weapons of war and, in several cases,
succeeding. Focus has recently been on the efforts of Iraq in particular to develop nuclear weapons
and biological and chemical weapons and weapons carriers.
The UN has a global responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
but is often unable to mobilize sufficient agreement and political will among its members to take
action. The United States is the only member of the UN capable of intervening in conflicts anywhere
in the world, but, like other countries, will mainly do so when its own interests are threatened. If
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the world community shields itself from the problem-ridden, poor regions, there is a risk that, in
the long term, the result will be large and widening gaps in both prosperity and security between
different countries and regions. It is particularly important that the world community can act in
such a way that weapons of mass destruction remain under responsible control. However, there is
a tangible risk that conflicting interests will make this impossible.
The developments of recent years have had both positive and negative implications for global
security. It is positive that the reform of the UN is under way, as this should improve its ability to
act effectively, even though this will be limited by the degree of willingness of members, and
particularly the major powers, to participate. Bilateral relations between the major countries of
the world tend to focus more on trade and economic cooperation, which ought also to have a
stabilizing effect on security. Negative developments include the difficulties encountered by the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process in achieving a successful outcome, the continuing tensions in the
Caucasus, North Africa and the whole of the Middle East, and the bloody conflicts in Africa,
which it seems could continue for a long time before the international community brings itself to
intervene. The situation in North Korea and the unsolved conflicts between China and Taiwan, and
between India and Pakistan, also give cause for concern, as do the situation in the Balkan peninsula
and the situation in the eastern Mediterranean..
The importance for security policy of developments in world trade should also be noted. Of
crucial significance for prosperity and living conditions is, for most countries, economic development
which, as a result of increasing globalization, is increasingly dependent on international trade and
industrial cooperation. This is illustrated by the fact that the severe economic crises in Southeast
and East Asia since the summer of 1997 have had considerable economic and political repercussions
around the world. Mutual dependence creates a common global interest in stability and security
reaching far beyond the purely economic sphere. In parallel to this, both individual countries and
groups of countries develop systems for tempering the effects of extraordinary events and
disturbances in global trade, something that has been illustrated by the latest economic crises in
southern and eastern Asia.
Increasing internationalization makes trading conditions - from favouring particular countries
to boycotting others - a means of exerting pressure in international relations. At the same time,
intensified economic cooperation creates incentives for maintaining stability and understanding in
international relations in general. For example, the incorporation of China, Russia and Ukraine into
the WTO - with the set of rules the organization applies - strengthens security and stability in
these countries and in their relations with the rest of the world.
Sweden sees it as particularly important that the UN is vigorously reformed, thereby creating
the conditions for an improvement in the UN’s financial situation and enabling the organization to
work more effectively to prevent conflicts and carry out peace-keeping operations. How far it is
possible to go will depend not least on the extent to which the permanent members of the Security
Council are willing to regard the UN as the appropriate means for protecting their interests.
It is evident that the UN does not at present have the capacity to lead peace-enforcement
operations as set out in chapter VII of the UN Charter. Instead it provides the opportunity,
recommended by the Secretary General, to form ad hoc coalitions, “coalitions of the willing”, as a
means of dealing with that type of conflict situation. This requires a mandate from the UN and
that a sufficient number of nations are really prepared to assume broad responsibility for security.
It also requires an organization, such as NATO in Bosnia, or a state, such as Italy in Albania, that
can lead the operations. In order to achieve a lasting peace in Europe it is necessary that the
European nations are prepared not only to take responsibility for their own continent, but also to
help increase stability and security in the many trouble spots close to Europe.
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The European security system
It is good that the European security system is increasingly treaty-bound, thus making clear the
power relationships and creating institutionalized forms of cooperation on security issues. This in
turn contributes to greater transparency and trust, and facilitates negotiations on problem-solving, since the political costs of unacceptable action are greater. It also enables more rapid and
effective response to crises. The evolving democracy in the former communist one-party states in
Europe, combined with the emerging body of legislation governing international relations, makes
Europe easier to predict than previously. There is less risk of conflicting interests escalating into
open conflict and war.
While there is reason to welcome the steps taken in the past year towards making security
issues increasingly treaty-bound, it should also be noted that there are many more steps still to be
taken before all the countries of Europe have been able to achieve the security solutions they
themselves are striving for. There are still many conflicting interests and much mistrust between
countries and populations which give cause for concern and involve the risk of local and regional
conflicts, particularly in the east and south-east.
It is of overriding importance that the European security system is based on the principles set
out in the UN Charter and that any intervention or sanctions directed at any party is legitimized
through a decision of the UN or the OSCE. The OSCE has its special competence as the most
comprehensive cooperation body in Europe and as the organization that together with the Council
of Europe constitutes a forum for establishing norms and principles for democracy, respect for
human rights and the rule of law. It is important that both the OSCE and the Council of Europe
put considerable effort into monitoring the observance of agreed norms and principles.
The OSCE has concentrated its operational activities on conflict prevention, political crisis
management and reconstruction. This has been most important for hastening the democratic process and strengthening the human rights situation in the new democracies that have emerged since
the end of state communism. The OSCE plays a particularly important role in the countries that
have still not fully developed their democratic systems.
The EU and NATO both have essential tasks to perform in the European security cooperation.
The operations in Bosnia have functioned as a catalyst for the development of the European - or
rather, Euro-Atlantic - security system. The experience of Bosnia has hastened NATO reform at the
same time as it has underlined the importance of coordinating civil and military action. The
implementation of the Dayton agreement has more clearly defined the roles the different organizations
can and should play. Developments in Bosnia have underlined the need for the EU to behave as a
united and strong actor but have also made clear the EU’s current limitations. It has demonstrated
the necessity of NATO’s crisis management capability for European security and the need for an
American presence.
One question that should be asked is the extent to which general conclusions can and should
be drawn from the Bosnian experience. Will it be possible to handle future acute European crises
without NATO or the United States, and will Russia be willing to cooperate with NATO? The
Commission believes it is most likely that NATO will continue to play a central role throughout
Europe, that the United States will continue its commitment to European security, and that Russia
will continue its coooperation with NATO and the West. But the United States will also demand
European involvement. And relations between Russia and NATO will probably also in the future
contain serious elements of friction and be dependent on developments in the reform process in
Russia.
It is important that the European states really are prepared, as in Bosnia, to assume their share
of responsibility for building up security and crisis management capacity both in Europe and in a
broader context. In the ongoing process of change, the different states are naturally striving to
protect their own interests, which can give rise to differences of opinion and even changes of
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position that have an inhibiting effect on the development of a stable security system for Europe as
a whole. It would be a pity if the European states thereby appeared to be almost incapable of
carrying out crisis management operations on their own. European crisis management capability
must be strengthened if we are not to continue to be largely dependent on a far from guaranteed
American willingness to intervene politically and militarily.
There continues to be uncertainty about the future development of security structures and
crisis management - with regard to both the rate of development and its nature - partly because
when new conflicts flare up they often force ad hoc solutions. The forms of crisis management
need to be developed and made flexible so that they can be adapted to the situation. When it
comes to larger operations in Europe, it will continue to be necessary for some time to come to rely
on the support of NATO resources. It is important that the forms are developed as intended so that
this can be done without all the member states and the United States in particular having to
contribute their own units. It should be possible to carry out smaller operations entirely with
European resources. Therefore, importance should be placed on the development of the EU’s capability to manage crises with the aid of the Western European Union.
It would also be unfortunate if crisis management were to be impeded by the inability to
make decisions, or by the failure to make them in time before a conflict has escalated too far.
Sufficiently forceful and rapid decisions are today difficult to achieve so long as the multinational
decision-making process and one or more of the national decision-making processes must be involved
before common action can be agreed. The future development of the Euro-Atlantic security system
should therefore pay attention to the crisis management decision-making process.
The many difficulties in the way of carrying out international operations mean that we should
be prepared for the fact that it can in some instances be impossible to achieve the necessary
consensus for the operations, either under NATO or the WEU, and that it can therefore be necessary
to act through more ad hoc coalitions in order to deal with the crises that arise. A basic requirement
is that international intervention is carried out under the mandate of the UN and/or the OSCE.
But the action itself may sometimes need to be restricted to a smaller group of states that are
willing to commit themselves in the specific situation.
It is still too early to evaluate the long-term stability of developments in Russia. Nevertheless,
much that has happened since 1996 has been positive. The administration is continuing to pursue
a reform policy, there is still freedom of the press, the GDP is no longer falling and western investment
is increasing. Foreign policy is still directed towards cooperation with the West, if not towards
agreement on all issues.
Nevertheless, there are still several weaknesses in Russian society. The party political and
judicial systems still provide the opportunity for strong individuals and groups to act high-handedly.
Different groups in the financial sector and industry can strongly influence social development to
better their own interests. A continued tug-of-war can be foreseen between nationalistic and western-oriented interests. Rapid changes are taking place between the individuals and groups that
currently have power and influence. Russian society is characterized today by a relatively large
number of actors with partially conflicting interests. The presidential election in the year 2000
can mean great changes to the direction of Russian politics. Corruption and crime are widespread
and affect many areas of society. Environmental and health problems are serious obstacles to increased
prosperity.
It is impossible to foresee the direction developments might go in from today’s mix of reforms
and openness coupled with autocratic attitudes, enormous social problems and new opportunities
for the enterprising and strong. Despite the positive aspects of recent developments, we must be
prepared for the fact that it will take a long time before we are able to draw any certain conclusions
about Russia.
Russia’s military capability has been further eroded in recent years. Relative priority is still
being given to the strategic forces and their nuclear weapons. As a result of inadequate training,
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exercises and maintenance, and an almost total lack of investment over many years, conventional
military capability is scarcely a powerful factor other than in Russia’s immediate vicinity. Even if a
reform of the military is carried out, considerable time will still be needed before an extensive and
powerful military operation can be carried out. There are Russian plans to up-date defence materials
and modernize the military defence system beginning in the year 2005 and continuing for several
decades. The surprisingly large arms export trade has meant that the competence of the defence
industry, particularly the air industry, has to a certain extent been maintained, but it is uncertain
how long this will suffice as a basis for the long-term renewal of Russia’s own defence resources.
It is of great importance to the stability and security of Russia, Europe and the world as a
whole that Russia’s political and economic reform processes are allowed to continue. Democracy
and the rule of law in Russia must continue to develop, and Russia must increasingly be included in
the euro-Atlantic security cooperation. In view of the continued risk that this positive process of
change in Russia could break down, it is of particular importance that it receives the strong support of other countries, even if the opportunity for those other countries to influence events is in
many cases limited.
The EU is of fundamental importance for ensuring lasting stability and security in Europe.
The impending enlargement of the EU and increased economic cooperation with its neighbours
will also have an important effect on security. European cooperation makes it possible for common
values and norms to be spread and applied through the broad network of relations and mutual
dependence that is emerging and which affects the daily life of every individual. It is a process
which will take time and which can encounter difficulties when different special interests are felt
to have been inadequately met. But it is also a cooperation between democracies that can gradually
resolve conflicts and conflicts of interest, and increase internal solidarity and mutual dependence.
Although it cannot be given military guarantees through the EU, a EU member state can still count
on considerable support by other means if it should be threatened from outside. To that end, the
common foreign and security policies aim to prevent conflicts and to take early action to deal with
crises.
The enlargement process itself has a significant effect on security policy. EU demands include
institutional stability that guarantees democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
the protection of minority groups. This has already had considerable positive effects in the candidate
countries. Despite the fact that not all the candidates can become members at the same time, it is
important that the enlargement process continues, thus ensuring that, step by step, the membership
criteria are satisfied.
The imminent enlargement of NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will
satisfy these countries’ aspirations. Enlargement should provide the basis for greater security in
Central Europe. Russia has opposed the imminent enlargement and opposes further enlargement.
Russia also uses other ways of limiting the military consequences of NATO enlargement. As a
result of the agreements signed between Russia and NATO, and the cooperation and restraint
shown by NATO with respect to the grouping of military resources, the disadvantages for Russia
have been kept to a minimum.
It should also be in Russia’s interest to contribute to European security solutions that both
minimize the need for Russian armament and facilitate a form of cooperation with the West that
enhances its own reform work. It must be an advantage to be able to limit its own military capability to what is required to cope with today’s more modest threats to Russian security. A Europe
that concentrates on structuring its military resources for crisis management and which, together
with the United States and Canada, directs NATO, the dominant defence organization, increasingly
towards broad security cooperation involving the whole of Europe, should be in line with Russian
national interests.
It is greatly to be hoped that NATO and Russia use the newly-formed Permanent Joint Council
(PJC) for continuous talks on joint security issues. In this way, the foundation is laid for mutual
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consideration and long-term joint operations to increase European security.
At the same time, it is essential that the joint security structure is not seen as of importance
only to NATO countries and Russia. Cooperation with the wider circle of non-NATO members in
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is equally important. All the countries that participate
in the security cooperation and international crisis management activities must be able to discuss
and influence the direction of the joint work. The EAPC will be an important forum for NATO and
countries outside NATO for gathering information and advice. Active participation in the EAPC,
including Russian, is crucial if the new security system is to be effective, but also in order to
create the understanding and trust between all the countries of Europe that is an essential basis
for lasting security.
One area where broad-based cooperation is particularly appropriate is the treatment of serious
peacetime emergencies. The risk of peacetime emergencies and dangers of different kinds caused
by nature or human agency exist in every country and are often difficult to deal with. At the same
time, there is mistrust between former enemies which can sometimes impede military cooperation.
Civil Emergency Planning has also been brought to the fore within the framework of the more
concrete work recently initiated within the EAPC following a Russian proposal which received
considerable support from the partner countries. In this way, the cooperation can both raise the
level of civil emergency planning and help increase openness and trust in other areas of the EuroAtlantic security cooperation. Furthermore, civil emergency planning is one area in which Sweden
- as a result of our broad view of security and our long tradition of thinking in terms of total
defence - is particularly well placed to make a constructive contribution.
It is of considerable importance to the future European security system that it is given concrete
expression in the defence sector. It is particularly important to adapt the old CFE Treaty on
conventional forces in Europe - originally signed between NATO members and Warsaw pact countries
- to today’s security situation. It is essential that the ongoing CFE negotiations lead to the modernized
treaty-bound regulation of the parties’ military resources. It is equally essential to up-date the
confidence and security-building measures adopted in the Vienna Document.
Future agreements on conventional weapons control and confidence-building measures will
provide the framework for the basic European military realities concerning conventional weapons.
These agreements must take into consideration the special situations of the parties involved and
their right to have a military capability as a basis for their own security - albeit at ever lower levels.
They should also contain restrictions and regulations governing behaviour, and be characterized by
such openness that, as far as possible, no country need feel threatened or subject to political
pressure from any other country.
In assessing the military significance of arms control, developments in military technology
and operational capabilities must be taken into account. Existing agreements are based on conditions
in the 1980s, when large-scale operations in Central Europe represented a major part of the threat
perception. The trend towards increasing emphasis on quality rather than quantity, flexibility,
information warfare, etc, makes it likely that today’s agreements become increasingly irrelevant.
The security situation today is also increasingly multi-faceted. Countries such as Germany and
France experience little or no real military threats, but for small countries such as the Baltic states
the situation is different.
In the field of defence, Europe must build up an effective crisis management capability. The
reformed NATO, with its different types of cooperation with partner states in the strengthened
PfP, is of crucial importance in this area. It is essential that all countries participate actively in the
PfP and other crisis management activities, even if their forms and scope need to be individually
adapted. Large-scale Russian participation in such cooperation would reduce the mistrust that has
survived the cold war in many places both in Russia and the West.
Principles for planning and commanding peace support operations are being drawn up within
the framework of the intensified PfP cooperation. It is important that countries participating in
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peace-support operations are given a better opportunity to enter at an early stage and influence
planning and command. It is gratifying that this is now happening as a result of the partner countries
increasingly being allowed to contribute personnel to relevant commands and units. It is also valuable
that measures to speed up the planning - by taking stock of available forces and resources - are
being carried out in the UN, NATO/PfP and the WEU.
It is also of great importance that forms and resources for international crisis management are
constantly under development, for example through the CJTF. Many countries increasingly place
emphasis on the ability to deploy national rapid reaction forces for several types of operations, or
to set up new forces for international operations. Countries are increasingly cooperating on the
establishment of joint forces. The ability to deploy forces rapidly is being given greater attention.
SHIRBRIG is one example of such a force. Some resources, such as medical units, command units
and other vital functions are, however, still in scarce supply internationally, especially for long-term
operations. The experience of Bosnia has also illustrated the difficulties encountered in civilian
and military cooperation and in achieving consensus on action against evils in civilian society.
For most of the countries of Europe, the risk of an armed attack is at present extremely low.
National defence forces still provide a means of safeguarding a nation’s long-term existence, while
their more immediate security policy relevance lies within other areas. An increasingly important
role for national defence is the ability to contribute reaction forces to international crisis management. It is important, however, to acknowledge the perhaps less clearly-stated role assigned to the
military capability of providing the flexibility for the country to be able to influence the change
process that the European security system is undergoing, and perhaps in some countries also to
function as an instrument of political pressure.
Many countries, while not experiencing an actual threat of attack, want, with the help of the
reassurance provided by a defence capability of their own, or through membership of military
alliances, to reduce the risk of exposure to political pressure, and increase their own self-reliance
and political ability to act in a crisis situation. In this context, the need also becomes clear of being
able to resist threats and pressure exerted by other than conventional military means. This can
include economic pressure, large-scale organized crime, destabilizing activities, sabotage, manipulation of the supply of information, or blackmail based on the threat of reprisals. The proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction raise a frightening prospect of the technical possibilities in this
area.
It is essential that the pan-European security architecture that is emerging focuses on the
threats and risks that seem to be most likely and relevant in the present situation. This means that
we in Europe must, in the next few years, create a system for dealing with two types of threats and
risks in particular: firstly, regional and local conflicts and crises; and, secondly, political pressure
and influence by nations, groups or organizations using other means than conventional military
attack.
For the first type of threat, crisis management in the broad sense that was discussed previously
is an important component of the security architecture. By preventing local and regional conflicts
through international cooperation, by intervening in them if they still occur, and by working for
reconstruction after a conflict has ended, security throughout Europe can be strengthened.
For the second type of threat, broad cooperation is also needed to prevent any one actor from
taking the law into its own hands in order to satisfy its own interests at the expense of the security
of others. No nation or group of people should need to be exposed to threat, pressure, danger or
injury through the high-handed action of another. It should be noted that the actors behind many
types of non-primary military threat and pressure can be other than states, and that influence can
be exerted over large distances. Shared norms and values, a well-functioning judicial system, broad
cooperation in all sectors of society and a strong joint crisis management capability provide an
important basis for creating robustness and greater security against the complex threats faced in
Europe today.
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Today’s complex societies, with their advanced infrastructures, large number of technical
systems and interdependence, and highly-developed communications systems and broad flow of
information across all national borders, create the preconditions for greater prosperity. But these
societies also provide the opportunity for those who wish to cause great damage with relatively
small means, to conduct large-scale organized crime and, through threat and influence via the mass
media, exert pressure and blackmail. The joint work for security in Europe must pay attention to
the threats that this entails and early seek to intervene firmly against any threats that arise. The
international community must act decisively against anyone who does not respect the international
norms of international behaviour or who fails to respect human rights.
The EU and the OSCE are important platforms for cooperation on “soft” security issues. But
there cooperation should also be carried out within many other bodies and in many different ways,
such as research, norms for avoiding unnecessary vulnerability in technical systems, exercises in
preparation for joint operations to deal with security-threatening crises. An important securityenhancing measure is cooperation with the many new democracies in Eastern Europe to develop
democratic functions, the judicial system, and fiscal and other social systems so that it is of benefit
to all to seek to safeguard their interests within the framework of the democratic process and the
prevailing social order. It would be a great threat to stability and security in the whole of Europe if
any of the new democracies was unable to maintain domestic security, causing their transition to
fail.
An important issue in shaping the defence of each of the countries in Europe is how to ensure
the supply of defence matériel. At present a rapid structural change in the forms of development
and production of defence matériel is under way among the world’s more important producers.
There is stiff competition between manufacturers and even countries wanting to safeguard their
national interests. Small manufacturers have difficulty asserting themselves on the market, and in
many areas the defence systems is so complex and expensive to develop that ultimately only large
manufacturers remain. Especially in the field of information technology, reliance is on a few dominating civilian enterprises. A deep technological rift is developing between Europe and the United
States.
There is a risk that these defence industry developments can lead to one-sided dependency
and opportunities for exerting pressure that can develop into powerful security policy instruments.
It is important that attention is paid within the framework for the European security cooperation
to the question of the supply of defence matériel, so that the freedom to act can be upheld, matériel
supply can be effective and access to technology safeguarded in important areas. A robust European defence industry creates the conditions for cooperation with the United States on more equal
terms for both parties.Transatlantic cooperation remains necessary in some areas. Strong political
and commercial decisiveness is called for to counteract the restraining forces that have their origin
in national, regional and employment-related special interests. Well functioning cooperation requires,
that domestic competence can be maintained within selected areas of technology. This is also
necessary in some cases for security reasons.
Sweden’s immediate vicinity
There is increasing interest in security policy cooperation between the Nordic countries. This
cooperation is based on the free choices that the Nordic countries have been able to make since the
end of the cold war. A clear manifestation of this is the fact that in the summer of 1997 the Nordic
Council arranged its first conference on security policy, a subject that, because of the countries’
different security policies, had previously been avoided. Another expression is the report on security
and defence policy which the Finnish Government presented to Parliament in the spring of 1997,
and which pointed out the similarities between Sweden’s and Finland’s evaluations of security and
stability developments, and the basis this creates for the expansion of Nordic cooperation. The
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long-standing Nordic peace support cooperation has also developed further, inter alia through joint
activities within the framework of the PfP. Further efforts are being made to bring about expanded
Nordic cooperation on defence matériel.
It is the Commission’s view that intensified Nordic cooperation is of considerable importance
if Nordic and northern European issues are to be included, and their interests safeguarded, within
the framework of the ongoing process of developing the security architecture of the whole of Europe. Furthermore, coordinated and joint operations can make our contribution to the international security cooperation both more effective and more meaningful. It is particularly valuable that
the Nordic countries work together within the security-enhancing cooperation with the Baltic
states and with Poland and Russia.
It is essential that the cooperation in the Barents region continues to develop. This must be
looked at in a long-term perspective. The concrete cooperation that recently evolved concerning
the management of nuclear waste, infrastructure, and the increase in cross-border contacts in
general, represent important steps along the way. Intensified practical cooperation in the region is
crucial for the improvement of living conditions and increased mutual understanding and trust.
Cooperation aimed at reducing the threats to the environment are particularly important. The
enormous problems in the Kola peninsula in particular call for extensive measures over a long
period if they are to be resolved. The Kola region is still an important base for Russia’s strategic
submarines.
In the Baltic region the structure of the European security system still does not satisfy the
requirements of all the parties. For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in particular, uncertainty over the
security solutions they can attain, and Russia’s strong objections to their joining NATO, are serious
problems. In view of this, EU membership for the Baltic states, which should also be of benefit to
Russia, is particularly important. The decision of the European Council in December 1997 on the
accession and negotiation processes has made clear that membership is dependent on the candidate
countries’ own merits and not on geography, history or access to security guarantees.
Greater cooperation with NATO and the major western countries on security issues is an
important next step for the Baltic states in the building of a long-term security solution. The broad
practical cooperation in the Baltic region and the Nordic countries’ cooperation on security with
the Baltic states of Eastern Europe in particular, provide an important contribution to security in
the region.
Of long-term significance for the security situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is their
relationship with Russia. There is a lack of trust in the three countries concerning Russia’s longterm ambitions in their region as a consequence of their historical experiences and current
nationalistic currents in Russia. The Baltic states have received with scepticism the proposal put
forward by Russia in the autumn of 1997 for a comprehensive security arrangement for the Baltic
region. They have, with some justification, interpreted the suggestion as being directed at their
ambitions to safeguard their own security by joining NATO.
The Commission holds the view that a basic starting-point must be the principle that has been
accepted by all OSCE members, that each country has the right to choose the direction its own
security policy will take. At the same time, it is the responsibility of all countries to consider
Europe as a whole and not seek to safeguard their own security at the expense of others. These
principles - the right to choose policy direction and the responsibility to consider Europe as a
whole - stand separately. Each country has the responsibility of making its own evaluation. One
principle can never cancel out another.
A positive feature of Russian-Baltic relations is the recent signing of a border treaty between
Russia and Lithuania. It would have a considerable confidence-building effect if Russia also signed
the negotiated border treaties with Estonia and Latvia.
There is no need for separate regional solutions in the Baltic Sea region. Instead, security
there must be part of a pan-European and transatlantic security system. Nevertheless, regional
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cooperation should continue to be developed at all levels. In this context, it is important to bear in
mind the Russian proposal for confidence-building measures in the non-military sphere. There is
also every reason to deal with the question of military confidence-building measures in a regional
format within the framework of the review of the Vienna Document that has just begun. It should
also be possible to use a regional format on a case-to-case basis within the EAPC, on condition that
such a format is open to all EAPC countries and that countries with an interest in security in the
Baltic Sea region participate in the work. The emphasis should be on a discussion of concrete
cooperation with a regional dimension, particularly PfP-related issues. However, the
institutionalization of the regional format should be avoided. It should be possible to develop bilateral military contacts between Sweden and Russia.
In the Baltic Sea region there is considerable potential for broader cooperation and the rapid
development of the economic and social sectors. The strong commitment of the countries concerned
and of the EU to development in the region was expressed through the Visby summit in 1996 and
again through the Riga summit in January 1998. The broadened economic and social cooperation
creates greater mutual dependence on good relations between neighbour countries in order for
prosperity to continue to increase, and is therefore of considerable significance for security policy.
The cooperation also directly benefits security issues in the broadest sense, for example by reducing
environmental risks and combating organized international crime.
If the Baltic states are to be able to, and to dare to, participate fully and effectively in the
economic cooperation in the region, it is essential that they feel that their sovereignty is secure. For
this reason, support by Sweden and many other countries to the development in the Baltic states of
an independent state’s normal security functions is of the utmost importance. A network of international relationships must be built up, a well-functioning judicial system created, efficient border
controls established, etc. In the military sphere it is important to continue to develop a national
defence under democratic control, capable of using its own resources to assert its integrity. It must
also be possible for the Baltic states to contribute to international crisis management within the
framework of the new European security arrangements that are emerging.
It is essential that Russia can develop broad cooperation with the West and that this is also
expressed in regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. In order for the Russian political and
economic reform processes to continue, it is crucial that the Russian people experience for
themselves western social systems and their democratic forms: the judicial and social systems and
the market economy. It is important that many experience the advantages of increased cooperation
with the West and of continuing the reform process. This requires both Russian and western
commitment if it is to come about.
St Petersburg is the obvious centre for Russia’s cooperation with the West in the Baltic Sea
region. But it is important that the former Soviet military bases in Kaliningrad and Murmansk that
were once completely closed to the outside world are included in the regional cooperation. Their
geographical location makes them ideally placed for extensive economic and social cooperation
with many countries in northern Europe. It is important that there is more reciprocal exchange in
the military sphere, through, inter alia, study visits, and cooperation on training and exercises for
peace-keeping activities.
The involvement and cooperation of the United States in different ways with all the countries
of northern Europe help incorporate and consolidate the Nordic region in the Euro-Atlantic security
cooperation. It is essential that American commitment and the consolidation process continue.
Questions of interest to Sweden
The positive evaluation of the international situation that was made before the last, two-phase
defence programme continues to apply in all main essentials. If anything, Sweden’s fundamentally
positive security situation has been strengthened. Many of the changes in the European security
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structures that were under discussion at the time are now being implemented. At the same time,
there remains basic uncertainty with respect to long-term developments. This is influenced by a
number of factors - political, economic and social - which interact in highly unpredictable ways.
The situation contains many problems and threats that have their roots in conflicts between nations and groups, in social and economic gaps, mass unemployment, extremist movements,
environmental damage, shortages of raw materials and much else. The links are so complex and
future developments so unpredictable that it is necessary to also prepare for the possibility that
today’s favourable security situation could worsen in the future.
In some areas, as has already been indicated, there is already reason to modify the picture
that provided the background to the latest defence programme. Briefly, the following points should
be mentioned as being of direct relevance for Sweden.
Developments in domestic policy in Russia have moved in a positive direction and Russia,
despite the fact that some unsolved problems still remain, has regulated through agreements
important security issues with NATO and neighbouring countries. At the same time, the Russian
military apparatus has become a weaker force, and it now takes longer than before to strengthen
offensive military capability. Despite the positive aspects of recent developments, we must be
prepared for the fact that it will take a long time before we are able to draw any certain conclusions
about Russia.
In the 1996 defence programme, attention was drawn to the changes in the regulations contained
in the CFE Treaty on heavy army materials in the flank zones. These regulations, like the CFE
Treaty as a whole, are currently being thoroughly reviewed and adapted to the new security situation via the negotiations being carried out in the spirit of the NATO-Russian Agreement. It is
important for Sweden, with our emphasis on flexible defence capability, that the new agreement
enables clear and early signals to be given if one party breaks the agreement. In this way, provision
is made for any measures that may be necessary. However, there is little possibility of Sweden
influencing current negotiations, despite the fact that we continually emphasize to the parties to
the Treaty the importance to Sweden of the flank regimes and the need to retain them in the new
agreement.
The developments in Russia, combined with NATO’s apparently unopposed enlargement by a
further three members, the fact that relations between NATO and Russia are treaty-bound, and
the fact that the EU enlargement process is going ahead, together mean that a major war in Europe,
and thus the threat of attack on Sweden, seems even more distant now than before the last defence
programme.
By consistently maintaining its policy of non-participation in military alliances, Sweden
continues to contribute to stability in northern Europe and create the conditions for national
freedom of action. Our capability to deal with attack continues to be fully assured for as long as
the present world situation prevails, and if we adapt our capability in pace with any changes in that
situation. Our policy of non-participation in military alliances precludes our participation in operations that concern the defence of our territory and security guarantees. But it presents no obstacle
to Sweden’s participating in other ways in the emerging, multi-faceted European security cooperation
where the focus is on cooperation based on trust, conflict-prevention and crisis management.
Sweden’s security policy is characterized in the new situation by full and active participation in the
work towards the objectives that are now shared by all European states. It is important that Sweden
can develop its participation in European security cooperation in pace with changes in the international situation.
Sweden’s non-participation in military alliances relies, among other things, on our having the
national competence and capacity to independently use and maintain our defence matériel in a
crisis or war situation. Our national defence technology and defence industry competence should
be such as to enable us to supply the defence forces as far as possible with cost-effective, highquality matériel, and to do so in a situation of increasing international tension and rearming.
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Complete independence of other countries is neither technically nor economically feasible. Instead,
greater involvement in international cooperation is, in most areas, the most desirable solution. The
rapid restructuring of the international defence industry in recent years and the increasing
competition in the sector firmly underline the need for both public authorities and businesses in
Sweden to increase their international cooperation on defence matériel. If this does not happen, we
risk a serious reduction in the Sweden defence industry, and finding ourselves in a situation of
considerable and one-sided international dependence. The need for greater international cooperation
also highlights the need for the application of a common Code of Conduct on arms export legislation
in the cooperating countries that is acceptable to them.
The threats requiring attention in the next few years arise from the remaining risk of local and
regional conflicts both in some parts of Europe and in Europe’s vicinity. These are conflicts where
a broad spectrum of instruments of force and methods of influence, both armed and unarmed, may
be used. The Balkan problem remains, and is in danger of increasing, despite substantial international efforts. The Mediterranean region contains a number of conflicts involving considerable violence
and terrorism. There is a risk that disagreements in the Caucasus and the Middle East can assume
armed form and have serious consequences for the world’s energy supply. These local and regional
conflicts in the vicinity of Europe can indirectly affect Sweden and may require Sweden’s
participation in international crisis management. In addition, Sweden can also be required to
participate in crisis management in a global context. The risks increase of our being affected by
conflicts far beyond our own region.
For a number of countries in Europe it has not yet been possible to find security solutions
that satisfy those countries’ aspirations. This applies especially to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
which is of particular significance for Sweden. Contributing to finding a long-term security solution for all the countries in the Baltic Sea region continues, therefore, to be a high priority issue for
Sweden.
As in other areas, there are within the sphere of defence and security policy a number of basic
problems concerning delimitation. The security concept has been enlarged, but at the same time it
is neither reasonable nor feasible to believe that everything that can affect the situation of nations
and people is of relevance to security policy and, even less, defence policy. The Defence Commission has elected to focus its discussion on those threats to security that can involve a relatively
rapid deterioration in normal social functions.
This means that threats must be of a certain weight (that is, concern society and many people,
rather than individual organizations or individuals). This also means that the threats are usually
linked to antagonistic actors or subversive activities. It is meaningful to seek to prevent such threats
from arising and to deal with them when they do occur. Defence resources can to a greater or lesser
extent help to deal with them. The risk of this type of security threat occurring will in turn
depend on long-term changes in social conditions and relations between nations. An important
feature of security policy is seeking to influence these relations so that the risk of threats to
security is reduced.
The Commission does not, however, regard as security threats the possible alterations in the
standard of living and living conditions - which can be threatening in themselves - that can be
associated with long-term changes in trade and industry, social conditions, the environment, the
climate, etc. These are issues that should be forcefully dealt with in other policy areas than defence
and security.
Against this background, the Commission wishes to point to a number of areas that should be
given attention in the coming discussions on the future direction of Sweden’s defence and security
policy.
Within the Commission’s definition of security policy, further priorities must be made.
Immediate issues include the balancing of different measures in order to deal with the threats that
are regarded as possible in the near future, and measures to develop the capacity to deal with
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future, possibly more serious, threats. Another important question is how we should approach the
prioritization of measures within our own region, Europe and the world at large.
Sweden should continue to actively contribute to EU enlargement, to the development of the
EU common foreign and security policy, and to the EU’s ability to use the WEU for humanitarian,
peace-keeping and peace-support operations. Attention should also be paid to the EU’s ability to
contribute to increased stability and security in countries in eastern and south-east Europe that
are not candidates for membership. In our own immediate vicinity the EU can contribute to finding ways out of the stagnation and risks created by the authoritarian regime in Belarus.
The Government has relatively recently presented its views to Parliament on Sweden’s
participation in the OSCE (Government Communication 1996/97:148), in the EAPC, and in the
deepened Partnership for Peace cooperation (Government Communication 1997/98:29). The
communication was accepted by Parliament. Within the framework of a more detailed description
of how our cooperation in these and other security organizations is to be implemented, there is
reason to further consider whether forms of international deployment of our Total Defence resources
need to be altered in order to facilitate our participation. We must be able to make a contribution
to European crisis management.
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) drawn up between the NATO
countries and former members of the Warsaw Pact (and their successors, with the exception of the
Baltic states), which is at present being renegotiated – hopefully at an ever lower level – will, when
a new treaty has been ratified, probably open the way for other European countries to sign. Even if
it can be expected to take a number of years before this happens, Sweden and other countries that
do not belong to a military alliance should begin now to consider the extent to which the Treaty is
also relevant for them.
Nordic cooperation in the security sphere has recently intensified. Consideration should be
given to the forms for asserting Nordic interests in the new European security system when these
coincide. The question should also be examined whether the Nordic total defence investment can
be made more effective and better able to participate in developing crisis management capability in
Europe.
Support to the Baltic states’ development of a total defence system and other security functions
should be developed and intensified in the light of experience so far. The support is of great
importance for the future integration of the states into the Euro-Atlantic security structures. The
work that has been done could become more effective through greater coordination between the
different donors.
Sweden should seek to intensify its bilateral cooperation with Russia within different civil
sectors such as trade, industry, education, environmental protection, the fight against crime, etc.
This is a natural development considering our geographical proximity and the enormous
opportunities offered by the rapid social transformation in Russia. But the broad cooperation also
contributes to Sweden’s security through its long-term confidence-building effect and reducing
the risks of serious strains in Russian society that could have consequences for us.
The defence-related cooperation with Russia should also be further developed both in bilateral and multilateral forms. Cooperation on peace-keeping operations can take place within the
frameworks of the UN, the OSCE, NATO and the EAPC/PfP in bilateral forms. Confidence-building measures should be discussed within the framework of the review of the Vienna Document
that is now beginning. The regional training centre in Almnäs can provide a base for the cooperation
with Russia and other Baltic Sea states. Civil rescue work is an important and promising area for
cooperation with Russia. In addition, the preconditions for cooperation on defence technology
should also be examined. In the defence-related cooperation with Russia, special efforts should be
made to develop contacts with Kaliningrad, St Petersburg and Murmansk.
The security- and defence-related cooperation should also be developed with other countries
in the immediate vicinity. This applies particularly to Poland, a country of growing importance in
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the Baltic Sea region. Our cooperation with the major power and the Baltic Sea state Germany is
also extremely important.
The great importance of the United States and its dominance in the field of security means
that its involvement in northern Europe is of fundamental importance. An important question for
Sweden is how and in what areas our own country should seek closer cooperation with the United
States, and how we can contribute to the United States’ continued involvement.
Crisis management should continue for a considerable time to be a necessary component of
the European security system. Our active participation in the pan-European security system requires
that Sweden has a well-developed and all-round ability to contribute to the many different types of
operations that can be necessary in the future. One question that should be raised is whether
Sweden, in view of the increasing international emphasis on crisis management, should develop
both its civil and military resources for such purposes still further. It can require both greater
capacity and availability, and a more diversified instrument with greater opportunities for flexible
cooperation between civilian and military operations.
There is reason to reconsider the relative importance of the various requirements when shaping
the total defence resources. We should consider giving relatively greater priority to crisis management capability both in our immediate vicinity and in international peace-support and humanitarian
operations. Greater relative investment in these tasks within existing economic frameworks should
be combined with the need for a satisfactory basis for the defence of our own country against the
limited threats that could arise in the next few years, and to expand the defence system if it should
prove necessary in the future. We should strive to devise qualified crisis management capability, in
terms of both personnel and materials, in such a way that it at the same time enhances our national
defence capability.
The expanding range of threats perceived in Europe today include many threats and risks that
do not primarily involve the threat of conventional military attack. Instead, it may be a matter of
secondary risks and emergencies of different types which, even at a considerable distance, can
follow regional or local conflicts in or outside Europe. Or it may be a matter of the opportunity to
act through threats, pressure, blackmail or terrorist acts that can have considerable consequences
even when only actors with relatively limited resources are behind them. There is also the risk of
organized crime becoming so extensive that it takes on significance for security. A question that
should be asked with respect to Sweden is whether we are doing enough to prevent and have the
capability to deal with these non-military threats and risks. In this context, the risks should also be
noted that are connected with today’s trend towards the greater proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
The rapid international structural changes in the defence industry sector and the increasing
reliance by the domestic defence industry on foreign sources, necessitate further steps to secure
Sweden’s provision of defence matériel and access to technological competence through deepened
and institutionalized international cooperation. Further steps should be considered which would
facilitate such a development and which could lead to a common Code of Conduct on arms export
legislation in the cooperating countries that is acceptable to them.
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