United Nations Security
Council Committee
2017 Study Guide
Claudia Negri &
Josh Prakash Majumdar
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Welcome Letter from Chairs
Dear Delegates,
First, we want to introduce ourselves. We are, Claudia Negri, Political Scientist
professional and a post-graduate student and Josh Prakash Majumdar, a graduate-student of Politics
at Sciences Po, hailing from India.
The Security Council is one of the most important organism of the world, where high
politics takes place. From issue ranging from war, cybercrime to on-going crisis, it has proven itself
to be one of the most challenging international arenas. Participating in an MUN as a Security
Council delegate is always the greatest honor for a delegate; and chairing one is too. So, we expect
the very best from each and every one of you, as we will do our best to make this committee the
best one in your life.
The two topics that gather us today are of great concern. The Security Council has received
enormous amount of criticism over its composition and how it works. Topics like veto power,
working methods and regional representation have been critized as outdated or not representative.
On the other hand, the escalation of the South China Sea conflict is jeopardizing the stability of the
region. With the construction of artificial islands by some countries, and the placement of possible
weapons, the international community raised their concern of a possible militarization of the sea.
Both of the topics are uncommon for the Security Council. Nonetheless, it is our
responsibility and duty to try and find new and innovative solutions. Continuing with past plans
hasn’t seemed to work. With the creativity and courage that a young generation possess, lets faces
this challenge with a new perspective, without the fear of proposing a crazy but viable plan. After
all, we are supposed to be the most educated generation of all times.
As delegates of the Security Council and of C’MUN, one of the most prestigious MUNs of
Europe, we expect highly of you. Although knowledge of the topics is expected – and somehow
minimal to participate- we wait for you more than that. We are waiting for delegates that respect
others opinion, that can argument with fact, that is humble towards other delegates, patient,
passionate about solving issue, that can fail and learn through it, curious for new solutions but
above all, to have fun. Having more or less MUNs doesn’t make a delegate better or worse, it is the
spirit what makes a MUNer. Someone eager to learn more, to help other, respectful, that knows
when to have fun or handle failures and believes in the UN values.
So let us makes this Security Council that BEST Security Council of C’MUN and Europe.
We know we are going to have a great time discussing issues that affect our world today.
Claudia Negri
Josh Prakash Majumdar
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Introduction
The use of islands for military means is nothing new in history. Throughout centuries,
governments and nations have used islands to project their military power or sovereignty, as stopovers or even military bases. These small pieces of land in the middle of the ocean have been
considered vital for States in their military strategy and survival. As technology has evolved, so has
their used.
Nowadays, in the South China sea, there is an ongoing conflict over the Spratly Islands and
other features of the region. The Spratly island are a set of islands, reefs, islets and even smalls
rocks, located between China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Several countries reclaim
this archipelago, under the argument of the 200 miles of exclusive economic zone.
Due to the strategic importance of the archipelago - which is rich in hydrocarbon and fossil
fuels, alongside the exceptional amount of commerce that transits the area- the conflict has
escalated in recent years. Parties involved have militarized the area, transforming the nature of the
controversyinto a hybrid and constabulary style, posing a threat to the peace. In recent years,
satellites images have shown the creation or even expansion of different islands in the area, with
clear intentions of building military bases or other kind of military facilities. This situation has
alarmed actors involved, over the future of the conflict and a possible even bigger escalation. With
the creation of military bases and the placement of military arsenal in the zone, a diplomatic and
peaceful solution is jeopardized.
Artificial island for Military Use - Useful definitions
Most concepts used in the discussion of the South China Sea and Spratly Islands are highly
technical and require some definition.
●
Islands and artificial islands: An island is defined under article 121 of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982), as the following:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land
territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Although some geographical accidents may follow the definition of article 121,
exceptions are also described. In article 121, point 3 an exception is highlighted, indicating
that a rock (for example) cannot be consider an island - even though its surface is above
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water - as this feature cannot hold human life or human activity, hence it does not (and
cannot) project EEZ (Baumet, 2016, pg.153 ; Beckman, 2013, pg.150).
On the other hand, artificial islands have a different regime under the UNCLOS.
Although not exactly defined in the convention, it is understood that an artificial island
corresponds to a human construction and not a naturally formed area. Probably the most
important difference between an island and an artificial island on this topic, refers to the fact
that artificial islands does not generate an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Defined under
article 60, point 8, UNCLOS states that “Artificial islands, installations and structures do
not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their
presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone
or the continental shelf”. Also, in article 55, section 1, part b, point i, the convention
clarifies that countries have authority over their EEZ to “the establishment and use of
artificial islands, installations and structures”.
The figure of artificial island is explored in depth in the UNCLOS. Article 60 is
very detailed to lists out the attributes of this elements and specifies its legal regimen, that
helps understand the difference between an island and an artificial island. For more
information about the difference between islands and artificial islands, refer to the
UNCLOS.
●
Spratly Islands: The Spratly Islands are located in the South China Sea.
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea bordered on the west by Vietnam, on
the east by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam, on the south by
Indonesia and Malaysia, and on the north by China and Taiwan. The width of the
South China Sea is approximately 550–650 nautical miles (nm), and its length is
more than 1200 nm(Beckman, 2013, pg.143).
The Spratly Island is an area of extensive commercial activities and rich in natural
resources. It “...consists of more than 140 islets, rocks, reefs, shoals, and sandbanks spread
over an area of more than 410,000 square kilometers (km2). Some are totally or
occasionally submerged, whereas others are always dry” (Beckman, 2013, pg.143).
●
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Exclusive economic zoneis defined under part V of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 55 indicates that
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,
subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights
and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States
are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.” (1982).
The EEZ should be no longer than 200 nautical miles. In this area, the state has
“...jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard
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to:the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine
scientific research; the protection and preservation of the marine environment…” (UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, article 56, part 1 section b.)
South China Sea, what is happening?
The Spratly Island and South China Sea conflict represents already an olddispute, as it has
existed for some decades (and even centuries). The Democratic Republic of China claims to have
sovereignty over the region since the Xi dynastic – exposing how old the conflict is - meanwhile
Vietnam claims that during colonial era and the 18th century Vietnamese emperors controlled the
region, while other modern States appeal upon modern international public law, specially the
UNCLOS, to justify their reclamations. Hence, thecore of the conflict relies upon the reclamation of
sovereignty between the coastal States in the region. The countries involved are the People’s
Republic of China (China), The Republic of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, The Republic of
Philippines, The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Nation of Brunei; although not all of them
claim the whole archipelago, as only China does. It should be noted that the United State of
America, although not a coastal state of the region, it is also extremely involved in the region,
particularly to the alliances with states involved, the influence on international politics and
cooperation treaties. The biggest and main problem relies on the overlapping of EEZ zones
reclaimed by the countries and the definition on whether what kind of geographical accidents have
attributions for EEZ. This issue is enormously significant for every of the reclamaints, as having a
legitimate EEZ gives them sovereignty over the area.
The importance of the South China Sea and why countries seem to give it such an
importance to the EEZ, relies on three aspect: the existenceof hydrocarbon resource and a rich
fishing area, the high amounts of commercial traffic and the geopolitical and strategic location. As
Beckman states (2013) “… the South China sea is a sea, one with enormous commercial and
military importance. In the South China Sea, all state enjoy freedom of the seas, including
navigation and overflight rights and other lawful uses of the sea…” (pg. 154).
The South China Sea, specifically the Spratly Islands, are in one of the busiest commercial
passages of the world; through it passes approximately $5 trillion USD annually (Glaser, 2015). It is
“home to some of the busiest sea lanes in the world, more than a quarter of the world’s trade pass
through […]Upwards of 80 and 90 percent of Chinese’s and Japanese’s oil imports also traverse
through these waters” (Ba, 2011, pg. 270). Therefore, and considering the economic growth rates of
the region, the South China Sea transforms itself into critical infrastructure for the economies
involved, from China, Taiwan, Malaysia, among others. Although international law allows and
enforces freedom of navigation of the sea, some parties involved have shown preoccupation over
possible actions in the future, that could impair freedom of navigation and the shipping that pass
through the area.
Furthermore, the South China Sea is believed to be rich in hydrocarbon resources and it is a
rich fishing area (Advincula, 2014; Ba, 2011). It is expected that the oil reserve of the South China
Sea is of 7,7 trillion barrels (Martins, 2012), that would certainlyeaseBeijing and other South East
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Asian countries with their consumption of energy. In view that China will demand more than 30%
of the global energy by 2020 (Gosh, 2014), it seems logical that China has special interest in the
zone. Also, fishing activities are an important economic incoming for the local and national
economies of the nations involved (Ba, 2011). Finally, the South China sea “is the second busiest
international sea-lane, and well over half of the world’s petroleum-bearing traffic passes through
this area (Koo, 2009, pg.138)
To finish, the South China Sea is a strategic and tactical zone for China and the USA. First,
the South China Sea is an area right next to China and hence represent a critical zone to defend, to
preventany attack or threat from other country. It represents a possible disadvantage and weakness
in China’s eyes, towards other countries (Ba, 2011). On the other hand, United States of America
has a special regarding the influence on the area, particularly after the 2008 economic recession. As
Chinaacts as a possible hegemonic challenger, the USA has seek to maintain and keep the influence
over the area. Therefore, the United States has gotten involved in the conflict, under the argument
of freedom of navigation (Ba, 2011, pg.282), creating unwelcome sentiments from China.
Historical review
The conflict over the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands, has been active for some
decades (even centuries) now. Due to the large amount of claimants and how the conflict has
evolved, it is especially complex and difficult to understand (Ba, 2011), which makes it necessary to
write a summarized historical review.
China claims that the Spratly Islands and region that has been under the Chinese control
since the Xia dynasty (1600 B.C.). It bases this argumentation upon the fact that the area was
mapped, studied and patrolled during that time and itwas the first State to do it (Furtado, 1999, pg.
388). Nonetheless, “questions over the ownership and control of the Spratly has been complicated
by more than a century of colonial competition beginning in the early 1800’s” (Furtado, 1999, pg.
387). During that time, the British Empire and the French empire made reclamations over the
region. Meanwhile, Vietnamassures that at the same time (19th century) “…Vietnamese emperors
had effectivelyadministered the Spratly archipelago” (Furatdo, 1999, pg. 391).What seems to be
clear is that, when the British and French empire left, “they left in their wake a series of power
vacuums and a corresponding dearth of rules, norms, and mechanism with which to resolve
confliction territorial claims” (Furtado, 1999, pg. 387-388).
During the Second World War, the area became somehow of a chaos and a territory
disputed by several parties (Japan, France, China). Once the war was over, France regained the
territory through the Vietnam colony (the French Indochina), as well as China, who occupied some
settlements of the South China Sea (but not the Spratly Island) (Furtado, 1999). When Vietnam
gained its independence from the French Empire, it regained once more the control over the alleged
islands as a State.
During the 1950’s tension between Vietnam and China arose, as Vietnam started to exercise
what they considered their sovereign territory and China protested over those actions (Koo, 2009).
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During the 70’s there were some violent and direct clashes between China and Vietnam. Even
more “in early 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces violently clashed again over the
occupation of several reefs, inthe Spratly chain.” (Koo, 2009, pg. 140).
During the same time, Philippines made the first claim over the region in 1956, through the
discovery that a citizen made of some islands and it - military - occupied them in 1968. Meanwhile
Malaysia made its firsts claims in “1979 when the government published an official map showing
the southernmost island of the Spratly chain to be part of the country's continental shelf and EEZ.”
(Furtado, 1999, 393).
Hence, upon entering the 80’s, all of the parties currently involved were already part of the
conflict. By the 1990’s, there were “violent actions and reactions” says Koo (2009, footnote 5) in
the region. Koo goes on and explains that
“China occupied the aptly named Mischief Reef in the Spratly groups, a circular reef
well with in the EEZ of the Philippines, leading to encounters between military vessels
from the Philippines and China in Spring 1995, In the same year, Taiwanese artillery
opened fire on a Vietnamese supply ship. In January 1996, three alleged Chinese
vessels engaged in a 90-minute fun battle with a Philippine navy gunboat. In 1998,
Vietnamese soldiers opened fire on a Philippine fishing boat”
During the 90’s and onwards, the ASEAN has tried to help resolve the dispute. In 1992,
ASEAN published a declaration called “ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea”, which “was
brief … [and] exhort[ed] for “peace” and “restrain” over South China Sea claims and “cooperation”
on other affairs of mutual interest” (Scott, 2012, pg. 1026). Then again in 2002 the ASEAN and
China signed the “Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China”, that contained extra
exhortations in compared to the 1992 declaration. “These included creating confidence-building
measures (CMBs), the maintenance of freedom of navigation at the sea and in the air, and the
conduct of negotiations inaccordance with international law and with regard to UNCLOS in
particular.” (Scott, 2012, pg.1026 - 1027).
Still conflicts between the actors continues. For example, during 2011 and 2012, the
Philippines and China had harsh encounters over the Reed Bank. “The Reed Bank incident […]
involved Chinese naval patrol boats ordering a Philippine oil exploration vessel out of the area.”
(Scott, 2012, pg. 1032). Meanwhile in 2014, there was a bilateral crisis between Vietnam and
China, when the last one “deployed a deep-sea oil rig in Vietnam’s two hundred-nautical mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) leading to a seventy-three-day crisis” (Glaser, 2015).
Recent Events and Arise of Conflict
Since 2014, with the first reports of artificial islands construction by China, tensions have
tightened.Wingfield-Hayes made one of the very first reports in 2014, through the BBC news,
where he personally visited the sites. In this report, Wingfield-Hayes states that Chin has been
working on this artificial islands since January of that year, with no-one knowingly clearly what the
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intentions were (2014). Consistently, parties involved got anxious about what was behind these
projects. “At the beginning of this year, the Chinese presence in the Spratly Islands consisted of a
handful of outposts, a collection of concrete blockhouses perched atop coral atolls.Now it is
building substantial new islands on five different reefs.” (Wingfield-Hayes, 2014). Although, at that
time it wasn’t sure what was the constructionof artificial islands project for, there was a belief that
the purpose war for a runway and a way to expand and project air power.
Later, it was confirmed that China had in fact, started building islands and was seeking to
enlarge other that were already under their control (Gosh, 2014). As Gosh (2014) reports.
Until the beginning of 2014, the Chinese presence in these islands consisted of a
handful of outposts that comprised a collection of concrete block-type houses perched
atop coral atolls. Now, China is expanding most of these islands, rocks, and
submerged reefs through landfill with sand dug from nearby reefs, which is being
dumped to create new structures. After the landfill is completed, the existing minimal
infrastructure is considerably upgraded. In some cases, the newer islands are being
created from submerged reefs and shoals. Presently, activity is underway on five
different reefs.
The construction was focused in the Johnson South Reef, and believed to build “an entire
air base along with concrete runway meant or fighter jets”, plan that was later published and
confirmed by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (Gosh, 2014). In that same year, the PCP
defined the South China Sea as a core interest for China (Gosh, 2014).
Amidst this construction, coastal states of the South China Sea arose their concerns over
China’s actions and how it would impact them.
Since 2014, China’s activities in the South China Sea have come under close scrutiny
after Beijing began a spate of artificial island-building and construction activities on
several features in the Spratly Islands at a historically unpreceded pace. Satellite
imagery and analysis has long shown that China is undertaking construction to
facilitate military activities, including setting up newradar facilities, helipad and
airstrips” (Panda, 2015).
Liu and other Chinese representatives, have assured that the construction of these islands
are for public service, humanitarian assistance and not for militarization (Panda, 2015). China has
repeatedlystated that, it is a false argument to insist that these constructions are for military
objectives and has blamed the United States of America for militarizing the area (Panda,2015). By
the end of 2015, the seven islands had already been built and China had shifted the focus “on
building a port, three airstrips, radar facilities and other military buildings on the islands ( Watkins,
2016). It is important to stress that “several reefs have been destroyedoutright to serve as a
foundation for the new islands, and the process also causes extensive damage to the surrounding
marine ecosystem” (Watkins, 2016).
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By the end of 2016 “The Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) revealed
commercial satellite imagery of new weapons system installed on several Chinese occupied
Spratly Island” (Stashwick, 2016). This new images proved evidence of “military point-defense
capabilities, in the form of large anti-aircraft guns and probable close-in weapons systems
(CIWS)…” (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016).
This new evidence, violates Xi non-militarization pledge over the area. Nonetheless,
official Chinese’s statements have insisted that is construction was only for “necessary defense”
purpose and that it “does not impact or target any country” (Stashwick, 2016). Even more, the
Chinese Defense Minister has expressed that it is a legitimate action from China to display these
defense capabilities and the militarization has been done by the USA – following the rhetoric of
the last years – (Panda, 2016).
However, as the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (2016) concludes
These gun and probable CIWS emplacements show that Beijing is serious about defense of
its artificial islands in case of an armed contingency in the South China Sea. Among other
things, they would be the last line of defense against cruise missiles launched by the
United States or others against these soon-to-be-operational air bases. They would back
up the defensive umbrella provided by a future deployment to the Spratlys of mobile
surface-to-air missile (SAM) platforms, such as the HQ-9 deployed to Woody Island in the
Paracel Islands. Such a deployment could happen at any time
Up to the moment, there hasn’t been any bigger reaction from other parties or states, nor
any public protest. However, it is to be expected that countries involved in the conflict will arise
their concern over the last finding and take actions.
Involved Parties and Actors
●
China: As already noted above, China reclaims the South China Sea under the historical
argument. “Despite the fact that China, like the other claimants, has ratifies UNCLOS […]
[the] historically based argument continues to be the basis of its claim to the Spratly”
(Furtado 1999, pg.390). As such, China “firmly opposes attempts to internationalize the
South China Sea issue, which should only be resolved bilaterally” ( Xinhua, 2011). Scott
(2012) arguments that “China’s distrust of outside involvement, particularly by the U.S., is
noticeable” (pg. 1022), going further to assure that, if the conflicts gains an international
nature, it will probably get worse and escalate.
China reclaims the whole South China Sea as it owns, and has been clear to defend
its own position. When the United Nations in 2008 asked for a clarification over what each
country reclaims, as a protest over Philippines and Vietnam joint submissions, China
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submitted a map, known as the nine-point dash line (attached to the note verable), where it
seems clear that the reclamation is over the whole South China Sea1
Due to the recent events, Chinese leaders have expressed their concern over the
United States involvement in the region and have stated that “…China opposes the
militarization of the South China sea and claims no to contribute to it” (Panda, 2015).
Nonetheless, recent declarations seem unclear and somehow contradictory between them.
China’s Foreign Minister has said that “China’s deployment of necessary defensefacilities
on its own territory has nothing to do with the so-called militarization” (Stashwick, 2016),
stressing out it is only for civilian needs. At the same time, Xi has referred to the
construction of the features as only a “military” defense and does not intend to target any
country (Stashwick, 2016). Meanwhile a spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry has
“justified China’s defensive construction as a “completely understandable” reaction to the
“high-profile display of militarystrength and frequent and large-scale military drills by
certain countries and their allies in the South China Sea” referring to the United States”
(Staswhick, 2016).
As such, China’s position seems to evolve according to the current circumstances
and their intentions remain unclear. With new actions being taken every day, Beijing
position seems to be unpredictable.
●
Philippines: The Philippines first claimed the Spratly Island when a citizen discovered the
Islands in 1956 and claimed them, they were later occupied in 1968.
The Philippines bases its arguments over the idea that “the islands were, before
1956, without a sovereign authority (terra nullius) [..] The government’s second argument
is based on the provision for 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zones, (EEZ)
embodied in UNCLOS” (Furtado, 1999, pg. 392.)
1
●
Vietnam: Vietnam claims over the Spratly Islands, are based in historic arguments, were
the “Vietnamese emperors had effectively administered the Spratly archipelago since the
1800s” (Furtado, 1999, pg. 391) and was regained, once Vietnam gained the independence
back from France. After the CLCS asked for their delimitations of their continental shelf in
2008, Vietnam and Malaysia made a joint submission, that triggered a Chinese response.
●
United States of America: The United States of America, as a worldwide leader, has not
been kept aside of the conflict of the South China Sea. Close allied of the Philippines, many
scholars and academics have state that the USA over the region is to avoid any direct
confrontation between the parties involved, that could blow into a major international
conflict (Advincula, 2014). “Washington’s ultimate choice of a response to China’s
aggressive posturing in the SCS (South China Sea) will have serious regional and,
potentially, global effects. As a superpower, the US possesses the political power, military
More on this Issue on Past UN resolutions and conventions
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capabilities, and even geographical proximity (though alliance and global power projection)
too counterbalance China in the APR” (Advincula, 2014, pg.61).
Past UN resolutions and Conventions
Due to the complexity of the topic and the amount of actors involved - as their power in
international politics - has implied that the UN has taken little to no involvement in the conflicts.
Furthermore, up to the date, there are no Security Council resolutions about the South China Sea or
the Spratly Islands. As Scott (2012) stresses out
The U.N. has lacked any involvement by its Security Council, despite its wideranging legal and enforcement power under the U.N. Charter (Chapter 7, article
51) to adopt measure to handle eruptions of “threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, or acts of aggression” (U.N. Charter). Such a mechanism has not been
invoked with regard to the South China Sea. This is unsurprising, given the
presence of the PRC [People Republic of China] as a veto-wielding permanent
member of the Security Council making wide-ranging claims at the center of the
dispute. (pg. 1021)
Even though the Security Council has never formally discussed the topic, it may be set into
the agenda, as the conflict fall under its competence. Moreover, some have argued that is very likely
that the South China conflict may be discussed in a nearby future in the Security Council. As
Raymond (2016) places it, interested players in the Security Council “could classify the South China
Sea issue as a dispute causing international friction, and hence within the UN Security Council’s
mandate”. It is clear the China will try to avoid the topic, as well as Russia. Nonetheless, the United
States of America, United Kingdom, and some non-permanent members, have shown interest in
bringing the issue up in theorganism.
Among notable UN organism that have been related somehow with the topic, is the U.N.
commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). During 2008, the commission asked the
countries to submit their continental shelf claims by May. Malaysia and Vietnam made a joint
submission, where they “extender their continental shelves from 200 nautical miles to 350 nautical
miles into the South China sea” (Ba, 2011, pg.272), that generated a response and criticism from
Philippines and even stronger from China (Scott, 2012, pg. 1022). China sent out a note verbale,
stating that “China’s has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China and the
adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the
seabed and subsoil thereof” (Note Verbale CML/17/2009). It stresses out the UN not to consider the
joint submission made by the countries mentioned before and attaches their own reclamation, known
as the nine-dash line (Note Verbale CML/17/2009). Here is when other tensions arose, as the ninedash line, which has upon the date, not beenexplained, seems to claim the whole South China Sea.
“The actual wording of the note verbale may be a relatively straightforward effort counter other’
claims and submission, but the attachment of the map, unexplained and without further elaboration,
it not” (Ba, 2011, pg. 272). At the end, “the CLCS, unable to consider submission in the event of
conflicting in claims, was immediately deadlocked” (Scott, 2012, pg. 1022).
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Although the previous disagreement wasn’t exactly regarding artificial islands nor military
arsenal, it does illustrate the complexity of issue. There have been some attempts by the United
Nations and other international governmental organism, such as the International Court of Justice, to
help solve the problem; but no “solution” has been achieved.
QARMA:
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●
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●
●
●
Will an artificial island have the right to have military bases and arsenal?
Will there be any sanctions against countries that continue with the militarization of the
area?
What will be conceive as militarization?
What will be the critical date of the issue?
What sanctions will be taken againstcountries that forbid the freedom of navigation and air?
What kind of actions and weapons will be considering as militarization?
Will there be any course of actions to resolve the dispute?
Bibliography
United Nations Documentation
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982
• Note Verbale CML/17/2009
Academic Papers
• Scott, David. 2012. Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea In “Asian Survey”, vol.52,
no.6. Pages 1019 – 1042
• Ba, Alice. 2011. Making Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled
Are the Waters? In “Contemporary Southeast Asia”, vol.33, no.3. Pages. 269 – 291
• Furtado, Xavier. 1999. International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Islands: Whither
UNCLOS? In “Contemporary Southeast Asia”, vol.21, no.3. Pages 386 – 404
• Advincula, Julian. 2014. China’s Leadership Transition and the Future of US-China
Relations: Insights form the Spratly Islands Case. In “Journal of Chinese Political Science”.
Pages 51-65
• Baumert, Robert. 2016. Reviewed Works(s): The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the
Sea by S.Jayakumar, Tommy Koh and Robert Beckman. In “The American Journal of
International Law”, vol.110, no.1. Pages 152-159.
• Beckman, Robert. 2013. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime
Disputes in the South China Sea. In “The American Journal of International Law”, vol.107,
no.1. Pages 142 – 163
• Koo, Min Gyo. 2009. Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia. Between
a Rock and a Hard Place. Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg, London,New York.
The Diplomat Articles
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•
•
•
•
Staswhick, Steven. New Weapons on China’s Artificial Islands Don’t Violate “NonMilitarization” of South China Sea. December 30, 2016
Panda, Ankit. It’s Official: Xi Jinping Break His Non-Militarization Pledge in the Spratly.
December 16, 2016
Panda, Ankit. Military Facilities Aren’t Militarization in the South China Sea: Chinese
Deputy Foreign Minister. November 23, 2015.
Gosh, P.K. Artificial Islands in the South China Sea. September 23, 2014.
Other News Articles
• Glaser, Bonnie. Conflict in the South China Sea. Contingency Planning Memorandum
Update. April 2015. Council on Foreign Relations.
• Wingfield-Hayes, Robert. China’s Island Factory. 9 September 2014. BBC News.
• Martins, Sebastiao. US Companies eye oil projects in South China Sea. July 18, 2012. Oil
and Gas Technology.
• Raymond, Greg. The South China Sea: Next Stop the UN Security Council? May 30, 2016.
The Interpreter.
• Xinhua (English). China Opposes Attempts to Internationalize South China Sea issue:
military newspaper. June 14, 2011. Xinhua Net News English
• Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. China’s New Spratly Island Defense. 2016.
• Watkins, Derek. What China has Been Building in the South China Sea. February 29, 2016.
New York Times.
Agenda II
UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS
Historical Background:
1945 to 1990:
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the membership of the United Nations grew steadily in numbers,
and the influx of new members, especially from Africa and Asia, drastically changed the
Organization. Attempts to rearrange the composition of the Security Council had previously been
rebuffed by the permanent members. However, by 1963 the calls were too loud to ignore, and in
1965, following ratification by the required number of Member States, resolution 1991 A (XVIII)
expanded the number of non-permanent seats from six to ten. This is till date that only expansion of
the Security Council.
1990 to 2000:
Before long, Germany and Japan both began advocating for permanent seats for themselves. The
two countries had contributed heavily to the Gulf War efforts, and dramatically increased their
contributions
to
the
United
Nations
as
a
whole.
P a g e |14
By1992,JapanandGermanyhadbecomethesecondandthirdlargest
contributorstotheregularbudgetoftheUN, respectively.
Italy, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, South Korea and Pakistan as well as some other countries
called for the creation of more non-permanent seats with members to be elected on a regional basis,
while fiercely resisting adding any new permanent seats and created a new group nicknamed the
“Coffee Club” or the Uniting for Consensus Group in the 1990s.
The African group, which represents the African Union (AU) at the UN, decided early on to
vehemently call for two permanent seats for Africa with the right of veto. The claim is based on the
Ezulwini Consensus, a common position adopted by the members of the AU in 2005. The
Consensus calls for two permanent seats; however, contrary to the previous position paper (the
1997 Harare Declaration) the seats would not be rotating within the group. Instead, they would be
country-specific and chosen exclusively by the members of the AU. At the moment, Egypt, South
Africa and Nigeria are among the main contenders for permanent seats.
In September 1992, India and 35 other Non-Aligned states tabled a draft resolution (later,
A/RES/47/62), calling for the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the 48th session of the General
Assembly, an item entitled Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership
of the Security Council. On 11th December 1992, a new resolution (A/RES/47/62) that was cosponsored by Japan was passed unanimously by the General Assembly. The resolution officially
placed the item on the General Assembly’s agenda, where it has remained.
As a result of the many proposals submitted, the General Assembly subsequently passed
resolution A/RES/48/26, which set up an “Open-ended Working Group on the Question of
Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and
Other Matters related to the Security Council” (more simply known as the Working Group).
It provided a formal forum for consultations on reform of both the expansion of the Council (cluster
I) and working methods (cluster II)
While reforms regarding membership require Charter Amendment, reforms in the working process
require a simple majority making it a less daunting task for the Member Nations. Various reforms in
this sphere have been sought. Initiatives included: publicizing the daily work program (S/26015);
publishing tentative monthly work schedule (S/26176); making almost final (‘in blue’) draft
resolutions available (S/1999/165); providing greater transparency on procedures of the sanctions
committee (S/1995/234, S/1995/438, S/1996/54), on peacekeeping operations (S/PRST/1994/22);
initiating meetings between Council and troop- contributing countries (S/PRST/1994/22); and
launching “Arria-style meetings,” in which a member of the Council could invite experts or
representatives of civil society for a discussion without issuing a formal statement. Although these
initiatives on working methods seemed to be appreciated by the general membership, the pressure
for Security Council expansion continued unabated.
In 1997, the President of the General Assembly and chairman of the Working Group, Razali Ismael
of Malaysia, put forward an ambitious three-stage reform plan (A/AC.247/1997/crp.1 and A/51/47,
P a g e |15
Annex II), which provided for the enlargement of the Security Council from 15 to 24 members,
including the addition of five new permanent members. The direct outcome of the Razali-proposal
was resolution A/RES/53/30 passed on 23 November 1998 by the General Assembly. The
resolution was a joint victory for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Italy. It stipulated that
any future resolutions on expanding the Security Council would need at least a two-thirds majority
to pass.
FIVE KEY ISSUES –
1) Categories of Membership (Expansion & Representation)
For many years, some member-states have been advocating expansion of the Security Council,
arguing that adding new members will remedy the democratic and representative deficit from which
the Council suffers. Disagreement on whether new members should be permanent or have veto
power has become a major obstacle to Security Council reform. Brazil, India, Japan and Germany
want a permanent seat in the Council, and have threatened to reduce their financial or military troop
contributions to the UN if they are not rewarded with permanent member status. African countries
have also expressed the need for permanent African representation in the Council to bring an end to
the hegemony of northern industrialized nations in the powerful UN organ.
Until now, the only reform of the SC took place in 1963, when the number of the nonpermanent
members was increased from 6 to 10 under Resolution 1991-XVIII. The amendment was approved
in the GA with France and the Soviet Union voting against, the UK and United States abstaining
and China (Taiwan) voting in favour. All permanent members eventually ratified the amendment; if
they had not, it would never have entered into force, which it did in 1965.
In December 2004, then Secretary General, Kofi Annan’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change proposed two models for enlargement, which both suggest expanding the Council to 24
members. This was issued in March 2005, under the title “In Larger Freedom”.
•
•
Plan A calls for creating six new permanent members, plus three new nonpermanent members
for a total of 24 seats in the council.
Plan B calls for creating eight new seats in a new class of members, who would serve for four
years, subject to renewal, plus one nonpermanent seat, also for a total of 24.
P a g e |16
Neither the Panel's document, nor the March 2005 Secretary General’s report titled "In Larger
Freedom" expresses a preference for one of the two models. Skeptics question whether Security
Council reform is feasible as long as certain members have the veto. This proposal was discussed in
the September 2005 Millennium+5 Summit, together with 2000 Millennium Declaration, and other
UN reform-related issues, however no conclusive decision was reached.
2) Regional Representation
The ongoing debate about Security Council reform has mainly focused on the expansion of
membership of the Council. The rationale for membership expansion is to include emerging powers
on the Council, but new single state members could exacerbate regional competition rather than
collaboration. During the negotiations, when countries address the issue of regional representation
they mainly tend to refer to “geographical representation”, following Article 23.1 of the Charter
which endorses the criterion of equitable geographical distribution. As a result, when additional
member States are proposed in the models put forth by negotiators, countries are divided into blocks
like “African States”, “Asian States”, “Latin American and Caribbean States”, “Western European
P a g e |17
States”, or “Group of Eastern European States”. These blocks reflect a mere geographical
distribution of the seats and do not imply that a given country could represent anyone other than
itself. This section aims to examine an alternative model for Council reform that would give
permanent seats to regional organizations or blocs rather than individual countries. This could make
the Council more representative without having to enlarge the Council too much. Additionally,
regional secretariats in New York could provide support for smaller countries that are serving on
the Council and would normally have a small team with fewer experts on the large number of issues
before the council.
Proponents of regional representation, like Italy, see the European Union as the first potential
candidate for a regional seat on the Council seat representing the interests of a large number of
states, including Italy, Germany and Portugal. However, opponents argue that the UN Charter does
not recognize regional organizations as eligible for membership in the UN. This argument could
block the EU from becoming the first regional member of the Security Council. The African Union,
Latin American region and the OIC also vehemently support this reform, as they have no such
representation, but most of the main world contentions lie in their region.
3) Veto Reforms
The UNSC "power of veto" is frequently cited as a major problem with the UN. By wielding their
veto power (established by Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter), any of the UNSC's five
permanent members can prevent the adoption of any (non-"procedural") UNSC draft resolution not
to their liking. Even the mere threat of a veto may lead to changes in the text of a resolution, or it
being withheld altogether (the so-called "pocket veto"). As a consequence, the power of veto often
prevents the Council from acting to address pressing international issues, and affords the "P5" great
influence within the UN institution as a whole. This power has been intensely controversial since
the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945. The United States and Russia would probably not have
accepted the creation of the United Nations without the veto privilege. Fifty years later, the debate
on the existence and use of the veto continues, reinvigorated by many cases of veto-threat as well as
actual veto use.
Discussions on improving the UN's effectiveness and responsiveness to international security
threats often include reform of the UNSC veto. Proposals include: Limiting the use of the veto to
vital national security issues; requiring agreement from multiple states before exercising the veto;
and abolishing the veto entirely. However, any reform of the veto will be very difficult. Articles 108
and 109 of the United Nations Charter grant the P5 veto over any amendments to the Charter,
requiring them to approve of any modifications to the UNSC veto power that they themselves hold.
In 2011, the S5 Nations submitted their reforms in regard to Veto Power, which is later given in
detail.
Security Council reform requires an amendment to the UN Charter. The relevant procedure as set
out
in
Article
108
involves
a
two-stage
process:
- First step: The General Assembly, in which all 193 member states have one vote each must
approve
the
reform
by
a
two-thirds
majority
(i.e.
at
least
128 states).
- Second step: Once approved, the Charter, an international treaty, is amended. The amended
P a g e |18
Charter must then be ratified by at least two-thirds of the member states, including the five
permanent Council members, in accordance with national procedures. The last and to date only time
that the Security Council was enlarged, in 1963, this process took around one and half years. Most
importantly, all five permanent members must also ratify the amendment.
This means that during the first stage, the veto specified in Article 27 of the Charter is not possible.
During the second stage, however, the parliaments of the five permanent Council members could
prevent the entry into force of the amended Charter by failing to ratify it.
Another important point: Even though in the General Assembly permanent members voted against a
proposed amendment, this does not automatically mean that they cannot go ahead and ratify the
amended Charter. For example, in the vote on enlarging the Security Council in 1963, only one
permanent member voted in favour, but by 1965, just eighteen months later, all five permanent
members had ratified the amended Charter after all.
Nonetheless, it has been argued that with the adoption of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution by the
General Assembly, and given the interpretations of the Assembly's powers that became customary
international law as a result, that the Security Council 'power of veto' problem could be surmounted.
By adopting A/RES/377 A, on 3 November 1950, over two-thirds of UN Member states declared
that, according to the UN Charter, the permanent members of the UNSC cannot and should not
prevent the UNGA from taking any and all action necessary to restore international peace and
security, in cases where the UNSC has failed to exercise its 'primary responsibility' for maintaining
peace. Such an interpretation sees the UNGA as being awarded 'final responsibility'—rather than
'secondary responsibility'—for matters of international peace and security, by the UN Charter.
Various official and semi-official UN reports make explicit reference to the Uniting for Peace
resolution as providing a mechanism for the UNGA to overrule any UNSC vetoes; thus rendering
them little more than delays in UN action, should two-thirds of the Assembly subsequently agree
that action is necessary.
4) Transparency and Working Methods
While countries like Russia are discouraging negotiators from addressing the “working methods
issue”, this is one subject where most of their counterparts have managed to find areas of
convergence, inasmuch as some countries have expressed a wish to separate the five issues and to
come up with an early partial reform. This would focus on the Security Council’s working methods
and the relations between the Council and the General Assembly.
The points for a broad reform of the Council’s working methods were spelled out under the
Chairmanship of Japan, in the Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2006/507) on the
“perception of the transparency, efficiency and inclusiveness” of the Security Council’s activity. In
April 2009 the Small Five presented their proposal on this subject in the wake of the 2006
Presidency document. Early in March 2010, the S5 stressed once again the importance of not
leaving to any compromise document the “working methods issue”, in spite of the mounting interest
in the issue of categories.
P a g e |19
First of all, interaction and dialogue with SC non-members, especially when they are contributors of
troops to UN missions, should be enhanced, as should cooperation with regional and sub-regional
organisations. This could be achieved by ensuring that these “stakeholders” participate in the
Council’s public and private meetings and by implementing Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter.
The Italian-Colombian proposal of April 2009 addressed the question of working methods in some
depth, also asking for better access to information through open briefings, timely availability of
draft Resolutions and Presidential Statements, and qualitative briefing for non-Council members.
This subject recently returned to the main floor, thank to Japan’s new engagement on this matter
and a debate held at the end of April 2010 on the implementation of the 2006 Note. On this
occasion it is noteworthy that the US intervention focused on conveying the improvements already
made with respect to open meetings, transparency and efficiency.
5) The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly
During the debate on the latest Report on Security Council activity, all the States harshly criticised
the report’s failure, in its traditional format, to serve the purpose of accountability. These reports are
a mere description of what has been done and lack a full political analysis of the work of the
Council. As many countries stated, the importance of the SC’s report to the GA on its work is
demonstrated by the fact that the UN Charter devotes a specific article to it. Consultations between
the two organs should be strengthened by scheduling regular and formalised meetings between their
Chairpersons with a view to sharing information and improving cooperation.
Once again, while divergences between negotiators have been ironed out, Russia admonished all
creeping “attempts to redistribute the powers of the main bodies of the Organisation to the
advantage of the General Assembly, compromising the prerogatives of the Security Council”.
It seems an endless work. A new round of negotiations started on 2 June 2010 on the basis of a
document released on 10 May and prepared by Ambassador Tanin according to positions and
proposals submitted by member States.
Chapter VI of the Charter, which contains the provisions relating to the pacific settlement of
disputes, represents a compromise between the provisions granting generous powers to the General
Assembly and the provisions attempting to restrict the powers and competence of the Assembly.
The former is found in Articles 10 and 14, while the latter are in Articles 11 and 12. However, the
Assembly’s power in maintaining international peace and security is only recommendatory, not
mandatory. It may only ‘make recommendation to the members of the United Nations or to the
Security Council or to both’, ‘discuss any question relating to international peace and security’, ‘call
the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace
and security’, and ‘recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation’. However,
where ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolutions are concerned, the General Assembly, not having mandatory
power conferred upon it by the Charter, can adopt resolutions that are binding in the sense that they
are based on the principles developed within the UN system, which now arguably constitute
P a g e |20
principles of international law. The Assembly’s function in this regard is the focal point for states’
views on international law, not one that can be said to create a mandatory power and certainly not
one that grants the Assembly a coercive power to order economic or military enforcement
measures.
The Assembly gained the confidence to take over the role of the Security Council when the latter
proved unable to perform its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security.
The ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution therefore achieved broader support among the international
community in general, which wanted to see the United Nations as active as it should be in restoring
international peace and security. As a result, it was a great achievement for the General Assembly in
performing its duty to uphold the most fundamental objective of the Charter – Peace.
BLOCK POSITIONS
THE P5Russia:
The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister clarified the Russian stance which is in favour of granting
permanent membership to the G4 (Japan, Germany, India and Brazil) and to South Africa and
Egypt. But the veto power should remain in the hands of original P5 members. This veto power
should neither be expanded nor taken away. Russia insists on minimalist expansion: the size of the
enlarged Council should remain in the low twenties, preferably at 20 countries. Russia agrees that
there is a general necessity for reform, but, like other P5 members, it is very concerned about the
ability of an extended Security Council to deal effectively with peace and security and especially
conflict resolution and crisis response matters. Russia did not specify its idea of an interim model
but underlined in its nonpaper of 2 March 2010 that “so far none of the existing models of
reforming the Council enjoys prevailing support in the UN”; Russia has stated that it will support a
reform that is likely to get support of a majority of the Security Council.
China:
China is for increasing the number of SC members with priority for developing countries, especially
African ones. In its Statement of 6 October 2009, however, China did not specify the number or
categories of new members and was silent on the right of veto. The Statement by the Foreign
Ministry spokesman Hong Lei clarified China’s stance about reforms in the Security Council.
"China supports reasonable and necessary reforms for the U.N. Security Council to make it more
representative for developing countries, especially for African countries," Hong said. China
advocates UN member states to seek "a package of" solutions and reach the broadest consensus
with patient and democratic consultation, he added. Hong said China strongly opposes any "stepby-step" or "piecemeal" approach in the reform, and objects to forcing an immature draft resolution
into action.
United States of America:
The United States has provided various statements that state its support for UNSC Reform under the
following parameters:
P a g e |21
o
o
o
o
o
Enlargement cannot diminish the UNSC’s effectiveness or efficiency;
Any proposal to expand permanent membership must name specific countries
(ruling out so-called framework proposals)
Candidates for permanent membership must be judged on their ability to contribute
to the maintenance of international peace and security;
There should be no changes to the current veto structure; and
Expansion proposals must accommodate charter requirements for ratification,
including approval by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate.
Recent developments have been the announcement of the USA of its strong and unwavering support
for India to receive a permanent seat when President of the United States Barack Obama addressed
the Joint Session of the Parliament of India:
“We salute India’s long history as a leading contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions.
And we welcome India as it prepares to take its seat on the United Nations Security Council. …..
That is why I can say today, in the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed United Nations
Security Council that includes India as a permanent member”
France:
France wants the Security Council to adapt to the realities of the 21st century. It should remain the
decision-making organ responsible for “the maintenance of international peace and security,”
ensuring the Organization’s "prompt and effective action”, in accordance with the United Nations
Charter (Article 24-1). It should better represent today’s world, while remaining capable of taking
the necessary measures to confront the security challenges of the 21st century.
France is in favour of an expanded number of permanent and non-permanent seats in the Security
Council, so that its composition takes into account the emergence of new powers that possess the
willingness and capacity to assume significant responsibilities.
• France supports the accession of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan to permanent member
status.
• France also supports an increased presence of African countries within the Security
Council, in particular among its permanent members.
United Kingdom:
The United Kingdom welcomed the efforts of Ambassador Tanin for bringing together and
updating the different positions on reform into a working document.
Underpinning the UK’s commitment to reforming the Security Council, Ambassador Parham said,
“It is our conviction that reform must uphold the Council’s ability to act effectively and decisively
to address issues posing a threat to international peace and security. This is the Security Council’s
primary responsibility, as set out in the Charter, and reform must not diminish its ability to fulfil
this role.”
The UK’s own vision for reform remains that they support permanent membership for Brazil, India,
Germany, and Japan along with permanent African representation. The UK also stated that they
P a g e |22
want to continue to work towards reforming and improving the Security Council’s working
methods.
France –United Kingdom Proposal:
Acknowledging the difficulties to bridge the gap between the different positions, France and the
United Kingdom proposed the option of an intermediate reform at the UK-France Summit on 27
March 2008. This could include a new category of seats, with a longer term than that of the
members currently elected. On completion of this intermediate period, a review should take place to
convert these new seats into permanent seats. France and the United Kingdom renewed their
proposal at the UK-France Summit on 6 July 2009.
The Group of 4 (G4)
The G4 Nations are four countries which support each other’s bids for permanent seats on
the United Nations Security Council. Unlike the G8, where the common denominator is
the economy , the G4's primary aim is the permanent member seats on the Security Council. The G4
nations are regularly elected to two-year terms on the Security Council as non-permanent members
by their respective regional groups: in the 24-year period from 1987 to 2010, Japan was elected for
five terms, Brazil for five terms, Germany for four terms and India for two terms. Cumulatively, the
G4 has spent 64 years on the UN's inception, with each country serving at least a decade. By
comparison, the three permanent members of the Security Council who have maintained their seats
since the UN's founding (France, the U.K., and the U.S.) have each accrued 68 years of
membership. The People's Republic of China has held its permanent seat for 42 years, since
it replaced the Republic of China in 1971, and the Soviet Union held a permanent seat for 45 years
before being replaced by Russia.
According to the IMF, all countries in the current "P5" members of the Security Council and the G4
currently rank among the 10 economies with the highest nominal GDP in the world, both regarding
the calculation of GDP by Purchasing Power Parity, and nominal GDP. G-4's main plan is to reform
the Security Council by adding 10 new seats - 6 permanent and 4 non-permanent. Four of the
permanent seats would be taken by Germany, Japan, Brazil and India, with the other two going to
African nations.
Quick Comparison of G4 and P5 Members
Country
Brazil
G4
% of World
Population
GDP
(PPP)₁
UN
Funding₂
Defense
Budget₁
Active
Military
2.8% (5th)
$3,101
(7th)
3.82%
(7th)
$24.6
(11th)
318,480
(16th)
Nuclear
Arsenal
NO
P a g e |23
G4
1.1% (17th)
$3,935
(5th))
6.39%
(4th)
$39.4 (9th)
186,450
(28th)
NO3
India
G4
17.7% (2nd)
$8,642
(3rd)
0.74%
(22nd)
$51.3 (6th)
1,325,000
(3rd)
YES
Japan
G4
1.7% (10th)
$4,901(
4th)
9.68%
(2nd)
$40.9 (8th)
247,150
(21st)
NO
China
P5
18.8% (1st)
$20,853
(1st)
7.92%
(3rd)
$215.0
(2nd)
2,333,000
(1st)
YES
P5
0.9% (20th)
$2,703 (
10th)
4.86%
(5th)
$50.9 (7th)
222,200
(24th)
YES
Russia
P5
2.0% (9th)
$3,685
(6th)
3.09%
(9th)
$66.4 (4th)
845,000
(5th)
YES
UK
P5
0.9% (22nd)
$2,757
(9th)
4.46%
(6th)
$55.5 (5th)
169,150
(32nd)
YES
US
P5
4.4% (3rd)
$18,558
(2nd)
22.00%
(1st)
$597.0
(1st)
1,492,200
(2nd)
YES
Germany
France
1
US$ billions 2Percent contributed to total UN budget
UNITING FOR CONSENSUS
Italy, through the ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci, along with Pakistan, Mexico and Egypt, in
1995 founded the "Coffee Club". Uniting for Consensus (UfC), (nicknamed the Coffee Club),
developed in opposition to the possible expansion of the United Nations Security Council. The
founders of the group were soon joined by other countries, including Spain, Argentina, Turkey,
Canada, and South Korea, and in a short time the group came to include about 50 countries in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. The thesis of the Uniting for Consensus group is that the increase of
permanent seats would have further accentuated the disparity between the member countries and
resulted in the extension of a series of privileges with a cascade effect. The new permanent
P a g e |24
members would have in fact benefited from the method of electing particularly advantageous in a
number of specific organs of the United Nations System. Under the leadership of Italy, it aims to
counter the bids for permanent seats proposed by G4 nations (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan)
and is calling for a consensus before any decision is reached on the form and size of the Security
Council. The group has submitted 2 proposals (Green and Blue Model) in recent years, as opposed
to Kofi Annan’s Plan A and Plan B.
2005- (Green Model)
During the 59th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the UfC group — lead by the
representatives of Canada, Italy, Colombia and Pakistan — made a proposal that centres on an
enlargement of the number of non-permanent members from ten to twenty. The Green Model adds
ten more non-permanent seats what would lead to a total of 25 seats in the UNSC (20 nonpermanent, 5 permanent). The non-permanent members would be elected by the General Assembly
for a two-year term and would be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their
respective geographical groups.
The other members and co-sponsors of the text, entitled "Reform of the Security Council", were
listed as Argentina, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, South Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey.
Although the proposal was not accepted, the initiative found broad consensus among member
states, including permanent member China.
2009- (Blue Model)
On 20th April 2009, Colombia and Italy, acting as representatives of the UfC group, provided a new
model of reform, which was presented as a concrete attempt to reach a deal. The Blue Model
proposed creating a new category of seats, still non-permanent, but elected for an extended duration
(3 to 5 years’ terms) without the possibility of immediate re-elections. This new kind of seat would
P a g e |25
not be allocated to single national countries but rather to regional groups on a rotational basis. As
far as traditional categories of seats are concerned, the UfC proposal does not imply any change, but
only the introduction of small and medium size states among groups eligible for regular seats. This
proposal includes even the question of veto, giving a narrow range of options that goes from
abolition to limitation of the application of the veto only to Chapter VII matters.
Italy has firmly rejected the G4 proposal and even denounced the unfair behaviour of G4 countries.
According to Italy, the G4 is attempting to exclude the UfC proposal from the floor, “on the basis of
a presumed level of support”. Moreover, Italy believes that it has shown flexibility by putting
forward a new proposal on April 2009, while the G4 remained tied to its 2005 document. There
were a total of 120 countries in the last UfC Meeting which took place during May, 2011 in Rome.
P a g e |26
QARMA:
1) What area of reform of the Security Council needs the special focus?
2) What should be the reforms if any in;
A) Veto Powers
B) Working methods
C) Regional Representation
D) Relation of the UNSC with the General Assembly.
E) Member-State Representation
3) Should all or any of the G4 nations be included in the Security Council as permanent members?
4) What shall be the procedure for the implementation of reform?
5) Which committee/body is responsible for UNSC reform?
6) How likely are the current P5 Members ready to accept any reforms that limit their current power
in the UN?
7) Is a fully democratic representation in the UNSC possible, and if so, will it be effective?
8) How long will reform take and how much time does the UN have?
CONCLUSION:
The United Nations Security Council is the world’s highest deliberative chamber. At a point where
the same organization advertises democracy and all its theories, one would guess it does not
introspect. For over 5 decades the Council has looked into every part of the world, but itself. The
debate for a change has been blowing in the wind for quite some time now, but we fail to find any
significant results. Furthermore, as has occurred in previous years, reform of the Security Council
can refer to several different things: to changing how the Council works, modifying the right of veto
or revising the composition of the membership. A look at the current state of negotiations should at
least provide some hints of possible future scenarios of the various reform processes.
Within the cluster of working methods, recent developments have given rise to modest optimism.
The 2006 presidential note (S/2006/507) solidified previous gains, and gave the Council a concrete
starting point for further work on reform. The British statement at the latest meeting of the Working
Group clearly demonstrated that there is – at least among some permanent members – a willingness
to work towards a more open and transparent Security Council, but the statement also highlighted
the inherent opposition from Council members against any interference in how to conduct “their
business.” Thus, the key to change lies more with the permanent members of the Council, than with
the General Assembly or small interest groups. According to diplomats from the S5 faction, future
work of the group will be centered more on inspiring change from within than promoting elaborate
General Assembly resolution.
Nonetheless, small steps have been taken towards change, although it is doubtful that these could
lead to modifications in the right of veto. Establishing set rules of procedure might pave the way for
some progress along the lines of the presidential note of 2006, but China, Russia and the United
States are fervently opposed to any rules that would govern how the Council conducts its dealings.
France, the UK and perhaps even a ‘daring’ non-member might be able to spur some development
P a g e |27
within the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, on further
non-binding, but publicly available, regulations. The two European countries do not necessarily
want to limit their powers, but they also know that their legitimacy currently rests on increasing the
transparency and inclusiveness of their Council dealings. To an extent, this has already happened in
regard to sharing information with other members of the European Union; however, they realize
that they also have to extend it to all General Assembly members.
For over a decade, Member States have fought a bitter war of attrition and reform fatigue seems
widespread, with some ambassadors even hoping to shelve the process if no compromise is found
by the end of this session. The road ahead looks indeed very challenging.
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