Lecture notes 13
13. The divided world 4: The Palestinian/Israeli conflict
Origins and Development of the Conflict
Introduction
The struggle between the Israelis and the
Palestinians is one of the most enduring and
explosive of all the world's conflicts. It has its roots in
the historic claim to the land which lies between the
eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea and the
Jordan river.
For the Palestinians the last 100 years have brought
colonisation, expulsion and military occupation,
followed by a long and difficult search for selfdetermination and for coexistence with the nation
they hold responsible for their suffering and loss.
For the Jewish people of Israel, the return to the land
of their forefathers after centuries of persecution
around the world has not brought peace or security.
They have faced many crises as their neighbours
have sought to wipe their country off the map.
Source: BBC News Online.1
In the following some of the key dates of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict will be highlighted and the
origins and development of the Arab-Israeli conflict will be briefly described.
Ancient times
The land that now encompasses Israel and the Palestinian territories has been conquered and reconquered throughout history. Details of the ancient Israelite states are sketchy, derived for the
most part from the first books of the Bible and classical history. Some of the key events include:
Biblical times
1250 BC: Israelites began to conquer and settle the land of Canaan on the eastern Mediterranean
coast.
961-922 BC: Reign of King Solomon and construction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Solomon's reign
was followed by the division of the land into two kingdoms.
586 BC: The southern kingdom, Judah, was conquered by the Babylonians, who drove its people,
the Jews, into exile and destroyed Solomon's Temple. After 70 years the Jews began to return and
Jerusalem and the temple were gradually rebuilt.
Classical period
333 BC: The conquest of Alexander the Great brought the area under Greek rule.
165 BC: A revolt in Judea established the last independent Jewish state of ancient times.
63 BC: The Jewish state, Judea, was incorporated into the Roman province of Palestine
70 AD: A revolt against Roman rule was suppressed by the Emperor Titus and the Second Temple
was destroyed. This marks the beginning of the Jewish Diaspora, or dispersion.
1
All following maps are also taken from BBC News Online.
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Lecture notes 13
118-138 AD: During the Roman Emperor Hadrian's rule, Jews were initially allowed to return to
Jerusalem, but – after another Jewish revolt in 133 AD - the city was completely destroyed and its
people banished and sold into slavery.
638 AD: Conquest by Arab Muslims ended Byzantine rule (the successor to Roman rule in the
East). The second caliph of Islam, Omar, built a mosque at the site of what is now the al-Aqsa
Mosque in Jerusalem in the early years of the 8th Century. Apart from the age of the Crusaders
(1099-1187), the region remained under Muslim rule until the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the
20th Century.
First Zionist Congress
The First Zionist Congress met in Basle, Switzerland, to discuss the ideas set out in Theodor
Herzl's 1896 book Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State). Herzl, a Jewish journalist and writer living in
Vienna, wanted Jews to have their own state - primarily as a response to European anti-Semitism.
The Congress issued the Basle Programme to establish a "home for the Jewish people in Palestine
secured by public law" and set up the World Zionist Organisation to work for that end. A few
Zionist immigrants had already started arriving in the area before 1897. By 1903 there were some
25,000 of them, mostly from Eastern Europe. They lived alongside about half a million Arab
residents in what was then part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. A second wave of about 40,000
immigrants arrived in the region between 1904 and 1914.
Shifting sands
At the time of World War I the area was ruled by the Turkish Ottoman empire. Turkish control
ended when Arab forces backed by Britain drove out the Ottomans. Britain occupied the region at
the end of the war in 1918 and was assigned as the mandatory power by the League of Nations
on 25 April 1920. During this period of change, three key pledges were made.
In 1916 the British Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, had promised the Arab leadership
post-war independence for former Ottoman Arab provinces. However, at the same time, the
secret Sykes-Picot Agreement between war victors, Britain and France, divided the region under
their joint control. Then in 1917, the British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour committed Britain to
work towards "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", in a letter
to leading Zionist Lord Rothschild. It became known as the Balfour Declaration.
The Balfour Declaration
The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was the first significant declaration by a world power in favour of
a Jewish "national home" in what was known as Palestine. Historians disagree as to what the then
British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, intended by his declaration. The letter has no
mention of the word "state", and insists that nothing should be done "which may prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine". The letter was
addressed to Lord Rothschild, a leader of the Jewish community in Britain. It became an important
arm of the movement to create a Jewish state in Palestine.
The letter:
Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917
Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you. on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of
sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet:
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Lecture notes 13
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours,
Arthur James Balfour
British control: Sykes-Picot
The Sykes-Picot agreement was a secret
understanding concluded in 1916 between
Great Britain and France, with the assent of
Russia, for the dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire. The agreement was not implemented,
but it established the principles for the division
a few years later of the Turkish-held region
into the French and British-administered areas
of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.
British control: Mandate Palestine
Palestine - comprising what are now Israel,
the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jordan - was
among several former Ottoman Arab
territories placed under the administration of
Great Britain by the League of Nations. The
mandate lasted from 1920 to 1948. In 1923
granted
limited
autonomy
to
Britain
Transjordan, now known as Jordan.
Arab discontent
The Zionist project of the 1920s and 1930s saw hundreds of thousands of Jews emigrating to
British Mandate Palestine, provoking unrest in the Arab community. In 1922, a British census
showed the Jewish population had risen to about 11% of Palestine's 750,000 inhabitants. More
than 300,000 immigrants arrived in the next 15 years. Zionist-Arab antagonism boiled over into
violent clashes in August 1929 when 133 Jews were killed by Palestinians and 110 Palestinians
died at the hands of the British police. Arab discontent again exploded into widespread civil
disobedience during a general strike in 1936. By this time, the militant Zionist group Irgun Zvai
Leumi was orchestrating attacks on Palestinian and British targets with the aim of "liberating"
Palestine and Transjordan (modern-day Jordan) by force.
In July 1937, Britain, in a Royal Commission headed by former Secretary of State for India, Lord
Peel, recommended partitioning the land into a Jewish state (about a third of British Mandate
Palestine, including Galilee and the coastal plain) and an Arab one. Palestinian and Arab
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Lecture notes 13
representatives rejected this and demanded an end to immigration and the safeguarding of a
single unified state with protection of minority rights. Violent opposition continued until 1938
when it was crushed with reinforcements from the UK.
UN partition of Palestine
Britain, which had ruled Palestine since 1920, handed over responsibility for solving the ZionistArab problem to the UN in 1947. The territory was plagued with chronic unrest pitting native
Arabs against Jewish immigrants (who now made up about a third the population, owning about
6% of the land). The situation had become more critical with the displacement of hundreds of
thousands of Jews fleeing the Nazi persecution in Europe. Some six million Jews were killed in the
Holocaust during World War II.
The UN set up a special committee which recommended splitting the territory into separate Jewish
and Palestinian states. Palestinian representatives, known as the Arab Higher Committee, rejected
the proposal; their counterparts in the Jewish Agency accepted it. The partition plan gave 56.47%
of Palestine to the Jewish state and 43.53% to the Arab state, with an international enclave
around Jerusalem. On 29 November 1947, 33 countries of the UN General Assembly voted for
partition, 13 voted against and 10 abstained. The plan, which was rejected by the Palestinians,
was never implemented. Britain announced its intention to terminate its Palestine mandate on 15
May 1948 but hostilities broke out before the date arrived.
The death of British soldiers in the conflict made the continuing presence in Palestine deeply
unpopular in Britain. In addition, the British resented American pressure to allow in more Jewish
refugees - a sign of growing US support for Zionism. Both Arab and Jewish sides prepared for the
coming confrontation by mobilising forces. The first "clearing" operations were conducted against
Palestinian villages by Jewish forces in December.
UN Partition Plan
The United Nations General Assembly decided in
1947 on the partition of Palestine into Jewish and
Arab
states,
with
Jerusalem
to
be
an
internationalised city.
Jewish representatives in Palestine accepted the
plan tactically because it implied international
recognition for their aims. Some Jewish leaders,
such as David Ben Gurion, the first Israeli prime
minister, opposed the plan because their ambition
was a Jewish state on the entire territory of
Mandate Palestine.
The Palestinians and Arabs felt that it was a deep
injustice to ignore the rights of the majority of the
population of Palestine. The Arab League and
Palestinian institutions rejected the partition plan,
and formed volunteer armies that infiltrated into
Palestine beginning in December of 1947.
Summary of UN General Assembly Resolution 1812
November 29, 1947
The territory of Palestine should be divided as follows:
A Jewish State covering 56.47% of Mandatory Palestine (excluding Jerusalem) with a
population of 498,000 Jews and 325,000 Arabs;
2
For the full text see
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/62c13fb98d54fe240525672700581383/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253!OpenDocument.
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Lecture notes 13
An Arab State covering 43.53% of Mandatory Palestine (excluding Jerusalem), with 807,000
Arab inhabitants and 10,000 Jewish inhabitants;
An international trusteeship regime in Jerusalem, where the population was 100,000 Jews and
105,000 Arabs.
The partition plan also provided for:
A guarantee of the rights of minorities and religious rights, including free access to and the
preservation of Holy Places;
A constitution of an Economic Union between the two states: custom union, joint monetary
system, joint administration of main services, equal access to water and energy resources.
The General Assembly also proposed:
A two-month interim period beginning 1 August 1948, date of expiry of the mandate when the
British troops were to be evacuated, with a zone including a port to be evacuated in the
territory of the Jewish State by 1 February;
A five-country Commission (Bolivia, Denmark, Panama, Philippines, Czechoslovakia) in charge
of the administration of the regions evacuated by Great Britain, of establishing the frontiers of
the two states and of setting up in each of them a Provisional Council of Government;
The gradual take-over of the administration by the Provisional Council of Government in both
States, and the organization of democratic elections for a Constituent Assembly within two
months.
Establishment of Israel
The State of Israel, the first Jewish state for nearly 2,000 years, was proclaimed at 1600 on 14
May 1948 in Tel Aviv. The declaration came into effect the following day as the last British troops
withdrew. Palestinians remember 15 May as "al-Nakba", or the Catastrophe.
The year had begun with Jewish and Arab armies each staging attacks on territory held by the
other side. Jewish forces, backed by the Irgun and Lehi militant groups made more progress,
seizing areas alloted to the Jewish state but also conquering substantial territories allocated for
the Palestinian one. Irgun and Lehi massacred scores of inhabitants of the village of Deir Yassin
near Jerusalem on 9 April. Word of the massacre spread terror among Palestinians and hundreds
of thousands fled to Lebanon, Egypt and the area now known as the West Bank. The Jewish
armies were victorious in the Negev, Galilee, West Jerusalem and much of the coastal plain.
The day after the state of Israel was declared five Arab armies from Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria
and Iraq immediately invaded Israel but were repulsed, and the Israeli army crushed pockets of
resistance. Armistices established Israel's borders on the frontier of most of the earlier British
Mandate Palestine. Egypt kept the Gaza Strip while Jordan annexed the area around East
Jerusalem and the land now known as the West Bank. These territories made up about 25% of the
total area of British Mandate Palestine.
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Lecture notes 13
1: Israel founded: UN partition plan
The United Nations General Assembly decided in
1947 on the partition of Palestine into Jewish
and Arab states, with Jerusalem to be an
international city. The plan, which was rejected
by the native Arabs, was never implemented.
2: Israel founded: Armistice
War broke out in 1948 when Britain withdrew,
the Jews declared the state of Israel and
troops from neighbouring Arab nations moved
in. After eight months of fighting an armistice
line was agreed, establishing the West Bank
and Gaza Strip as distinct geographical units.
Formation of the PLO
Since 1948 there had been fierce competition between neighbouring states to lead an Arab
response to the creation of Israel. That left the Palestinians as passive onlookers. In January
1964, Arab governments - wanting to create a Palestinian organisation that would remain
essentially under their control - voted to create a body called the Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO). But the Palestinians wanted a genuinely independent body, and that was the goal of Yasser
Arafat who took over the chairmanship of the PLO in 1969. His Fatah organisation (founded in
secret five years earlier) was gaining notoriety with its armed operations against Israel. Fatah
fighters inflicted heavy casualties on Israeli troops at Karameh in Jordan in 1968.
The 1967 War
Mounting tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbours culminated in six days of hostilities
starting on 5 June 1967 and ending on 11 June - six days which changed the face of the Middle
East conflict.
Israel seized Gaza and the Sinai from Egypt in the south and the Golan Heights from Syria in the
north. It also pushed Jordanian forces out of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Egypt's powerful
air force was put out of action on the first day of fighting when Israeli jets bombed it on the
ground in a pre-emptive strike. The territorial gains doubled the area of land controlled by Israel.
The victory heralded a new age of confidence and optimism for Israel and its supporters.
The UN Security Council issued resolution 242, stressing "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area
can live in security". The resolution called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict". It also called for an end to "all claims or states of
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Lecture notes 13
belligerency and respect for... the sovereignty... of every state in the area and their right to live in
peace... free from threats or acts of force".
According to the UN, the conflict displaced another 500,000 Palestinians who fled to Egypt, Syria,
Lebanon and Jordan.
Six-Day War: Before the war
From 1948 to 1967, the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem, was ruled by Jordan. During this
period, the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian
military administration. Israeli troops captured
Egypt's Sinai peninsula during the 1956 British,
French and Israeli military campaign in response
to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The
Israelis subsequently withdrew and were replaced
with a UN force. In 1967, Egypt ordered the UN
troops out and blocked Israeli shipping routes adding to already high levels of tension between
Israel and its neighbours.
Six-Day War: After the war
In a pre-emptive attack on Egypt that drew
Syria and Jordan into a regional war in 1967,
Israel made massive territorial gains capturing
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and
the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal. The
principle of land-for-peace that has formed the
basis of Arab-Israeli negotiations is based on
Israel giving up land won in the 1967 war in
return for peace deals recognising Israeli
borders and its right to security. The Sinai
Peninsula was returned to Egypt as part of the
1979 peace deal with Israel.
UN Security Council resolution 242
November 22, 1967
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East;
Emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting
peace in which every State in the area can live in security;
Emphasising further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have
undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter;
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Lecture notes 13
Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
Affirms further the necessity,
For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through
measures including the establishment of demilitarised zones;
Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish
and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a
peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special
Representative as soon as possible.
The 1973 Yom Kippur war
Unable to regain the territory they had lost in 1967 by diplomatic means, Egypt and Syria
launched major offensives against Israel on the Jewish festival of the Day of Atonement or Yom
Kippur. The clashes are also known as the Ramadan war.
Initially, Egypt and Syria made advances in Sinai and the Golan Heights. These were reversed
after three weeks of fighting. Israel eventually made gains beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines. Israeli
forces pushed on into Syria beyond the Golan Heights, though they later gave up some of these
gains. In Egypt, Israeli forces regained territory and advanced to the western side of the Suez
Canal. The United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations all made diplomatic
interventions to bring about ceasefire agreements between the combatants. Egypt and Syria
jointly lost an estimated 8,500 soldiers in the fighting, while Israel lost about 6,000.
The war left Israel more dependent on the US for military, diplomatic and economic support. Soon
after the war, Saudi Arabia led a petroleum embargo against states that supported Israel. The
embargo, which caused a steep rises in petrol prices and fuel shortages across the world, lasted
until March 1974. In October 1973 the UN Security Council passed resolution 338 which called for
the combatants "to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately... [and start]
negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a
just and durable peace in the Middle East".
Arafat's first UN appearance
In the 1970s, under Yasser Arafat's leadership, PLO factions and other militant Palestinian groups
such as Abu Nidal launched a series of attacks on Israeli and other targets. One such attack took
place at the Munich Olympics in 1972 in which 11 Israeli athletes were killed.
But while the PLO pursued the armed struggle to "liberate all of Palestine", in 1974, Arafat made a
dramatic first appearance at the United Nations mooting a peaceful solution. He condemned the
Zionist project, but concluded: "Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom
fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand." The speech was a watershed in the
Palestinians' search for international recognition of their cause.
A year later, a US State Department official, Harold Saunders, acknowledged for the first time that
"the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiating of
an Arab-Israeli peace".
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Lecture notes 13
Israel's resurgent right wing
Hardline Irgun and Lehi groups may have been instrumental in the creation of Israel in 1948, but
their heirs in the Herut (later Likud) party failed to win an Israeli election until 1977. This election
ended Likud's long period in opposition. Until this time Israeli politics had been dominated by the
left-wing Labour Party. Likud ideology focused on extending Israeli sovereignty in the whole of the
earlier Britsh Mandate Palestine, as well as claiming Jordanian territory as part of the "Greater
Israel" of Biblical times.
The new government, led by former Irgun leader Menachem Begin, intensified Israeli settlement
activity in the West Bank and Gaza with a view to creating "facts on the ground" to prevent any
future territorial compromise over the areas captured in 1967. Agriculture minister Ariel Sharon
spearheaded this movement as chairman of the ministerial committee for settlements until 1981.
Israel and Egypt make peace
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat stunned the world by flying to the Jewish state and making a
speech to the Israeli parliament in Jerusalem on 19 November 1977. Sadat became the first Arab
leader to recognise Israel, only four years after launching the October 1973 war (known as the
Yom Kippur war in Israel). The war was indecisive after Egypt and Syria had attacked Israeli
forces occupying Sinai and the Golan Heights. It ended with the issuing of UN Resolution 338
calling for "a just and durable peace in the Middle East".
Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David accords in September 1978 outlining "the framework for
peace in the Middle East" which included limited autonomy for Palestinians. (see Appendix) A
bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed by Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
Begin six months later in March 1979. The Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had seized in the 1967
war, was returned to Egypt.
Arab states boycotted Egypt for breaking ranks and negotiating a separate treaty with Israel.
Sadat was assassinated in 1981 by Islamist elements in the Egyptian army, who opposed peace
with Israel, during national celebrations to mark the anniversary of the October war.
Israeli invasion of Lebanon
The Israeli army launched a massive military incursion into Lebanon in the summer of 1982.
Operation "Peace for Galilee" was intended to wipe out Palestinian guerrilla bases near Israel's
northern border, although Defence Minister Ariel Sharon pushed all the way to Beirut and expelled
the PLO from the country. The invasion began on 6 June, less than two months after the last
Israeli troops and civilians were pulled out of Sinai under the 1979 treaty with Egypt. The action
was triggered by the attempt on the life of Israeli ambassador to London Shlomo Argov by the
dissident Palestinian group Abu Nidal. Israeli troops reached Beirut in August. A ceasefire
agreement allowed the departure of PLO fighters from Lebanon, leaving Palestinian refugee camps
defenceless.
As Israeli forces gathered around Beirut on 14 September, Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Christian
Phalange militia, was killed by a bomb at his HQ in the capital. The following day, the Israeli army
occupied West Beirut. From 16 to 18 September, the Phalangists - who were allied to Israel killed hundreds of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps as they were encircled by
Israeli troops in one of the worst atrocities of nearly a century of conflict in the Middle East. Mr
Sharon resigned from his post as defence minister after a 1983 Israeli inquiry concluded that he
had failed to act to prevent the massacre.
Palestinian intifada
A mass uprising - or intifada - against the Israeli occupation began in Gaza and quickly spread to
the West Bank. It put pressure on both the PLO and Israel. Protest took the form of civil
disobedience, general strikes, boycotts on Israeli products, graffiti, and barricades, but it was the
stone-throwing demonstrations against the heavily-armed occupation troops that captured
international attention.
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Lecture notes 13
The Israeli Defence Forces responded and there was heavy loss of life among Palestinian civilians.
More than 1,000 died in clashes which lasted until 1993.
PLO opens door to peace
Despite its military might, Israel was unable to suppress the intifada which started in 1987 and
was backed by the entire Palestinian population living under Israeli occupation. The intifada
proved more powerful than had been expected. For the PLO - based in Tunis since its expulsion
from Lebanon in 1982 - the uprising threatened the loss of its role as the main player in the
Palestinian "revolution" as focus shifted to the occupied territories and away from the Diaspora
population.
The Palestinian National Council (a government-in-exile) convened in Algeria in November 1988
and voted to accept a "two-state" solution based on the 1947 UN partition resolution (181),
renounce terrorism and seek a negotiated settlement based on Resolution 242, which called for
Israel to withdraw from territory captured in the 1967 war, and Resolution 338.
The US began dialogue with the PLO. But Israel continued to view the PLO as a terrorist
organisation with which it would not negotiate. Instead, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
proposed elections in the occupied territories before negotiations on a self-rule agreement.
Madrid Summit
The 1991 Gulf War was a disaster for the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat whose support for Iraq
alienated his wealthy supporters in the Gulf. With Kuwait liberated from Iraqi control, the US
administration devoted itself to Middle East peacemaking - a prospect more appealing to the
financially weakened and politically isolated Arafat than Israel's hard-line Likud prime minister
Yitzhak Shamir.
Numerous visits by the US Secretary of State James Baker prepared the ground for an
international summit in Madrid. Syria agreed to attend, hoping to negotiate a return of the Golan
Heights. Jordan also accepted the invitation. But Shamir refused to talk directly with PLO
"terrorists", so a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was formed with prominent Palestinian
figures- who were not from the PLO - taking part. In the days before the summit, Washington
withheld $10bn of loan guarantees from Israel in a rare moment of discord over the building of
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. A worldwide audience watched the beginning of this
historic summit on 30 October 1991. The old enemies were each given 45 minutes to set out their
positions. The Palestinians spoke of a shared future of hope with Israel, Shamir justified the
existence of the Jewish state, while Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara dwelled on Mr
Shamir's "terrorist" past. After the summit the US set up separate bilateral meetings in
Washington between Israel and Syria, and with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegations.
The Oslo Peace Process
The election of the left-wing Labour government in June 1992, led by Yitzhak Rabin, triggered a
period of frenetic Israeli-Arab peacemaking in the mid-1990s.
The government - including the "iron-fisted" Rabin and doves Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin - was
uniquely placed to talk seriously about peace with the Palestinians. The PLO, meanwhile, wanted
to make peace talks work because of the weakness of its position due to the Gulf War. Israel
immediately lifted a ban on PLO participants in the stalemated bilateral meetings in Washington.
More significantly Foreign Minister Peres and his deputy Beilin explored the possibility of activating
a secret forum for talks facilitated by Norway.
With the Washington bilateral talks going nowhere, the secret "Oslo track" - opened on 20
January 1993 in the Norwegian town of Sarpsborg - made unprecedented progress. The
Palestinians consented to recognise Israel in return for the beginning of phased dismantling of
Israel's occupation. Negotiations culminated in the Declaration of Principles, signed on the White
House lawn and sealed with a historic first handshake between Rabin and Yasser Arafat watched
by 400 million people around the world.
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Birth of the Palestinian Authority
On 4 May 1994 Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation reached an agreement in Cairo
on the initial implementation of the 1993 Declaration of Principles. This document specified
Israel's military withdrawal from most of the Gaza Strip, excluding Jewish settlements and land
around them, and from the Palestinian town of Jericho in the West Bank. Negotiations were
difficult and were almost derailed on 25 February when a Jewish settler in the West Bank town of
Hebron fired on praying Muslims, killing 29 people. The agreement itself contained potential
pitfalls. It envisaged further withdrawals during a five-year interim period during which solutions
to the really difficult issues were to be negotiated - issues such as the establishment of a
Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories and the
fate of more than 3.5 million Palestinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 upheavals.
Many critics of the peace process were silenced on 1 July as jubilant crowds lined the streets of
Gaza to cheer Yasser Arafat on his triumphal return to Palestinian territory. The returning
Palestinian Liberation Army deployed in areas vacated by Israeli troops and Arafat became head of
the new Palestinian National Authority (PA) in the autonomous areas. He was elected president of
the Authority in January 1996.
Oslo II and the assassination of Rabin
The first year of Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho was dogged by difficulties. Bomb attacks
by Palestinian militants killed dozens of Israelis, while Israel blockaded the autonomous areas and
assassinated militants. Settlement activity continued. The Palestinian Authority quelled unrest by
mass detentions. Opposition to the peace process grew among right-wingers and religious
nationalists in Israel.
Against this background, peace talks were laborious and fell behind schedule. But on 24
September 1996 the so-called Oslo II agreement was signed in Taba in Egypt, and countersigned
four days later in Washington.
The agreement divided the West Bank into three zones:
•
Zone A comprised 7% of the territory (the main Palestinian towns excluding Hebron and East
Jerusalem) going to full Palestinian control;
•
Zone B comprised 21% of the territory under joint Israeli-Palestinian control;
•
Zone C stayed in Israeli hands. Israel was also to release Palestinian prisoners. Further
handovers followed.
Oslo II was greeted with little enthusiasm by Palestinians, while Israel's religious right was furious
at the "surrender of Jewish land". Amid an incitement campaign against Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin, a Jewish religious extremist assassinated him on 4 November, sending shock
waves around the world. The dovish Shimon Peres, architect of the faltering peace process,
became prime minister.
Deadlock
Conflict returned early in 1996 with a series of devastating suicide bombings in Israel carried out
by the Islamic militant group Hamas, and a bloody three-week bombardment of Lebanon by
Israel.
Peres narrowly lost elections on 29 May to the right-wing Binyamin "Bibi" Netanyahu, who
campaigned against the Oslo peace deals under the motto "Peace with Security". Netanyahu soon
enflamed Arab opinion by lifting a freeze on building new settlements in the occupied territories
and provoking fears about undermining Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem by opening an
archaeological tunnel under the compound of al-Aqsa mosque - one of Islam's holiest sites.
Despite his antagonism towards the existing peace process, Netanyahu, under increasing US
pressure, handed over 80% of Hebron in January 1997 and signed the Wye River Memorandum
on 23 October 1998 outlining further withdrawals from the West Bank. But his right-wing coalition
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Lecture notes 13
collapsed in January 1999 in disarray over the implementation of the Wye deal. He lost elections
on 18 May to Labour's Ehud Barak who pledged to "end the 100-year conflict" between Israel and
the Arabs within one year.
The five-year interim period defined by Oslo for a final resolution passed on 4 May 1999, but
Yasser Arafat was persuaded to defer the unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood to give a
chance for negotiations with the new administration.
Second intifada
Initial optimism about the peacemaking prospects of a government led by Ehud Barak proved
unfounded. A new Wye River accord was signed in September 1999 but further withdrawals from
occupied land were hindered by disagreements and final status talks (on Jerusalem, refugees,
settlements and borders) got nowhere. Frustration was building in the Palestinian population who
had little to show for five years of the peace process. Barak concentrated on peace with Syria also unsuccessfully. But he did succeed in fulfilling a campaign pledge to end Israel's 21-year
entanglement in Lebanon.
After the withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, attention turned back to Yasser Arafat, who was
under pressure from Barak and US President Bill Clinton to abandon gradual negotiations and
launch an all-out push for a final settlement at the presidential retreat at Camp David. Two weeks
of talks failed to come up with acceptable solutions to the status of Jerusalem and the right of
return of Palestinian refugees.
In the uncertainty of the ensuing impasse, Ariel Sharon, the veteran right-winger who succeeded
Binyamin Netanyahu as Likud leader, toured the al-Aqsa/Temple Mount complex in Jerusalem on
28 September. Sharon's critics saw it as a highly provocative move. Palestinian demonstrations
followed, quickly developing into what became known as the al-Aqsa intifada, or uprising.
The return of Sharon
By the end of 2000 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak found himself presiding over an increasingly
bitter and bloody cycle of violence as the intifada raged against Israel's occupation in the West
Bank and Gaza.
With the collapse of his coalition, Barak resigned as prime minister on 10 December to "seek a
new mandate" to deal with the crisis. However in elections on 6 Febuary 2001, Ariel Sharon was
swept to power by an Israeli electorate that had overwhelmingly turned its back on the land-forpeace formulas of the 1990s and now favoured a tougher approach to Israel's "Palestinian
problem".
The death toll soared as Sharon intensified existing policies such as assassinating Palestinian
militants, air strikes and incursions into Palestinian self-rule areas. Palestinian militants,
meanwhile, stepped up suicide bomb attacks in Israeli cities. The US spearheaded international
efforts to calm the violence. Envoy George Mitchell led an inquiry into the uprising, while CIA
director George Tenet negotiated a ceasefire - but neither initiative broke the cycle of bloodshed.
The Mitchell Commission of May 2001 summarized the main points of an American-led inquiry into
months of Israeli-Palestinian violence. Chaired by former US-senator George Mitchell, the socalled “Mitchell Report”3 remained the most significant diplomatic attempt to bring the two sides
closer and to end the violence that began in September 2000.
Re-occupation of the West Bank
Palestinian militants carried out an intense campaign of attacks in the first three months of the
year, including a hotel bombing which killed 29 on the eve of the Jewish Passover holiday. In
response, Israel besieged Yasser Arafat in his Ramallah compound for five weeks and sent tanks
and thousands of troops to re-occupy almost all of the West Bank. Months of curfews and closures
3
For a summary and full text of the report see the Appendix and also “Sharm-El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report.” U.S.
Department of State Online. Available http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm.
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Lecture notes 13
followed as Israel carried out operations it said were aimed at destroying the Palestinian terrorist
infrastructure.
Controversy raged as Israeli forces entered and captured the West Bank city of Jenin in April. A
UN report later refuted Palestinian claims of a massacre, but Amnesty International concluded
that the Israeli army had committed war crimes in Jenin and also Nablus. May saw a five-week
stand-off between the Israeli army and a large group of militants and civilians sheltering inside
Bethlehem's Church of the Nativity.
In June, US President George Bush called for Palestinians to replace their leader with one not
"compromised by terror", and outlined a timetable for negotiations which would later become the
plan known as the "roadmap".4 Israel began building a barrier in the West Bank (the ‘fence’),
which it said was to prevent attacks inside Israel, although Palestinians feared an attempt to
annex land. Mr Arafat faced heavy pressure to reform the Palestinian Authority and rein in the
militants. Palestinian attacks continued, met with periodic Israeli incursions and a ten-day siege
which reduced much of Mr Arafat's compound to debris.
Road map sparked hope
After several Palestinian attacks in January 2003, Israel stepped up operations against Hamas,
killing the militant group's founder. With the US and Israel continuing to refuse to deal directly
with Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader appointed Mahmoud Abbas as his prime minister.
In late April, the US published the much-delayed roadmap, which outlined a step-by-step
timetable towards a negotiated Palestinian state, with the first phase contingent on an end to
Palestinian violence and Israeli incursions and settlement activity. In May, the Israeli cabinet
endorsed the plan, though it put on record several reservations.
At a summit with the US president in Aqaba, Jordan, in June, Mr Abbas called for an end to the
armed intifada, while Israeli President Ariel Sharon declared his support for the creation of a
"democratic Palestinian state at peace with Israel". Further negotiations led to pull-backs of Israeli
forces in Gaza and Bethlehem. Mr Abbas secured a temporary cessation of violence from
Palestinian militant groups.
In August, after seven weeks of relative calm, the truce disintegrated with a spate of tit-for-tat
Palestinian suicide bombings, Israeli raids and targeted killings. After a long-running power
struggle with Mr Arafat over control of the Palestinian security apparatus, Mr Abbas resigned in
early September. He was replaced by Arafat-loyal Ahmed Qurei. Construction of the West Bank
barrier continued throughout the year despite growing international criticism. The Israeli cabinet
voted to "remove" Mr Arafat and in December Mr Sharon told the Palestinians he would implement
a policy of unilateral separation unless they halted violence.
The Geneva Accord: An unofficial proposal to resolve the conflict
On 1 December 2003, the Draft Permanent Status Agreement, better known as the Geneva
Accord or Geneva Initiative, was launched at a ceremony in Geneva. The Accord is an extragovernmental and therefore unofficial peace proposal meant to solve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Amongst its creators are Israeli politician Yossi Beilin, one of the architects of the Oslo
accords, and former Palestinian Authority minister Yasser Abed Rabbo. Both noted that the
Geneva accord doesn't oblige any of their respective governments, even though Rabbo was a
minister at the time of the signing.
The Accord would give Palestinians almost all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and part of
Jerusalem, drawing Israel's borders close to what existed before the 1967 war. In return for
removing most of the Israeli settlements in those areas, the Palestinians would limit their "right of
4
For a full text of this “performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” see the
Appendix.
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Lecture notes 13
return" to Israel to a number specified by Israel and will drop all other claims and demands from
Israel.
However, official and public support for the agreement on both the Israeli and Palestinian side has
been quite low so far.5
The death of Arafat
Throughout the first half of 2004 Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli air strikes continued.
Israel provoked outrage among Palestinians by killing Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin
in a targeted missile attack in March. A second senior leader, Abdel-Aziz al-Rantissi, was killed a
month later.
In April Ariel Sharon revealed a "disengagement plan" which included the withdrawal of all 8,000
settlers and the troops that protect them in the Gaza Strip, and from three small settlements in
the northern West Bank. Construction of the West Bank barrier continued, despite increasing
protests and changes to the route in response to a verdict in the Israeli High Court. In July, the
International Court of Justice in The Hague pronounced the barrier illegal, but Israel dismissed the
non-binding verdict.
Intra-Palestinian political turmoil broke out over the summer as Yasser Arafat, Prime Minister
Ahmed Qurei and various Palestinian factions battled over reform of the security forces. After
three bombings in August and September and numerous Palestinian rocket attacks on Israeli
towns, Israel launched a major and bloody incursion into northern Gaza.
In late October Arafat became seriously ill and flown to France for emergency treatment. He died
of a mysterious blood disorder on 11 November 2004. The news was met with a tide of grief
among Palestinians. Emotional crowds engulfed Mr Arafat's compound in Ramallah as his body
arrived by helicopter to be buried. Mahmoud Abbas, who had spent a brief spell as prime minister
in 2002, was confirmed as Arafat's successor as chairman of the PLO.
Israel’s pullout from the Gaza strip
Mahmoud Abbas was elected president of the Palestinian Authority after a landslide victory in the
Palestinian elections taking place in January 2005. But post-election attacks by Palestinian
militants immediately threatened to derail hopes for renewed peace talks. However, Mr Abbas
deployed Palestinian police in northern Gaza and by February had persuaded Hamas and Islamic
Jihad to begin a temporary, unofficial cessation of violence.
Mr Abbas and Mr Sharon went on to announce a mutual ceasefire at a summit in Egypt, although
the militant groups stopped short of making their fragile – and far from watertight - truce official.
Preparations for – and controversy over – Ariel Sharon's planned pullout from the Gaza Strip
continued, with the Israeli Prime Minister securing cabinet backing and fending off calls for a
referendum from opponents. Despite widespread protests by settlers, the withdrawal went ahead
in late August and early September, with emotional scenes as Israeli troops removed some
settlers by force.
2006 – Another disappointing year of conflict: Analysis and Future Outlook
Some senior Palestinians were visibly excited by the fact that early 2006 Sharon was forming a
new centrist party and dropping substantial hints about pulling out of parts of the occupied West
Bank. In addition, there was U.S. President Bush’s talk endorsing Middle East democracy, which,
however, never won over the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people. In subsequent months
crisis after crisis followed.
The most dangerous long-term problem is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to imagine how
a Palestinian state equipped with sufficient sovereignty could be established alongside Israel. At
present more leaders than ever before agree that a two-state solution is the only way ahead.
5
For the full text of the agreement and latest news on the Initiative see Geneva Initiative Online. Available:
http://www.geneva-accord.org/.
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Lecture notes 13
Among those in favour of such a solution are the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, Ehud
Olmert , Israel’s Prime Minister (following the demise of the disease-ridden Sharon), and a long
list of others headed by George Bush, Tony Blair and the leaders of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia. Even Khaled Meshal, the exiled political leader of Hamas – the Islamic resistance
movement which won the Palestinian elections and currently forms the Palestinian government –
though he refuses to recognize Israel, is prepared for negotiations to create a Palestinian state in
the West Bank and Gaza, and for a ten year truce with Israel. Despite this widespread agreement,
however, the leaders of the rival parties profoundly disagree on the terms and shape of such a
two-state settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
President Abbas and a majority of Palestinians envisage a fully functioning state to be created on
the land that Israel captured in the 1967 Middle East war – in Gaza, the West Bank and (East)
Jerusalem – with a few minor adjustments possible. But for Ehud Olmert and other Israeli leaders
a future Palestinian state will not include most of the settlements for Jews that Israel has set up –
in violation of international law since 1967 – in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.6 It is also not
clear what role, if any, Israelis would accept for Palestinians in Jerusalem, or whether they would
allow them fundamental attributes of sovereignty like control of their own borders, airspace and
territorial waters. Israelis, supported by the world powers (esp. the U.S.) also state that they will
not negotiate with Hamas until it recognizes the Israeli state, gives up violence and accepts the
agreements that have been made by previous Palestinian leaders. Other major issues that would
have to be resolved include the future of Palestinian refugees and control of water resources.
The Palestinians are turned increasingly on themselves – and also against each other as the
ongoing violent power struggle between Fatah – Hamas shows – in a society that is fragmented,
violent and impoverished. King Abdullah of Jordan has warned that a Palestinian civil war is a real
danger in the coming year. President Bush still urges Palestinians to embrace democracy, which
they thought they did when they voted decisively for Hamas in the January 2006 elections.
The removal of fewer than 9,000 Jewish settlers from Gaza in 2005 caused a national trauma in
Israel. It is hard to imagine any Israeli leader being either willing or able to move a sufficiently big
proportion of the more than 400,000 Jewish settlers who live in the occupied territories to satisfy
the Palestinians. Some Israelis believe that uprooting the settlements could even destroy their
state. Settlements were created partly out of the intention to make it impossible for Israel to
leave the land it had occupied. Israel’s politicians who authorized and promoted the settlements
all assumed that they could only beneficial for the Jewish state. But if the settlements stay against
the will of the Palestinian people, along with the security perimeters, access roads and military
patrols that are required to protect the settlements, it is hard to see how there can be anything
like peace (not to mention a permanent conflict resolution).
Further North, the outlook for Lebanon is no less grim. The war with Israel in summer 2006 has
been the catalyst for severe internal conflicts between Christian and Islamic parties (primarily the
Hezbollah). This boils down to a dispute that is becoming increasingly violent between those who
want to look East and embrace what they believe are its natural allies in Syria and Iran and those
who instinctively look West towards Europe and the U.S. By the end of 2006, the opposition was
trying to overthrow the government by staging big demonstrations in the centre of Beirut.
6
It is widely accepted that under international law, the Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel are illegal.
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relating to the protection of civilian persons in time of war states: “The occupying power
shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territories it occupies.”
Within the international community the overwhelming view is that Article 49 is applicable to the occupation of East Jerusalem, the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The United States has in the past called the settlements illegal, but has more recently used milder
language, at least in public. However, the Mitchell report into the causes of Palestinian-Israeli violence that began in September
2000 said: “… customary international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, prohibits Israel (as an occupying power) from
establishing settlements in occupied territory pending an end to the conflict.”
Israel argues that the international conventions relating to the occupied territories do not apply to the Palestinian territories because
they were not under the legitimate sovereignty of any state in the first place.
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Lecture notes 13
These developments in Palestine, Lebanon and other countries in the Arab world increase the
already high level of fear and ‘siege mentality’ among the Israeli population. To date Israel is still
the only Middle Eastern state with nuclear weapons. Yet suddenly its military hegemony in the
region, unquestioned for almost 40 years, feels less solid. The Israeli Defence Forces performed
badly in Lebanon and have not been able to break the Palestinian resistance in the occupied
territories. Syria is arming itself, apparently for self-defence, and Iran is pursuing its nuclear
ambitions, thus being an increased threat for the existence of the Jewish state. Internally, the
Israeli society is becoming increasingly fragmented and the gap between the rich and the poor
widens. To conclude: the Middle East remains a melting pot of conflict.
Concluding Remarks
The core issues dividing the Israeli and Palestinian national communities have remained relatively
constant over the years. They include the following:
Territory and Borders: specific, fixed, agreed-upon boundaries for Israel and for the Arab
states in the region, including whatever form of Palestinian state or political entity is created;
Status of Jerusalem;
Settlers and settlements: the political, civil and national status of approximately 400,000
Jewish Israelis currently living on occupied land within the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem);
Refugees and the right to return: the political, civil and national status of over four million
Palestinians currently living outside the borders of the historic Palestine;
Compensation for Palestinians and Israelis who were forced to leave their homes and property
as a direct result of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict;
Natural resources: the allocation of resources such as water among the peoples of the region;
Assurance of mutual security for all states and all peoples in the region;
Economic viability of all the states in the region;
Political, civil and national status of Palestinians currently living within Israel;
Role of the international community in supervising a negotiated settlement.
Each of these issues reflects a significant and controversial aspect of Israeli-Palestinian relations
that must be addressed before a just and stable conflict resolution can be achieved.
Literature
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October 2006. Available: http://almashriq.hiof.no/general/300/320/327/oslo.html.
Barzilai, Gad (1999) “War, democracy and internal conflict: Israel in a comparative perspective.”
Comparative Politics, 31, 3: 317-336.
Balfour, Arthur James (1917) "The Balfour Declaration of 1917, 2nd November." Middle East Web. Internet.
11 January 2007. Available: http://www.mideastweb.org/mebalfour.htm (with an Introduction and
Background Analysis by Ami Isseroff).
Barak, Oren (2005) “The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000.” Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 42, no. 6.
Chomsky, Noam (1999) Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians. Foreword by Edward
Said. Updated ed. London: Pluto Press.
Cohn-Sherbok, Dan and Dawoud El-Alami (2003) The Palestine-Israeli Conflict: a Beginner’s Guide. Updated
ed. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
Farer, Tom (1991) “Israel’s unlawful occupation.” Foreign Policy, 82: 37-58. (DL)
Galtung, Johan (1972) “Conflict Theory and the Palestine Problem.” Journal of Palestine Studies, 2, 1: 34-63.
Geneva Initiative (2003) The Geneva Accord: A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement. Geneva: Geneva
Initiative.
Hermann, Tamar (2005) “The bi-national idea in Israel/Palestine: Past and Present.” Nations and
Nationalism, 11, 3: 381-401.
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Lecture notes 13
Howe, Stephen (2000) “The politics of historical ‘Revisionism’: Comparing Ireland and Israel/Palestine.” Past
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Klieman, Aaron S. (2000) Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status Negotiations. New York: Columbia
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Pappe, Ilan (1999) The Israel/Palestine Question: Rewriting Histories. London: Routledge.
Robinson, Glenn E. (1997) Building a Palestinian State: the Incomplete Revolution. Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Rouhana, Nadim N. (2004) “Group identity and power asymmetry in reconciliation processes: The IsraeliPalestinian case.” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 10, 1: 33-52.
Rouhana, Nadim N. (1997) Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press.
Said, Edward (1992) The Question of Palestine. New York: Vintage Books.
Shikaki, Khalil (2006) “Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public opinion and the Peace Process.” USIP
Special Report 158, January 2006. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Online:
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr158.html.
Smith, Charles (2005) “The Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in Fawcett, Louise (ed.) International Relations of the
Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
U.S. Department of State (2003) "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" U.S. Department of State Online. Washington, DC, 30 April 2003. Internet.
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Lecture notes 13
Appendix
The Camp David Accords of 1979
The Camp David accords, signed in the United States in September 1978 by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem
Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, were the first peace deal between Israel and an Arab state.
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of
Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to
September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite
other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.
Preamble
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:
• The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is United
Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
• After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of
civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of
the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned
to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among
nations.
• The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the
parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the
peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of
both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this
generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
• The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and
legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.
• To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future
negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are
necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
• Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts
of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the
Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in
assuring security.
• Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal
relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree
to special security arrangements such as demilitarised zones, limited armaments areas, early warning
stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other
arrangements that they agree are useful.
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Lecture notes 13
Framework
Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable
settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighbourly relations.
They recognise that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the
conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for
peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbours which is
prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed
as follows:
A. West Bank and Gaza
Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the
resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the
West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
•
Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into
account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West
Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants,
under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn
as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace
the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be
invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due
consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the
legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
•
Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the
West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank
and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will
define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and
Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining
Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring
internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may
include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the
manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
•
When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and
inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third
year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status
of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbours and to conclude a peace treaty between
Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt,
Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate
but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties
which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its
neighbours, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan
to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the
peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of
the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security
Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries
and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the
legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will
participate in the determination of their own future through:
o i The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West
Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by
the end of the transitional period.
o ii Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West
Bank and Gaza.
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Lecture notes 13
iii Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how
they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
o iv Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between
Israel and Jordan.
All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours
during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force
will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and
Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and
Egyptian officers.
During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will
constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons
displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption
and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures
for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.
Egypt-Israel
Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall
be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of
concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while
inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace
treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of
a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will
agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.
o
•
•
•
B.
•
•
Associated Principles
•
Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties
between Israel and each of its neighbours - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
•
Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To
this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the UN Charter. Steps to be taken in this
respect include:
o a. Full recognition
o b. Abolishing economic boycotts
o c. Guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection
of the due process of law.
•
Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with
the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common
goal.
•
Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
•
The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the
implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of
the parties.
•
The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their
provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to
underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform
their policies an actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.
For the Government of Israel: Menachem Begin
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat
Witnessed by Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America.
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Lecture notes 13
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East: Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace
Treaty between Egypt and Israel.
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of
concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.
It is agreed that:
•
The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually
agreed.
•
All of the principles of UN Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and
Egypt.
•
Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three
years after the peace treaty is signed.
The following matters are agreed between the parties:
•
The full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognised border between Egypt and
mandated Palestine
•
The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai
•
The use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian
purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations
•
The right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the
Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are
international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of
navigation and over flight
•
The construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful
passage by Egypt and Jordan
•
The stationing of military forces listed below.
Stationing of Forces:
No more than one division (mechanised or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area
lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.
Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will
be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from
20km (12 miles) to 40km (24 miles).
In the area within 3km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not
to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers. Border patrol units not to exceed three
battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.
The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations. Early warning
stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement. United Nations forces will be
stationed:
•
In part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the
international border, and
•
In the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will
not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a
unanimous vote of the five permanent members.
After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established
between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations;
termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual
protection of citizens by the due process of law.
Interim Withdrawal:
Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east
of a line extending from a point east of al-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be
determined by mutual agreement.
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Lecture notes 13
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt: Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat
For the Government of Israel: Menachem Begin
Witnessed by: Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America
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Lecture notes 13
1993 Declaration of Principles
Historic handshake at the White House: Yitzhak Rabin, Bill Clinton and Yasser Arafat
The “Oslo declaration” failed to secure a permanent status agreement
The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements is the main agreement signed between
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It was signed on White House lawn amid much fanfare in
September 1993.
Many of the declaration's provisions - the inauguration of the Palestinian National Authority, the handover of
some land to Palestinian control, and the formation of the Palestinian security forces for example - were
implemented.
However, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators failed to move on from these initial provisions to a permanent
status agreement on issues including Jerusalem, borders and refugees. Frustration at the failure of the peace
process to deliver what it promised, and the collapse of last ditch talks chaired by former US President Bill
Clinton at Camp David were partly to blame for the beginning of another Palestinian intifada, or rebellion against
Israeli occupation, in September 2000.
The deterioration of relations since the start of the intifada means that many Israelis and Palestinians now see
the process that was begun in 1993 as dead.
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle
East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time
to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognise their mutual legitimate and political rights, and
strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly,
the two sides agree to the following principles:
Article I: Aim of negotiations
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other
things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the
Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years,
leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). It is
understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the
negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967)
and 338 (1973).
Article II: Framework for the interim period
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.
Article III: Elections
1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to
democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed
supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the
protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the
entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.
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Lecture notes 13
3.
These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realisation of the legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
Article IV: Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated
in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial
unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.
Article V: Transitional period and permanent status negotiations
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the
third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people's
representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees,
settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with other neighbours, and other
issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or
pre-empted by agreements reached for the interim period.
Article VI: Preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the
authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of
a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health,
social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian
police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the
transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.
Article VII: Interim agreement
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim
Agreement").
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its
members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil
Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority,
legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the
Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in
accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will
establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian
Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a
Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority and any other Authorities
agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military
government will be withdrawn.
Article VIII: Public order and security
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending
against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of
safeguarding their internal security and public order.
Article IX: Laws and military orders:
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities
transferred to it.
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Lecture notes 13
2.
Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.
Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison committee
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent
agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint
Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other
issues of common interest and disputes.
Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in economic fields
Recognising the mutual benefit of co-operation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip
and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a co-operative manner the
programmes identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.
Article XII: Liaison and co-operation with Jordan and Egypt
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and
co-operation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one
hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote co-operation between them.
These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on
the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with
necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by
this Committee.
Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli forces
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the
Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in
addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be
redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the
assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to
Article VIII above.
Article XIV: Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho area
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.
Article XV: Resolution of disputes
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent
agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison
Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be
agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be
settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an
arbitration committee.
Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian cooperation concerning regional programmes
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan",
the regional programmes and other programmes, including special programmes for the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.
Article XVII: Miscellaneous provisions
1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and agreed minutes pertaining thereto shall be
regarded as an integral part hereof.
Done in Washington, DC. this thirteenth day of September 1993.
For the Government of Israel: (Signed) Shimon Peres For the PLO: (Signed) Mahmud Abbas
Witnessed by: The United States of America (Signed) Warren Christopher and The Russian Federation (Signed)
Andrei V Kozyrev
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Lecture notes 13
Annex I: Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections
1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according
to an agreement between the two sides.
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:
(a) The system of elections
(b) The mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition
(c) Rules and regulations regarding election campaigns, including agreed arrangements for the organizing
of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and television station.
3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4 June 1967 will not be prejudiced
because they are unable to participate in the election process owing to practical reasons.
Annex II: Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area
1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration
of Principles an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area
subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip
and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho
area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.
3. The above agreement will include, among other things:
(a) Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and
its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives
(b) Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external
security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations and other mutually agreed matters
(c) Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force
consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and
Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force
coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers
(d) A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon
(e) Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Co-ordination and Co-operation Committee for mutual
security purposes
(f) An economic development and stabilisation programme including the establishment of an Emergency
Fund, to encourage foreign investment and financial and economic support. Both sides will co-ordinate
and co-operate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims
(g) Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho
area.
4. The above agreement will include arrangements for co-ordination between both parties regarding passages:
(a) Gaza-Egypt
(b) Jericho-Jordan;
5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under
this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the
Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.
6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an
integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.
Annex III: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian co-operation in economic and development programmes
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing committee for economic co-operation,
focusing, among other things, on the following:
1. Co-operation in the field of water, including a water development programme prepared by experts from
both sides, which will also specify the mode of co-operation in the management of water resources in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as
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Lecture notes 13
well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim
period.
2. Co-operation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Programme, which will also
specify the mode of co-operation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity
resources.
3. Co-operation in the field of energy, including an energy development programme, which will provide for the
exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will
encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Programme may also provide for the
construction of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas
pipelines.
4. Co-operation in the field of finance, including a financial development and action programme for the
encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as
the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.
5. Co-operation in the field of transport and communications, including a programme, which will define
guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza sea port area, and will provide for the establishing of transport
and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In
addition, this Programme will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways,
communications lines, etc.
6. Co-operation in the field of trade, including studies, and trade promotion programmes, which will encourage
local, regional and interregional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza
Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones and co-operation in other areas related to trade and
commerce.
7. Co-operation in the field of industry, including industrial development programmes, which will provide for
the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian industrial research and development centres, will promote
Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for co-operation in the textile, food,
pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.
8. A Programme for co-operation in, and regulation of, labour relations and co-operation in social welfare
issues.
9. A human resource development and co-operation plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and
seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centres, research institutes and data banks.
10. An environmental protection plan, providing for joint and/or co-ordinated measures in this sphere.
11. A Programme for developing co-ordination and co-operation in the field of communications and media.
12. Any other programmes of mutual interest.
Annex IV: Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian co-operation concerning regional development
Programmes
1. The two sides will co-operate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a development
programme for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the Group of
Seven. The parties will request the Group of Seven to seek the participation in this programme of other
interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.
2. The Development Programme will consist of two elements:
(a) An Economic Development Programme for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
(b) A Regional Economic Development Programme.
The economic development programme for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following
elements:
(1) A Social Rehabilitation Programme, including a Housing and Construction Programme
(2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan
(3) An Infrastructure Development Programme (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc)
(4) A Human Resources Plan
(5) Other programmes.
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Lecture notes 13
The regional economic development programme may consist of the following elements:
(1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development
Bank, as a second step
(2) The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for co-ordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea
area
(3) The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal
(4) Regional desalinisation and other water development projects
(5) A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of
desertification
(6) Interconnection of electricity grids
(7) Regional co-operation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy
resources
(8) A regional tourism, transportation and telecommunications development plan
(9) Regional co-operation in other spheres.
3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups and will co-ordinate towards their success.
The two parties will encourage inter-sessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies,
within the various multilateral working groups. Agreed minutes to the Declaration of Principles on interim
self-government arrangements:
A. General understandings and agreements:
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to
the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these
agreed minutes below.
B. Specific understandings and agreements:
Article IV:
It is understood that:
1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and
authorities transferred to it.
Article VI (2):
It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:
1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who will assume
the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the
Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation,
tourism and any other authorities agreed upon.
2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.
3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance
with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary
adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.
4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately
commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance
with the above understandings.
Article VII (2):
The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for co-ordination and co-operation.
Article VII (5):
The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities
not transferred to the Council.
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Lecture notes 13
Article VIII:
It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for co-operation and co-ordination
between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the
Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.
Article X:
It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian
delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the joint IsraeliPalestinian liaison committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the
joint committee. The joint committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint committee may add other
technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of
its meetings.
Annex II:
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external
security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians
may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.
Agreed in Washington DC, on 13 September 1993.
For the Government of Israel: (Signed) Shimon Peres
For the PLO: (Signed) Mahmud Abbas Witnessed by: The United States of America, (Signed) Warren Christopher
and The Russian Federation, (Signed) Andrei V Kozyrev.
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Lecture notes 13
The Mitchell report
Summary of recommendations
Introduction
Discussion
What happened?
Why did it happen?
End of violence
Rebuild confidence
Resume negotiations
Recommendations
Summary of recommendations
The Government of Israel (GOI) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) must act swiftly and decisively to halt the
violence. Their immediate objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations.
During this mission our aim has been to fulfil the mandate agreed at Sharm al-Sheikh. We value the support
given our work by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties for their co-operation. Our
principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm al-Sheikh spirit and that they
implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe that the summit participants will support
bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.
The restoration of trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this end. Given the high
level of hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. This can be decided
only by the parties. We urge them to begin the process of decision immediately. Accordingly, we recommend
that steps be taken to:
The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and undertakings and should
immediately implement an unconditional cessation of violence. The GOI and PA should immediately resume
security co-operation.
The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off period" and implement additional
confidence building measures, some of which were detailed in the October 2000 Sharm al-Sheikh Statement and
some of which were offered by the US on January 7, 2001 in Cairo (see Recommendations section for further
description).
The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage incitement in all its forms.
The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that terrorism is
reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100% effort to prevent terrorist operations and to
punish perpetrators.
This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's
jurisdiction.
The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of existing settlements.
The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging non-lethal
responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to minimizing casualties and friction between the two
communities.
The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli populated areas and
IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.
The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who had been
employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the
destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in Palestinian areas. We
acknowledge the GOI's position that actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons. Nevertheless,
the economic effects will persist for years.
The PA should renew co-operation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximum extent possible,
that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and
individuals engaged in terrorism.
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Lecture notes 13
The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy places sacred to the traditions
of Jews, Muslims, and Christians.
The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian and Israeli non-governmental
organizations involved in cross-community initiatives linking the two peoples.
In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, we recommend that the
parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and mutual understandings, and take
corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming full and meaningful negotiations.
Introduction
On October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, the
President of the United States spoke on behalf of the participants (the Government of Israel, the Palestinian
Authority, the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, and the United States, the United Nations, and the European
Union).
Among other things, the President stated that the United States will develop with the Israelis and Palestinians,
as well as in consultation with the United Nations Secretary General, a committee of fact-finding on the events
of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence.
The committee's report will be shared by the US President with the UN Secretary General and the parties prior
to publication. A final report shall be submitted under the auspices of the US president for publication.
1. On November 7, 2000, following consultations with the other participants, the president asked us to serve on
what has come to be known as the Sharm al-Sheikh fact-finding committee. In a letter to us on December 6,
2000, the president stated that: The purpose of the Summit, and of the agreement that ensued, was to end the
violence, to prevent its recurrence, and to find a path back to the peace process. In its actions and mode of
operation, therefore, the committee should be guided by these overriding goals. The committee should strive to
steer clear of any step that will intensify mutual blame and finger-pointing between the parties.
As I noted in my previous letter, "the Committee should not become a divisive force or a focal point for blame
and recrimination but rather should serve to forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the
future." This should not be a tribunal whose purpose is to determine the guilt or innocence of individuals or of
the parties; rather, it should be a fact-finding committee whose purpose is to determine what happened and
how to avoid it recurring in the future.
After our first meeting, held before we visited the region, we urged an end to all violence. Our meetings and our
observations during our subsequent visits to the region have intensified our convictions in this regard. Whatever
the source, violence will not solve the problems of the region. It will only make them worse.
Death and destruction will not bring peace, but will deepen the hatred and harden the resolve on both sides.
There is only one way to peace, justice, and security in the Middle East, and that is through negotiation.
Despite their long history and close proximity, some Israelis and Palestinians seem not to fully appreciate each
other's problems and concerns. Some Israelis appear not to comprehend the humiliation and frustration that
Palestinians must endure every day as a result of living with the continuing effects of occupation, sustained by
the presence of Israeli military forces and settlements in their midst, or the determination of the Palestinians to
achieve independence and genuine self-determination.
Some Palestinians appear not to comprehend the extent to which terrorism creates fear among the Israeli
people and undermines their belief in the possibility of co-existence, or the determination of the GOI to do
whatever is necessary to protect its people.
Fear, hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The greatest danger of all is that the culture of
peace, nurtured over the previous decade, is being shattered. In its place there is a growing sense of futility and
despair, and a growing resort to violence. Political leaders on both sides must act and speak decisively to
reverse these dangerous trends; they must rekindle the desire and the drive for peace. That will be difficult. But
it can be done and it must be done, for the alternative is unacceptable and should be unthinkable.
Two proud peoples share a land and a destiny. Their competing claims and religious differences have led to a
grinding, demoralizing, dehumanising conflict. They can continue in conflict or they can negotiate to find a way
to live side-by-side in peace.
There is a record of achievement. In 1991 the first peace conference with Israelis and Palestinians took place in
Madrid to achieve peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
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Lecture notes 13
In 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel met in Oslo for the first face-to-face
negotiations; they led to mutual recognition and the Declaration of Principles (signed by the parties in
Washington, DC on September 13, 1993), which provided a road map to reach the destination agreed in Madrid.
Since then, important steps have been taken in Cairo, in Washington, and elsewhere. Last year the parties came
very close to a permanent settlement. So much has been achieved. So much is at risk.
If the parties are to succeed in completing their journey to their common destination, agreed commitments must
be implemented, international law respected, and human rights protected. We encourage them to return to
negotiations, however difficult. It is the only path to peace, justice and security.
Discussion
It is clear from their statements that the participants in the summit of last October hoped and intended that the
outbreak of violence, then less than a month old, would soon end. The US president's letters to us, asking that
we make recommendations on how to prevent a recurrence of violence, reflect that intention.
Yet the violence has not ended. It has worsened. Thus the overriding concern of those in the region with whom
we spoke is to end the violence and to return to the process of shaping a sustainable peace. That is what we
were told, and were asked to address, by Israelis and Palestinians alike.
It was the message conveyed to us as well by President Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah of Jordan, and UN
Secretary General Annan. Their concern must be ours. If our report is to have effect, it must deal with the
situation that exists, which is different from that envisaged by the summit participants.
In this report, we will try to answer the questions assigned to us by the Sharm al-Sheikh summit: What
happened? Why did it happen? In light of the current situation, however, we must elaborate on the third part of
our mandate: How can the recurrence of violence be prevented?
The relevance and impact of our work, in the end, will be measured by the recommendations we make
concerning the following:
•
Ending the violence
•
Rebuilding confidence
•
Resuming Negotiations
What happened?
We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we not determine the guilt or innocence of individuals
or of the parties. We did not have the power to compel the testimony of witnesses or the production of
documents.
Most of the information we received came from the parties and, understandably, it largely tended to support
their arguments. In this part of our report, we do not attempt to chronicle all of the events from late September
2000 onward. Rather, we discuss only those that shed light on the underlying causes of violence.
In late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other officials received reports that Member of the Knesset
(now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was planning a visit to the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem.
Palestinian and US officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prohibit the visit. (Then Prime Minister)
Ehud Barak told us that he believed the visit was intended to be an internal political act directed against him by
a political opponent, and he declined to prohibit it.
Mr Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers. Although Israelis
viewed the visit in an internal political context, Palestinians saw it as highly provocative to them.
On the following day, in the same place, a large number of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators and a large
Israeli police contingent confronted each other. According to the US Department of State, "Palestinians held
large demonstrations and threw stones at police in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated
metal bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing four persons and injuring about 200."
According to the GOI, 14 Israeli policemen were injured. Similar demonstrations took place over the following
several days.
Thus began what has become known as the "al-Aqsa Intifada" (al-Aqsa being a mosque at the Haram alSharif/Temple Mount).
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Lecture notes 13
The GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations
on 25 July 2000 and the "widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for
the impasse.
In this view, Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring
Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative."
The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) denies the allegation that the intifada was planned. It claims,
however, that "Camp David represented nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend the force it exercises
on the ground to negotiations," and that "the failure of the summit, and the attempts to allocate blame on the
Palestinian side only added to the tension on the ground... From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to
the disturbances with excessive and illegal use of deadly force against demonstrators; behaviour which, in the
PLO's view, reflected Israel's contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians.
For Palestinians, the widely seen images of the killing of 12-year-old Muhammad al-Durra in Gaza on 30
September, shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced that perception. From the perspective of the GOI,
the demonstrations were organised and directed by the Palestinian leadership to create sympathy for their cause
around the world by provoking Israeli security forces to fire upon demonstrators, especially young people.
For Israelis, the lynching of two military reservists, First Sergeant Vadim Novesche and First Corporal Yosef
Avrahami, in Ramallah on 12 October reflected a deep-seated Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jews.
What began as a series of confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces, which
resulted in the GOI's initial restrictions on the movement of people and goods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(closures), has since evolved into a wider array of violent actions and responses. There have been exchanges of
fire between built-up areas, sniping incidents and clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. There have
also been terrorist acts and Israeli reactions thereto (characterised by the GOI as counter-terrorism), including
killings, further destruction of property and economic measures.
Most recently, there have been mortar attacks on Israeli locations and IDF ground incursions into Palestinian
areas. From the Palestinian perspective, the decision of Israel to characterise the current crisis as "an armed
conflict short of war" is simply a means "to justify its assassination policy, its collective punishment policy, and
its use of lethal force."
From the Israeli perspective, "The Palestinian leadership have instigated, orchestrated and directed the violence.
It has used, and continues to use, terror and attrition as strategic tools."
In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation and degree of control exercised by the
other. However, we were provided with no persuasive evidence that the Sharon visit was anything other than an
internal political act; neither were we provided with persuasive evidence that the PA planned the uprising.
Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a
campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the GOI to
respond with lethal force.
However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to contain the
demonstrations and control the violence once it began; or that the GOI made a consistent effort to use nonlethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians.
Amid rising anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and acted accordingly. The
Sharon visit did not cause the "al-Aqsa Initifada." But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have
been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited.
More significant were the events that followed: the decision of the Israeli police on 29 September to use lethal
means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to
exercise restraint.
Why did it happen?
The roots of the current violence extend much deeper than an inconclusive summit conference. Both sides have
made clear a profound disillusionment with the behaviour of the other in failing to meet the expectations arising
from the peace process launched in Madrid in 1991 and then in Oslo in 1993.
Each side has accused the other of violating specific undertakings and undermining the spirit of their
commitment to resolving their political differences peacefully.
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Lecture notes 13
We are struck by the divergent expectations expressed by the parties relating to the implementation of the Oslo
process.
Results achieved from this process were unthinkable less than 10 years ago. During the latest round of
negotiations, the parties were closer to a permanent settlement than ever before. Nonetheless, Palestinians and
Israelis alike told us that the premise on which the Oslo process is based - that tackling the hard "permanent
status" issues be deferred to the end of the process has gradually come under serious pressure.
The step-by-step process agreed to by the parties was based on the assumption that each step in the
negotiating process would lead to enhanced trust and confidence. To achieve this, each party would have to
implement agreed-upon commitments and abstain from actions that would be seen by the other as attempts to
abuse the process in order to predetermine the shape of the final outcome.
If this requirement is not met, the Oslo road map cannot successfully lead to its agreed destination.
Today, each side blames the other for having ignored this fundamental aspect, resulting in a crisis in confidence.
This problem became even more pressing with the opening of permanent status talks. The GOI has placed
primacy on moving toward a Permanent Status Agreement in a non-violent atmosphere, consistent with
commitments contained in the agreements between the parties.
"Even if slower than was initially envisaged, there has, since the start of the peace process in Madrid in 1991,
been steady progress towards the goal of a Permanent Status Agreement without the resort to violence on a
scale that has characterized recent weeks."
The "goal" is the Permanent Status Agreement, the terms of which must be negotiated by the parties. The PLO
view is that delays in the process have been the result of an Israeli attempt to prolong and solidify the
occupation. Palestinians "believed that the Oslo process would yield an end to Israeli occupation in five years,"
the timeframe for the transitional period specified in the Declaration of Principles.
Instead there have been, in the PLO's view, repeated Israeli delays culminating in the Camp David summit,
where, "Israel proposed to annex about 11.2% of the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) ..." and offered
unacceptable proposals concerning Jerusalem, security and refugees.
"In sum, Israel's proposals at Camp David provided for Israel's annexation of the best Palestinian lands, the
perpetuation of Israeli control over East Jerusalem, A continued Israeli military presence on Palestinian territory,
Israeli control over Palestinian natural resources, airspace and borders, and the return of fewer than 1% of
refugees to their homes."
Both sides see the lack of full compliance with agreements reached since the opening of the peace process as
evidence of a lack of good faith. This conclusion led to an erosion of trust even before the permanent status
negotiations began.
During the last seven months, these views have hardened into divergent realities. Each side views the other as
having acted in bad faith; as having turned the optimism of Oslo into the suffering and grief of victims and their
loved ones. In their statements and actions, each side demonstrates a perspective that fails to recognize any
truth in the perspective of the other.
For the Palestinian side, "Madrid" and "Oslo" heralded the prospect of a State, and guaranteed an end to the
occupation and a resolution of outstanding matters within an agreed time frame.
Palestinians are genuinely angry at the continued growth of settlements and at their daily experiences of
humiliation and disruption as a result of Israel's presence in the Palestinian territories. Palestinians see settlers
and settlements in their midst not only as violating the spirit of the Oslo process, but also as an application of
force in the form of Israel's overwhelming military superiority, which sustains and protects the settlements.
The Interim Agreement provides that "the two parties view the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit,
the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period." Coupled with this, the Interim
Agreement's prohibition on taking steps which may prejudice permanent status negotiations denies Israel the
right to continue its illegal expansionist settlement policy.
In addition to the Interim Agreement, customary international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention,
prohibits Israel (as an occupying power) from establishing settlements in occupied territory pending an end to
the conflict.
The PLO alleges that Israeli political leaders "have made no secret of the fact that the Israeli interpretation of
Oslo was designed to segregate the Palestinians in non-contiguous enclaves, surrounded by Israeli militarycontrolled borders, with settlements and settlement roads violating the territories' integrity."
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Lecture notes 13
According to the PLO, "In the seven years since the (Declaration of Principles], the settler population in the West
Bank, excluding East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, has doubled to 200,000, and the settler population in East
Jerusalem has risen to 170,000. Israel has constructed approximately 30 new settlements, and expanded a
number of existing ones to house these new settlers."
The PLO also claims that the GOI has failed to comply with other commitments such as the further withdrawal
from the West Bank and the release of Palestinian prisoners. In addition, Palestinians expressed frustration with
the impasse over refugees and the deteriorating economic circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
From the GOI perspective, the expansion of settlement activity and the taking of measures to facilitate the
convenience and safety of settlers do not prejudice the outcome of permanent status negotiations. Israel
understands that the Palestinian side objects to the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Without prejudice to the formal status of the settlements, Israel accepts that the settlements are an outstanding
issue on which there will have to be agreement as part of any permanent status resolution between the sides.
This point was acknowledged and agreed upon in the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993 as well as
mother agreements between the two sides. There has in fact been a good deal of discussion on the question of
settlements between the two sides in the various negotiations toward a permanent status agreement.
Indeed, Israelis point out that at the Camp David summit and during subsequent talks the GOI offered to make
significant concessions with respect to settlements in the context of an overall agreement.
Security, however, is the key GOI concern. The GOI maintains that the PLO has breached its solemn
commitments by continuing the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives.
"Israel's principal concern in the peace process has been security. This issue is of overriding importance.
Security is not something on which Israel will bargain or compromise. The failure of the Palestinian side to
comply with both the letter and spirit of the security provisions in the various agreements has long been a
source of disturbance in Israel."
According to the GOI, the Palestinian failure takes several forms: institutionalised anti-Israel, anti-Jewish
incitement; the release from detention of terrorists; the failure to control illegal weapons; and the actual
conduct of violent operations, ranging from the insertion of riflemen into demonstrations to terrorist attacks on
Israeli civilians.
The GOI maintains that the PLO has explicitly violated its renunciation of terrorism and other acts of violence,
thereby significantly eroding trust between the parties. The GOI perceives "a thread, implied but nonetheless
clear, that runs throughout the Palestinian submissions. It is that Palestinian violence against Israel and Israelis
is somehow explicable, understandable, legitimate."
End the violence
For Israelis and Palestinians alike the experience of the past several months has been intensely personal.
Through relationships of kinship, friendship, religion, community and profession, virtually everyone in both
societies has a link to someone who has been killed or seriously injured in the recent violence.
We were touched by their stories. During our last visit to the region, we met with the families of Palestinian and
Israeli victims. These individual accounts of grief were heart-rending and indescribably sad. Israeli and
Palestinian families used virtually the same words to describe their grief.
When the widow of a murdered Israeli physician - a man of peace whose practice included the treatment of
Arab patients - tells us that it seems that Palestinians are interested in killing Jews for the sake of killing Jews,
Palestinians should take notice.
When the parents of a Palestinian child killed while in his bed by an errant .50 calibre bullet draw similar
conclusions about the respect accorded by Israelis to Palestinian lives, Israelis need to listen. When we see the
shattered bodies of children we know it is time for adults to stop the violence. With widespread violence, both
sides have resorted to portrayals of the other in hostile stereotypes.
This cycle cannot be easily broken. Without considerable determination and readiness to compromise, the
rebuilding of trust will be impossible.
Since 1991, the parties have consistently committed themselves, in all their agreements, to the path of nonviolence. They did so most recently in the two Sharm al-Sheikh summits of September 1999 and October 2000.
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Lecture notes 13
To stop the violence now, the PA and GOI need not "reinvent the wheel." Rather, they should take immediate
steps to end the violence, reaffirm their mutual commitments, and resume negotiations.
Resumption of Security Co-operation:
Palestinian security officials told us that it would take some time - perhaps several weeks - for the PA to reassert
full control over armed elements nominally under its command and to exert decisive influence over other armed
elements operating in Palestinian areas. Israeli security officials have not disputed these assertions.
What is important is that the PA make an all-out effort to enforce a complete cessation of violence and that it be
clearly seen by the GOI as doing so. The GOI must likewise exercise a 100% effort to ensure that potential
friction points, where Palestinians come into contact with armed Israelis do not become stages for renewed
hostilities.
The collapse of security co-operation in early October reflected the belief by each party that the other had
committed itself to a violent course of action. If the parties wish to attain the standard of 100% effort to prevent
violence, the immediate resumption of security cooperation is mandatory.
We acknowledge the reluctance of the PA to be seen as facilitating the work of Israeli security services absent
an explicit political context (ie, meaningful negotiations) and under the threat of Israeli settlement expansion.
Indeed, security co-operation cannot be sustained without such negotiations and with ongoing actions seen as
prejudicing the outcome of negotiations.
However, violence is much more likely to continue without security co-operation. Moreover, without effective
security co-operation, the parties will continue to regard all acts of violence as officially sanctioned.
In order to overcome the current deadlock, the parties should consider how best to revitalise security cooperation. We commend current efforts to that end.
Effective co-operation depends on recreating and sustaining an atmosphere of confidence and good personal
relations. It is for the parties themselves to undertake the main burden of day-to-day co-operation, but they
should remain open to engaging the assistance of others in facilitating that work.
Such outside assistance should be by mutual consent, should not threaten good bilateral working arrangements,
and should not act as a tribunal or interpose between the parties. There was good security co-operation until
last year that benefited from the good offices of the US (acknowledged by both sides as useful), and was also
supported indirectly by security projects and assistance from the European Union.
The role of outside assistance should be that of creating the appropriate framework, sustaining goodwill on both
sides, and removing friction where possible. That framework must be seen to be contributing to the safety and
welfare of both communities if there is to be acceptance by those communities of these efforts.
Rebuild confidence
The historic handshake between Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister Rabin at the White House in
September 1993 symbolised the expectation of both parties that the door to the peaceful resolution of
differences had been opened.
Despite the current violence and mutual loss of trust, both communities have repeatedly expressed a desire for
peace. Channelling this desire into substantive progress has proved difficult. The restoration of trust is essential,
and the parties should take affirmative steps to this end.
Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. This
can be decided only by the parties. We urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.
In the September 1999 Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum, the parties pledged to take action against "any threat or
act of terrorism, violence or incitement." Although all three categories of hostilities are reprehensible, it was no
accident that "terrorism" was placed at the top of the list.
Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected non-combatants for political ends. It
seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror and demoralisation throughout a population.
It is immoral and ultimately self-defeating. We condemn it and we urge that the parties co-ordinate their
security efforts to eliminate it. In its official submissions and briefings, the GOI has accused the PA of supporting
terrorism by releasing incarcerated terrorists, by allowing PA security personnel to abet, and in some cases to
conduct terrorist operations, and by terminating security cooperation with the GOI. The PA vigorously denies the
accusations.
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Lecture notes 13
But Israelis hold the view that the PA's leadership has made no real effort over the past seven months to
prevent anti-Israeli terrorism. The belief is, in and of itself, a major obstacle to the rebuilding of confidence.
We believe that the PA has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence by making clear to both communities that
terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and by taking all measures to prevent terrorist operations and to
punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists
operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
The GOI also has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence. A cessation of Palestinian-Israeli violence will be
particularly hard to sustain unless the GOI freezes all settlement construction activity. The GOI should also give
careful consideration to whether settlements that are focal points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining
chips for future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of productive talks.
The issue is, of course, controversial. Many Israelis will regard our recommendation as a statement of the
obvious, and will support it. Many will oppose it. But settlement activities must not be allowed to undermine the
restoration of calm and the resumption of negotiations.
During the half-century of its existence, Israel has had the strong support of the United States. In international
forums the US has at times cast the only vote on Israel's behalf. Yet, even in such a close relationship there are
some differences. Prominent among those differences is the US Government's long-standing opposition to the
GOI's policies and practices regarding settlements.
As the then-Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III, commented on 22 May, 1991: "Every time I have gone to
Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have been met with the announcement
of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy. It's the first thing that Arabs - Arab
Governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in the territories - whose situation is really quite desperate the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don't think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the
settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace."
The policy described by Secretary Baker, on behalf of the Administration of President George W Bush has been,
in essence, the policy of every American administration over the past quarter century.
Most other countries, including Turkey, Norway, and those of the European Union, have also been critical of
Israeli settlement activity, in accordance with their views that such settlements are illegal under international
law and not in compliance with previous agreements.
On each of our two visits to the region there were Israeli announcements regarding expansion of settlements,
and it was almost always the first issue raised by Palestinians with whom we met. During our last visit, we
observed the impact of 6,400 settlers on 140,000 Palestinians in Hebron and 6,500 settlers on over 1,100,000
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
The GOI describes its policy as prohibiting new settlements but permitting expansion of existing settlements to
accommodate "natural growth." Palestinians contend that there is no distinction between new and expanded
settlements; and that, except for a brief freeze during the tenure of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, there has been
a continuing, aggressive effort by Israel to increase the number and size of settlements.
The subject has been widely discussed within Israel. The Ha'aretz English Language Edition editorial of April 10,
2001 stated: "A government which seeks to argue that its goal is to reach a solution to the conflict with the
Palestinians through peaceful means, and is trying at this stage to bring an end to the violence and terrorism,
must announce an end to construction in the settlements."
The circumstances in the region are much changed from those which existed nearly 20 years ago. Yet, President
Reagan's words remain relevant: "The immediate adoption of a settlements freeze by Israel, more than any
other action, could create the confidence needed."
Beyond the obvious confidence-building qualities of a settlement freeze, we note that many of the
confrontations during this conflict have occurred at points where Palestinians, settlers, and security forces
protecting the settlers, meet. Keeping both the peace and these friction points will be very difficult.
We were told by both Palestinians and Israelis that emotions generated by the many recent deaths and funerals
have fuelled additional confrontations, and. in effect, maintained the cycle of violence. We cannot urge one side
or the other to refrain from demonstrations. But both sides must make clear that violent demonstrations will not
be tolerated.
We can and do urge that both sides exhibit a greater respect for human life when demonstrators confront
security personnel. In addition, a renewed effort to stop the violence might feature, for a limited time, a "cooling
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Lecture notes 13
off' period during which public demonstrations at or near friction points will be discouraged in order to break the
cycle of violence. To the extent that demonstrations continue, we urge that demonstrators and security
personnel keep their distance from one another to reduce the potential for lethal confrontation.
Actions and Responses:
Members of the Committee staff witnessed an incident involving stone throwing in Ramallah from the
perspectives, on the ground, of both sides. The people confronting one another were mostly young men. The
absence of senior leadership on the IDF side was striking. Likewise, the absence of responsible security and
other officials counselling restraint on the Palestinian side was obvious.
Concerning such confrontations, the GOI takes the position that "Israel is engaged in an armed conflict short of
war. This is not a civilian disturbance or a demonstration or a riot. It is characterized by live-fire attacks on a
significant scale¿ The attacks are carried out by a well-armed and organized militia."
Yet, the GOI acknowledges that of some 9,000 "attacks" by Palestinians against Israelis, "some 2,700 involved
the use of automatic weapons, rifles, hand guns, grenades, and explosives of other kinds." Ahus, for the first
three months of the current uprising, most incidents did not involve Palestinian use of firearms and explosives.
B'Tselem reported that, "according to IDF figures, 73% of the incidents [from September 29 to December 2,
2000] did not include Palestinian gunfire. Despite this, it was in these incidents that most of the Palestinians
[were] killed and wounded ..."
Altogether, nearly 500 people were killed and over 10,000 injured over the past seven months; the
overwhelming majority in both categories were Palestinian. Many of these deaths were avoidable, as were many
Israeli deaths. Israel's characterisation of the conflict, as noted above, is overly broad, for it does not adequately
describe the variety of incidents reported since late September 2000.
Moreover, by thus defining the conflict, the IDF has suspended its policy of mandating investigations by the
Department of Military Police Investigations whenever a Palestinian in the territories dies at the hands of an IDF
soldier in an incident not involving terrorism.
In the words of the GOI, "Where Israel considers that there is reason to investigate particular incidents, it does
so, although, given the circumstances of armed conflict, it does not do so routinely."
We believe, however, that by abandoning the blanket "armed conflict short of war" characterisation and by reinstituting mandatory military police investigations, the GOI could help mitigate deadly violence and help rebuild
mutual confidence.
Notwithstanding the danger posed by stone-throwers, an effort should be made to differentiate between
terrorism and protests. Controversy has arisen between the parties over what Israel calls the "targeting of
individual enemy combatants."
The PLO describes these actions as "extra-judicial executions," and claims that Israel has engaged in an
"assassination policy" that is "in clear violation of Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention." The GOI states
that, "whatever action Israel has taken has been taken firmly within the bounds of the relevant and accepted
principles relating to the conduct of hostilities."
With respect to demonstrations, the GOI has acknowledged "that individual instances of excessive response may
have occurred. To a soldier or a unit coming under Palestinian attack, the equation is not that of the Israeli army
versus some stone throwing Palestinian protesters. It is a personal equation."
We understand this concern, particularly since rocks can maim or even kill. It is no easy matter for a few young
soldiers, confronted by large numbers of hostile demonstrators, to make fine legal distinctions on the spot.
Still, this "personal equation" must fit within an organisational ethic; in this case, "The Ethical Code of the Israel
Defence Forces, which states, in part: The sanctity of human life in the eyes of the IDF servicemen will find
expression in all of their actions, in deliberate and meticulous planning, in safe and intelligent training and in
proper execution of their mission. In evaluating the risk to self and others, they will use the appropriate
standards and will exercise constant care to limit injury to life to the extent required to accomplish the mission."
Those required to respect the IDF ethical code are largely draftees, as the IDF is a conscript force. Active duty
enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers and junior officers - the categories most likely to be present at
friction points - are young, often teenagers.
Unless more senior career personnel or reservists are stationed at friction points, no IDF personnel present in
these sensitive areas have experience to draw upon from previous violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontations. We
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Lecture notes 13
think it is essential, especially in the context of restoring confidence by minimizing deadly confrontations, that
the IDF deploy more senior, experienced soldiers to these sensitive points.
There were incidents where IDF soldiers have used lethal force, including live ammunition and modified metalcored rubber rounds, against unarmed demonstrators throwing stones. The IDF should adopt crowd-control
tactics that minimize the potential for deaths and casualties, withdrawing metal-cored rubber rounds from
general use and using instead rubber baton rounds without metal cores.
We are deeply concerned about the public safety implications of exchanges of fire between populated areas, in
particular between Israeli settlements and neighbouring Palestinian villages. Palestinian gunmen have directed
small arms fire at Israeli settlements and at nearby IDF positions from within or adjacent to civilian dwellings in
Palestinian areas, thus endangering innocent Israeli and Palestinian civilians alike.
We condemn the positioning of gunmen within or near civilian dwellings. The IDF often responds to such gunfire
with heavy calibre weapons, sometimes resulting in deaths and injuries to innocent Palestinians. An IDF officer
told us at the Ministry of Defence on March 23, 2001 that, "When shooting comes from a building we respond,
and sometimes there are innocent people in the building."
Obviously, innocent people are injured and killed during exchanges of this nature. We urge that such
provocations cease and that the IDF exercise maximum restraint in its responses if they do occur. Inappropriate
or excessive uses of force often lead to escalation. We are aware of IDF sensitivities about these subjects. More
than once we were asked: "What about Palestinian rules of engagement? What about a Palestinian code of
ethics for their military personnel?" These are valid questions.
On the Palestinian side there are disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas of responsibility and accountability.
The lack of control exercised by the PA over its own security personnel and armed elements affiliated with the
PA leadership is very troubling.
We urge the PA to take all necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of command for armed
personnel operating under its authority. We recommend that the PA institute and enforce effective standards of
conduct and accountability, both within the uniformed ranks and between the police and the civilian political
leadership to which it reports.
In their submissions and briefings to the committee, both sides expressed concerns about hateful language and
images emanating from the other, citing numerous examples of hostile sectarian and ethnic rhetoric in the
Palestinian and Israeli media, in school curricula and in statements by religious leaders, politicians and others.
We call on the parties to renew their formal commitments to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and to
abstain from incitement and hostile propaganda. We condemn hate language and incitement in all its forms. We
suggest that the parties be particularly cautious about using words in a manner that suggests collective
responsibility.
Economic and Social Impact of Violence
Further restrictions on the movement of people and goods have been imposed by Israel on the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip. These closures take three forms: those which restrict movement between the Palestinian areas
and Israel; those (including curfews) which restrict movement within the Palestinian areas; and those which
restrict movement from the Palestinian areas to foreign countries.
These measures have disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians; they have increased
Palestinian unemployment to an estimated 40%, in part by preventing some 140,000 Palestinians from working
in Israel; and have stripped away about one-third of the Palestinian gross domestic product.
Moreover, the transfer of tax and customs duty revenues owed to the PA by Israel has been suspended, leading
to a serious fiscal crisis in the PA.
Of particular concern to the PA has been the destruction by Israeli security forces and settlers of tens of
thousands of olive and fruit trees and other agricultural property. The closures have had other adverse effects,
such as preventing civilians from access to urgent medical treatment and preventing students from attending
school. The GOI maintains that these measures were taken in order to protect Israeli citizens from terrorism.
Palestinians characterize these measures as "collective punishment." The GOI denies the allegation: Israel has
not taken measures that have had an economic impact simply for the sake of taking such measures or for
reasons of harming the Palestinian economy. The measures have been taken for reasons of security.
Mag. Bert Preiss
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Lecture notes 13
Thus, for example. the closure of the Palestinian territories was taken in order to prevent, or at least minimise
the risks of, terrorist attacks. The Palestinian leadership has made no attempt to control this activity and bring it
to an end. Moreover, the GOI points out that violence in the last quarter of 2000 cost the Israeli economy
$1.2bn, and that the loss continues at a rate of approximately $150m per month.
We acknowledge Israel's security concerns. We believe, however, that the GOI should lift closures, transfer to
the PA all revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who have been employed in Israel to return to their jobs.
Closure policies play into the hands of extremists seeking to expand their constituencies and thereby contribute
to escalation.
The PA should resume co-operation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that Palestinian workers employed
within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to terrorists and terrorist organisations.
International development assistance has from the start been an integral part of the peace process, with an aim
to strengthen the socio-economic foundations for peace. This assistance today is more important than ever. We
urge the international community to sustain the development agenda of the peace process.
It is particularly regrettable that places such as the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, Joseph's Tomb
in Nablus, and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem have been the scenes of violence, death and injury.
These are places of peace, prayer and reflection which must be accessible to all believers. Places deemed holy
by Muslims, Jews, and Christians merit respect, protection and preservation. Agreements previously reached by
the parties regarding holy places must be upheld.
The GOI and the PA should create a joint initiative to defuse the sectarian aspect of their political dispute by
preserving and protecting such places. Efforts to develop inter-faith dialogue should be encouraged.
One of the most controversial subjects raised during our inquiry was the issue of deploying an international
force to the Palestinian areas. The PA is strongly in favour of having such a force to protect Palestinian civilians
and their property from the IDF and from settlers.
The GOI is just as adamantly opposed to an "international protection force," believing that it would prove
unresponsive to Israeli security concerns and interfere with bilateral negotiations to settle the conflict.
We believe that to be effective such a force would need the support of both parties. We note that international
forces deployed in this region have been or are in a position to fulfil their mandates and make a positive
contribution only when they were deployed with the consent of all of the parties involved.
During our visit to Hebron we were briefed by personnel of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron
(TIPH), a presence to which both parties have agreed. The TIPH is charged with observing an explosive
situation and writing reports on their observations. If the parties agree, as a confidence-building measure, to
draw upon TIPH personnel to help them manage other friction points, we hope that TIPH contributors could
accommodate such a request.
Many described to us the near absolute loss of trust. It was all the more inspiring, therefore, to find groups
(such as the Parent's Circle and the Economic Co-operation Foundation) dedicated to cross-community
understanding in spite of all that has happened. We commend them and their important work.
Regrettably, most of the work of this nature has stopped during the current conflict. To help rebuild confidence,
the GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) already involved in confidence building through initiatives linking both sides. It is
important that the PA and GOI support cross-community organisations and initiatives, including the provision of
humanitarian assistance to Palestinian villages by Israeli NGOs.
Providing travel permits for participants is essential. Co-operation between the humanitarian organisations and
the military/security services of the parties should be encouraged and institutionalised. Such programs can help
build, albeit slowly, constituencies for peace among Palestinians and Israelis and can provide safety nets during
times of turbulence.
Organisations involved in this work are vital for translating good intentions into positive actions.
Resume negotiations
Israeli leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding violence." Palestinian leaders do not wish to be
perceived as "rewarding occupation." We appreciate the political constraints on leaders of both sides.
Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence is to be broken and the search for peace resumed, there needs to be a new
bilateral relationship incorporating both security cooperation and negotiations.
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09.02.2007
Lecture notes 13
We cannot prescribe to the parties how best to pursue their political objectives. Yet the construction of a new
bilateral relationship solidifying and transcending an agreed cessation of violence requires intelligent risk-taking.
It requires, in the first instance, that each party again be willing to regard the other as a partner.
Partnership, in turn, requires at this juncture something more than was agreed in the Declaration of Principles
and in subsequent agreements. Instead of declaring the peace process to be "dead," the parties should
determine how they will conclude their common journey along their agreed "road map", a journey which began
in Madrid and continued in spite of problems - until very recently.
To define a starting point is for the parties to decide. Both parties have stated that they remain committed to
their mutual agreements and undertakings. It is time to explore further implementation. The parties should
declare their intention to meet on this basis, in order to resume full and meaningful negotiations, in the spirit of
their undertakings at Sharm al-Sheikh in 1999 and 2000.
Neither side will be able to achieve its principal objectives unilaterally or without political risk. We know how
hard it is for leaders to act - especially if the action can be characterised by political opponents as a concession without getting something in return.
The PA must - as it has at previous critical junctures take steps to reassure Israel on security matters. The GOI
must - as it has in the past - take steps to reassure the PA on political matters. Israelis and Palestinians should
avoid, in their own actions and attitudes, giving extremists, common criminals and revenge seekers the final say
in defining their joint future. This will not be easy if deadly incidents occur in spite of effective co-operation.
Notwithstanding the daunting difficulties, the very foundation of the trust required to re-establish a functioning
partnership consists of each side making such strategic reassurances to the other.
Recommendations
The GOI and the PA must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their immediate objectives then should
be to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations. What we are asking is not easy.
Palestinians and Israelis - not just their leaders, but two publics at large - have lost confidence in one another.
We are asking political leaders to do, for the sake of their people, the politically difficult: to lead without knowing
how many will follow.
During this mission our aim has been to fulfil the mandate agreed at Sharm al-Sheikh. We value the support
given our work by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties for their co-operation. Our
principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm al-Sheikh spirit, and that they
implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe that the summit participants will support
bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.
The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and undertakings and should
immediately implement an unconditional cessation of violence. Anything less than a complete effort by both
parties to end the violence will render the effort itself ineffective, and will likely be interpreted by the other side
as evidence of hostile intent.
The GOI and PA should immediately resume security co-operation. Effective bilateral co-operation aimed at
preventing violence will encourage the resumption of negotiations. We are particularly concerned that, absent
effective, transparent security co-operation, terrorism and other acts of violence will continue and may be seen
as officially sanctioned whether they are or not.
The parties should consider widening the scope of security co-operation to reflect the priorities of both
communities and to seek acceptance for these efforts from those communities. We acknowledge the PA's
position that security co-operation presents a political difficulty absent a suitable political context, ie, the
relaxation of stringent Israeli security measures combined with ongoing, fruitful negotiations.
We also acknowledge the PA's fear that, with security co-operation in hand, the GOI may not be disposed to
deal forthrightly with Palestinian political concerns. We believe that security co-operation cannot long be
sustained if meaningful negotiations are unreasonably deferred, if security measures "on the ground" are seen
as hostile, or if steps are taken that are perceived as provocative or as prejudicing the outcome of negotiations.
The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off period" and implement additional
confidence building measures, some of which were proposed in the October 2000 Sharm al-Sheikh Statement
and some of which were offered by the U.S. on January 7, 2001 in Cairo.
The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage incitement in all its forms.
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09.02.2007
Lecture notes 13
The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that terrorism is
reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100% effort to prevent terrorist operations and to
punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists
operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of existing settlements. The kind of
security co-operation desired by the GOI cannot for long co-exist with settlement activity described very recently
by the European Union as causing "great concern" and by the US as "provocative."
The GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements, which are focal points for substantial friction,
are valuable bargaining chips for future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of productive
talks.
The GOI may wish to make it clear to the PA that a future peace would pose no threat to the territorial
contiguity of a Palestinian State to be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before 28 September 2000 which will reduce the number
of friction points and the potential for violent confrontations.
The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging non-lethal
responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to minimising casualties and friction between the two
communities.
The IDF should:
•
Re-institute, as a matter of course, military police investigations into Palestinian deaths resulting from IDF
actions in the Palestinian territories in incidents not involving terrorism
•
Abandon the blanket characterisation of the current uprising as "an armed conflict short of war," which fails
to discriminate between terrorism and protest
•
Adopt tactics of crowd-control that minimise the potential for deaths and casualties, including the
withdrawal of metal-cored rubber rounds from general use
•
Ensure that experienced, seasoned personnel are present for duty at all times at known friction points
•
Ensure that the stated values and standard operating procedures oof the IDF effectively instil the duty of
caring for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as Israelis living there, consistent with the
ethical code of The IDF.
The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who had been
employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the
destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in Palestinian areas.
We acknowledge the GOI's position that actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons.
Nevertheless, their economic effects will persist for years.
The PA should renew co-operation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximum extent possible,
that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to organisations and
individuals engaged in terrorism.
The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli populated areas and
IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.
The GOI and IDF should adopt and enforce policies and procedures designed to ensure that the response to any
gunfire emanating from Palestinian populated areas minimises the danger to the lives and property of
Palestinian civilians, bearing in mind that it is probably the objective of gunmen to elicit an excessive IDF
response.
The GOI should take all necessary steps to prevent acts of violence by settlers. The parties should abide by the
provisions of the Wye River Agreement prohibiting illegal weapons.
The PA should take all necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of command for armed
personnel operating under its authority.
The PA should institute and enforce effective standards of conduct and accountability, both within the uniformed
ranks and between the police and the civilian political leadership to which it reports.
The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy places sacred to the traditions
of Muslims, Jews, and Christians.
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09.02.2007
Lecture notes 13
The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian and Israeli non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) involved in cross-community initiatives linking the two peoples. It is important that these
activities, including the provision of humanitarian aid to Palestinian villages by Israeli NGOs, receive the full
backing of both parties.
We reiterate our belief that a 100% effort to stop the violence, an immediate resumption of security cooperation and an exchange of confidence building measures are all important for the resumption of negotiations.
Yet none of these steps will long be sustained absent a return to serious negotiations.
However, in order to provide an effective political context for practical co-operation between the parties,
negotiations must not be unreasonably deferred and they must, in our view, manifest a spirit of compromise,
reconciliation and partnership, notwithstanding the events of the past seven months.
We recommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and mutual
understandings, and take corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming full and meaningful
negotiations. The parties are at a crossroads. If they do not return to the negotiating table, they face the
prospect of fighting it out for years on end, with many of their citizens leaving for distant shores to live their
lives and raise their children. We pray they make the right choice. That means stopping the violence now.
Israelis and Palestinians have to live, work, and prosper together. History and geography have destined them to
be neighbours. That cannot be changed. Only when their actions are guided by this awareness will they be able
to develop the vision and reality of peace and shared prosperity.
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Lecture notes 13
Elements of a performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Draft December 2002
The following is a performance-based and goal-driven road map, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and
benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic,
humanitarian and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet. The destination is a final and
comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of
June 24, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 15 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial
statements.
A two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and
terrorism (when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to
build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty) and through Israel's readiness to do what is
necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both
parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below. The Quartet will assist in facilitate
implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions between the parties as required. The
plan established a realistic timeline for implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will
require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations
outlined below. Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases
may come sooner than indicated in the plan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.
A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and
viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours. The
settlement will resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the
foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements
previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah-endorsed by the Beirut Arab
League Summit-calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a
comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive
peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.
The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties' performance on implementation of the
plan. In each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.
Phase I: Ending terror and violence, normalizing Palestinian life, and building
Palestinian institutions present to May 2003
In Phase 1, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps
outlined below: such action should be accomplished by supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians
and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and
incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. Palestinians undertake
comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and
free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize
Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two sides
restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also
freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.
At the outset of Phase I:
Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security
and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence
against Israelis everywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.
Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an
independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed
by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official
Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.
Security
Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the
ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on
Israelis anywhere.
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Lecture notes 13
Rebuilt and refocused (Palestinian Authority) security apparatus begins sustained, targeted and effective
operations aimed at confronting al those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and
infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security
authority, free of association with terror and corruption.
GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or
demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli constructions;
destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet Work
Plan.
Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal
monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its
implementation.
Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in
collaboration with the outside oversight board (U.S.-Egypt-Jordan) (Quartet support for efforts to achieve a
lasting, comprehensive cease-fire).
•
All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered
Interior Minister.
•
Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security
cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level
meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.
Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms support for groups supporting and
engaging in violence and terror.
All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian
Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account.
As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied
since September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.
Palestinian institution-building
Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as
possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary
democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate. Constitutional
committee proposes draft document for submission after election for approval by appropriate Palestinian
institutions.
Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-making
body.
GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, internationally supervised
security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform
efforts.
Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. Completion
of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms
for this purpose.
Establishment of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.
Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by the
International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.
As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the context of open debate and
transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multi-party process, Palestinians hold
free, open, and fair elections.
GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and voting
officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.
GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem
based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements
between the parties.
-
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Lecture notes 13
Humanitarian response
Israel takes measures to improve humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in full al
recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing
restriction on movement of persons and goods, and allowing fill, safe, unfettered access of international and
humanitarian personnel.
AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and
Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort.
GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer funds, including arrears, in accordance with
agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.
Civil society
Continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs. For people to people programs,
private sector development and civil society initiatives.
Settlements
GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.
Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of
settlements).
Phase II: Transition June 2003-December 2003
In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with
provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a
permanent status settlement. As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a
leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance
and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have
the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent,
viable state.
Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are
appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to
normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institution, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends
with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Its primary goals are
continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of
Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I,
ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister,
consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
International conference: Convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties; immediately after
the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a
process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.
•
Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including
between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles described in the preamble
to this document.
•
Arab states restore pre-Intifada links to Israel (trade office, etc).
•
Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic
development, refugees, and arms control issues.
New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalized, and approved by appropriate
Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution.
Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally established, consistent with draft
constitution.
Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation on the bases laid
out in Phase I.
Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of IsraeliPalestinian engagement, launched by the international conference, As part of this process, implementation
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09.02.2007
Lecture notes 13
-
of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial continuity, including further action on settlements in
conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of
the Quartet.
Quartet member promote international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible UN membership.
Phase III: Permanent status agreement and end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 20042005
Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both
parties and Quartet mentoring. Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian
institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a
permanent status agreement in 2005.
Second international conference: Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at beginning of
2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and
formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a
final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to
support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel
and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.
Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force in
preparation for final status agreement.
Continued sustained and effective security performance and sustained, effective security cooperation on the
bases laid out in Phase I.
- International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian economy,
in preparation for final status agreement.
Parties reach final and comprehensive settlement status agreement that ends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that
ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the
refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political
and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims
worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and the sovereign, independent, democratic and viable
Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.
Arab state acceptance of full, normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the
context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.
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