Case Study
Assessing the history and value of
Human Genome Sciences
Received: May 23, 2013. Accepted: September 3, 2013.
Laura M. McNamee
is Research Associate in the Center for Integration of Science and Industry and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Natural and Applied
Science at Bentley University. Her research focuses on patterns of sustaining and disruptive innovation in biotechnology, the
impact of technology life cycles on drug development, and business models for the biotechnology industry.
Fred D. Ledley
is Director of the Center for Integration of Science and Industry and a Professor in the Department of Natural and Applied Sciences
and Department of Management and at Bentley University. He has served on the faculties of the Baylor College of Medicine and
Howard Hughes Institute, and also as a founder and senior executive of several biotechnology companies in gene therapy and
personalized medicine. His research focuses on the interface between science and business, as well as strategies for accelerating
the translation of scientific discoveries to create public value.
Abstract
Human Genome Science (HGS) aspired to dominate the emergent field of genomics by discovering expressed
gene sequences and developing therapeutic and diagnostic products based on proprietary genes. While HGS’
accomplishments fell short of their own lofty expectations, by the time HGS was acquired by GlaxoSmithKline,
the company had extensive intellectual property and had launched a product with >$1 billion market potential.
Nevertheless, HGS’ acquisition price was less than the total capital investments in the company. This work examines
HGS’ history and accomplishments in the context of the business plan described by the company at their IPO. We
focus specifically on the company’s valuation over time, which was highly correlated with general market indices,
but negatively correlated with metrics of technical or clinical progress. The history of HGS points to the challenge of
accounting for the value created by a science-based business plan. Earnings-based metrics, present value calculations,
and “fair value” assessments did not account for HGS’ progress in executing their stated business plan. This work
highlights the critical need for accounting practices that credit value to the progress of translational science and
enable investors to profit from such investments.
Journal of Commercial Biotechnology (2013) 19(4), 3–10. doi: 10.5912/jcb.619
Keywords: Genomics; drug development; value; investment; biotechnology; accounting
Introduction
H
uman Genome Sciences (HGS) was not a
company with normal ambitions. At its founding in 1992, HGS aspired to dominate the newly
emergent field of geno­mics by being the first to sequence
and patent all of the genes expressed from the human
genome and develop a pipeline of therapeutic and diagnostic products based on these genes. The company’s
outsized ambitions were advertised in elaborate annual
reports, which featured Greek gods and saints as metaphors for the company’s search for knowledge and
fight against disease. By the time HGS was acquired by
Correspondence: Fred D. Ledley, Bentley University.
Email: [email protected]
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in 2012 for $3.6 billion,1 the
company could claim many accomplishments, but had
ultimately failed to fulfill its own lofty expectations. The
story of HGS is an exemplar of the ambitions and aspirations of the biotechnology industry in general, and its
denouement provides insight into the challenges that
prevent this industry from fulfilling its promise. What
happened to HGS? What was its value? What can the
biotechnology industry learn that will be of value in the
future?
A SHORT HISTORY
The history of HGS begins with Craig Venter’s ambitious
proposition that all of the genes expressed by the human
genome could be discovered by shotgun sequencing of
O c to be r 2013 I Vo lu m e 19 I N u m b er 4
3
expressed messenger RNA sequences, termed “expressed
sequence tags” (EST). In 1992, two investors, Alan
Walton and Walter Steinberg, who were among the
first to recognize the commercial potential of Venter’s
approach, arranged for the founding of two organizations. The Institute for Genetic Research (TIGR), a
non-profit scientific enterprise led by Venter, would
undertake high-throughput sequencing of ESTs. Human
Genome Sciences (HGS), a commercial enterprise led
by William Hazeltine, would provide financial support
for TIGR, and have commercial rights to its discoveries.
Within a year, HGS completed a landmark partnership
with SmithKline Beecham, which provided additional
capital investment, research funding, and experience in
drug discovery and development.
In 1993, HGS filed for its IPO. The Company’s S-1
filing described the company’s goals as: “The Company’s
principal objective is to discover rapidly and obtain proprietary rights to a substantial portfolio of novel genes
and to commercialize products based on those genes
either alone or in collaboration with corporate partners.”2 The strategy, as described in the S-1 filing, was “to
identify rapidly the majority of the genes that comprise
the human genome through partial sequencing and to
select for further development those genes which have
potential commercial value.” Already by 1993, the S-1
stated that “…the Company believes it has, together with
TIGR, identified approximately 25,000 human genes
(including approximately 20,000 novel genes) of a total
of 50,000–100,000 genes believed to exist.”2
The relationship between TIGR and HGS was terminated in June 1997, and Venter turned his attention
to sequencing the entire human genome through his
association with a new company, Celera Genomics. By
then, more than 162,000 non-overlapping ESTs had
been sequenced. Of these ESTs, 82% were thought to
represent the transcripts of previously unknown genes.3
HGS’ 1998 annual report summarized its gene discovery efforts thus: “Between 1993 and 1995, HGS’ scientists
isolated messenger RNAs corresponding to what is estimated to be more than 95 percent of all human genes.”4
The report also described an emphasis on a “functional
genomics” program, which included gene expression
profiling to “analyze gene expression of each of the more
than 11,000 newly discovered secreted protein genes”
as well as “high-throughput, robotic-cloning method
to produce small amounts of each newly discovered
secreted protein” and the analysis of 12,000 genes using
this method.4
On the business development front, HGS assembled
a “Human Gene Consortium” of pharmaceutical companies including SmithKline Beecham, Schering-Plough,
Takeda Chemical, Synthelabo, and Merck KGaA, to partner in drug discovery and development. These companies
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Journal of Commercial Biotechnology provided HGS with financial and technical support, and
integrated HGS’ intellectual property and methods into
their partner’s internal development programs. When
the consortium agreement expired in June 2001, an HGS
press release noted that “Consortium members have
identified approximately 460 research programs for the
creation of small molecule, protein, and antibody drugs,
involving about 280 different genes. We believe there is
substantial value in these partnerships”
The first clinical trials with proteins discovered
through EST sequencing began in the late 1990s. In
1995, HGS initiated clinical development of repifermin,
a recombinant Keratinocyte Growth Factor-2 protein
(KGF-2), to accelerate the healing of ulcers. In 1998, it
initiated clinical trials for mirostipen, a recombinant
Myeloid Progenitor Inhibitory Factor-1 protein (MPIF-1)
for the treatment of neutropenia. Also in 1998, a third
candidate product, a gene therapy incorporating the
gene sequence for Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor-2
protein (VEGF-2) to treat atherosclerosis, was spun
out to a newly formed gene therapy company, Vascular
Genetics. None of these trials would proceed beyond
Phase 2 (Table 1). In addition to using newly discovered
gene sequences and their gene products as therapeutic
entities, HGS entered into a partnership in 1999 with
Cambridge Antibody Technology to develop mono­
clonal antibodies that would inhibit the function of the
gene products discovered by HGS.
As the stock market started its exuberant climb
in 1999 and Craig Venter joined Francis Collins at the
White House to announce completion of the Human
Genome Project in 2000, HGS was well positioned to
capitalize on investor enthusiasm for genomics. The
company had more than 100 issued patents, a robust
clinical development pipeline, multiple corporate partners, and a high profile in the scientific and business
community. The company raised a total of $1.4 billion
dollars through two secondary offerings in 2000, and
closed Q3 2000 with a market capitalization in excess
of $8.5 billion. This financing bonanza allowed HGS to
grow to over 1100 employees and purchase Principia
Pharmaceutical for $150 million. This acquisition provided HGS with an expanded clinical pipeline of 20
candidate products based on existing, patent-expiring
biological products as well as a technology applicable to
pharmaceuticalizing gene products identified through
HGS’ gene discovery platform. Despite its formidable
technical position and strengthening clinical pipeline,
the end of the “dot.com” bubble caused HGS’ stock to
collapse. By the end of 2002, the company’s market capitalization had dropped to $1.1 billion, only 13% of its
peak value (Figure 1a).
HGS had limited revenues from 1993–2008, mostly
from research relationships, and continued to invest
ht tp://www.CommercialBiotechnology.com
O c to be r 2013 I Vo lu m e 19 I N u m b er 4
5
1995
2003
2003
1998
2000
2001
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2005
2005
2005
2006
2008
2008
2009
raxibacumab (Abthrax)
streptococcus vaccine
mirostipen
ardenermin
darapladib
albinterferon alfa-2b
belimumab (Benlysta)
albumin-IL-2 fusion (Zalbin)
BLyS radiolabelled
HGS-TR2J
mapatumumab
albutropin
lexatumumab
CCR5mAb004
albiglutide
SSR-411298
rilapladib
FP-1039
HGS-1029
SAR-115740
Phase 1
repifermin
Product
1
1
2
2
2
3
1
1
1
2
1
1
FDA
Launch
3
3
1
2
1
Launch
2
Phase
D/C
D/C
Active
Active
D/C
Active
D/C
D/C
D/C
Active
D/C
D/C
D/C
Launch
D/C
Active
D/C
D/C
D/C
Launch
D/C
Status
transient receptor potential cation channel, subfamily V1
baculoviral IAP repeat containing 3
fibroblast growth factor receptor 1
phospholipase A2, group VII
fatty acid amide hydrolase
glucagon
chemokine (C-C motif ) receptor 5
tumour necrosis factor receptor superfamily, 10b
growth hormone receptor
tumour necrosis factor receptor superfamily, 10a
tumour necrosis factor receptor superfamily, 10b
tumour necrosis factor superfamily, member 13b
interleukin 2 receptor, alpha
tumour necrosis factor superfamily, member 13b
interferon (alpha, beta and omega) receptor 2
phospholipase A2, group VII
tumour necrosis factor superfamily, member 13b
myeloid progenitor inhibitory factor-1
antigen, Bacillus anthracis, anthrax toxin receptor 1
fibroblast growth factor receptor 2
Target
7442
330
2260
7941
2166
2641
1234
8795
2690
8797
8795
10673
3559
10673
3455
7941
10673
6368
84168
2263
Gene #
CE
CE
RP
CE
CE
RP-alb
MAB
MAB
RP-alb
MAB
RP
RP
RP-alb
MAB
RP-alb
CE
RP
RP
vaccine
MAB
RP
Type
pain
cancer
cancer
Alzheimer’s
pain/depression
diabetes
UC, HIV/AIDS
cancer
GH Deficiency
cancer
cancer
cancer
cancer
lupus
hepatitis C
atherosclerosis
immunodeficiency
neutropenia
infection
anthrax
UC/ulcers
Indication
Table 1: Human Genome Sciences clinical portfolio 1993-2012. Phase 1: date of initiation of phase 1 trial; Phase: most advanced phase achieved; Status: status as of
September 2013; Target: therapeutic protein or target; Gene #: sequence comprising product or target; Type: RP = recombinant protein, MAB = monoclonal antibody,
CE=chemical entity, RP-alb=albumin fusion. Clinical status, target, gene #, and lead indication were identified in Pharmaprojects
heavily in R&D (Figure 1b-c). The company would ultimately invest more than $2.7 billion in R&D, which
resulted in consistent growth of a product pipeline, as
estimated by the number of Predicted Product Approvals
(PPA) (Figure 1d). PPA estimates the number of products
likely to be approved based on the number of candidates
in each stage of clinical development and the historical approval probability for candidates at that stage.6
HGS continued to expand its intellectual property with
steady growth in the number of issued patents (Figure
1e). Nevertheless, HGS’ market capitalization tracked
below the cumulative capital investment in the company for most of the decade. By end of 2008, its market
capitalization would be only $264 million, less than 3%
of its peak value and only 11% of the total capital raised
(Figure 1a).
In 2009, HGS had three applications before the FDA.
One was for Zalbin (albinterferon alpha-2b), a fusion
protein that had been tested in two pivotal phase 3 trials for chronic hepatitis C. The second was Benlysta
(belimumab), a monoclonal antibody against BLyS
(B-lymphocyte stimulator, or BLyS tumor necrosis factor
Figure 1: Human Genome Sciences: technical and financial metrics from 1992-2012. (a) left axis: market
capitalization, total capital raised; right axis: NASDAQ Biotech Index (NBI) (b) earnings per share (EPS) (c)
annual R&D spending and revenues (d) Predicted Product Approval (PPA) (e) number of patents issued to HGS.
Financial data is from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ, patent data from www.uspto.gov, and clinical data is from
Pharmaprojects
6
Journal of Commercial Biotechnology ht tp://www.CommercialBiotechnology.com
superfamily, member 13b), which achieved its primary
endpoints in two pivotal phase 3 trials for Systemic
lupus erythematosus (SLE). The third was ABthrax
(raxibacumab), a monoclonal antibody intended to provide passive immunity against anthrax toxin, a product
HGS had already begun to produce for the U.S. Strategic
National Stockpile (Table 1). HGS’ market capitalization
began to rise precipitously from its nadir in 2008, reaching a peak of over $5.5 billion by the end of 2009. During
this period, the company reportedly rejected a $7 billion
acquisition offer from Amgen7, choosing instead to raise
over $850 million in additional capital through secondary offerings.
After many years of net negative earnings, HGS
achieved profitability in 2009 (Figure 1a), largely due to
revenues from the manufacture of ABthrax for the U.S.
Strategic National Stockpile. The company anticipated
positive earnings after 2012, based on the approval of
the drug applications then before the FDA, but in June
2010, Zalbin received unfavorable reviews from an FDA
advisory committee. A review committee also asked
­
HGS to provide additional data on ABthrax, which was
submitted in July 2012. The FDA’s review of Benlysta in
November 2010 highlighted questions about the safety
and efficacy of the drug, leading to a 10% drop in the
company’s stock price the next day. When the drug was
finally approved for the treatment of SLE in March 2011,
HGS had a market capitalization of $6 billion. By year
end, however, HGS stock had dropped precipitously
based, in part, on disappointing early sales of Benlysta
and negative earnings reports, and closed the year with a
market capitalization of $2 billion.
It is worth noting that SLE is a challenging target
for drug development and potentially a blockbuster market. Benlysta was the first drug to be approved explicitly for treatment of this indication since corticosteroids
and Plaquenil in 1955, and Aspirin in 1948. SLE affects
as many as 1.5 million people in the U.S. annually,8 and
analysts have variously estimated the market for Benlysta
to be between $3.1 billion and $7 billion annually.9
In April 2012, GSK made a hostile offer to acquire
HGS, offering $13 per share, an 81% premium on the
company’s stock price of $7.17 per share, a 52-week
low. Although it initially rejected the offer, HGS ultimately was acquired for $14.25/share, or $3.6 billion,
less than the $3.9 billion in capital investments that had
been made in the company since its inception. The net
acquisition price, $3 billion less cash and debt, included
$2.6 ­billion in net operating loss carry-forwards and
R&D tax credits, and allowed GSK to recapture 50%
of Benlysta profits owed HGS through their alliance.
Moreover, at acquisition, HGS had seven additional
candidate products in clinical development including
ABthrax, which was approved in December 2012.
DID HGS ACHIEVE ITS PLAN?
While few companies have so articulately or artistically
captured the expectations for the nascent field of geno­
mics in the 1990s, HGS’ aspirations were not unique. Many
entrepreneurs and investors believed that companies like
HGS would not only be able to establish meaningful proprietary positions in human genes, but radically reform
the processes for validating drug targets and drug discovery. It was widely expected that genomics would not only
provide new targets for drug discovery, but accelerate the
pace and efficiency of drug development. These expectations were evident in HGS’ S-1 filing which described
plans to “discover rapidly and obtain proprietary rights to
a substantial portfolio of novel genes”2 and commercialize
“products based on those genes,”2 as a means of creating
economic value for its shareholders. Did HGS succeed in
achieving these goals?
“a substantial portfolio of novel genes”
By the sheer number of genes sequenced, the combined gene discovery platforms of HGS and TIGR were
successful. Early data from TIGR described the discovery
of as many as 100,000 novel genes.3 While these observations overestimated the number of genes in the human
genome (later determined to number less than 30,000),
it is likely that the sequences identified by HGS, in fact,
included a substantial number of previously unknown
genes. By the time HGS was acquired, more than 600
patents would be issued, testifying to their apparent novelty and utility.
HGS was not, however, the only enterprise
engaged in EST sequencing in the early 1990s. Incyte
Pharmaceuticals, founded in 1991, had an identical
strategy of gene discovery by high-throughput EST
­
sequencing and, by 2012, had more issued patents (>800).
Also in 1994, Merck launched the Integrated Molecular
Analysis of Genomes and its Expression (IMAGE)
Consortium designed to place EST sequences in the
public domain and systematically prevent companies
like HGS and Incyte from establishing blocking, proprietary positions through gene discovery. Moreover,
EST sequencing was widely practiced in investigatorinitiated research through the early 1990s. Thus, while
HGS did establish a substantial portfolio of intellectual
property, it did not dominate the intellectual property
landscape of the human genome.
“commercializing products based on those genes”
The initial optimism of scientists that genomics would radically advance drug discovery was shortlived. By 2001, a report from Lehman Brothers titled
O c to be r 2013 I Vo lu m e 19 I N u m b er 4
7
“The Fruits of Genomics” called attention to the fact
that genomic approaches to target discovery and validation were not sufficiently robust to add near-term value
to pharmaceutical development, and that the novel targets provided by genomics were less-well characterized
than previous drug targets.10 The report predicted that
the initial impact of investments in genomic technologies would be to slow productivity, increase costs, and
decrease the present value of products in development.
HGS’ experience conforms to this prediction.
From 1992–2012, HGS commenced clinical trials
of 21 candidate products (Table 1). HGS’ first clinical
trials of candidate products arising from its gene discovery and functional genomics platforms failed. It was
not until 2001 that HGS began clinical development of
Benlysta.
Benlysta is a monoclonal antibody targeted against
tumor necrosis factor (TNF) superfamily member 13b,
a protein involved in B-cell activation. The TNFSF13B
gene, which expresses this protein, was described by
HGS contemporaneously with papers from four other
institutions describing the same target, referred to
variously as B Lymphocyte Stimulator (BLyS), B-cell
Activating Factor (BAFF), APOL-related leukocyte
expressed ligand (TALL), or the Dendritic cell-derived
TNF-like molecule.11-15 Moreover, by the time Benlysta
was approved, three other monoclonal antibody products targeted against different TNF homologues had
already been approved including Remicade (1998) for
Crohn’s disease and both Humira (2002) and Simponi
(2009) for Rheumatoid Arthritis. Moreover, two other
monoclonal antibody products against the same target,
Eli Lilly’s tabalumab and Anthera Pharmaceuticals’ blisibimod, were in late stage development as of 2012. Thus,
while HGS was successful in commercializing at least
one product related to its gene discovery and target validation platforms, it was not far ahead of the forefront of
drug discovery or development.
At the acquisition in 2012, HGS had a product pipeline that would be predicted to produce 4–5 commercial products based on a calculated PPA. Significantly,
many of these products are not genome-related and
involve microbial targets or are albumin fusions of
existing biological products (glucagon, growth hormone, interferon, and IL-2) designed to extend patient
life and improve pharmacokinetics. These development programs did not originate with HGS’ genomic
platforms, but were enabled by HGS’ ability to raise
large amounts of capital based on the promise of geno­
mics. HGS’ experience in this regard is similar to that
of other genomics companies such as Millennium and
Incyte, which ultimately created less value from the
gene sequences they discovered, than from their ability
to raise capital based on the promise of their genomics
8
Journal of Commercial Biotechnology platforms, which would subsequently be invested in
more traditional drug discovery projects or acquisition
of late stage products.
Return on investment
The $3.6 billion paid for HGS was less than the $3.9 billion of capital investments that had been made in the
company. Thus, even without taking into account the
inflation adjusted value of early investments or dilution
from noncapital transactions, HGS provided a net negative return on shareholder investments.
A closer examination of HGS’ market capitalization
over time, however, provides a more nuanced picture.
This analysis shows that each round of private or public
investment provided investors with an opportunity to
exit with a positive return (Figure 2). For venture capital
investors, the IPO only 18 months after the initial investment provided a substantial step-up in valuation and
the opportunity for liquidity. While HGS’ stock traded
below the IPO price for almost five years, the bull market
of 1999–2000 offered opportunities for positive returns.
Even investors who participated in two financings at the
peak of the 2000 tech bubble had a window, though limited, to exit with a positive return before the stock collapsed in late 2000. Thus, venture investors, institutional
investors, and investment banks had an opportunity to
make money from HGS, even though the company failed
to create long-term value. On average, however, investors
who bought shares through public markets lost value.
ASSESSING THE VALUE OF HGS
At its inception, HGS was explicitly an R&D-stage, science-based business committed to a long-term program
of discovery that was expected to identify product dev­
elopment opportunities. As such, HGS exemplified both
the biotechnology industry’s ambition and its ability to
mobilize large amounts of capital for translational science. Throughout its history, HGSs valuation exemplified
the greatest challenge facing the biotechnology industry,
namely the absence of a rational relationship between
market or accounting-based metrics of corporate value
and the technical progress of companies focused on
translating science for product development.
Like many start-up biotechnology companies, HGS
overestimated the potential of its core technologies, the
impact that genomics would have on the efficiency of
drug development, and the timeline required to translate
nascent science into approved products. Nevertheless,
HGS ultimately did exactly what it promised investors; establishing a substantial portfolio of intellectual
ht tp://www.CommercialBiotechnology.com
Figure 2. Return on Investment in HGS. Opportunities to exit with a positive return (black) or negative return (red) at the end of each
quarter 1992–2012. Investment dates and prices are shown at left and indicated by green boxes. The average price of venture capital
investments was determined from HGS’ S-1A filed in November 1993. Other financial data is from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ.
property and a pipeline of promising products, as well
as successfully launching an important product with billion-dollar potential. These accomplishments, however,
were never reflected in HGS’ valuation, and the company
was ultimately acquired for a “fair value” that was less
than the total capital investment in the company, and
little more than the sum of its cash, R&D tax credits, and
royalties owned on jointly-developed products.
HGS’ market capitalization between 1993 and
2012 correlated significantly with general market conditions, as measured by the NASDAQ or NBI indices,
but exhibited a significant negative correlation with
the accumulation of intellectual property and maturation of its product pipeline, as measured by PPA (data
not shown). Similarly, HGS’ technical progress did not
contribute to the 10-fold increase in valuation during
the 1999-2000 “dot-com” bubble, the subsequent 30-fold
decrease in valuation to a nadir in 2008, nor the fact that
HGS’ valuation was 3-fold higher in 2009, with no products on the market, than it was at the end of 2011, after
Bentlysta was approved. The fact that HGS stock tracked
with the NADAQ index, whose components are valued
primarily by the economic performance of commercial
products and consumer behavior, is counterintuitive
given HGS’ business plan focused on the advancement
of translational science. The discordance between HGS’
accomplishments and its valuation was highlighted in
the disconnect between GSK’s justification of its offer to
acquire HGS for $13/share as reflecting the “fair value” of
HGS,16 while HGS argued that this offer failed to “reflect
the value inherent in Human Genome Sciences.”1
What is the “value inherent” in a biotechnology
c­ompany such as HGS? Can this even be defined or
measured? Earning-based value metrics are not relevant
to research-stage companies that operate at a net loss.
Moreover, such metrics systematically devalue R&D
expenses of revenue-generating companies by decreasing earnings. Present value calculations can ascribe
de minimis value to long-term development programs.
Accounting standards that define the “fair value” of
assets, including intellectual property, are heavily influenced by temporal market conditions. Most financial
analysts focus on near-term fluctuations in stock price,
which often reflect technical milestones, but not the
steady technical progress that enables seminal milestones
to be reached. Without minimizing the expertise and
complexity inherent in evaluating intellectual property,
intangible assets, alliances, management, tax credits,
cash positions and other critical aspects of a ­company’s
strategic and financial position, a macro­scopic analysis of HGS history suggests that such analyses failed
to account for the technical progress of the company
towards its goals. At acquisition, much of HGS’ progress
and intellectual property would have been accounted for
simply as goodwill.
Pisano has argued that biotechnology is, at its core,
a science-based business that requires distinct architecture and business models from other businesses.17
One critical component of such architecture would be
standards for valuing science-based companies that
provide for a rational appreciation of value in parallel
with a company’s technological successes and failures.
O c to be r 2013 I Vo lu m e 19 I N u m b er 4
9
Investors should be able to invest in the strategic goals
of ­early-stage companies with the expectation that the
company’s technical success towards achieving these
goals will be reflected in increasing valuations. The
fact that such success may not be reflected in economic
metrics of value creation constitutes a systematic dis­
incentive for investment and entrepreneurial activity in
general. This is evident in the current climate of investment activity, which increasingly eschews investments
in translational science, in favor of investments in products whose value can be formally measured by traditional
market-based metrics. Mechanisms that credit value to
the course of translational science would enable investors to realize positive returns on investments in effective
translational science and ensure that the industry continues to attract the capital required for groundbreaking
research and development.
HGS is a conspicuous exemplar of both the promise of the biotechnology industry and also the challenges
facing an industry focused on creating value through
the translation of nascent scientific discoveries into successful products and sustainable companies. For the
industry to continue mobilizing the large amounts of
capital investment required for translational science,
there needs to be greater alignment between milestones
of translational progress and measures of the value that
can be realized by investors.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Center for Integration of Science and Industry is supported by a grant from the National Biomedical Research
Foundation. The authors thank Alan Walton for sharing
his experience with Human Genome Sciences, Michael
Boss and Nancy Hsiung for their insights, JR Brennan
for contributions to this research, and Donna Connor
for her contributions to this manuscript.
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10
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