1. Euthyphro's First Attempt to define Piety:
“I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple robbery or
anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious.” [5e; p. 6]
As evidence of this, Euthyphro claims that Zeus prosecuted his father for injustice, too. [6a]
Socrates' Rebuttal #1:
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2. Euthyphro's Second Attempt to define Piety:
"What is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious." [7a; p. 8]
Socrates' Rebuttal #2:
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3. Euthyphro's Third Attempt to define Piety:
“Socrates: ...[W]hat all the gods hate is impious and what they all love is pious, and...what some gods love and other hate is
neither or both? Is that how you wish us to define piety and impiety?”
“Euthyphro: I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the
impious.” [9de; p. 11]
Socrates' Rebuttal #3:
1. Euthyphro’s third definition is ambiguous because it holds two incompatible logical possibilities: Either, i.) the gods agree to
love a pious act because it is already aptly described as pious; or, ii.) the action or circumstance of the gods’ lovin’ it is what
causes or explains the aptness of that description.[10a, p. 12] To show that this is so, Socrates explains to Euthyphro that it is a
logical principle reflected in grammar and syntax that descriptions are apt because of actions or circumstances which cause or
explain them, not vice versa. [10ad; p. 12-13]
2. This allows Euthyphro to understand that what he means is choice “i.” not choice “ii.” [10d; p. 13] As a result of this it
becomes clear that “the pious” and “the god-loved” are not equivalent in meaning. The activity or circumstance of the god’s
loving could only make something “a god-loved thing.” But the pious is not described as pious as the result of that loving
activity. The loving activity itself happens because the gods already recognize that something fits the description “pious.” In
other words, they are lovin' it because it is "Pious"; it isn't "Pious" because they are lovin' it. [10d-11b; p. 13-14]
3. So, the third definition only tells us that whatever is aptly described as pious can only also be described as "god-loved" as
the result of the gods' loving activity. But we still do not know what the circumstance or action is that makes something pious in
the first place. We still don’t recognize what it is that makes the description “pious” apt for anything that is “pious” and
deserves it. So, this cannot be an adequate definition of “Piety.”