Penultimate draft for:
Pólya, T. (2007): Omitting depth cues: The aesthetics of perceptual `reflexivity'. In: Anderson, J. D. and
Fisher Anderson, B., eds., Narration and Spectatorship in Moving Images. Cambridge: Cambridge
Scholars Press, 246-259.
Pagination may differ. Illustrations to be found here:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwxSovVw2exwM0VFVWpFVTRzR0k/view?usp=sharing
Omitting depth cues: The aesthetics of perceptual ‘reflexivity’
Tamás Pólya
[email protected]
Film Studies and Visual Culture Seminar
University of Pécs, Hungary
1. Chances of reflexivity in the perceptual domain
Artistic self-reflexivity (or reflexivity), as envisioned by the Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky
(1917/1988) and German playwright and theoretician Bertolt Brecht (1937/1985) leads to a sort of
alienation or estrangement (defamiliarization, ostranenie, Verfremdung) from, or disruption of, the
smooth process of reception. That is, reflexivity leads to a sort of awareness on the audience’s part,
which, in the case of films, may be a dawning awareness of being faced with an artificial ‘optical surface’
and an ‘artificial scene’ (cf. Anderson 2002). 1
As for cinema history, it has been customary for many films d’auteur from the New Waves on to try
to prompt a reflexive state of mind on the viewer’s part (the best known examples are by Jean-Luc
Godard). The means to achieve reflexivity characteristically, but not exclusively, range from a selfreflexive narrative, the presentation of a non-linear or incoherent plot, the representation of filmic
equipment or mise-en-scène itself, through direct address of the viewer, and open philosophizing (cf.
Metz 1991, Stam 1992).
However, many of the just mentioned forms of reflexivity are related to (a deviant use of) filmic
narration, and typically bear the mark of what László Tarnay and I called in our 2004 book categorial
level cognitive understanding (Tarnay and Pólya 2004). That is, such phenomena are perceived and
analyzed by the viewer at a relatively high, linguistico-conceptual level of cognitive functioning.
Additionally, they require a relatively low-threshold of attention to be perceived, i.e. they are hard to
miss.
There exist, however, filmic devices which might be regarded the perceptual counterparts of genuine
reflexive ones. These primarily induce the viewer’s awareness by offering less conspicuous visual or
aural phenomena, many of which are less significant, or even insignificant, from a narrative point of
view. In fact, one of main tenets of this paper is that a largely unconscious analog to genuine filmic
reflexivity can be achieved by perceptual, i.e. non-narrative filmic devices, ones that involve our lowerlevel cognitive mechanisms responsible for aural and visual processing. Erika Kapronczai and I labeled
this kind of reflexivity (or quasi-reflexivity) in films perceptual reflexivity (as opposed to conceptual
reflexivity, related to ideology or narrative). From among perceptual reflexive phenomena, here I discuss
those related to the (partial) 3D illusion provided by films.
Before turning to these strategies, let me briefly describe how filmic reflexivity in general may work
at a cognitive level. As not all possible cognitive sources of aesthetic pleasure derived from reflexive
filmic experience can be discussed here, only a threefold functional explanation is proposed.
Firstly, the higher the informational complexity of a film, the greater the chance it requires such an
amount of cognitive processing which cannot but rise to the level of consciousness and result in an
alienating awareness. In Last Year in Marienbad (1961, Alain Resnais), for example, the non-linear plot
and the editing not only puzzle the viewer―that would only amount to what any well-made detective
story can achieve―but also, as it were, embody the rememberer’s sifting through his memories, fears and
desires.
1
The paper is mostly based on my contribution to Pólya and Kapronczai (2006), and I thank Erika Kapronczai for the
examples originally provided by her (figures 004d, 022, and 028). I also thank Barbara and Joseph Anderson, David Bordwell,
Torben Grodal, Bruce Hutchinson, Joseph G. Kickasola, Larson Powell, and László Tarnay and many others for their
comments and suggestions at CCSMI 2006 Potsdam.
Secondly, in the clearest cases of filmic reflexivity the viewer is faced with a blatant reminder of the
artificial and representational nature of films. In such cases he can find a coherent reading of the film only
at a meta-level, at which he consciously concludes that the film is only a possibly false representation of
reality (cf. Henderson 1971). For instance, that may happen in films where filmmaking is being shown
such as in Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s Beware of a Holy Whore (1971), but also in The Band of Outsiders
(1964), where Godard shuts down the soundtrack completely for a minute, or in the Wind from the East
(1970, Godard and the Dziga Vertov Group), where the narrator reminds the viewer of the eventual
manipulative intentions and interests of capitalist ideology.
And, thirdly, there are cases of perceptual reflexivity when a shift of attentional focus takes place.
When such a perceptual reflexive device is employed, the viewer’s attention, which in the case of
traditional feature films is by default directed to the filmic narrative, comes to be deflected or averted
from the narrative, and becomes partly or wholly centered on some perceptual phenomenon or change. It
is in this act of attentional re-focusing that the disruption of the smooth reception of the film transpires. In
non-reflexive or escapist films the perceptual material is only subservient to the conceptual and emotional
processing insofar as it either only provides material for the viewer’s narrative understanding by showing
who does what to whom, or influences his emotions at an unconscious level (think of sudden cuts in
horror films etc.). To put it differently, and focusing now on the visual dimension, the visual properties of
the filmic image normally do not come close to arise to the conscious attentional level of the viewer,
while in perceptual reflexive cases they do, or almost do.
But why the qualification of ‘almost’? Because in cases of perceptual reflexivity the disruption of the
flowing narrative processing is not uniform but rather comes in different degrees. It need not be total and
need not make the viewer entirely, consciously aware of the attentional re-focusing, that is, of the
perceptual change or perceptual peculiarity encountered. In fact, I would like to suggest that the
aesthetically most successful examples of perceptual reflexivity are those which do not rise to the level of
consciousness but rather unsettle the smoothness of filmic reception only slightly―even though this
brings with it the possibility that the viewer ignores or overlooks the potentially reflexive device.
Indeed, artistic reflexivity in general is a phenomenon that almost invariably exists only in the eye of
the beholder: except for the case of self-reference, it cannot be claimed that it can be objectively,
scientifically identified. Rather, reflexivity results from the interplay of the work of art and its audience,
due to its dependence on the sensitivity and attention of the latter.
But to return to perceptual reflexivity, here is an example to illustrate the above suggestions. It is the
scene in Kagemusha (1980, Akira Kurosawa) right after the death of lord Shingen, when the Takeda army
marches on barren, grayish hills (clip 01 or fig. 000a-f). 2 In a long shot, the camera slowly pans to the
right and zooms on the column of soldiers wearing reddish purple armors and carrying brightly colored
red and green banners until it comes to show, in a much narrower frame now, a section of the column clad
in black and white, with black flags, and horses in the shadow and thus colorless, all this against a veryvery slightly colored grayish background. The perceptual reflexive effect here, I submit, consists in the
exclusion of colors: it is a rather inconspicuous change, which slightly surprises or unsettles the viewer
for a moment, and manages to generate an almost unconscious sense of sullenness or even grief. Of
course, this is a case of perceptual reflexivity which borders on customary conceptual understanding
because the viewer can easily link the perceived change to the narrative content of the film (i.e. death).
The point lies in the subtlety of the disruption effect.
2. Forms of perceptual reflexivity
Perceptual filmic reflexivity in general comprises a range of phenomena both in the aural and the visual
domain (for an overview in Hungarian see Pólya and Kapronczai 2006). Among the categories of filmic
visual reflexivity which I cannot examine here in detail one finds the following: displacement of the
2
The
interested
reader
can
find
the
illustrations
mentioned
in
the
text
at
http://www.btk.pte.hu/tanszekek/mtk/magunkrol/publikaciok/polya06cog.zip; but please contact the author if the link does not
work.
narratively important elements from the visually prominent positions; visual framing; deviant (or nonnormal) use of colors; pronounced use of geometric composition; the integration of ‘other’ media into the
filmic image and so on (cf. also Henderson 1971 and Stam 1992).
Let me focus now on those perceptual reflexive phenomena which involve the partial omission of
depth cues normally available on the filmic image. It is well-known in cognitive theoretic circles that
films achieve the illusion of 3D depth because of their being recorded in a photomechanical way
(Anderson 1996, Cutting 2005, Anderson and Fisher-Anderson 2005). From among all kinds of depth
cues normally available to the human eye, it is only three that are missing in the case of films:
convergence of the eyes, retinal disparity (or stereopsis), and monocular motion parallax induced by the
observer’s movement. However, camera movement and the movement of the objects being filmed can
make up for motion parallax (Rogers and Graham 1984), and not even the other two cues are
indispensable for the sense of depth to be realized (Grosslight et alii 1978, Cutting and Vishton 1995,
Cutting 2005). Normally, all other depth cues are available in films: accommodation of the eyes (because
of varying depth of field), occlusion, kinetic depth cues (available from the rotation of 3D objects),
variations in luminance (such as shading), cast shadows, and various sorts of perspective such as texture
gradient, size gradient (or relative size of objects), and converging parallels (Marr 1982, Kersten,
Mamassian and Knill 1997, Livingstone 2002, Cutting 2005, Sekuler and Blake 2005). Accordingly, in
normal, undisrupted filmic reception the viewer experiences a 3D illusion, with his perceptual processing
being based exactly on the just mentioned cues.
Now, my suggestion is that a perceptually reflexive experience can be generated by films which
intentionally or accidentally present images which lack some of the depth cues normally available on
photographic media. To put it differently, undoing the 3D illusion by omitting depth cues is one of the
ways to disrupt or unsettle the smooth process of filmic reception and to trigger a more or less conscious
awareness on the viewer’s part. Since there are several depth cues normally contained in a filmic image
that can be omitted, there are several ways for a film to make it (more) difficult for the 3D illusion to
emerge.
Note that the artistic urge to achieve a (quasi-)reflexive effect in such a way stems from the essence of
films: photomechanical recording. While in European painting achieving the illusion of reality was a
noble and hard-sought goal for many centuries, film offered a relatively robust illusion of depth, and thus
of reality, by its very nature. The challenge here, as countless experiments from the Mélies shorts on
indicated, lied in stretching or disrupting the 3D illusion already given.
3. A partial taxonomy of perceptual reflexivity: ways to undo the 3D illusion
Before the actual taxonomy, here are a couple of qualifications. First, the taxonomy being offered is
deficient in at least two respects. On the one hand, it is non-exhaustive as it does not cover all perceptual
reflexive phenomena. On the other hand, it is a peculiarity of the phenomena under scrutiny that they not
always can be categorized in a clear-cut manner: i.e., the ways of omitting depth cues tend to intersect and
manifest themselves more at a time. For example, sequences which are susceptible to trigger the reflexive
awareness of the viewer are often temporally drawn-out static shots (relatively long takes) or shots of
objects performing no or very little movement. Thus, these images lack the cues otherwise available from
motion parallax and the rotation of 3D objects. It is also a recurring feature of visually reflexive shots that
some flat surface blocks out a large part of the image field; that the depth of field is large; that shadows
are less prominent; or that the scene is shot with a telephoto lens.
Second, most of the examples come from feature films, that is, from films containing narrative in at
least a rudimentary form. The reason for this is that I believe that non-narrative or experimental films tend
to foreground the perceptual dimension of filmic reception by default, and thus they leave no space for an
extra perceptual disruption of the viewer’s cognitive processing to occur. That is, experimental films
constitute a case of ‘sensory or retinal art’ in and by themselves, as William Earle put it (1968: 38f).
3.1. Elimination of occlusion
Rigid objects in the foreground occlude those in the background, yielding one of the most powerful and
salient depth cues. Thus 3D illusion suffers considerably, when object occlusion is lessened or eliminated.
3.1.1. Apparent adjacency
It happens quite rarely in the real world that non adjacent objects deflect photons in such a way that they
yield a retinal image on which their edges are perfectly adjacent. In fact, when the observer moves
around, the chance of it being so drops practically to zero. However, the illusion of adjacency can be
created on static shots, since there are infinitely many points in real space on the imaginary line running
from our retina to the vanishing point, which correspond to the same retinal point independently from
how deep they are located in real space. Thus with appropriate positioning of the objects and the camera,
any two objects can be made to be seen as being adjacent: even if our cognitive system finds that
practically impossible on some other basis.
Very Chytílova exploits this optical peculiarity in her Daisies (1966), where a male figure is seen to
apparently lie on the top of a wooden structure which the sunbathing protagonists lean to (fig. 002). The
trick works despite our strong intuitive sense that there must be a problem with the size of the young man
(cf. 3.3.3.). Even more daringly, in The Goddess of 1967 (2000) by Clara Law, a human figure is
positioned near the lower edge of the frame so that he seems to stand directly on it―though here the flatlooking static background of the sky also weakens the illusion of depth (fig. 003).
These are cases of what Ramachandran and Hirstein called ‘suspicious coincidences’ of edges (1999:
27), to be avoided on paintings with an aesthetic intent. However, they are welcome in films, where they
are employed with a possibly reflexive, distancing intent.
3.1.2. Use of vertical or horizontal bands
The 3D illusion is severely weakened when the image field is made up of either vertical or horizontal
bands that do not cross and do not correspond to the 3D structure of the space depicted. The effect seems
to stem from the partial or total lack of object occlusion (and in some cases, from the lack of spatial
reference points, see 3.3.1.).
A series of shots play out this effect in Wong Kar-Wai’s 2046 (2004), where the wide-screen image is
composed by a figure in medium-shot or close-up and the rest by some flat, vertical surface such as a
curtain, piece of wall, or, sometimes, simply darkness (fig. 004a-d). An even more abstract visual pattern
is offered in The Goddess of 1967 (2000, Law) when the camera pans upwards showing two adjacentlooking facades, which seem to be transformed into a striped surface textured by windows and the
blackened branches of a tree (fig. 005a-b).
Horizontal bands seem to be employed to achieve a flattening effect more often. Their effect can be
augmented either by using a flat or flat-looking surface as background on which no, or minimal, texture
gradient can be perceived (the par excellence example is the empty or monochrome sky or sea), or when
all 3D objects depicted are of a relatively small size so that the shading effects they are subject to (cf.
3.2.3.) cannot reveal their plastic nature.
In Close to Eden (1991, Nikita Mihalkov) a couple of long shots of the steppe exploit this effect,
especially the closing shot, which shows the chimney of a plant, apparently growing from the top of the
hill (a case of apparent adjacency again), but which is ultimately dominated by the horizontal stripes of
the hill, the smoke, and the sky (fig. 006). The closing shot of Labyrinth in the Fields (1983, Shuji
Terayama) shows a group of children playing under the gray sky on the brownish dunes (fig. 007). In the
same movie, a full shot is taken of the main character crossing a river, where the brown bush, the gray
rocks on the riverbank and the blue water form three quasi-horizontal bands (fig. 008). Pastoral―To Die
in the Country (1974), also by Terayama, exhibits a similar shot of the sea, made with a lilac-colored
filter (fig. 009). One of the finest examples can be found near the climax of Maborosi (1995, fig. 010),
where Hirokazu Koreeda takes a long shot of a funeral procession on the beach, moving along a corridorlike band of the sea, under the dark sky partitioned into a darker and whiter band by the clouds. The shot
is static and drawn-out, and the mourners proceed very slowly, parallel both to the stripes dominating the
picture and the horizontal line of the frame―all of which strengthen the flattening effect.
3.2. Omission of depth cues related to illumination or variations in luminance
Deflected light plays a fundamental role in guiding depth perception, as shading or sharp variations in
perceived luminance are reliable indicators of the edges and protuberances of objects.
3.2.1. Blurring of luminance contrast boundaries
There are several ways to eliminate or blur luminance contrast boundaries on photographed images: for
instance, by shooting in diffuse rather than direct light, by taking out of focus shots, or by applying a
powerful blur- or anti-aliasing effect during post-production. The result is similar: once the edges of
objects are blurred, their 3D shape and relative positions become much more difficult to recognize.
A well-known historic example can be found in Man Ray’s Starfish (1928, fig. 011a-b), parts of
which have been shot through milk-glass. Similarly, the gradual vanishing of the lines defining a young
woman’s head seems to lead to a surprisingly strong aesthetic effect in The Dreamlife of Angels (1998,
Eric Zonca, fig. 012).
3.2.2. Over- or underexposition
Over- or underexposition is a relatively radical way of softening the edges of objects since they may
easily lead to the disappearance of the distinct object itself by letting it be soaked up by the surrounding
light or darkness.
Overexposition seems to be used more often in order to bring about such an effect. The end sequence
of Tarkovsky’s The sacrifice (1986) offers a well-known example, where the branches of the tree fuse
into the glaring see (fig. 013). In one of the first scenes of Maborosi (1995, Koreeda), the grandmother
strolls away on a dark street, followed by her granddaughter Yumiko, and we see their figures melting
into the light of the outer street (fig. 014a-f). It adds to the poignancy of the scene, and lessens its
perceptual reflexive character, that it presents Yumiko’s dream about her late grandmother, that is, her
past, which is just as vague and shadowy as the two shapes in the light. There is a distinctive example in
the third scene of Abbas Kiarostami’s minimalist Five Dedicated to Ozu (2003), lasting about ten
minutes, where the stretches of sea, sand and sky form three horizontal bands (cf. 3.1.2.) and slowly
vanish, together with the dogs on the beach, into the stately expanding whiteness (fig. 015a-d).
A partial underexposure is employed in The Goddess of 1967 (2000, Law), where a curtain in the
background is surrounded by deep, homogeneous darkness, so as to make its spatial position hard to
determine (fig. 016). And the next category can also be regarded a case of local underexposure.
3.2.3. Use of silhouette-figures
Protuberances and cavities of objects are normally well discernible in the real world due to our adaptation
to the fact that light usually arrives from above: a white-to-black gradient is deflected from a convex
body, while a black-to-white grading can be seen on concave objects (cf. the crater illusion). Although
this is a depth cue relevant only to the shape within the boundaries of objects, if it is omitted, objects
seem to flatten out.
A rather conspicuous, thus only initially reflexive, way to employ this effect is to use silhouettes
throughout a film (e.g. József és testvérei [Joseph and his brothers], 2004, András Jeles). A more
sophisticated use of it can be found in Maborosi (1995, Koreeda) in the climax scene, when husband and
wife are seen, in a couple of long shots, meeting besides a funeral pyre on the evening beach (fig. 017a-c).
Apart from the figures’ being silhouettes, other factors contributing to the apparent two-dimensionality of
the scene are the spare use of colors (there is only black and shades of rusty mauve), the minimal
movement, and the striped and symmetrical composition. Nice examples can also be found in Double
Suicide (1969, Masahiro Shinoda, fig. 018a-c) or Shanghai Triad (1995, Yimou Zhang, fig. 019).
Shots taken in fog or mist yield a similar effect, as of a tree in the fog in Life on a String (1991, Chen
Kaige, fig. 020), or about a lonely figure standing on a wooden pier in the twilight in Distance (2001,
Koreeda, fig. 021).
3.3. Weakening of perspectival effects
The various kinds of perspectival depth cues (texture gradient, atmospheric perspective, converging
parallels) play a major role in creating and sustaining the sense of depth on a picture. Their omission
seriously weakens the 3D illusion even though the effect of occlusion generally persists.
3.3.1. Omission of the background and the spatial reference points
Often the actual background of a scene is blocked out by a large, flat, vertical surface placed in the
background or middle ground (this was a recurring device in earlier films of Jean-Luc Godard), so that
perspectival effects disappear, and only a few or no reference points remain for the observer to assess the
relative spatial positions of objects and to form a coherent sense of space. An identical effect can be
achieved by narrowing down the frame so as to prevent the inclusion of essential reference points on the
picture.
A couple of shots utilize the anti-perspectival effect in the Vertical Ray of the Sun (2000, Anh Hung
Tran, fig. 022), or in Double Suicide (1969, Shinoda, fig. 023). It is used quite profusely by Wong KarWai in 2046 (2004), where, in close ups or over the shoulder shots, the characters’ head seems to float in
total, homogenous darkness (fig. 024a-c). Another example is offered in Daisies (1966, Chytílova), when
the main characters sit in a boat, against the dynamic, yet static-looking background constituted by the
half-dark, half-shiny waves of a river (fig. 025)―although the use of the telephoto lens arguably adds to
the flatness effect here. Spatial reference points are omitted and perspectival effects are weakened in a
quite spectacular manner in various scenes of Life on a String (1991, Kaige). For instance, the viewer
cannot but perceive a fairly unrealistic spatial configuration (fig. 026) when he sees children doing
laundry on something like a shoal that apparently floats in the middle of nowhere. Similarly, a small
silhouette-like figure seems to face a towering amount of golden-yellowish river water, in a scene looking
like a gigantic painting (fig. 027).
In an opposite way, an object can hinder the pick-up of perspectival cues by being placed in the
foreground such as in the Vertical Ray of the Sun (2000, Tran, fig. 028).
And here is an example of omitting reference points by narrowing down the frame. In a surprising
shot of Labyrinth in the Fields (1983, Terayama), the viewer first perceives only yellow flowers scattered
on something like a rug that fills practically the whole background, plus a quadrangular object to the right
in the foreground, and a strange wheel-like object to the right, apparently made up of wooden spokes and
a rather angular red band possibly forming a portion of the ‘tire’ (fig. 029). It takes a moment or two to
realize that this is a high angle shot of a rug laid to the ground, on which a couple of Japanese
instruments, namely, a quadrangular spool, and a wheel used for winding the yarn, are placed.
3.3.2. Photographing flat surfaces from a perpendicular position
A special case of the omission of background occurs when a flat surface is photographed perpendicularly,
from, typically, but not necessarily, a high angle camera position. So, texture gradient and converging
parallels tend to disappear, and the scene apparently becomes, if the main plane is appropriately
decorated, a 2D ornamental surface.
A classic author, Orson Welles has employed this device to try to turn the floor of a courtyard into
something like a wall full of renaissance designs (The Tragedy of Othello: The Moor of Venice, 1952, fig.
030), but the opening shot of The sheep thief (1997, Asif Kapadia) about a boy lying beside the desert
road also serves as an excellent example (fig. 031).
However, an eye-level shot such as the one in Daisies (1966, Chytílova) can also achieve a similar
effect, by showing a 3D object (a clock) surrounded by 2D ornamental elements, which seem to enhance
the sense of two-dimensionality in a contextual way (fig. 032).
3.3.3. Odd or indeterminate relative size
The fact that, just as described in 3.1.1., objects in different depth positions may look adjacent, and the
fact that our cognitive system expects object size to co-vary with distance (the farther something is, the
smaller it looks), may lead to small disturbances in depth and/or size perception, when objects are
positioned in such a way as to look abnormally big or small (provided that other depth cues do not help
the observer much).
Probably the best-known example of this effect is the shot of the unnaturally big hand and card in
Hitchcock’s Spellbound (1945, fig. 033), although some of Eisentstein’s shots are also impressive (fig.
034 from ¡Que Viva Mexico!, 1932-1979; and fig. 035 from Ivan, the Terrible I., 1944). But examples
can be found in contemporary films, too. In Vertical Ray of the Sun (2000, Tran) a girl, in a relatively
high angle shot, steps into a virtual frame constituted by large-looking leafs and seems to be much smaller
for a moment than she really is―until occlusion helps to redress the viewer’s perceptual mistake (fig.
036a-b). A low angle view in The Scent of the Green Papaya (1993, Tran Anh Hung) makes the chair in
the foreground look oddly large and too close to the lamp hanging from above (fig. 037), very similarly to
a shot in Wayward Cloud (2005, Ming Liang Tsai), where we see the apparently oversized feet of the
main female character at the edge of her bed, against the background of the ceiling (fig. 038, brightened
for presentational purposes).
In the domain of experimental films, Shuji Terayama exploited the viewer’s size expectations to a
surprising effect on various occasions. In A tale of labyrinth (1975), a normal-sized door seems to have
been metamorphosed into a miniaturized one (fig. 039a-d); just as a normal-looking gate turns out to be
much bigger than expected, when a human figure appears in it (in A woman with two heads, 1977, fig.
040a-c); or it is the book in the opening shot of The reading machine (1977) that reveals its true size only
after a couple of seconds, when we can compare it to the reader’s hand (fig. 041a-d).
3.4. De-objectification
An extreme way to omit spatial reference points that help depth perception (cf. 3.3.1.) is to expose the
physical or material details (e.g. the surface texture) of the photographed object in such a detail as to deobjectify it, that is, to abolish the perceptual conditions necessary for it being perceived as an object. This
is usually done through a close up or extreme close-up, and, I assume, triggers primarily non-conceptual
processing on the viewer’s part. This may be regarded the purest instance of reflexive perceptual
disruption, and may constitute the case when filmic experience comes closest to the utterly sensual
experience induced by the quasi-tangible reality of paints on a traditional canvas.
Here are a couple of examples: the grains of sand sticking to the hair and face of the Woman in the
Dunes (1964, Hiroshi Teshigahara, fig. 042), the reddish sand in the opening shot of Goya in Bordeaux
(1999, Carlos Saura, fig. 043), the soil dashed by the rain in The sheep thief (1997, Kapadia, fig. 044), the
flowing, distorted, hypnotic lights in Michael Mann’s Thief (1981, clip 02 or fig. 045) and Collateral
(2004, fig. 046a-d), and the patches of ink poured into water, forming indescribable shapes at the start of
Kwaidan (1964, Masaki Kobayashi, fig. 047a-i). Finally, there is a brief, but splendid shot just before the
main title of Vengeance is Mine (1979, Shohei Imamura), when a police car, shown form behind, seems
to make waggling and hopping motions in the dark so that, for a moment, its lights resemble erratic red
brush marks left on the pitch-black canvas of the night (clip 03 or fig. 048a-d).
6. Summary
The paper discussed examples of filmic reflexivity―the disruption of smooth filmic reception typical of
‘escapist’ filmic experience―of mainly perceptual nature. It laid out a taxonomy for a group of (quasi)reflexive perceptual phenomena based on the undoing of the 3D illusion characteristic of the filmic
image. It was suggested that in such cases it is exactly the omission of depth cues that induces a
disruption of the continuous, unconscious experience and that leads to a state of quasi-awareness in the
viewer, on the borders of conscious and unconscious processing. Differently put, I argued that genuine,
high-level, conceptual artistic reflexivity, related to the negation or subversion of the conventions of
traditional narrative filmmaking, has a lower-level cognitive counterpart involving quasi-reflexive filmic
phenomena which achieve an aesthetic effect through changes induced in cognitive processing by purely
perceptual stimuli.
References:
Anderson, J. D. (2002): Scene and Surface in the Cinema: Implications for Realism. Cinémas (Cinéma et
cognition) 12.2: 61-73.
Anderson, J. D. (1996): The Reality of Illusion: An Ecological Approach to Cognitive Film Theory.
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP.
Anderson, J. D. and Fisher Anderson, B., eds. (2005): Moving Image Theory: Ecological Considerations.
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP.
Brecht, B. (1937): Verfremdungseffekte in der chinesischen Schauspielkunst. In: Brecht (1985): 74-89.
Brecht, B. (1985): Schriften zum Theater. Über eine nicht-aristotelische Dramatik. Suhrkamp:
Frankfurt/Main.
Cutting, J. E., and Vishton, P. M. (1995): Perceiving layout and knowing distances: The interaction,
relative potency, and contextual use of different information about depth. In: Epstein and Rogers
(1995): 69-117.
Cutting, J. E. (2005): Perceives Scenes in Film and in the World. In: Anderson and Fisher Anderson
(2005): 7-27.
Earle, W. (1968): Revolt against realism in the films. In: Mast and Cohen (1979): 33-44.
Epstein, W. and Rogers, S., eds. (1995): Handbook of perception and cognition: Vol. 5. Perception of
space and motion. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Grosslight, J. H., Fletcher, H. J., Masterton, R. B. and Hagen, R. (1978): Monocular vision and landing
performance in general aviation pilots: Cyclops revisited. Human Factors 20.1: 27-33.
Henderson (1971): Toward a Non-Bourgeois Camera Style. In: Nichols (1976): 422-438.
Kersten, D., Mamassian, P. and Knill, D. C. (1997): Moving cast shadows induce apparent motion in
depth. Perception 26.2: 171-92.
Livingstone, M. (2002): Vision and Art: The Biology of Seeing. New York: Harry N. Abrams.
Mast, G. and Cohen, M., eds. (1979): Film theory and criticism. New York–Oxford: Oxford UP.
Metz, C. (1991): L’énonciation impersonelle, ou le site du film. Paris: Klincksieck
Nichols, B., ed. (1976): Movies and Methods, Vol. I. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Pólya, T and Kapronczai, E. (2006): A vizuális reflexivitás kognitív elméletéhez. [On the theory of visual
reflexivity.] Apertúra 2006 Spring, available at: http://www.apertura.hu/2006/tavasz/polya-kapronczai/
Ramachandran, V. S. and Hirstein, W. (1999): The Science of Art: A neurological theory of aesthetic
experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6.6/7: 15-51.
Rogers, B. J. and Graham, M. E. (1984): Aftereffects from motion parallax and stereoscopic depth:
Similarities and interactions. In: Spillmann and Wooten (1984): 603-619.
Sekuler, R. and Blake, R. (2005): Perception. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Skhlovsky, V. (1917): Art as technique. In: Lodge (1988): 16-30.
Lodge, D., ed. (1988): Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader. London: Longmans.
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1995): Relevance Theory: Communication and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell.
Spillmann, L. and Wooten, B. R., eds. (1984): Sensory experience, adaptation and perception. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Stam, R. (1992): Reflexivity in film and literature: from Don Quixote to Jean-Luc Godard. New York:
Columbia UP.
Tarnay, L. and Pólya, T. (2004): Specificity Recognition and Social Cognition. Bern–Frankfurt a/M–New
York–Oxford: Peter Lang.