CONCLUSION-
CONCLUSION
ETHNIC AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AND CONFLICTLINKAGES IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS DURING
THE EIGHTIES
The study in the previous chapters tries to capture the problematique of
India-Pakistan relations in one of the most elaborate ways. The effort to ground the
problem in the historical context and then deconstruct it to trace it through the parameters
of ethnic and communal violence alone. that is context-specific, robs the study of ~II
pretensions of generalization across time and space. One may add here. that even though
avowedly limited in scope, content and exercise. the study does not fore-close the
possibility of leaving sufficient space open for generalization ..
In the course of our study we unearthed the historical prejudices that shaped the
nature of state-formation in India and Pakistan to facilitate our understanding of
Pakistan's uninhibited involvement in domestic affairs of India. The study also helped
in understanding how Pakistan's national identity; professedly religious since its very
inception; underplayed its territorial component and has always laid emphasis on its
Islamic character. The urge for a confessional identity, we have seen, was even more
necessitated by the division of Pakistan in 1971. partly mediated by India. Right from
the beginning Pakistan's Islamic identity was designed to serve as an unpretentious (yet
strategic) counterpoise to India's professedly secular national-state, and all through the
fifties and the sixties, Pakistan's Islamic identity was made to be nourished on repeated
denial of secularism in India as well as regular affirmation of the sanctity of 'the two
300
nation theory'. But the war of 1971 shattered the logic of 'the two nation theory' and
exposed Pakistan to ridicule from the Indian side, that religion cannot forge nationality
across ethnic and cultural divides.
From 1971, there grew in Pakistan, a realisation that the rationale of Pakistan
('Islam as the chief ingredient of Pakistani national identity) had to be brought into
sharper focus, and thus a steady constituency was built up, through the whipping up of
popular frenzy in favour of Islamization of an overtly Islamic society, inorder to forestall
~
all possible ethnic reassertions that might rip open the unity of Pakistan. The issues of
Baluchi, Sindi and Pathan assertion had started eating up, the core idea of Pakistan.
Islam, unstirred, could not forge an unity among them. But when Islam was stirred up,
in contradistinction to secularism in India, it proved an instant unifier. The Islamic
revolution in a Shia dominated Iran must have encouraged the Islamizers, further in this
direction. The most important thing about Islamization was, however, its opposition to
anything Indian. For over the years, India meant to them little else than a democracy
dominated by the Hindus, always conspiring to wipe out Islam from the subcontinent.
either through inversion of Islamic culture through making inroads into it and infecting
it with heretical ideas or through absorption of Islam into Hinduism through cultural
imperialism. 1
That is why cultural troops from India were not permitted to visit Pakistan during Zia's regime
because girls were not pemtitted in Islam to dance and sing. But 'girls from Libya were pemtitted to dance
in mini-skirts and Chinese women with bare am1s and legs were peimitted to perform their shows in puhlic
in Pakistan. Indian films were thoroughly banned.
301
As such, 'the Pakistan variety of Islam' was reflexively anti-Indian and drew its
sustenance from such India-baiting. One need not labour too much to explain that the
campaign for Islamization had an overarching anti-India or anti-Hindu aura about it.
From early 1970s, we have seen (in Chapter-V, on Communal Violence in India) how
leaders in Pakistan sought to whip up anti-India hysteria for electoral purposes. Even a
self-proclaimed socialist like Bhutto was compelled to take steps to prove his devotion
to Islam. With Zia in power for most of the 1980s, Islamization became the ruling
passion in Pakistan.
Islamization and Pakistan's Response to Communal Violence in India
Right since its inception, Pakistanis have always expressed concern over the fate
of their coreligionists in India. Across the years, various rulers have hinted at 'the tics
that bind us with them', 'the historical responsibility we owe to them' to legitimize their
concern thus expressed. 2 No communal riot in India has gone unreported or
uncommented in the Pakistani press. And in almost all cases the reactions have been
pungent and scathing. During the fifties and the sixties such reactions had some kind of
a spontaneity about them. The reactions ranged from 'call for a third Pakistan' or
2
It would be pertinent here to mention that, during dte anti-Ahmadiya riots which proved the
nuissance value of fundamentalistic-Islam, d1e people, who led the riots, were interrogated by thl:
committee which sought to investigate into the riots. Most of the leaders were of opinion dtat dte Muslims
left out in India struck a bond of unity with the Muslims in Pakistan and the Indian Muslims were so
devoted to the Islamic state in Pakistan that in case of a war between the two countries, they would render
ffi1Conditiooal support to Pakistan. This kind of feeling even made it obligatory on dteir part to express
sympathy with them in times of distress.
302
'another homeland for Indian Muslims' to 'deliberate conspiracy of the Hindus 1o
systematically eliminate Muslims'. All this while, Indian secularism was called a
camouflaged hoax. Towards the seventies the tone was tempered by thankfulness lo
Providence, for having escaped such an ordeal, by the establishment of Pakistan. The
essential anti-Hindu spirit,however,remained. J.N.Dixit,the retired Foreign secretary of
India, at the end of a very eventful and seasoned diplomatic career,during which he also
~
served as ambassoder to Pakistan,has recently written a book on lndo-Pak relations-' in
which he hints at the irrational suspicions that cloud the minds of the citizens of the both
the states. He ev-en visualises that there is no hope for beter bilateral relations in ncar
future.
When we enter the eighties, we mark that, Pakistan which was undergoing serious
convulsions under the feverish zeal for Islamization,seized every opportunity to coUIHcr
threats- to Islam, from any possible quarter. Under Zia, the media, heavily censored to
cover the domestic issues, gave vent to its spleen, against the atrocities on Muslims in
India. It is difficult to establish the impact, islamization in Pakistan had on India,
nevertheless, the corresponding communal situation in India might suggest such the
possibility of such a link. It was during the eighties that a section of the Muslim
intelligentsia in lndia,became vocal about discriminations and the atrocities perpetrated
on them as well as the emptiness of the secularism practised in India. One of the mosl
vocal among them, Syed Shahbuddin, called the Indian official move, to appoint Muslims
3
J .N .Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed Relationship :indo-Pak Relations. 1970-1994.(Delhi:Konark
Publishers, 1995)
303
as Judges and Presidents, as 'window-dressing', 'for decorating the facade', 'to hide the
ugliness within, for ego satisfaction'. He further added:
'.... these characters do not enjoy the confidence of the
Muslim community, they are objects of ridicule .... How
can the Muslim community look upto them since they do
not lift a finger when Muslims are burnt in Ahmedabad,
when mosques are desecrated and graveyards are taken
over, when Islam, Quran and the Holy Prophet are
insulted, when Qurbani (presumably of the cow) is
prohibited, when Muslim children are compelled to
perform Hindu rites' .4
After the Maliana massacre(U.P.) of 1987, the Imam of Jama Masjid, Syed Imam
Bukhari threatened to break the legs of the policemen and burn the Kothis of the Muslim
ministers'. After Colonel Ganj riots in Gonda district of U.P., Bukhari even sought UN
or international mediation. If one tallies these statements, with the statements issued hy
.
advocates of Pakistan in pre-partition India and by leaders of various hues in Pakistan at
present, we can find a recurring pattern among them. Of course it is presumptuous to
say that statements of Indian Muslims are dress-rehearsed but the collateral thinking
suggests that Islamization in Pakistan, has had its impact in India. The hullabaloo created
over the Shah Bano case and Muslim insistence on the continuation of their personal laws
showed, how secularization(which the Muslims perceived as de-islamization), even in the
most desirable quarters, was resisted by Muslims in India with uncharacteristic firmness.
It is impossible to ignore the impact, this would have had, on Hindu communal
organisations. The eighties saw the rise of Hindu Communalism, of a very assertive type.
4
Quoted by Rajendra Sareen, 'Rise of the Communal Ogre' in Tribune (Chandigarh) 9 Octollt:r
1989.
304
The opening up of the Babri Mosque, at Ayodhyam in February 1986 marked the
beginning of Hindu assertiveness. It is difficult to establish the connections between
Islamization in Pakistan and rise of Hindu communalism in India, though, one could take
it as a spill over effect of the unthinking irrational orthodoxy, such Islamization induced
among the Muslims in India. For the conservative rightist Hindu organisations, the
connection between Pakistan and Indian Muslims was taken for granted, and as sucq, the
backlash in the wake of Shah Bano case and the Babri Mosque looked perfectly natural.
What was important, and has often gone unheeded, is the fact that in Shah Bano case.
the voice of the liberal citizen and the conservative Hindu struck an identical note, both
emphasizing the necessity of uniform civil code, censuring and admonishing the Mus Iims
in not too dissimilar ways. The secular state in India, in order to show that it would not
stoop to the wishes of the majority community, even for a secular cause, rode over the
judicial opinion, which underlined the need to move towards a uniform civil code.
However,it is difficult to judge the effect. The effort to placate the Muslims created a
discomofort and an increasing sense of intolerance amongst the majority community. in
howsoever indirect ways. And the opening up of the long-sealed gates of the Babri
Mosque was the proverbial lac;t staw that broke the camel's back. The surge in the ranks
of the pro-Janambhoomi sympathisers, was certainly a pointer towards the failure of
'Nehruvian secularisation project' in India and overwhelming
anti-pathy towards
Muslims in general.
. This had to have impact on India-Pakistan relations when Pakistan went on
expressing serious concern over the communal situation in India. The Pakistan National
305
Assembly spared no opportunity to move resolutions expressing concerns about the Bahri
Mosque and communal riots in India. All this, in a sense stifled the Indian effortc; in
tackling the problems with sternnes and impunity,further aggravating the communal
atmosphere . And the Indian government had to lodge protests against this. If one studies
India-Pakistan relations during periods riven by communal clashes, one can mark how
Pakistan government behaved in irresponsibie ways by trying to act almost as a domes! ic
pressure group rather than as an outside power. Thus we see, the government of Pakislan
cancelling official appointmentments in protest against riots in India and responsihle
legislators in Pakistan, behaving as errand boys, blaring out their voices against lhe
government of India. During the eighties, the military dispensation in Pakistan; nol so
much out of genuine conviction as out of an expedient decision not to provoke the ire of
the Indian government; chose officially to tone down the voice of protest. We have seen
how President Zia's reactions were euphemistically addressed, yet retained the bite. lie
had raised the issue indirectly at international fora, too. The Benazir government 1ha1.
succeeded the Zia regime and the Sharif government that succeeded Benazir, showed no
sign of improvement. They reverted to the impassjoned rhetoric of the earlier times. All
along, the Muslim population in India has been treated as a valuable extra-territorial
constituency as if the -partition business was an unfinished endeavour. On the other side
of the spectrum,
the reluctance of the Pakistan government to take back the Bihari
Muslims who had migrated to India during the 1971 war, and are awaiting clearance
from Pakistan for safe passage to Pakistan has never been exploited by India .with as
much care, to explode the hypocrisy behind Pakistan's concern. Moreover,India has
306
never expressed concern about anti-Hindu riots in Pakistan with as much vehemence.~
Pakistan's concern about the state of Muslims in India, in the wake of communal
riots, has a legitimizing effect on the very basis of Pakistan. Intellectuals of different
shades in Pakistan, grappling with the national moorings, have no better means of
justifying the near-theocratic identity than by emphasizing on the secular camouflage of
the communal Hindu state in India and threats to Pakistan's identity and security from
India. The very basis of Pakistan in history, was mooted around the theme of Hindu
majorityism. Over the years, the lines of argument have remained the same and Pakistan,
more as an ideological than as a territorial state, has paraded its identity on theocratic
terms. The ensuing ideological incompatibility between an Islamic and a 'secular' state
has made interactions between them extremely feeble and unhealthy. Pakistan's regular
questioning of the secular foundations of the Indian state has complicated matters further.
Many scholars have viewed India-Pakistan relations as a logical extension of
Hindu-Muslim relations in the sub-continent. This is attested by the fact that the people
of the two states have behaved more as members of particular communities, than citizens
of states. If the spread of the communities were_ defined in exclusive territorial terms then
things would not be as bad. The problem lies in the fact that one of the states defines its
identity in secular territorial terms while the other in communal theocratic terms and hy
virtue of the sheer logic of its communal basis, the latter feels committed to its
coreligionists 'who were blood of their bloods, soul of their souls not long ago' in tlu;
5
During the fifties India expressed concem in so far as the anti-Hindu riots in Pakistan mi!'lll
precipitate anti-Muslim Hindu backlash.
307
other state and as such, the nostalgic sense of a singular community spread across two
sovereign political systems partially blurs their civil commitments as citizens of a
sovereign state and accords a sense of legitimacy to their concern for their fellow
members of the community in the other state. This is bound to have a bearing on the
relationship of the two states by making the task of the maintenance of order in the other
state, almost intractable. Even in the absence of material support, mere moral support
has the ability to sow seeds of dissension, and thus make the project of nation-building
all the more difficult.
The study seeks to diagnose the biases that plague the relationship between India
and Pakistan. The singular most important factor responsible for spoiling, any effort at
reconciliation has been, the tendency of Pakistan to perceive its relationship with India
solely on communal terms; the relationship of a Muslim State with a Hindu state. For
India, the outright de-recognition -of its professed secular credentials i>y Pakistan, has
been a major stumbling block, in strengthening its relationship with Pakistan.
Violence in Punjab and Kashmir and India-Pakistan relationsFrom internal perspective troubles in Punjab and Kashmir would look more ethnic
than communal. Most of the modern states face such ethnic assertions within their
bounds, the causes of which can be attributed to problems of governance. The remedy
as such can very well be sought within the state system. The Sikh assertion in Punjab
even when it was accompanied by demands for Khalistan denoted a typical aversion
against central encroachment on the freedom of the state, shared by federating units all
308
over India. There were serious discussions going on at all levels, of evolving a better
system of distribution of powers between the centre and the states and the Sarkaria
Commission, instituted by the centre to look into the matter came up with many
unfavourable rerparks against the centre. Punjab, being a prosperous state, put up a
stiffer resistance than others. But soon, such secular protests suffered a qualitative decline
and assumed aggressive secessionist postures. In the post-Indira assassination phase . it
sunk even further into Hindu-Sikh rivalry. What was in the beginning an ethnic protest
soon put up a communal face.
PUNJAB
It was very soon discovered that violence or terrorism m Punjab was getting
steady encouragement from Pakistan. Indian complaints were evaded by the Pakistan
government all through the eighties. And we have seen the press in Pakistan urging the
government to avenge the division of Pakistan in 1971 by making best use of the
circumstances. The non:.r~sident Indian Sikh com.munity, which patronised the pro-Sikh
Khalistan movement, were provided safe harbour, with all facilities in Pakistan and were
allowed to spread their network there. Most of their activities were indirectly encouraged
by the government by deciding not to interfere in their activities. Of course, at timt:s.
even Zia would advise them to behave like dedicated citizens. But, as it has been
established in the study, the secret collusion between militants and the lSI tempered the
Sikh resistance with renewed zeal and vigour. Zia's government would try to convince
Indian government of Pakistan's non-involvement by resorting to some facile combing
309
operations, but no substantial step was ever taken to discourage the militants in setting
up their preparatory bases in Pakistan. Pakistan's reluctance to hand over the Sikh
hijackers was, viewed form Indian side, as an incident that indicated the nature of
Pakistani involvement on the issue. The Sikhs in Pakistan were allowed to establish an
uninterrupted communication with the main advocates of Khalistan abroad and pump in
material and moral support from them. And once incitement came aplenty from Pakistan
and the Sikh terrorists were fed with resuscitating zeal, the crisis deepened further
making the issue almost unmanageable for India.
This was sure to affect India-Pakistan relations. Even though it was repeatedly
denied by Pakistan, Indian allegations supported by concrete evidence suggested that
Pakistan would not pull its hand out of the Punjab trouble even for the sake of
maintaining good relations with India. The official level communication that were
supposed to generate confidence between the two neighbours, was often turned into
opportunities to hurl allegations at each other, and thus spoil the spirit of the talks. The
talks could never signal
a new
beginning, rather they were avenues to reiterate mutual
suspicions. Even. during the mid-eighties, Zia's government tried to invent a scapegoat
in India, by alleging that India was involved in the trouble in Sind and was interfering
in Pakistan's domestic political process by funding the Movement for Restoration of
Democracy led by Benazir Bhutto.
Punjab thus gave another dimension to the India-Pakistan trouble. It proved that
Pakistan's ideological commitment to Islam had an anti-India component to it. Service
to the cause oflslam meant exploding the myth of secularism in India. Pakistan's popular
310
press interpreted the Sikh problem as a conclusive proof of the multi-communal or rather
multi-national nature of state in India where the community of Hindus held sway over
other minority communities, forcing them to eternal subservience. This was also backed
up by arguments from quarters very close to Zia-ul Haq (Lt.General Akram Khan who
was a close confidante and Z.A.S.uleri who was the press advisor to Zia ul Haq) that
Pakistan should not let the opportunity slip off its hand, for secession of Punjab would
further weaken democracy and secularism in India and thus justify the logic of the
foundation of Pakistan and at the same time avenge the division of Pakistan in the 1971
war. Punjab issue was thus a major irritant that kept the two countries partially
estranged. With the coming up of Benazir in 1989, there was some fresh thinking on the
Punjab issue and the intelligence wing was revamped to ensure no further meddling over
the issue. From 1990 onwar<ffi Punjab violence became perfectly manageable, though
rudimentary involvement from Pakistan's side, to keep the Punjab problem alive a! a
lower key, cannot be ruled out.
KASHMIR
The eighties also saw a remarkable build up of terrorist violence in Kashmir.
While in case of Punjab Pakistan involvement followed a popular stir, in case of
Kashmir, Pakistan's involvement was direct, right from the very start. From the tribal
invasion of 1947, through Operation Gibraltar stage-managed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in
1965, to the present times, Pakistan has always tried to champion the cause of liberation.
of the Kishmiris. Pakistan occupied Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) has been the launching
311
ground of all operations from Pakistan side. Over the years Pakistan has tried to foment
armed insurgency in Kashmir by playing host to major militant outfits like the JKLF,
even though the JKLF advocated complete independence, which ran counter to the
interests of Pakistan.
During the eighties, however, the scene changed. As our study reveals, keeping
close pace with 'Islamization', the problem of Kashmir was paraded in the international
fora as an 'Islamic' problem, and the campaign had succeeded in manufacturing
sympathy for 'Kashmir Liberation' among many fslamic countries. The government in
Azad Kashmir had also allotted a major part of its budget for accelerating the pace of
liberation struggle through every possible means. We have seen how during early eighties
the JKLF launched the stir with the Mhatre murder but subsequently lost out to a military
outfit (the Hizbul Mujahideen) that nas been allegedly run by the intelligence wing of
Pakistan(the lSI), at the behest of the pro-Pakistani Jamiat-i-lsJami, with the aim of
securing the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan. From Pakistan's side it has been repeated
over the years that until and unless Kashmir is merged with Pakistan: rhe movement for
Pakistan would not be complete.
Thus the call for independence floated on the basis of Kashmiriyat (or Kashm iri
nationality) by organisations like Plebiscite Front and JKLF has been thoroughly
superceded by cans for merger with Pakistan. The secular has yielded place to the
communal. Against this backdrop, the Indian army was called upon to handle the
insurgency. But then, the insurgency fed on the army excesses which generated a sense
of disaffection and continued to simmer.
This intermittent space was appropriated hy
312
Pakistan to float a host of militant outfits, with avowed aims of merger of the state of
Kashmir with Pakistan and thus it gave a new lease of life to the insurgency in the
valley. It has been held by the intelligence in India that in April, 1988, Zia-ul Haq was
planning an operation, code named 'Operation Topac' to sponsor terrorism in Kashmir
in a cautious, gradual and planned manner. Even though the authenticity of the reporr
which was published in Indian Defense Review by 'IDR Research team, was doubtful, the
Pakistani connection was never beyond suspicion and thus the sudden spurt of violence
in 1988-1989 lends credence to such a report. From
the~
year 1988, the problem was
given a deliberate communal colour. The Hindu population in the valley was
systematically expelled and Islam reigned supreme in Kashmir. Even after Zia left the
scene, the Benazir Government which was initially interested in developing good
relationship with India, developed cold feet very soon when the opposition brought in the
question of 'Kashmir liberation'. Benazir, in a desperate effort at stealing the winds out
of the sails of the qpposition, was seen mouthing the call of fighting a thousand years·
war with India to liberate Kashmir.
The eighties were marked by efforts from both sides to restore diplomatic and
other communications to ensure friendly relations between the two countries. But the
efforts always stumbled on the issue of Kashmir. While on other issues. Pakistan adopted
a defensive posture, on the issue of Kashmir it was unrepentantly hostile. It always
sought to justify its stand. The protest from Indian side to all this was equally firm. Thus
the issue of Kashmir proved the major destabilizer, in India-Pakistan relations. The
nature of relationship depended on the intensity of violence in the valley and at the height
313
of Kashmir trouble during 1989-1990, we find the leaders trading threats of war over the
issue.
Thus the issues of communal and ethnic violence; which had the capacity to turn
communal (or religious); went on affecting the relations between the two countries for
most part of the eighties. The situation even came to a head in 1987-1988, when the
communal riots together with terrorist violence in Punjab and Kashmir turned for the
worse. The Indian army exercise in Rajasthan and Gujarat sector (code named Operation
Brass Tacks) had even made Pakistan so llpprehensive that Pakistan had taken an all out
preparation for an encounter, which looked very imminent, given the kind of situation
that had developed in the absence of any communication between the two states, which
was lying suspended for a while on the very issues that would have precipitated yet
another war. Fonunately enough, the channels of communication were activated at the
last minute and war was averted. But all this proved that a worsening communal situation
in India might create a climate of hostility that might unwittingly precipitate a war.
The recent years, the early nineties, brings the correlation between communal
violence and India-Pakistan relations into bolder relief. We have seen how the lack of
proper initiative at the governmental level has allowed the relationship to perpetuate at
a level of reduced adversarial interaction. This has created a condition. a context, most
suitable for communal conflicts to take place in India. The nineties in India have
witnessed the surge of Hindu militancy which even forcefully hints at the prospect of
making the links look more convincing. We have thus marked how the slump in
India-Pakistan diplomatic relations during the early nineties was almost coterminus with
. 314
the slump in the communal atmosphere in India and vice versa. In the recent years
therefore, conflict-linkages in this area have been too obvious and one hopes the study
would not require as much prodding to convince a discerning audience.
315