Arto H aapala
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place
I
T h e re are m any reaso n s for distinguishing aesthetics a n d ethics from
each o th e r, b u t th e m o st obvious ones are probably historical. T he tradition
stem m in g fro m B au m g arte n a n d K ant largely u n d e rsto o d aesthetics in the
original G reek sense o f the word: aisthanomai, to perceive o r sense. Aesthetics
is p rim arily a m a tte r o f th e senses, especially th e ‘h ig h e r senses’, seeing a n d
hearing. Ethics is c o n c ern e d with principles distinguishing m orally acceptable
actio n s fro m im m o ral ones, o r setting standards for a good life. A esthetics
deals w ith m atters th a t are som ehow m ore vague and in d efin ite th an ethical
p ro b lem s, a n d aesth etics is, in d eed , based on so m eth in g less reliable an d
p e r m a n e n t - th e senses - c o m p a re d to ethics w here reaso n a n d ra tio n al
ju stific atio n s seem to have a g re a te r role. This has co n trib u te d , n o do u b t,
to th e ev alu atio n a n d ra n k in g o f them in philosophy: aesthetics has b een
seen as th e least im p o rta n t field, com ing well b e h in d th e m o re sophisticated
a n d w ell-g ro u n d ed fields o f epistem ology an d ethics. T h ese distinctions an d
th e i r v a lid ity h av e b e e n q u e s t i o n e d ,1 a n d th e re h av e b e e n n u m e ro u s
arg u m e n ts a n d attem p ts to establish, for exam ple, the cognitive fu n ctio n o f
art, H an s-G eo rg G a d a m e r’s b ein g o n e o f th e m ost well-know n.2 However,
th e ways we th in k a b o u t aesthetics a n d ethics are still strongly m ark ed by
this trad itio n .
I d o n o t w an t to q u estio n the ratio n ale o f these divisions; I d o th in k
th a t we n e e d a d istin ction betw een aesthetic an d ethical issues to m ake m ore
s e n s e o f o u r w o rld . In th is p a p e r I c o n s id e r an a r e a c r u c ia l to o u r
u n d e r s ta n d in g o f o u rse lv e s a n d o u r p o sitio n in th e w o rld w h e re th e
d istin ctio n b eco m es n o t only pro b lem atic b u t disappears alto g eth er. In o u r
everyday d ea lin g s w ith th e su rro u n d in g s we have m a d e o u r ow n we are
w ithin a sp h ere th at exem plifies how both aesthetic an d ethical issues overlap
1 See Wolfgang Welsch, UndoingAesthetics (London: Sage Publications, 1997), translated
by Andrew Inkpin, 60-102.
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method ( London: Sheed & Ward, 1989), second,
revised edition, translation revised byjoel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 81100.
Filozofski vestnik, X X (2 /1 9 9 9 - X IV ICA), pp. 253-264.
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to a significant degree. All this com es to g e th e r in the c o n c e p t o f place. Place
u n d e rsto o d in th e sense o f a p e rs o n ’s m ean in g fu l a n d sig n ifican t lo catio n
b rin g s to g e th e r aesth etics a n d ethics. W h e n living in a p la c e - o r m o re
existentially, w hen living a place - we a re ro o te d to o u r s u rro u n d in g s in
such a way th a t b o th o u r aesthetic a n d m o ral ju d g e m e n ts are d e te rm in e d
by th e d e e p ties th a t we have d ev elo p ed . It is b e c a u se o f this e x iste n tia l
fo u n d a tio n th at th e d istinction betw een aesth etic a n d eth ica l aspects o f life
tends to disappear. In certain areas o f life, b u t n o t in all, beauty a n d goodness
com e to g eth er.
I
shall first delineate a short existential ac co u n t o f the concepts o f ‘p la c e ’
a n d ‘w o rld ’ o r ‘life w o rld ’. I call m y a c c o u n t ‘e x is te n tia l’ b e c a u se I am
in terested in the structures o f the life w orld, a n d the life w orld is d e te rm in e d
by h u m an existence an d its structures. T h e ‘existentials’3 o f h u m a n existence
are also th e stru ctu res o f o u r life w orld. T h e h e rm e n e u tic circle o f h u m a n
a n d w orld, o r h u m a n a n d history, m ean s th a t we as h u m a n bein g s a re also
d e te rm in e d by th e w orld.4 T h e interw eaving o f h u m a n a n d w orld is o n e o f
m y s ta rtin g p o in ts , a n d it c re a te s th e o n to lo g ic a l f o u n d a ti o n f o r m y
u n d e rsta n d in g o f aesthetics, ethics a n d th e ir role in h u m a n ex isten ce.
My em phasis will b e in e n v iro n m e n ta l issues in a b ro a d sense. I am
in terested in the h u m an environm ent, in c lu d in g art, th e b u ilt en v iro n m e n t,
a n d to s o m e e x t e n t th e n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t. I s h a ll d is c u s s s o m e
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f my a c c o u n t fo r o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f th e h u m a n
en v iro n m en t, b u t I shall n o t go into issues such as ecology, con serv atio n a n d
re sto ratio n .
II
L et m e begin with th e concepts o f ‘c u ltu re ’ a n d ‘tra d itio n ’. T h e se are
cru cial term s in u n d e rs ta n d in g w h at is m e a n t by w o rld o r by life w orld.
H istoricity a n d trad itio n are g ro u n d in g ideas in h e rm e n e u tic s a n d fig u re
pro m in en tly in G a d am er’s thinking. F or H e id e g g er, th e h e rm e n e u tic circle
was existential in n atu re in the sense th a t th e h u m a n way o f being, existence,
was ch aracterised by a ‘fo re -u n d e rsta n d in g ’ o f B eing in g e n e ra l.5 T o grasp
3 Martin Heidegger introduces the notion of the ‘existential’, ‘ein E x isten zia l' to
distinguish his ideas from Kantian categories. Macquarrie and Robinson translate the
term as ‘existentiale’ (pi. ‘existentialia’), B eing a n d Tim e (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 70
and 79, but this is somewhat clumsy. See Sein u n d Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag,
1979), 44 and 54.
4 See Heidegger, B e in g a n d Time , 424-449; Gadamer, op. cit., 254-264.
5 See Heidegger, op. cit., 358-364; Gadamer, op. cit., 265-271.
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Aesthetics, Ethics, and the M eaning o f Place
B eing in g en e ral we m u st study h u m an existence, an d this is what H eidegger
d o es in Being and Time. F or G adam er, the question is m o re ‘m u n d a n e ’: the
ro le o f h isto ricity in u n d e rsta n d in g in the hum anities, a n d the im p o rtan ce
o f tr a d itio n in h u m a n life. G a d a m e r criticizes th e E n lig h te n m e n t fo r
n e g le c tin g th e ro le o f history a n d for o p eratin g with th e c o n c e p t o f p ure,
n o n -h isto rica l reaso n , a n d h e goes so far as to m ake m orals also relative to
a trad itio n :
T h at which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an
authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by
the fact that the authority of what has been handed down to us - and
not just what is clearly grounded - always has power over our attitudes
and behaviour. ... The real force of morals, for example, is based on
tradition. They are freely taken over but by no means created by a free
insight or grounded on reasons. This is precisely what we call tradition:
the ground of their validity. And in fact it is to romanticism that we owe
this correction of the Enlightenment: that tradition has a justification
that lies beyond rational grounding and in large measure determines
our institutions and attitudes.1’
I shall n o t take a stance o n the question o f w h eth er all m oral principles
a re b a se d o n ly o n tra d itio n o r w h e th e r they have a m o re fu n d a m e n ta l
ju stific atio n , be it ra tio n a l o r otherw ise. B ut w hen we com e to ae sth etic
p ro b le m s , th e n , I th in k , we are firm ly o n a h isto ric a l fo u n d a tio n . O u r
a e s th e tic c u ltu r e - o u r p ra c tic e s w ith in th e arts as w ell as ju d g e m e n ts
c o n c e rn in g th e aesth etic value o f o u r e n v iro n m e n t —has g ain ed its p re se n t
fo rm d u rin g th e course o f history. T h e re would no t b e any aesthetic culture
w ith o u t its tra d itio n , a n d if its trad itio n h ad b ee n d ifferen t, o u r aesthetic
c u ltu re w ould also be d ifferent. O u r aesthetic culture is stru ctu re d in certain
ways a n d q u ite co m p lex, w ith a n u m b e r o f co ntrasting tendencies.
It is also time th a t m akes a cu ltu ral p ractice possible a n d g u aran tees its
ex istence. T h e lo n g e r a trad itio n is, the stro n g er it is. A trad itio n always has
th e te n d e n c y to m ultiply itself by p ro d u c in g objects a n d events o f th e sam e
k in d a n d creatin g new practices aro u n d itself. This m eans th at the structures
are fu rth e r s tre n g th e n e d a n d th eir existence is taken m o re a n d m o re for
g ra n te d . H e re , ‘th e test o f tim e ’ m eans th at tim e justifies the existence o f
c e rta in practices as well as objects a n d events th a t go w ith it; th e re are n o
tim eless crite ria w hich w ould constitute the test a n d th ro u g h which different
o b jects a n d events w ould have to pass. T h e re is n o logic beyond tim e th at
w ould p rovide an ex p lan a tio n a n d a rationale for the p re se n t state o f affairs.
O n ce th e re is a trad itio n its structures are always the basis for new things
to com e. B u t in th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f the W estern a rtw o rld , th ere can occu r
0 Gadamer, ibid., 280-281.
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Arto Haapala
strands a t certain times in history which go very m u ch against o f th e tradition.
T his is w h a t m any avant-garde m o v em en ts have d o n e . A g e n e ra l th e o ry
ca n n o t ex p lain why these sorts o f d ev e lo p m e n ts take place, o r why m any
o th e r d iffe re n t k in d s o f d e v e lo p m e n ts tak e p lace . W e have to re f e r to
p artic u la r circum stances - econom ic, religious, social - a n d to p a rtic u la r
individuals living a n d m aking decisions in these circum stances.
T h e H e id e g g erian ideas o f th e re la te d n e ss o f B eing in g e n e ra l a n d
h u m an existence could be applied to clarify the relatio n sh ip betw een cultural
structures a n d an individual living within them . T h e Sein, being, in o u r Dasein,
th ere-being, is fo rm ed by the d iffe re n t c u ltu ra l stru ctu re s in to w hich we are
b o rn . O n e o f the ‘sites’ (das Da) w hich we in h a b it is th e a e sth e tic c u ltu re .
T h e way we exist in o u r aesthetic cu ltu re , th a t is, w h at we as h u m a n bein g s
in th e ex istential sense are as far as aesth e tic m atters are c o n c e rn e d , is set
by co n stitu en ts o f th a t culture. We have an ‘aesth etic n a tu r e ’ o f a c e rta in
kin d because we w ere ‘throw n in to ’7 an aesth etic c u ltu re o f a c e rta in kind.
O n e o f th e existentials o f o u r existence is th e ‘a e sth e tic e x iste n tia l’. In a
H e id e g g erian m an n er we could also investigate th e n a tu re o f o u r a e sth e tic
c u ltu re th ro u g h a study o f o u r ‘a e s th e tic e x is te n tia l’; a n d vice versa by
exploring th e aesthetic culture we throw light o n ourselves as entities existing
in this c u ltu re .8
I have b e e n talking a b o u t ‘aesth etic c u ltu re ’. I u n d e rs ta n d th e w ord
‘cu ltu re ’ as synonym ous with the w ord ‘w o rld ’, so, we can use the expression,
‘aesthetic w o rld ’. This raises fu rth e r H e id e g g erian points. H e id e g g e r w rites
a b o u t th e w orld a n d its relatio n to en titie s w ithin it as follows:
The world itself is no t an entity w ithin-the-w orld; and yet it is so
determinative for such entities that only in so far as ‘there is’ a world
can they be en co untered and show them selves, in th eir Being, as
entities which have been discovered. But in what way ‘is there’ a world?
If Dasein is ontically constituted by Being-in-the-W orld, and if an
understanding of the Being of its Self belongs just as essentially to its
Being ... then does not Dasein have an understanding of the world a pre-ontological understanding, which indeed can and does get along
w ithout explicit ontological insights? With those entities which are
7 In Bdngand Time Heidegger defines ‘thrownness’: »This characteristic of Dasein’s Being
- this ‘that it is’ - is veiled in its ‘whence’ and ‘whither’, yet disclosed in itself all the
more unveiledly; we call it the ‘thrownness' of this entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it is
thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the ‘there’.« (174)
8 This reciprocity has important consequences for many traditional problems in
aesthetics, for example interpretation; see Arto Haapala, »Interpretation, Context,
and the Ethics of Interpretation - An Essay in Existential Aesthetics«, in Interpretation
and Its Boundaries (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1999), edited by Arto Haapala
and Ossi Naukkarinen, 162-176.
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Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place
encountered within-the-world - that is to say, with their character as
within-the-world - does not something like the world show itself for
the concernful Being-in-the-world?'J
H u m a n s as en tities existing in the w orld are co n stitu te d by being-inth e-a esth etic-w o rld . A n d in so far as we have b e e n a c q u a in te d w ith the
aesth e tic w orld, we have also developed a pre-ontological u n d e rsta n d in g o f
its stru ctu res. As we are d ea lin g with o r taking care of th e entities existing in
th e aesth e tic w o rld - works o f art, buildings, design objects, n atu ra l objects
a n d lan d sc a p e s - we a re a t th e sam e tim e necessarily tak in g care o f the
a e sth e tic w orld, a lth o u g h th e w orld itself is n o t an o b je c t o r event in the
sam e sense as en tities w ithin-the-w orld. T he aesthetic w orld is in d e e d the
p re co n d itio n o f any aesthetic object an d event, bu t at the sam e tim e the world
w o u ld n o t ex ist w ith o u t its o bjects. T h e w orld m akes in d iv id u a l things
possible, a n d it can exist a n d m anifest itself only th ro u g h these entities. This
is also tru e fo r th e stra n d o f h u m a n existence I have called the ‘aesthetic
e x iste n tia l’: th e re is a m u tu a l d e p e n d e n c e betw een this aspect o f h u m an
b e in g a n d th e ae sth e tic w orld.
I have so far d elib erately avoided the expression ‘a rt w orld’, a n d used
instead th e b ro a d e r expression ‘aesthetic w orld’. W orlds o f a r t - music, visual
arts, literatu re, film, th eatre, etc. - are paradigm atic exam ples o f the aesthetic
w orld. M any o f o u r aesthetic practises have b een established in o n e a rt form
o r a n o th e r, a n d th e practices vary d e p e n d in g on the e ra a n d th e a rt form .
V isual arts in th e M iddle Ages w ere very d iffe ren t co m p ared to now. T h e
o b serv atio n s I have m ad e o f the aesthetic w orld apply to the a rt w orld as
well. B ut I w ould like to b ro a d e n the scope because my co n cern s in this essay
are m ainly a b o u t non-artistic objects. However, I do n o t deny the significance
a n d in flu e n c e o f a rt o n o u r aesthetic cu ltu re as a whole.
Ill
I have now estab lish ed th e fo u n d a tio n o f o u r aesth e tic cu ltu re , an d
show n so m e o f th e c o m p licated relations th e re are b etw een the aesthetic
world, aesthetic objects a n d h u m an existence. Let me now tu rn to the concept
o f place. T h e c o n c e p t has b ec o m e com m on a n d p o p u la r in re c e n t analysis
o f th e h u m a n e n v iro n m e n t. It is w orth n o tin g th at H e id e g g e r’s w ritings on
‘d w e llin g ’ h av e in s p ire d n u m e ro u s w rite rs.10 R ath er th a n g o in g in to a
9 H eidegger, op. cit., 102.
10See Edw ard Relph, Place a n d Placelessness (London: Pion Limited, 1976), 17-18, 37-41;
Edw ard S. Casey, G etting Back into Place - Toward a Renewed U nderstanding o f the Place-
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Arto H aapala
discussion o f the co n c ep t o f place, let m e sim ply stip u late a m e a n in g fo r th e
term . T his will allow m e to clarify its re la tio n sh ip to th e a e sth e tic w orld a n d
o u r e x p e rie n c e o f a e sth e tic objects. T h is will in tu r n p ro v id e a p a th to
co n sid erin g how aesthetic a n d ethics co in cid e in this co n tex t.
W h en w riting this essay at my office I have a place. I occupy a place in
th e straig h t forw ard physical sense: I am sitting in my ch air, w hich is in my
office, w hich is in a building, etc. B ut I am n o t in te re ste d in th e C artesian
sense - as H eid eg g er calls it - o f an o b je c t a n d its place in th e w orld. n I d o
n o t w ant to d efine place in term s o f a fixed space so th a t a c e rta in space o r
sp ac es w o u ld b e n e c e ssa ry fo r m y p la c e . I h a v e a p la c e in th e m o re
so p h isticated sense o f th e w ord. I have a place in th e sense th a t I have a
re latio n sh ip to h u m ans, to d ifferen t things a n d events a ro u n d m e. My place
is m eaningful and significant for m e because 1 have co n stru e d d iffe re n t kinds
o f relatio n s to entities su rro u n d in g m e. I have fam iliarised m yself with th e
im m ed iate su rro u n d in g s o f my office. M ost o f th e things inside th e office
a re ‘read y -to -h a n d ’ — they are th e re fo r m e so th a t I can u se th em . T h e
co m p u ter, telep h o n e an d all the books a n d p ap ers are fam iliar to m e, w ithin
my reach , a n d I see th em as entities w hich exist fo r m y p u rp o se s.12 B ut also
th e view fro m the window, the co rrid o r b e h in d my office d o o r, th e d iffe re n t
ro u te s I tak e to th e office, th e le c tu re halls in w h ich I te a c h , th e se also
co n stitu te m y place. I create a place fo r m yself w ithin th e stru c tu re s o f a
cultural w orld by connecting different sorts o f ties to d ifferen t sorts o f entities.
My place has m ore o r less p e rm a n e n t features to w hich I re tu rn alm ost every
day, like my h o m e a n d my office.
In th e existential sense th a t I w an t to d efin e it, place is, thus, th e form e-significant-and-m eaningful-collection-of-entities. I am u sin g th e w o rd
‘entity’ broadly to cover n o t only physical tilings, b u t also all kinds o f cultural
objects a n d events, such as d iffe ren t o rg an isatio n s a n d in stitu tio n s, cu ltu ra l
practices a n d conventions, b u t also o th e r h u m a n beings w ho a re d e fin e d by
their relations to entities which are significant a n d m eaningful to them . W orld
is th e historically stru ctu re d fo u n d a tio n th a t gives us en tities w ith m e a n in g
a n d value; place is a selection o f d iffe re n t culturally m ean in g fu l en tities th a t
a re significant for p artic u la r individuals b ecau se o f th e ir actions, interests,
o r an y th in g th at has an influence o n th e ir evaluations a n d decisions.
World. (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 109-145. I have
analysed the concept of place in more detail in my ‘On the Aesthetics of the Everyday
- Familiarity, Strangeness and the Meaning of Place”, forthcoming in Philosophy and
Geography, Vol. IV: Aesthetics ofEveryday Life, 1999.
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Aesthetics, Ethics, and the M eaning o f Place
IV
Now we have a view to th e basic ontological stru ctu re o f the w orld a n d
h u m a n s w ith in it in term s o f aesthetic w orld a n d place. W h ere does the
re la tio n s h ip b etw e en aesthetics an d ethics com e in? T h e idea o f aesthetic
c u ltu re alread y raises th e basic issues in aesthetics, su ch as aesthetic value.
L e t m e look a t th e status o f aesthetic values w ithin th e aesthetic w orld an d
p ro c e e d in this way to th e m o re general problem s o f values a n d evaluation.
O u r aesthetic cu ltu re is deeply m arked by values; the structures defining
o u r aesth e tic ex isten tial a n d from w hich all aesthetic objects are b o rn are
value-laden. T h e ro le o f values is m anifested very clearly in pieces th a t are
re g a rd e d as classics - a classic is by definition valuable in som e respect. In
th e arts in p artic u la r, classics are d efin ed within a p erio d o r style. J .S. B ach’s
p ieces are classics w ithin th e corpus o f b aro q u e m usic; T olstoy’s novels are
classics w ith in th e c a n o n o f Russian literature. T he crite ria o f goodness in
B ach ’s m usic a n d in T olstoy’s novels differ u n d erstan d ab ly to a g reat e x te n t
a lre a d y b e c a u se m u sic a n d lite ra tu re ap p e al to d iffe re n t aspects o f o u r
ex isten c e, m usic m o re o ften to o u r em otions, lite ra tu re to o u r cognitive
faculties. T o b e a real classic, th e piece m ust go beyond its original context;
B ach is clearly n o t lim ite d to th e B aroque, b u t to th e w hole trad itio n o f
W e ste rn m usic. As G a d a m e r puts it:
...w hen we call so m eth in g classical, th ere is a consciousness of
som ething enduring, o f significance that cannot be lost and that is
independent of all circumstances of time - a kind of timeless present
th at is contem poraneous with every other present.'3
I shall, how ever, c o n c e n tra te h e re on th e m ore p erso n al side o f o u r
a e s th e tic ev a lu a tio n s. J o s e p h M argolis has m ade a d istin c tio n b etw een
‘appreciative ju d g m e n ts ’ a n d ‘findings’. W hen talking a b o u t ‘findings’ th ere
is a widely a c c e p te d set o f n o rm s to w hich o n e refers in justifying a claim ,
w hereas in ap p reciativ eju d g m en ts personal preferences, o r ‘taste’ as h e calls
it, have a ro le to play. H e writes:
... findings obtain where some set of the actual properties of an object
are, on a theory, taken to be sufficient for the ascription of a certain
value; the informality with which such properties may be specified does
n o t affect the logical status of findings. But appreciativejudgm ents
o b tain w here, precisely, the actual (th e m inim ally describable)
properties of an object are ‘filtered’ through the personal tastes and
“ Heidegger, ibid., 122-134.
12This is Heidegger’s ‘U m sicht’, Sein u n d
B e in g a n d Time, 98.
13Gadamer, op. cit., 288.
Zeit,
69; in English translation,
‘circumspection’,
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Arto Haapala
sensibilities o f th e agent of ju d g in g ; th e re , no set o f th e actual
properties of an object are sufficient to justify the ascription of the
relevant value. Hence, on an appropriate theory, we say that an object
has a certain value (findings) or one is justified only in ascribing a certain
value to that object (appreciativejudgm ents).14
I am interested in appreciativejudgm ents ra th e r th an findings. A finding
is a ju d g m e n t ab o u t a constitutive fe a tu re w ithin th e aesth e tic w orld - like
»B ach’s ‘M atth ew P assio n ’ has g re a t a rtistic (o r a e s th e tic ) m e rit« - an
appreciative ju d g m e n t says m o re a b o u t th e sp e a k e r —»F innish lan d scap es
in th e w in te r are very ca lm in g a n d b e a u tifu l« . B u t b o th fin d in g s a n d
a p p r e c ia tiv e ju d g m e n ts p lay a ro le in a e s th e tic s ; in M a r g o lis ’s view
»appreciative m atters d o m in ate ... in th e a e sth e tic d o m a in « .15
W hat is it that m akes som e aesthetic objects m o re significant fo r us th a n
others? W hy is it th a t certain works sp eak to us m o re th a n oth ers? T h e re
are cases in which we acknow ledge th e value o f a piece, it m ay even b e a
classic, an d still we can n o t enjoy it. This does n o t have to b e a case o f ‘aesthetic
acrasia’, i.e. th at we c a n n o t enjoy th e ae sth etic value o f a p iece b ec au se o f
som e k in d o f p ersonal defect in us. I w ant to lo o k at cases w h e re we a re able
to create a particularly d ee p relatio n to an ae sth e tic object. T h ese kinds o f
bo nds are, I think, often based in p a rtic u la r characteristics o f o u r place.
I can develop a taste for certain kinds o f a rt by system atically studying
a p artic u la r style an d getting m o re a n d m o re fam iliar w ith th e fe atu res th a t
co n stitu te it. O r I m ay develop a taste unknow ingly, fo r ex am p le w hen living
in a p a r tic u la r e n v iro n m e n t, b e it r u r a l o r u r b a n , a n d I m ay s ta r t to
appreciate th at particular environm ent o r th at k in d o f m ilieu m o re generally.
I m ight b egin to feel attached to p articular kinds o f aesthetic objects. Because
o f my place an d th e ‘h o riz o n ’ th at is c re a te d by it, I have an affinity w ith
certain kinds of aesthetic objects. Som e o f th ese affinities a re b ased o n very
fu n d am en tal hu m an existentials: to be a m an o r to b e a w om an clearly shapes
different kinds o f affinities. These prim ary divisions are, however, m ad e m o re
co m p licated by n u m ero u s o th e r factors th a t d efin e h u m a n ex isten ce - all
th e cu ltu ral aspects th a t are essential fo r th e h u m a n way o f b ein g , as well as
the p erso n al aspects o f individuals living a n d ac tin g in a c u ltu re .
P lace is, in d e e d , th e h o riz o n th a t d e te rm in e s o u r p e rc e p tio n s a n d
preferen ces. G adam er defines ‘h o riz o n ’ in this way:
Every finite present has its lim itations. We define the co n c ep t o f
‘situ atio n ’ by saying that it represents a stan d p o in t th at limits the
possibility of vision. Hence the essential concept of situation is the
14Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989),
223-224.
15Margolis, ibid., 224.
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Aesthetics, Ethics, and the M eaning o f Place
concept of ‘horizon’. The horizon is the range of vision that includes
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying
this to the thinking mind, we speak of the narrowness of horizon, of
the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening of new horizons,
and so forth.1'’
O u r places a n d h o rizo n s are by n o m eans fixed, o n the contrary, the
ex isten tial a n d h isto ricist c o n c ep tio n o f h u m a n existence I have developed
is very ex p licit a b o u t th e possibility o f change. But it is also an existential
fact th a t th e ra n g e o f choices dim inishes in the course o f tim e - my existence
is by now m u ch m o re d e te rm in e d th an twenty years ago. It is this construal
o f o n e ’s ex isten ce th a t lim its o u r choices a n d decides o u r preferences.
T h e c o n n e c tio n b e tw e e n a place a n d aesth etics is, how ever, m o re
c o m p lic a te d th a n th at. T h e re is a ten d en c y to feel affinity to so m eth in g
fam iliar th a t is p a rt o f o n e ’s own existence, b u t o n e o f th e striving forces
b e h in d d iffe re n t d ev elo p m en ts in W estern a rt is the search for so m eth in g
new. In th e visual arts this ten d en cy has b een very clear, a n d it reveals the
o th e r side to aesth etics - th e values innovativeness a n d strangeness. In the
c o n te m p o ra ry arts, th e u n ca n n y a n d the shocking have played a significant
role. By contrast, in everyday surroundings strangeness has h ad a significantly
m in o r ro le, n o t only in th e aesthetics o f n atu ra l env iro n m en ts b u t also in
u rb a n settings. A lth o u g h o n e can p o in t o u t singular exam ples o f striking
b u ild in g s a n d b u ilt areas, as well as spectacular natu ral scenes, it is still true
to say, th a t g en erally sp eak in g strangeness does n o t have such im p o rtan ce
in e n v iro n m e n ta l aesthetics.
In th e ‘aesth etics o f p la c e ’ I am p u ttin g em phasis o n those aspects o f
aesth etics w h e re fam iliarity ra th e r th an strangeness d o m in ate. My place is
d e a r to m e b ec au se it is p a rt o f my existence. All features o f o n e ’s place d o
n o t have to b e b eau tifu l in any strong or definite sense o f the word, b u t th ere
is a te n d e n c y to value th e m positively. T h e relation betw een a perso n an d
en tities co n stitu tin g his o r h e r place is an affectionate one; w hen we are in
c o n s ta n t c o n ta c t w ith o u r su rro u n d in g s a n d have c re a te d o u r very own
p e rs o n a l ties to it, it b e c o m e s so m e th in g to w hich we c a n n o t have an
in d iffe re n t attitu d e . O u r place is too close to us for us to have any distance
from it.
As I have trie d to show above, this closeness is o ntological in n atu re : is
n o t s o m e th in g in d e p e n d e n t fro m us b u t precisely th e p e rs o n a l in o u r
existence. This m ean s th a t th ere can be tensions and contradictions betw een
a p e r s o n ’s a e s th e tic p re fe re n c e s a n d m o re g en erally a c c e p te d aesth e tic
stan d ard s. A s u b u rb a n a re a can be very d e a r to som ebody w ho has lived
"’Gadamer, op. cit., 302.
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Arto Haapala
th e re d u rin g his o r h e r c h ild h o o d even th o u g h an o u tsid e r w ould estim ate
its aesth etic value to be very low. W e gain satisfactio n th ro u g h a k in d o f
c o m fo rtin g security: the aesthetic p leasu re o f place is b ased o n th e fact th a t
we know it so well; it is so m eth in g we can trust; it is n o t th re a te n in g ; it d oes
qu estio n o u r p referen ces, values o r in d e e d , existence.
Even th e ugly aspects o f o n e ’s p lace - ugly again by so m e cu ltu rally
d efin ed stan d ard s - gain som e aesthetic value. T h ey m ay c o n trib u te to th e
stability a n d co m fo rt th at is essential in place. An old p a ir o f shoes m ay b e
repulsive to som eone w ho does n o t know th eir history a n d has n o t used them .
For the ow ner, they are b o th fam iliar a n d co m fo rtab le, a n d it is in this th a t
th eir aesth etic value lies. This does n o t m ean , how ever, th a t we p re fe r n o
changes to o u r su rro u n d in g s. We m ay well b e w illing to allow even m ajo r
m odifications if the su rroundings are aesthetically, socially, o r in som e o th e r
respects defective. T h e p o in t I am m aking is th a t b ein g p a rt o f a place im bues
every entity with value for a person.
This value can b e u n d e rsto o d also in ethical term s: my place d efin es
my way o f existing a n d any ch ange in th e place has som e c o n se q u e n c e s fo r
my existence. L et m e take an e x tre m e e x a m p le to illu stra te th e se m o ra l
im plications. It is m orally w rong to m ove p e o p le fro m a n a re a w ith o u t a
co m p ellin g reason. A com pelling re aso n co u ld b e, fo r ex a m p le , th a t th e re
is som eth in g poisonous in the area th at constitutes a h ea lth h azard to p eo p le
living th ere. T h ere co uld be o th e r com pelling reasons, b u t for my a rg u m e n t
it is n o t necessary to d efine as w hat co n stitu tes a c o m p ellin g reason.
It is clear th a t th e re are reasons w hich are n o t c o m p ellin g fro m th e
p o in t o f view o f those living there. T o force p e o p le to m ove b ecau se o f th e ir
race o r age, is, generally speaking, m orally w rong, a lth o u g h th e re m ig h t b e
sin g u lar cases and contexts in w hich even such actions co u ld b e ju stifie d .
W ith re c e n t shocking cases o f e th n ic clean sin g in Yugoslavia, it b ec o m e s
obvious th a t the arg u m en ts used by all parties o f th e co n flict are o f th e fo rm
th at a p articu lar area is an essential p a rt o f a n a tio n ’s identity. T h e re fe re n c e
is to larger cultural structures th at th e n serve as a g ro u n d fo r th e co n stitu tio n
o f individual places, a n d in this way are also p arts o f places. So th e re is a
very d e e p existential a n d m oral d im en sio n in th e c o n c e p t o f place.
У
T h e existential, the m oral, a n d th e aesth e tic aspects are in te rtw in e d
to g e th e r in c o m p lic a te d ways. My j u d g m e n ts a b o u t m y p la c e a r e n o t
objectiv e, b u t n ecessarily ‘b ia s e d ’. My p la c e h as a e s th e tic v alu e sim ply
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Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place
b ec au se I am existentially tied to it, a n d th ro u g h this existential c o n n e ctio n
I am a tta c h e d to it em o tio n ally too. It has ethical value because it is at the
h e a rt o f my existence a n d a changing o f it w ould affect my existence. Entities
in my place are, in a way, p a rt o f m e, an d so I tend see them as beautiful
a n d w o rth preserving. O n c e again I have to stress th at this is a tendency, n o t
a g e n e ra l ru le. W e can each p o in t o u t things co n stitu tin g o u r place th a t we
w ould ra th e r re p la ce w ith so m eth in g else. It m ig h t be a b u ild in g style we do
n o t like, o r it m ig h t b e so m e th in g m o re abstract, like an in stitu tio n o r a
cu sto m th a t goes ag ainst o u r n atu re .
L e t m e finally draw som e conclusions re g ard in g ju d g m en ts ab o u t the
e n v iro n m e n t. If my existential analysis is on th e rig h t track, th e re seem to
b e two very d iffe re n t sorts o f value ju d g m en ts. W hen I am talking ab o u t my
c lo s e s t e n v ir o n m e n t, a b o u t s o m e th in g th a t c o n s titu te s m y p la c e , m y
ju d g m e n ts a re d e riv e d fro m my very own e x iste n tia l c o n stitu e n ts, a n d
acco rd in g ly they are very m u ch ab o u t myself. They d o n o t say m uch ab o u t
th e e n v iro n m e n t as such, b u t ra th e r ab o u t a possible way o f life. F or a New
Y orker th e city o f New York is the fam iliar su rro u n d in g w hich exem plifies
n u m e ro u s positive qualities: it is rich a n d exciting, m aybe som etim es even
cosy a n d hom ely. F o r an o u tsid e r New York m ay a p p e a r as th re a te n in g a n d
h o stile. T h e se ju d g m en ts stem from very d ifferen t g ro u n d s, d iffe ren t ways
o f life c o n stitu tin g d iffe re n t horizons. T hey are bo th g en u in e a n d in th eir
ow n co n tex ts accep tab le verdicts. But because o f th eir in co m p atib le points
o f d e p a rtu re , they c a n n o t b e placed o n sam e scale. T hey address d iffe ren t
p laces. T h is is M a rg o lis’s a p p re c ia tiv e ju d g m e n t: ta k in g p le a su re fro m
m a tc h in g o n e ’s way o f life with the su rro u n d in g s o r displeasure from the
lack o f su ch m atch in g .
B ut o u r value ju d g m en ts ab o u t the environm ent are n o t always subjective
in this sense. T h e re are culturally accepted values th e validity o f w hich is
n o t d e p e n d e n t o n any ind iv id u al p referen ces. Classics are p arad ig m atic
ex am p les o f this, a n d th e re are classics in all fields o f cu ltu re. Also, m any
n a tu ra l scenes have g a in e d the status o f a classic, for exam ple N iagara Falls
o r th e Rocky M ountains. Classics exem plify certain values a n d they m aintain
th ese values. V alue ju d g m e n ts in this sense are in a cultural sphere. C ultural
entities exist w ithin a cu ltu re, a n d this goes for cultural values too. S om eone
m ay n o t like B ach ’s m usic, b u t this does n o t deny its cultural value. T o do
th e la tte r w ould only show ig n o ran c e o f o u r m usic culture.
B oth c u ltu ra l values a n d o u r p erso n al p re fere n ces, b o th w orld a n d
place, are ro o te d in o u r existence. T hey d eterm in e w h at we are a n d how
we view th in g s a ro u n d . T his also m eans th a t goodness a n d beauty go h a n d
in h an d : th e way I am in th e w orld is bo th an ethical a n d aesthetic issue.
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Arto Haapala
T h e d eterm ining grounds and character o f my place are o f u tm ost im p o rtan ce
fo r m e in every sense o f the w ord b ecau se these are m atters th a t c o n stitu te
w hat, as a h u m an b eing, I finally am . Place is n o t an im p erativ e, it is ra th e r
an exem plification o f certain choices a n d decisions th a t a p a rtic u la r h u m a n
b ein g has m ade, a n d th a t fu rth e r c o n stitu te this p a rtic u la r individual as a
h u m a n b ein g . T hese are the origins o f h u m a n existence as a c u ltu ra l en tity
a n d as an individual with distinctive featu res d istin g u ish in g h im o r h e r fro m
o th e r h u m an s.
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