Somalia Case DRAFT 8 March 2017
Somalia Case
Somalia is by all standard measures a failed state. It does not control its territory and is,
therefore, unable to provide security or ensure access to basic services to its citizens. Most
experts agree that the country is being held together by AMISOM, the African Union mission
serving under a UN mandate since January 2007. The United State government supports
AMISOM’s critical role because Somalia remains of strategic importance to Washington.
During the Cold War, the US provided strong support for Mohamad Siad Barre after he broke
with the Soviet Union in the late 1970s until 1989. Today, Somalia is a pivotal location in the
larger effort to counter violent extremism.
Background:
Map (we may find a better one. This clearly shows Somaliland and Puntland which is helpful
but is also out of date –showing ICU territory) A smaller one would also be helpful.
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Somalia Case DRAFT 8 March 2017
Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa, bordered on the east by the Indian Ocean, in the north
by the Gulf of Aden and to the west by Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Boundaries created by
colonial powers artificially divided the Somali people among Ethiopian, Somalia and Kenya. The
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Somalia Case DRAFT 8 March 2017
territory of Somalia was once split between a British protectorate and an Italian colony. The
territories were joined to become independent Somalia in 1960. But the early divisions left their
mark. The British protectorate is today’s Somaliland, independently governed and largely
immune from the clan warfare that has characterized much of Somalia since the overthrow of
Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had begun to restore a
modicum of stability and order in the mid 2000s. The US government, fearing that the ICU
would create a safe haven for al Qaida, supported an invasion by Ethiopia which drove the ICU
from Mogadishu. Amid a resurgence of clan violence, a militant faction of the ICU formed Al
Shabaab which has pursued a radical campaign against internal opponents and external forces
ever since.
Governance:
Somalia has been plagued by weak government since 1991. Various interim efforts led to a
Transitional Federal Government that was later replaced by a Federal Government of Somalia
(FGS) in 2012. The government in all phases has been dependent upon external support,
AMISOM in particular since 2007, to remain in power. This has been an important source of
support for Al Shabaab who is able to characterize Somali government officials as puppets of
foreign powers.
The security situation since the ouster of the ICU has been so precarious that the first president
of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was chosen by clan
representatives in parliament as was the newly inaugurated second president, Mohamed
Abdullahi Mohamed. Multiple delays of the latest election and the inability to hold a direct
election of the president as planned were due to ongoing violence and insecurity.
The new Constitution (2012) established a federal system of government; clan dominance in all
aspects of Somali life making a centralized government system unworkable. Somaliland and
Puntland had effectively established their autonomy in the late 1990s when the rest of the
country was convulsed by conflict. Borders for new states in the rest of the country have been
proposed. However, the lines have been already been a source of conflict. The best-known
example is the clashes between Galmudigu and Putland over the city of Galkayo which was
divided between the two. The fighting has killed or injured almost 100 and displaced more than
80,000. (PKSOI “Peace Operations Estimate—AMISOM/UNSOM” November 2016, p. 2;
International Crisis Group, “Galkayo and Somalia’s Dangerous Faultlines” 10 December 2015.)
Corruption corrodes all aspects of governance—the government, political processes, security
forces and the economy. Somalia is ranked the most corrupt country in the world by
Transparency International. Corruption not only undermines the legitimacy of the government, it
provides another source of support for Al Shabaab which presents itself as untainted by
corruption. For most citizens, clan allegiance is paramount. Clan militias provide what security
there is, the population looks to traditional mechanisms resolve conflicts.
Economy:
Somalia is a low income country. It has a largely informal economy that is supported by
agriculture, especially livestock, remittances from abroad and telecommunications. The
government still lacks the capacity to collect taxes which reinforces its dependence on external
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Somalia Case DRAFT 8 March 2017
aid. The country’s periodic droughts make agriculture a precarious source of income and
sustenance. Hence famine is a common occurrence.
Rampant corruption creates a poor climate for licit business which is needed for a formal and
diversified economy. Although economic indicators have improved in the last two years, the
World Bank ranks Somalia at the bottom for east of doing business. Only latter would generate
the revenue for a government which is able to provide security and basic services.
Social Composition:
Unlike many countries, the population of Somalia is overwhelmingly Somali (85%). Moreover,
virtually all are Sunni Muslim. The common language of the country is Somali. Arabic is also
recognized as an official language. Ethnicity and religion could provide important sources of
social cohesion. What divides Somalis are clans who compete for power and access to scarce
resources. The good news is that power and division or sharing resources is negotiable in ways
that ethnic or religious identity is not.
Neighborhood:
Ethiopia and Kenyan have long had intrusive and conflicting interests in Somalia. Both have
intervened independently and are now part of the AMISOM mission in Somalia.
Inflection Points:
Political change: A new president was finally chosen on February 8, 2017 after months of delays.
Instead of the favored incumbent, a former Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed,
popularly known as “Farmajo,” was selected by a complex and indirect process based on clans.
Although the process was breathtakingly corrupt—thousands of dollars were paid for votes—the
results were greeted with cheers in the capital. He is reportedly popular across clans and favored
by the military. His popularity provides a window of opportunity for the government to curtail
corruption, improve governance and security. President Mohamed Abdullahi, a dual US-Somali
citizen, nominated Hassan Ali Khaire, a dual citizen of Norway and Somalia, to be his Prime
Minister. Khaire was unanimously approved by parliament on 1 March. The new leadership
could be a strong partner for the US and for AMISOM. A note of caution--one basis for the new
president’s popularity is his strong nationalist appeals and claims of independence from foreign
interests which could affect his work with key AMISOM players as well as the United States.
Somali refugee camp in Kenya: Kenya’s plan to close Dabaab in May 2017 was blocked by a
High Court judge on 9 February 2017. Set up as a temporary camp for Somalis fleeing conflict
in 1991, Dabaab has become the largest refugee camp and home to hundreds of thousands of
Somalis. The Kenyan government will appeal on the grounds that the camp has become a haven
for terrorist activity. In the meantime, the stay provides the Somali government, AMISOM and
other assistance providers time to plan for camp residents should the facility be closed. Without
a plan, repatriation of over 300,000 Somalis could be destabilizing at a tenuously hopeful
juncture for the country.
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Somalia Case DRAFT 8 March 2017
US restrictions on refugees from Somalia: US president’s first executive order to temporarily ban
refugees from seven countries, including Somalia, was stayed by a federal district court. A
revised executive order reinstates a temporary ban on refugees from Somalia but exempts those
already in possession of a Green Card or visa. This, too, is likely to be challenged in the courts
but the intent of both efforts may hinder cooperation between US and Somali security
institutions. Conversely, the message may strengthen Al Shabaab by inadvertently reinforcing its
message of conflict between the West and Islam.
AMISOM drawdown and end: AMISOM’s 22,000 AU force is critical to stabilization in
Somalia. Yet AMISOM’s future is uncertain and its effectiveness has been tarnished. AMISOM
has been a high risk mission for peacekeepers. Approximately 3,000 have been killed since 2007.
Financial support for the mission has declined as mission costs tripled between 2009 and 2016.
The EU, which pays the salaries of AMISOM troops, cut the monthly allowance paid to
peacekeepers by 20% beginning in January 2016. Both Kenya and Uganda threatened to
withdraw their forces from AMISOM in response. In March 2016, the EU stopped paying the
monthly salaries of some 5,400 Burundian troops in Somalia altogether as part of its restrictive
measures against President Pierre Nkurunziza's government. Burundi also threatened to
withdraw its troops. Ethiopia has drawdown its troop levels, creating open spaces for Al Shabaab
to occupy. Further withdrawal of AMISOM troops is slated for October 2018; all troops are to be
out of Somalia by the end of 2020.
Although deemed essential to what progress has been made in Somalia, AMISOM’s
effectiveness is limited by local mistrust of the troops deployed. Somalis have seen AMISOM
troops as serving only the interests of the previous Somali government, not those of the people
generally. The new president wants to accelerate AMISOM’s exit from the country.
Furthermore, AMISOM troops have engaged in human rights abuses, including sexual
exploitation and abuse of local women and girls. Somalis particularly dislike Ethiopian and
Kenyan troops because of historic conflicts with their countries and suspicions about their
current intent. To complicate matters further, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops do not trust or
cooperate with each other. The loss of 180 Kenyan lives when their forward operating base at El
Adde in Ethiopia’s sector was overrun by Al Shabaab is one example of the cost.
The Somali National Army: The new president and the US are pinning hopes on building a
strong and professional Somali National Army to fight Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda and ISIS and to
bring order and stability to the country. Currently, the army is weak, corrupt and disorganized. It
has limited capacity and is not generally accepted by the population beyond the capital. The US
military has stepped up training and drone strikes. A small contingent of US Special Forces
advise and assist Somali forces.
Cracks in Al Shabaab: Al Shabaab has aligned itself with Al Qaeda. Some members are
defecting to ISIS (or Daesh) which is operating in Puntland. This fragments opposition to the
government further and has created rifts within some Somali clans. Ironically, Al Shabaab is
currently the primary obstacle to ISIS expanding its operations in the country. The Somali
National Army is not a credible opponent at this time.
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Somalia Case DRAFT 8 March 2017
Humanitarian Crisis: Nearly 40 % of the Somali population needs humanitarian assistance. In
January 2017, a worsening drought has left millions without food, water or healthcare in a
country crippled by decades of war. Five million Somalis, or more than four out of 10 people, do
not have enough to eat because of poor rains, following three years of drought in the hard hit
north, and fighting between the Islamist militant group al Shabaab and Somalia’s African Unionbacked government according to Reuters. Save the Children has issued an urgent appeal: “If calls
for aid are not answered within the next two months, millions of children could be at risk of
death and Somalia could once again fall into famine. President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed
declared a state of disaster in early March. In 2011, a quarter of a million people lost their lives –
130,000 of them children under five years old. With the international community slow to
respond, droughts intensifying and spring rains set to fail, the tragedy of 2011 looks set to repeat
itself. The UN issued a call for $6 billion in the coming weeks to prevent a humanitarian disaster.
As of 6 March, only $500 million had been received.
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