Weekly Case Summaries
Weekly Case Summaries: May 23-29, 2016
Case Name: People v. Franklin , CalSup , Case #: S217699
Opinion Date: 5/26/2016 , DAR #: 5060
Case Holding:
Juvenile homicide offenders may not be sentenced to the functional equivalent of
LWOP without the protections outlined in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. __. Franklin
was 16 when he shot and killed a rival. The trial court sentenced him to a mandatory term of
50 years to life. On appeal, Franklin argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment,
citing Miller and People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262. The Court of Appeal affirmed,
reasoning that the subsequent enactment of Penal Code section 3051 cured any potential
constitutional infirmity. The California Supreme Court granted review. Held: Sentence
affirmed and case remanded. As a threshold matter, the Supreme Court considered whether
Miller's prohibition on LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders also prohibits
sentences that are the functional equivalent to LWOP. The court answered that question in
the affirmative. A similar question arose in the context of sentencing for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders. In Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, the Court held that no
juvenile who commits a nonhomicide offense could be sentenced to LWOP. In People v.
Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, the California Supreme Court held that Graham also
prohibited sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide offender to the functional equivalent to LWOP.
"[J]ust as Graham applies to sentences that are the "functional equivalent of a [LWOP]
sentence so too does Miller apply to such functionally equivalent sentences" for juvenile
homicide offenders.
Senate Bill No. 260, which added Penal Code section 3051, moots Miller claims, but
remand is required in this case to provide the parties with an opportunity to make an
accurate record. The Legislature explicitly passed Senate Bill No. 260 to bring juvenile
sentencing into conformity with Graham, Miller, and Caballero. At the heart of the bill is
section 3051, which requires the Parole Board to conduct a "youth offender parole hearing"
during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a juvenile offender's incarceration. Section 3051 thus
reflects the Legislature's judgment that 25 years is the maximum amount of time that a
juvenile may serve before becoming eligible for parole. Franklin did not argue that a life
sentence with parole eligibility during his 25th year of incarceration (when he would be 41
years old) is the functional equivalent of LWOP. Because section 3051 transformed
Franklin's sentence into one that includes a meaningful opportunity for release during his
25th year of incarceration, it is neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent and thus has
rendered Franklin's Miller challenge moot. However, Franklin did argue that section 3051 did
1
not satisfy Miller because it permits a trial court to abdicate its responsibility to ensure that a
juvenile offender's sentence comports with the Eighth Amendment at the outset. Although
disagreeing, the Supreme Court determined that remand was appropriate "to provide an
opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender's
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board, years later, may
properly discharge its obligation to 'give great weight to' youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd.
(c)) in determining whether the offender is 'fit to rejoin society' despite having committed a
serious crime 'while he was a child in the eyes of the law.'" (Quoting Graham v. Florida
(2010) 560 U.S. 48, 79.) [Editor's Note: The court noted that its "mootness holding is
limited to circumstances where, as here, section 3051 entitles an inmate to a youth offender
parole hearing against the backdrop of an otherwise lengthy mandatory sentence. We express
no view on Miller claims by juvenile offenders who are ineligible for such a hearing under
section 3051, subdivision (h), or who are serving lengthy sentences imposed under
discretionary rather than mandatory sentencing statutes."]
The full opinion is available on the court's website here:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S217699.PDF
Case Name: People v. Vasquez , District: 3 DCA , Case #: C071195
Opinion Date: 5/25/2016 , DAR #: 5025
Case Holding:
Gang offenses and enhancements withstood sufficiency challenge pursuant to People v.
Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, because prosecution admitted evidence of an associational
connection between the members of the Norteño subset who committed the predicate
acts and the subset the defendants belonged to. Vasquez and other RVN subset Norteños
robbed and assaulted a stranger. During the event, witnesses heard the defendants yelling
"Norte." The jury convicted them of a number of offenses and found true a number of
enhancements, including a substantive gang offense (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)) and a
gang enhancement (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)). On appeal, the defendants challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence of the gang offense and enhancement under Prunty. Held:
Affirmed. The existence of a criminal street gang is an element of both the gang enhancement
and substantive gang offense. In Prunty, the court held that "where the prosecution's case
positing the existence of a single criminal street gang for purposes of section 186.22(f) turns
on the existence and conduct of one or more gang subsets, then the prosecution must show
some associational or organizational connection uniting those subsets." Here, the defendants
belonged to the RVN Norteño subset, but the prosecution did not offer evidence that the RVN
subset committed the predicate acts necessary to establish the existence of a criminal street
gang. Instead, the prosecutor offered evidence that members of a different subset, the
Broderick Boys, committed the predicate acts. However, the prosecution carried its burden
under Prunty of showing an associational connection between the RVN subset and the
Broderick Boys by admitting photos depicting RVN members and Broderick Boys together,
including photos that were taken at another Norteño's funeral: "Such conduct shows a loyalty
not only to their particular set but also an association with the larger Norteno street gang as a
whole." Other evidence also showed that the Norteño subsets shared an association with each
other and the larger Sacramento-area Norteño gang.
2
The full opinion is available on the court's website here:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C071195.PDF
Case Name: Jackson v. Superior Court (Riverside County) , District: 4 DCA , Division: 2 ,
Case #: E064010
Opinion Date: 5/24/2016 , DAR #: 4970
Case Holding:
Defendant who has been committed as incompetent for the maximum period, but who is
not gravely disabled, is not entitled to release from custody where new charges are
currently pending. In 2008, Jackson was charged with a lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, §
288, subd. (b)). He was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to Patton State
Hospital. In May 2015, the trial court ordered defendant's release because he had reached the
maximum period of commitment authorized by law (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (c)(1)). The
prosecution then secured an indictment in a new case, related to the conduct of the earlier
case. The court declared a doubt as to Jackson's competency in the new case, but did not
declare him incompetent. Defendant moved for his release in the new case, which was
denied. This writ petition followed. Held: Petition denied. A defendant who has been found
incompetent to stand trial and whose competence has not been recovered must be returned to
the committing court within 90 days of the date that is three years from the date of
commitment (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (c)(1)). At that point the trial court may initiate
conservatorship proceedings if it finds the defendant to be gravely disabled. Relying on
Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715 and In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, Jackson
claimed that absent a conservatorship, the only other alternative under section 1370 is his
release. However, Jackson did not show that he is committed solely on account of his
incapacity to proceed to trial because a new indictment was filed against him. In addition, the
record contained no evidence that he was declared incompetent to stand trial in the new case
and unlikely to regain competency. He also failed to show that he was "committed" at all in
the new case. The court urged the Legislature to amend section 1370, subdivision (c)(2) to
clarify the options available to the trial court when faced with a defendant who has been
committed as incompetent for the maximum period, but who is not gravely disabled.
The full opinion is available on the court's website here:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E064010.PDF
Case Name: People v. Robinson , CalSup , Case #: S220247
Opinion Date: 5/23/2016 , DAR #: 4846
Case Holding:
Court of Appeal erred by reducing sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional
purpose offenses that were not supported by sufficient evidence to misdemeanor sexual
battery because misdemeanor sexual battery is not a lesser included offense. Defendant
was convicted of multiple counts of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional
purpose (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (c)). On appeal, the court found insufficient evidence as to
two of the four victims, and reduced two of the offenses to misdemeanor sexual battery (Pen.
Code, § 243.4, subd. (e)(1)). Defendant's petition for review was granted. Held: Reversed.
Where a verdict is not supported by the evidence, a court may reduce the conviction to a
lesser included offense if the record establishes guilt as to the lesser offense (Pen. Code, §
3
1181, subd. 6). To determine whether one crime is necessarily included in another, a court
may look either to the accusatory pleading or to the statutory elements of the offenses. If a
crime cannot be committed without necessarily committing the lesser offense, then the lesser
crime is included in the greater offense. However, if the same evidence is required to support
all of the elements of both offenses, neither offense is a lesser of the other. Sexual battery by
misrepresentation of professional purpose results in the victim being unaware of the nature of
the act, which negates legal consent. This offense shares three elements with misdemeanor
sexual battery: (1) the defendant must touch an intimate part of the victim (2) with a sexual
purpose and (3) the victim did not consent to the touching. On the surface, this makes it
appear that misdemeanor sexual battery would be a lesser included offense. But, as illustrated
by this case, the same evidence is needed to establish all elements of both offenses when the
prosecution's theory is that defendant's misrepresentations negated any consent. As a result,
misdemeanor sexual battery is not a lesser included offense of sexual battery by
misrepresentation of professional purpose and the Court of Appeal was not authorized to
reduce the sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose offenses to
misdemeanor sexual battery.
Where an element of an uncharged lesser offense is broader than an element of a
greater offense, the defendant must be given notice of the prosecution's intent to rely on
the broader element of the lesser offense. The lack of consent element of misdemeanor
sexual battery is a general one, whereas sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional
purpose involves a specific circumstance in which consent is legally vitiated. Here,
misdemeanor sexual battery was not charged and the jury was not asked to consider lack of
consent except for the professional misrepresentation. Under these circumstances, reducing
the sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose offense would deprive the
defendant of notice that he needed to defend against the broader misdemeanor offense.
The full opinion is available on the court's website here:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S220247.PDF
Case Name: In re Richards , CalSup , Case #: S223651
Opinion Date: 5/26/2016 , DAR #: 5046
Case Holding:
Murder conviction reversed because amendments to Penal Code section 1472 rendered
the prosecution expert's trial testimony on bite marks "false evidence." In 1997,
Richards was convicted of the 1993 murder of his wife. His conviction was affirmed on
appeal. A 2012 habeas petition based on the prosecution expert's recantation of his trial
testimony that a human bite on the deceased matched Richards' unusual teeth, was denied
because it did not constitute "false evidence" within the meaning of Penal Code section 1473
(In re Richards (2012) 55 Cal.4th 948 (Richards I). In response to the Richards I decision,
the Legislature amended section 1473 to include in the definition of "false evidence," expert
opinions which have either been repudiated or undermined by later technology. Richards
filed a petition based on this amendment. Held: Petition granted. Penal Code section 1473
provides a writ of habeas corpus may be based on the ground that material, false evidence
was introduced against the defendant. Prior to 2014, it provided no specific guidance
regarding the meaning of "false evidence," causing the court in Richards I to find that it did
4
not include recanted expert testimony unless the evidence shows that the opinion offered at
trial was objectively untrue. In 2014, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1058, modifying
the "false evidence" standard to include expert opinions that have been repudiated by the
expert who originally offered it or that have been undermined by later scientific research or
technology. Under this amendment, Richards met his burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the prosecution expert bite mark evidence given at his trial constituted
"false evidence."
The false bite mark evidence was material and unduly prejudicial. Under Penal Code
section 1473, false evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, but for the
admission of the testimony, the result of the trial would have been different. Here, the
prosecution bite mark evidence was material because, with the exception of this evidence, the
defense could have provided a substantial response to much of the prosecution's remaining
case, requiring reversal.
The full opinion is available on the court's website here:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S223651.PDF
Case Name: People v. Lehman , District: 1 DCA , Division: 1 , Case #: A144800
Opinion Date: 5/25/2016 , DAR #: 4972
Case Holding:
Restitution award for $1 million for noneconomic damages in felony child molestation
case upheld despite lack of expert or victim testimony establishing that particular
amount. A jury convicted Lehman of a number of sex offenses (including violations of Penal
Code section 288) for abusing his granddaughters. On appeal, he challenged a $1 million
noneconomic restitution award on various grounds including that the prosecution failed to
make a prima facie case to support such an award because, at the restitution hearing, the
prosecutor only presented evidence of similar awards in other cases. Held: Affirmed. Penal
Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f) provides that the court may order victim restitution for
the value of stolen or damaged property, medical expenses, mental health counseling, lost
wages or profits, and "[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological
harm, for felony violations of Section 288." Unlike economic damages, "[n]o fixed standard
exists for deciding the amount of [noneconomic] damages." Furthermore, section 1202.4 does
not require any particular kind of proof to establish a victim's losses. Although there was no
expert or victim testimony offered at the restitution hearing, the court could properly consider
the victims' trial testimony, the victims' statements at sentencing, and the recommendation set
forth in the probation officer's report. In this case, the victims' testimony and statements were
sufficient to support the trial court's finding that they continued to suffer psychological
distress from Lehman's years of abuse. The award in this case was not so large that it shocks
the conscience and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Court does not need to specify how it calculated the amount of noneconomic damages.
Lehman also argued that the restitution award was invalid because the trial court did not
specify how it arrived at the $1 million award. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Although
courts have reversed restitution awarded for economic losses when the court failed to specify
how it calculated the amount, there are "significant differences" between economic and
5
noneconomic losses, as the latter "require more subjective considerations." Here, the court
stated that psychological distress was the basis for the award. Provided there is no fixed
standard for calculating noneconomic losses "it is unclear exactly what more the trial court
could have done" to explain the basis for the award.
The full opinion is available on the court's website here:
http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A144800.PDF
Case Name: Foster v. Chatman , USSup , Case #: 14-8349
Opinion Date: 5/23/2016 , DAR #: 4795
Case Holding:
State court erred under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 by crediting prosecutor's
race-neutral reasons for using peremptory strikes against black jurors where
prosecutor's file contained documents reflecting that black jurors had been targeted for
strikes from the outset. A Georgia jury convicted Foster of murder and sentenced him to
death. On appeal, he argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike all
four black prospective jurors was racially motivated in violation of Batson. The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed. Foster filed a state habeas petition and obtained a copy of the
prosecutor's file. Inside the file, Foster found various documents that illustrated black
prospective jurors had been targeted for exclusion by the prosecution team from the outset.
Nevertheless, the state trial court denied Foster's habeas petition, concluding that review of
the Batson issue was barred by res judicata because the material in the prosecutor's file did
not sufficiently alter the facts material to the Batson analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court
ultimately granted certiorari. Held: Reversed. As a threshold matter, the state judgment did
not rest on an independent state law ground that precluded federal review. Although the state
court relied on res judicata, its analysis of state law ground turned on a federal question—
whether the materials in the prosecutor's file altered the Batson analysis. On the merits, the
contents of the prosecutor's file coupled with a comparative juror analysis showed purposeful
discrimination in the prosecution's selection of the jury. The race-neutral reasons provided for
striking the black jurors also applied to white jurors who were not stricken. The state court
erred by concluding otherwise and denying Foster's Batson claim.
The full opinion is available on the court's website here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-8349_6k47.pdf
During the week of May 23, 2016, the California Supreme Court granted review in the
following cases:
Grants and Holds
In re A.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 758, review granted 5/25/2016 (S233932/A144487)
People v. Vasquez (Mar. 7, 2016, H039956) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233855)
Briefing deferred in A.S. and Vasquez pending decision in In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 676, review granted 2/17/2016 (S230923/A144149), which presents the
6
following issue: Did the trial court err imposing an "electronics search condition" on minor as
a condition of his probation when it had no relationship to the crimes he committed but was
justified on appeal as reasonably related to future criminality under People v. Olguin (2008)
45 Cal.4th 375 because it would facilitate his supervision?
People v. Bell (Mar. 15, 2016, E063018) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S234017). Briefing deferred pending decision in Harris v. Superior Court (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 244, review granted 2/24/2016 (S231489/B264839), which presents the
following issues: (1) Are the People entitled to withdraw from a plea agreement for
conviction of a lesser offense and to reinstate any dismissed counts if the defendant files a
petition for recall of sentence and reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor under
Proposition 47? (2) If the defendant seeks such relief, are the parties returned to the status
quo with no limits on the sentence that can be imposed on the ground that the defendant has
repudiated the plea agreement by doing so?
People v. Casias (Mar. 22, 2016, H042065) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233979)
People v. Gomez (Mar. 15, 2016, E062867) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233849)
Briefing in Casias and Gomez deferred pending decision in People v. Page (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 714, review granted 1/27/2016 (S230793/E062760), which presents the
following issue: Does Proposition 47 ("the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act") apply to
the offense of unlawful taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851), because it is a
lesser included offense of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (d), and that offense is eligible
for resentencing to a misdemeanor under Penal Code sections 490.2 and 1170.18?
People v. Fernandez (Mar. 11, 2016, B266087) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233986)
People v. Santamaria (Mar. 8, 2016, D068307) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233904)
Briefing in Fernandez and Santamaria deferred pending decision in People v. Romanowski
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 151, review granted 1/20/2016 (S231405/B263164), which present
the following issue: Does Proposition 47 ("the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act"), which
reclassifies as a misdemeanor any grand theft involving property valued at $950 or less (Pen.
Code, § 490.2), apply to theft of access card information in violation of Penal Code section
484e, subdivision (d)?
People v. Gutierrez (Mar. 3, 2016, B250333) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233295)
People v. Morales (Feb. 17, 2016, B253249) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233255)
Briefing in Gutierrez and Morales deferred pending decision in People v. Mateo (Feb. 10,
2015, B258333) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/11/2016 (S232674), which presents the
7
following issue: In order to convict an aider and abettor of attempted willful, deliberate and
premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, must a
premeditated attempt to murder have been a natural and probable consequence of the target
offense? In other words, should People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868 be reconsidered in
light of Alleyne v. United States (2013) ___ U.S. ___ [113 S.Ct. 2151] and People v. Chiu
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 155?
People v. Herrera (Mar. 2, 2016, E062184) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233569). Briefing deferred pending decision in People v. Friday (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 8,
review granted 7/16/2014 (S218288/H039404), People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
1283, review granted 7/16/2014 (S218197/H039603), and People v. Klatt (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 906, review granted 7/16/2014 (S218755/H038755), which present the following
issue: Are the conditions of probation mandated by Penal Code section 1203.067, subdivision
(b), for persons convicted of specified felony sex offenses—including waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination, required participation in polygraph examinations, and waiver of
the psychotherapist–patient privilege—constitutional?
People v. Louder (Mar. 10, 2016, B265170) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233865). Briefing deferred pending decision in People v. Valenzuela (2015) 244
Cal.App.4th 692, review granted 3/30/2016 (S232900/D066907), which presents the
following issue: Is a defendant eligible for resentencing on the penalty enhancement for
serving a prior prison term on a felony conviction after the superior court has reclassified the
underlying felony as a misdemeanor under the provisions of Proposition 47?
People v. Myers (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 794, review granted 5/25/2016 (S233937/C078277).
Briefing deferred pending decision in People v. Chaney (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1391, review
granted 2/18/2015 (S223676/C073949), and People v. Valenzuela (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th
692, review granted 3/30/2016 (S232900/D066907), which present the following issue: Does
the definition of "unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd.
(c)) under Proposition 47 ("the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act") apply on retroactivity
or other grounds to resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Pen. Code, §
1170.126)?
People v. Stewart (Apr. 11, 2016, D067967) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
(S233478)
People v. Valencia (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 730, review granted 5/25/2016
(S233402/C079394)
Briefing in Stewart and Valencia deferred pending decision in People v. Gonzales (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 35, review granted 2/17/2016 (S231171/D067544), which presents the following
issue: Was defendant entitled to resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18 on his
conviction for second degree burglary either on the ground that it met the definition of
misdemeanor shoplifting (Pen. Code, § 459.5) or on the ground that section 1170.18
impliedly includes any second degree burglary involving property valued at $950 or less?
People v. Strickland (Mar. 9, 2016, C078578) [nonpub. opn.], review granted 5/25/2016
8
(S233933). Briefing deferred pending decision in People v. Buycks (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
519, review granted 1/20/2016 (S231765/B262023), which presents the following issue: Was
defendant eligible for resentencing on the penalty enhancement for committing a new felony
while released on bail on a drug offense even though the superior court had reclassified the
conviction for the drug offense as a misdemeanor under the provisions of Proposition 47?
Status Update
On May 25, 2016, the court ordered the question of California law presented in a matter
pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Robinson v. Lewis (9th
Cir. 2015) 795 F.3d 926, request granted 12/16/2015 (S228137)) restated as follows: "When a
California court denies a claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the petitioner
subsequently files the same or a similar claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus directed
to the original jurisdiction of a higher court, what is the significance, if any, of the period of
time between the earlier petition's denial and the subsequent petition's filing (66 days in this
case) for the purpose of determining the subsequent claim's timeliness under California law?"
9