SECURITY
AARMS
Vol. 6, No. 2 (2007) 219–228
The role of reinforcing reserves within the scope of
national defence
LAJOS URBÁN
Invitel Zrt., Gödöll , Hungary
National reserve forces, capable of integrating into the regular armed forces and of
operating independently to serve national and allied needs are required to reinforce
and support the small peacetime regular army.
Introduction
Fulfilment of responsibilities derived from Hungarian membership in NATO represents
a challenge not only for the armed forces, but also for the entire nation. This was
apparent in the Strategic Review conducted by the Ministry of Defence in 2000, which
defined force modernization as the main goal, and by the Defense Review conducted
during 2002–2003, which defined new “levels of ambition” for Hungarian armed forces
capable of meeting both national and international defence requirements. Both of these
reviews reinforced the necessity of reorganization the armed forces, reducing overall
numbers and creating a fully professional, all-volunteer force. Although the various
political parties agreed upon the basic issues, there was disagreement concerning the
legal and technical aspects of transforming the military into an all-volunteer
organization. The debate resulted in a typical Hungarian solution: the peacetime
suspension of conscription.
The debate concerning means for re-invigorating the system of national defence, or
to be precise the reinforcement of the professional armed forces in times of national
emergency, was handled in a somewhat superficial fashion, and to date none of the
proposed solutions has borne real fruit. The central idea was that in times of emergency
peacetime forces would be reinforced with “reservists” composed of those who had
previously served in the military. This rather naive approach represents outmoded
organizational thinking and fails to take into account the evolving circumstances of
military operations in the early 21st century, or the needs of the all-volunteer Hungarian
armed forces.
In 2002, the Hungarian Parliament declared among other things, that the
reorganized Hungarian Defence Forces must be capable not only of defending the
nation militarily, but must also be prepared to provide civil defence and emergency
Received: March 13, 2007
Address for correspondence:
LAJOS URBÁN
Invitel Zrt., Gödöll , Hungary
E-mail: [email protected]
L. URBÁN: The role of reinforcing reserves
assistance in times of crisis, as well as reinforcement of civilian authorities should a
state of emergency be declared through constitutional means. It is questionable how
these tasks can be accomplished using “reservists” who had earlier been trained only in
combat skills (mechanized infantry, armour, artillery, etc.). It is clear that these
individuals, who have fundamentally been trained to fight, do not possess the necessary
training to perform complex duties in times of emergency.
A professional and responsible leadership cannot seriously hold a view that
necessary defence tasks can be carried out by a reserve force that exists only in the legal
sense. Should these reserves be required, the consequences of such a reinforcement
scheme will be felt not only by the reservists, but also by the entire defence
establishment and will prevent the professionals from succeeding as well.
The strictly system-based operational requirements of a military force demand that
there must be few variations in the preparation of elements of the force. This is
particularly true from the standpoint of training, since variations in the quality of
training leads to serious problems in interoperability.
It is imperative therefore, that a comprehensive force structure concept be developed
and implemented, leading to the establishment of a force that is realistically capable of
performing all assigned defence tasks. Such a force needs to take into account the burden
sharing capability of the nation and a realistic assessment of threats of national security.
Missions and tasks of reinforcing reserve forces
No nation on earth can afford to finance regular military forces capable of meeting all
concrete or potential national security threats at all times. Hungary’s present economic
conditions certainly do not support implementation of such an idea. Indeed, adequate
funding for the forces determined as necessary by the Defense Review has been lacking.
However, beyond a certain point the level of funding provided for defence cannot be the
basis of further bargaining; fiscal difficulties do not eliminate the requirement to provide
sufficient capability for national defence. With membership in NATO, Hungary accepted
and assumed responsibilities for the development and maintenance of given national
defence capabilities and is obligated to put them at the disposal of the Alliance in times of
need. According the agreement, forces offered up for use by NATO must be kept in are
peacetime at the 80% readiness level, as a minimum.
The Hungarian Strategic Planning System continues to rely on an exaggeratedly
long preparation time to prepare its forces for deployment, and there is little realization
that in times of crisis offered-up forces must be quickly staffed and ready at the 100%
level. It is of course possible, that forces will be committed before the reinforcement is
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completed. Thus, it is an essential principle, that those serving full-time be capable of
operating all of the weaponry and equipment of the unit without reinforcement.
Reinforcement of offered – up forces, forces destined for deployment, can only be
assured with individuals who have been trained and prepared to perform complex
combat tasks at a sufficiently high level of expertise. Reinforcement can only be
accomplished using reservists who have received systematic, detailed and continuous
training. This is true not only for just the offered-up forces, but for the entire armed
forces. The following questions remain valid:
Who is capable of influencing events, or guaranteeing, that adequate time will be
available for the preparation, training or equipping of units needed to provide vital
assistance in times of crisis?
Although admittedly extreme, it is not outside the bounds of possibility that a natural
disaster may occur just at the time when the armed forces are already committed to an
armed conflict. The strict qualitative requirements and the anomalies associated with
preparation time clearly point to the importance of preparing adequate reserve forces.
We need to develop and establish a reserve system that is capable not only of
integrating into the structure of the regular armed forces, but also of participating
independently in national and allied operations. Within our structurally small armed
forces, we need to develop a degree of reserve specialization and distribution of
responsibilities. To ensure operational interoperability and functional compatibility,
while concurrently satisfying differentiated preparation and selection requirements,
three reserve categories need to be established:
• Reservists detailed to fill out NATO offered-up forces, fully trained and
equipped to integrate into pre-determined in regular all-volunteer units. These
individuals will receive regular periodic training at their designated units.
• Reservists similarly trained and prepared to fill other, non-NATO designated
regular military units.
• Finally, those reservists who are trained and prepared to assume duties in both
time of war and during periods of national crisis, who can be called up as
prescribed by law.
In 2002–2003, the Defence Review determined the missions and tasks of the allvolunteer Hungarian Defence Forces. At the same time, and in response to the political
will, the last conscript was quickly demobilized. Strictly, on the merits this was the
right thing to do, however the same political will has failed to provide the support
necessary to sustain the remaining military capability.
At present, emphasis for allocation of resources is placed on units designated to
perform military operations outside the country. At the same time, the quality of life,
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training, equipment and modernization of remaining forces is neglected. In contrast to
the declared aims of the modernization program, reduction in force has become the
synonym for progress. At the same time, the reserve forces necessary for the successful
operation of the force, due to the lack of any future reinforcement, are rapidly
diminishing. This is not just rhetoric, but also a valid statement of the facts. There is no
need for complicated modeling of future trends, it is simply a matter of logic that
suspension of peacetime conscription, after a while, will reduce the number of those
suitable for reserve duty under the concept that former soldiers will serve as
reinforcements. Indeed, the lowering of the legal limit for reservists to those under 40
years of age, as well as the demographics of the country clearly point to a very rapid
erosion of the number of those suitable for reservists duty.
Recent terrorist acts and other emergencies in other countries pose concrete dangers
for the security of our own nation as well. We must have and maintain sufficient forces
to deter, or to defend against the negative consequences of them. The ongoing
continuous reduction in the capabilities of the armed forces has not been commensurate
with a reduction in the threats against our country. When our security is examined in
this light, it becomes obvious that creation of viable reserve forces or more accurately
Reinforcing Forces remains a valid requirement. Beyond the technical requirements
derived from the needs of the armed forces, the need for the creation of Reinforcing
Forces is emphasized by a universal principle. Namely, that national defence continues
to be a national issue, whereby every citizen has the constitutional right and moral
obligation to participate in the defence of the nation according to his individual
capabilities. However this can only be accomplished if one is prepared to perform such
duties during peacetime.
The creation of Reinforcing Forces serves to satisfy both the organizational and the
technical requirements of national defence:
Mission: Integrated into the peacetime structure of the armed forces and trained
during both peacetime and in times of crisis, the Reinforcing Forces ensure the full
staffing of the units of the armed forces, provide the necessary professional and military
capabilities and support the combat and other operations of the force.
In peacetime, working in close cooperation with other organizations constituting the
full scope of national defence, Reinforcing Forces assist in deterring threats to the
nation and the population, participate in the training and education of defence forces,
and maintain the traditions that link the armed forces to the civilian population.
The missions, tasks and functions of the Reinforcing Forces will be accomplished
independently, and in close cooperation with other elements of the national defence
structure:
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In peacetime:
Individual soldier and unit training and education
Preparation for execution of general and certain technical defence tasks
Conduct of basic military training and additional skills training
Security guard and military police functions
Specific technical tasks: search and rescue, aid and assistance to local populations in
time of flood, etc.
In times of war or emergency: In addition to tasks accomplished during times of
peace, conduct of activity commensurate with the emergency. This includes:
• Reinforcement of specific military capabilities within the regular armed forces.
• Conduct of regional and specific security guard duties,
• Supporting allied forces arriving on the territory of Hungary,
• Conduct of given combat, support or other operational tasks.
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Organization of Reinforcing Forces
During determination of the necessary organization and structure of Reinforcing Forces
(RF), it is important to remember that they must operate both rationally and
economically. Accordingly, we need to examine the existing, as well as the still existing
but unused capabilities of the entire defence establishment. The structure of the
Reinforcing Forces needs to encompass three elements:
Central Leadership, responsible for strategic planning and coordination,
Regional Command Headquarters, responsible for coordination of the planning,
training and operations of subordinated units,
Reinforcing Battalions, composing the operational units of the force.
The central leadership, or the Headquarters Reinforcing Forces, would operate as a
subordinate element of the Ministry of Defence. Working closely with both civilian policy
planners and the Defence Staff, and relying on the basic infrastructure of the Ministry, the
Headquarters would operate through the integrated activities of a Reinforcing Force
Coordination and Planning Centre, RF Operations Centre and an RF Logistics Support
Centre. This is a preliminary concept and the organizational structure of the Headquarters
could, after careful evaluation, be modified to better suit requirements.
In addition to planning and directing the operational activities of subordinated units,
Reinforcing Force Battalion headquarters would also be responsible for coordinating
with military, peace enforcement and civilian leaders locally.
Battalion commanders would be responsible for execution of directed plans and
policies, both in peacetime and during time of war or emergency. As a result, the
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battalions must have an adequate structure and capabilities necessary for
accomplishment of specified tasks. This also requires that they must be adequately
trained to perform assigned functions. This is especially true in the case of those
reinforcing soldiers who will be designated to fill out units offered up to NATO.
Distribution of Reinforcing Force leadership elements
The physical distribution of leadership elements will be determined by the missions and
tasks assigned to them, although sufficient thought needs to be given to the operating
costs of Reinforcing Forces. Thought also needs to be given to the interoperability
requirements between reinforcing and regular forces.
Thus, to ensure close and continuous cooperation and coordination between the
Headquarters of the Reinforcing Command and the MOD/HDF, and to ensure that
already existing support and administrative capability is used in the optimum manner,
the Reinforcing Force Coordination and Planning Centre should be emplaced in one of
the existing ministry bases/centres. The placement of centres responsible for
Reinforcing Force operational and training coordination should be determined based on
the needs of subordinate battalions and training bases. Earlier closed, or planned to be
closed bases, or bases with a low level of usage could enter into consideration of the
emplacement of these organizations.
Relying on an entirely new approach, the placement of the Reinforcing Force
Logistics Support Centre could be accomplished by linking it with one of the Ministry
background organizations. This is obviously a new idea, but not without merit, since
these organizations already provide wide-ranging support to the armed forces.
Background organizations already provide base guard forces, base operations support
activities they support exercises, provide logistics transportation services, and are
responsible for the physical security and the operation of certain secure sites.
Accordingly, background organizations can easily provide necessary logistics support
to the Reinforcing Forces by leveraging already existing resources and capabilities.
It is both prudent and logical to emplace the Regional Command Headquarters
geographically based on anticipated missions and tasks. Inclusion in already existing
County Mobilization Command facilities seems logical, although the distribution of
these mobilization organizations may be modified due to nationally mandated
administrative reorganization measures.
Reinforcing Force Battalion and Company headquarters could be emplaced on
already existing military bases throughout the country.
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The structure and staffing of Reinforcing Force organizations
Top-level leadership organizations are responsible for planning and organizing, and for
employing the resources of permanently assigned and occasionally mobilized
reinforcing officers and soldiers. Due to the need for continuity, the staffing by
permanent personnel may reach 30%–50%. This requirement could be met by a
combination of active duty and retired officers, NCOs and civil servants. With a more
rational use of existing presently vacant positions throughout the defence establishment,
this would not constitute a significant actual increase in headcount
The regional commands could be staffed with a minimal complement of full-time
personnel led by an assigned chief of staff and constituting some 15%–20% of the table
of organization. These individuals would prepare the plans executed by reserve, or
Reinforcing Force personnel (80%–85%) to support necessary training. The unit
commander and his deputy remain reservists.
Again, consideration should be given to integrating these headquarters with the
existing county mobilization command headquarters. The Reinforcing Force battalion
headquarters, manned by two or three permanent personnel, led by either the battalion
commander or the chief of staff, and augmented by Reinforcing Force personnel could
be integrated into the existing organization of mobilization commands.
In the case of Reinforcing Force companies, the entire complement could be staffed
by reinforcement force and perhaps (retired) personnel acting as warehousemen, as
necessary.
The required officer and NCO staffing for the reinforcement forces could be assured
from the active duty complement of the HDF. At the same time, with reduction of the
upper age limit for reservists/reinforcement personnel to 40 years of age, certain
positions could be staffed by adequately prepared and fit retired personnel. The
extensive technical and professional capability inherent in the civilian population can be
converted for use within the operating units of the Reinforcing Forces.
In the beginning, Reinforcing Forces could be staffed by those who have previously
completed their military duties and have been adequately trained. Later, reinforcing
soldiers can be specifically trained for duties with the reserve forces.
Determination of the actual required manpower structure of the Reinforcing Forces
can only be accomplished once all of the missions and tasks of these forces has been
decided. However, based on the general missions of the defence forces, and upon the
results of earlier strategic analysis, as well as from the standpoint of financing, it can be
extrapolated that Reinforcing Forces would number between 5,000–10,000 individuals.
Based on experiences to date, the staffing of each of the reinforcing companies can be
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estimated as 100–120. This number then leads to an estimate that each battalion will
constitute approximately 500 individuals.
Based on the existing county structure within Hungary, this would mean that each
county would have a significant capability available for accomplishment of complex
and regionally specific tasks civil defence and crisis management services.
It should be emphasized at all levels, that development of a Reinforcing Forces does
not mean an increase in the overall numbers of the armed forces, nor does it require
fundamentally new funding sources. In fact, creation of the Reinforcing Force adds to
the creation of an integrated manpower system that results in the more rational and costeffective use of existing resources
Infrastructural, supply and fiscal requirements
From an infrastructural standpoint the Reinforcing Forces can be emplaced on still
existing, but only partially used military bases, or alternatively, formerly closed but still
useful bases could be recommissioned.
Use of existing mobilization command headquarters facilities should also be
considered. These facilities have adequate office, warehouse, service and other
capabilities and they are already distributed throughout the country. The distribution of
these facilities is suitable to support the distribution of Reinforcing Force units.
In the case of specialized units, institutions that already have similar capabilities and
technical requirements could be employed. As an example, chemical corporations,
power stations, etc. could also serve as a base for specialized reinforcing units.
The logistics support for Reinforcing Forces could be ensured through use of existing
supply stockpiles, with a rotational replacement of the supplies that have been expended.
This would lead to the creation of a unified, integrated logistics system supporting both
the active-duty and the Reinforcing Forces. At the same time, supplies that are not always
required due to the part-time nature of Reinforcing Forces, (food, fuel, technical spares
parts, etc.), can also be provided from civilian sources when needed.
Financing constitutes the most serious element in the creation of Reinforcing
Forces. Thus, such a force can only be established after careful, comprehensive and
thorough analysis. Units and capabilities need to be constituted in an orderly,
synchronized fashion, commensurate with the probability of employment.
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Command and control of the Reinforcing Force
The Reinforcing Force Headquarters operates under the direct supervision of the
Minister of Defence. The principles, rules, regulations and responsibility for the
command and control of these forces will be decided upon by the Parliament. The scope
of responsibility and the parameters of cooperation between the Force and government
and civilian organizations will be decided upon by the Government.
Training and preparation
The personnel, technical and infrastructural requirements for the training of the
Reinforcing Force constitute one of the most difficult issues There will be difficulties in
ensuring that an adequate number of trainers and volunteer reservists can be made
available. Analysis shows that the greatest obstacle to the voluntary acceptance of parttime military service by members of the public stems from the fear that the individual
will lose his jobs if he volunteers. This is the main reason for the failure of the existing
volunteer reservists program. The change in regimes also resulted in a significant
change in the economics and demographics of the country. Given market economics
and other opportunities available to the potential volunteers, existing governmental
regulations are insufficient to safeguard the jobs of the volunteers.
This forces us to research and consider methodologies for the training and
preparation of reservists, which in peacetime exert the least possible stress on both the
volunteers and on their employers. At the same time, a system of adequate
compensation for the volunteers needs to be developed.
One possible solution for alleviating the personnel and technical problems
associated with preparation of the Reinforcing Force could be establishment of a
Training Resource Division either at the RF Operations and Training Centre, or at one
of the Regional Commands. This capability would consist of mobile training groups
capable of providing a substantial portion of the necessary training and instruction onsite and at the appropriate level of quality. At the same time, the existing primary and
additional skills training capability of the regular armed forces could also be leveraged
in favour of the Reinforcing Forces.
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Summary
Hungary’s membership in NATO considerably improved the nation’s security and made
it possible that the earlier, conscript-based mass army be greatly reduced in numbers. At
the same time, the political will of the nation decreed that an all-volunteer force be
created. These fundamental changes completely changed the character of the Hungarian
Defence Forces, its conditions of service and indeed the entire organization of the force.
The new all-volunteer peacetime defence forces are capable of meeting national and
international peacetime retirements, but in case of crisis, additional forces will be
required. Crisis-related tasks can be supported by the Reinforcing Forces, who work
together and continuously with the regular forces. The small peacetime military,
augmented by the Reinforcing Forces can satisfy the requirements of the nation in an
economic and effective manner.
References
Military Decision Mc 441/1- NATO Framework Policy On Reserves; North Atlantic Military Committee
Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; 20 February 2001.
The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence for
Reserve Affairs; December 2002.
P. STRUCK: The Bundeswehr Reservist Concept (Bundestministerium Der Verteidigung), Berlin, 10
September 2003.
Law CV (XI.8.) 2004, concerning the Hungarian Defence Forces.
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