on the Korean Peninsula:
What Next
A Project Interim Report by:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
May 2009
By
James L. Schoff
Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies
&
Yaron Eisenberg
Research Associate
on the Korean Peninsula:
What Next
May 2009
A Project Interim Report by:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
In Association with the Fletcher School, Tufts University
By:
James L. Schoff
Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies
and
Yaron Eisenberg
Research Associate
For further information, please contact:
Cambridge, Mass., IFPA Office
James L. Schoff
[email protected]
Contents
Introduction v
Milestones and Meanings
1
How to Characterize a Peace Regime
5
Developing a Peace Regime
8
First, Do No Harm: Armistice and OPCON
8
Basic Agreement as a Foundation
10
Parties to a Peace Regime
11
Five Tracks
13
The Six-Party/KPPR Linkage
14
Timing and Triggers
15
The U.S.-ROK Alliance Factor and Regional Considerations
18
Appendix A
References
App:1
Appendix B
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms
App:3
Appendix C
Trail of Documents Related to Korean Peace Regime Development
App:4
Appendix D
North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange (Basic
Agreement), 1991
App:5
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
iii
iv
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
Introduction
The term “peace regime” officially made its Six-Party Talks
debut in the September 2005 Joint Statement from the
fourth round of those negotiations, as the participating
nations emphasized their commitment to build a lasting
peace in Northeast Asia by pledging to initiate a separate
negotiation for a “permanent peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula” at an appropriate time.1 Although the Six-Party
Talks are primarily focused on denuclearizing North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK), the
mention of a separate peace regime dialogue by “the directly related parties” acknowledged the many unresolved
political, diplomatic, and national security issues in Korea
that contribute to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. After
all, North and South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) are
still technically at war with one another, and the armistice
agreement that has governed the cease-fire for over fiftyfive years was never intended as a long-term solution to
the Korean War.
Despite this acknowledgement of the ultimate importance of establishing a Korean Peninsula peace regime
(KPPR), no KPPR talks have occurred and no one can identify a probable start date or even a likely agenda for those
negotiations. At this writing, the Six-Party Talks themselves are in danger of collapsing (again), and the prospects for true peace in Korea seem dimmer than they have
been in more than a decade. North Korea has stepped up
1 The Six-Party Talks consist of delegations sent by China, Japan,
North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States. For a detailed discussion about the Six-Party Talks, see Schoff et. al. 2008.
its threats against the South, the United States, and Japan
with bellicose statements, missile tests, and border closings. Pyongyang also stated in April 2009 that nuclear war
with South Korea and the United States was just “a matter of time,” given what it called the “war chariot” of the
U.S.-ROK alliance (Yonhap News Agency 2009a). North
Korea followed this up with its second nuclear weapon
test in May 2009, and it called for “shaping a new diplomatic framework” through bilateral talks with the United
States (Yonhap News Agency 2009b).
These developments require careful consideration by
U.S. and ROK policy makers, as political transition in the
North (and earlier in the South), economic stress, and regional military modernization seem to be prompting major strategic adjustments on the peninsula. As a result,
stronger linkages are developing between the denuclearization talks, armistice management, and KPPR development, and they are also becoming less predictable. On the
one hand, efforts to better manage the armistice and to
think concretely about peace regime options could have
a positive influence on the atmosphere for Six-Party Talks
and lead to useful confidence-building measures (CBMs)
for the future. On the other hand, rushing into peace talks
when mutual confidence is particularly low could strain
an outdated armistice and allow conflict to erupt in the
West Sea or along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), endangering the fragile peace that has endured for half a century. The way that the U.S.-ROK alliance responds on these
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
v
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
interconnected fronts will influence North Korea’s reaction and determine how much support the allies receive
for their initiatives from other key players in the region.
These are the critical variables for shaping a more positive
security environment on the peninsula in the near term
and for the future.
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), working with partners in South Korea, the United States, and
China is in the middle of a three-year project exploring
peace regime building on the Korean Peninsula in ways
that support and facilitate the denuclearization objectives of the Six-Party Talks. Our aim is to combine research and dialogue in a mixed academic/policy (Track
1.5) environment among the “directly related parties” to
explore the linkages mentioned above, and to develop a
broader consensus regarding the potential synergies between armistice management, peace regime building, and
denuclearization.
As part of this project, IFPA and some of its partners
held a one-day U.S.-ROK workshop in Washington, D.C., on
November 22, 2008, to discuss peace regime development
from a bilateral perspective, which will lead to future
meetings involving Chinese specialists and (we hope)
eventually DPRK representatives. The November 2008
workshop explored critical alliance issues such as considering how the two governments approach the design and
development of a peace regime, prioritizing concerns that
a peace regime must eventually address, and finding the
most productive way to build bilateral, and later multilateral, consensus on key issues and processes. This interim
report in part describes the results of that bilateral meeting, combined with subsequent interviews and research in
the lead-up to North Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test.
The IFPA workshop was organized in cooperation
with the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS)
at Yonsei University and the East Asia Foundation (EAF),
and in collaboration with the Institute for Foreign Affairs
and National Security (IFANS) and the U.S. Institute of
Peace (USIP). IFPA is grateful to its partners and collaborators in this endeavor, and to the Carnegie Corporation
of New York for its generous financial support that makes
this project possible. IFPA is also grateful to the workshop
Six-Party Talks
Since 2003, China has hosted an irregular series of multilateral meetings known as the Six-Party Talks, with the goal of achieving “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” Delegates representing China, the United States, DPRK, ROK, Japan, and Russia convene
sporadically at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing and engage in negotiations at a very senior level. The meetings are marked by rounds and
phases, each lasting anywhere from a couple of days to two weeks. Participants meet in plenary and bilateral sessions, in addition to informal conversations and ceremonial events. The purpose of the talks is generally to formalize agreements worked out in rough form through bilateral and
minilateral shuttle diplomacy that takes place among key players in the intervening months.
As host, China serves as the Six-Party chair and secretariat. Each country delegation can number up to twenty officials drawn from various government ministries and departments, though the heads of delegations have been largely consistent:
China: Vice minister of foreign affairs (chair),
United States: Assistant secretary of state for
East Asian and Pacific affairs,
DPRK: Vice minister of foreign affairs,
ROK: Deputy minister of foreign affairs and trade,
Japan: Director-general for Asian and
Oceanian affairs (foreign ministry),
Russia: Deputy minister of foreign affairs.
Six-Party Talks: Summary of Rounds
vi
Round Phase
1
2
3
4
1
4
2
Dates
8/27-29/2003
2/25-28/2004
6/23-25/2004
7/26-8/7/2005
9/13-19/2005
5
5
5
1
2
3
11/9-11/2005
12/18-22/2006
2/8-13/2007
6
6
6
6
1a
1b
2
3a
6
3b
3/19-22/2007
7/18-20/2007
9/27-30/2007
7/10-12/2008
7/23/2008
12/8-11/2008
Outcomes / Remarks
Agreement on a joint statement restating the goal of peacefully completing verifiable denuclearization; the six
parties will implement agreed-upon steps based on “commitment for commitment and action for action”
Initial-actions agreement for implementation of the September 2005 joint statement; establishment of five
working groups
6th round starts slowly as BDA funds held up and Yongbyon shutdown delayed
Resumption of first phase talks
Second-phase actions agreement for implementation of the September 2005 joint statement
Agreement in principle on verification procedures
Foreign ministers meet informally on sidelines of ASEAN Regional Forum
Failed to agree on detailed verification protocol, but door still open for future talks
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
participants, who lent their valuable time and considerable expertise to the project.
The workshop occurred in the wake of a flurry of activity related to the Six-Party Talks and North Korean denuclearization. In May 2008, North Korea delivered to U.S.
officials thousands of documents detailing its nuclear
programs, plans were drawn up to raze the cooling tower
attached to the Yongbyon nuclear facility, and there was
even talk of the United States establishing a liaison office
in Pyongyang to oversee nuclear disablement (Yonhap
News Agency 2008). On June 26, 2008, President Bush announced that the United States intended to remove North
Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, an action long sought by the North Koreans, and the cooling
tower came down. Although a process of verification for
North Korea’s nuclear declarations had been agreed to in
broad principle during this period, disputes quickly erupted about what kinds of procedures would be allowed (and
when), and the Six-Party Talks began to break down. By
September North Korea was threatening to restart its nuclear reactor, it expelled UN inspectors from the site, and
in December a final Six-Party push for an agreed verification protocol failed to bridge the differences. Complicating the situation, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il reportedly suffered a stroke in August, and outsiders were
unsure of the state of his health until he reappeared in
public in early 2009.
At the time of the workshop, inter-Korean relations
were also showing clear signs of deterioration, after years
of incremental progress. The new ROK president, Lee
Myung-bak, took a different approach to North-South
relations than had his two predecessors, emphasizing
greater reciprocity in diplomatic relations, and he advocated a stronger ROK relationship with the United States.
North Korea’s response became increasingly negative as
2008 wore on, refusing to engage the South, for example,
even after a fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist by a
North Korean soldier in the Mt. Kumgang area in July. The
situation further deteriorated after the IFPA workshop,
as ROK tour operations in North Korea were suspended,
and Pyongyang threatened clashes with the South in late
January 2009 and announced that the country was scrapping all inter-Korean political and military agreements.
According to a statement made by the DPRK Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea and carried
by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency, “All
the agreed points concerning the issue of putting an end
to the political and military confrontation between the
north and the south will be nullified” (Yonhap News Agency 2009c). North Korea’s rocket/missile launch in April and
its nuclear test in May exacerbated tensions, and now the
last operating North-South venture (the joint industrial
complex at Gaesong) is in danger of being shut down.
The results of the workshop in Washington, D.C., were
both encouraging and sobering. The majority of the participants agreed that beginning to discuss and conceptualize a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula would benefit the allies in the short term and ultimately all members
of the Six-Party Talks. Despite such general agreement,
however, there were clear differences of opinion regarding
the preferred timing and KPPR negotiating priorities. This
report highlights several themes that participants raised
during the workshop, such as 1) defining the peace regime
concept; 2) explaining the linkage between peace regime
building and denuclearization; 3) organizing the timing
and sequencing of events; and 4) understanding the potential roles that different countries and international organizations can play in the process, as well as considering
how KPPR developments might affect other U.S. alliances
in the region.
At the time of this report’s release the region is in
the grip of a tense geopolitical standoff, suggesting that
achieving a workable peace regime (or even starting that
process) could prove elusive for several years. Despite
these challenges, preparing to build and institutionalize
a KPPR is an important U.S.-ROK alliance exercise. It will
also be important to include China, and eventually North
Korea too, to begin developing a common understanding
of KPPR principles. Although there will be much for the
parties to argue and disagree about, focusing on the common ground that does exist is the first step, along with
understanding each country’s interests and political imperatives. This will help the allies contribute to building
a better armistice in the near term, and it should also improve the chances that the parties can take advantage of
brief windows of negotiating opportunity when they do
occur in the future.
Problems on the Korean Peninsula are certainly intractable, but they are not static. The prospects for lasting peace in Korea will rise and fall, and we must be ready
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
vii
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
to take at least one step forward each time they rise. Just
as in building a house, even in winter one can begin to
design, seek approvals, and prepare for logistical challenges long before hitting the first nail with a hammer
in the spring. Like any negotiation filled with complexity and historical significance, solving the security dilemmas swirling around the Korean Peninsula requires time
and patience.
We begin this report with a short look at the history of
KPPR concepts and achievements to date. Even though
North Korea has recently disavowed past agreements,
these are still the foundation upon which any future KPPR
effort will build. They also illustrate why a “new diplomatic framework,” as Pyongyang sees it (i.e., a U.S.-DPRK bilateral negotiation) will not solve , and could exacerbate, the
security situation on the peninsula.
viii
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
Milestones and
Meanings
By invading South Korea in June 1950, North Korea intended to unify the peninsula under Pyongyang’s communist
control, and it received strong support from China and the
Soviet Union in this endeavor. Despite North Korea’s objectives, by the time the armistice was signed at Panmunjom three years later, the Korean War only managed to
cement the peninsular divide created by U.S. and Soviet
forces following Japan’s surrender to end the Second World
War. Moreover, the Korean War exacted a horrible toll of
human suffering and economic damage in Korea.
Korea’s fate has often been affected by decisions made
in foreign capitals. In 1943, the United States, Britain, and
China stated in the Cairo Declaration that “in due course,
Korea shall become free and independent,” but that had
not come to pass by the time North Korean soldiers
crossed the 38th parallel in 1950 (Oberdorfer 2001). On
July 7, 1950, shortly after the war began, the newly established United Nations passed Security Council resolution
UNSC 84, which called for the establishment of the U.S.led United Nations Command (UNC) to help South Korea
defend itself.
One year into the conflict, in July 1951, the Soviet delegation to the UN approached the UNC to initiate negotiations for ending the war. Although the parties agreed
in principle that the 38th parallel should serve as a guide
for a demarcation line, talks continued for two years as
disagreements over prisoner exchanges and the final demarcation line intensified. Finally, the UNC commander,
the commander of Chinese “volunteer” forces (Chinese
People’s Volunteer Army, or CPV), and North Korea’s supreme commander signed the Armistice Agreement on
July 27, 1953. Although the agreement was relatively effective at institutionalizing a cease-fire, the signatories never
meant for it to serve as a political settlement. It is instead
a military document signed by military leaders, containing mechanisms to help the parties keep the cease-fire.
For example, the armistice established the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) along the 38th parallel, a line separating North and South. The armistice also created a twokilometer buffer on either side of the MDL known as the
DMZ. In addition, it established committees and commissions to provide multilateral oversight of the terms of the
cease-fire.
The armistice contains many limitations despite its
continued utility. First, the armistice failed to construct
an effective means by which to adjudicate armistice violations. For instance, the UNC claims that North Korea
has violated the terms of the armistice 430,000 times
while North Korea recognizes approximately 3. Conversely, North Korea accuses the South of 830,000 violations when the number of violations is probably closer to
16 (Lee Sanghee 2007). Second, North Korea rejects the
West Sea demarcation line. Soon after the armistice was
signed, the UNC determined that the islands of Pak Yong
Do, Dae Cheong Do, So Cheong Do, Yun Pyung Do, and
Woo Do would fall under UNC control and established
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
1
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
the Northern Limit Line (NLL) three nautical miles to the
north of those islands. Pyongyang often expressed its desire to see the NLL pushed farther south, and at a Military
Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting in 1973 the North
declared that it would not recognize the NLL.
As one IFPA workshop participant noted, “The armistice’s objective of a complete cessation of hostilities was
temporary in nature, until a final peaceful settlement
would be achieved.” The parties designed the armistice to
segue from a military settlement to a political one, and
they scheduled a meeting for within three months of signing the armistice to plan for that transition. In what would
emerge as a pattern with inter-Korean negotiations, however, those talks were delayed by nearly a year and eventually abandoned.
Allusions to a final Korean political settlement did not
resurface until 1972 with the release of the North-South
Joint Communiqué. In that document, the two Koreas
agreed in principle to threat reduction and confidencebuilding measures and recognized their mutual desire
for reunification and a peaceful conclusion to the Korean War. It reads, “Firstly, reunification should be achieved
independently, without reliance upon outside force or its
interference; secondly, reunification should be achieved
by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms
against the other side” (see Appendix C for a list of KPPR-related documents). What prompted Pyongyang to
seek talks with Seoul in 1972 on these issues? The answer
is not clear (and probably multifaceted), but one important factor might have been Washington’s new China policy and President Nixon’s visit to Beijing earlier that year. It
is hard to know, however, if North Korea sensed potential
U.S. weakness (its former enemy embracing its ally), or if it
was more concerned with possible Chinese abandonment
(its former ally embracing its enemy).
Although the 1972 Joint Communiqué offered a degree of optimism, North Korea circumvented the South
Koreans just two years later by appealing directly to the
Americans for peace talks. The DPRK government sent a
letter to the U.S. Congress in which it proposed direct bilateral negotiations in order to create “the prerequisites
to the removal of tension on Korea and the acceleration
of the country’s independent and peaceful reunification.”
The letter continued, “It is becoming increasingly evident
that as long as the U.S. troops remain in south [sic] Korea
2
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
it is impossible to remove tension and consolidate peace
in Korea” (DPRK government 1974). North Korea did not
recognize South Korea as a sovereign and legitimate state,
and for Pyongyang, the presence of U.S. troops on the peninsula constituted the main issue that required resolution.2
The DPRK peace proposal sought the dissolution of the
UNC and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.
Needless to say, the United States and South Korea were
opposed to such terms.
Hope for introducing a KPPR was renewed in 1991 when
top officials from Seoul and Pyongyang signed the NorthSouth Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange (the so-called Basic
Agreement, see Appendix D). This was a comprehensive
document in which the two parties pledged to “exert joint
efforts to achieve peaceful unification,” including various
CBMs such as the establishment of a South-North liaison
office at Panmunjom and plan to reconnect certain railways, roads, and many Korean families separated for decades since the war. Important points to note about this
document include that the two parties described their relationship not as one between states, but instead as a “special interim relationship stemming from the process toward unification.”
In addition, the agreement pledged recognition and respect for each other’s system of government, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, no slander or vilification, and no actions of sabotage or attempts to overthrow
the opposing regime. A former ROK official emphasized
at the workshop, “The North Koreans are really obsessed
with these principles… and they will insist they be included in any agreement you try to negotiate with them.”
The Basic Agreement was followed by the 1992 NorthSouth declaration of the denuclearization of the peninsula,
which, interestingly, directly connected the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to helping “to create conditions and an environment favorable for peace and peaceful
unification.” This agreement also suggested establishing a
South-North joint nuclear control commission (JNCC) to
aid in verification, but the two sides could never agree on
how to launch that organization.
Pyongyang’s apparent lack of interest in actually implementing these two agreements with any vigor again
2
For its part, the ROK constitution enacted in 1987 states in Article 3 that “the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.”
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
raises the question of why the North agreed to their terms
in the first place. As during 1972, external factors might
have been critical, as Pyongyang watched Germany reunify in late 1990 and the Soviet Union collapse at the end
of 1991. Kim Il-sung might have viewed reaching out to
South Korea as a useful strategy to provide his country
some diplomatic space and political breathing room as it
contemplated the possible ramifications of these tumultuous geopolitical events.
In 1993, amidst DPRK-IAEA wrangling over nuclear-related inspections, the United States and North Korea met
for “policy-level” talks in New York and later issued a brief
joint statement that, among other items, agreed to the familiar principles of assurances against the threat and use
of force (including nuclear weapons), mutual respect for
each other’s sovereignty, non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs, and support for peaceful reunification of
Korea. A series of inter-Korean talks began around this
time as well (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004). But as
one veteran Korean negotiator reminded workshop participants, “Any optimism with the North turned out to be
a frustration and a disappointment, and any good agreement rarely lasted more than two years.” In this case, the
momentum for peace that began building in 1991 lasted
only slightly more than two years, as the first North Korean nuclear crisis broke out in earnest in early 1994.
What little progress had been made during those years
regarding possible U.S.-DPRK normalization, limiting
U.S.-ROK military exercises, and exchanging North-South
special envoys was gone, and the spotlight was back on
denuclearization. Still, the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework that came out of this crisis offered a new (albeit fragile) diplomatic path to support reconciliation efforts. The
framework did focus more on the nuclear issue than on
peace regime building, but it also led to an unprecedented
level of economic and diplomatic engagement, including
planning for the construction of two light-water nuclear
reactors in North Korea by a multinational consortium,
KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Economic Development
Organization).
Moreover, the Agreed Framework paved the way for
other initiatives, such as a four-party meeting proposed
by presidents Kim Young Sam and Bill Clinton in 1996, involving North and South Korea, the United States, and
China to discuss replacing the armistice with a political
settlement. Even though the Four-Party Talks failed to
achieve their objectives, one Korean workshop participant involved in those talks noted that “It provided an important venue for bilateral discussions to happen simultaneously in the four-party context. These meetings were
an important ice‑breaking moment, in terms of our ability to talk very frankly with each other about our concerns,
and to begin an initial exploration of some basic concepts
regarding what we are now calling a peace regime.” The
United States also opened bilateral talks with the North
on missiles, the recovery of U.S. soldiers missing in action
from the Korean War, and future denuclearization logistics (such as fuel rod removal).
The next key milestone came amid ROK president Kim
Dae-jung’s so-called sunshine policy toward the North,
specifically the first-ever inter-Korean leadership summit
in June 2000. Although the resulting joint declaration was
short on specifics, the endorsement by top leaders for promoting exchanges and economic development led to several inter-Korean projects including the joint industrial
zone at Gaesong and a tourism zone at Mt. Kumgang, as
well as a series of family and cultural exchanges. At the
summit, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il also “agreed that
there is a common element in the South’s concept of a
confederation and the North’s formula for a loose form
of federation.” For a brief time after the summit meeting,
it seemed as if the spirit of the Basic Agreement of 1991
(which had hardly been implemented throughout the
1990s), had been revived, and that the political environment was finally favorable for carrying out the ambitious
agenda described in that document.
In the “two-steps-forward, two-steps-back” dance of
negotiating with North Korea, however, many of these
achievements were rolled back over the next nine years.
A change in administration in the United States and new
evidence regarding a possible North Korean uranium enrichment program (UEP) contributed to the collapse of
the Agreed Framework and the second North Korean nuclear crisis, in 2002. North Korea then withdrew from the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, a
move that later prompted a multilateral approach to pursuing denuclearization in the form of the Six-Party Talks.
The Six-Party Talks have a mixed track record in terms of
stopping North Korea’s nuclear program, and they have
contributed only slightly to the future development of a
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
3
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
KPPR. Still, the talks on denuclearization are now closely intertwined with formally ending the Korean War and
normalizing U.S.-DPRK relations, even if the parties cannot agree about which step comes first.
The United States clearly sees substantial (if not nearly complete) DPRK denuclearization as a prerequisite for
diplomatic normalization and signing some sort of declaration ending the war, even if planning for a peace regime
and implementing CBMs might begin beforehand. After
North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, for example, White House
spokesperson Tony Snow stated, “If the North Koreans
dismantle their nuclear programs and renounced further
nuclear ambitions, we are willing to do a whole series of
things, including declaration of the end of the Korean War.”
Conversely, North Korea prefers to hold onto its nuclear
devices until after normalization and related KPPR steps,
as a way to maintain deterrence until it is convinced that
America has ended its “hostile policy” toward the North.
A North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, for
example, released on July 22, 2007, explained, “The establishment of the peace regime on the Korean peninsula is
one of processes to the goal of denuclearization.” This is
a fundamental challenge going forward, though it is perhaps an area where discussing a KPPR can be useful, since
depending on how it is structured, it could include incremental steps that might provide political cover for both
sides so that it does not appear that one has capitulated
to the other.
The final historical milestone worth mentioning is the
second inter-Korean leadership summit in October 2007.
The resulting Declaration on the Advancement of SouthNorth Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity further emphasized the “need to end the current armistice regime
and build a permanent peace regime…[and] of having the
leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to
convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.”
This question about the number of directly concerned parties (three or four) is discussed in more detail below, but
the statement is noteworthy in that Pyongyang seemed to
acknowledge the multilateral nature of the problem. In the
past, even though North Korea participated in the FourParty Talks, it never truly accepted the legitimacy of South
Korea’s right to participate, as Pyongyang only wanted to
negotiate directly with the United States. Now, in late 2007,
after a decade of negotiating with liberal governments in
4
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
Seoul, Pyongyang seemed to recognize that South Korea
deserves an official seat at the peace table. Whether or not
this would ever mean that the North would sign a peace
treaty directly with the South, however, is still an open
question.
How to Characterize
a Peace Regime
The 2005 Joint Statement may have officially linked a peace
regime to the Six-Party Talks, but few experts can adequately define the KPPR concept, let alone specify its components. One workshop participant confessed, “I’m not sure
what the organizers mean when they say ‘peace regime.’ In
fact, I’m not sure what I mean when I say ‘peace regime.’
And I’m pretty convinced that the people in 2005 who wrote
‘peace regime’ into the joint declaration didn’t have a clue
what they meant when they said ‘peace regime.’” This point
was echoed by others at the workshop, and from an alliance perspective, this lack of clarity can lead to misunderstandings and a misalignment of expectations. Defining
the concept of a KPPR and its implementation is critically important to the alliance and the success of future negotiations. As one participant offered, “If at the end of the
day we can come up with a common definition of what we
all mean by ‘peace regime,’ we will have probably already
made a major contribution to this effort.”
Academics and policy makers often think of regimes
as sets of norms, rules, patterns, and principles of behavior guiding the pursuit of interests, around which actors
converge (Krasner 1983). Regimes usually are not as formal as institutions (with a specific address, staff, or letterhead), and they can often be quite expansive (such as the
nuclear non-proliferation regime based on bilateral and
multilateral treaties and involving international organizations and supplemental supplier initiatives). Although
many scholars have been studying and writing about various KPPR schemes for years, there is still no clear consensus about what approach is best.
There are two principal debates regarding the nature
of a KPPR, and they are interconnected. The first revolves
around what a peace regime is supposed to produce (that
is, how we describe its purpose and the desired end state).
At its most basic level, the KPPR could be an updated version of the armistice, with an added political agreement
to end the war and endorse a framework for reconciliation along the lines of the Basic Agreement; this would be
only a slight change from the status quo based on hope for
improved North-South relations over time. A more ambitious view links a KPPR directly to the process of reconciliation and confederation, to settling tough issues like
the West Sea NLL, to facilitating cross-border traffic, trade,
and communication, and to meaningful military CBMs
that reduce military forces along the DMZ. Related to this,
the second debate focuses on whether a peace regime is
primarily a process (or even just the trigger for a process)
that eventually leads to a desired end state, or instead
more of a destination that will codify or institutionalize
a particular outcome.
A peace regime has alternatively been described as “a
mechanism to create peace;” “a framework for ameliorating the mutual distrust and the hostile relationships…
[and] a foundation for peaceful coexistence and mutual prosperity between the two Koreas;” “an institutional
device for legal termination and prevention of wars and
maintenance of peace;” and “a process of building peace,
not the ultimate state of peace” (O 2007; Lee Sanghee
2007; Lee In Ho 2008; Cho 2007). Alexander Vershbow,
then-U.S. ambassador to South Korea, described the U.S.
attitude in late 2007: “We agree that, in addition to the
core commitments [of formally ending the war and establishing a normal boundary between the two Koreas], a
permanent peace agreement would also include military
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
5
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
confidence-building measures that would defuse some of
the military tensions that today cut across the DMZ” (Vershbow 2007).
Workshop participants shared varying interpretations
of peace regime and peace regime building as well. Many
of the participants agreed with some of their academic
counterparts that a peace regime refers to a process and
not just an outcome. One Korean participant argued that
a “peace regime is something bigger than peace agreement. It should involve reconciliation among the parties
and confidence-building measures among the parties.” An
American participant concurred that a peace regime is a
“process, not just an end state, and that the process codifies mutual actions and it provides for the requisite confidence-building measures.”
Several participants focused on replacing the armistice with a permanent political settlement. An American
government official commented that “The peace regime
is a grouping of international agreements that specifically constitute a framework for ending the Korean War and
establishing an enduring peace on the peninsula.” Another
participant agreed: “The Korean War Armistice Agreement
should be replaced by a peace treaty with a final peaceful
settlement as it is stipulated in the preamble of this agreement.” According to one Korean participant, the current
South Korean administration views peace regime building as a mechanism to replace the armistice. The participant said, “The KPPR as we know it and we view it means
a political and legal state where the Korean War has been
officially terminated and where a permanent peace has
replaced the current regime on the peninsula.”
Yet for one Korean participant, the armistice
though outdated has provided a relative peace quite
successfully. He explained, “I am living in Korea with
the peace regime of the armistice agreement. Actually
we maintain peace relatively well since 1953.” He suggested that a peace regime should build upon the armistice and focus on other issues that the armistice fails
to deal with, such as the process of unification or confederation. This might seem a bit like splitting hairs—
whether or not the armistice is “replaced” or “built
upon”—but it should at least prompt us to consider
the specific day-to-day (and extraordinary) responsibilities of the current armistice infrastructure so that
key duties are addressed and capabilities maintained
6
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
or enhanced. For the sake of security and peace, it is
important to strike the right balance between building confidence and maintaining deterrence.
There is also an overarching question of whether
the KPPR ends up facilitating Korean reconciliation
and unification, or in fact serves to solidify the division of Korea by allowing North Korea to strengthen
its economy through more normalized external relations while its leadership remains focused on maintaining internal control and trying to improve its ability to dictate terms for future reunification. In other
words, is a prerequisite for a KPPR essentially a North
Korean political decision to seek unification on terms
acceptable to the South, or can a KPPR be realized
even if North Korea just wants to be left alone? As one
participant put it, “The peace regime process should
be seen as changing the game in North Korea, not
locking it in place. That means it should lead to changes in Pyongyang…maybe not a change in regime, but
changes in behavior, and changes in the way the regime operates.”
When one considers the various benchmarks or
preconditions that would most likely comprise any
peace regime process for the Korean Peninsula, major roadblocks will no doubt emerge during negotiations. For instance, the United States has made it clear
that peace cannot occur without denuclearization, effectively making denuclearization a precondition for
normalization, peace with South Korea, or even legally concluding the Korean War. For the North Koreans
the sequence is reversed. One participant said it best:
“I can’t imagine a peace regime or any type of peace
agreement being actualized before denuclearization. I
also have never met a North Korean who could imagine denuclearization before there was a peace agreement or a peace treaty or some similar arrangement.
Therein I think lies the rub and one of the reasons why
we find this so difficult.” But there is much more to it
than just the nuclear issue.
Washington and Seoul can begin by defining what they
consider to be the conditions necessary for peace on the
peninsula, each by itself, and as an alliance. As they do
this, it is likely that they will end up describing a peace
regime more as a destination than as a process. In other words, the conditions acceptable to the allies are not
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
something that North Korea is likely to agree to in advance,
in such areas as verifiable denuclearization, reducing the
forward-deployed nature of the DPRK forces along the
DMZ, or scaling back the DPRK’s missile programs. Similarly, the allies are probably not yet ready to meet North
Korea’s likely early conditions for shaping a peaceful environment, such as limiting US-ROK military exercises, cutting U.S. forces or military investment on the peninsula,
avoiding any sanction or criticism of DPRK illicit activity
or human rights violations, and many other possible conditions. A peace regime cannot be fully implemented until
both sides are no longer suspicious or fearful. The regime
itself does not alleviate suspicion or fear. A participant offered, “We’ll probably only be able to implement a peace
regime when we don’t really need one anymore.”
If we choose to define a peace regime as a destination,
then the final settlement should amount to a package deal
addressing the outstanding issues plaguing negotiations
and considering the demands and preferred timing for
implementation by each party. A near simultaneous exchange presents the best chance of success. One former
U.S. official stated, “I look at a peace regime or peace arrangements as made up of different components. It’s not a
single document. And I think it’s sort of a deal where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed on this. It’s got to
be a package…if you don’t do that, you don’t have the possibility of developing something that’ll hold.” By executing such a complex diplomatic maneuver, one manages
to satisfy the preferred timing of each party. The United
States achieves denuclearization prior to normalization
and the DPRK obtains normalization before denuclearization. This suggests a very long and drawn out negotiating process that focuses on building mutual confidence.
To be successful, all sides must commit at some level to
this process.
Viewing a KPPR as a far-off destination does not absolve the interested parties from their responsibility to
work toward that goal, however indirectly or incrementally, even if they are convinced that no progress is possible in the near term ( for example, because one considers a counterpart’s ruling regime or administration to be
completely hostile to its own core requirements). A policy of throwing up one’s hands and claiming that nothing
can be done is not an acceptable option for policy makers,
even in the short term. Some productive work can always
be carried out, either in an alliance context, a trilateral
ROK-U.S.-China context, or by engaging North Korea in
the simplest of confidence-building measures related to
armistice maintenance and armistice modernization. Official and unofficial dialogue on armistice and KPPR issues
amongst the parties and the UN (and UN-related organizations) will pay dividends in the future if we can begin to lay
a baseline for common agreement on KPPR development.
Some non-governmental interaction (e.g., medical assistance or education and cultural exchanges) might also be
useful in the interim, to keep channels of communication
open and to try to improve mutual understanding.
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
7
Developing a Peace Regime
Participants echoed throughout the workshop the need
for KPPR preparation, no matter how bleak the current
chances are of reaching a final settlement with North Korea. Negotiating with North Korea often resembles climbing
a mountain, rather than a staircase. Climbing a staircase
requires an incremental approach, maneuvering over predetermined distances with each step building upon the previous one. Climbing a mountain requires more creativity
and entails added unpredictability, where a climber may
take a shortcut one day but the long way around the next,
make substantial progress one hour only to fall back the
next, all the while experiencing moments of desperation
and reaching many false peaks. Moreover, unlike climbing
stairs, climbing a mountain requires preparation and logistical coordination. As one participant noted, “to support
this long journey, we have to prepare, not only for the initial stage, but also the desirable end state in the peace regime process.” By preparing, we better position ourselves
to exploit any narrow window of opportunity that might
open. Along these lines, several recurring themes surfaced
over the course of the workshop.
recently enough to warrant continued vigilance. These include two DPRK assassination attempts of ROK president
Park Chung-hee in 1968 and 1974, the Axe Murder Incident
in the Joint Security Area (JSA) in 1976, and several clashes
in the West Sea in the 1990s and in 2002, in which dozens
were killed on both sides.3 In these and many other cases,
components of the armistice infrastructure (or successor
bodies) played important roles in preventing further escalation and trying to devise new procedures to avoid future conflict.
The armistice created three commissions charged with
implementing, monitoring, and maintaining the ceasefire. The first, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC),
was made up of delegates from the UNC (UNCMAC) and
the Korean People’s Army/Chinese People’s Volunteers
(KPA/CPV MAC). The UNCMAC delegation consisted of a
U.S. two-star general leading the group of UN, South Korean and British representatives. The KPA/CPV delegation
consisted of one Chinese member and three North Koreans, also led by a two-star DPRK general. Between 1953
and 1991, the MAC held 459 meetings and thousands of
engagements amongst lower-ranked delegations. In 1991,
First, Do No Harm: Armistice and OPCON
a South Korean general assumed the leadership role of the
Most participants credited the armistice arrangement with
UNCMAC, which upset the North Koreans, who stopped
contributing to the relative peace that Korea has experiattending certain MAC meetings. North Korea withdrew
enced over the last five decades. This has less to do with the
from the MAC in 1994, stating that it would not recognize
piece of paper itself than with the spirit of the armistice and
the UNCMAC as a counterpart and prevented CPV staff
its infrastructure that helps to govern interaction between
the two opposing forces and offers precedents for dispute 3
One North Korean infiltration of South Korean territory occurred in 1996, while the Four-Party Talks were taking place. Even
resolution. The armistice has helped to control the number
though ROK officials were incensed and demanded a DPRK apoloof violent clashes between the two sides over the years, but
gy, they also stressed the need to continue engagement in those talks.
such incidents have occurred frequently nonetheless and
In fact, food aid, much of it from ROK charities and religious organizations, continued to flow to the North (Yonhap News Agency 1996).
8
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
officers from participating in certain MAC-related events
(United Nations 1995). Eventually, in 1998, UNC-KPA general-officer (GO) talks replaced the MAC dialogue. The GO
talks have a similar composition of delegates to that of
the MAC, though the North Korean side lacks a Chinese
member and the UNC side is not led by a ROK two-star
general.
The second commission established by the armistice was the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
(NNSC). The NNSC monitored both North and South Korea for compliance with the terms of the armistice outside of the DMZ. The NNSC also conducted investigations
per the MAC’s request. However, the DPRK often proved
uncooperative in such investigations, thus rendering the
investigative arm of the NNSC largely irrelevant. The UNC
and the KPA each nominated two of the members to this
commission. The UNC nominated Sweden and Switzerland while the KPA nominated Czechoslovakia and Poland. In 1991 the KPA declared the NNSC irrelevant. Two
years later the DPRK forced the Czech delegation to leave
North Korea, and it then proceeded to evict the Polish delegation in 1994. The NNSC continues to operate in support of the terms of the armistice and enforcing the two
main mechanisms responsible for maintaining the armistice, the MDL and the DMZ. The third commission established by the armistice was the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, which ceased functioning in 1954 after
prisoners were exchanged.
As noted earlier, the UNC has faced some serious challenges over the years, and the relationship among key actors has evolved over time. The U.S. role was dominant
early on. For example, U.S. forces took primary control after the Axe Murder Incident in 1976, when two American
officers were killed by North Koreans in the JSA as part of
a small work detail to trim an obstructing tree. Eventually,
the UNC and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) decided to return
to the JSA to cut down the tree, and after much deliberation back in Washington, operation Paul Bunyan commenced on August 21, 1976. This time the dispatched security detail was backed by an infantry company in twenty
helicopters and seven Cobra attack helicopters providing
support overhead. B-52 bombers, fighter jets, and F-111s
from the U.S. and ROK air forces were fueled and patrolling nearby. The aircraft carrier Midway also patrolled,
ready to deploy assets if the need arose. Just before the
operation, the UNC used the MAC to notify the North Koreans of the impending mission, warning them not to interfere. After this show of force, the North Koreans stood
down and agreed to a longstanding UNC proposal to divide the JSA at the MDL (Oberdorfer 2001).
Over the years, South Korea has taken increasing responsibility for armistice maintenance and for crisis management when conflict occurs. As noted above, a South
Korean two-star general became the senior allied member of the MAC in 1991, and later direct North-South GO
talks also occurred occasionally as a supplement to UNCKPA GO talks. In 1994, South Korea assumed operational
control (OPCON) of its armed forces in peacetime, and it
took the lead in crisis management, for example, during
the 1996 DPRK submarine infiltration incident, when ROK
forces were in charge of the combined allied response. After a DPRK sub ran aground along the South Korean coast,
ROK soldiers and police led the search for its crew, while
twelve U.S. Kiowa helicopters equipped with infrared radar joined the effort at the South’s request. U.S. forces also
helped with communications and engaged in the search
with the understanding that when the North Koreans
were located, the South would greet them (Sullivan 1996).
Starting in 2004, as part of the USFK realignment program, South Korea began to take over a number of missions directly associated with maintaining the armistice,
and during the next five years ROK forces assumed the
following missions historically performed by their U.S.
partners: 1) security of the DMZ, 2) security and support
at the JSA, 3) counter-fire task force headquarters command and control, 4) air-to-ground range management,
5) rapid land mine emplacement, 6) maritime special operations forces interdiction, 6) close air support controllers, 7) weather forecasting, 8) communication zone decontamination, and 9) day and night search and rescue
missions (Bell and Finley 2007).
In addition, the alliance is currently preparing to transfer wartime operational control of ROK forces from the
CFC commander, a U.S. general, to the ROK military leadership, a change scheduled to take effect in 2012. OPCON
transfer is an example of alliance modernization that will
also affect peace regime building, so it must be taken into
consideration by all concerned. In 2012, USFK will become
U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM), and together with ROK
Joint Forces Command they will become “complementary,
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
9
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
independent commands in a supporting-to-supported relationship” (Bell and Finley 2007). In other words, the ROK
commander will indicate what U.S. support he needs, and
KORCOM will be responsible for carrying out those activities. KORCOM will be headquartered in Pyeongtaek, and
the two commands will be linked through the Alliance
Military Coordination Center (Zissis and Lee 2008). One
workshop participant stressed that the “time to change”
[the OPCON relationship] has arrived, but this process still
leaves many questions as yet unanswered, not the least of
which is what will be the practical role for the UNC and
other armistice infrastructure going forward.
Some ROK politicians, former military officers, and
defense analysts have been critical of the OPCON transfer initiative, concerned that it could weaken the ROK’s
military ties with the United States and undermine deterrence. A few are also wary of South Korea’s ability to
adequately handle the job of command and control. U.S.
confidence in the ROK’s capabilities, however, seems genuinely high, and the allies have been making investments
and conducting a series of exercises to prepare for the 2012
milestone. An American workshop participant involved in
the OPCON transfer process suggested that doubters visit
Camp Humphreys, “and let’s show you all of the construction that’s happening down there and all the improvements as we move south…If you see the investment being
made by both sides of this military alliance, it’s clear that
we’re there for the long haul.” Indeed, Camp Humphreys
is expected to grow five-fold by 2012, eventually hosting
over seventeen thousand troops and becoming one of
America’s largest overseas bases (Baker 2007). Another U.S.
workshop participant added, “The professionalism of the
ROK military is on par with any force in the world. I fought
side by side with them in Vietnam. And I have a great appreciation. And I am not the only general officer in the U.S.
military that has that opinion, by far.”
This participant argued that the deterrence capability
underwritten by the U.S. presence on the peninsula will
not be lost as a result of this strategic change. Deterrence
emanates from the strength of the alliance and not the exact number of U.S. warplanes that sit on a tarmac in South
Korea. The overall opinion among American participants
was that denuclearization constitutes a separate issue and
need not affect the timing of OPCON transfer. “You can do
the OPCON before you get the denuclearization,” said one
10
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
military officer, “because we have confidence that the deterrence of the alliance will remain and the capability to
respond is what makes that deterrence credible.”
Yet OPCON transfer has the potential to be an important factor in the KPPR debate. Discussions about armistice maintenance and improvement will increasingly be
inter-Korean matters, and although this might not please
Pyongyang, it is altogether appropriate and should facilitate North-South coordination of expanding cross-border
economic activity (such as rail and road links) and the
maintenance of security. The evolution of the UNC will also
be interesting to watch, as that body steps back into a supporting role, and under a KPPR it could eventually transform into a more neutral forum to assist with monitoring
and dispute resolution (though it would probably have to
undergo some change to accommodate likely DPRK reservations). If a KPPR dialogue is initiated in the near term,
there must be effective communication and close coordination between that process and the alliance effort to support the armistice and execute OPCON transfer.
Basic Agreement as a Foundation
Most workshop participants agreed that the 1991 Basic
Agreement remains the most promising document in
terms of establishing concrete measures and mechanisms
to improve conditions for peace regime building, and this
is probably still the case despite North Korea’s unilateral
repudiation in January 2009 of all past inter-Korean political and military accords. Many argued that the Basic
Agreement could serve as the basis for a future political settlement. One Korean participant urged the new administration in Washington to “reconfirm the value of the Basic
Agreement.” A second participant from the United States
reiterated his Korean colleague’s point and said that even
though the failure to implement the measures set forth
by the Basic Agreement made it incapable of serving as
the key political agreement to transition from the armistice, the agreement “does offer an internationally recognized, legally sufficient foundation upon which to build a
peace regime.”
The Basic Agreement, as mentioned earlier, outlines
several CBMs and other gestures to foster goodwill and
build the trust necessary to make real progress on a KPPR.
These go beyond mere pledges to refrain from aggression
or interfering in each other’s internal affairs. The Basic
Agreement authorized the establishment of a Korean
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
joint military committee to oversee the implementation
of CBMs including, among other measures, notification
of troop movements, exchange of military personnel and
information, phased and verifiable arms reductions, and
direct telephone links. It also paved the way for various
economic, social, and cultural exchanges, also managed
by different joint committees.
The Basic Agreement is a template for improving inter-Korean relations and a way to help bring about the
conditions necessary for peace. It is also something that
Pyongyang consented to at one point in its history. “It is
really necessary to think about the conditions that will
enable a peace regime to establish real peace,” one participant said, “and it seems to me that as a starting point
that begins with threat reduction. And that begins with
the implementation of the basic agreements. I think this
is absolutely fundamental as a starting point.” President
Lee Myung-bak supports the idea of using the Basic Agreement as a foundation for peace regime building. In March
2008, Lee declared that previous agreements should act
as a basis for making progress with North Korea and that
the Basic Agreement outweighed any other in significance
(Kang 2008).
Parties to a Peace Regime
At first glance, identifying the so-called directly related parties to a KPPR seems quite obvious, namely the two Koreas,
the United States, and China (given their central involvement in the Korean War and the precedent of the Four-Party Talks). Scratch the surface, however, and some important
differences of opinion, caveats, and qualifications begin
to emerge. Fortunately for the U.S.-ROK alliance, there is
unanimous agreement that a KPPR is first and foremost a
Korean (that is, inter-Korean) initiative. Pyongyang professes to agree, judging from the language it has approved
in North-South documents dating back to 1972. The first
principle for reunification in the 1972 North-South Joint
Communiqué, for example, is that it “should be achieved
independently, without reliance upon outside force or its
interference.” This point, conveyed with slightly different
wording, has been reiterated in every important inter-Korean agreement since.
DPRK leaders, however, seem to view ending the Korean War and working toward unification as two separate
activities, because in many ways they always saw themselves as legitimately representing all of Korea and the war
as one of self-defense against the Americans (and their
“traitorous puppet lackeys” in the South). Over the years,
North Korea has persistently tried to isolate South Korea at multilateral talks, and to seek direct bilateral negotiations with the United States regarding a peace treaty. A Korean participant expressed his worry that at some
point Washington might oblige Pyongyang, if only to try
to move the diplomatic process along. “There is concern
in Korea that in the end, it might just be the U.S. and the
DPRK in the process,” he said, “and this would perhaps
unintentionally accept the longstanding North Korean argument that Washington and Pyongyang were the major
players, or parties of the Korean War.” The participant continued, “Doing so would also mistake Washington support
for the North Korean logic that the U.S. initiated the Korean War, and recognize North Korea as the only legitimate
political entity on the Korean Peninsula.”
Participants offered four major reasons behind North
Korea’s strategy to engage directly with the Americans for
ending the war. First, North Korea views the United States,
not South Korea, as the central obstacle to peace, symbolized by the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. An
American official pointed out that “the main reason the
North Koreans participated in the Four-Party Talks was
because the U.S. agreed that one agenda item could be
the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula
and establishment of a separate peace treaty between the
U.S. and North Korea.” Second, Pyongyang sees peace with
the United States as a more effective guarantor of regime
survival. One participant observed, “The North wants to
preserve its regime by changing the situation from an armistice to a peace regime, not with South Korea, but with
the United States. That’s the only way of regime survival
in their mindset.” Third, North Korea suggests that technically speaking, South Korea should not participate in
peace regime building, since only the UNC commander,
a Chinese representative, and a North Korean representative signed the armistice. If a peace regime intends to
replace the armistice, North Korea argues, only the signatories of the armistice should sit as parties to a peace regime. Fourth, North Korea seeks to buttress its belief that
Pyongyang is the sole legitimate leadership in Korea.
U.S. officials, however, have consistently supported
the idea that South Korea should be a party to any agreement involving resolution of the war. They often counter
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
11
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
North Korea’s arguments by pointing out that the United
States was not a signatory to the armistice either; rather,
it was the UNC commander who signed on behalf of all
UNC members (including the Republic of Korea). Moreover, when the armistice was signed, the KPA and CPV
commanders made a point of confirming this fact, because they wanted to make sure that ROK forces would
be required to abide by the terms of the agreement (United Nations 1995, 6). So, if North Korea and China were satisfied in 1953 that the armistice was binding on ROK forces, they cannot now claim that Seoul was never a party to
that agreement.
ROK leaders have made some progress over the years
making their argument that Seoul will be a key player in
KPPR dialogue and that it should be a party to ending the
war. One participant answered fears concerning the ROK’s
potential isolation by stating, “A peace regime must, at its
core, have a Korean agreement and be seen by others as
a Korean solution.” Since the introduction of the term
“peace regime” in the Six-Party Talks in 2005, Seoul and
Pyongyang did manage to agree that the there were “three
or four parties directly concerned,” when President Roh
Moo-hyun met with Kim Jong-il in October 2007. The three
they referred to were apparently the two Koreas plus the
United States, and China might be the fourth. But given
the vagueness of what KPPR actually means, this still does
not clarify that the North would accept South Korea as a
signatory to a formal peace treaty to end the war. Pyongyang instead might view a KPPR as a collection of agreements and arrangements, including a U.S.-DPRK peace
treaty.
Another reason why North Korea might be reluctant to
include the South in formal peace treaty talks is because
of all the potential claims this could open up from Seoul.
For example, a Korean participant listed a few points
( from a ROK perspective) not often mentioned during discussions of peace regime. He said, “First, we need to hold
war criminals accountable in the historic context. Second, there has to be some discussion of reparations for
the damages incurred during the Korean War.” There are
also many in the South who believe that the North is still
holding hundreds, if not thousands, of prisoners of war in
their country. The North makes similar claims against the
South. Getting into these disputes would open up a large
number of intractable issues that could easily derail peace
12
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
talks before they ever got started. Koreans are going to
have to think hard about whether or not they are willing
(and able) to formally end the war without solving these
problems. There might be a way to end the war and establish a joint committee to explore and resolve these claims
as part of peace regime building, but one must also be
careful not to sweep too much under the rug in the early
stages, lest the peace collapse and confidence be further
undermined for the future.
Even though a key component of peace regime building is a sincere inter-Korean dialogue, which appears
quite elusive in the near term, tension between the two
has sometimes facilitated an inter-Korean effort to institute certain threat reduction measures without the assistance of the international community. The mechanisms
may prove imperfect yet they demonstrate a capacity for
the two states to work bilaterally.
For example, following a series of skirmishes over fishing areas in the West Sea that peaked in 1997 and 1999,
North and South Korea initiated working-level engagements in 2001 to find a diplomatic solution to the fishing
controversy and other maritime issues surrounding the
disputed NLL. The effort accelerated after the 2002 naval
clash that left dozens of sailors killed or injured. Finally,
following a general-level military meeting in 2004, the two
sides signed the Inter-Korean Maritime Agreement and
Subsequent Exchange on June 14, 2004. The agreement
encouraged the establishment of a military hotline, along
with the use of the same radio frequencies so as to avoid
future miscommunication, as well as to stop propaganda along the DMZ (Sang-min 2004). The 2004 agreement
served as a foundation from which the two sides continued to issue further threat reduction measures in the maritime domain.
Workshop participants also considered the inclusion
of China as a party to KPPR negotiations. China, a regional power and growing force on the international stage,
chairs the Six-Party Talks and is North Korea’s largest
trading partner and benefactor. Participants unanimously agreed that China should be included in KPPR discussions and that in many ways the United States and China
could act as endorsers or guarantors of what would primarily be an inter-Korean agreement. A few roles for the
United States and China in the KPPR might mirror each
other, perhaps including some involvement in dispute
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
resolution, in which case Washington would need to coor- Five Tracks
dinate its objectives and modalities with Beijing. One par- As participants considered the potential contours of a
ticipant offered, “At the end of the day, the key track that peace regime, they identified five principal tracks as core elemerges is between the U.S. and China. Because whatever ements of any process to develop a viable peace regime:
we want to do on the Korean Peninsula, the management
1. As discussed, the inter-Korean dialogue reof the U.S.-China relationship will be the key pillar, and we
mains the central focus of any peace regime.
have to plan in advance.”
The ROK-DPRK track addresses the need for a
The main area where Chinese and American involveKorean solution to a Korean problem. An inment is qualitatively different, of course, is the fact that
ter-Korean agreement to build a peace reU.S. troops are forward deployed on ROK soil and opergime is a prerequisite for KPPR development.
ate in a joint command (and there are no Chinese forces
2. The United States will also play a key role in peace
in North Korea), and it seems that this point was instruregime building, in part because of its commitmental behind the mention of “three or four parties” at
ments to the U.S.-ROK alliance and in part bethe second inter-Korean summit. The suggestion is that
cause of North Korea’s desire for normalized bithere are some military CBM issues that only need to be
lateral relations with Washington. The United
discussed amongst the two Koreas and the United States,
States, through a U.S.-DPRK track within a wider
since only their troops would be involved. It remains to
framework, can offer North Korea several imporbe seen whether or not Pyongyang’s distinction of “three
tant diplomatic carrots that may help convince
or four” also applies to other potential components of a
North Korea to pursue denuclearization and feel
KPPR.
more comfortable compromising with the South.
In addition to individual states, the United Nations is
3. In addition to these two bilateral tracks, a quadalso a directly related party to some degree, and its inrilateral track reminiscent of the Four-Party Talks
volvement could prove useful when the other parties seek
will be critical, since it is this group that will most
international legitimacy and external support in the form
likely be responsible for formally ending the armiof monitoring and development assistance. The UN austice and endorsing the successor arrangement.
thorization for the UNC is still in force, and the UNC will
4. Fourth, a wider and looser track consisting of
still exist even after the transfer of operational control in
other parties such as Russia and Japan, and per2012. UN members that still maintain a liaison (or stronhaps multilateral or intergovernmental instituger) presence in the UNC include the United States, the
tions, in order to ensure that a peace regime acUnited Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
counts for their interests and to harness any
Columbia, Thailand, Philippines, Netherlands, Belgium,
support they can provide for the process. Those
Greece, Turkey, Denmark, and Norway. An American offiinvolved in building a KPPR should also examcial commented, “I would argue that while a UN role speine the possibility of using or creating intergovcifically is not required, either legally or practically, it is
ernmental institutions based upon the various
likely prudent nonetheless in order to ensure internationEuropean models, allowing for the creation, if
al legitimacy of this process.” Yet despite the UN’s lack of
needed, of additional mechanisms for regional
direct involvement, a participant from the United Nations
support for a peace regime. The Northeast Asia
explained that although the UN would welcome an opporpeace and security mechanism envisioned in the
tunity to be part of a solution to the Korean dilemma, it
Six-Party Talks is related to this broad track.
does not necessarily see a need for it as an institution to
5. Fifth, any peace regime arrangement must intake the lead or get directly involved at this time. The UN
clude complete and verifiable denuclearization.
considers the North Korean nuclear issue and peace reThis is, in essence, the main Six-Party track. In fact,
gime building as a contained issue already being handled
some qualify denuclearization as an entirely sepby responsible parties in a multilateral fashion. Time will
arate process, even if it remains in reality a comtell if this assessment continues.
ponent of a final peace regime. As one participant
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
13
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
familiar with current South Korean thinking as it
relates to the new U.S. administration’s diplomatic strategies towards the North said, “An important strategy of the [South] Korean government
is to create a new peace structure, what we call
structure, on the Korean Peninsula. This structure
can be based on two pillars, first, the denuclearization of North Korea, and the second is the establishment of a peace regime on the Peninsula.”
The Six-Party/KPPR Linkage
Ever since North Korea stepped up its nuclear program in
the 1980s, U.S. policy has been to make denuclearization a
sine qua non of any discussion about formally ending the
Korean War. For U.S. policy makers, it is a fundamental
component of the “conditions necessary for peace.” One
participant with extensive government experience noted,
“It was also clear to us, at least on the U.S. side participating
in the Four-Party Talks, that a resolution of the nuclear issue was absolutely fundamental if we were going to make
any progress on the peace regime. That was clear going in.
It was even clearer coming out of those talks.” Later, President Bush stated in September 2007, “We look forward to
the day when we can end the Korean War. That will happen when Kim Jong-il verifiably gets rid of his weapons programs and his weapons” (Chosun Ilbo 2007).
Much to the chagrin of allied negotiators, North Korea continuously interweaves denuclearization with U.S.
troop withdrawal from the peninsula. One participant
shared his experiences discussing denuclearization with
a North Korean counterpart:
And here, I want to come back to the point
that was made earlier about U.S. troops on the
Peninsula. Because in this discussion with the
North Koreans, my interlocutor kept using the
phrase “the complete denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula” as the goal, the goal that
North Korea has. And he repeated that phrase
over and over again. And finally I interrupted
him. And I asked him what he meant by that
phrase. I said, “The ROK does not have nuclear weapons. The United States does not have
nuclear weapons on the Peninsula. You are the
only party,” I asserted, “…that has an evident
nuclear capability on the Peninsula. What do
you mean by the complete denuclearization of
14
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
the Korean Peninsula?” And then he responded by saying, “We mean the elimination of the
threat.” And I said, “Define that, if you would.”
And his response was, “The threat posed by U.S.
troops on the Peninsula and your alliance with
the ROK.” And I said, “Is this what you mean
by the end state that you seek in these current
discussions with the United States and in the
six-party talks?” And he looked at me and he
said, “Yes.”
Such differing perspectives on denuclearization and
the varying expectations of what denuclearization would
entail cloud the peace regime building process by making denuclearization an endless cycle of trying to build a
bridge that is too short to reach both sides.
Mention of peace regime building entered the Six-Party
Talks slowly but surely. The Chinese delegation proposed a
draft of a joint statement in 2005 that included language
referring to a final peace settlement, and experts speculated that the United States, South Korea, North Korea,
and China would meet in follow-up engagements following the Six-Party Talks to discuss a final peace settlement
(Jin 2005). The result was the September 19, 2005, Joint
Statement, which formally introduced the term ‘peace
regime’ to the denuclearization negotiation, though the
statement stipulated that reaching a peace regime would
constitute a separate track from the Six-Party Talks. The
South Korean offer, made in 2005, of an economic and security package in return for nuclear dismantlement was a
step toward recognizing that denuclearization required a
comprehensive approach. And with the mention of peace
regime in what was otherwise a denuclearization negotiation, the linkage between denuclearization and peace regime was established, creating a precedent that now appears hard to break.
Several workshop participants reminded the group
of the dangers of linking denuclearization and peace regime building, pointing out that the initial intention was
to keep the two tracks separate. One participant warned
that by including peace regime building, North Korea can
continue to delay denuclearization in the name of peace
regime building. The participant also cautioned the more
enthusiastic participants against hastily pursuing a peace
regime because doing so risks placing greater emphasis
on peace rather than denuclearization, which remains the
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
core issue and the main obstacle to peace from a U.S. (and
oftentimes a ROK) perspective.
The wariness associated with linking denuclearization
to peace regime building stems from what several participants viewed as a growing false sense of security in South
Korea vis-à-vis the North. The participants who remained
more skeptical of North Korea’s intentions and prospects
for a peace regime wanted to make sure that a KPPR will
protect South Korean security concerns and U.S. interests.
One participant offered a historical analogy by claiming,
“We should not conduct a discussion about a peace agreement in public in a way that contributes to the psychological disarmament of the Republic of Korea, which was
already well advanced by the June 2000 summit. We must
be very careful about avoiding a false peace, which would
not serve the purposes of the alliance any better than the
simulacrum of peace achieved in 421 B.C. served the interests of Athens.” A Korean participant agreed: “So any unilateral moves toward North Korea or bilateral discussions
should be very careful that these movements do not create a false sense of security in our society.” The participant
advised not to underestimate the military threat posed by
the North or to diminish the importance of the U.S. military presence in South Korea.
As mentioned earlier in this report, a comprehensive
package deal where all of the pieces of the Korean puzzle
fall together nearly simultaneously is the approach that
seems the most likely to work, given the alternative, largely improbable scenarios. Denuclearization and the peace
regime remain interwoven, and what emerges is an interplay of agendas and national interests that coincide with a
desired outcome. In such a scenario, the parties resemble
a gang of prisoners chained at the ankle, only able to make
progress toward their goals in small, coordinated steps.
So if the two principal aims, as the South Korean government’s peace structure stipulates, are denuclearization
and a peace regime, the negotiating parties should pursue parallel tracks of negotiation and try to make progress
on each track. Progress on one track does not have to depend on the progress of the other, yet a conclusion to one
track remains dependent on concluding the other. They
must cross the finish line together.
Timing and Triggers
Many participants recalled the rather fast-paced process
of reunifying Germany in the years leading up to the end
of the Cold War as an example of a successful peaceful reconciliation of a divided people, separated by history, ideology, years of hostility, and a physical wall. Admirers of
the German model also noted how success was predicated on bilateral and multilateral cooperation prior to actual reunification. For instance, the “two-plus-four” treaty
signed on September 12, 1990, by East and West Germany,
the Soviet Union, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, outlined the necessary conditions for a peaceful transition to a reunified, sovereign Germany. The treaty,
which resulted from months of negotiation, addressed issues relating to security, border definition, sovereignty, nuclear power status, withdrawal of Soviet military forces,
other troop reductions and limits, and a vision of a future
reunited Germany.
Some participants looked beyond multilateral preparation and the apparent success of German reunification,
arguing that the real force behind the change lay with a sequence of historical events that radically altered the geopolitical reality in such a fundamental way that change
was inevitable. Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika programs in the 1980s led to greater economic and
political liberalization. Then, as the Soviet Union’s decay
became apparent, East Germany and other Eastern European countries under Moscow’s yoke began to seriously
explore the prospects for independence. The Berlin Wall
fell in 1989, and East Germany held its first free elections
on March 18, 1990, fulfilling one of the preconditions for
reunification talks. In the end, it was East Germany’s desire to reject communism and merge with the West that
brought about reunification. Furthermore, the road to
German reunification became clear once the breakdown
of the East-West world order and the demise of the communist bloc had reached the point of no return. The momentum building towards reunification, which included
multilateral collaboration, occurred within a sequence of
historical events that forced a set of circumstances on the
actors, and not in a vacuum in which it was incumbent
on the actors to change the fundamental environment.
International and regional preparation, albeit important,
only eased an otherwise foreseeable, if not unavoidable,
outcome.
To some, the case of German reunification is not applicable to peace regime building as long as the current
North Korean regime remains in power. Assuming no
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
15
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
sequence of events that produces a tectonic shift on the
peninsula, North Korea will not permit an environment
that promotes true reconciliation, let alone a peace regime. A U.S. government official participating in the workshop advised that North Korea, aware of what happened
in Germany, would seek to avoid any negotiation that resembles the German example and integration of the East
into the West. The participant stated that this is simply
“not where the North Korean regime wants to go.” One participant declared that throughout its history Pyongyang
never truly revealed signs of interest in reconciliation with
Seoul or Washington on anybody’s terms other than its
own. North Korea seeks to maintain its nuclear capability and resists integrating with South Korea, not to mention continuing to threaten its southern neighbor and the
United States. Therefore peace regime building without
a change in regime, or a significant change in behavior,
seems elusive.
Another participant warned that some policy makers
in Seoul and Washington, eager to believe that North Korea has changed its tune, have in the past misinterpreted
North Korean signals, thus creating a dangerous environment for a potentially ill-prepared and delusional alliance.
For example, during an interview in October 1972 with
several North Korean publications and some Japanese
newspapers, Kim Il-sung discussed the 1972 North-South
Joint Communiqué. According to the participant familiar
with the articles, Kim Il-Sung “said that by independent
unification he meant no more U.S. role on the peninsula. By peaceful, he meant stop military modernization in
the south. And by Grand National Unity, he meant scope
for pro-North Korean operatives to be active in the South.”
The participant proceeded to offer a more recent example.
“Following the heralded visit by Jo Myong Rok on October
12, 2000, to Washington, D.C.,” he said, “Kim Jong-il addressed a military cadre and explained that international
agreements, such as the Berlin-Moscow Agreement of 1939
and the Moscow-Tokyo Agreement of 1940 only serve as
temporary instruments designed to sustain a stalemate
until one side attains the strength to overtake the other.”
Although some might believe that peace regime building will require regime change in Pyongyang, Washington’s policy is to refrain from trying to facilitate or promote such a change. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
echoed previous White House statements to that effect
16
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
when responding to a direct question on regime change
during a State Department briefing in 2006 (U.S. Department of State 2006). Workshop participants highlighted
a perceived shift in U.S. policy that leans toward accommodating the North Korean regime in power. One participant noted, “I think that at least prior to the 2000 summit
between the North and the South, ‘peace’ meant peaceful reunification. I think after the summit, ‘peace’ became
peaceful coexistence. And we’re probably defining peace
more now I think in the coexistence frame than we are in
the reunification frame.”
Still, as one participant noted, “Even if we believe that
a peace regime is not possible without the collapse of the
North Korean political system, this can’t be our only policy approach, that is, to simply wait for North Korea to collapse or some kind of external change.” The United States
should work proactively with its allies and regional partners in the region to envision a framework for building a
KPPR, which in turn may help improve the conditions for
peace regime building and denuclearization. Even negotiating with the North Korean regime in its current form can
be beneficial in terms of keeping open lines of communication and sustaining the dialogue, which might yield at
least smoother implementation of the armistice arrangements. Perhaps if North Korea came to believe that the
survivability of its regime would not be at stake in a peace
regime, it might enter negotiations with some flexibility.
One participant familiar with past negotiations stated, “It
might be useful, at least if the North is willing to do this,
to start negotiating [a KPPR]. My view is, we should have
started negotiating it yesterday, for one particular reason…
and that is, to give the North a sense that we are willing
to live with them.”
North Korea has a terrible human rights record and
has engaged in terrorism, kidnappings of foreign nationals, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and weapons proliferation. The United States has difficulty turning its back
on such transgressions and working with a regime that
commits acts of this kind, yet history has demonstrated
that the United States is at times able to work with unpalatable governments in order to achieve broader aims. The
reversal of Libya’s nuclear program and the restoration of
Libya-U.S. diplomatic relations is one example. It is important to remember, however, that there was no “South
Libya” in that case that was a steadfast and trusted ally
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
of the United States. Washington cannot simply hold its
nose and reach out its hand to North Korea without carefully considering the impact in Seoul. Thus, the inter-Korean track is paramount.
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
17
The U.S.-ROK Alliance
Factor and Regional
Considerations
As we move forward and begin to understand what characterizes a peace regime and how best to approach peace
regime building, we must also examine the endeavor from
the perspective of the U.S.-ROK alliance, along with looking closely at other regional considerations. History demonstrates that improperly coordinated diplomacy frustrates
any hope of negotiating with North Korea effectively and
satisfactorily from an alliance standpoint.
For years North Korea has pursued a negotiating strategy of trying to split and weaken the alliance by moving
each bilateral dialogue forward at different speeds. The
overarching feature of North Korean diplomacy remains
its attempt to isolate South Korea by repeatedly probing
the United States to test Washington’s receptiveness to
bilateral negotiations. When the United States displays a
willingness to explore the possibility of conducting bilateral talks with North Korea, South Korea begins to fear
isolation or abandonment. Many South Korean experts
worry that North Korea may in fact manage to manipulate the United States into engaging in a bilateral track to
the detriment of the alliance and South Korean national
interests. A participant warned, “The end result would be
a North Korean victory in political, ideological, psychological warfare and political embarrassment for our government and the South Korean people. It would also lead
to the decline of the U.S.-ROK alliance and ultimately may
lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula.
Maybe that is the end result of such a U.S.-DPRK peace regime building process.”
The alliance must approach negotiations with a clear,
mutual understanding of national and alliance interests,
18
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, other regional
influences such as China and the U.S.-Japan alliance, and
diplomatic strategies. One participant remarked, “I believe it is essential for our two countries to closely cooperate as allies throughout the whole process of relevant
negotiations.” Only a unified and coordinated diplomatic
front can thwart and deter North Korean efforts to destabilize the alliance and derail multilateral negotiations.
The alliance can begin the process of coordinating its
diplomatic strategies by first clarifying certain points that
may help improve conditions on the ground and guide future negotiations, such as the outlook for continued U.S.
military presence on the peninsula and the importance
of achieving denuclearization. A participant stressed the
importance of gaining a “common understanding on prospective agendas including measures to reduce military
tensions and the relationship between the KPPR and the
U.S.-ROK relationship.”
Participants offered their opinions about how the United States and South Korea could improve the coordination
of negotiating strategies and maintain lines of communication. One participant highlighted the appeal of the goodcop-bad-cop scenario in which one country offers carrots
while the other threatens to use sticks of some kind, thus
“maximizing incentives.” In reality, this scenario has not always played out well. A Korean participant recalled his
experience trying to execute the good-cop-bad-cop tactic
with the Bush administration. At the time, U.S. officials
urged their ROK counterparts to play the bad cop, in order to make U.S. “carrot” offers look more attractive. Seoul
pondered this, only to find out in subsequent discussions
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
with others in the administration that the U.S. commitment to providing carrots was tenuous at best. The participant lamented, “How could I guarantee that my side
would be a bad and tough cop, when the other side cannot be counted on to be a reliably good cop?”
An American participant recalled that U.S. and ROK
negotiators have often undermined each other by not
properly coordinating their carrot-and-stick approach
in their negotiations with North Korea. The participant
recommended that the Obama administration create a
role within the U.S. government similar to that of William
Perry’s position as a policy coordinator and presidential
envoy during the Clinton administration. President Clinton charged Perry with coordinating the U.S. incentives
and disincentives with those that the ROK and Japan employed during negotiations. In fact, Obama did eventually
appoint former U.S. ambassador to South Korea Stephen
Bosworth to be his special representative for North Korea
policy, though the extent to which he is the overall coordinator is not yet clear, as some other key Obama officials
are still awaiting confirmation.
A Korean participant echoed calls for coordination
and remarked that the United States and South Korea,
even trilaterally with China, should begin to prioritize objectives, agree upon future steps, and identify the timing
and sequencing of events. He suggested that a committed Track 2 channel may best fulfill the need to initiate
such coordination. The participant said, “And such common ground should be further expanded through quiet,
but substantive discussions like this very forum.”
Although the alliance needs to better coordinate its
strategies vis-à-vis North Korea and appear united in its
effort to denuclearize the peninsula and build a peace
regime, South Korea must ultimately lead peace regime
building. Despite the many layers of the Korean dilemma,
the inter-Korean relationship remains the core issue, and
ultimately a peace regime must emerge from an inter-Korean dialogue. A participant said, “Regardless of how you
define peace regime, the South Koreans have to take the
lead.” Yet the possibility of North Korea accepting South
Korea as a major, if not the main, player in this conversation appears to have grown more distant in the past year.
The participant added, “And the prospects of North Korea cooperating with the South in that regard, at least today, seem fairly slim.” In order for peace regime building to
progress, North Korea must recognize that the road to reconciliation and normalization runs through Seoul and not
exclusively through Washington. North Korea cannot continue to insist on pursuing alternative negotiations bilaterally with the United States at the expense of the multilateral process and bilaterally with South Korea
The alliance must also consider other regional influences and partners as it develops a coordinated strategy
to pursue peace regime building. The process of including multiple regional actors is further complicated by considering the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan’s legitimate interests in the resolution of the Korean
War and the outcome of peace regime building. Japan’s
grievances against North Korea include the whereabouts
of Japanese abductees and the threat of a nuclear North
Korea armed with ballistic missiles capable of reaching
Japanese shores. Aside from Japan’s disagreements and
fears regarding North Korea, Japan could play an important role in the process. One participant recommended
approaching Japan first and then China. He said, “The
next step should be to involve Japan in the trilateral mechanism. That way we can increase our package of incentives and disincentives. And then we have to go to China
to explain our plan, so that they are also onboard. The sequence of consultation is very important.”
In conclusion, U.S. policy makers should review carefully the sorted history of Korean peace efforts before considering substantive bilateral negotiations with the North,
even if those talks occur ostensibly within the framework
of the Six-Party Talks. Although our peace regime building project is only at the midway point, it is already clear
that Korean history, peace making, and denuclearization
are all tightly intertwined, and Washington must understand how gestures in one area might impact inter-Korean relations and the U.S.-ROK alliance more generally. The
best way to do this is to work closely with Seoul to combine historic review with forward looking policy making
in a way that takes into consideration these interconnections, and with other key regional players they can begin
to chart a practical course for peace regime development.
These are the next objectives for IFPA and its partners in
this project. Ultimately, neither the alliance nor North Korea can determine on its own what constitutes the conditions necessary for peace or how to achieve them. This
can only be accomplished through dialogue involving all
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
19
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
three nations (and including China), and it will no doubt
be a long journey. Before we take the next step, let us take
stock together of where we’ve been, and where we think
we ought to go.
20
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
Appendix A
References
Achin, Kurt. 2008. US commander in South Korea says control transfer will strengthen alliance. Voice of America, July 3.
Lee In Ho. 2008. The establishment of a peace regime
on the Korean Peninsula and the future of the ROKU.S. alliance. East Asian Review 20, no. 2 (Summer).
Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between
South and North Korea. 1991. December 13.
Lee Sanghee. 2007. Toward a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Brookings Institution, May 2.
Baker, Fred W. III. 2007. Camp Humphreys development rises from rice paddies. Armed Forces Press Service. June 21.
North-South Joint Communiqué. 1972. July 4. http://www.
nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/agreements/CanKor_
VTK_1972_07_04_north_south_joint_communique.pdf.
Bell, B. B., and Sonya L. Finley. 2007. South Korea leads
the warfight. Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 47, 4th quarter.
O Tara. 2007. Building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Korea and World Affairs 31, no. 4 (Winter).
Brown, David G. 1999. North Korea in 1998: A year of
foreboding developments. Asian Survey 39, no.1: 130.
Oberdorfer, Don. 2001. The two Koreas: A contemporary history. Rev. ed. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Cho Min. 2007. Establishment of peace regime on the Korean Peninsula: A ROK perspective. Korea and World Affairs 31, no. 3 (Fall).
Joo Sang-min. 2004. Koreas agree to ease tensions; generals reach accord avoiding sea clashes, ending propaganda along border. Korea Herald, June 5.
Chosun Ilbo. 2007. Bush favors denuclearization first,
peace later. September 10. http://english.chosun.com/
w21data/html/news/200709/200709100014.html.
Schoff, James L., Charles M. Perry, and Jacquelyn K. Davis. 2008. Nuclear matters in North Korea. Herndon, VA: Potomac Books, 6.
Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity. 2007. October 4.
South-North Joint Declaration. 2000. June 15.
DPRK government. 1974. Letter to Congress of
the United States of America. March 25.
Foster-Carter, Aidan. 2001. Pyongyang watch Hyundai
and North Korea: What now? Asia Times Online, March
30. http://www.atimes.com/koreas/CC30Dg02.html.
Harden, Blaine. 2008. N. Korea cuts South’s access to factory site. Washington Post, December 2.
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 2008. Peace regime
building on the Korean Peninsula. workshop, November 22.
Jin Ryu. 2005. NK, US to discuss peace treaty. Korea Times, August 8.
Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the
Six-Party Talks. 2005. September 19.
Kang Hyun-kyung. 2008. President offers olive branch
to NK. Korea Times, July 11. http://www.koreatimes.
co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/07/116_27417.html.
Krasner, Stephen D., ed. 1983. International regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Sullivan, Kevin. 1996. Twenty-first North Korean from submarine killed in South; U.S. night-vision helicopters join
search for remaining four. Washington Post, September 29.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2008.
The Military Balance. London: Routledge.
United Nations. 1995. 1994 report of the activities of the
United Nations Command. UN Doc. S/1995/378. May 11.
U.S. Department of State. 2006. On-the-Record Briefing Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. October 17.
Vershbow, Alexander. 2007. A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula: The way ahead. Remarks to the
IFANS special seminar, Peace regime on the Korean Peninsula: Visions and tasks. October 26.
Wit, Joel, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci. 2004. Going critical: The first North Korean nuclear crisis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press.
Yonhap News Agency. 1996. Food aid continues despite tension over submarine incident. October 15.
———. 2008a. North Korea, U.S. to set up liaison offices in capitals: FM. May 1.
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
App:1
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
———. 2009a. North Korea says nuclear war only matter of time. April 17.
———. 2009b. Pro-North Korea newspaper urges U.S. to open two-way talks. May 26.
———. 2009c. North Korea scraps agreement on
sea border with South Korea. January 30.
Zissis, Carin, and Lee Youkyung. 2008. The U.S.South Korea Alliance. Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. April 14.
App:2
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
Appendix B
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms
CBM
confidence-building measure
CPV
Chinese People’s Volunteer Army
DMZ
Demilitarized Zone
DPRK
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EAF
East Asia Foundation (ROK)
GO
general officer
GSIS
Graduate School of International Studies of Yonsei University (ROK)
IFANS
Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (ROK)
IFPA
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (U.S.)
JNCC
joint nuclear control commission (DPRK-ROK)
JSA
Joint Security Area
KEDO
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KORCOM
U.S. Korea Command (to be established in 2012)
KPA
Korean People’s Army
KPA/CPV MAC
Korean People’s Army/Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Military Armistice Commission
KPPR
Korean Peninsula peace regime
MAC
Military Armistice Commission
MDL
military demarcation line
NLL
Northern Limit Line
NNSC
Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee
NPT
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
OPCON
operational control
ROK
Republic of Korea (South Korea)
UEP
uranium enrichment program
UN
United Nations
UNC
United Nations Command
UNCMAC
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission
USFK
U.S. Forces Korea
USIP
U.S. Institute for Peace
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
App:3
Appendix C
Trail of Documents Related to Korean
Peace Regime Development
Date
7/27/1953
Title
The Korean War Armistice
Agreement
7/4/1972
North-South Joint
Communiqué
12/13/1991
Agreement on Reconciliation,
Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between
the South and the North (Basic
Agreement)
Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula
Highlights
Codified the ceasefire
Established 38th parallel as Military Demarcation Line
Instituted special commissions to oversee terms
The first official joint statement agreeing to principles of independent
and peaceful reconciliation
North Korea
South Korea
Created foundation for future discussions regarding peaceful
reconciliation
Detailed several CBMs
North Korea
South Korea
Agreed not to test, manufacture, produce, possess, store, deploy, or use
nuclear weapons
Agreed not to possess uranium enrichment facilities
6/11/1993
Joint Statement of the DPRK
and the United States
10/21/1994 Agreed Framework between the
United States and the DPRK
North Korea
United States
North Korea
United States
Recognized each country’s sovereignty
Pledged non-interference in domestic affairs
First official mention of moving toward “full normalization” of U.S.-DPRK
relations
U.S. assurances against the threat or use of nukes against the North
6/15/2000 South-North
Joint Statement
North Korea
South Korea
9/19/2005
China
Japan
North Korea
Russia
South Korea
United States
South Korea
United States
Sought common ground between the South’s concept of confederation
and the North’s formula for loose federation
Promoted balanced development of the national economy
DPRK committed to abandoning nuclear weapons and programs, and
U.S. affirmed no-attack pledge
Agreed that the “directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace
regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”
1/20/1992
Joint Statement of the Fourth
Round of the Six-Party Talks
11/17/2005 Joint Declaration on the ROKU.S. Alliance and Peace on the
Korean Peninsula
2/13/2007 The Initial Actions for the
Implementation of the Joint
Statement
10/4/2007 Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean
Relations, Peace and Prosperity
App:4
Parties
Chinese People’s
Volunteers
Korean People’s Army
United Nations
Command
North Korea
South Korea
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
China
Japan
North Korea
Russia
South Korea
United States
North Korea
South Korea
The “two leaders shared a common understanding that the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will provide an important basis to
build a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.”
Established five working groups to deal with core issues including U.S.DPRK normalization and NE Asian regional security
Reiterated plan for directly related parties to negotiate a KPPR
Reaffirmed principles in the June 15 Joint Declaration
Recognized the need to end the armistice and build a permanent peace
regime
Agreed to work together to have the “leaders of the three or four parties
directly concerned” to declare an end to the war
Appendix D
North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation,
Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange (Basic
Agreement), 1991
Adopted at the third-day session of the fifth north-south high-level talks in Seoul on December 13, 1991
Pursuant to the will of all the fellow countrymen desirous of the peaceful reunification of the divided country, reaffirming the three principles of national reunification laid down in the July 4th North-South Joint Statement;
Pledging themselves to remove the political and military confrontation for the achievement of national reconciliation, for the prevention of invasion and conflicts by the armed forces, for the realization of detente and for the guarantee of peace;
To realize many-sized cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the nation; and
To make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, admitting that the relationship between the sides is not
the one between countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing towards reunification, the
north and the south have agreed as follows:
1. North-South Reconciliation
Article 1. The north and the south shall recognize and respect the system that exists on the other side.
Article 2. The north and the south shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side.
Article 3. The north and the south shall cease to abuse and slander the other side.
Article 4. The north and the south shall refrain from all acts aimed at destroying and overthrowing the other side.
Article 5. The north and the south shall make concerted efforts to convert the present armistice into a durable
peace between the north and the south and observe the present Military Armistice Agreement until such peace has
been achieved.
Article 6. The north and the south shall discontinue confrontation and competition, cooperate with each other and
make concerted efforts for national dignity and interests in the international arena.
Article 7. The north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south liaison office at Panmunjom within three
months after the effectuation of this agreement in order to ensure close contacts and prompt consultation with each
other.
Article 8. The north and the south shall form a north-south political subcommittee within the framework of the fulldress talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement in order to discuss concrete measures for implementing and observing the agreement on north-south reconciliation.
2. North-South Nonaggression
Article 9. The north and the south shall not use arms against the other side, nor shall they invade the other by force
of arms.
Article 10. The north and the south shall settle differences and disputes between them peacefully through dialogue
and negotiation.
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula
App:5
t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s
Article 11. The north and the south shall designate as the
demarcation line and zone of nonaggression the Military
Demarcation Line which was laid down in the agreement
on the military armistice dated July 27, 1953 and the area
which has so far been within the jurisdiction of the sides.
Article 12. In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression the north and the south shall set up and operate a
north-south joint military committee within three months
after the effectuation of this agreement.
The north-south joint military committee shall discuss and
promote the realization of military confidence-building
and disarmament, such as notification of and control over
the transfer of large units and military exercises, use of the
Demilitarized Zone for peaceful purposes, exchange of military personnel and information, the realization of phased
arms cutdown including the removal of mass destruction
weapons and offensive capability and their verification.
Article 13. The north and the south shall install and operate direct telephone links between the military authorities
of the sides in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed conflicts.
Article 14. The north and the south shall form a northsouth military sub-committee within the framework of the
full-dressed talks in one month after the effectuation of this
agreement and discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on nonaggression and the removal of military confrontation.
their free will and take measures regarding other problems
awaiting humanitarian solution.
Article 19. The north and the south shall connect severed
railways and roads and open sea and air routes.
Article 20. The north and the south shall install and
connect the facilities necessary for the exchange of post
and telecommunication and ensure secrecy in this sphere
of exchange.
Article 21. The north and the south shall cooperate with
each other in economic, cultural and many other fields
in the international arena and jointly conduct external
activities.
Article 22. For the implementation of the agreement on
effecting cooperation and exchange in various fields, such
as economy and culture, the north and the south shall form
a north-south joint economic cooperation and exchange
committee and other departmental joint committees within three months after the effectuation of this agreement.
Article 23. In order to discuss concrete measures for the
implementation and observance of the agreement on cooperation and exchange between the north and the south,
the two parts shall establish a north-south cooperation
and exchange subcommittee within the framework of the
full-dressed talks in one month after the effectuation of
the agreement.
4. Amendments and Effectuation
Article 24. This agreement can be amended and supple3. North-South Cooperation and Exchange
mented by mutual consent.
Article 15. The north and the south shall effect economic Article 25. This agreement shall become effective as from
cooperation and exchange, such as joint development of re- the date when the north and the south exchange its text
sources and the exchange of goods in the form of exchange after they go through necessary formalities.
within the nation and joint investment for the coordinated
and balanced development of the national economy and for Inked December 13, 1991 by,
the promotion of the well-being of the whole nation.
Yon Hyong Muk
Article 16. The north and the south shall effect coopera- Premier, DPRK Administration Council, Head
tion and exchange in various fields, such as science, tech- of the north side’s chief delegate of the delegation to the
nology, education, literature and art, public health, sports, N-S high-level talks
environment and mass media including newspapers, raChong Won Sik
dio, TV and publications.
Prime Minister, ROK Chief delegate
Article 17. The north and the south shall effect free travof the south side’s delegation to the S-N high-level talks
els and contacts between members of the nation.
Article 18. The north and the south shall effect free correspondence, travels, meetings and visits between the separated families and relatives and their reunion based on
App:6
Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula