Logical Oddities and Locutional Scarcities: Another Attack upon Methods of Revelation
Author(s): Herman Tennessen
Source: Synthese, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Dec., 1959), pp. 369-388
Published by: Springer
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HERMAN TENNESSEN
LOGICAL
Another
The main
tentative
AND
ODDITIES
Attack
SCARCITIES
Of Revelation.1)
Upon Methods
incentive behind
interpretations
LOCUTIONAL
some
is to bring up for discussion
are
of
the
fact
that
there
explanations
this article
and
which
locutions, formulations
expressions,
intuitively or dis
sound odd or even 'logically odd' to at least some communi
coursively
cators under certain circumstances,
in rare cases, even to all
maybe
linguistic
I will also be dealing
under any circumstances. However,
communicators
with what may be called: 'locutionalscarcity',
namely in so far as reasons
for the alleged oddness of a certain locution are found in its linguistic
or its remarkably infrequent occurrence. In fact I will try
the advisability
of the following
somewhat audacious
looking
a
with what he clearly,
is
confronted
Whenever
communicator
proposal:
to be a logical oddity, he
and perhaps
instantaneously,2)
recognizes
non-occurrence
to argue
should
as a rule rather endeavour
locutional
as a
of this phenomenon
which
of
may present a
interpretations
to conceive
scarcity (the plausible
challenge to his hermeneutical
imagination).
indicate what I here mean to refer
Let me first, by way of introduction,
to by 'logical oddity'. Suppose we adopted a model of thought which
somewhere on a con
would permit us to locate any given proposition
ranging from extremely true but extremely trivial statements at
statements at the
end to extremely audacious but extremely false
in
intended to be expressed
other end.3) The majority
of propositions
tinuum
one
*) This
Against
article may
Illustration',
and brilliant
'An Attack
Synthese,
analysis
Upon
as a follow-up
on my articles
The
in Synthese,
Fight
and
and
'Evidence
Issue 2, Nos.
Vol. VIII,
3-5,
Synthese,
account
Crockett's
Vol. XI, No.
1. Cf. also Campbell
adequate
be conceived
Revelation',
of methods
Revelation',
of
Journal
revelation
versus
of Philosophy,
Vol.
empirical
LVI, No.
in his
procedures
3, and Tennessen
1955.
and Definiteness
pp. 1-7, Oslo,
Analyses
of Intention,
can conceivably
is discussed
be anything
but instantaneous
on Duration
and Recognition.'
in Analysis:
article
'Dialogue
by me in a forthcoming
For further details and for the introduction
is excessively
oversimplified.
3) This model
etc. see: 'On Worth
as opposed
to 'prima facie tenability'
of the concepts
of 'audacity
or better:
in
Vol. II, No.
while
Objectivity
3, pp. 183-198,
Hypotheses',
Inquiry,
and Gullv?g:
2) Whether
Communication
Inquiry,
Vol.
Logical
recognition
and Argumentation,
4, 1959.
Sect.
17. to Sect.
22, and
'What
Should
We
Say?',
II, No.
369
HERMAN TENNESSEN
o rdinary, (usual, normal, customary, most frequently occuring,) standard
cases of communication, would then, I assume, be located near the middle
If frequency of occurrence
is represented
of this continuum.
by the
axis, the general occurrence
the shape of an approximate Gauss
ordinate
distribution
would
probably
assume
curve:
OCCURRENCE
FREQUENCY
\
./
^?Y
The
X
: Extremely
area
for plausible
interpretations
of a given
interpretandum
true, but extremely
: Extremely
audacious,
false propositions
Y
trivial
propositions
but extremely
are found at, or very close to either one of
odd propositions
Logically
the two terminal points. In a formalized
language, these two extremes
as
or only F's, respectively,
be
characterized
in
T's
might
having only
their truth tables; but in our terminology
'logical oddity' would designate
to which there (within the intended reference of commu
any proposition
nication) off hand, was
ment,
(extremely
high
to be either practically
a
or practically
audacity)
found
a 100% disagree
100% agreement,
(extremely high triviality: i.e., extremely high prima facie tenability) *).
to illustrate the more or less obvious
The above diagram
is meant
that in an ordinary, a customary, most frequently occurring,
hypothesis
no one would ever intend to transmit
standard case of communication,
to himself or to any other communicator,
any such extreme proposition
are considered
which is just why such propositions
'extreme', 'logically
odd' etc:. They are not worth propounding.
Hence
if a sentence, T, is
to express either: an extremely true-trivial statement or: an
statement, neither of these interpretations, will
extremely audacious-false
a plausible
of T. They make T
generally be considered
interpretation
interpreted
x) Cf. Objectivity...
370
and
Sect.
17-22,
Inquiry,
Vol.
II, No.
32, No.
4.
AND
ODDITIES
LOGICAL
LOCUTIONAL
SCARCITIES
to some, even logically odd. Moreover:
the inter
odd, maybe,
pretation is the more implausible, the more the external form of T seems
to evince either an outrageous audacity or a platitudinal
triviality. Thus
we have fewer reasons to suspect 'All (un) married men are (un) married'
sound
to convey anything in the direction of a logical oddity than in the case
extreme or odd formulation
less conspicuously
such as:
of externally
'All bachelors are (un) married' or: 'All (un )married men are bachelors'
etc. Furthermore:
by the same token we may on occasions find that we
and our fellow
a
beings by actually conveying
we
were
a
logical oddity of sort, when
thought
making
significant
a worthwhile
statement, that is: when we have employed
proposition,
have
fooled
ourselves
we
locutions with no or little external manifestation
Consider,
rather bold
the following
for
not
of logical oddity.
too conspicuously
odd, but
To: A normal man does not
instance,
and exciting-looking
sentence,
It sounds quite singular
exist.1) To occurs in a textbook in psychology.
one might even say. If we look up the word
at first sight-staggering,
'normal' in one of our dictionaries, we find such suggestions for synonymic
alternatives
as,
e.g.:
'regular',
'ordinary',
'usual',
'most
frequently
occuring', and the like. So there is this psychologist who has the audacity
to maintain
that the most frequently occurring, regular, ordinary, usual
human being, does not exist at all. If taken at its face value, it certainly
seems to convey a proposition, more than audacious enough to deserve
a lifted eyebrow. And the empirical semanticist (S) rushes to the psycho
logist (P) for an interview.
S: Sir, may we ask you what
does not exist?'
P:
I mean what
you mean
by the sentence:
'A normal man
I said.
S: Oh, I see: That most men do not exist?
P: That is, of course, not what I mean. I am merely pointing to a fact,
based on life-long experiences, that all human beings are more or less
psychologically
S: Everybody?
P: Everybody.
x) This
No.
3.
example
abnormal.
is borrowed
Neurotic,
from
if you see what
'On Worthwhile
Hypotheses',
I mean.
Inquiry,
Vol.
371
II,
HERMAN TENNESSEN
S : You, yourself, sir?
Eh. Well,
P: Humph.
I am a human
being,
am I not? And
similarly
constituted...
S: Oh, well. No rule without
exceptions, you know,
proves the rule and that sort of thing.
P: No.
that
rule is absolutely without
exceptions. That's the way it's
are viviparous.
to be. Let me explain: All placental mammals
a few exceptions...
This
bound
S: With
the exception
P: Consequently,
they are all born, and, at a certain stage, disconnected
from their mother's body. Now: As we psychologists
define 'traumatic
a traumatic
umbilical
this
disconnection
entails
experience',
necessarily
on
to
infant.
the
the
other
'Neurosis',
hand, is nothing
experience
but a name
for
the functional
manifestation
of
such a traumatic
are neurotic,
(a) All mammals
experience. Consequently:
(b) All
are
human beings are mammals,
All
humans
neurotic.
(c)
beings
Quod erat demonstrandum.
Simple logic, isn't it?
S: Quite. What now puzzles me is only this: Why would you want to
in such a way that everybody,
including other mammals
becomes neurotic in this sense of 'neurotic'?
use 'neurotic'
as well,
P: That is exactly what I just explained. I am merely pointing to a fact,
based on life long experience, that all human beings are more or less
psychologically
abnormal.
Neurotic,
if you see what
I mean.
S: Everybody?
Etc.,
Etc.,
Etc.,
ad
nauseam.
In the terminology
here suggested the verbal behaviour
of the psycho
logist may be described as an oscillation between an extremely audacious
and an extremely
trivial hypothesis. He is torn between two decisions.
On the one hand, he wants to be extremely veracious and tell the absolute,
the world
incontrovertible
truth; on the other, he wants to overwhelm
with a flabbergasting,
novelty. But, as the saying goes:
breathtaking
'The new things aren't true things, and the true things aren't new things.'
is to be done? The situation calls for a sentence, To, which admits
So what
of a sufficiently wide range of precization Ti, T2, T3,..
.Tn to bridge the
as
tenable, but trivial hypothesis
gulf fixed between
(a) an extremely
a
a
sentence
but
and
transmitted,
say, by
Ti,
highly audacious,
(b)
untenable
372
hypothesis
as indicated by a sentence, Tn.
ODDITIES
LOGICAL
Tl>
T2>
AND
LOCUTIONAL
T3>
SCARCITIES
Tn_2,
Tn-1,
Tn
T xo
The
extremely
trivial
direction
tenable
but extremely
of precization.
The
extremely
untenable
audacious
direction
but extremely
of precization.
so to speak, audacity from one
To borrows,
highly ambiguous
direction of interpretation
(Tn), and tenability from the other (Ti).
Tn may tentatively be formulated as follows:
The
Tn There are no members at all in the class of human beings to which
most human beings belong, viz. normal, usual, most frequently
occurring
human beings. On the other hand, the extremely
trivial direction
of
could, in order to bring out the contrast, be phrased as
precization
follows :Ti : // the expression
'normal' is used in such a way that nothing
can be normal and at the same time belong to the class of human beings,
then no human being will ever be normal in this (peculiar) sense of'normal'.
a moderate
hypothesis,
degree of both
expressing
be
No
and
Tm.
Tm
may
exemplified by
audacity,
living person
tenability
today is justified in claiming that he is completely normal in the sense that
An
intermediate
use nerves not sufficiently disrupted
his cognitive or emotional processes
as
so
to interfere with a nearly 100% effective life adjustment.
In other
words: The importance of discussing
these imaginary extremes of these
to drift, by insensible
relates to our fatal propensity
oddities,
a
from
into a totally
and
degrees
factually audacious hypothesis
formally
unqualified platitudinal
triviality. In our example the psychologist
argued
a
man
came
is
that:
'no
normal'.
in
like
he
He
lion.
also
But,
vigorously
went out like a lamb. That is to say: He started out with a sentence
logical
to transmit a hypothesis
which, off hand, sounded as if it were meant
of a marked, maybe even extreme audacity
i.e., logically odd, it seemed,
in a sense which comes close to (formal) contradiction.
But hard pressed
at the audacity end, he tip-toes over to the other tenability-triviality
373
HERMAN TENNESSEN
a logical oddity which
extreme, and expresses
instead, unknowingly,
of
resembles more a positively
analytical proposition,
unperceived,
course, especially by himself.
of logical oddity thus serves the function of a warning
The predication
to be en garde: It may be, especially when we
to all communicators
either a wildly exciting statement or one
believe we are communicating
true in all possible worlds, that we are
which is bound to be absolutely
at all, but
not conveying any worthwhile
proposition
merely a totally insignificant logical oddity
and consequently
tenability or audacity,
(at least at times)
(i.e. completely
lacking either
devoid of human
interest).
as previously
locutions, the more
And,
Let
stated: The less conspicuously
odd the employed
reasons do we have to be alert.1)
some linguistic phenomena
us for comparison
consider
found in
precocious children, pedantic
comic papers:
and editors of allegedly
logicians
humorous
The girl next door to where we live had a fight with her brother the other
'Ronny is so rough, tomorrow I'll be black and
day and complained:
blue all over!' To which my little boy dryly remarked: 'No object can at
to say, he also
the same time be black and blue all over.'2) Needless
objects to such parental
vigorously
sayings as: 'Enough is enough',
T both like it, and I don't' etc. Philosophers
do the same, thus, Nowell
as
sentence:
'P is cultivating weeds' 3)
Smith labels
'logically odd' the
of course,
to describe
which,
which
undertaken
is the most
customary,
ordinary,
legitimate way in
a very natural and important horticultural
activity
Standard Oil and other anti-weed-spray
producing
by
it is the same possibility of misinterpretation
which
companies. Likewise,
makes
the well known advertisement
from a cleaning establishment
a
of
in
comic
'Don't kill your wife; let us
paper:
worthy
being reprinted
do the dirty work.' - All the cited cases have one thing in common:
involved understands
Every communicator
perfectly well how the sen
tences concerned
x) This
paper
same
is most
point
Hypothetical
2) He had
are most
Character
374
by
Jacob
Meloe
in his
1.
I, No.
the market
be most
described
may
all over.
Ethics
to be interpreted. The
Analyses',
Inquiry, Vol.
later on, that there is really on
though,
surface of which
time red and gold
3) P. H. Nowell-Smith:
made
convincingly
of Logical
to admit
the entire
plausibly
p. 72.
adequately
logical odd
'Dialogue
on
the
a gift wrapping
as being at the
AND LOCUTIONAL
LOGICAL ODDITIES
SCARCITIES
ity occurs solely as a result of actual or potential misinterpretations.
case cited, and in similar examples of other philos
In the philosopher's
ophers, it seems as if the logical oddity direction of interpretation prevails
of a widespread
that sentences
among philosophers
optimism
so
to
their
be
may profitably
appearance,
speak, that the
judged by
external form should reveal or otherwise permit one to 'see' what a word
because
in a given case, and that consequently
it is easy to
a term is used in harmony with a given definition or not...
'see' whether a given sentence transmits a proposition
which
is
or sentence
'means'
'see' whether
or to
to be e.g.
bound
and not descriptive,
normative
synthetic,
meaningful
orthodox,
and
not
meaningless,
logically
or analytic
odd, not
and not
logically
so forth...
to this optimistic assumption of logical clairvoyance
and
attitude may be expressed
effective communicator
objective
as follows (using the somewhat deceptive statement / sentence model of
In principle,
almost any sentence may transmit almost any
thought):
In contradistinction
a more
proposition.1) Or in other words, it is hard to conceive of two so different
sentences that itwould not also be possible to imagine some circumstances
under which they would transmit the same proposition
(for at least one
in at least
in at least one reference of communication
communicator,
one language society), and vice versa, for externally identical sentences
it seems safe to assume
expressing different propositions.
Consequently
a
a
that given
list of plausible
To, and
formulation,
(but cognitively
rather similar) precizations Ti, T2, T3 and Tn, itwould always be possible
to phrase the precizations
in such a way that the list at the same time
furnished examples of every conceivable and relevant syntactical category.
sentence, can
say for instance, a declarative
Any given transmitter,
plausibly be interpreted to express statements which might have been just
as well
or even more
or
transmitted
precisely
by, say, interrogative
or
sentences.
in
other
words:
the
still
Or,
imperative,
exclamatory
general
skepticism toward language as a means of rendering the inter- and intra
more
communication
effective,
personal
sharpened
join forces with
in preventing
the effective
sensitivity for language ambiguities
nicator from believing
in any cognitively
significant distinction
l) Vice
expression
versa
for concepts
transmit
may
and
linguistic
almost
any
expressions
: In principle
almost
any
commu
between
linguistic
concept.
375
HERMAN TENNESSEN
or between
propositions,
grammatical categories
other outward
shapes
concepts, made solely or mainly on grounds of
or in
or on similar differences in the construction
and
skeletal
or formulations
forms
of
the linguistic
locutions,
of
what we
regardless
Thus,
'logically odd' and by 'logically normal
statements, my view would be that any conceivable
expressions
intend to understand
by,
employed.
say:
(orthodox) (standard)'
sentence, To, may more or less plausibly, be interpreted to express an
indefinite number of both logically odd and logically normal proposi
tions.1)
To what
extent do ordinary people exhibit these different hermeneutical
hermeneutical
attitudes, as on the one side, the rigid but clairvoyant
on
flexible
and
tolerant
the
the
other
side
hermeneutical
and
attitude,
our
out
at
recent
carried
studies
attitude?
Some of
Berkeley seem to
indicate that most people have a tendency to regress to a sort of logical
or linguistic
rigidity when confronted with na?ve, unrefined questionnaires
and language usages. The question has been raised
words
concerning
whether itmight be possible to condition respondents in our investigations
and a flexibility-group.
to get groups of both kinds: a rigidity-group
As part of a rather extensive study of 147 students, who up to then had
in any form, 75,
with
been relatively uninfected
logic or semantics
a
were
lecture
to
short
(207 words), phrased with
exposed
(Group I,)
we
as a 'logico-maniacal'
will
describe
the purpose of eliciting what
attitude, and 72 (Group II,) to another lecture (255 words) with what
we call a more 'common sensical' bias. The former lecture went as follows:
I.
(logico-maniacal
lecture)
'Most people express themselves very inaccurately and illogically. Often
they do not even realize what they are actually saying. One can hear
people say, for instance: 'You couldn't possibly tell me where I can find
room?' They do not understand that, in an attempt to be polite,
are
in
fact accusing the other person of not being able to tell where
they
the lavatory is located.
the men's
x) It goes,
logically
I hope, without
statements
standard
normative/descriptive,
376
odd and
that what
here
is said about
saying,
logically
as analytic/synthetic,
true for such distinctions
also holds
meaningful/meaningless_
AND LOCUTIONAL
LOGICAL ODDITIES
SCARCITIES
people can be illogical:
the following familiar clich?: 'A guy is a guy.' This is, of
(a) Consider
a guy is a guy, what else could
course, a very silly thing to say. Naturally
he possible be? It is, in fact, like saying 'A = A', '2 = 2', and so forth.
We will call such sentences:
'Tautologies'.
We will consider
three ways
in which
(b) Today I heard our neighbour
screaming:
'Somebody has dropped
on
car.
over.'
Of
It
red
all
and
is
course, no single object
my
green
paint
can at the same time be both red and green all over. We will say that my
neighbour on this occasion expressed a self-contradiction.
(c) Another
phrase on quite often hears is this: 'The mail is closed.'
Of course, mail is not a thing that can be closed. Such a sentence we call:
nonsensical.
and (c) nonsen
try to pick out (a) tautologies,
(b) contradictions,
an
a
in the margin
sical sentences in the following
list of sentences. Put
for tautologies; a b for contradictions; a c for nonsensical sentences. State
on a separate sheet the reasons for your judgment, (including, of course,
Please
you find that the sentence is not a tautology nor a self
nor nonsensical,
but simply express an ordinary, maybe
contradiction
somewhat controversial
statement.)'
cases where
The
'common
sensical'
II.
lecture on the other hand was worded
(common
sensical
as follows:
lecture)
'It is good to try to be precise and 'logical'. But it is even more important
to be able to understand what our fellow beings attempt to convey to
us - particularly when the sentences they use sound a bit imprecise and
illogical. What we need then is not an attitude of 'logical hairsplitting',
but more patience and tolerance and knowledge about our language and
it is actually used in our daily, ordinary communication
with our
selves and our fellow beings. Thus we know that when a person says to
us: 'You couldn't possibly tell me where I can find the men's room,'he
how
to accuse us of not being able to tell him where to find it.
when we say: 'A guy is a guy', 'Enough is enough' etc. we never
intend to convey a superfluous platitude
like 'A = A' or anything of
that order. Or as we will say: Nobody ever wants or intends to express a
does not mean
Likewise
false.
tautology. The same is true for statements which are obviously
a
on
car.
if
It
red
has
is
my
person says: 'Somebody
E.g.
spilled paint
377
HERMAN TENNESSEN
and green all over', we can rest assured that he does not want to tell us
that he has a car, the entire surface of which has the colour green, and at
the same time the colour of this same surface is red. In short: Nobody
ever wants or intends to express a self-contradiction.
it goes
Finally,
ever wants or intends to express other
saying that: Nobody
statements.
kinds of completely nonsensical
Please read carefully down the following list of sentences. Whenever
you
come to a sentence which you think these rigid, 'hair-splitting'
logicians
without
call a 'tautology', put an a in the margin:
put a b if you think
'see' an alleged 'self-contradiction'
that they would
; and a c if you find
sentences that some 'highbrows' might feel tempted to call 'nonsensical'.
would
on a separate sheet your own, plausible interpretation of the different
sentences, and give reasons why you think one, some, or all the sentences
nor nonsensical.
nor self-contradictions,
are neither tautologies,
Write
Do this only if this is what you think! In cases where you do not
think that a sentence should be classified outside the three categories,
(a), (b) and (c), give reasons why you think so.'
NB!
of 31
with a questionnaire
groups were confronted
consisting
to
out
contradic
and
the
task
sentences,
(a) tautologies,
(b)
pick
given
sentences. Group I intuited without difficulties
tions, and (c) nonsensical
Both
Not more
than ten per cent of this group found in as
the sentences
many as eight cases any difficulties at all in classifying
In equally many cases the deci
concerned in one of the three categories.
sentences were
The following
'seen' by 73 or
sion was unanimous.
or (c)
more out of 75 to be either (a) tautologies,
(b) self-contradiction,
the classifications.
nonsense
sentences:
1. Boys will be boys. 2. A dollar is a dollar. 3. What
6. When one says a thing is not true, one lies. 9. When
one is bedridden, one stays in bed. 12. This sentence is sentence. No. 12
in the present questionnaire.
13. When
it rains in Berkeley,
it rains in
(a) Tautologies:
is done, is done.
17. A spinster has no child. 18. A guy is a guy. 19. Nothing
Berkeley.
is both round and square. 21. The deaf cannot hear. 22. Here in the west,
men are men. 23. Behind the clouds the sky is always blue. 24. Rose is
a rose is a rose is a rose. 27. The Berkeley campus of the University
29. I see what I see.
is in Berkeley, California.
of
California
(b) Self-contradictions:
378
11. Not
all unmarried
men
are bachelors.
16.
logical
oddities
and
locutional
scarcities
The coffee in the coffeeshop is not coffee. 20. The absent-minded professor
was looking for the book, even though he knew where it was. 28. Nothing
is pretty,
ismore exciting than a commonplace
platitude. 30. Kim Novak
and at the same time she is not. 31. (b) Today is Thursday,
it. (Or, in 15 questionnaires:
31 (a). Ron Currie
believe
and I don't
has
left the
room, and I don't believe it.1))
: 4. The stuffed lungs of
sentences (but not contradictions)
(c) Nonsense
the fox twitch and cry love, and the strutting gern lay seeds on the black
sill. 7. The holy ghost inMeadowsweet
Hall, Higglefore-cum-wortlebury
beneath-the Hill was only an anemic yawn of a dandruffed hippopotamus.
10. Either the nothing exists only because the not, i.e., negation exists,
or negation and the not exist only because the nothing exists.
This nearly perfect harmony within Group I is only marred
by six
were
as
as
sentences which
the others, but
classified just
unmistakably
differently by a significant number of different respondents. Only one
sentence, however, was to an equal extent classified
are extinct.
viz. No. 25. Unicorns
in all three categories,
(b) Group II, on the other hand (the group with a common
seemed almost equally capable of interpreting all the given
- to transmit
except the three nonsense sentences
plausible,
sense bias)
sentences -
reasonable,
or
tenable
less
fairly interesting, worthwhile,
hypotheses or more or
two
less advisable proposals. Only
sentences, both classified as 'tauto
difficulties. Nine
logies' of Group I, seemed to cause hermeneutical
more
students resigned vis ? vis sentence No. 12, twelve vis ? vis No. 27; they
were both bound to be tautologies! And characteristically,
neither of these
sentences would ever have been recognized,
intuitively,
instantaneously,
or otherwise,
as tautological
logician. The other
or even as analytic
by any
sentences, however, of which
presumably competant
some are traditionally and, of course, by our Group I given as examples
or at least of logical oddities were easily and
of self-contradictions
or
unanimously
practically unanimously
interpreted to express somewhat
discoursively,
sentences the (only) plausible
synthetic statements. Among
seem
not
to
of
did
which
raise a shadow of doubt in
interpretations
controversial
x) Say that these two things were the case at time Ta: (1) R.C. had left the room, and
that I, at
to follow
then it seems
that R.C.
had left the room,
(2) I did not believe
a sentence which would most
I would
time Tb, am justified
in asserting:
have uttered
transmit
plausibly
and I don't believe
a true proposition
it.
if I at time Ta had
said
: 'R.C.
has
left the room
379
HERMAN
TENNESSEN
No. 11 : (Not
any members of Group II, a few deserve to be mentioned:
all unmarried men are bachelors) Not all unmarried men lead a free...
bohemian
wild...
unconventional...
life; some have gone steady with
etc. No. 30. (Kim Novak
is pretty and at the same time
the same girl...
: N. is pretty in some respects only...
from certain angles...
she is not) K.
sometimes ('at the same time' is apparently
interpreted as synonymous
to 'yet'...
'on the other hand'.) No. 31a (Ron Currie has left
'still'...
the room and I don't believe it): I can hardly believe that R. C. had the
nerve. .. would dare to...
leave the room. No. 31b (Today is Thursday
and I can't believe it): I can hardly believe that it is (already) Thursday.1)
last examples are particularly
interesting. They belong to a type of
I
true
and
don't
believe
it.' [i.e., that X is true]) quite
('X is
or even
used to exemplify
'contradictions',
'logical oddities',
commonly
The
sentences
'contradictory sentences'. And it seems difficult, even to the most visionary
to think of plausible or even logical of literal interpretations
hermeneutist
here (of 31a and 31b) fit to illustrate anything in the direction of logical
seems familiar with situations where
something
Everybody
true which he at that time did not believe to be true. There is hardly
anything odd to be found in the following two reports: (b) 'Yesterday was
oddness.
was
and I did not believe it' ; or (a) T did not believe that R. C.
Thursday
had left the room at a time when he (actually) had left it.' Quite another
thing is the fact that it probably would require a Marcel Proust to seize
such
while they were still present, and momentarily
report
tense. It is this practical-psychological
in an adequate
queerness
seems to have caused our 'common sense' students to discard any
situations
them
which
of the mentioned
'logical' or 'literal' interpretations
in
favour
of
and
the
indicated, more
(31b
31a)
previously
more
more
i.e.
reasonable,
customary,
plausible
normally,
frequently
In other words: The two mentioned
sentences
occurring interpretations.
so called
such
sentences
may more or less plausibly be interpreted to convey statements, proposi
tions which it very rarely would be necessary to transmit. And yet, when
ever this necessity occurs, it seems imperative that the adequate linguistic
are at hand. The prevalent
means
of 'logical oddity' with
confusion
- because of the
'locutional
scarcity' or 'infrequent occurrence' may
is
to the well known
'The present
response
sentence,
king of France
amusing
x) An
be wiser
these days
wise':
could possibly
he doesn't
'Agree! Because
exist, and what
than not to exist.'
380
logical
oddities
and
locutional
scarcities
or impermissibility
of logical oddities,
illegitimacy
effectively
sentences
from being
uncommon,
prevent
unusual,
extraordinary
even in the rare cases when effective verbal communication
employed,
alleged
would
entirely depend upon their availability. This iswhy it is so important
a certain tolerance towards locutional curiosities. And this
to maintain
is why (for purposes of communicability)
itwould be safer to assume that
by and large so called
'logical oddities'
are virtually
infrequent
occur
rences.
Group
II was
also given
would classify
logicians'
I's classifications
Group
only
one major
the task to predict how 'these hair splitting
the same 31 sentences. Their predictions
of
were almost perfect (ratio 10.8/11.3). There was
a sentence which was
'seen' to be self
exception:
contradictory by almost 90 per cent (63) of Group I and which absolutely
none in Group II would suspect even hair-splitting
logicians to 'see' or
conceive of as anything but a hackneyed
truism about professors. The
sentence (No. 20) reads : 'The absent minded professor was looking for
the book, even though he knew where
it was.' Members
of Group I
would apparently
it to
reject this sentence because
they interpreted
transmit a negative analytic - here misleadingly
called: 'self-contradic
tory' statement. Group II, on the other hand, was unanimously
willing
to accept the same sentence as expressing a positive synthetic statement.
In other words : It might serve as an effective illustration of what Arne
Naess
calls 'pseudo-disagreement'.1)
In order to bring out this point a little more extensively,
the above study
followed up by another, where 25 or the 31
was, after three weeks,
sentences which lent themselves most readily to a true/false classification,
were
with
given to the same sample
the following instructions:
of
students
(Group I and Group
II)
'1. Read carefully the 25 sentences listed below. Try to decide for each
one whether you think it can express: (a) a true or (b) a false statement.'
'2. State your reasons for each decision.'
a score of splended
of
illustrations
a
two
the
few
useful
groups, plus
pseudo-disagreements
examples
of pseudo agreement within each of the two groups, all apparently due
on the part of the informants regarding their ability to
to overoptimism
The
collected
material
furnished
between
x) Interpretation
and Preciseness,
Oslo,
1953.
381
HERMAN TENNESSEN
'see' what can possibly be meant by a sentence combined with insufficient
sensitivity to language ambiguities.
In conclusion we repeat: The present article endeavors
inter alia to
attitude'
furnish arguments for what one might call a 'Humpty-Dumpty
to narrow down the field of
to language, and against any tendencies
by employing rigid, a priori norms
permissible modes of communication
or rules for 'what can possibly be said and meant.'
is the procedure where the linguistic legislator
Particularly misleading
arrives at his 'laws' by asking questions of the skeletal form: 'Is it possible
'no' to such questions
to X?' and conclude from a more or less unanimous
'P did X'. For example: Most
that one cannot ever say ana mean:
people
to admire a
off hand, deny that it is possible
probably,
not prevent
them from
closed eyes. But this would
or
odd
not
where the necessity might occur for
situations
a statement which would be most adequately transmitted, for
would
landscape
imagining
expressing
with
instance, by the sentence: T admired the landscape with closed eyes.'
The whole thing ismost often a question of general (included hermeneuti
equip Mr. P. with trans
cal) imagination. We may even, if necessary,
parent eyelids, or turn him into an eidetic (with positive after-images)
etc_
Fifty years ago nobody would believe it possible for a person
to continue
life after the heart had stopped beating.
his (biological)
In fact, the following sentence, T: 'His heart stopped beating and he did
a 'self-contradiction',
not die' might have been commonly
considered
'a sin against language' and what not. Today,
'a logical oddity',
things
are happening
all over the world which are normally,
legi
frequently,
means
to
sentences
similar
of
and
described
very
by
adequately
timately
there are
this: 'His heart stopped beating and he did not die.' Moreover,
'hard'
the more
within
tendencies
distinct
developed,
particularly
sciences to formulate
tions and concepts
and symbols intended to transmit proposi
or less ??imaginable,
at least to most of the
sentences
more
present generation.
armchair philosopher,
blessed with devine revelations
The clairvoyant
who will a priori establish today what can possibly be said and meant
and done tomorrow, is reminiscent of a high-esteemed Danish writer who,
article on 'Flying
at the turn of the century, wrote an encyclopedia
Machines'.
ideas will
382
'that none of these fantastic
he concluded,
'It is obvious,'
ever be realized. Since, as everybody knows, nothing heavier
oddities
logical
and
locutional
scarcities
nothing heavier than air can ever fly in the
air.' And while he was writing, birds sailed through the sky...
Another unfortunate way of trying to determine whether a given locution
ought to be conceived as a logical oddity or not is the method of telling
can float
than water
in water,
our fellow beings:
and asking ourselves and occasionally,
we
'what should
situation. We may be able to
say?' in the described
little stories
elicit
-
or
spontaneously
verbal
not
-
an
amazing,
general,
intra-
and
inter
But other
agreement.
empirio-semantical
investigations
personal
raise the suspicion that in most cases we have to do with pseudo-dLgrtz
ments - in the technical sense of this term as introduced by Arne Naess
Some recent empirio-semantical
in his Interpretation
and Preciseness.
revealed
twenty-one cognitively different ways in which
x)
investigations
this locution 'what should we say (when)' could plausibly be interpreted
more precise. This list of precizations
represents per se an
to take verbal agreement to
important warning against any temptation
the question:
'What should we say (when)' as a symptom of actual agree
to indicate
ment on an issue, a topic, a subject matter - or disagreement
or
as
more
two
of the main twenty-one
actual disagreement.
As long
and made
directions
the chances
of precization of 'what should we say (when)' are slurred over,
are that the verbal agreement will turn out to be a pseudo
to be a pseudo-disagreement.
agreement, a verbal disagreement
Pretests in these experiments seemed to promise that the most spectacular
would arise due to failure to distinguish between
pseudo-disagreements
two directions of precization
of which one may be called : 'a language
- direction of
direction of precization' and the other: 'a tenability
preciza
tion' on the other.
were constructed:
two questionnaires
Consequently,
1. 'Language Qst.' and 2. 'Tenability Qst.'
Both presented eighteen
'Should we ever say...'
questions
adult respondents
(non-students) who were asked to answer
to the 198
either
'yes'
or 'no' to the questions and state their reasons 'why we should say...',
and 'why we should not say'...,
respectively. The last fifteen questions
were the same in both questionnaires,
whereas
the first three were
different.
The
studies
1) These
Vol.
4,
II, No.
pp. 278f.
language questionnaire
are
also
1959, where
(Qst. 1.) started out with
'What should we
in my
article:
reported
one will find the list of
the twentyone
say?',
a set of
Inquiry,
precizations,
383
HERMAN TENNESSEN
as to whether
'we should say'
concerning which a decision
or
not
such sentences
obviously had to do with their correctness from a
or idiomatic
of view. The
point
grammatical-syntactical
tenability
a
had
set of three
(Qst. 2)
questionnaire
corresponding
introductory
sentences
of which was just as clearly dependent upon
sentences, the acceptability
or not.
whether they seemed to transmit tenable hypotheses
The remaining fifteen questions did not lend themselves unambiguously
to either of the above interpretations.
The guess was ventured
that:
(a) Qst.
whether
1.: respondents would be apt to let their standpoint
'we should say' or 'we should not say') to each one
(as to
of the
correctness and
following locutions depend upon grammatical-syntactical
idiom and: (b) that Qst. 2: respondents would hold that whether
'we
should say' a locution or 'we should not say' a locution was solely a
of the tenability of the statement presumably
transmitted by the
in question.
In other words, we would have reasons to suspect
between the two groups of respondents as well as,
pseudo-disagreements
between
generally
(a) respondents who answered 'yes' (respectively
'no')
function
sentence
is more
and, what
important: pseudo-agreem
the same answers
groups with
(either 'yes' or 'no')
to the fifteen last questions.
The results of these seemed to support
for tenability
ents within
reasons;
these hypotheses.
In other words: As long as participants
convincingly
on language usage fail to make
in discussions
explicit which of the
major directions of precization
they have in mind (intend to transmit)
so long shall we have reasons to
they employ such sentences,
that any agreement reached on 'what we should say when', would
easily be revealed as a pseudo-agreement.
The significance of this point is quite adequately brought out in another
when
suspect
set of empirio-semantical
of the question'when
should we
investigations
ever point to an action, X, and say: That
action (X) is "voluntary",
'
or "not voluntary"?'
"involuntary",
The most
were here found
hermeneutical
conspicuous
discrepancies
to
who
would
tend
be
with
concerned
the advisability
respondents
a
certain
different
of adopting
moralistic,
terminology (from
hedonistic,
and similar points
of view) and
humanitarian,
socio-psychological
between
respondents
only
'X is voluntary.'
interesting
384
the likelihood of anybody
discussing
(ever) uttering:
etc. under the indicated circumstances.
The most
difficulties,
however,
did
not
arise
until
this normative/
logical
oddities
and
- direction
of precization
understood
respondents
locutional
scarcities
was well overcome.
Then it appeared
'would you (ever) say
to mean something
that X was voluntary'
like: 'say you were given the
choice to classify X either under the heading of "voluntary actions" or
under the heading: "involuntary
actions"
(or "not voluntary actions"),
predictive
that some
the sentence
which
would you choose?' Others,
apparently,
thought the following
was what was being asked: 'Is it a tenable hypothesis
about (or descrip
to
tion of) your behaviour
predict that under the given circumstances
you would point to the action X and utter: "X is voluntary (involuntary,
not voluntary-)
"?'. While the first group was trying to solve subsumability
of the latter were searching their hearts and reins
members
problems,
to find out how they would probably act. None
the less quite often the
two groups would come out with the same decision e.g. T would say...'
or T would not say': 'X is voluntary'. Thus the first group would not
describe a particular action (X) as 'voluntary', because of practical or
in determining where on the voluntary-involuntary
difficulties
continuum the action in question (X) should be located. The second group
would not say: 'X is voluntary',
because the classification
of X as a
theoretical
voluntary action was too obvious. And who ever wants to say the obvious?
Thus nobody would ordinarily point to a person who goes to enjoy a
a voluntary
action.'
good show and say: 'That person is performing
One might just as well have said: 'That person is that person.' To say
about an action which
is obviously
that it is a voluntary
voluntary,
action,
is trivial,
redundant.
never do so except under very
teaching children or foreigners to speak
One would
e.g. when
special circumstances,
English and the like, as indicated below.1)
A study on trivial and worthwhile
hypotheses
a
reveals convincingly
a
to
the
obvious
express
(without
reluctancy
good pretext).
in a normal, standard,
We would never under ordinary circumstances
situation point to an ordinary
chair, and an ordinary
paradigmatic
universal
table, an ordinary man and say: 'that is a chair', 'that is a table', or
'that is a man', unless there was something fishy about the chair, the
table, the man_
'It goes without
saying
that a hypothesis
be this well
known
*) It must
believe
that we would
(should?
seems fishy about X.
which
phenomenon
can?)
only
found
say
has
non
to be invariably
led
'X is voluntary'
some
philosophers
provided
something
385
to
HERMAN TENNESSEN
within a certain reference of communication,
Ra, will not
be propounded within Ra except in order to form a basis or a
can stand and debate the relative
on which Ra communicators
controversial
ordinarily
platform
hypotheses within Ra.' *)
tenability of other, genuinely controversial
an
we
are
Thus if
discussing
object which seems to be on the borderline
between a chair and a stool, i.e., a 'fishy' chair, it might be a good idea
on a more
to start out with an agreement
trivial, less controversial
hypothesis
by pointing to an ordinary chair and saying: 'Do you agree
that this here is a chair? OK? Then I will try to show to you that: If this
is a chair, then that (not so subsumable) object is a chair.' The same goes
try to solve the problem whether X is a
an obviously voluntary action, Y (e.g.,
to
voluntary action, ny pointing
a
going to enjoy
good movie) and show how accepting Y as a 'voluntary
action' argues for (or against) accepting the more controversial
('fishy')
X as a voluntary action.
for voluntary
There
actions. We may
are cases where
it is necessary
'a voluntary action'.
to call a spade
voluntary action
The last five questions
of the questionnaire
:
as
read
follows
theses-study')
(11) Should we ordinarily
(12) Should we ordinarily
(13) Should we ordinarily
(14) Should we ordinarily
(15) Should we ordinarily
say: 'Today I met
say: 'Today I met
and a
'a spade'
(in the 'worthwhile
a man who was
hypo
5' 10" tall?'
a man who was 6'
6" tall?'
say: 'Today I met
say: 'Today I met
a man who was 8' V
say: 'Today Imet
a man who was
a man who was 9'
tall?'
9" tall?'
15' tall?'
it
answered only one of these questions
(which made
to get an even and sufficient number of informants),
and was
then asked to explain why he answered as he did. The distributions
of
'yes' and 'no' answers to these questions was illustrative:
Each
informant
difficult
other
(11) 5'10" (12) 6' 6" (13) 8T
(14) 9'9" (15)
303
12
128
91 yes
511
453no
38
246
520
109
14
9
9 26
21
*) 'On Worthwhile
386
Hypotheses,'
Inquiry,
Vol.
II, No.
3, Pp.
186.
15'
LOGICAL ODDITIES
AND LOCUTIONAL
SCARCITIES
13. seems to present the ideal amount of audacity and
tenability (plausibility?) to be worthwhile saying, 'to make sense', as the
- 14. and
are apparently
not
15., however,
especially
subjects said.
11. is considered
of as tenable;
conceived
idle, futile, boring, trivial;
12. is a borderline case.1)
- and
maybe nobody
By way of summary one might say: It seems obvious
that there should be no rule against saying X
would ever doubt it
Question
number
(within a language society, La) only because X has so far never occurred,
one so far has been
been said, uttered, written
(within La): Whereof
silent thereof one may have to speak. We need a language with which we
can describe
unforseen, unimagined,
hardly imaginable phenomena. On
the other hand the language must also permit one to express the most
that - for some
platitudes whenever
boring, futile, idle, commonplace,
seems to be important. - And, of
strange reason or other
possibly
course, these are only two of many types of occasions when one would
inhibitions in employing certain locutions. Thus, one would rarely,
to so much as utter the
if ever, succeed in persuading a good Catholic
sentence:
'The Pope is a dirty liar.'
Stylistic taste may also forbid one
or pompous
to use particularly
and bombastic
technical,
flowerig
a kiss as, say:
as
I
as
described
far
has
ever,
know,
language. Nobody
have
intercourse' or a Calla lily as 'an anemic yawn'. But this
'quadro-labial
does not prevent the occasion from occurring in which these designations
proper and fitting. The same goes for the case where an
man
a perfectly normal, conventional,
in
standard situation
average
a
his
that
he
'deliberate',
cigarette, saying
lights
'voluntary',
performed
as
'action', or anything as ludicrously pompous
'causally determined',
would
be most
that.
But again: There might be cases where such locutions would be most
say.
appropriate, would 'make sense', as some philosophers
It is certainly true that a locution is by and large most correctly applied
in cases which are the ordinary, conventional,
common-sensical,
usual,
cases
of
its
standard,
normal,
customary,
paradigmatic
right application.
On
the other hand,
*) This
experiment
has
low yes-score
relatively
on 3'.
low no-score
it would
later been
and
high
be most
unfortunate
if one were prevented
repeated,
starting out with V 8", 3', 4' 2", etc. with
on Y 8" and 4' 2", and high yes-score
no-score
and
387
HERMAN TENNESSEN
them in such cases as well where they, off hand, sound
from employing
odd and preposterous.
said: 'Wor?ber man nicht sprechen kann, dar?ber
After all, Wittgenstein
muss man
not: 'Wor?ber man geschwiegen
hat, dar?ber
schweigen,'
kann man
nicht
University
of California,
388
sprechen.'
Berkeley.