FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 61974/11
Algirdas VOSYLIUS and Laimute VOSYLIENE
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on
3 September 2013 as a Chamber composed of:
Ineta Ziemele, President,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Päivi Hirvelä,
George Nicolaou,
Paul Mahoney,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Faris Vehabović, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 27 July 2011,
Having regard to the information provided by the respondent
Government under Rule 49 § 2 of the Rules of Court,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
A. Introduction
1. The applicants, Mr Algirdas Vosylius and Ms Laimute Vosyliene, are
Lithuanian nationals, who were both born in 1956 and live in Marijampole,
Lithuania. The application concerns the death of their son Rolandas in the
United Kingdom and the prosecution of the person responsible, V.C., a
fellow Lithuanian national. V.C. was initially charged with murder and
then, when the trial judge ruled that there was no case to answer on that
charge, manslaughter. He pleaded guilty to the charge of manslaughter, was
sentenced to four years’ detention in a young offenders’ institution and was
then deported to Lithuania in the course of his sentence.
2
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
2. Following a preliminary examination of the admissibility of the
application, on 5 October 2012 the judge appointed as rapporteur under
Rule 49 § 2 of the Rules of Court requested the respondent Government to
submit copies of the trial judge’s ruling that there was no case for V.C. to
answer on the charge of murder, a transcript of his sentencing remarks when
sentencing V.C. for manslaughter, and the deportation order made against
V.C. That documentation was submitted on 15 November 2012.
B. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised
as follows.
4. On 20 July 2010, Rolandas Vosylius, was attacked by V.C. outside
Leyton Midland Road railway station, London. The two men were known to
each other through work and the whole incident was captured on CCTV. It
appears that, after a heated discussion, V.C. punched Mr Vosylius on the
jaw, causing him to fall to the ground. There were some further blows
inflicted by V.C. while Mr Vosylius was lying on the ground. Mr Vosylius
died at the scene. He was twenty-five at the time of his death; V.C. was
nineteen.
5. V.C. was charged with Mr Vosylius’ murder. He was also charged, in
the alternative, with manslaughter. The case went to trial before a judge and
jury at the Crown Court at Snaresbrook on 9 February 2011. V.C. pleaded
guilty to manslaughter but denied murder, stating that he had not intended
either to kill Mr Vosylius or to cause really serious bodily harm when he hit
him. (In the criminal law of England and Wales, one of the two forms of
intent must be present before a person is guilty of murder: see paragraph 14
below.) It was accepted by the prosecution that there was no intent to kill
but not accepted that there was no intent to cause really serious bodily harm.
6. In addition to the CCTV evidence, the only other significant evidence
in the case came from two pathologists, one called by the prosecution, the
other by the defence. Their evidence was that the cause of death was a tear
to the carotid artery (the main artery in the neck) and that the blow to the
jaw had been one of moderate force. When it was put to him in
cross-examination, the pathologist called by the prosecution accepted that
the blow would not necessarily have been struck with an understanding of
its implications in terms of the fatality which it caused.
7. At the close of the prosecution case, the defence submitted that there
was no case to answer on the charge of murder since the prosecution had not
proved that V.C. had intended to cause serious harm. That submission was
opposed by the prosecution who argued that the necessary intent could be
inferred inter alia from V.C. continuing to strike Mr Vosylius while he was
lying on the ground.
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
3
8. The trial judge upheld the submission of no case to answer in respect
of the murder charge. He found that, if there was any such intent to cause
really serious bodily harm, it had to be present at the time the fatal blow to
the victim’s jaw was struck. There was, in the trial judge’s view, no such
intent. There was no evidence of premeditation on the part of V.C., nor any
evidence that he was specially trained in the use of his fists or
knowledgeable as to the likelihood of the grave results that such a blow
could cause. The trial judge also accepted the defence’s submission that the
necessary intent could not be inferred from the later injuries inflicted by
V.C. (the forensic evidence was that they caused no more than bruising), or
by the manner in which he had left the scene (Mr Vosylius had been
conscious at that moment). The trial judge therefore concluded that there
was no evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly directed as to the
law, could be sure that there was intent to cause really serious bodily harm.
9. The prosecution did not appeal against that ruling. V.C. was then
sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for manslaughter, less the 189 days
he had already spent in custody. In sentencing him, the trial judge observed:
“In sentencing you for what you admitted you did, I do so on the basis, as I have
previously indicated in addressing the jury, that no reasonable jury could be sure that
at the time you struck what seems to have been on the evidence the first and fatal
blow to the unsuspecting and unaggressive workmate who you were confronting that
you intended by doing so to cause him really serious bodily injury.
I add that it has never been suggested by the prosecution in the course of this trial
which has ended that you had ever formed any intent to kill him.
I accept, too, that the nature of the force that you used in that first fatal blow was
moderate in nature and that the nature of the fatal injury which you caused was not
one that you foresaw. In that sense, to use the expression that has been used already –
perhaps as I have observed not in one sense the happiest one to use – but adopted
from one of the reports from the two pathologists who considered this case, it was a
single ‘unlucky’ punch which brought about the sad death of your victim, Rolandas
Vosylius.
However, the blow that you struck was a blow of more than trivial nature which you
must have foreseen, in my judgment, that it might by using the force that you did
cause some form of actual bodily harm to the unsuspecting victim of your assault.
As the CCTV footage that I have seen though makes clear, so brutally and
shockingly, the fatal first blow was not the only one that you struck in what was, as I
accept, a matter of twenty-one seconds or so, a persistent course of violence which
you visited upon the unresisting and wholly blameless man who you were attacking.
Although none of these additional assaults caused him any serious injury, the fact
remains, in my judgment, that this was and in terms of culpability has to be
considered as a series of repeated assaults and not a case of a single, isolated punch
which was struck in one flash of temper over a matter of a second or two.
This persistent attack, the series of assaults, occurred, as is, of course, too clear, in a
public place in a railway station where members of the public and train staff were
nearby in broad daylight. Happily, but perhaps by chance, no person seems to have
witnessed or heard the incident when it occurred.
4
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
In determining, as I must, in accordance with the framework that Parliament has
provided and the Court of Appeal Criminal Division has set out in its guidance, I first
have to judge whether I should consider sentencing you to an indefinite sentence of
imprisonment for public protection or to an extended sentence because only those
kinds of sentence would be appropriate to meet such risk that you might represent of
being a danger to the public after the conclusion of what otherwise would be a
commensurate sentence for this offence.
To implement a sentence of either of those kinds, to pass such a sentence, would
require me to be satisfied that you would represent a significant risk in the future of
committing offences in this context of violence which carry with them a significant
risk that by doing so you would cause death or serious personal injury.
Having regard to your previous good character and acknowledging that this case
does not reveal that you were, as some are, unhappily, accustomed to carry offensive
weapons or engage in premeditated serious violence, I have concluded that the future
risk that you present in terms of danger to the public does not require me to pass a
sentence which would either be indefinite or extended. The risk to which I have
referred in my judgment can properly be reflected in my assessment as to what is the
appropriate length of the custodial sentence which, quite obviously, the seriousness of
this offence requires me to pass.
In determining what the length of that sentence should be I give you credit, as of
course I should and do, for your plea of guilty entered to the charge of manslaughter.
I find that that plea was not entered on the very first occasion you were asked to enter
a plea to the indictment, but I do accept that, following consideration, though not
perhaps immediate acceptance, of advice from leading counsel you did tender that
plea notably in advance of the trial and I therefore assess that the quantum of credit is,
as [counsel for the defence] has submitted, to be assessed at twenty-five per cent.
It cannot, though, be said that at the time you were interviewed by the police in
relation to this incident you displayed either candour or remorse for what you had
done. Indeed, you wrongly and wholly unjustifiably sought to cast blame upon the
man that you had killed. There is no credit, therefore, for any remorse of that nature
which an early acceptance of responsibility would have earned you, indeed, an
element of discredit for the way you sought to portray events until many months later.
In assessing the appropriate length of sentence I have helpfully had my attention
drawn by the prosecution and the defence learned counsel to a recent decision of the
Court of Appeal Criminal Division, Attorney-General’s Reference No. 60 of 2009, a
decision on which the judgment of the court was given by the Lord Chief Justice
[see paragraph 16 below].
The guidance given in that case is of assistance as to the general approach to cases
of this general kind which judges who have to sentence should have in mind. It isn’t
in terms a guideline case as technically so-called, but it is of very considerable
importance in assisting me in the approach that I should adopt.
The individual appeals and references which were dealt with in the course of the
judgment of that court were, of course, entirely, as the expression is, fact-specific,
depending on their own facts and allowance has to be made in different ways for that
fact in drawing too crude a comparison between the sentences that were regarded as
appropriate by the Court of Appeal in those cases.
In deciding within the range that is appropriate in my view for sentence that your
case presents, I take cognisance, of course, of the fact that at the time of this offence
you were, although an adult, only nineteen. You are now twenty. I take account of the
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
5
fact that you have no previous convictions in this country or in your home country of
Lithuania for violent offences and you are, in fact, a person of effective good
character.
But I also reflect on the gravity of the loss of life which you caused, the loss of life
which meant that a young man aged twenty five had his life taken away from him.
You will have to live and remember for the rest of your life with the understanding
which I hope you have of that fact and what it meant obviously to the deceased and
the grief and pain and loss which has occasioned to Mr Vosylius’ family.
The impact of the offence on them has been set out in a statement which I have read
and which I have considered.
I make it to clear to them and to all that no sentence of the court for an offence of
this kind can in any way seek properly to reflect the gravity of the loss of life which
the offence caused or the loss and grief to the family and friends of the person who
has died.
The fact is that you by your appalling and unlawful assault caused the death of an
innocent man who offered no resistance to your violence, who was wholly unprepared
for the fatal blow which you struck and who continued to offer no defence to the
persistent assaults upon him which the CCTV coverage makes so clear. There was,
too, no provocation of any kind which could begin to justify or excuse your
behaviour.
I have concluded, having regard to all of the submissions made to me and weighing
the aggravating and mitigating factors which are present in this case and to which I
have made reference, that the appropriate sentence in this case is one of four years’
detention in a young offenders’ institution.”
10. The trial judge made no observations as to V.C.’s deportation to
Lithuania, save that it was to be considered in accordance with the
legislation that had been enacted by Parliament on the matter.
11. On the basis of advice from senior counsel, the Attorney General
decided not to refer the case to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the
sentence was unduly lenient.
12. V.C. would ordinarily have become eligible for release after serving
half of his sentence. Given the time he had spent in detention before trial,
V.C. would have reached the halfway point of his sentence on 5 August
2012. However, on 5 April 2011, in light of his conviction for
manslaughter, the Secretary of State for the Home Department notified V.C.
that she was considering deportation on grounds of public policy and
requested reasons why he should not be deported. On 17 October 2011,
V.C. signed a disclaimer expressing his desire to return to Lithuania under
the Government’s early removal scheme. On 23 November 2011, he was
notified by the Secretary of State of her decision to make a deportation
order. V.C. again signed a disclaimer repeating his desire to return to
Lithuania under the early removal scheme. The deportation order was
signed on 29 November 2011 and served on V.C. on 7 December 2011.
Removal under the early release scheme was approved by the governor of
6
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
the Young Offenders’ Institution where V.C. was being detained on
8 December 2011 and his deportation took place on 6 January 2012.
13. Once the case had been concluded, the applicants wrote to the
Crown Prosecution Service seeking an explanation as to what had
happened. On 26 July 2011, they received a reply setting out the facts of the
case, outlining what had happened at trial and how V.C.’s sentence had
been set, and endeavouring to explain to them why V.C. had not been
convicted of murder. The letter also advised them of the possibility of
applying to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation.
Similar information was provided to Rolandas Vosylius’ fiancée via private,
English solicitors she had instructed. The applicants also received two
letters from the Victim Liaison Service, the first outlining when V.C. would
be eligible for early release, and the second informing them of his
deportation.
C. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. Murder and manslaughter
14. For a defendant to be found guilty of murder, the prosecution must
prove that he deliberately and unlawfully killed another person and that, in
doing so, he intended to kill or to cause really serious bodily harm. Murder
in England and Wales carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.
The offence of manslaughter includes unlawful killing without intent to
kill or to cause really serious bodily harm (so-called “involuntary
manslaughter”). It carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment for life.
Section 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provides that, on an indictment
for murder, a person found not guilty of murder may be found guilty of,
inter alia, manslaughter.
2. Applying for sentences to be reviewed by the Court of Appeal
15. Sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 allow the
Attorney General to apply to have sentences for certain offences reviewed
and, where appropriate, increased by the Court of Appeal. He or she may do
so when a particular sentence appears to be unduly lenient. The power exists
in respect of, among other offences, those which are triable only on
indictment (that is, in the Crown Court before a judge and jury).
Manslaughter, being triable only on indictment, is one such offence.
3. Attorney General’s Reference Nos 60, 62 and 63 of 2009
16. In the above case (also reported as R v. Appleby and others) [2009]
EWCA Crim 2693, the Court of Appeal Criminal Division considered two
references by the Attorney General in respect of sentences which had been
passed for murder or manslaughter and which the Attorney General
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
7
considered to be unduly lenient. These were joined to another appeal where
the appellants appealed against the sentences they had been given after
pleading guilty to manslaughter. The common feature of the cases was that
the deaths had occurred as a result of attacks in public places. The Court of
Appeal gave guidance on the appropriate sentences which should be passed
in such cases, notably that greater attention than before should be paid to the
consequences of the crime (owing to the enactment of section 143(1) of the
Criminal Justice Act 2003: see paragraph 19 below) and also that violence
on the streets had now to be seen as a significant aggravating factor. The
court added that, in such cases, if CCTV footage was available, it should be
studied closely before sentence was passed, as it conveyed much more of
the reality of the incident and its accompanying violence than words alone.
The consequence of the guidance laid down was that, in the cases which
had been referred by the Attorney General, the Court of Appeal increased
the sentences which had been passed by the trial judges and, in the third
case, it dismissed the appellants’ appeals against their sentences.
4. General provisions on sentencing
17. Part 12, Chapter 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 enacts general
provisions about sentencing in the criminal courts of England and Wales.
18. Section 142(1) provides that, in every case where the offender is
aged eighteen or over at the time of conviction, the court must have regard
to the five purposes of sentencing: the punishment of offenders, the
reduction of crime, the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, the protection
of the public, and the making of reparation of offenders to persons affected
by their offence.
19. Section 143(1) provides that, in considering the seriousness of any
offence, the court must consider the offender’s culpability in committing the
offence and any harm which the offence caused, was intended to cause or
might foreseeably have caused.
20. Sections 144 and 174(2) allow for reduction in sentence when the
offender has pleaded guilty. In accordance with 2007 guidance issued by the
Sentencing Guidelines Council (replaced in April 2010 by the Sentencing
Council), the level of reduction should be gauged on a “sliding scale”. This
ranges from a recommended one third where the guilty plea was entered at
the first reasonable opportunity, reducing to one quarter where a trial date
has been set, to one tenth for a guilty plea entered at the “door of the court”
or after the trial has begun.
21. Section 244 enacts the duty of the Secretary of State to release a
prisoner on licence once he has served the “requisite custodial period”. For
a sentence of twelve months or more, the requisite custodial period is
one-half of the sentence.
22. Section 260 makes provision for the early removal of prisoners liable
to removal from the United Kingdom. The removal may not take place until
8
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
one-half of the requisite custodial period within the meaning of section 244
has been served (see section 260(7)(b)).
COMPLAINTS
23. The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention that
the United Kingdom authorities failed to protect their son’s right to life.
They further complained that V.C.’s conviction for manslaughter instead of
murder and his sentence of four years’ imprisonment were insufficient.
24. They made the same complaints under Article 6 of the Convention
and, also under that Article, they complained that they have not been given
copies of the relevant decisions taken in the course of the criminal
proceedings against V.C.
THE LAW
A. Article 2
25. Article 2, where relevant, provides as follows:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law...”
1. General principles
26. Where life has been taken by a private individual rather than a State
agent, the general principles which guide the Court’s examination are the
following:
- Article 2 imposes a duty on the State to secure the right to life by
putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of
offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for
the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions
(see Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998,
Reports 1998-VIII, p. 3159, § 115; Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC],
no. 37703/97, §§ 67 and 89, ECHR 2002-VIII; and Menson v. the United
Kingdom (dec.), no. 47916/99, ECHR 2003-V; Kontrová v. Slovakia,
no. 7510/04, § 49, 31 May 2007).
- Compliance with the State’s positive obligations under Article 2
requires the domestic legal system to demonstrate its capacity to enforce
criminal law against those who have unlawfully taken the life of another
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
9
(see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98,
§ 160, ECHR 2005-VII).
- Thus, the effective judicial system required by Article 2 may, and under
certain circumstances must, include recourse to the criminal law (Calvelli
and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR 2002-I).
- There is an implicit requirement that the proceedings be conducted
promptly and with reasonable expedition (Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02,
§ 150, ECHR 2009).
- However, it is not for the Court to address issues of domestic law
concerning individual criminal responsibility, that being a matter for
assessment by the national courts (Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99,
§ 116, ECHR 2004-XII).
- Article 2 does not entail the right for an applicant to have third parties
prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence (see, mutatis mutandis, Perez
v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 70, ECHR 2004-I) or an absolute
obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction, or indeed in a
particular sentence (see, mutatis mutandis, Tanlı v. Turkey, no. 26129/95,
§ 111, ECHR 2001-III).
- The Court’s task consists in reviewing whether and to what extent the
courts, in reaching their conclusion, may be deemed to have submitted the
case to the careful scrutiny required by Article 2 of the Convention, so that
the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and the significance of the
role it is required to play in preventing violations of the right to life are not
undermined (Öneryıldız, cited above, § 96).
2. The present case
27. This is not a case where there was any history of threats by V.C to
the life or physical integrity of Rolandas Vosylius, such as would have
engaged the State’s positive obligation to take preventative operational
measures in order to protect Mr Vosylius (contrast Osman and Opuz, both
cited above). Thus, contrary to the applicants’ submission that the State
failed to protect Mr Vosylius’ life, the State’s positive obligation in this case
extends only as far as enforcing the criminal law against V.C. after
Mr Vosylius’ death at his hands.
28. The Court can find no fault with the manner in which the criminal
proceedings against V.C. were conducted. The death of Mr Vosylius was
investigated promptly. V.C. was promptly and properly charged with
murder and, in the alternative, manslaughter. No issue can arise from the
prosecution’s failure to secure a murder conviction when the case came to
trial. V.C.’s acquittal on the charge or murder stemmed entirely from the
different mens rea (mental elements of the crime) for murder and
manslaughter in the substantive criminal law of England and Wales, which
is a matter of assessment for the courts of that jurisdiction and not for this
Court (see Öneryıldız, cited above, § 116). The trial judge who found that
10
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
no reasonable jury, properly directed, could convict of murder only did so
after hearing expert evidence from two pathologists, each of whom was
subjected to examination and cross-examination by the defence and
prosecution. It is clear from the transcript of his ruling, which has been
provided to the Court, that the trial judge made his ruling after full
consideration both of the evidence in the case and of the domestic law on
intent.
29. Similarly, no issue arises in respect of the sentence passed by the
trial judge for manslaughter. While it has reiterated that there is no absolute
obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction or a particular sentence
(see subparagraph 6 of paragraph 26 above), the Court is nonetheless
prepared to accept that a manifestly inadequate sentence for the taking of
life could result in a finding that a State had failed to discharge its positive
obligation under Article 2 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Opuz,
cited above, § 169). However, this is not the case here. In sentencing V.C.,
the trial judge was clear that only a custodial sentence would be appropriate.
In deciding how long that sentence should be, he considered all of the
relevant aggravating and mitigating factors in the case. He was fully
familiar with the circumstances of the offence, not least because, before
passing sentence and consistently with the Court of Appeal’s guidance in
Attorney General’s Reference Nos 60, 62 and 63 of 2009I (see paragraph 16
above), he had watched the CCTV footage of the attack. Having done so,
the trial judge formed the view that, although there was not sufficient
evidence to infer the necessary intent for murder, V.C. had committed a
brutal and shocking attack on an unresisting and wholly blameless victim.
Also consistent with the Court of Appeal’s guidance in those cases, the trial
judge regarded it as an aggravating factor that the attack took place in public
and in broad daylight. Against these factors, the trial judge balanced V.C.’s
age, his lack of previous convictions, and the limited credit which had to be
given to him for his guilty plea. Finally, the trial judge read and considered
the victim impact statement that had been submitted by the applicants. All
of these factors were ones which the trial judge was entitled, and indeed
bound, to consider. His consideration of these factors and the full reasons
given by him in his sentencing remarks mean that the four-year sentence the
trial judge passed is not one which could be regarded as so manifestly
inadequate as to raise an issue under Article 2.
30. The trial judge’s consideration of the victim impact statement also
shows that the applicants were involved in the case. Although it could not
have been easy for them to follow the proceedings (and they no doubt had
difficulty in understanding why V.C. was acquitted of murder), the case file
shows that efforts were made by the prosecuting authorities to explain to
them what had happened. In the course of the proceedings before this Court,
the applicants have been provided with the transcript of the trial judge’s
ruling in respect of the murder charge and the transcript of his sentencing
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
11
remarks. Those transcripts should go some way to dispelling any remaining
confusion that might have existed as to the conduct and outcome of the
criminal trial.
31. The effectiveness of that trial is not undermined by the fact that no
reference was made by the Attorney General to the Court of Appeal on the
grounds that the sentence given to V.C. was unduly lenient. Indeed, the fact
that such a power exists shows that an effective judicial system, with
appropriate safeguards for victims and their families, was in place. It is
immaterial that the power was not used in this particular case, not least
because the decision not do so was only taken on the basis of advice from
senior counsel.
32. Finally, although the time V.C. spent in prison was much less than
the four-year sentence passed, this was a result of the ordinary operation of
the law on time spent on remand, eligibility for early release and deportation
of foreign offenders. The trial judge was well aware that these mechanisms
would apply when he passed the four-year sentence. Moreover, it is not for
this Court to call into question such mechanisms and their existence does
not weaken the effective judicial protection of the right to life (see, for
instance, Maiorano and Others v. Italy, no. 28634/06, § 112, 15 December
2009; Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 37703/97, §§ 72-73,
ECHR 2002-VIII).
33. For the foregoing reasons, the Court is satisfied that the domestic
authorities gave to this case the careful scrutiny which is required by
Article 2 of the Convention. There has therefore been no breach of the
respondent State’s positive obligations under that Article. The applicants’
complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4 of the Convention.
B. Article 6
34. Article 6, where relevant, provides:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law...”
35. The issue of whether Article 6 applies to proceedings in which
victims or their families were joined as civil parties was considered by the
Court, sitting as a Grand Chamber, in Perez, cited above. The Grand
Chamber found that the right to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced
for a criminal offence could not be asserted independently: it had to be
indissociable from the victim’s exercise of a right to bring civil proceedings
in domestic law.
36. In England and Wales, there is no right of a victim or his family to
be joined as a civil party to criminal proceedings. As such, and consistent
12
VOSYLIUS AND VOSYLIENĖ v. THE UNITED KINGDOM DECISION
with Perez, Article 6 does not apply in the present case. Therefore, to the
extent that the applicants’ complaints under Article 6 are different from
those already made and considered by the Court under Article 2, they are
incompatible ratione materiae and must also be rejected in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Françoise Elens-Passos
Registrar
Ineta Ziemele
President