The Vatican’s media politics: L’Osservatore Romano coverage of the
Northern Ireland hunger strike
!
SUMMARY
This article will explore the Osservatore Romano’s coverage of the Northern Ireland hunger
strikes with the aim of understanding, rethinking, and reconsidering the role of the Vatican
in the 1980-1981 crisis. The analysis will reflect on the Osservatore as a media instrument,
describing all of the Vatican’s possible stances and potential pressures or restrictions, taking
both the tone and shape of the articles into consideration, and using both quantitative and
qualitative approaches in its exploration. Drawing on the field of media studies, the
conclusion will show how the published content, history, and effects are closely monitored
by the Vatican’s secretariat of state and thus carefully reflect a precise political position.
!
SHORT TITLE FOR USE AS A RUNNING PAGE-HEAD
The Vatican and the Northern Ireland conflict
STATEMENT OF THE ARTICLE’S LENGTH IN NUMBER OF WORDS
(INCLUDING BOTH TEXT AND FOOTNOTES), AND A LIST OF TABLES,
GRAPHS, MAPS AND ANY OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL
This article counts 7734 words (including both text and footnotes).
LIST OF TABLES, GRAPHS AND MAPS
1. Table 1, LAGANÁ G. (2016), Frequency of the articles published on the Northern
Ireland conflict in the Osservatore Romano, between 1969 and 1993, pp. 8,
Session “The Osservatore Romano’s coverage of the Northern Ireland hunger strikes:
quantitative and qualitative approaches.”
1
INTRODUCTION
The difference in the reactions of the Catholic Church to the Irish hunger strikes has been
explained through its relationship with the British Government, as well as through the
structure of the hierarchy of the Irish Catholic Church and its split in response to Bobby
Sands’s hunger strike in 1981. It has been suggested that a major reason to account for the
reaction to the 1981 hunger strikes resides with the lower-class Irish clergy, who cared less
about British political sensitivities than the hierarchy, and thus supported the hunger
strikers’ cause. Meanwhile, the English hierarchy continued to condemn violence and
hunger striking (McKeown, 2015).1
Much of the debate among academics on the 1981 hunger strikes stems from the wide
variety of sources available 2 . While this is a problem faced by all researchers, it is
particularly true when we consider the different reactions of the Catholic Church to the Irish
hunger strikes3. The Vatican, as the head of the largest and most centralised religious
organization in the world, has often challenged national authorities in areas such as human
rights and security4. It is also a sovereign state with diplomatic representatives across the
globe. As such, the Vatican’s efforts in national issues and policies have the power to
resonate and have a greater impact domestically and internationally.5
The purpose of this work is to readdress these debates so as to include a description of all
the Vatican’s possible stances and potential pressures or restrictions; and this is done
through the examination of a primary published source, the Osservatore Romano6, together
with a combination of oral history and archival documents.
This article will explore the Osservatore’s coverage of the Northern Ireland hunger strikes
with the aim of understanding, rethinking, and reconsidering the role of the Vatican in the
crisis of 1980-1981. While differences and peculiarities in the reactions of the Catholic
Church have been widely explored7, less had been said about their mediatisation. The
Osservatore is a unique source in this regard, as well as an authoritative representation of
2
the Vatican’s point of view with respect to the culmination of a five-year protest during the
Northern Ireland Troubles.
The Catholic Church has a long history of reflecting on the use of violence by political
authorities; the global reach of the Roman Catholic Church has exposed it to a wide array of
political issues, but like any other international actor, the Vatican focuses on a few key
situations. The Catholic Church is not a political organization, but the Pope is one of the few
international figures with a global platform from which to communicate his message. His
position makes him a moral authority in global politics and an important participant in the
dialogue on the role of religion in international relations.8 John Paul II used his authority to
exploit this ‘overview’ position in an attempt to bring an end to the 1981 hunger strikes9,
and religion could have been expected to continue to play a significant role in such
international issues in terms of human rights; particularly given the fact that religion is
especially significant in situations where religious identity is a facet of state identity or a
motivating factor in political violence.10
This article will demonstrate its findings through three main sections: the first will present a
quantitative analysis of the articles published in the Osservatore, and the second and third
will complement this quantitative method by means of a qualitative analysis in exploring the
subject matter of the articles published in 1980 and 1981. The conclusion will show how the
published content, history, and effects are closely monitored by the Vatican’s secretariat of
state, and thus carefully reflect a precise political position. The Osservatore is a clear
example of a newspaper that belongs to a particular environment and is conditioned by that
same environment, and so is a unique source which has not previously been considered as a
topic for study.
METHODOLOGY
The Osservatore is an Italian-language newspaper published in the Vatican City. It sells
12,000 copies, taking account of its six weekly and one monthly edition in languages other
3
than Italian, and its total circulation is around 100,000 (Vian, 2009).11 Despite the location
of its publication, it is not an official newspaper of the Holy See: it publishes official
documents, but it has its own editorial line with regard to other news (Fiorentino, 2013).12 In
the 1980s, the Osservatore’s relationship with the Vatican was strictly close Two types of
article were published: those in which a Vatican department had directly intervened and
which were highlighted to those in the know by three discrete asterisks ***; and those
written by the Osservatore's staff with care not to embarrass or offend the institution
(Fiorentino, 2013).13 The newspaper offered an ultra-conservative view of the pope: black
and white, and without pictures. Its international coverage was closely monitored by the
Vatican’s secretariat of state, whose main source of information is the papal nuncios
(Cavallotto, 2012).14
The aim of this article - the exploration of the Osservatore’s coverage of the Northern
Ireland hunger strikes (1980-1981) - is with the intention of both understanding the
representation of this authoritative point of view, and of reflecting more broadly on the
Osservatore as a media instrument and its impact in the public sphere. The attention will be
devoted to the Vatican line on Northern Ireland: its stances, restrictions, and potential
pressures reflecting a conflict where the Catholic population was both victim of and
responsible for the violence.
The timescale (1980–1981) is the leitmotiv of this study, and both quantitative and
qualitative approaches will be used in its analysis. Furthermore, this work will consider the
tone and shape of the articles. This will allow for the assessing of the degree of media
interest in the events and for the establishing of the initial findings on the various daily
coverage policies. As it is based on unencrypted data, this type of analysis favours intuition
and interpretation. Most importantly, the interest is focused on both the shape and tone of
the articles, as well as the journalists themselves – when their name is cited. This part is
illuminated by the historical context illustrated, and this allows us to take daily account of
4
the perception of events, and thus to know what image they give of the hunger strikes and
which information they publish about it. To complete the picture, the analysis will
incorporate ‘human’ sources such as oral history and archival sources. This proved
necessary given the media origins of the study which affect its language and linearity: the
historical events are sometimes arbitrarily interrupted due to the silence of the publication
based on editorial choices; moreover, the language of the Catholic Church - which also
became the language of the Osservatore - has its own specificities, favouring interpretation,
translation, and deduction.
!
THE OSSERVATORE ROMANO’S COVERAGE OF THE NORTHERN
IRELAND HUNGER STRIKES: QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
APPROACHES.
As icons of ethnic conflict, even in the absence of sectarianism within ancient, modern, and
contemporary civilisations, Catholicism and Protestantism and their main manifestations
ensure religion its value when people no longer practice their faith, and secularisation is at
the centre of contemporary debates. At the same time, Catholicism and Protestantism are
symbols of identity in Northern Ireland, reflecting the heritage of a past that is too hard to
forget. Some disputes survive for years, even decades, with little action and little reason to
resolve them. They can remain harmlessly in the background of civil societies, or can
become the pretext for hostility when there is a shift in the balance of power or of domestic
turbulence. A direct solution is often difficult to achieve when a belligerent path is chosen,
and third parties are useful in promoting settlement (Crocker Chester, 2005: 62/410)15. The
road to a settlement was long and uncertain in Northern Ireland, and as the following case
analysis shows, the Vatican’s efforts were easily overturned by events.
The Holy See is the central point of reference for the Catholic Church all over the world,
and it must be viewed as analogous to a sovereign state: it has a centralised government
called the Roman Curia, with various essential departments, and the secretary of state as its
5
chief administrator (Zambarbieri, 2011: 112)16. It entertains diplomatic relations with states,
and the Vatican City is its sovereign territory. Diplomatically, the Holy See acts and speaks
for the whole Catholic Church, and over the years it has succeeded in developing the
diplomatic network that has existed on the international scene for more than 1600 years
(ibid). John Paul II devoted much of his time and energy to expanding this network, and it
became more important when considered, at least in the ‘80s, as the most important source
of information of the Osservatore (Cavallotto, 2013). The apostolic nuncio to Ireland from
1969 to 1989 was the Italian, Gaetano Alibrandi. Peculiarly, this Sicilian archbishop was
known as the longest-serving papal nuncio to any one country when he left Ireland in
January 1989 after almost 20 years in his post. His position had not always been easy,
especially when he was seen to take an unhelpful stance on the Northern Ireland Troubles
and their fallout in the Republic by governments headed by Fine Gael in the 1970s and 80s.
Predictably, he was drawn into this situation because of his dual role as the Holy See's
diplomatic representative to the Republic and as the pope's legate of the Catholic Church in
Ireland, north and south of the border (Moloney, 2007).17 As Giuseppe Fiorentino, head of
the International Service at the Osservatore, pointed out in 2013:
Our office is composed of editors, journalists and correspondents. These are often people
who live in the territory and that send information directly to the editor. The sources are
these correspondents, apostolic nuncios, and ambassadors and various news agencies. It
should be noted that, with regard to the nuncios, ambassadors and, at times, the agencies, the
information comes to us through the Vatican’s secretariat of state. In the ’80s, Gaetano
Alibrandi was based in Ireland and, as a consequence, he was also our main source of
information (Fiorentino, 2013)18.
It is thus possible to trace the path of the flow of information from Northern Ireland to the
Osservatore. The Church network is without doubt hierarchical and has incredibly tight
links: its work consisted in reducing the distance between the Holy See (perceived as a
6
supranational authority) and the national and sub-national level. Territorial information
would come from the middle-class clergy: local priests, prison chaplains, and the person in
charge of the diocese, the bishop. This would then be passed to the local archbishop who
would communicate the contents to the nuncio, who would then send the messages to the
secretariat of state by means of a secret code (Cavallotto, 2012).
The main purpose of the Osservatore is inferentially both political and religious: the
newspaper must report on the activities of the Holy See, considered as an institution; and of
the Vatican, represented as a state. It deals with international politics, diplomacy, and
mediation, while paying particular attention to all of the crisis situations in the world. The
importance of this is underestimated (Fiorentino, 2013). This paper highlights the Christian
values of the different situations, based on the dispatches communicated by the press
agencies, and often under the control of the secretariat of state, signalled by ***.
This research is part of a deeper analysis, focused on discerning the diplomatic action of the
Vatican in Northern Ireland from 1969 until 1998. This entire press coverage can be
summarized with the following chart:
19
7
The total analysis of the frequency is important in identifying the significance given to the
Northern Ireland conflict in the newspaper. Moreover, the occurrence, size, and location of
articles devoted to the topic can be used, both to assess the degree of press interest in the
events, and to establish the initial findings on the various daily coverage policies. It
expresses the work of the established network: the Church could be considered a system of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in its own domain. The need and
the choice to mediatize this activity can reflect the work, position, and necessity of the
reaction within the audience. At the same time, it expresses the lack of coverage: when
major facts are not even mentioned in the publication, it is because of an editorial choice that
takes the priorities of the newspaper into account, or indeed, the need to hide a possible
political position.
1980 - 1981: VIOLENCE ERUPTS AT IRISH HUNGER STRIKE PROTEST
Ireland today faces many problems, and the Irish people are deeply aware of their
seriousness and urgency. In the face of deplorable delays or even of continuous disregard of
these problems the temptation to hasten their solution, even by violent means, may become
very strong. But violence as a solution is illusory. [...] If there is to be peace, there must first
be justice. Everyone must play his part. Obstacles, which stand in the way of justice, must
be removed: obstacles such as civil inequity, social and politician discrimination, and
misunderstanding between individual and groups. There must be a mutual and abiding
respect for others: for their persons, their rights and their lawful aspirations. (Conway,
1972)20
This extract was published in the Osservatore in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday (1972).
The Catholic Church had shown a genuine concern for peace and reconciliation since the
beginning of the conflict. This same concern is somewhat deeper in the ‘80s, its focus being
particularly on the welfare of prisoners after the protests started in 1976. 21 Given the
circumstances in Northern Ireland and the hostility to Catholicism of the implicit majority,
8
the community could rarely differentiate its life in separate religious and political terms.
Hence, the spectacle of priestly involvement in political activity is not surprising (Ruane and
Todd, 1996: 67 & 74). 22 However, with the advent of the protests in 1976 and the
emergence of Provisional IRA violence before this, the hierarchical church at all its levels
began to reassess the nature of the relationship between institution and people. Lay
Catholics became more assertive about their leadership roles, and the Church became more
hesitant about its historical identification with a, by now, violent and murderous nationalist
ideology (Donnelly, 1977: 239).23 In accordance with the hierarchy, the closest figure to the
prisoners became the prison chaplain. Theology issues were more present at the higher level,
while the daily activity of the middle-priests increased. In the early ‘80s, Father Tom Toner
occupied the role of chaplain at the Maze, and after the protests started, Father John Murphy
joined him. Among their duties was the task of organizing masses, confessions, and rites for
the dead. They could also have represented the link between prisoners and the exterior, but
this is not often verified. At a higher level, we find visitor priests from local parishes or
missionaries. The difference between the ceremonies was dramatic: people came in and
looked at the prisoners with a sense of fair when locals became were used to us. Rites would
not have been different from the outside, with a rare exception: in church, missionaries
would have been controlled, while within the prison, they had freedom of speech
(McKeown, 2015). Laurence McKeown underlines the fact that, during his hunger strike
days, no church representative ever said to him: ‘you are wrong’ (Ibid).24
Within this framework, church personalities and their political positions are not unexplored.
Monsignor Thomas Ó Fiaich25 was long criticised for his stance on militant republicanism
being less critical than that of his predecessor, especially at the time of hunger strikes. In
1978, he had already affirmed his fears about a possible escalation of violence:
What I would be afraid might happen […] and it could be the occasion for an extra
outbreaks of violence. I have reason to think […] from of the chaplains who visit the prison
9
regularly on Sunday mornings that my statement of the end of July helped to defuse what
was a particularly dangerous situation in which there was considerable danger of violence
outside the prison because of the situation inside at that time 26 (Ó,Fiaich, 1978).This
scenario eventually came to pass a few years later in 1980, when permission was granted to
escalate, and a total of thirty-three prisoners participated in the Maze Hunger Strike,
including one female.
Conditions in the protesting wings continued to deteriorate then through 1979 and 1980, nut
in spite of this only five short articles appeared in the Osservatore that year about the
situation in Northern Ireland. The messages are short, between nine and twelve lines, and the
official source is the press agency ANSA. The Osservatore did not mention any of the facts
that were lacerating Northern Ireland from the inside, with the exception of three short
articles in which Séan McKenna’s conditions are reported. Very generally, a paper of 29
October 1980 entitled ‘The situation in Northern Ireland’27 reports: ‘A hunger strike is
underway in the HM Maze Prison ***’. Later on, in December, another paper reports: ‘Sean
McKenna, since 53 days no hunger strike, lay in a coma and is close to death’28. Publishers,
owners, and other corporate executives can try to use their power over journalists to
influence how news is reported and published. The Osservatore is not lagging behind, but in
1980 the reason is still unclear. Worldwide circumstances probably deserved more coverage
such as John Paul II’s visit to West Germany (15–19 November 1980), and sometimes the
need to please many different and powerful audiences can push journalists to make choices
intended to conveniently coincide with the requirement of the market, not forgetting the
necessity of the Osservatore to avoid any kind of ‘embarrassment’ for the institution. The
Catholic Church condemns suicide, but key figures in the Irish Catholic community had
another view, as Laurence McKeown pointed out:
O’Fiaich was not just a priest: he was an historian; he was able to separate religion from
politics. He knew the situation and he knew in what sort oppression we used to live in jail.
10
He had the personal and theological capacity to accept the reasons of the Hunger Strike and
he was not afraid to talk because he knew how oppressive the regime was, and also if he did
not agree he wouldn’t argue. On the other hand, the Archbishop of Westminster Basil Hume
had another opinion: he used to claim the hunger strike as a mere suicide, without having
any contact with us. He knew nothing. Even theologically then cardinals and church’s men
could have different views on the same matter. The only difference in this case is that
Cardinal Hume was English. (McKeown, 2015)
Basil Hume, archbishop of Westminster from 1976 to 1999, frequently publicly condemned
paramilitary violence; and his pastoral letter, condemning the 1981 hunger strikes in Long
Kesh/Maze Prison as a form of unlawful killing equivalent to suicide, was in direct contrast
with the views of his Irish counterpart, Cardinal Tomas Ó Fiaich. Moralists, sceptics and
Church men can spend years to question the right of an individual to die in this manner, but
this kind of reflection would bring us far from the main focus: these same moralists would
not think of questioning the early martyrs of the church who died for such things as their
virtue, their refusal to deny papal infallibility or the seal of confession. The attention has to
be put on the fact that, in 1980, the Holy See chose not to maximise the impact of the hunger
strike news on the whole of the Catholic community. To openly take a stand on one side or
another could have had consequences, not only within the institution itself, but also in terms
of worldwide public opinion. Moreover, the 1980 events had no concrete significance: the
strike was called off before anyone died.
Civilian type clothing was actually introduced prior to the commencement of the hunger
strike. It was still not our own clothes but clothing provided by the prison in a limited (often
bizarre!) style and colour. The first hunger strike ended when it was thought there was
agreement on the wide range of demands, though called off before any discussion on the
actual content could be negotiated. (Ibid)
11
!
THE HUNGER STRIKE AS AN ULTIMATE POLTICAL WEAPON: 1981.
Not long after, it became clear that there were no concessions from the British government,
and a new hunger strike was launched on 1 March 1981: the fifth anniversary of the
abolition of special category status. The prisoners’ motivation cut clearly to their selfperception as a legitimate army, as evidenced in the following quotation: ‘We, the
Republican Prisoners of War in the H-Blocks, Long Kesh, demand, as of right, political
recognition and that we be accorded the status of political prisoners. We claim this right as
captured combatants in the continuing struggle for national liberation and selfdetermination’ (Ruzzu, 2004: 96). Prisoners’ specific demands - that they not be required to
wear a prison uniform or do prison work, and that they be allowed to associate freely with
other prisoners, organise their own educational and recreational facilities, and have one visit,
one letter, and one parcel per week - attracted much Catholic, and indeed international
sympathy on civil libertarian grounds. To capitalise on the massive rise of sympathy the
hunger strikers received, the prisoners explicitly stated that they were happy for their five
demands to be applied to all convicts, politically motivated or not (Ibid).
We are not allowed to know, at this early stage, if there was any pressure from the Vatican
City on the Government or on prisoners: no materials dated after 1939 are available for
public viewing in the Vatican Secret Archives (Castaldo and Lo Bianco, 2010: 920),29 and
the Osservatore remains silent. A confidential note, dated 18 February 1981 (10 days before
the hunger strike began), describes a private meeting at Hillsborough Castle between the
secretary of state, three senior NIO officials, and three Catholic representatives, in the
persons of Cardinal Tomas O’Fiaich, Father Toner, and Father Murphy. Without going into
detail, the fact that three church representatives took part in the meeting shows the important
part they played in the negotiations, even before the strikes began.30 In terms of media
events, we need to look to the month of March. The Provisionals had always been
suspicious of a possible involvement in electoral politics. They believed that many
12
nationalists, while supporting the IRA’s armed struggle, would have preferred to vote for the
trusted politicians of the SDLP. A poor vote for declared republicans would undermine the
armed struggle, as Laurence McKeown confirmed: ‘We weren’t sure or particularly
supportive of Bobby’s31 candidacy. If he wouldn’t be elected, Thatcher would have used it
against us’ (McKeown, 2015: pp.3).
The leadership of Sinn Féin eventually concluded that the opportunity to capitalise on the
massive Catholic sympathy for the hunger strikers was too good to miss. On 5 March 1981,
Frank Maguire, Independent MP for Fermanagh/South Tyrone, but quite a traditional
republican close to the Provisionals, unexpectedly died. On 9 April a by election was called
and in a straight contest with Harry West of the Ulster Unionist Party, Sands was elected by
30,492 votes to 29,04632. The Osservatore said for the first time: ‘The catholic prisoner has
been on hunger strike for forty days’. 33 The election of Bobby Sands to the British
parliament disproved the British argument that the ‘men of violence’ had little political
support. The republicans, the Catholic community, won and the British government's
response seemed to confirm the nationalist debate that the electoral process counts only
when it supports the government's position. Bobby Sands was duly nominated, and close
enough to death so as to finally catch the attention of the Holy See. Certainly, the situation
had always had the deserved consideration at a subnational and national level, but the media
needs to follow its own marketing laws. The nationalist guidance was clever in terms of
timing and building momentum, and the consequent global media coverage encountered this
strategy perfectly. While the Osservatore is not the only case, it certainly has an original
point of view. The opportunity was too good to be missed: the political activity increased,
the Catholic community strengthened its position and the Holy See chooses finally to
mediatize this escalation, using the Osservatore.
13
The journal covers the Irish hunger strikes from 6 April to 30 May. May’s papers are
relevant to the conditions of Patrick O’Hara, but the attention is almost entirely focused on
Pope John Paul II’s assassination attempt on 13 May.
After proclaiming Sands’s election, the newspaper pushes the reflection further on the
possible change in the electoral law ‘as a measure to prevent any future election of IRA
prisoners’. This law would successively be known as the Representation of the People Act
1981.34
On 22 April, Sands was on his fifty-third day of hunger strike and, with the timely report on
the prisoner’s condition, the Osservatore published the following message:
[…] We appreciate the activities of the two chaplains at the Maze, and we have now heard
their ideas in full detail. Monsignor Ó Fiaich reported the conclusions that followed a
meeting held on 18 February in Hilsborough. We shall approach the problem with flexibility
and fairness in a genuinely humanitarian spirit and will try to grasp any practical opportunity
to relieve the situation. The atmosphere in the prison is frightening, and prisoners seem
determined to sacrifice themselves for the cause, more so than last year. Their attitude is
more extreme than on the previous occasion. They did not really expect to succeed, although
privately they probably have some hope that they might. These men must try to think
realistically: they will never obtain the complete capitulation of Thatcher. There have been
priests who have supported the first hunger strike, as it was a protest, not a useless sacrifice
of human life’.35This paper is not signed and does not carry the *** mark.
A common error made by journalists and theologians is to interpret all the texts of the
Osservatore as if they were of official value of the Magisterium, the church’s teaching
authority. They cannot have such a value unless a high-ranking bishop is writing a solemn
text. The article mentioned below shows for the first time the church’s ability to exploit the
semi-official nature of the newspaper, used to publicly denounce a national crisis, of which
the paper underlay the Christian values and the issues in terms of human rights. This article
14
talks without the supervision of the secretary of state, carefully choosing the right words to
be at the same time an international actor without being a political player. It is possible to
read a unique point of view, which had never been mediatized before: in 1980, the Catholic
Church supported the first hunger strike. It understood both the reasons and the
humanitarian concerns for the welfare of prisoners, and strategically chose not to express
this position at an international level. In 1981, the situation worsened, and the need of whole
community support became more insistent. The Catholic church chose then to talk by
different means, among which the Osservatore is exclusive due to its unique nature:
officially it is the word of the Holy See, unofficially the article is unsigned and published
under the individual control of the editorial team.
Day-by-day, the newspaper reported in detail, not only the condition of Bobby Sands, but
also those of Frances Hughes, Raymond McCreesh, and Patrick O’Hara. It quoted all the
international reactions and the whole of the diplomatic mission of Monsignor Magee
between the Maze and the British government. The international appeals of Simone Veil,
along with Washington’s opinion on the problem, are described, including the accidents and
rioting’.36 By satisfying the requests of the prisoners, the government could still save human
lives. This is not surrender, but only justice’.37
The coverage ended on 30 May, reporting a message from Father Magee. John Magee was
appointed secretary to the Vatican’s Congregation for the Evangelisation of Peoples in 1969,
and during Pope John Paul II’s visit to Ireland in 1979; Monsignor Magee was a constant
presence at his side. In 1981, at the pope’s request, Mgrs. Magee visited Bobby Sands in a
fruitless effort to bring the strikes to an end. Just days before Bobby Sands died, he
personally implored republican leaders in the Maze Prison to call off their protest. The plea
failed, but its significance was not lost (Magee, 1981: 1-2).38
The Maze talks, which drew massive publicity, saw Magee meet other hunger strikers,
Francis Hughes, Raymond McCreesh, and Patsy O’Hara, before he embarked on a sequence
15
of private attempts to sympathise with families of victims of republican violence (McGarry,
2011).39 His last message in L’Osservatore would report: ‘I guarantee you that the Holy
Father will continue determinedly to seek the means to help all the people of Northern
Ireland, to find any possible solutions which can solve their Community problems in
accordance with the Christian teaching’ (Magee, 1981: 6).40
CONCLUSION
While contradictions have always been associated with this kind of protest and have divided
public opinion from time to time, there is agreement on the fact that the hunger strikes of
1980-1981 represent a turning point in the history of the Northern Ireland conflict. Different
means have been attributed to the hunger strikes: political instrument and suicide. They are
considered firstly as an instrument of political pressure. In a document circulated in 1981
entitled Hunger Strikes: The Search for Solutions,41 Fr. Denis Faul and Fr. Raymond Murray
wrote:
We consider fasting to be a highly moral form of passive protest that an individual can
use to draw attention to suffering that is ignored or overlooked by the government. If a
group of people or a single individual are suffering, in silence and in isolation, and all
attempts to draw attention to their case are in vain, they have sufficient reason to take
recourse to fasting as a sign of protest’.42
(cited in Ruzzu in Italian, my trans. 2004: 217)
In this way, Faul and Murray confer legitimacy to the hunger strikes as a form of protest.
Another element of the Catholic Church, however, considers the hunger strikes to be simply
suicide.
In 1980, the coverage of the Irish hunger strikes in the Osservatore is very sparse and
closely linked to the Secretariat of State; and while it is possible that this was due to other
worldwide circumstances deserving more coverage, the true justification for this lack of
coverage is reported in 1981. In an article published on 22 April, the Holy See officially
16
reports that it chose not to discuss the political line taken by the local Catholic Church who
supported the protesters. The situation changes in 1981 however, in that the protest comes to
be viewed in a different light by the Vatican: it is now considered as suicide, and so contrary
to Christian doctrine. In addition, while the definition of martyr as ‘a person who is put to
death or endures great suffering on behalf of any belief, principle, or cause’43 would seem to
accurately represent the experience of the Irish prisoners who chose this path: an extreme
sacrifice, the sacrifice of their own life, represented the common point between the struggle
of the republican movement and its Catholic faith (Ruzzu, 2004: 219), this interpretation is
in conflict with the open condemnation by the Vatican, of both the protesters and the
intransigence of the English government, that is expressed through the lens of the
Osservatore. Another inconsistency resides in the inaccurate interpretation of the nature of
the 1980-1981 hunger strikes:
The hunger strike in Ireland has always been used as an instrument for political
pressure. In 1980, conditions deteriorated to the point of pushing prisoners to take this
extreme path: we were physically destroyed. During a protest, you always get to a
moment where hard decisions have to be taken. We could surrender or go further and
go on hunger strike, which has always been a postponed card, since the visit of John
Paul II in 1979. The 1980 Hunger Strike was meant to get our demands. The second
hunger strike has then to be seen as the continuity of the first one: our mentality hadn’t
changed, the issues hadn’t changed, and the demands hadn’t changed. (McKeown,
2015: p.5)
In April 1981, the leadership of Sinn Féin eventually concluded that the opportunity to
capitalise on the massive Catholic sympathy for the hunger strikers was too good to miss;
the Osservatore concluded similarly with the election of Bobby Sands, an event which is
pivotal to this consideration of the Vatican’s political position through the lens of its semiofficial press publication. It went on to cover all events, day by day, until Patrick Ó Hara’s
17
death. The entrance of Sinn Féin onto the Irish political scene is considered to be just one of
the changes to arise from these years. The Osservatore, in its report on the diplomatic
initiative of Monsignor Magee, presents this as an alternative path for the Catholic
community to the precedent way of violence which has characterised the Northern Ireland
Troubles since then.
This press coverage raises many questions; however, it is clear that the Osservatore is in a
position to reflect a precise political position throughout the years in question. In this vein,
its links with the Secretariat of State become extremely important: the Osservatore is a
newspaper that represents a particular environment and is shaped by that same environment,
and its nature of a semi-official press publication became instrumental to the Holy See: it
can report things that the Clergy would not say in other contexts, or it reports the official
thought of the Vatican and the Pope as spiritual guides and religious authority. Its impact
may not be huge, but it is substantial for the Catholic Church all around the world as
demonstrated by the editions published in languages other than Italian.
18
1
MCKEOWN L (2015), interviewed by Giada Lagana, Dundalk, 24 April 2015.
2
MITCHELL C. (2003), “Catholicism in Northern Ireland and the politics of conflict”, Working Papers in British-Irish
Studies, no. 33, pp. 15
3
Clayton, P (1998) “Religion, ethnicity and colonialism as explanations of the conflict in Northern Ireland”, in
Rethinking Northern Ireland, ed. D Miller. London: Long man: 40-54.
4
For Catholic conceptions of human rights, see T. Hoppe (1994), ‘Human Rights’, in J. A. Dwyer (ed.), The New
Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, Collegeville: Liturgical Press, pp. 467-9; P. G. Carozza and D. Philpott,(2012)
‘The Catholic Church, human rights, and democracy’, Logos, 15:3, pp.15-43. For more secular conceptions of human
rights in international relations, see for example, J. Donnelly (1985), The Concept of Human Rights, London: Croom
Helm; J. Donnelly (2013), International Human Rights, Boulder: Westview Press, 4th edn.
5
ZAMBARBIERI A. (2011), Il nuovo papato: sviluppi dell’universalismo della Santa Sede dal 1870 ad oggi, Milano,
Edizioni San Paolo, pp. 112.
6
Subsequently referred to as 'Osservatore'
7
See for example, Clayton P (1998) “Religion, ethnicity and colonialism as explanations of the conflict in Northern
Ireland”, in Rethinking Northern Ireland, ed. D Miller. London: Long man: 40-54; Fulton, J (2002) “Religion and
emnity in Northern Ireland: institutions and relational be- liefs”, Social Compass 49(2), pp. 189-202; Crilly, O (1998)
“The Catholic Church in Ireland” in A tapestry of beliefs: Christian traditions in Northern Ireland, ed. N Richardson.
Belfast: Blackstaff Press, pp. 23-44; O’MALLEY P. (1991), Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the
Politics of Despair Boston, Beacon Press pp. 330.
8
SHELLEDY R. B. (2004), “The Vatican’s role in global politics”, SAIS review of International Affairs, volume 24, no
2, summer-fall, pp. 149-162.
9
DE BREADUN D. (2001), “Sands rejected pope's order to come off hunger strike”, The Irish Times, 31 December.
10
APPLEBY R. S. (2000), The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield; JUERGENSMEYER M. (2000) , Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious
Violence, Berkeley: University of California Press; and HAYNES J. (2001), "Transnational Religious Actors and
International Politics," Third World Quarterly, 22 April, pp. 143-158.
19
11
VIAN G.M. (2009) “Behind the scenes of the Pope’s newspaper”, interviewed by John Hooper in The Guardian, 20
May.
12
FIORENTINO G. (2013) “L’Autonomia dell’Osservatore Romano”, Interviewed by Giada Lagana, 9 January.
13
FIORENTINO G. (2013), Ibidem.
14
CAVALLOTTO G. (2012) “I nunzi apostolici e L’Osservatore Romano”, intewieved by Giada Lagana, 23
November.
15
CROCKER CHESTER A. (direction,2005), Grasping the nettle – Analysing case of intractable conflict, Washington,
Us Institute of Peace Press, pp. 62.
16
ZAMBARBIERI A. (2011), Il nuovo papato: sviluppi dell’universalismo della Santa Sede dal 1870 ad oggi, Milano,
Edizioni San Paolo, pp. 112.
17
MOLONEY E. (2007), A secret story of the IRA, London, Penguins Books, pp. 46.
18
FIORENTINO G. (2013), Ibidem.
19
LAGANÁ G. (2016), Frequency of the articles published on the Northern Ireland conflict in the Osservatore
Romano, between 1969 and 1993, in “The Vatican’s media politics: L’Osservatore Romano coverage of the Northern
Ireland hunger strike”, pp. 8.
20
Letter from Paul VI to the Cardinal William Conway, Archbishop of Armagh, Primate of all Ireland.« Lettera di
Paolo VI al Cardinale Conway » (1972), L’Osservatore Romano, 33945/65, 18 March, pp.1.
21
On September 1976, Ciaran Nugent was brought into the Maze prison, having been convicted of a terrorist offence
occurred after March 1976, the cut-off date for special category status. When offered a prison uniform, he refused to
accept it. Naked, he wrapped himself in his prison bedding. By late 1980, approximately 340 prisons were “on the
blanket”. In a closed and fevered atmosphere, bitter attrition with the hard-nosed prison authorities escalated the
republican non-cooperation campaign into dramatic forms. Source: RUZZU M. (2004), Martiri per l’Irlanda- Bobby
Sands e gli scioperi della fame, Genova, Fratelli Frilli Editori, pp. 8.
22
RUANE J. and TODD J. (1996), The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ire- land: Power, Conflict and Emancipation
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 67 - 74.
23
DONNELLY P. (1977), “Political Identity in Northern Ireland: An Issue for Catholic Theology,” in Studies: An Irish
Quarterly Review 86, no 343, pp. 239.
24
MCKEOWN, Ibidem.
20
25
Following the death of Cardinal William Conway in 1977, Pope Paul VI appointed Thomas Ó Fiaich Archbishop of
Armagh, on the 18th August 1977. He was ordained bishop on 2nd October 1977, with as Principal Consecrator the Papal
Nuncio Archbishop Gaetano Alibrandi. Source: http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/bishop/bofiaich.html.
26
Fr. Ó FIAICH T. (1979), Interview on radio RTE, 24th of December.
27
“La situazione in Irlanda del Nord” (1980), L’Osservatore Romano, 36684/258, 29 October, pp.2.
28
“ La situazione in Irlanda del Nord” (1980), L’Osservatore Romano, 36684/308, 17 December, pp. 2.
29
CASTALDO G., LO BIANCO G. (2010), L’Archivio della nunziatura apostolica in Italia I (1929-1939) - Cenni
storici e inventario, Roma, Archivio Segreto Vaticano (Coll. Collectanea Archivi Vaticani), pp. 920.
30
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/law/docs/faul81.htm Last visit: Wednesday the 30th of June, at 12:46 pm.
31
Robert Gerard Sands (9 March 1954 – 5 May 1981) has been the 1rst Hunger Strike who died, while imprisoned at the
H.M prison Maze.
32
“Elezioni politiche suppletive in Irlanda del Nord” (1981), L’Osservatore Romano, 36668/84, 13 April, pp.1.
33
Ibidem.
34
Ibidem
35
“Prossimo al coma un esponente dell’IRA” (1981), L’Osservatore Romano, 36676/92, 22 April, pp. 4.
36
“Il governo inglese respinge le condizioni di Bobby Sands” (1981), L’Osservatore Romano, 36683/99, 30 April, pp.
1.
37
CLARK R. (1981), “Agente ucciso a Belfast in un attentato dinamitardo”, L’Osservatore Romano, 36682/98, 29
April, pp. 1.
38
MAGEE J. (1981), “Bobby Sands versa ormai in condizioni disperate”, L’Osservatore Romano, 2-3 May, pp. 1-2.
39
MCGARRY P. (2011), “Controversial private secretary to three popes subject of disturbing revelations”, The Irish
Times, 14 June.
40
MAGEE J. (1981), “Visita a Belfast della signora Thatcher”, L’Osservatore Romano, 36707/123, 29-30 May, pp.6.
41
D. FAUL, R. MURRAY, Hunger Strikes. The Search for Solutions, Belfast, Linen Hall Library (photocopy), 1981.
42
Riteniamo il digiuno una forma altamente morale di protesta passiva che un individuo può utilizzare per attirare
l’attenzione su sofferenze ignorate o trascurate dal governo. Se un gruppo di persone o un singolo individuo soffrono, in
silenzio ed in isolamento, e tutti gli sforzi per attirare l’attenzione sul loro caso sono falliti, essi hanno un motive
sufficiente per ricorrere al digiuno in segno di protesta.
43
Dizionario Garzanti della Lingua Italiana, Milano, 2015, lemma “Martirio”.
21