Paper title
Forging Alliances:
Mapping the Balance of Power between India and China
Paper prepared for:
Whatever Happened to North-South? - IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference
São Paulo, Brazil
February 16th -19th
Panel:
Regional Balancers: Pivotal State Actors in Sub-Systemic Integration and Balancing
Processes
Paper Presented by:
Author
Antonio Henrique Lucena Silva
PhD. Candidate, Political Science
Fluminense Federal University – UFF, Brazil
Researcher of Santiago de Cali University – USC, Colombia
Email: [email protected]
Co-Author 1
Augusto Wagner Menezes Teixeira Júnior
PhD. Candidate, Political Science
Federal University of Pernambuco – UFPE, Brazil
Grantee of CAPES
Email: [email protected]
(Draft Paper – please do not quote without permission)
ABSTRACT: Nowadays, Asia is essential to contemporary international relations, specially
for international security and economy. However, in Brazil studies about that region are
insufficient. Nevertheless, countries like China and India are becoming more influential in
South America. This paper aims to understand the contemporary Asian balance of power
dynamics. In order to do so, one examine the system of alliances and ententes that structure
the balance of power through the role of pivotal countries, namely: India and China. We
conduct a case study of these countries to demonstrate how, through these mechanisms, the
countries seek to counterbalance the power of one and other in three strategic contexts: South
Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean Rim. We analyze variables such as arms transfers,
military spending, agreements with other countries, joint military exercises and regional
actors outside the region; notably United States and Russia. In the first section of the paper,
we review the literature about alliances and ententes, later, in the second section, we present
an analysis of the security dynamics in Asia-Pacific. In the third and last part, the alliance
mapping and the power balance context analysis is made, as well as the identification of the
Indian and Chinese alliances patterns.
Introduction
Since the fast rise of China and India in the 1990, many specialists agree that the
twenty first century will be the Asian century (ZAKARIA, 2009; HURRELL, 2009). The
non-fulfilled expectations of peace and prosperity from a “lonely superpower”
(HUNTINGTON, 1999) and its relative decline in the first decade of the new era opens the
path to new emerging powers and new architecture of security and defense structure.
Asia is turning into a center of commercial and economic growth, but also crucial to
international security. Not only countries, but also seas and naval geopolitics seem to draw
again global map of power and wealth. Despite of being a BRIC country, Brazilian academy
gives more and more attention to these processes, by in a slow pace. In this sense, this paper
foresees to contribute to Brazilian thinking on Asian security and defense dynamics.
Departing from Alliance Theory in International Relations, specially Russett (1971),
one tried to map the main processes of balancing and counter-balancing between India and
China. A review of the literature helped to shed light in different kinds of security
cooperation and levels of institutionalization and commitment between partners. The main
questions that one hopes to answer are: what are the main patterns of security and defense
cooperation followed by China and India? What have changed after the end of the Cold War?
How do they relate themselves with neighbors and extra-regional powers? How political and
diplomatic approximation and arms transfers can help to understand the balance of power in
action?
In order to answer these questions, we first departed from a review of the literature
about alliances and ententes. The theoretical and empirical research has left clear that there is
a huge variety in depth when speaking of security cooperation in Asia. In this sense, what
kind of phenomenon is more usual, alliance or ententes? In the second section, we present an
analysis of the security dynamics in Asia-Pacific. We start from cold war period to the
changes after the end of bipolarity. This section is important to understand how cooperation
patterns have shifted through time in the region. In the third and last part, the alliance
mapping and the power balance context analysis is made, as well as the identification of
Indian and Chinese alliances patterns. Due to the historical lack of trust and strong regional
institutions, our hypothesis is that India and China prefers ententes to alliances, as Russett
defines the latter. The research design is predominantly historical and qualitative, but we use
datasets to produce political interferences, specially in the third section of the paper.
Notes on Cooperation in Security and Defense Issues
In order to have a comprehensive account on nowadays balance of power in Asia it is
need to first expose the theoretical ground from one is departing. Balance of power is a mode
of security cooperation, maybe one of the oldest one, alongside with alliances. Although
occidental political thought normally postulates the predominance of fear, conflict and
competition in the relations between political communities, since the old Greeks, researches
has accounts of cooperation in security matters, as war and balancing (BROWN et al., 2003).
It seems that this phenomenon has survived the old polities of Europe to modern and
contemporary international system, which includes Asia.
When one is speaking of cooperation between modern territorial states, one can
describe security cooperation as “collaboration between conflictuous parties” (MÜLLER,
2003, p. 370). In this logic, security cooperation implies relying on the resources or other
states for one own objectives. This kind of behavior and logic has to deal with two problems:
anarchy and self-help. In accord with neo-realist tradition, the absence of a super-state or an
overwhelming authority in the international system leaves few options for cooperation,
especially in sensitive matters (WALTZ, 1979). Cooperation in the realms of defense and
security happens sporadically and is maybe dangerous due the risk of defection. In this sense,
security must be achieved by the states in their own. The puzzle brought by history is that not
only friendly states cooperate with themselves, but also that cooperation between rivals (or
previous ones) happens in international relations. Although patterns and partners of
cooperation often shift, how explain cooperation in this areas and its endurance in time? For
that, we turn to neo-institutionalism in political science.
As stated above, security cooperation appears in a variety of forms and different
arrangements in the real world. Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane have developed an
elegant model for the study of security institutions 1 (1999). Following their neoinstitutionalism framework, one can say that cooperation in defense and security varies in
three dimensions: levels of institutionalization, who can make part of it (exclusiveness versus
inclusiveness) and the kind of problem that is faced (risk or threat). Combining these
dimensions, it is possible to identify many kinds of security cooperation arrangements. Of the
ones that are exclusive and facing threats, the most important are alignments, ententes and
alliances. The previous order obeys the level of institutionalization, from the lower to the
higher. Balance of power can also vary from a low institutionalized arrangement (AntiNapoleonic coalitions) to a highly one (NATO during the Cold War) (JERVIS, 1983). This
characteristic is relevant to this paper because normally security cooperation in Asia is
followed by a variety of levels of institutionalization.
As one can understand, history accounts the existence of cooperation in sensitive
areas as defense and security. In his classical essay published in “International Regimes”
(1983), Jervis shows how cooperation is present in European history during the ninetieth and
the twenty centuries. In his theoretical exposition on security regimes, both the Concert of
Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are the core examples of how and why
does states engage in cooperation in security. Jervis shows why conscientious collaboration
with other states can be a rational behavior, mainly when facing identifiable threats from
other state (a hegemon or a revisionist state) or group of these actors (as coalitions or
alliances).
1
As one can see above, neo-institutional school understands alliances as institutions, opening new paths on how
to explaining security cooperation.
Alongside or against Jervis, and even until him, a substantive literature about security
cooperation that goes from neo-realism to the Copenhagen School has emerged (WALTZ,
1979; KEOHANE, 1984; AXELROD & KEOHANE, 1986; OYE, 1986; WALT, 1987;
BUZAN et. al., 1998; BUZAN & WAEVER, 2003). Next, we will discuss some of their
hypothesis about cooperation in defense and security that will be valuable to the objective of
this paper.
Probably, the central question here is why and when do states cooperate in defense
and security issues? International Relations schools as neo-realism, liberal institutionalism
and the Copenhagen School normally accept that anarchy play an important role in
international system. They also understand that cooperation does not come cost-free; some
margin of autonomy may be lost. However, authors as Axelrod and Keohane (1986) shows
that preferences can change, and institutions play a key role in this process. The game of
“Shadow of the Future” is a useful idea of why and in which conditions cooperation emerges.
Taking states as rational actors, these authors’ postulates that there is a learning capability,
for that, the repetition of game is essential. In other words, when is repeated a game on and
on, the costs of cooperation decline. Communication is important here, as Keohane puts it
(1984). Information may be seen as the fuel for cooperation. Without it, cooperation gives
place to harmony of policies, but not coordination. But how states changes preferences, how
it identity enters the understanding of the phenomenon? In this area, authors such Buzan et.
al. Jaap (1998) has an important contribution.
Although an independent thought, the Copenhagen School lays its roots in social
constructivism and some researches in postmodernism. In a few lines, one can say that in this
perspective, security cooperation is explained by changes in perception and discuss and
through changes in international security structure and states preferences. Not all researches
of this school have embraced the postmodernist agenda; in fact, Buzan shows an interest
bridge between neo-realism and constructivism. In this sense, security cooperation can be
explained when states changes their understanding of amity and enmities in their regional
scenario or against foreign regional threats (BUZAN & WAEVER, 2003).
Those are different ways that one can analyze the balance of power phenomenon.
Albeit a traditional theme of strategic studies, we believe that is possible, even necessary, to
use some bridges between neo-realism, neo-institutional theory and the Copenhagen School.
The complexity of Asiatic security and defense scenario asks for a more robust
comprehensive survey. In order to do so, we will follow the theoretical strategy of Barry
Buzan and Ole Waever2 (2003). The previous discussion on security cooperation will be
highlighted next with a literature review on alliances and ententes.
Alliances and Ententes: A Literature review
This section of the paper explores the differences about alliances and ententes. Many
scholars of International Relations have distinct conceptions about what is an alliance
between states. It’s important to distinguish several concepts in international relations
literature for the purpose of this work because of the use of widely definitions. India and
China relations with other countries can be described as an alliance, entente, or alignment?
The analysis of this paper is in alliance theory, so, semantic precision is necessary to clarify
some definitions explaining what is and what is not in respect to alliance theory. For many
years states have formed and dissolved alliances. An alliance constitutes a component of
2
This theoretical strategy and the bridges it builds with mainstream theories in international relations are posed
in chapters 1, 2 and 3 of Buzan and Waever (2003).
states external policy. They are a fundamental for states achieve it is interests in the political
arena (DUFFIELD et al, 2008, p. 292).
George Modelski (1963, p. 773) has described alliance as “one of a dozen or so key
terms in International Relations”. Influential concepts about “what is an alliance” had taken
place in the literature. Military alliances were been described in the field of economy. The
seminal study of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) is an example how economists and political
scientists have applied instruments of public economics to the comprehension of military
alliances. For these authors, a military alliance is “a group of nations that are bound to
provide protection to all members from aggression by common enemies” (OLSON and
ZECKHAUSER, 1966). In this case, at the individual level, the alliance generates military
security or deterrence, which is considered a public good. Warr (1983) argues that there is a
close relationship between the theoretical literature addressing military alliances and the
private provision of public goods literature. Other studies had followed this tradition as
McGuire and Groth (1985) and Conybeare, Murdoch and Sandler (1994).
In a different definition of alliance of Olson and Zeckhauser tradition, Stephen Walt
(1987, p.1) describes an alliance as “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation
between two or more sovereign states”. Other scholars as Michael Barnett and Jack Levy
(apud DUFFIELD, 2008, p.293) have the same conception like Patricia Weistman who
described alliance as “bilateral of multilateral agreements to provide some element of security
to the signatories” (idem). These broad definitions are criticized to be much comprehensive
and makes difficult to understand other types of agreement. The large conceptions have other
problem: Do not distinguish between the other types of collective security arrangements.
A broader definition on “alliance” may lead to misperceptions about what an
“alignment” is. “Alignment” generally refers to a degree of amity relations between states in
the International Relations. Two or more states can be aligned if some of it is interests,
policies, or particular issues are congruent. Glenn Snyder argues that expectations of states
about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions. He
also completes his thought adding that (formal) alliances “are one simply behavioral means to
create or strengthen alignments. Thus, alliances are a subset of alignments those that arise
from or are formalized by an explicit agreement, usually in the form of a treaty” (SNYDER,
1997, p.6). In this line of reasoning, an “entente” is a form of alignment. The term “entente”
is no longer used as it was in past years, but the entente conceptions denotes a kind of
alignment that have a short time term, different from a full alliance. Robert A. Kann (1976,
p.611) defines entente as a flexible agreement of cooperation between two foreign powers;
Bruce Russett (1971) also adds, in an entente states consult or cooperate in political matters.
For Russett, an entente is a type of alliance (idem), despite the concept of entente is larger
than an alliance. In this case, Kann is more precise in the definition of an entente means, as
well the scholar puts that in this kind of alignment, and there are no definite compromises as
in a treaty, for example. The military dimension in an alliance is more explicit than an
entente; of course, depending on the circumstances, it could extent the entente for a military
cooperation, like an alliance, but in this case, the nature of relationship changes. In an
alliance, the military threat is well defined as in the NATO alliance against the communist
states or the Warsaw Pact. Ententes are alignment for wide-range possibilities that include
military cooperation, non-military activities or humanitarian cooperation.
Both Russett and Snyder have similar conception about alliances. Russett defines an
alliance is a formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the
conditions under which they will or will not employ military force (1971, p.262). Snyder
(1997) defines alliances as formal agreements, which are conclude by states, involving
military matters and other orientation about states outside the membership. Recently, authors
from the liberal and realist traditions of International Relations describe alliances as
international institutions, not specifically in military terms, but can change the state behavior
or the distribution of power. In the liberal school, Robert O. Keohane (1988) defines
institutions as alliances. In this case, Keohane emphasizes the rules that all participants are
subject. On the other hand, John Mearsheimer recognizes institutions – and alliances – as part
of great powers efforts to maintain or increase their power (1995, p.2).
The Balance of Power theory also gives a contribution to understand the formation of
alliances. Using different types of balancing, states engage in alliances as a balancing strategy
to reduce the power of a hegemonic state or to provide security in the case of a weak state.
T.V. Paul (2004, p.3) identifies three forms of balancing: Hard balancing, Soft balancing and
Asymmetric balancing. Hard balancing strategy includes an open arms build-up, create or
maintain a formal alliance, or both; Soft balancing concerns on tacit balancing or limited
arms build-up. In this concept, states generally develop ententes or limited security ways to
balance a threatening state or a rising power. The last one, asymmetric balancing, involves
both a state and a non-state actor. Non-state actors, as violent terrorist groups, use this
strategy because they do not have enough strength to face the hegemon country. In the
regional level, as in the Asia-Pacific, balancing rather than bandwagoning, occurs due to
threat perceptions. When a country acquires significant military power within a region, it is
neighbors tend to enter in a balancing strategy. As T.V.Paul (2004, p.7) argues, “the objective
of a regional balancing is to generate a stable distribution of power with the way to prevent a
war”. Commonly, the balancing strategy includes an alignment, entente or alliance to an
extra-regional power to acquire weapons, modernize or obtain military advantage.
In fact, regardless of the different concepts and theories, alliances forged by states
have some functions for collective security: Identify threats, trace strategies to confront them,
plan military operations more effectively, conduct joint international exercises and show to
potential adversaries some military might for deterrence. Another function of an alliance is to
facilitate the contact among the ruling elites of a country (DUFFIELD et al, 2008, p.299). It´s
import for civilians and military personnel to exchange experiences, information, technology,
doctrines and ideas. The security context of Asia-Pacific, especially China-India relations to
other countries, is extremely significant to diversify its partners. Through alliances or
ententes, the two letters of the BRIC acronym seek to achieve their goals beyond the regional
neighbors.
India security dynamic: A historical perspective
The Copenhagen School provides some tools to understand regional security
dynamics. Focus on regions as the main level of analysis provides a more accurate view of
intra and extra regional security relations (BUZAN & WAEVER, 2003). India and China are
part of Asian continent, but due the presence of major powers as the United States and its
dominance of the Pacific Ocean, it is better-suited to take in account a macro-region: AsiaPacific.
Although knowing the relevance of these macro-dynamics, one has to capture the
security relations that arise from these countries and their regions, South (India) and SouthEast Asia (China). The section will shad light on the historical aspects that allows one to
understand today’s security predicaments in Asia. First, we shall draw the picture of India
and South Asia regional security complex, then; we will fallow the same steps for China.
Gandhi philosophy and anti-imperialism marked Indian foreign policy and security
concerns from 1947 to 1962. The colonial and imperialist powers were the main threat
providers for India and post-colonial states in the 1940’s and early 1950’s (DASH, 2008). In
domestic politics, India government assumed a socialist identity that reflected in the way that
Indian state and economic development should evolve in the next decades (CHIBBER, 2003).
The rise of India as an independent state did not left scars with it relation with Britain, but
also with other polities of the old Indian Union, the most important, Pakistan.
Located in South Asia, India makes frontier with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal,
Bhutan, Myanmar, China, Maldives and Sri Lanka. Thinking in regional terms, India main
security issues can be understood as internal or external. Beginning with the latter, the
separation of Pakistan from India left unsolved issues in Indo-PAK relations since then.
Aside a history of military confrontations and wars between India and Pakistan, the use of
irregular warfare against India, as terrorism has marked the multidimensional identity of the
conflict. According to Sood (2009), Pakistan poses threats to India in several ways: as a
conventional military competitor, as a nuclear power, as a promoter of logistics, intelligence
and resources for terrorists and subversive activities in Indian Territory. In addition to that,
during the cold war Pakistan was also part of an alliance with China and the United States. In
the near 1990’s and especially since 2000, the Islamic country tends to turn into a failed state
with several consequences for Indian security and regional stability.
Sood (2009) also sees Bangladesh foreign policy towards India as problematic.
Although it had closer relations with India during its split from Pakistan in the 1971,
Bangladesh, such as Nepal, had developed a deep fear of Indian hegemony (DASH, 2008).
However, both countries do not pose threats in a conventional military manner. With a
broader security concept, one may see that Bangladesh refugees to India and a stronger
Islamic political orientation are problems in their own. Nepalese terrorist supporters and the
externalities of internal conflict to India is problematic by the use of the “Chinese card” when
bargaining with India (MOHAN, 2009). Other important indirect regional threat provider is
Sri Lanka. The long civil strive and its repercussion in south India is a problem for New
Delhi since the 1970’s, and the difficulties of resolving this issue has driven India into a
military intervention in the 1980’s that have not helped New Delhi objectives. Alongside with
Islamic terrorists related to Pakistan, India suffers with an old Maoist revolt in the northeast.
As seen above, South Asian neighbors are seen by Indian security analysts as threat
providers (MOHAN, 2006, 2009; SOOD, 2009; DASH, 2008), but none of then poses a
major threat than Pakistan. Since 1947, the year of Indian independence, Pakistan and India
sustain a conflictive relationship. Four major conflicts were fought by those countries, in
1947 and 1965 for Kashmir, in 1971 because the independence of Bangladesh, and in 1999,
again Kashmir as the issue (the so-called Kargil War).
In face of this history, authors such as Mohan (2006, 2009), Sood (2009) and Roy
(2009) agrees that Pakistan is India’s main security issue and has shaped this country strategy
and efforts. Nevertheless, India was, until very early, a player in global issues, as
decolonization, anti-imperialism and the non-aligned movement (NARLIKAR, 2009). In this
sense, the regional and global arenas always dialoged in the country foreign policy
orientation, with predominance for the first. Spite the regional and territorial competition
between India and Pakistan as the main fuel of strives, other logics has given impulse for
keeping the fighting.
Thomas (2004) gives a good reasoning for understand it. The logic of Indo-PAK
conflict can be made clearer by viewing three levels of balancing. In a first level (regional),
there is a balancing and competition between India and Pakistan. In a second layer
(Continental – Asia) there was a balance between India and Afghanistan against Pakistan and
China. The picture is complete adding two more actors and a higher level of balance (global),
in the side of India stands the Soviet Union and aside Pakistan the United States.
Figure 1: Main Alliance structure during the Cold War
Level
Alliance A
Alliance B
Regional
India
Pakistan
Continental
Afghanistan
China
Global
Soviet Union
United States
Source: Thomas (2004).
As can se in figure 1, these dynamic led to triangular relations, forging an alliance
system that drove from the regional to the global stage. Despite the importance of the broader
alliance between pro-soviet socialists in Asia, the main cooperative partner for India’s
endeavors was the Soviet Union, former Russia.
Despite of never being a formally aligned member of the socialist pole, Indian foreign
policy orientation made her a partner of the Soviet Union. Since the struggle for
independence of India and China, Soviet Russia stood aside with logistic, intelligence or
military resources and by its communist parties (as it was in India during the British rule).
When strive for independence turned successful in both countries, the USSR was a close
partner, especially in trade, technology transfer and arms selling. From 1947 to the fall of the
Soviet empire, the bulk of Indian military equipment was soviet made. After the Sino Indian
war of 1962 and the progressive deterioration of soviet-Chinese relations in the 50’s and 60’s
the ties between India and the USSR grew stronger. As United States engaged China in the
70’s, a balancing logic had to get in its way in the south and southern Asia.
Different from the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the close relations between India and
USSR was a strategic and pragmatic alignment, far from a formalized alliance. The bricks
that brought together those countries, especially after the death of Nehru in 1964 was more of
strategic than ideological grounds. The demise of China from the soviet pole and the
approximation of the United States in Asia by containment strategy made clear for USSR the
need of allies in the region. China also played a key role in the formation of India’s main
security issues and its alliance and balancing movements.
It is valid to quote Sood (2009) when the author poses that it was a time that main
police-makers of the Indian foreign policy establishment, as Nehru, view positively China
and its role in Asia and the world. The invasion of Tibet and the 1962 war changed this vision
in a brutal way. As we can see in this short historical review, Indian analysts understand
China as a rational actor that tends to maximize its wealth and power, acting through a realist
mindset. The same authors sees Indian foreign policy until 1962 as idealistic (THOMAS,
2004; ROY, 2009).
The strategic relations described above allow us to see India’s main alliance and
balancing structure in Asia during the cold war. With the fall of the USSR and after the
domestic reforms in India in the early 90’s, Indian foreign policy orientation and security
policies has shifted, as the indo-US cooperation and the new relevance of the Indian Ocean
for India and China core objectives, as energy sources. For now, the next section will draw
the picture of the historical framework of China’s alliances and the formation of its security
relations in Asia.
The Chinese security dynamic in Pacific-Asia: A historical perspective
After the establishment of the Popular Republic of China (PRC) in October of 1949,
soon in February of 1950 Soviets and Chinese announced an alliance. The support of the
Soviet Union was essential for the preparation of war and the infra-structure construction for
defense industry (BLANKER apud INBAR, 1998, p.140). As soon as the communist China
emerged, the country was involved in a major war in the Korean peninsula. These conflict
and the Chinese interest to became a power in the region led the government to make
considerable investments on weapons acquisitions and the development of a indigenous
defense industry. The experience of the military defeats in the XIX century for Europeans
powers, developed an interest and a necessity to modernize the Chinese military forces. The
partnership with the Soviet Union was important to this effort.
This partnership does not last long. The death of Soviet Union strong men, Joseph
Stalin in March of 1953, brought changes in the Sino-Soviet relationship. USSR entered in a
period of “collective leadership” being Nikita Khrushchev the most prominent, following by
Malenkov in the Council of Ministers and Lavrenti Beria in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In 1954, Khrushchev visited China in order to deepen the bilateral cooperation. At the end of
1953, China represented to the soviets 20% of their exportations, and the USSR represented
to the Chinese 55,6% of the global trade (MEDVEDEV apud TSAI, 2003, p.27). The
military cooperation among the two countries brought modern weapons for the Chinese
arsenal. China received tanks, airplanes, frigates and submarines during 1949 to 1961. The
country arms acquisition from abroad included: 150 Tu-2 bombers, 500 IL-28, 1,500 MIG-15
fighters, 300 MIG-17, 20 MIG-21, 2,500 T-34/85 tanks, 4 Gordy Class destroyers, 4 Whisky
and 4 Romeo Class submarines (TSAI, 2003). The arms transfers to China also encompass
other types of fighters, bombers, tanks and helicopters. The 20th Congress of the Communist
Party in Soviet Union held in 1956 represented a turn in Sino-Soviet partnership. Khrushchev
put an end to Stalin´s cult as well as the denunciations for their crimes, create malaise in
Beijing. The China´s Communist Party decided to continue to Mao Tsé-Tung´s line of
thought with the combination of Marxism-Leninism combined to the Chinese Revolution.
Other events as the “pacific coexistence” of USSR and United States, the refusal to support to
the Chinese attacks on Kuomintang troops on Quemoy Strait by the soviets, concessions to
the Americans made by the Soviets after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the lack of support to
“Third World” revolutions, the end of technology transfer to China nuclear program
generated an embarrassment to Sino-Soviet relations. China started to send supplies to
support the revolutions in North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Cambodia and Laos. Also,
the Chinese Communist Party decided to send weapons to the “war of liberation” in
Indonesia, Byrmania (actually Myanmar), Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Algeria, Republic
of Congo, Somalia and Tanzania (COOPER apud TSAI, 2003, p.30).
The Soviet Union started to criticize the Chinese posture arguing that country position
to the international relations was harming international peace and encouraging a nuclear war
with United States. Because of these questions, USSR suspended further cooperation with
China. In April of 1960, China released several papers condemning Moscow for abandoning
the Leninist practices and, in retaliation, the Soviets decided to cut off the military
cooperation in the same year and removed the 1,300 technicians and specialists. This decision
had a huge impact in the Chinese Communist Party that seemed obliged to cancel or suspend
many military programs. Although the end of military cooperation reduced the development
of several programs, China decided to research on nuclear technology and detonated its first
nuclear bomb in 1964. Chinese ruling elite continued to have divergences with Moscow,
especially during Brejnev era, because the intervention on Czechoslovakia in 1968. President
Richard Nixon visited China in 1972 as an example of a successful diplomat achievement
(HOFF, 1994, p.182). With the rise of Deng Xiaoping in 1970 decade, Beijing changed his
policy to approximate to United States. Other events illustrate the deterioration of SinoSoviet relations. USSR supported the Vietnamese invasion on Kampuchea that removed a
pro-Beijing government, soon after, Moscow send a military force to help the Babrak Kamal
regime in Afghanistan. Concomitant to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China begin to
cooperate militarily with the West. During this period, the arms transfers to China included
helicopters from France, aviation engines from Great Britain, missiles from Italy, radars and
helicopters from United States and advanced computers and electronics from Japan
(SCHICHOR, 1998).
China relations to the United States began to frozen due to President Ronald Reagan
decision to sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan and to deepen ties with this country. Mikhael
Gorbachev became leader of Soviet Union’s Communist Party in 1985. The new secretarygeneral of the communist party created a favorable environment of reapproximation to the
Chinese. Sino-Soviet approximation was also facilitated by the events of Tiananmen Square
in 1989, when images of People´s Liberation Army tanks attacked students killing 400-800
civilians3. Considered as a serious disrespect to Human Rights, due the massacre, the US
government cancelled the “Pearl Peace” Program frustrating the Chinese desire to modernize
its Armed Forces with American advanced military equipment (LUCENA SILVA, 2010).
The fall of Berlin Wall brings significant changes to the Sino-Soviet relationship. In 1991
Jiang Zemin visited Russia to buy helicopters and order Sukhoi Su-27 aircraft. Since 1992,
during Boris Yeltsin administration, Russia seeks to improve her relationship with AsiaPacific countries. Because of this new international and political environment, China and
Russia have returned to cooperate in military terms. In this period occurs the “birth” of the
“Strategic Partnership” between them. Russia understands the Chinese need for modern
weapons, so, decided to reinforce the ties of “friendship” with the objective to sell weapons.
It’s important to note that Russia do not sell the “latest” version of what is produced, to
safeguard the technologies that are sold to China. The arms transfers to India by Russia are
modern than that one’s sold to Chinese Armed Forces (BRAUER e DUNNE, 2004).
A delicate subject between China and India relations are the arms transfers. As written
in the previous section, the Himalayan War of 1962 was remarkable for the nation´s defense
policy, especially for India. The country defense budget more than doubled in this period
(SIPRI, various years 1962-1972). During the 1950 and 1960 decade, India received military
aid from United States in order to contain communist China. From 1960 to 1990, US-Indian
relations frozen because US rapprochement to China and the new relations to Pakistan. The
transfers of hardware and technology almost ceased to happen, only returning in the 1990 as
an American need to counterweight the Chinese ascendency (COHEN, 2001, p.136-137 and
p.268-298). The focus of US arms changed to Soviet to be the main supplier to Indian Armed
Forces. During the period of the 1962 war and after, the Soviet began to provide assistance
for Indian defense industry. Soviet-design but Indian-manufactured arms take place into the
scenario of the military context of Asia-Pacific. Of all agreements made by the country,
almost 70% were Soviet (SINGH apud BASKARAN, 2004), with few exceptions could be
seen as British and French material. The United States armed Pakistan during the 1950´s but
ceased the arms transfers in the early 1960 decade.
3
The New York Times reported about 400 to 800 deaths. Chinese Red Cross said he number was bigger: 2,600
students were killed. A Reassessment of How Many Died In the Military Crackdown in Beijing Source:
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE0DC143EF932A15755C0A96F948260&sec=&spon=&p
agewanted=all. Acessed in January 9 of 2011.
Due the end of American arms transfers, Pakistan could only rely on Chinese help to
build an arms industry necessary to its security needs. China became Islamabad main supplier
in the 1965. In the 1970, Pakistan received 300 fighters and 1,000 T-59 Chinese tanks; by the
1980´s Beijing technology transfer do Islamabad included missile assistance helping Pakistan
to keep the balance with India´s nuclear program. With this support, Pakistan was able to
detonate six nuclear devices in 1998, equaling Indian nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 (idem, p.
184-187). As Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in the 1980´s, Pakistan received military
aid from the Reagan administration of 3 billion dollars, F-16 fighters, attack helicopters,
tanks and howitzers. More recently, in result of 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the American need
to Pakistan as a partner in a new war in Afghanistan to track Al-Qaeda´s and Taliban
members, Bush administration approved an aid of 3.2 billion dollars beginning in 2004. An
additional aid of 5 billion was approved by American Senate for use in 2012 to 20164. South
Asia region continue to invest high in defense. According to US Department of State5, South
Asia region military expenditures rose from 0,8% to 2% of world’s share over the last
decade. Most notably, China and India pursued a self-sufficiency policy (LUCENA SILVA,
2010) that was hard to achieve. Both countries tried hybrid efforts to eliminate the
technological gap of the West. However, China and India continue to rely on foreign
procurement to maintain the balance in the region. Some of the efforts will be discussed on
the next section of the paper.
India and China Post-War Defense and Security Cooperation in Asia -Pacific
History is important to understand today’s India and China balance of power and
competition in Asia-Pacific. China’s exit from the Soviet pole and India non-aligned foreign
policy complicated bipolarity, specially by confronting levels and logics of security
predicaments (BUZAN & HANSEN, 2010). In this sense, India and China’s alignment with
Russia and the US during the cold war have created a flexible cooperation pattern, different
from a formal alliance or a Ad Hoc Coalition (HAGERTY, 2006).
If during the cold war trilateral relations were the main structure of cooperation
between India, USSR and Afghanistan versus China, US and Pakistan, two macro-events
have induced a structural change in these patterns. First, the fall of the Soviet Empire has left
only one superpower in the world stage. The power distribution has shifted in an unexpected
way, leading to some changes in alignments and other sorts of military and political
cooperation.
During the 90’s, the world gave attention to a rising China, that climbs more rapidly
towards a global power status and opening its economy and improving its relation the West.
In the other side, India kept a close proximity towards Moscow, turning Russia its main
strategic partner in Asia. India’s nuclear tests in 1998 have brought a harsh diplomatic
situation with US and its allies, aggravated with Pakistan own nuclear tests in the same year.
The second macro-event that would change Asia-Pacific landscape was Al-Qaeda’s
attack on American soil in 2001 09/11. Terrorism turned to be number one security problem
for the US, and central Asia was saw as one of the main sources of the problem. In this
context, US-PAK relations and United States strategic evaluation of India changed rapidly.
4
EUA concederão US$ 2 bilhões em ajuda militar ao Paquistão. Access in January 10th of 2011:
http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/internacional,eua-concederao-us-2-bilhoes-em-ajuda-militar-apaquistao,628341,0.htm
5
For further information see: http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/1999_2000/index.htm
The White House under Bush administration fastened its approximation with New Delhi,
initiated during Clinton years ahead the US government.
This short historical resume helps to see the scope of the geopolitical landscape that
influences India and China, specially the balance of power between then in the XXI century.
That said, in this section of the paper, one shall map the main alignments that those two
countries make part of, specially alliances and ententes.
India and Russia has a solid cooperation in security and defense issues. Since the
former USSR, arms and technology transference plays a key role in Indo-Russian relations.
Since the 50’s, an important percentage of India’s arms import comes from Russia and
United Kingdom. Covering from ground forces equipment to navy submarines and a Carrier,
one of the most impressive cooperation projects between India and Russia is the PAK FA T50, a fifth generation fighter.
Russia is also relevant for oil and gas supplies, being a crucial partner in Central Asia.
Other sensitive issue is that this country’s relation to China is frequently dubious, by Russian
fears of China’s rising and proximity to its area of influence.
In order to balance China fast rising and strategic challenge, South Asia is the prime
stage for Indian moves. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a
regional cooperation initiative, created by Nepal and Bangladesh to foster technical and
economic cooperation and integration in South Asia. Although created in 1985, the
association earned more attention by India in the 90’s. In fact, SAARC was part of India’s
strategy for securing its neighborhood from external influences. Economic cooperation is
growing since the implementation of SAPTA (SAARC Preferential Trade Agreement) and
SAFTA (SAARC Free Trade Agreement), but in a slow pace.
Soft power is followed by a greater proximity and military cooperation, specially by
Maldives “agreeing to set up a network of 26 radars across the Maldives atolls to be
networked to the Indian coastal radar system, along with the establishment of an air station to
conduct surveillance flights and coordinate naval patrols in the Maldives Exclusive Economic
Zone.” (IISS, 2010, p. 336). Sri Lanka recently entered in the realm of India’s partners in
defense cooperation after the fall of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in 20096 .
Both countries will take joint naval exercises in 2011 in order to strength lines of
communication and security in Indian Ocean7.
Out of South Asia, India is in search of partners for diplomatic approximation and
military cooperation. Japan and South Korea were engaged by India due to her broadening
security concern. Conscious of the need of spreading its influence out of the Indian Ocean,
Japan and South Korea appears to be relevant partners to secure energy routes and supplies,
but more important, for balancing China and its territorial claims and request for domain in
Eastern Asian seas. In 2007, India embarked in a series of joint naval exercises with Japan,
South Korea, but also US, Russia, Philippines, Vietnam, New Zealand and China. The
participation of Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, New Zealand and Philippines shows how India
is turning closer towards US allies in Asia-Pacific.
The Indo-US approximation is the most important issue in the alliance system at AsiaPacific. However, as Hagerty (2006) states, US-India relation is more of an entente than an
alliance. India still maintains its rhetoric on “strategic autonomy” (MALIK, 2010) core of its
strategic culture. The late US recognition of India as a nuclear power and proposals of
technology transfer may be helpful for India’s efforts in balancing China, as it may be
6
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4315493. Access in January 19th, 2011.
7
http://www.india-defence.com/reports-4916. Access in January 19th, 2011.
relevant to US containing strategy. As Indo-US relations improve, United States can turn into
an important arms supplier to India also.
How China acts and reacts towards India in Asia-Pacific strategic landscape? China
sustained a deep cooperation in politics and military affairs with the USSR until the late 50’s
are, departing as part of soviet pole in the 70’s. Meantime, Russia never ceased to be an
important arms supplier and source for technology. Nowadays, China and Russia are together
in the so-called Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). A regional organization focused
in defense cooperation of central Asia, SCO has in Russia and China it main players. SCO
may develop in an important political dialogue forum, even because it has India and Iran as
Observer States. Along with weapons systems, Russia is a key energy provider to China. In
the sense that gas and oil is important in the composition of Russia’s GNP, the ties between
Russia and China are still tight.
South Asia is turning into a relevant strategic front for China. India’s relations to its
neighbors are not always easy and China normally tries to capitalize from that (THOMAS,
2004; DASH, 2008). Although Pakistan is the most known aligned state to China in the
region, Beijing is trying to reach others as Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
In spite of the historical friendly relations between India and Bangladesh, problems
always arose. First, the use of water sources between then is a sensitive political question, as
it is Bangladesh immigrants to India and ethnic change in the country (SOOD, 2009).
Following these problems, China seeks to embrace South Asian countries with it economic
rising and growth opportunity. In matter effect, Chinese economic relations with South Asian
countries is bigger than India’s, despite of Bhutan (MALIK, 2010). Sood (2009) and General
V. P. Malik (2010) states that India prime area of influence is seriously engaged by China,
specially through the strengthening of military and logistics in Tibet. This problem is
deepening when one takes in consideration the relations between Nepalese Maoists and
Indian communist Naxalite with China.
Nevertheless, is the “string of pearls” that worries the most Indian analysts as C. Raja
Mohan (2006), Thomas (2004), Sood (2009) and Malik (2010). Several Chinese bases in the
Indian Ocean may pose future threats to India. That would not be possible without South
Asian countries cooperating with China. Maldives has let China build a base in Marao and
China is helping Sri Lanka to build port and bunker facilities at Hambantota. Those facilities
will add to the already Chinese functioning ports in Gwadar (Pakistan), Chittagong
(Bangladesh) and Sittwe (Myanmar), crucial to Chinese sea lines of communication.
Figure 2: Chinese Sea lines of Communication in Indian
Ocean
Source: Pehrson (2006, p. 3).
Similar to the case of Myanmar, there is also plans to build military installations in
Burma. Other main aligned state with China is North Korea, crucial to Chinese naval policy
and avoiding South Korea and the US with a beachhead in South China.
As one can see, post-cold war systems of alignments in Asia-Pacific have turned
extremely confuse. There is not possible to find easily alliances as were CENTO (Central
Treaty Organization) and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) previous to 1992.
In accord to our theoretical and conceptual background, one can state that the
predominant kind of defense and security cooperation in Asia-Pacific varies from ententes to
some limited informal alliances. Based in the definitions from Russett (1971) and Hagerty
(2006), the relations that India and China establishes with South Asian and Southeast Asian
countries may be characterized as highly flexible, non or low institutionalized, based on
pragmatic alignment of interests (not only military) and without serious commitment towards
collective defense. Interestingly, the kind and pattern of security and defense cooperation
found in this area of the world seems to validate the neo-realist hypothesis that security
cooperation only happens in order to maximize power and wealth (MÜLLER, 2003).
In the next section, we shall demonstrate how power maximization took place in India and
China in terms of arms transfers and building military capabilities.
India and China: Interconnectedness of the military build-up
Both India and China are countries avid for weapons. Despite the efforts to become
self-sufficient and have a reliable defense industry, India and China are still dependent on
foreign high technology weapons to balance in the region. Since 1962 war, both countries
seek to have modern armed forces. For India, the humiliating defeat in the war lead to a
modernization policy of the industry and armed forces. However, India and China could not
reach the technological sophistication of the West by its own means. So, foreign procurement
was necessary to obtain the state of the art in advanced weapons. According to SIPRI (see
table X), since 1990 to 2009, India and China are on the top list of worlds higher arms
importers. Although China is considered the largest importer, the recent advances in
developing an arms industry enable the country to be an exporter of military equipment. Also
in accordance with SIPRI (idem), China reached the 6th position in the share of world´s arms
exports. United States (30%), Russia (19.7%), Germany (10.9%), France (8.2%), United
Kingdom (4.5%) and Israel (3.4%, behind China in the list) are the main export countries.
Together they represent 76.7% of the transfers around the globe.
The first and second of the list as well have an important role for India and China in
the Asia-Pacific region. During the Cold War, USSR and United States sold weapons for
countries in the region changing the power dynamic between the countries. As discussed in
the previous section of the paper, US sold jet fighters to Pakistan modifying Indian
perception of security. The country acquired Mirage fighters from France to balance the
Pakistani new fighter force. This is an example how the arms transfers represents a relevant
variable to understand China-India relations and its relation to other countries.
USSR played a substantial role to provide China and India with high technological
weapons. For China, the Soviets helped to build and indigenous arms industry during the
1950 and 1960 when divergences between Beijing and Moscow caused a break in the
relationship. A new strategic partnership emerged in the 1990s as an important way to the
Chinese be equipped with advanced weapons and receive technology transfer from Russian
defense industry. Meanwhile, India has acquired many weapons from USSR and Russia.
1
2
3
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
Recipient
2002
Rank
1990
2009
2001
Table 1: Top 10 Largest Arms Importers
Sum
19902009
China
3366
2819
2207
3080
3511
3831
1474
1481
595
32448
India
1242
1872
2802
2227
1036
1257
2179
1810
2116
30771
Turkey
553
1009
438
187
1005
422
585
578
675
34901
South
623
461
680
986
686
1650
1758
1821
1172
22938
4
Korea
5
Japan
498
425
433
386
301
459
469
584
391
21088
6
Greece
725
491
2241
1598
389
598
1796
563
1269
20573
7
Taiwan
408
271
96
329
763
625
12
12
102
20331
Saudi
8
59
555
159
1161
148
185
64
115
626
19697
Arabia
9
Egypt
848
701
613
601
628
777
676
214
217
16291
10
UAE
186
213
695
1246
2198
2026
938
748
604
14048
Others
10543 8690
8561
9327
9892 12697 15491 14804 14873 246114
Total
19052 17506 18924 21056 20557 24528 25443 22766 22640 468199
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 1990-2009. SIPRI notes: Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values
(TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices; A '-' indicates that the value of deliveries is less than
US$0.5m.
US and China transferred arms to Pakistan and to prevent from the Pakistani build-up,
India purchased weapons from USSR/Russia. In total India purchased 70% of its arms from
USSR/Russia (LUCENA SILVA, 2010). Attempting to diversify its partners, India sees
United States to be an important arms supplier. In 2004 President Bush and Prime Minister
Vajpayee signed the Next Steps for Strategic Partnership (NSSP). For US, the armed
Pakistan, and the need to improve relations to India is an important instrument to counter
China for a “strategically stable Asia” (COHEN & DASGUPTA, 2010, p.166).
France
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
Table 2: Arms Exports to India
Total
(Sum
19902009)
22
11
15
142
96
5
13
30
10
921
32
20
12
5
5
16
20
20
31
934
33
61
85
166
123
111
77
18
94
866
9
9
7
14
11
4
5
-
-
77
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
17
-
-
76
-
-
-
-
-
-
133
17
-
-
27
25
-
-
-
10
1272
43
17
50
32
-
193
89
-
-
452
1020
1690
2138
1477
651
873
1719
1454
1761
18812
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
189
26
26
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
192
8
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
17
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
336
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
50
-
18
-
112
126
-
172
282
116
1965
20
14
77
81
-
-
-
-
-
350
10
6
3
-
-
54
83
6
4
218
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3372
-
-
340
170
-
-
-
-
90
600
1242
1872
2802
2227
1036
1257
2179
1810
2116
30771
Germany
(FRG)
Israel
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgystan
Netherlands
Poland
Russia
Singapore
Slovakia
South Africa
South Korea
Sweden
UK
Ukraine
USA
USSR
Uzbekistan
Total
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Note: USSR include for values during 1990-1991. SIPRI Notes:
Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices; A '-' indicates
that the value of deliveries is less than US$0.5m.
Table 2 shows the arms exports to India. Compared to USSR/Russia, that reached in
1990 to 2009 period the total amount of 22.184 billion dollars, US trade to India only
reached, for the same period, 218 million dollars. The NSSP is a bureaucratic path to change
this scenario and improve Indian-US relationship. As a new cooperative instrument, the
agreement includes civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, high technology trade
and missile defense. The context of Asia-Pacific security dynamic make India and United
State “natural allies”, expression that Douglas Feith has coined (COHEN & DASGUPTA,
Op. Cit.). On the other hand, China since the Tiananmen crackdown, an American embargo
resulted in the end of “Pearl Peace” program.
France
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
Table 3: Arms Exports to China
Total
(19902009)
69
67
62
92
89
73
68
76
62
1473
14
12
14
27
19
14
6
6
6
263
Israel
28
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
350
Italy
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
52
Japan
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
30
3081
2581
2031
2831
3224
3527
1248
1246
401
28149
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
780
40
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
370
67
64
5
35
84
122
58
58
30
711
USA
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
56
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
214
Total (Sum) 19902009
3366
2819
2207
3080
3511
3831
1474
1481
595
32448
Germany (FRG)
Russia
Switzerland
UK
Ukraine
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Note: USSR include for values during 1990-1991. SIPRI Notes:
Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices; A '-' indicates
that the value of deliveries is less than US$0.5m.
Table 3 above shows the arms exports to China. Chinese Armed Forces continue to
rely on foreign weapons despite the efforts made to create an indigenous arms industry.
From 1990 to 2009 Chinese import of American components reached 56 million dollars
while USSR/Russian arms amounted more than 28 billion. India and China interconnections
on arms trade are a complex web that involves United States, Russia, Pakistan, Israel, France,
United Kingdom, and others in small level. Sino-Pakistani relationship causes concern in
India, specially because China is accused of clandestine supply nuclear and missile
technologies to Pakistan8. For China, helping to strengthen military capability of Islamabad
8
This question was discussed and tracked. For more information see: "Incidental Intelligence: China Emerging
As Third World Weapons Supplier," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1991, p. 19; Gary Milhollin and
Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, p. 17;
matter, to balance with India. The same type of policy is used by United States to increase
Taiwan´s military forces. Taipei and Beijing relations are stressed since Taiwan Strait Crisis
(1995-6) and the Chinese approved the Anti-Secession Law in March of 2005. Taiwan also
build an indigenous arms industry.
Table 4: Countries with the largest arms industries in the World, 2002
Rank
Country
Source
1
USA
Government
2
France
Government
3
United Kindom
Government
4
Germany
-
5
Japan
Government
6
Russia
Government
7
Canada
Private Industry
8
China
-
9
Israel
-
11
South Korea
Government
13
India
Government
19
Taiwan
Government
20
Ukraine
-
Source: Extracted from: Eamon Surry, “Transparency in the Arms Industry,” SIPRI Policy Paper, no. 2
(Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, January 2006).
China and India are listed in the position 8th and 13th as having larges industries
companies. Good positions in this rank are not translated in reliable weapons. China
continues to be heavily dependent on Russian exports and technology transfer, while have
serious problems to develop its internal capacity. After years of development, China still
don´t have a reliable engine, need Russian support for the J-10 fighter, its 63 submarine fleet
only had a dozen patrols in 2009. Chinese represented almost half of Russian military
exports9. Another example of foreign dependency is India. The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)
began to be developed since 1980 and the fighter is far away from enter in series production.
New partnerships with Israel will grantee some technology transfer and an increase in the
development of the industry. More than ever, most important projects have Russian
cooperation like the BraHmos cruise missile, Glonass satellite, and technology transfer for
The Risk Report, May 1995, p. 8; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic
Bazaar," Washington Post, 12 May 1991.
9
“Military strength eludes China, which looks overseas for arms”. Accessed in January 17th of 2011:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/24/AR2010122402788_2.html
the nuclear submarine. According to SIPRI (Op. Cit) Chinese military expenditure grow
194% from 1998 to 2008, and the Indian had 44.1% at the same period. Due the lack of an
autonomous arms industry and the security dynamic of Asia-Pacific are not the best for
strong confidence-building measures, the military spending of China and India tend to be
high in the next years.
Conclusion
In the present paper it was discussed the Asia-Pacific contemporary balance of power
dynamics. India and China are pivotal states to understand these dynamics, and the relations
with foreign powers, specially United States and Russia. In order to clarify the complex web
of relationship involving New Delhi and Beijing, was analyzed the strategic context of the
region in many sides: agreements with other countries, arms transfers, security dynamics and
its relations with other countries outside the region. Using as reference the alliance theory, we
investigate how China and India reacts towards a counterbalance of the power of one and
other.
Difficulties in the relation India-Pakistan, China-Taiwan, and the period of Cold War
also the aftermath for the alliance patterns were the focus of our analysis. Taking into account
Russett (1971) definition of alliance, it’s hard to realize Sino-Indian alliance patterns as
formal alliance with other countries. In an attempt to maximize the power of agreements,
China and India adopted a flexible way of relationship to other countries, especially on
agreements and arms transfers. A flexible way of agreement allow the countries to obtain
greater advantages from different partners. This is particular visible in the arms and
technology transfer, with the two countries possessing various suppliers from varied regions
of the planet.
United States and USSR/Russia played an important role in India and China foreign
relations, but we detected that both countries are trying to expand their network of relations
covering Europe, Middle East, Africa and changing their traditional connections. For the
reason mentioned above, New Delhi and Beijing balance each other using not formal
alliance, but a kind of alignment depending on the purpose. The alignment US-PakistanChina during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, reinforced Russia and India relations.
Nowadays, because American war against terrorism and the importance to contain an
increasingly powerful China, US and India have “affinities” that resulted in a new alignment
emerged by the NSSP.
Sino-Indian relations are not excellent actually. Confidence build measures are
necessary to improve the bilateral relation to attenuate an eventually attrition about
divergences in the political arena. Another war, like the Himalayan War of 1962, is unlikely
to happen in the context of both countries emerge as strong economies. However, cooperation
between them is scarce while the balance of power persists in the next decade.
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