Debates 1/2013
POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL:
Implications for European and International
Security
Ambassador Christopher Dell
Round Table, 5 June 2013
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POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL
Abstract
A direct consequence of the unrest across North Africa has been the expansion of violent
extremism across the Sahel. We are witnessing a worrisome development in the region’s
security landscape as these violent extremist organizations grow and develop sophisticated
networks. These emerging threats can be illustrated by the unique challenges facing Libya, Mali,
Nigeria, and Somalia. The US Strategy to Africa and to security sector assistance goes well
beyond terrorism. Through collaboration based on shared values and mutual goals, the US is
finding that its efforts are more likely to be achieved if it pursues both bilateral and multilateral
partnerships with African, European Union, and NATO partners.
Uma consequência direta das revoltas no Norte de África tem sido a expansão do extremismo
violento pela região do Sahel. Estamos a testemunhar uma evolução preocupante no contexto
de segurança desta região, à medida que estas organizações violentas e radicais crescem e
desenvolvem redes sofisticadas. Estas ameaças emergentes podem ser ilustradas pelos desafios
particulares enfrentados pela Líbia, Mali, Nigéria e Somália. A Estratégia dos Estados Unidos para
África e para o apoio ao setor de segurança vai muito para além do terrorismo. Através de uma
colaboração assente em valores partilhados e objetivos comuns, os EUA estão a perceber que os
seus esforços terão maior probabilidade de sucesso se prosseguirem parcerias bilaterais e
multilaterais, com os parceiros de África, da União Europeia e da NATO.
Keywords: Africa, Sahel region, Security, Terrorism, U.S. and Portugal
Palavras-Chave: África, região do Sahel, Segurança, Terrorismo, E.U.A. e Portugal
ABOUT THE PUBLICATION
This publication should be cited as: IMVF (2013); Political and military dynamics in the Sahel:
Implications for European and international security. Round table held in 5 June 2013 with
Ambassador Christopher Dell, IMVF Debates 1/2013, Lisbon.
The text was edited by Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira and Fernando Jorge Cardoso. The views
expressed in the publication do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
organisation.
This publication is the result of a partnership between IMVF, the AIP Foundation, EuroDefense-Portugal and AFCEA-Portugal, in
the framework of a series of roundtables on "Strategy and Security vs. Internationalization and Investment". These debates aim
at improving knowledge and thinking on various political and security dynamics that influence investment' decisions and the
internationalization of the Portuguese economy. Ambassador Dell’s participation was sponsored by the U.S. Embassy.
More about IMVF at www.imvf.org
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POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL
ÍNDICE
1. INTRODUCTORY SPEECH
4
2. DEBATE
9
3. BIOGRAPHY NOTE
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18
POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL
1. INTRODUCTORY SPEECH
Thank you for your kind introduction. It is great to
be back in Portugal. For those of you who do not
know, early in my career with the U.S. Department
of State I served at the U.S. Consulate in Oporto and
at the Embassy in Lisbon. My experience in Africa
began in the early 1990s as the deputy chief of
mission in Mozambique. And in 2001, I was posted
as the U.S. Ambassador to Angola. So I am familiar
with the Lusophone countries of Africa and
personally aware of the strategic role Portugal has
played and continues to play on the continent.
Our nations, Portugal and the United States, share
the desire for a stable and secure Africa. As has
been stated many times by the previous commander
of U.S. Africa Command, General Carter Ham, “a
safe, stable, and secure Africa is in the best interest,
not only of African nations, but of the united states
and the international community.” I truly believe
this and I look to the strong relationship between
our two nations to help ensure stability and security
in this region of the world.
The Security Landscape in the Sahel Region
Today I would like to talk about the security
landscape in the Sahel region as it relates to the
international community. I’d also like to briefly
describe the U.S. Strategy toward Northwest Africa,
and U.S. Africa command’s approach to
implementing that strategy. And then finally, I
would like to offer my thoughts on ways for the
United States and Portugal to partner in Africa. As
the on-going situation in Mali is relevant to all three
of these topics, I’ll refer to this crisis and the
international response to it throughout my remarks.
During the 15th and 16th centuries, when Portugal
was playing a leading role in the European discovery
of Africa, West and Northwest Africa were of
strategic importance on the emerging global stage.
In recent years North Africa has once again emerged
as a focus of attention, not only in the region, but
again on a global scale. Much of this stems from the
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Mapa: A região do Sahel, África.
Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in December of
2010 and spread throughout North Africa and the
Middle East. Unfortunately, it is also easy to see that
a direct consequence of the unrest across North
Africa has been the expansion of violent extremism
across the Sahel. Violent extremist groups have
capitalized on the security vacuum created when the
former regimes fell.
We are witnessing a worrisome development in the
region’s security landscape as these violent
extremist organizations grow and develop
sophisticated networks. Of greatest concern are the
activities of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in East Africa,
the Maghreb, and the Sahel, as well as the emerging
threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria. These groups have
targeted or expressed a desire to target western
interests in Africa on multiple occasions and present
significant challenges as individual organizations.
Now there is growing evidence that points to
collaboration between the various violent extremist
organizations. This is evident in the flow of arms,
money and fighters, as well as the sharing of
experience and tactical activity between these
organizations. This growing network represents a
great threat to regional stability across the Sahel.
And this emerging threat is only a short boat ride
from Europe. If unaddressed, I fear these
organizations may in time present a very real and
dangerous threat to Europe and eventually to the
United States.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL
Perhaps I can better articulate that emerging threat
to both our countries by delving into the unique
challenges facing Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia.
In Libya, violent extremist organizations are seeking
to take advantage of the government’s fragility as
institutions marginalized during the 40 years of
Kaddafi’s reign struggle to consolidate control over
the country. External influencers, including AlQaeda associated elements, are attempting to
establish networks and safe havens in Libya, most
notably in the eastern portion of the country. The
absence of effective local government and the
proliferation of weapons following the revolution
make Libya highly volatile, as the tragic September
11, 2012 attacks in Benghazi have brought into
focus.
As a second case study, let me discuss how the coup
d’état and the invasion by Tuareg rebels in Mali last
year has contributed to the region’s security
landscape.
Al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb, or
AQIM, and other violent extremist organizations
took advantage of the rapidly deteriorating situation
and briefly gained control of the northern two-thirds
of Mali before the French government and a
coalition of neighbouring African nations intervened
to help the Malian military restore security. The
United States is supporting these efforts by moving
French troops and supplies from Europe to Mali,
providing aerial refuelling support, and by sharing
important reconnaissance information. As the
European Union fields its training mission with the
purposed of helping to build credible Malian armed
forces, the United States is working in parallel to
train the forces of the neighbouring states who are
participating in the African-led international support
mission to Mali, or AFISMA. As the French and
AFISMA efforts transition to a UN peacekeeping
mission, we will continue to provide our traditional
high level support to UN operations. The recent UN
Security Council resolution demonstrates that when
regional security and stability are threatened, we
collectively respond because left unchecked, these
threats have the ability to jeopardize western
interests in Africa, Europe, and the United States.
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My third exploratory case is Nigeria, where we see
the emergence of Boko Haram as a growing
challenge. This violent extremist organization
continues to stage attacks targeting government
officials, churches, and most notably, the United
Nations headquarters in Abuja. Boko Haram’s
increasingly violent attacks seek to discredit the
Nigerian government and to impose a harsh
interpretation of sharia law on the local populace.
Boko haram has also publicly expressed its intent to
target western interests, making it clear that this
group threatens not only regional stability, but also
American and European interests and lives.
While we support Nigeria’s effort in neutralizing
Boko Haram, we are at the same time increasingly
troubled by the trend of human rights violations
committed by members of the Nigerian military. Not
only is this troubling from a humanitarian
perspective, it reverses any efforts to counter
insurgents, and win the support – the hearts and
minds, if you will – of at-risk communities.
My final example of the networking that is occurring
between these terrorist organizations is Somalia.
Al-Shabaab, a U.S.-recognized terrorist organization
which is formally part of the Al-Qaeda structure, has
increasingly strong ties to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, and is increasingly linked to AQIM in the
west. We believe Al-Shabaab remains one of the
greatest threats on the continent. Al-Shabaab has
professed openly their intent and desire to attack
western interests, and indeed America and Europe.
Due to the combined efforts of the African union,
regional peacekeeping forces, and Somali national
security forces, today Al-Shabaab is in a greatly
weakened condition. The African Union mission in
Somalia, known as AMISOM and Somali forces have
together reduced the ground held by Al-Shabaab and
once again control the key cities of Mogadishu and
Kismayo. Somalia now has a parliament, a prime
minister, and a president, something not seen since
the 1980s. This is a great success story of regional
cooperation. It shows how collectively individual
nations and security organizations can come
together to successfully address a common threat.
But, Al-Shabaab is not yet defeated. They seek to
undermine the progress that has been achieved.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY DYNAMICS IN THE SAHEL
We must continue to apply attention and resources
to AMISOM’s effort to assist the Somalis in focusing
on governance, economic growth, and
development of their security forces to ensure the
continued improvement of the security landscape.
Al-Shabaab has recently renewed its attacks in
Mogadishu itself, a troubling but timely reminder
that the job is not yet done in Somalia.
These four examples demonstrate how networks
between violent extremist organizations are
materializing. To complicate our challenge even
further, violent extremism is often closely linked to
illicit trafficking of persons, drugs, and other
commodities. And as violent extremist
organizations earn a significant amount of their
income from kidnapping for ransom and piracy, we
begin to see the clear correlation between the
growth of violent extremism and illegal activities.
This has a profoundly corrosive effect on security,
economic growth, and strong governance in these
crucial regions. This makes our efforts to disrupt and
destroy these networks in West Africa a critical
component of the fight against violent extremist
organizations in the Sahel and elsewhere.
U.S. Strategy to Africa
Permit me to turn now to my second discussion
point of how the U.S. conceives of its strategy in
Africa. Our policies in Africa are guided by the
National Security Strategy, signed by president
Obama in May 2010. It lays out a strategic approach
for advancing American interests, including the
security of the American people, support for our
values, and an international order that can address
21st century challenges. This Strategy focuses on
promoting common interests throughout the world
to strengthen security and to promote the rule of
law. This document also discusses the importance of
disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda and
its violent extremist affiliate networks which directly
threaten the United States, our allies, and partners.
In addition to the national security strategy, we have
three presidential policy directives (PPDs) that guide
our approach to supporting security and stability in
Africa. PPD 13 focuses on North Africa and the
Middle East, and PPD 16 focuses on sub-Saharan
Africa.
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A common thread throughout both is that the
United States opposes the use of violence and
repression against any group of people. Instead, we
support democracy, transparent institutions, and
economic growth and trade to promote durable
systems that advance peace and security. We
believe progress in these areas can set the
conditions for our African partners to most
effectively address the threat of violent extremism.
A third and final presidential policy directive I would
like to share with you is our newest, it was just
released last month. PPD 23 specifically focuses on
the president’s new approach to security sector
assistance. Unlike the PPDs on North and subSaharan Africa, this policy applies to our
partnerships with all partner nations, not just those
in a specific region. This directive aims to bring
greater coherence across the U.S. Government to
our effort in the security sector. It defines those
national institutions that have the most significant
impact on stability; it highlights the principal goals
the U.S. will pursue in collaborating with partners;
and it describes the methods we will use to conduct
security assistance. The most salient theme of this
PPD is that a comprehensive investment in
assistance helps our partners meet their security
challenges and can avert larger crises.
US AFRICOM’s approach to implementing this
national guidance is multi-faceted; however, there is
one salient element throughout: partnership. Our
relationships with our allies and partners are at the
centre of our engagement with the world, and with
Africa in particular. These relationships are based
on more than our shared opposition to terrorism.
We are focused on partnerships that are grounded in
common values, and based on mutual interests and
mutual respect. At the broad, conceptual level,
partnership is about creating a framework to
support and sustain the values that enhance longterm cooperation. It is an approach that includes
many spheres of effort; some of which are inherently
military in nature, while others are not. For
example, strengthening defence institutions is an
essential element in building a durable and reliable
security sector. It involves collaborating along a
spectrum of activities to address immediate threats,
as well as identify and plan for future opportunities
to prevent threats.
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
These partnerships can only grow lasting roots if
they are grounded in a nuanced understanding of
the willingness and capability of our respective
African partners to cooperate with us on security
issues ranging from countering violent extremists to
maintaining security through peace keeping
operations.
will contribute to economic prosperity and security
on land. To address each of these issues
successfully, APS partners work together with a
common purpose. There is a relationship between
security of the sea; the ability of countries to
govern their waters; and a country’s prosperity,
stability, and peace.
Part of this broader concept of partnership involves
selecting the right nations with which to partner. A
partner must have more than just a willingness to
improve their institutions. An ideal partner has
strong and capable institutions as well as a
willingness to work together to achieve shared goals.
In order to partner strategically, we are working to
define for ourselves the specific characteristics and
institutions partners must possess, and combine this
with our understanding of that partner’s impact on
the stability of a given region.
Given Portugal’s long maritime history, where I’m
going is no doubt already obvious to all of you – this
is a natural area for deeper cooperation between our
two nations and African partners. APS would be an
ideal opportunity to collaborate together, as it brings
partnerships into action through cooperation among
many different nations and organizations, and
promotes maritime governance around Africa. The
oceans of the world are a common bond between
the economies and countries of the world. 80% of
the world lives on or near the coastline and 90% of
the world's commerce is transported on the ocean.
We believe that security of the seas is essential for
global security, but individual nations cannot combat
maritime problems and crimes alone. APS is a direct
response to the growing international interest in
developing maritime partnerships, and is a way for
the United States and Europe to respond to African
leaders' requests to build a prosperous Africa.
Moreover, given the troubling nexus between
criminal networks and violent extremists networks,
helping our African partners better address the flows
of illicit goods through their maritime borders can
make a critical contribution to our counter terrorism
efforts as well.
When we speak of partnerships, we have in mind
not only our African partners, but our international
partners who have a stake in seeing a stronger
security landscape in Africa. Again, through
collaboration based on shared values and mutual
goals, we’re finding that our efforts are more likely
to be achieved if we pursue both bilateral and
multilateral partnerships with our African,
European Union, and NATO partners. Through this
approach, we find that our resources are better
optimized, and most importantly, our African
partners are the lead stakeholders. The joint efforts
of the U.S. and the EU to provide training to the
African troop contributing nations in AMISOM is a
prime example of the kind of close, multilateral
partnership we see as an emerging paradigm in
Africa.
Another example of an activity that I’d like to share
with you is our African Partnership Station, or APS.
APS is a series of activities designed to enhance
maritime safety and security in Africa by working
together with African and other international
partners. Our goal is to empower African nations to
protect their own maritime security interests. APS
responds to specific African requests for assistance
that benefits the international community as a
whole, not just the United States. It is inspired by
the belief that effective maritime safety and security
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DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
U.S and Portugal in the Sahel
We place a great deal of emphasis on our
international partnerships, and our relationship with
Portugal is certainly one of our strongest. I’d like to
spend the last few minutes of my time with you
today discussing what we believe are our common
interests in the Sahel region.
Turning to U.S.-Portuguese relations, I see
opportunities for strengthening our traditionally
strong partnerships. I realize that the news of a
reduced U.S. Presence at Lajes has been the recent
focus of attention, and that these operationallydriven changes in our force posture have been
interpreted by some as a weakening of our
relationship. Nothing, of course, could be further
from the truth. One testament to our strong
relationship is last month’s 32nd session of the U.S.Portugal Standing Bilateral Commission. This
meeting highlighted the importance of bilateral and
international coordination on issues relating to
global security and stability, including the present
situations in Mali and Guinea-Bissau. Portugal's
recent work on two bilateral agreements – your
ratification of the “terrorism screening information
exchange agreement” and your ongoing
implementation of the “preventing and combating
crime agreement” – is yet more proof of our strong
partnership. But beyond simply asserting that “all is
well,” in U.S.-Portuguese relations, I would like to
urge you to join us in thinking critically about where
we can further enhance our common efforts in
Africa.
Our two countries’ objectives are well aligned. The
U.S. Presidential policy directives on Sub-Saharan
Africa and security sector assistance share goals
found in the Programa de Apoio às Missões de Paz
em África (PAMPA) such as: security sector capacity
building, military training and education,
cooperation with regional and sub-regional
organizations, and highlighting Africa on the agenda
of international organizations such as NATO, the
European Union, and the United Nations. The fact
that Portugal has contributed advisors to the EU
team for the UN mission in Mali is evidence of this
commitment.
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The United States recognizes it cannot, and indeed it
should not, try to ensure security in the region alone.
Our former commander, general Ham, would often
quote an African proverb, “if you want to go quickly,
go alone; if you want to go far, go together.”
Because of the experience Portugal has in Western
Africa, the United States knows that bilateral and
multilateral efforts are the best approaches for all
stakeholders.
I hope I’ve succeeded in making it apparent that the
security landscape in North and West Africa is
extremely complex and, moreover, that it has to be
considered in a broader context. No single country,
certainly not the United States, has the means to
confront all these challenges alone. The United
States values its relationship with Portugal, and
views our collaboration as an important element of
a networked, multi-faceted response to these
challenges that can have real and lasting impacts in
the Sahel. The terrorist threat in the Sahel, and the
ripples it sends through the entire continent, reflect
a network of extremists. The only effective
response to a networked problem is a networked
solution, comprised of partnerships focused on
shared goals and desired outcomes.
I am truly honoured and have enjoyed the
opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward
to hearing your thoughts, and hopefully participating
in more dialogue throughout the day. Thank you.
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
2. DEBATE
On the debate participants have questioned
Ambassador Dell on a number of issues and gave
their own interpretation of the dynamics that occur
in the Sahel. The questions and issues focused by the
participants and by the speaker can be summarized
in 10 groups:
Question 1: a first group of questions was about
Mali: the relationship between Al Qaeda and a
number of radical Islamic groups operating in other
countries, namely Boko-Haram in Nigeria and AlShabaab in Somalia; the reasoning behind the
apparent change of position of the MNLA the
National Liberation Movement of Azawad, which
seems to be now working in close relationship with
the French; the existence or non-existence of
intervention of Iran and the Hezbollah in the region;
the comparison with the situation in Guinea-Bissau
and with the role of the EU, CEDEAO and the US was
also brought to the table.
The ambiguous role that the MNLA is playing shows
how complex the situation in Mali is and illustrates
how terrorist organizations can exploit instability
and insecurity. The MNLA represents the long
standing aspiration of the Tuareg, who have a very
difficult relationship with the southern Malians and
often feel they are treated as second class citizens.
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They took the initiative and pushed against the
government in the wake of the coup by Captain
Sanogo last year, and then created the fertile
conditions in which AQIM can operate, the exact
relationship between the AQIM and MNLA is, as
described, always shifting. They are partners of
opportunity, probably don’t share fundamentally the
same goals, as Tuareg is essentially about a
nationalist aspiration whereas AQIM represents a
global jihadist ideological perspective. However, they
have been willing to make common cause some of
the time in Mali, and there is a lot of debate in Mali,
between the Malian, the French and others in the
region about working with MNLA, trying to co-opt
them and divide them from AQIM, but the
government in Mali see the Tuareg threat as more
important than the terrorist threat. This underscores
the volatility and fragility of the situation that
complicates the work of the international
community in helping restore a democratic effective
government in Mali and satisfy at the same time the
aspiration of the Tuareg minority.
The influence of Iran and Hezbollah is less obvious in
the Sahel at this juncture, nonetheless there is
extensive evidence that a lot of foreign fighters are
flowing between the Maghreb, between Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt and that there is a counter flow of
experienced fighters coming from Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Syria into the Maghreb itself. So it’s not
possible to articulate that this is a one way flow of
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
influence; the influence is circular and there are
exchanging experiences, tactics, resources, finances
and weapons in a great movement that really
encompasses an arc of crisis, from the Atlantic all the
way through central Asia, with growing and worrying
actions between all of these groups.
On why the international community has dealt with
Mali in one way and with Guinea-Bissau in another,
two things were stressed: one, most of the
international community recognizes that the AlQaeda threat in Mali has much wider ramifications,
it is a very short boat ride from North Africa to the
Iberian Peninsula and beyond, so it’s not very hard
to imagine the implications of these particularly for
Portugal, Spain and also for the rest of Europe; two,
another difference between both situations is the
French choice to intervene decisively in Mali,
something that continues a long standing pattern of
French role in their former French colonies. GuineaBissau, in contrast, seems not to be recognized
widely by the international community as
representing the same systemic threat, as Mali does.
In Guinea-Bissau there is no one who is prepared to
intervene in the same way as the French have
chosen to do in Mali. The recent arrest by the US of
the former chief of staff of the Guinea-Bissau
military, who is holding in New York with charges of
drug trafficking, certainly represents a significant
increase in the US attention to the problem, but
there is no anticipation that the United States is
going to choose to intervene directly; rather it will
probably work with partner countries, the nations
surrounding Guinea Bissau, to try to strengthening
their ability to contain this problem.
Another challenge is how to think of this problem
beyond the sphere of just Africa, as a transatlantic
challenge, because of the drugs traffic that is flowing
from Latin America, from Brazil, from Colombia to
Africa, and through Africa into Europe. The chief of
staff in Guinea Bissau who was arrested was plotting
with the narco-traffickers to bring weapons back to
Colombia in order to attack the government there,
what shows the connection between criminal
networks and terrorists, who are finding a new
theatre in Latin America. But this is not a problem
that can be thought of in simple terms of one region
or even the regions of Africa and Europe, it has to be
thought in transatlantic terms.
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As Brazil right now is almost entirely focused on
other matters, such as the upcoming World Cup and
the Olympics, it has focused on developing its
maritime patrol resources and shows very little
interest in this transatlantic problem, except in
participating in the Africa Partnership Station – the
Brazilians did send a frigate to participate in the APS
last year. This is an area where Portugal could
possibly take out the role to encourage Brazil to step
up and to deal more forcibly with the drug and
weapons traffic problem across the Atlantic.
Question 2: A second group of questions was about
the nature of the answer to the terrorist threats. As
“spring” revolutions occur on the Arab and the
African soil, the power vacuum they create allowed
for the emergence of extremism of varied colors.
While the European Union, living in a deep crisis, is
answering case by case, sometimes supporting
violent and extremist movements instead of creating
a global coherent policy, the US elaborates
conceptual PPDs, based in values. In the presence of
possible future crisis, the answers the EU and the US
are giving seem to be fragile and too much
diplomatic, instead of showing a strong political and
operational attitude.
The number of US forces deployed in Africa rose
from about 4.000 up to 6.000 recently. They are
deployed throughout the continent, including in
ships off the coast of Africa and 2.000 on the only
permanent US military facility in Africa (in Djibouti),
some in particularly small units in the Maghreb,
assisting the local military and the French to get after
the problem of the terrorists operating in that
region. The Defense NATO ministers recently were
discussing how to respond to the Libyan
government’s request to train 5 to 8 thousand
Libyans, to create the core of a new national army
which is a challenge for the Alliance. The US would
like to see this became a question of multilateral
partnership, to include conducting the actual training
somewhere in Europe, rather than in Libya itself,
because of the security challenge of sending forces
into Libya in large numbers, that could be a visible
target.
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
These numbers and the creation of the AFRICOM
represent for some the US is militarizing its policy
towards Africa. For others, the US is not doing nearly
enough. After more than a decade of constant war
for the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is very little
appetite in Washington for involvement in another
large scale war in the struggle against Al-Qaeda. The
most effective responses to security problems in
Africa seem to come when Africans devise the
solutions and the international community helps
them develop the capability to implement those
solutions that they have created in the context. It is
much better that Chad, Niger, Burkina-Faso, Senegal,
Mauritania work to contain the problem in Mali than
the US or France themselves, taking into account the
consequences of outside interventions, the way
these unfold and how complex they get and the
negative effect they have.
Although the outside response was not as effective
as the threat probably calls for, it seems that the US
response has been more effective than the European
response with the very notable exception of the
French intervention in Mali, probably because not
only of the economic crisis and the inward looking
focus of the EU right now, but also for the fact that
after all the Europeans have participated through
NATO in these wars over the last decade or so, and
they are just as tired as the American people are.
Nonetheless, Europeans and Americans have to face
the fact that this is a persistent threat that is not
going away and needs network solutions to these
networking problems.
Question 3: This group of questions focused on two
aspects: one, about lessons learned in Somalia for
the new security threats in the Sahel, taking into
account the correlation between violent extremism
and international criminal activity with piracy in nongoverned maritime areas; two, on how shall the
present militarization of the US response to African
problems help to solve more long-term issues such as
the de-radicalization of extremist groups, including
youngsters who adhere to militant ideologies more
on search of a salary or a way of subsistence.
A part of the US response to questions of security in
Africa - particularly illicit flows of people and
weapons and contrabands of all forms - should not
have a military response. These are law and
11 IMVF DEBATES 1/2013
enforcement challenges at least in US thinking where
a clear distinction is made between the role of
military and the role of law and enforcement
agencies.
Most of the security problems are law and
enforcement problems for which a military
organization has no mandate to act. AFRICOM have
some authority to act on narcotics and terrorism by
working with the US Coast Guard, which is a Law and
Enforcement agency, on the maritime realm. The
solution lies not so much in strengthening African
militaries as in strengthening Africa law and
enforcement institutions, meaning not only Coast
Guards or Police but also Court Systems. It is no good
to apprehend economic criminals in the Gulf of
Guinea who are bunkering oil in huge quantities and
arrest them – this doesn’t lead to anything, they are
just released when they are on shore, so this
requires the development of an entire legal system
that has to be created in these countries so that they
become able not only to interdict and detain
criminals on the high sea but also to prosecute them
and lead to punishment on land. That is the
approach that governs US strategy for the Gulf of
Guinea problem - some Coast Guard officers are
working in Stuttgart with AFRICOM with the aim to
strengthen the entire legal sector of African
countries. It begins with military operations off and
on, boarding vessels on high seas but bringing them
on the court room or the jail cell.
The second part of the question, is outside the
authority of the AFRICOM, and it means inoculating
large parts of the population against the temptations
of terrorism and extremism, in people living in
desperate conditions looking for answers, looking for
hope, that are often attracted to these ideologies.
USAID has been doing extensive research into these
risk populations in Africa trying to figure out what
makes them out of risk and what proper responses
are. The problem is actually much more fundamental
than simply poverty or the lack of job prospects; the
USAID Officer Transition Initiatives has done some
particularly creative research in this complex area
and it’s really a problem of development, it is a
problem of sociology. It’s not a military problem, is
not something that the AFRICOM, or the US military
or the Portuguese military should be intervening;
these are long term societal challenges and should
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
be understood from that perspective and addressed
in that way. It seems there are not yet very good
answers to fight against the growing popularity of
the extreme views on the Islamic world for a
particular generation, and this remains one of the
fundamental challenges in the coming years.
Question 4: The fourth group of questions was also
about two correlated issues: one, of a more strategic
nature, on how to organize a bi-multi response to the
new threats, meaning a more effective cooperation
between international institutions and states on
security and development issues; a second one, more
operational in nature, if the creation of an African
rapid reaction force to complement the African
Stand-by forces could be a good contribution to the
security in Africa and the Sahel.
There seems to exist a strong correlation between
both issues. AU is very much what the EU was in its
early days. Its aspirations thus far are much greater
than its ability to implement them. There were the
aspirations and the slow growing in the way to
implement them, from the coal and steel community
until the Lisbon treaty and the EU of today. The AU is
somewhere closer to the Coal and Steel Community
and there is a spectrum here until the aspirations
come to something more effective, more ambitious.
Experience shows that the sub-regional
organizations of the AU, ECOWAS, SADC and the
others, have not yet demonstrated the institutional
capabilities to be the vehicles for organizing
multilateral forces. US has its own particular
problems, some of the organizations do not want to
work with America and the US do not work with
some of them – for example, US will not engage with
SADC as long as there is a problem called Robert
Mugabe; ECOWAS was the strongest organization
but now has weakened as a reflection of the
weakening of Nigerian military along the last few
years. So these elegant concepts have not yet the
capability to sustain the burden that a truly
multilateral rapid reaction force or rapid reaction
brigade would impose on them.
So, this is a long term ambition that the US shares
with Africa by working with the regional
organizations to strengthen these organizations at
the regional or at the AU level. But more important
12 IMVF DEBATES 1/2013
is to define how to helping Africa work through the
various real operational challenges. For example,
Angola sees itself as a most important, if not the
most important player in Africa, their ambitions are
enormous. They long to have recognized not only
their potential and their wealth, but what they
perceive as their role. Africa does not need their
battalion of rifle men to form an effective
multilateral response force, where Africa lacks the
strategic lift, air lift, ready to move materials and
troops at long distance quickly: this is something that
Angola possesses. However, they have had a fairly
unhappy history of unilateral attempts to intervene
around the Continent and that has not enhanced
their reputation in ways they would like it to have.
The US role here is to help them think through how
they can make an effective contribution, the ways to
do that and to get those more in line with the AU
approach which indeed will serve not only AU
interests but also the Angola’s. This should be seen
as the famous win-win kind of solution.
Again it comes to a carefully analysis with all the
African states of both their willingness and their
ability – willingness and capability have their tricks,
the military always were taught to think in these
terms, early on at the staff college – you have to
match the two, both willingness and the ability, and
identifying those countries who are both willing and
capable of making a contribution. And when such an
analysis is done, it leads to approach the situations in
different ways: in some cases it is just a matter of
military training, of teaching how to shoot,
manoeuver and communicate; but in others it is
more of a diplomatic response, finding mutually
agreeable ways.
Question 5: A fifth group of questions concerned the
approach on security and development that
according to the Portuguese position, stated into a
national strategy paper, should require an integrated
approach; how the US approaches the 3 “D”
(development, defense, diplomacy), taking into
account the diversity of agencies that operate in the
field and how military operations incorporate other
dimensions, namely development.
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
There is a clear linkage between the 3 “D”. Actually
the correct order should be diplomacy, development
and defense. The US military, any military involved in
these challenges really should be the last resort; it is
not the first response, except in the sense of
strengthening local institutions. Good governance in
the defense sector can only succeed in the context of
good governance more broadly in a country; good
governance meaning respect for the rule of law,
respect for human rights, respect for gender, respect
for civilian control of the military, transparence in
the financial transactions of the government, and so
on.
Governing a country by the rule of law, and not by
the rule of personality, is a necessary foundation to
build strong defense institutions that can deal with
security challenges. Too often in Africa the equation
has been put the other way around: building a
strong army and strong police forces and use them
to solve problems. This only postpones the problems
or imposes solutions when pressure builds
underneath them. Portugal possesses a strategy, the
US doesn’t. The new US PPD 23 is an attempt by
Washington to pull this together and develop an
integrated strategy. Usually everyone talks about
uniformity of effort, whole-of-government
approaches, nobody is in favor of disunity of efforts;
and yet the unity is yet to be achieved. How to get
development and defense working together?
Back to human rights and defense of the rule of law
in African defense institutions, everyone agrees this
is important, everyone agrees the US Africa
Command should play a positive role helping to do
that, and yet no one agrees whether the Defense
Department should be doing that or the State
Department should be doing that or the USAID
should be doing that… When someone says the
military should not do human rights, the military
doesn’t do the rule of law, and so there is neither
clarity on the US government, nor an integrated
approach, although the effort around the PPD 23
intends to be the effort to define that. To do defense
reform, to help African militaries to develop their
culture of respect for the rule of law, right now there
are these prohibitions on USAID working with the
military sector, just as the military is prohibited to
work with Law and Enforcement agencies, but
13 IMVF DEBATES 1/2013
everybody knows that in Africa Law and
Enforcement authority is often given to the military.
There is a lot of conceptual work to do at
Washington to break all these barriers on the US
institutional approach.
But probably the greatest efforts to integrate the 3
“D” remain in Africa. If Portugal has a positive
experience on this, it should share it with the US
Embassy because it will affect embassies all over the
world – this process calls for an integrated country
strategy, which is going to be written by the
Embassies not just in Africa, but all over the world.
That is the only place where the US Government
comes together as a whole in foreign policy: it is at
the level of a country team at the Embassy, where a
strong Ambassador can make the Aid mission, the
Department of Justice people or the Department of
Labor people, the defense organizations work
together and have a single unified approach. But this
is going to be a huge work for the US, a working
process.
Question 6: Round six of questions was again
focused on piracy in Somalia and the Gulf of Guinea,
questioning whether the involvement of Al-Shabaab
and Boko-Haram could lead to an international
intervention in the Gulf of Guinea similar to that in
Somalia, including a naval force if the piracy
escalates to terrorist operations affecting
international interests.
The problems in the two regions seem to be very
different. The situation in the Horn of Somalia is
piracy pure and simple, while in the Gulf of Guinea is
high seas’ criminality, and this is an important
conceptual difference. Piracy is about lawless people
seizing vessels on the high sea and high seas’
criminality is a complex problem. It’s land basis on its
origin, it’s about Nigeria, it has to do with the
Nigerian weak state and there are many people in
positions of power controlling the high seas’
criminality.
NATO intervention in Somalia has been effective;
piracy is down markedly in recent years. It is also
down in the Gulf of Guinea, but once again appears
to be growing. It appears to be related with the end
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
of the amnesty program in Nigeria itself, the
financing to the groups that were given amnesty is
ending and once again they are resuming criminal
activity related to robbing petroleum, both in land
and sea. NATO will not likely respond organizing a
second naval intervention; the proper response
(since a navy response in the Gulf of Guinea would
be attacking the symptoms and not the cause), is to
face the question of institutional corruption and the
weakness of the rule of law in the states of the
region. These are two different sets of problems,
although both of them involving criminal activity at
the sea. Better to organize a response built around
African institutions; the navies are weak there but
the response should be to organize more effective
coast guards law enforcement capabilities, either
than naval capabilities pure and simple.
Question 7: It was asked whether there are security
issues foreseen for the next decade that could affect
direct private investment in Mozambique, taking into
account the growing Islamic influence in that
country.
Mozambique stands now at a crossroad; Renamo
appears to be pressing the government and
threatening to resume the fight from Gorongoza and
the bush. The situation in the East coast of Africa is
complex, taking into account cultural and trade
patterns. The weakness of the states in Mozambique
and Tanzania is troubling and there is a huge
movement of narcotics from central Asia, Pakistan
and Afghanistan, as well as people into Tanzania,
and then moving towards Europe and the West.
What is seen time and time again is the corrosive
impact of that kind of activity, the money that
represents on the state structure. Tanzania is a fairly
successful state, President Quet Masire has done a
great job there, but the kind of money this
represents is troubling, and what this can do to
undermine a reasonable successful state is troubling
- more so in the case of Mozambique where the
state is not that strong, the institutions are not
strong, the economy is not that strong, the kind of
situation is more challenging, as money and drugs
are beginning to flow through and corruption follows
inevitably in their way. It is going to be a challenge in
the coming years, especially when Mozambique tries
to simultaneously develop this massive new offshore
14 IMVF DEBATES 1/2013
resources now discovered.
Thankfully the drug problem did not follow in Angola
what diamonds and oil did; one does not know what
Angola would have become If it faced this sort of
narcotic challenge at the same time as all the other
resources have started to flow at a massive scale on
the course of this last decade. However, one should
not be so much gloomy as one should be thankful for
suddenly Mozambique is confronting this problem of
vast resources. Hopefully some countries, such as
Norway which has a vast track on this, can help them
to manage these inflows in ways that strengthen the
state and foster development, rather than undercut
the state and lead to massive corruption problems,
weakening the rule of law and condemning people
to poverty.
It is going to require a significant intervention by the
international community. When someone from
Washington shows up in Luanda and says “I’m here
from Washington and I want to help”, the reaction is
not 100% welcome given the history of involvement
of US with Angola during the cold war. The US ability
to help Angola achieving common goals improves
when the US works multilaterally. It is less
threatening to Angola, Mozambique or South Africa
if the US partners with them, in their multilateral
processes, rather than trying to bring out US bilateral
processes or to create US multilateral processes.
Partnering with South Africa in ongoing multilateral
maritime exercises or involving India and Brazil is
more acceptable in Pretoria than the US saying “hey
let’s organize a naval exercise together”. Something
similar is probably true with Luanda, where
participation with the US in the multilateral
processes that involves partners with whom the
Angolans feel more comfortable (Brazil, Portugal,
Italy, whoever) is a model that should be looked
collectively more seriously, as a way forward to help
countries addressing the challenges in a way that is
more on their comfort zone, where they feel more
comfortable working. Given Portugal’s historical ties
with these places, it could take the lead on
organizing multilateral efforts, which the US could
then support but not dominate, as domination of the
US is what these countries feel threaten by.
Mozambique is a country the world is not paying
enough attention to, and is one of the coming
challenges.
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
Question 8: the eighth round of questions evolved
around the linkages between security and economic
interests. Will third countries be ready to intervene
on security matters without a vested commercial
agenda? And foreign intervention linked to
commercial interests will not bear the risk to be seen
as foreign occupation? On the other hand, offering
military training to fragile democracies will not result
in armed forces acting at the political level? And how
can we control the transference of civil technologies
that can be used for military purposes?
Security is the fulcrum for many states, but security
can only be thought in terms of the 3 “D”: security
comes more through diplomacy and development
than through defense; at least that is what one
would like to see in the case of Africa. The instinct of
too many African regimes is to put all the emphasis
on defense rather than fund the other 2 “D”, or
improve the level of life of people in those countries.
Perhaps there is a fourth “D” that should be used in
this context that is Democracy. It will be unlikely to
achieve security without a proper development,
democracy and diplomacy as well.
On the question of “who pays and who are the
partners?” there is a need to identify willing and
capable partners. Part of their willingness is
grounded in common values and mutual interests. It
is much easier to think of a longer term security,
developmental, democratic partnership with a
country like South Africa, which has a relatively
strong democratic institutional framework and
where good governance is relatively strong in the
African context. It is much easier to think of
developing a much more enduring partnership with
South Africa than it is with Zimbabwe. When the
military sometimes talk about capacity building as
teaching them how to do this and to do that, one
should ask, for example, if you teach the Burundians
to be snipers what can prevent them to turn the
guns on you the next week, unless you focus on the
building of this enduring relationship?
Why has NATO succeeded so well? NATO exists
today, long after the Soviet Union disappeared as a
threat because it developed those habits of
cooperation, because all of its members share
common values and there is a relatively common
15 IMVF DEBATES 1/2013
perspective on the world. That doesn’t mean there
are not differences in particular issues, but all allies
believe in democracy, good governance, the rule of
law; and if there is not fundamental work to develop
those kind of partnerships with African countries,
than anything one does in the defense area is built
on sand, because it will be eroded the first time the
regime changes, and the regime will be fragile in the
first place, and likely subject to change if it’s not the
kind of stable democracy. Democracy really
represents the best hope for Africa and for the
peoples of Africa. Effective investments in
strengthening democratic institutions and in the rule
of law are the most effective way to build security in
Africa. To the extent that can be done, then African
countries will want to invest less in purely military
park, buying guns, tanks, airplanes, helicopters and
all the nice toys that soldiers like to have. Because
the regimes feel necessary to defend themselves
against their own people in the first instance - which
is after all where this money is spent, not defending
the borders of the nation against some national
external enemy, but really having a strong security
apparatus to defend the regime against its own
people.
The question on dual-use technology is always been
a difficult one, and even more complex in the
information age, when much of the high technology
and much of what is done in terms of security really
relies on informatics, on information, on computers
and networks, and the line between civilian use and
military use is getting ever more blurred.
Question 9: The questions focused on security
situations in the Mediterranean and the Sahel and
the absence of a common international answer,
sometimes with lack of consensus on the nature of
the issues and the response strategies. After the
spring revolutions in the Maghreb and the terrorist
threats in the Sahel, a process of redefinition of EU
policies started with the concept of Extended
Neighborhood implying the extension of cooperation
to the neighborhood of the countries with which the
EU establishes partnerships (the Sahel). The 5 + 5
initiative is developing its Cooperation in the military
and defense spheres, but dialogue is yet to be
effective. How to build a new cooperative concept
and create synergies, among US, EU and NATO to
answer to these new threats?
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
It is possible that things will get worse before they
get better. The recognition that challenges in North
Africa require multilateral solutions is not yet
acquired, as the North African partners don’t yet
recognize the threat, and countries like Nigeria and
Morocco do not yet show the willingness to tackle
these problems; they are still trying to deal with
them independently, internally or see other
problems as more significant and don’t share a
common assessment of the nature and seriousness
of the threat. Possibly things will have to get worse
before they are ready to come to the table and join
with the US and the EU in the kind of multilateral
network solutions that have to be built.
For a countless of times over the last thirty years a
lot of people talked about Marshall plans, but the
main reason why there’s never been a second
Marshall plan is probably because there is never
been a second set of conditions that would make the
Marshall plan succeed. One of the fundamental
flaws of the concept of development,
philosophically, is the idea of applying Marshal Plans
to different situations. The reason why the Marshall
plan worked so well is because Europe already had
the education levels, already had the experience and
the basic business institutions to become
prosperous. World War II simply took away the
means, so one had to restore the means, and the
basic conditions were already there. However, what
is now on the table is to create the basic conditions
and provide the means at the same time, and there’s
a world of a difference between those two models.
The Marshall plan was not just about development,
it was about providing a lone to Europe to get back
on its feet - the bicycles in the factory and everything
else was gone as a result of the war but the
Europeans already had all the knowhow. If the
question was just a couple of billion dollars, the
money could be found, but it is more than that.
Question 10: the last set of questions was around the
nature of the religious war in the Sahel and the North
of Africa.
Since the change in the priorities of International
security induced by the 2001 terrorist attack to the
US, the nature of the terrorist war has been equaled
to a war between radical Islam and the West; this
simplification hides the fact that there is a struggle
16 IMVF DEBATES 1/2013
within political Islam that is possibly more crucial
than the “Huntingtonian” civilization clash. This kind
of struggle is evident in the Sahel and the North of
Africa and what is at stake is the existence of
opposite concepts about the relationship between
religion and politics. So, when someone asks
whether Hezbollah and Iran are involved in the
Sahel, one misses a fundamental point, the point
that the Shiite interpretation is considered an enemy
to the radical Sunni groups acting in that region. If
we add to this situation last week decision in the EU
Council to approve bilateral military help to the
opposition (mostly Sunni) groups in Syria, we see
some European countries disregard the probable
route those guns will follow to the hands of
extremist anti-western terrorist groups attacking
western interests and European people as it has
occurred in Libya. We are, therefore, in the presence
of a complex mix of security and strategic
conundrum where what goes in Middle East ends in
the Sahel and the African vicinities.
So, how does the US look at the situation in the
Sahel? What should effectively be considered a
greater danger, the Iran and Hezbollah or the radical
extremism of Al Qaeda kind of groups – which by the
way were initially trained and armed by the
Americans in Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight
against the former USSR)? How does the US see this
ongoing struggle within political Islam? A second
question that ultimately relates with the region we
are discussing has to do with the broad security and
economic implications of the US decision to attain
self-sufficiency in the production of oil and gas by
2020, taking advantage of the new technologies used
in Shell deposits – is this decision changing the course
of the relationship and the US strategic positions
towards the Middle East?
Samantha Powers became well known when she
wrote a book about the genocides in Africa called “A
problem from Hell” - probably she chose the wrong
subject for that title, because the issues we are
talking about are really the problem from hell,
because “we are dammed if we do and damned if we
don’t”: we are in hell either way. The various tensions
within the Islamic world, between the Shias and Sunnis,
Wahhabis and Salafis and all the other different
tendencies actually represent two different visions not
only in religion, but of governing of the state.
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
Iran clearly sees itself as a nation state in the first
instance, a deeply religiously founded nation state,
but a nation state above all else, not part of some
larger Islamic caliphate (as it is really the aspirations
of Al-Qaeda, to recreate the caliphate and to export
Islam again to the world, in some aspects recreating
the earlier success of Islam in the centuries after
Mohammed).
Do Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the other
sort of traditional nation states really have more in
common than what divides them, even if they don’t
see it because they look at it from religious
perspectives? And if that is the case, how do the
outsiders articulate that in a way that actually permit
them to see it and to agree with it, to recognize that
the goals of Al-Qaeda movements are actually more
a threat to them that it is to others? This provides a
very interesting perspective to reimagine responses
to the immediate violent extremist threat that is
complicated further by the fact that Iran plays both
sides of this issue - they certainly have shown that
they are no friends of Al-Qaeda, they have shown
that they are no friends of the Taliban, they have not
acted decisively to hurt the US in Afghanistan over a
decade now, because the US presence there is less
of a threat to Iran than the Taliban state was. The
present US relation with Iran has a lot of
particularities that go back to 1979 where the US
traditionally had more in common. Iran was one of
US bastions of relationship with the Middle East – it
may that the answer for being foes lies with the US
so much as it lies with Iran.
The oil and energy question is also very crucial, as it
is obvious that if you could develop alternatives to
Middle Eastern oil, the Middle East will fall away as a
geostrategic issue. In the same way, Russia becomes
less important, less powerful, if the Russian oil and
natural gas supplies that Europe depends on, are
substituted by other forms of energy. We are
probably witnessing a geostrategic shift in the
balance of power globally, as the discovery of shell
gas start to minimize the importance of the holdings
of the Middle East and Russia; now, is not enough to
make a go away completely… We all know if it took
Saudi Arabia off the oil grid, the world will collapse,
because they still represent a huge proportion of the
energy consume; but the shift is beginning.
17 IMVF DEBATES 1/2013
The interesting questions are: will the environmental
concerns lead to the American government for
example not developing these new shell gas
resources? People will oppose the fracking
technology when they debate, or not? The American
sort of love affair with the automobile may lead to
the conclusion that the US will develop the shell gas
and probably develop on a scale that allows major
exports to Europe and thereby minimize Russia
ability to use gas as a geostrategic weapon against
Europe. The reasons why the CEO of Exxon or Mobil
are not bending the future of their corporations on
the cleaning asset, behind developing alternative
energies, tells us how American industry has lost
sight of a sort of corporative responsibility and is
totally focused on answering the shareholders
bottom line today.
DINÂMICAS POLÍTICAS E MILITARES NO SAHEL
3. BIOGRAPHY NOTE
About the Speaker
Christopher Dell a senior U.S. diplomat is Deputy to
the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA)
of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).
Ambassador Dell was appointed as the civilian
deputy to the Commander on September 15, 2012.
As U.S. Africa Command’s DCMA, Ambassador Dell
directs the command’s plans and programs
associated with health, humanitarian assistance and
de-mining action, disaster response, security sector
reform, and Peace Support Operations. He also
directs Outreach, Strategic Communication and
AFRICOM’s partner-building functions, as well as
assuring that policy development and
implementation are consistent with U.S. Foreign
Policy.
Previously, he served as the Ambassador to the
Republic of Kosovo from 2009 to 2012. He served as
Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy Kabul from
2007 to 2009. Prior to that, Ambassador Dell was the
Ambassador to the Republic of Zimbabwe from 2004
until July 2007, and from 2001-2004, he was the U.S.
Ambassador to the Republic of Angola.
A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, with
the rank of Career Minister, Ambassador Dell also
served as the Chief of Mission, U.S. Office, Pristina,
Kosovo from 2000 to 2001. Prior to this post, he was
the Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Sofia,
Bulgaria from 1997 to 2000; Deputy Director, Office
of Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of European and
Canadian Affairs from 1994 to 1996; and Deputy
Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Maputo,
Mozambique from 1991 to 1994.
In addition, Ambassador Dell served as Special
Assistant to the Under Secretary for International
Security Affairs from 1989 to 1991 and as Executive
Assistant to the Special Negotiator for Greek Bases
Agreement, Bureau of European and Canadian
Affairs from 1987 to 1989. Ambassador Dell was also
the Desk Officer for Spain and Portugal, Bureau of
18 IMVF DEBATES 1/2013
European and Canadian Affairs from 1986 to 1987;
Staff Assistant, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
from 1985 to 1986; Political Officer, U.S. Embassy,
Lisbon, Portugal from 1984 to 1985; Vice Consul, U.S.
Consulate, Oporto, Portugal from 1983 to 1984; and
Vice Consul, U.S. Consulate, Matamoros, Mexico
from 1981 to 1983.
Ambassador Dell has received numerous awards,
including the Ibrahim Rugova Peace Medal by the
President of Kosovo, Kosovo’s highest order. He also
received the Meritorious Service Medal of the
Kosovo Security Force for his contributions to the
development of the KSF upon the completion of his
service in 2012. Ambassador Dell was awarded the
Presidential Distinguished Service Award in 2004 and
in 2003 he received the State Departments Robert C.
Frasure Award for his role in helping Angola through
the aftermath of its civil war. In 2000, the President
of Bulgaria granted Ambassador Dell the Order of
the Madara Horseman, First Degree. Ambassador
Dell also received a Kellett Fellowship from Columbia
University (for study at Oxford University) in 1978.
Ambassador Dell graduated in 1980 from Balliol
College, Oxford University, where he earned an
M.Phil. degree in international relations. He received
his B.A. in 1978 from Columbia College, Columbia
University, where he graduated magna cum laude
and Phi Beta Kappa. He is fluent in Spanish,
Portuguese, and Bulgarian.
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cultura dos países de expressão oficial portuguesa.
ABOUT IMVF
Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF) is a private foundation and a Non-Governmental
Development Organization (NGDO) that carries out humanitarian aid and economic, cultural and
social development cooperation and education. It also conducts studies and produces scientific
papers on several fields of knowledge, and promotes and disseminates the culture of countries
whose official language is Portuguese.
Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr
Rua de São Nicolau, 105
1100-548 Lisboa
Portugal
Tel.: + 351 213 256 300
Fax: + 351 213 471 904
E-mail: [email protected]
www.imvf.org