Security, Geopolitics, or Irredentism?
Explaining Russian Foreign Policy
from a Neoclassical Realist Perspective
Alex Reichwein
Justus-Liebig-University Giessen
Giessen Graduate Centre for Social Sciences, Business, Economics and Law (GGS)
([email protected])
Paper to be presented at the
57th ISA Annual Convention 2016
“Exploring Peace”
Atlanta, GA
March 16th – 19th, 2016
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„Arguably Russia is becoming status quo-oriented
now that it has shown its resolve in the Southern Caucasus.
(Mouritzen/Wivel 2012: 198 in their book on the Russo-Georgian War)
Introduction
At the latest after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, Russia is back on the map of international
politics a a great power. But, what drives Russian foreign policy? Why did Russia fight war against
Georgia? Which motives are at the bottom of the Russian annexation of the Crimea 2014? And what
about Moscow's Eurasian project? Is it all about purely security concerns and security policy by
means of balance of power- (Waltz 1979b), or balance of threat- (Walt 1987, 1992), or regional
hegemony-strategies (Mearsheimer 2001, 1990) against potential challengers and competitors in the
region, as neo-realists and structural realists argue? Is it a new geopolitics and seeking for a new
sphere of influence? Or is it ideological driven foreign policy in the name of Russian irredentism, a
power politics which is nearly perfectly disguised by politics of international law
(Völkerrechtspolitik) as “humanitarian intervention” to “protect Russian civilians” under the
umbrella of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, as Moscow's official statements let
hypothesise? This remains puzzling to analysts, and what we need are models of explanation. This
paper, in general, aims to contribute to the current debate on Russian foreign policy in the discipline
of International Relations (IR). The starting point is the prevailing approach in contemporary
foreign policy theorizing and analysis (FPA) in the U.S. (Lobell/Ripsman/Taliaferro 2009; Rose
1998) and even in Europe (Reichwein 2012; Toje/Kunz 2012): Neoclassical realism (NCR) leaves
neo-realist and structural realist approaches behind, and overcomes too parsimonious and limited
explanations of either power-/threat-balancing or regional hegemony-seeking by focusing on the
complex relationship between security concerns and a combination of domestic and cognitive
factors all driving and shaping a state's foreign and security policy, and by integrating the systemic
level and the intrastate level into one single multi-framework of explanation in order to offer an
enhanced tool for foreign policy analysis (Rathbun 2008; Reichwein 2012; Rose 1998) and to
explain a state's foreign policy.
In a first step toward a more nuanced and European NCR (Toje/Kunz 2012), Mouritzen
(2007, 2009) and Mouritzen/Wivel (2012b, 2012f) contributed in a twofold manner by bringing
alleged “lessons of the past” into the domestic politics-level (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012b: 44-46), and
by presenting a completely new level of explanation focusing on a state's environment, “proximate
power concerns” and spheres of influence (in Eurasia), thus geopolitics (which was rejected even
by realist in the postwar era for political reasons), on the agenda (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012b: 7/8,
24/25, 33-39), because “as neoclassical realists took the reasonable step of adding factors to the
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systemic perspective, they elegantly jumped over the spatial factor and landed in states' domestic
societies and decisionmaking procedures” (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012: 8). And both remedy this
omission by inserting an interstate level of analysis between the systemic and the intrastate levels.
In other words, enhanced NCR enables us to link the international system (in which a state holds a
certain position because of its power capabilities and its constraints on state behaviour), the
interstate relations (geopolitics of the regional power in the shared neighbourhood in order to
establish a sphere of influence) and instrastate factors (including policy-makers' interests and
(mis)perceptions, domestic state institutions and politics, and factors such as ideas and identity all
guiding the foreign policy of a state in particular historical constellations) together. In a second step
towards enhancing the NCR framework, the paper asks for further factors on the intrastate level
guiding the foreign policy of a state. Therefore, it is providing the scene, and it is arguing the
rationale of my research by rather presenting theoretical arguments than detailed empirical case
studies, and should be read as the introduction and first step to my work on Russian foreign policy
in the Putin era.
A briefly state of the art
Beside the inspiring book Explaining Foreign Policy: International Diplomacy and Russo-Georgian
War (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012) on which I tie up, we have a wide range of - more or less - realist
analysis of the Russo-Georgian War and the foreign policies of both states (Allison 2008, 2009;
Asmus 2010; Cornell/Starr 2009; Eberhardt 2008; Mikhelidze 2009; Rich 2010; Tsygankov/TarverWahlquist 2009). But, there are only a few realist contributions to the Russian intervention in the
Crimea so far. Nearly all scholars are presenting rather neo-realist and structural realist
interpretations focusing on the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war for Europe, the relations
between Russia and the U.S., and power shifts in international politics as such (see also
Rauch/Wurm 2013) than detailed analysis of Russian (or Georgian, or Ukrainian) foreign policy.
And most articles are rather comments than analysis: Either some realists make the point that they
had always known what will happen since the Ukraine has given up its nuclear options in the 1990s,
that expectable war is also the West's fault, and that we all may have had known what will happen
(Mearsheimer 1990, 1994, 2014; Walt 2016). Or, quite the contrary, some scholars make the point
that realists are totally wrong in their misreading of the Ukraine war (Motyl 2015a, 2015b). Some
articles rather make the point that realism and its different approaches (classical realism, structural
realism, neo-realism, neoclassical realism) are well prepared to deal with Russian foreign policy as
such (Wieclawski 2011). Other articles such as Realism in Russian Foreign Policy: The Crimean
Case (Maitra 2014) just focus on “the return of the Great Power Rivalry-thesis (see also Schweller
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1999). And yet other articles try to explain the Russian-Ukraine War with the help of Waltz' neorealist balance of power- (Rynning 2015) or Walt's structural realist balance of threat-theory (Bock
2015; see also Schweller 2003b), and argue in favour of these theoretical approaches for theoretical
and political reason. Finally, the PhD thesis EU-Russian Competition in their Shared
Neighbourhood: A contest for Ukraine (Smith 2015) is rather a detailed empirical study on the
competition between security and profit-maximization logics in Russian and Ukrainian and EU's
foreign policy with some theoretical implications than a detailed and systematic theoretical analysis.
In need of an enhanced theoretical framework
Beside Mourizen and Wivel, there are only two articles dealing with Russian foreign policy from a
neoclassical realist perspective so far: Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security
through the lens of neoclassical realism (Kropatcheva 2012) is on Russian foreign policy towards
the West, cooperative and non-cooperative tactics, and the factor of prestige and status (see also
Wolf 2011; 2014) in Russian foreign policy. And Reviving the Russian empire: the Crimean
intervention through a neoclassical realist lens (Becker/Cohen/Kushi/McManus 2016) argues that
although many policy-makers and IR/FPA scholars maintain that international norms have altered
the motivations underlying state behaviour, it may be argued that states continue to pursue national
self-interest, but no longer solely by military force, but with the help of economic and normative
strategies (which is a very interesting argument in light of Russian humanitarian reasoning of
interventionism).
Again, what is currently missing in these debates, however, are neoclassical realist analysis
of Russian foreign policy in light of the Russia-Georgian and the Crimean War which deal with the
complex relationship between security concerns, geopolitics, domestic politics and irredentism as a
sort of state ideology (the only neoclassical realist who works on the factor of ideology so far is
Schweller 2009, but with a focus on fascist Germany, Italy and Japan in the 1930s). In other word,
what we need is a further development of the NCR framework of analysis which pays realist
attention to ideological driven, but morally or, as in the Russian cases, legally disguised power
politics in order to offer comprehensive and fruitful explanation of contemporary Russian foreign
policy. Exposing ideological driven foreign policy, and presenting a normative critique of reckless
power politics in the robe of international law, particular moralism or any other pretence, is the core
of Hans J. Morgenthau's classical realism (Morgenthau 1977; see also Gilpin 2005; Mearsheimer
2005; Mearsheimer/Walt 2003; Reichwein 2013) on which NCR ultimately is based.
Structure of the paper
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This paper, in particular, aims to contribute some ideas in this regard. It is divided into four parts. I
start presenting very roughly widely shared explanations and an alternative narrative of both
puzzling cases to be explained, namely the Russo-Georgian War and the intervention in the Crimea
(I.). I continue by arguing the rationale of realist explanations of Russian foreign policy, and why
NCR is best equipped and well-prepared to explain Russian foreign policy (II.). Following this, I
provide the scene by presenting the theoretical context and purpose of my research, and thereby
arguing in favour of NCR as a foreign policy theory. This part introduces the state of the art of NCR,
and its explanatory power and added value compared with neo-realist and structural realist
approaches. But it also adverts to and points out NCR's blindness and weakness for certain factors
which are (in particular in the Russian case) important in order to analyze and explain a state's
foreign policy (III.). Finally, I outline my future research agenda, namely revisiting NCR and
elaborating an enhanced theoretical framework of realist FPA in the above-mentioned sense (IV.).
I.
Explanatory Objects: Russian puzzling Interventions in Georgia and the
Crimea
I start presenting very roughly widely shared explanations and an alternative narrative of both
puzzling cases to be explained, namely the Russo-Georgian War and the intervention in the Crimea.
The Russian-Georgian War 2008
On 8 August 2008, the Russian army and air force attacked the territory of Georgia through Russian
North-Ossetia and the Russian-dominated South-Ossetia, an autonomous region in Georgia with a
Russian majority and a Russian-friendly government in its de facto capital Tskhinvali. Foregone had
been riots in South-Ossetia and the Russian-oriented autonomous Republic Abkhazia between proGeorgian and Abkhazian and Ossetian pro-Russian paramilitary forces 1 , and Georgia's puzzling
nighttime bombing of Tskhinvali (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012c). Because of the well-prepared Russian
full-scale military response (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012d), Georgia had sustained a remarkable defeat,
and Russian troops had been entered on Georgian territory, and marched in the direction of the
capital Tbilisi. After Russian victory and following withdrawal, the status of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia as autonomous and Russian-controlled republics have been confirmed by the governments
in Tqvarcheli and in Tskhinvali and the Kremlin.
For most realist commentators and analysts, Russia's attack was because of security concern
and protection of borders, because Georgia was not only the military strongest competitor emerged
1
For the historical roots of the Georgian-Russian conflict, see Mouritzen/Wivel 2012a: 9-16.
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from the former Soviet Union, but also an ally of the U.S. since the 1990s, member of a NATO
partnership program and member of the Coalition of the Willing during the Iraq War (2003), and
associated with the EU (Matveeva 2013). According to theoretically more sophisticated neo-realist
and structural realists, the scenario of Georgia's NATO membership, resulting in NATO's military
presence at the Russian borders, are seen as a security threat in Moscow, and the answer of a
rational actor being challenged or threatened is either a balance of power- or a balance of threatstrategy. From Mearsheimers offensive realist approach, it may be argued that Georgia has
underestimated Russian military strength, taken the alleged opportunity, and failed disastrously
(Mearsheimer/Walt 2003 reminds of Iraq's misperception of Iran's military strength after the Islamic
Revolution in 1979, leading to the First Gulf War), which, according to neoclassical realists, is a
prime example of misperception in foreign policy and its consequences. Other realist inspired IR
scholars argue that Russia's intervention was a revisionist “return of history” (Kagan 2008) in order
to widen Russian territory, and it resembles and reminds on Hitler-Germany's annexation of the
German-dominated Sudetenland in 1938, and the following end of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty
and territorial integrity, or the Soviet Union's interventions in Budapest 1956 and Prague 1968 in
order to stop democratic oppositions (Lukes 2009). And yet other realists, such as Mouritzen and
Wivel, elaborated that Russia's first major military intervention since the collapse of the Soviet
Union can be seen as a new Russian strategy of geopolitics in the shared neigbourhood, and a
challenge to an American dominated unipolar world order (Putin 2012), and as Moscow's grand
strategy to establish a new Russian sphere of interest in Eurasia between the EU and China
(Mouritzen/Wivel 2012e, 2012f). In his Munich speech, Russia's president Vladimir Putin very
clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with the U.S. hegemony since the end of the Cold War, and U.S.
military presence in the region (Putin 2007). Against this background, the Georgian-Ossetian
conflict presented an opportunity to put its foot down, and to create precedents towards a Russian
sphere of influence in the Caucasus and towards a multipolar world with different spheres of
interest. However, Moscow legitimised the military intervention with reference to international law
and by humanitarian reasoning, namely “protecting Russian civilians in South-Ossetia and
Abkhazia against prosecution, punishment and genocide“.
The Crimea Intervention 2014
On 10 March 2014, covered operating Russian special-forces invaded Ukrainian territory and
occupied the Crimea. On 16 March 2014, a referendum was held which resulted in the annexation
of the Crimea and the “integration” into the Russian Federation. The majority of the Crimea
population is Russian (between 60 and 65 percent, according to the U.N.). Already at 27 February
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2014, the regional parliament in the capital Simferopol had installed a pro-Russian government and
administration. Foregone was a struggle for power in the Ukraine between the government and the
opposition in February and March, the “Euromajdan Revolution“, and the demission and escape of
pro-Russian President Wiktor Janukowytsch. In March and April, pro-Western President Petro
Poroschenko und Prime Minister Arsenij Jazenjuk have been elected, but a bloody war in the EastUkraine between pro-Russian militia (who are under a cloud to be supported by Moscow) and the
Ukrainian army broke out. According to the United Nations (U.N.), more than 3000 soldiers and
civilians have been killed in the region of Lugansk and Donetsk until today.2
For most realist commentators and analysts, Russia's attack in the Ukraine is puzzling. The
Ukraine, even under the new pro-Western government, did not really threaten Russia's security, and
there was no necessity for border protection, or strategies of roll-back, or power- or threatbalancing. Some other realists in the U.S. are convinced that Russia's second intervention was the
next step towards a revisionism in order to widen Russian territory and power. And to yet others, it
makes sense to argue that Russia's second major military intervention since the collapse of the
Soviet Union can be seen as confirmation of Mouritzen's and Wivel's thesis of a new Russian
strategy of geopolitics in the shared neigbourhood, and the establishment of a new Russian sphere
of interest in Eurasia. From Mearsheimer’s offensive realist approach, it may also be argued that
Russia, seeking for regional hegemony in its shared neighbourhood, has estimated Ukrainian
political and military weakness because of the intrastate power competition between the
government and the opposition correctly, taken the cheap opportunity, and succeeded. Anyway,
some theoretically sophisticated neoclassical realists may argue that Putin has waged a war for
domestic reasons in order to demonstrate power, and to mobilize what neoclassical realists name
national support and cohesion, and state power (see Reichwein 2012: 44-47) as a resource against
the growing democratic opposition in Russia. However, again, Moscow legitimised the military
intervention in the Crimea with reference to international law and by humanitarian reasoning,
namely “protecting Russian civilians in the Ukraine against prosecution, punishment and genocide”.
“Protecting Russians” – Russia, humanitarian intervention, and the use of the R2P
I argue that Russian interventionist foreign policy can also be explained and classified as a new sort
of “Western styled” ideological driven foreign policy – disguised by international law and alleged
humanitarian reasoning. In the last years, we can identify at least two cases of authoritarian
interventionism in the name of “human rights” and “the protection of civilians”: Russia's
intervention in Georgia (2008) and the Ukraine (2014) (Hansel/Reichwein 2016). Russia and the so
2
For the historical roots of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, see Kuzio 2007; Snyder 2004, 2015.
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called Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an binding U.N. norm (see Stahn 2007) to protect civilians
against war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide is a very peculiar case
(see Burai 2016, Kurowska 2014). At first glance, one may think that Russia is an opponent of the
R2P, because in the 1990s, it was a reliable opponent of Western humanitarian interventions in the
“internal affairs” of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Kuhrt 2014). But, at second glance,
Russia's R2P policy is much more ambivalent. Between 2001 and 2005, Russia did neither oppose
the core idea of the responsibility to protect, nor proceedings and establishment of the R2P within
U.N., nor has it avoided to refer to the R2P since its institutionalization after the World Summit
2005 (Bannon 2006; Loges 2013). Quite contrary, the Russian government and Moscow's diplomats
played an active part in the debates on the R2P, and they were successful in introducing a particular
old understanding of the R2P as minority protection by regional and great powers.
The Russian position essentially boils down to a irredentist version of conditional
understandings of sovereignty. Yet in contrast to Western powers, these aberrations from absolute
understandings of sovereignty are not always overtly displayed. Thus, Russia (like China) keeps
presenting themselves as a legalistic and pluralistic (see Brock 2005; Jackson 1995) advocate and
guardian of Westphalian notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity (Lavrov 1999). According to
Russian (and Chinese) diplomats, the responsibility to protect civilians lies primarily with the
governments of the countries (plural!) concerned, and individual states and national governments
(and not the U.N. collectively) are the key players in R2P affairs:
We favour the interpretation of the concept of the responsibility to protect in accordance with
the final document of the 2005 summit (GA resolution 60/1), as a responsibility of each State to
protect those individuals under its jurisdiction – protection from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. Moreover, it is the United Nations and the Security
Council that bear the task of supporting those national efforts. (Russian statement to the R2P, 27.
May 2008, S/PV. 5998: 16, cited according to Loges 2013: 313)
At the same time however, the Russian government it is eager to stress the quasi-executive
functions of the U.N. Security Council (SC), and the veto position of the Permanent 5 Members (P5)
(Kuhrt 2014; Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2008). As one of the P5, Russia
sees itself as a great power responsible for peace, security and stability in its shared neighborhood
(the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia, Belarus, the Caucasus, and the Baltic States) (Mouritzen/Wivel
2012c; Romanova/Pavlova 2012). Therefore, Russia is avoiding (and opposing) any development
that could minimize its power and influence as one of the P5 within the U.N., and its voice
opportunity over the R2P and its definition, implementation and application (Gestaltungsmacht).
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Moreover, Russia is avoiding (and opposing) any politics that could limit its latitude and freedom of
action. This is why Moscow is very sceptical concerning any institutionalized and binding character
of the norm, any obligatory commitment to intervene in ex ante defined cases. Quite contrary,
Russia underlines the fact that every single conflict has its own specifics, and therefore must be
evaluated separately in a given historical/political context. More important though, the commitment
to sovereign equality and territorial integrity is not only constrained by great power responsibilities,
but also by the existence of transnational cultural and ethnic ties. Thus, former President Dmitri
Medvedev, already in 2006, warned that
Protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable
foreign policy priority of our country […]. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any
aggressive acts committed against us (quoted in Shapovalova 2011: 170).
Putting words into action, three years after the U.N. World Summit when the R2P had been adopted
as binding international law, Russia did intervene in Georgia in 2008, and in the Ukraine in 2014. In
2008, Russian troops supported the pro-Russian militas in South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, which both
had been autonomous republics within the territory of Georgia and which both are now de facto
states. The intervention was justified by the government in terms of peace-keeping and
humanitarian reasons, namely to “protect suffering Russian civilians” (Medvedev 2008). What is of
high importance is the government's justification for the war as a necessary intervention to end “a
genocide against South Ossetians and to protect Russian civilians” (Kuhrt 2014). Clearly, the
language used by the Russian government and Russian diplomats was resembled Western liberal
arguments to justify the bombing of Serbia in 1999. Even more striking, Russia explicitly cited the
Kosovo precendent as reason why the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in 2008 was legitimate (Allison 2008; Kuhrt 2014).
In the case of Russian's intervention in and its annexation of the Crimea in February and March
2014, Putin also referred to the Kosovo case in a twofold manner: According to the Kremlin, the
intervention of Russian troops in the territory of the Ukraine was necessary to “prevent a genocide
against Russian people”. Russia invoked its idea about the core of the R2P, namely preventive
humanitarian intervention in order to protect Russian minorities and citizens from discrimination,
crimes and punishment, and death:
If we see such uncontrolled crime spreading to the eastern regions of the country [Ukraine],
and if the people ask us for help, while we already have the official request from the
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legitimate president, we retain the right to use all available means to protect those people […]
with whom we have close historical, cultural and economic ties (President Vladimir Putin,
quoted in Coicaud 2015: 173-174).
Moscow underlined the necessity and right of secession and independence of the Crimea from the
Ukraine with regard to Kosovo's separation from Serbia in 2007 (Kuhrt 2014). Defending the
absorption of the Crimean in his Address to the State Duma in March 2014, Putin explained:
Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent
our Western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they
agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is now
doing, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country's central authorities
(Vladimir Putin, quoted in Coicaud 2015: 174).
To sum up: Russia uses a humanitarian language, referring indirectly to the R2P and directly to the
Kosovo precedent, in order to justify military interventions abroad (which can also be seen as an
instrument for a policy of irredentism) and to disguise Russian power politics in the shared
neighbourhood. Russia's expropriation of the R2P language and idea can be interpreted as a way in
which Russia hold up a mirror to the Western humanitarian interventionism. But, it can also be
interpreted as a new, interest- and power-driven authoritarian interventionism in humanitarian robe.
Against this background and understanding, in the following two parts, I argue the rationale of a
realist analysis and explanation of Russian foreign policy (II.), and in particular the use of the NCR
framework with a focus on security concerns, geopolitics, and ideology (III).
II.
Why Explaining Russian Foreign Policy through the Lenses of Neoclassical
Realism
I continue by arguing the rationale of realist explanations of Russian foreign policy, and why NCR
is best equipped and well-prepared to explain Russian foreign policy. Beside the argument that
Russian foreign policy is power politics, and realism is a theory about power politics (Reichwein
2015: 102), there are at least three further reasons for a neoclassical realist analysis of Russian
foreign policy: (1) The role the realist tradition and its different approaches play in the Russian IR
discipline. In order to get attention in the academic and public sphere in Russia (and in the U.S.) for
this kind of research, and in order to start a fruitful debate with Russian (and U.S.) IR scholars
dealing with Russian foreign policy (most of them being realists) mean to speak the same
theoretical language. (2) The character of the foreign policy decision-making process and the fact
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that Russian foreign policy makers, institutions and elites believe in power politics, and classify
Russia's foreign policy as a “realist approach”. (3) And the characteristics of Russian foreign policy,
and the challenges coming along with this for a neo-realist and structural realist approaches.
Realism as dominant IR theory in Russia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, and in the course of a liberalization of research and
the marketplace of IR theories, Marxism lost its centrality in the Russian social sciences and IR
studies, and realism acquired a central role in Russian IR. According to Russian IR theorists, this
was first and foremost a result of absorbing and reproducing Western IR debates (in particular the
U.S. debate). But there other reasons for the rise of realism in the new Russian IR community. One
is that realism and realists’ affirmative understanding of power became a kind of ideology and
mobilization factor in order to get the Russian population's support for a power-oriented Russian
foreign policy. Critical IR scholars such as Alexander Sergounin call Russian realists derzhavniki “those who support the great statehood of Russia“ (Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 236). Even though
there is a heterogeneous group of Russian realists - historical, structuralist, political, sociological,
geopolitical, and polit-economic ones -, neo-realism and its core idea of power-balancing against
competitors and challengers at the global scale (the U.S.) and in the shared neighborhood (China,
Ukraine, Georgia, the Caucasus) became the dominant paradigm in Russian IR in the 1990s and
2000s. But, NCR recently has get more and more attention, but most neoclassic realist inspired
studies are rather empirical rich than theoretical informed (see Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 234-236;
Sergounin 2009). Nevertheless, NCR in Russia is on its rise and can make a distinguished career in
Russian IR, because it provides Russian foreign policy makers with more or less clear foreign
policy instructions. 3 Therefore, sometimes puzzling Russian foreign policy is best analysed and
explained by a sophisticated European NCR framework.
A realist foreign policy machinery and a realist Russian foreign policy
The main characteristic of the political system in Russia is the centrality of the state. In history,
Russia has always been characterized by a powerful state machinery, powerful ministries, and a
powerful presidency (see Trenin/Lo 2005). Accordingly, Russian foreign policy has always been
3
Ironically, the reason for the growing popularity of NCR is not only that it provides Russian foreign policy
makers with more or less clear instructions. NCR is also popular because of the work of U.S. neoclassical
realist and Newsweek columnist Fareed Zakaria (From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's
World Role, Princeton, 1998; The Post-American World, New York, 2008), whose work is translated into
Russian, because of his fairly simplistic realist analysis and his critique of U.S. foreign policy both inspiring
Russian IR scholars to rethink Russian foreign policy, the use of military force, and the soft/smart powerconcept (see Berenskoetter/Quinn 2012) through neoclassical realist lenses (Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 237238).
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regarded as the domain of the Highest Representative: the tsar, the Politburo or the President. And
Vladimir Putin's presidency confirm this tradition of the authority of the Russian President. Putin's
statement in 2010, when he meanwhile became Prime Minister, underlines this: “I was fed up with
making foreign policy” (Putin 2010, cited according to Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 238/239). This
does not mean that the government and the ministries, the parliament and interest groups are
marginalized. They all play foreign policy ball, and the political elite care about foreign policy,
being convinced of all strands of realism as an appropriate foreign policy program for Russian
foreign policy today. Furthermore, the recent political development in Russia, and the power shifts
and transition in international politics (Rauch/Wurm 2013; Mouritzen/Wivel 2012d, 2012e) led to
an all-permeating presence of realist thinking in Russian politics and foreign policy. Sergounin
distinguishes between two approaches in Russian realist thinking: Realpolitik and geopolitics.
Whereas the former rather was a guideline for Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War, the latter
becomes more and more prominent since 2000, because IR scholars and politicians/foreign policy
makers in Russia (which are closer to each other than in Germany or the U.S.) do more and more
care about Eurasia. Geopolitics as a theory conceptualize Russia's sui generis position between
Europe and Asia, and defines a kind of masterplan to establish, control and widen a new Russian
sphere of influence in the European Near Abroad including Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, the
Caucasian Near Abroad including Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian Near Abroad
including Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (see Mouritzen/Wivel
2012d) (Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 236-237).
In sum, it can be stated that Russian realism is very limited in its normative dimension and
claim (Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 249). Realism in Russia is rather an political instrument to justify
Russian power politics abroad and to articulate Russian interests, and to less extend what it once
was founded and established, namely an analytical and critical reflection of foreign policy, and a
normative condemnation of reckless and war-prone power politics, and a call for peaceful and
prudent foreign policy. This misunderstanding and misuse of realism as an ideology to justify a
reckless power politics in the robe of international law, particular moralism, or any other pretence
was exactly what the founder of realism, Hans J. Morgenthau, and other European classical realists
had warned against during their whole academic career and lifetime (see also Morgenthau 1948,
1960, 1962; see Reichwein 2013). Here, beside the analytical core, the normative dimension of the
realist tradition comes into play. Therefore, it is time to bring European realism as an analytical,
critical and normative tradition in IR (Alejandro/Jorgensen/Reichwein/Rösch/Turton 2016) back on
the agenda, and into the Russian IR discourse.
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The triangle of security concerns, geopolitics and ideology: a challenge for NCR
Finally, Russian foreign policy is best characterized by a complex relationship between (1) security
concerns and questions about regional hegemony, (2) geopolitics and a sphere of influence in
Eurasia (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012e, 2012f), (3) and domestic, cognitive and ideological factors in the
foreign policy making process such as the issue of self-perception and identity as either a Western
and European power or not (Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 239/240; see also Trenin 2007), or
irredentism as a state ideology (Hansel/Reichwein 2016).
National security concerns
Therefore, it is not wondering that security thinking in terms of national security of the state and
society (including hard security issues such as military force and counter-intelligence, national
defense, or energy security) is first and foremost about Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity,
Russian anti-terror measures (like in the Caucasus, or in Syria since 2014) and “protecting Russian
civilians abroad”, and that security thinking is pervading nearly all spheres of Russian policy and
society. The omnipresent role of security thinking and power politics in the name of the national
interests become also obvious in basic foreign policy documents of the government. Russian leaders
are always engaged with capabilities, resources (military, economic), and the question which
qualities a great power need to remain competitive towards challengers and competitors. In the
National Security Concept of 2009, the need to guarantee national cohesion and state power is
stressed in order to face threats such as unilateral power of other states. To sum up, Russian politics,
society and foreign policy is over-securitized (Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 243-246).
Polarity, geopolitics and the shared neighbourhood
Russian foreign policy leaders are also engaged with polarity and Russia's geopolitical position and
relations to the shared neighbourhood. In the Russian discourse, there are at least three prominent
positions: Some are convinced that because of its potentials and resources but also his tradition and
history, Russia can recreate its old role of a European power, and try to establish a new multipolar
“European Concert of Great Powers” (see Mearsheimer 1990). Others, advocating for a multipolar
global world, hold the idea of a power balancing-strategy against the U.S. and European states (see
Rynning 2015). Both, Putin 2007 in his Munich Speech and Foreign Minister Sergei W. Lavrov
(2008, 2010), have called for “cultural pluralism and acceptance of various civilizations as the basic
norm of for international relations” and “cooperative multipolarity in the international system” as a
key strategic interest and the ultimate goal in Russian foreign policy (see also Foreign Policy
Concept 2008). Any yet others discuss the idea of what Randall Schweller (2010) has called “the
13
concept of entropy of power”, and what Lavrov has introduced in his speech to the Duma in May
2010 (Lavrov 2010a). According to this concept, Russia seems to pursue a revisionist strategy in a
polycentric world, seeking no longer to be recognized as a part of the West or Europe, but instead
establishing an independent power pole and creating a new sphere of influence named Eurasia. In
another speech in September 2010, Lavrov presented his vision of a world divided in different (and
not overlapping) regional structures and spheres, and he underlined “Russia's responsibility to rule
and, where necessary, to shape them” (Lavrov 2010b) (see Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 242/243, 246248).
Ideas and ideology in foreign policy
Finally, Russia is also a market place of ideas and ideologies in foreign policy. In search for security,
national unity and a new identity as a power pole called Eurasia, the challenge and task is not only
to control Russian territory and borders, and to pursue strategies of geopolitics by creating a sphere
of influence in the shared neigbourhood. The challenge is also to present great strategies and ideas
guiding Russian foreign policy. One idea in the Russian discourse is the reconstruction of the Soviet
Empire (Romanova/Pavlova 2012: 247/248; see also Wohlforth 2001). Another great idea is
irredentism, which includes Russian security at the borders, to expand and widen the Russian sphere
of influence and to strengthen Russian ethnic identity by strategies of expansionist and
interventionist foreign policy disguised as “humanitarian intervention” or “peace keeping” with the
aim “to protect Russian civilians”, as in Georgia 2008 and the Crimea 2014. Accordingly, NCR
whose motto is “Taken systemic determinants seriously, but open the black box state, and bringing
the statesman and state institutions, ideas and perception, and identity and ideology back in
(Reichwein 2012: 36-44; see also Kitchen 2012, 2010; Kunz/Saltzman 2012; Ripsman 2009;
Schweller 2009; Sterling-Folker 1997, 2009) seems to be well-prepared to analyse Russian foreign
policy in the triangle of security concern, geopolitics, and irredentism as a sort of state ideology.
III.
Explaining Foreign Policy: Neoclassical Realism and its state of the Art
Consequently, in the next step, I provide the scene by presenting the theoretical context and purpose
of my research on Russian foreign policy from several alternative analytical angles, or perspectives
within the realist tradition in IR, and thereby arguing in favour of NCR as a foreign policy theory.
This part introduces the state of the art of NCR, and its explanatory power and added value
compared with neo-realist and structural realist approaches. But it also adverts to and points out
NCR's blindness and weakness for certain factors which are (in particular in the Russian case)
important in order to analyse and explain a state's foreign policy.
14
Theories of foreign policy
Theories of foreign policy take as their dependent variable the external behaviour of individual
states. These theories seek to explain what a particular state tries to achieve in the international
scene, why and when the state tries to achieve it, and how the state does so. For that purpose,
theories of foreign policy take both the external (systemic) and the internal (domestic) factors
characterizing or surrounding a state as independent variables. These variables are seen to drive and
shape the foreign policy of a state. In the European literature on foreign-policy analysis, liberal and
neo-realist approaches are strictly separated from each other. Liberalism thus appears much more
distinct from realism than in the U.S. discourse (see Doyle 2008). 4 Whereas many liberal theories,
often with a constructivist input (Müller/Risse-Kappen 1993; Risse-Kappen 1995), stress the
decisive influence of internal dynamics and domestic or cognitive factors on foreign policy at the
unit level (and underestimate the effects of systemic factors and constraints such as anarchy and
self-help on a state and its foreign policy), neo-realist theories and pure systemic explanations of a
state's foreign policy behaviour, in contrast, underline the pivotal influence of systemic-level factors
(and underestimate the internal configuration of the state, internal dynamics, and domestic factors).
According to neoclassical realists, the limitations coming along with this are the result of the
fundamental assumption both approaches hold in terms of either the domestic unit (domestic and
cognitive factors such as the state, state institutions and institutional arrangements, political parties,
economic and societal actors and elites, perception, political culture as a consequence of history,
democratic values, beliefs and ideas such as democracy promotion, human rights protection) or the
systemic level (anarchy and its constraints, leading inevitably and always to balance of power-,
balance of threat- or regional hegemony-seeking behaviour of rational states who are supposed to
have all information and resources and support necessary for such costly power balancing-strategies
available) being the decisive, or even deterministic, single cause of a state’s foreign policy. This
either-or-assumption is embedded within their analyses from the start. It is exactly this separation,
and the limitations coming along with it, that NCR claims to overcome. Neoclassical realists draw
upon insights from both liberal ‘Innenpolitik’ theories and neo-realist foreign-policy theories. 5
4
Legro/Moravcsik (1999) postulate a strict distinction between the great paradigms in IR (realism,
liberalism, institutionalism, and constructivism) and in doing so manage to define them well. This
distinction has been most clearly articulated by Moravcsik 1997. However, following (not sharing) an
emerging IR scholarly consensus, European NCR treats liberalism as distinct from realism as well as from
neoliberal institutionalism (regime theory). The signature argument of liberal theories is that international
relations are best explained on the basis of domestic political arrangements within a state, whereas
neoliberal/regime theories emphasize the causes and effects of institutional arrangements at the
international level on a state's behaviour. For an overview of the literature on different approaches in
foreign-policy analysis, see Holsti 1995; Reichwein 2012; Smith/Hadfield/Dunne 2008.
5
For detailed arguments why NCR is a challenge to liberal (which do not take systemic pressures seriously
15
Overall, however, NCR is best understood as an examination and a further development of neorealist theories (see Rathbun 2008; Reichwein 2012: 32-36, 47-51).
Neoclassical realism as a foreign policy theory
Any attempt which seeks to introduce realism on the FPA theory market must reconsider three
points.
Realism as a foreign policy theory
First of all, there is a debate whether realism is a foreign policy theory or not. Knowing that neorealism and structural realism are both theories of the international system with more (Mearsheimer,
Walt) or less (Waltz was very sceptical about his systemic theory as a foreign policy theory; see
Waltz 1996) implications on the foreign policy behaviour of the states, neoclassical realists argue
that it is possible to derive a foreign policy theory from neo-realism, structural realism and classical
realism (see Elman 1996) 6, whereat classical realism has been created by Morgenthau as a foreign
policy theory (see Myers 1997, 1999; Reichwein 2013; Williams 2007).
One tradition – many theories
Secondly, there is no definitive or single theory of realism. Rather, ‘realism’ is a term with multiple
meanings.
It
is
a
distinctively
European
school
of
thought,
or
tradition
(Alejandro/Jorgensen/Reichwein/Roesch/Turton 2016; Knutsen 2012; Reichwein 2012) in IR which
shapes theorizing about international politics in different ways. In other words, there are many
different (both competing and complementary) realist theories, or approaches. On the one hand, the
multitude of sub-schools (or approaches) within realism share a set of basic assumptions embedded
within them. The realist tradition has been constructed around its main proposition, namely that
politics is a struggle for power among states. Thus, regardless of the differences between them,
Morgenthau’s classical realism, Waltz’s defensive neo-realism, Mearsheimer's offensive structural
realism, or Walt’s balance-of-threat theory all share a common foundation. Yet, on the other hand,
they neither share a common and consistent theoretical framework nor agree about international
enough as the main driving force of a state's foreign policy) as well as neo-realist theories (which are
blind for domestic and cognitive factors also driving and shaping a state's foreign policy) of foreign policy,
and how it overcomes the limitations of both approaches by integrating them into one single framework
of analysis, see Reichwein 2012: 32-36.
6
See Reichwein 2012: 33/34. For the debate on whether realism is a foreign policy theory or not, and the
argument that it is, see also Baumann/Rittberger/Wagner 2001; Brooks 1997; Reichwein 2015; Wivel
2005; Wohlforth 2008.
16
politics.7
Neoclassical realism under construction - a conglomeration of different approaches
Thirdly, NCR is an emerging and, in the meantime, rising approach within the realist tradition, in
particular in the U.S. In his primarily (Rose 1998) and in his updated version (Rathbun 2008;
Reichwein 2008; Schweller 2003a, 2004), it is a theoretical framework (or model, or template) of
foreign policy analysis, characterized by a specific conception of the international system in which
states are embedded, a specific understanding of the role of state leaders' and elites' perception, and
a specific model of the state, its institutions and state–society relations in connection with foreign
policy. In order to reconstruct and to understand the development of NCR, it is necessary to
reconsider Morgenthau’s classical state-centred European realism, Waltz’s systemic neo-realism and
theoretical insights from liberal constructivism (Jervis 1976; Risse-Kappen 1995; Wendt 1992,
1995), and to integrate these approaches into one single framework of analysis. But, even within the
neoclassical realist camp, there is no consensus over whether NCR is in fact representing a coherent
framework of foreign-policy analysis. As already mentioned, Gideon Rose (1998) has indeed
introduced NCR as a coherent realist school of foreign policy which posits a single explanatory
variable and a common set of intervening variables which generates testable hypotheses about state
behaviour. But, a few years later, Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, in contrast, argue that there is no
single and no coherent neoclassical realist theory of foreign policy, but rather a conglomeration of
different approaches (all presented in their book) which have been developed since the mid-1990s
(Lobell/Ripsman/Taliaferro 2009: 8). Indeed, there are debates within the neoclassical camp about
whether the systemic or the domestic level is more important. 8 It is worth mentioning again that
NCR is no coherent framework fixed once and for all. This means that the NCR framework is under
construction and can be supplemented, and that it opens the opportunity for IR/FPA scholars for an
ongoing theoretical development in light of puzzling foreign policies.
However, there are three aspects of their analyses that all neoclassical realists insist are
7
For the differences between classical realism and neo-realism, see: Tellis 1996; Waltz 1988. For an
overview of the variety and richness of realism, see Brooks 1997; Gilpin 1986; Reichwein 2012; Waltz
2008.
8
Some authors, like Schweller (2009), view the role of society and domestic actors as episodic and rare,
and look instead to the systemic factors which shape a state's foreign policy. Others, like Colin Dueck
(2009) and Jason Davidson (2006), contend that domestic actors regularly affect the style and form of a
state's foreign policy. Still others, like Steven Lobell (2009), Mark Brawley (2009), or Benjamin Fordham
(2009), view internal dynamics within the state and the role of domestic actors as increasingly pervasive
and powerful in shaping foreign policy. Finally, Norrin Ripsman (2009), Jeffrey Taliaferro (2009) and
Jennifer Sterling-Folker (2009) construct approaches positing the conditions under which domestic actors
and societal forces will affect foreign-policy choices and implementation (see also Kitchen 2010).
17
crucial: area expertise in specific regions of the world; the knowledge of a state and its bureaucracy,
institutions and history (see Reichwein 2012: 49/50); and the claim to develop a theoretically
elaborated concept of the international system and its constraints, the state and statesmen, and
domestic and cognitive factors driving and shaping a state's foreign policy in different regions
during different eras. Taken together, all three form a precondition for a comprehensive
understanding of a state’s external environment and internal configuration. Thus, neoclassical
realists offer empirically detailed and theoretically informed analyses of the foreign policy of
individual states, in particular the grand strategies of great powers across time and space.
Neoclassical realism as a challenge to neo-realism: combining three levels of analysis
Deriving a foreign policy theory from neo-realism, and taken Waltz's claim for parsimony seriously
(Waltz 1979a), the preference of realist inspired FPA is “explaining much by little” through a
combination of three different level of analysis (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012: 5/6). Therefore, it is argued
that for explanatory purposes, various realist perspectives should be made compatible by the
conscious effort of the analyst, which means that these perspectives should be mutually competitive
and ultimately supplement each other. It is precisely here where NCR steps in and widens the neorealist analytical scope.
Starting from the systemic level
Neoclassical realists incorporate both the internal and the external determinants of state behaviour
into their multi-level framework, albeit the anarchical international system and the distribution of
power among states as core insights from Waltz's neo-realism are ultimately seen to be crucial (but
not sole) factors and independent variables which set broad parameters for a state’s external
behaviour (Reichwein 2012: 38-41). This means that the starting point of neoclassical realist
analysis is the assumption that under the circumstances of anarchy, the distribution of material
power capabilities among states in the international system, and the position a state has in that
system are what matters most, and drives and shapes first and foremost the foreign policy of this
state towards corresponding balance of power-behaviour as a dominant mode of action. This is why
neoclassical realists are still 'realists'. Nevertheless, a neoclassical realists go beyond this valid
neorealist assumption. NCR is a realist type of multi-level game focusing on the interplay of
systemic and unit-level variables in shaping a state's foreign policy. Neoclassical realists accentuate
systemic factors as well as cognitive and domestic factors as a common set of intervening variables
translating systemic constraints into foreign policy.
18
Opening the black box state – and bringing the state, the statesman and perception back in
As classical realists such as Morgenthau once did, neoclassical realists open up the ‘black box’ state,
previously assumed to be closed, in order to draw two intervening variables at the unit level into the
equation, which may drive and shape the foreign policy of a state in directions other than those
predicted by neo-realist and structural realist theorists. In other words, state leaders are assumed to
be constrained in their decisions by systemic as well as by cognitive and domestic factors. These
two variables are both in fact a set of factors:
(1) Cognitive factors, such as state leaders’ perceptions of the international power
distribution, state's intentions and threats in the international environment or the shared
neighbourhood in which a state is embedded;
(2) Domestic factors, in particular state structures and institutions, and domestic actors such
as state leaders and elites, who are the representatives of interests and/or strategic
culture,
and who formulate and implement foreign-policy decisions within specific contexts, and
other internal dynamics in the decision-making process.
(3) Moreover, the degree of freedom of action and the ability state leaders have relative to
their society to mobilize resources necessary for foreign policy play a significant role.
In other words, neoclassical realists such as Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro (2009) examine the
central role of the state and statesman. They seek to explain why, how and under what conditions its
internal configuration intervenes between state leaders’ perceptions of systemic pressures, threats or
opportunities thrown up by the international system and the actual foreign policy those leaders are
likely to pursue as a response to these pressures. In opening the black box state, and bringing
perceptions and state institutions back in, neoclassical realists are able to address the following
questions:
(1) How does a state, specifically the decision-making elite who act on its behalf, assess and
perceive international threats and opportunities? And who decides how to respond to
systemic constraints?
(2) To what extent, and under what conditions, can key domestic actors actually bargain with
state leaders and influence foreign and security policy? Who are the relevant actors within
the state, and which actors have the greatest influence on policy?
(3) How do states go about extracting and mobilizing resources from society, working
through domestic institutions, and maintaining the support of key stakeholders and the
public necessary to implement their chosen foreign policies? How much power do domestic
actors have to obstruct the state when it seeks to mobilize power resources and support?
19
(4) What are the degree of state autonomy and freedom from society, and the level of elite
and societal actor consensus concerning foreign policy?
In a nutshell: NCR offers a transmission belt between systemic stimuli, on the one hand, and the
actual foreign policy a state pursues, on the other (see also Reichwein 2012: 35, 37/38, 42-44).
Explaining different types of behaviour
Moreover, neoclassical realists challenge neo-realist theories because they address the issues of how
and under what circumstances cognitive and domestic factors will impede states from pursuing
expected neo-realist types of behaviour. Neoclassical realists distinguish between different states
and their various foreign-policy strategies and goals. By opening the black box state, and
incorporating domestic and cognitive factors in their analyse, they can explain why some states
pursue a defensive balance-of-power/threat strategy, while others strive for expansion and regional
hegemony, and still others behave in contradiction to neo-realist propositions by pursuing instead
various strategies of underexpansion and underbalancing and bandwagoning that are puzzling in a
neo-realist world (see Reichwein 2012: 37/38, 44-47, 49)
Brief summary: Neoclassical realism as an enhanced approach – to be supplemented
To sum up very briefly: NCR is not a simply supplement, but a further development of European
classical realism and of Waltz’s American neo-realism, and a new approach within the realist school
of thought (for a detailed summary, see Reichwein 2012: 47-49). It has widely been argued that
simplistic, purely power-oriented theories of foreign policy inspired by neo-realism and claiming
the ‘value’ of parsimony are too parsimonious to explain the foreign-policy behaviour of states,
because they only focus on the systemic-level. Therefore, neo-realist theories are in need of
examination. Against this background, it is argued that NCR is an enhanced approach which
overcomes the limitations of neo-realist theories and helps realist foreign-policy analysts to deal
with puzzling phenomena and behavior of even powerful states, which neo-realist theories cannot
explain. In other words, NCR can be understood as a response to the perceived shortcomings of
neo-realist theories of foreign policy. 9
Neoclassical realists’ primary focus is on providing an explanation for the various foreign
policies of individual states. It discusses what are the circumstances under which systemic and
domestic constraints will likely have a major influence on a state's foreign policy? These are
important questions on the neoclassical realist research agenda that cannot be addressed by neo9
For the well-known shortcomings and pitfalls of NCR, which are not discussed here, see Fordham 2009;
Reichwein 2012: 50/51.
20
realist theories of foreign policy. In addressing these questions, NCR fills a gap in the neo-realist
foreign-policy literature in which the ‘black box’ state, as both a political entity and an analytical
concept, is underdeveloped. Neoclassical realists, in contrast, open the black box and develop a well
articulated and theoretically informed concept of the state.
Hence, NCR is not a general theory for which advocates claim universal explanatory power,
as neo-realist theorists do. NCR rather claims to provide analysts with the tools necessary to
understand the complex sources and dynamics of foreign policy by means of a theoretically
informed framework and by means of empirically detailed case studies. Neoclassical realists, like
neo- and structural realists, start from the level of the international system, but incorporate the
domestic level by opening the black box state and bringing the statesman, state institutions and
bureaucracy, society and elite as well as interests, perception, and identity as crucial factors driving
and shaping the decision-making process and the foreign policy of a state back in.
IV.
Neoclassical Realism Revisited: Towards an Enhanced Explanatory
Framework
In an outline of a future research agenda of NCR, Reichwein writes:
A second issue needing further research relates to perceptions. It is one thing to say that
perceptions matter, yet still another to grasp them analytically. With respect to the latter,
operational code about how perception works in the foreign-policy decision-making process
might be of help. In this context, more attention should be paid to how cultural and ideological
factors affect foreign-policy actors, how these perceive their own and others’ capabilities and
intentions, and how such perceptions about ‘we’ and ‘they’ are translated into foreign policy. In
other words, what is the neoclassical realist understanding of history? What do states learn from
the past in order to formulate foreign policy goals today? How do ideas and ideology as further
intervening variables translate systemic factors into foreign policy? (2012: 50).
The Spatial Blindness of Modern Realism
In a first step toward a more nuanced and European NCR, Mouritzen (2007, 2009) and
Mouritzen/Wivel (2012b, 2012f) contributed in a twofold manner by bringing alleged “lessons of
the past” into the domestic politics-level (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012b: 44-46), and by presenting a
completely new level of explanation focusing on a state's environment, “proximate power
concerns” and spheres of influence (in Eurasia), thus geopolitics (which was rejected even by realist
in the postwar era for political reasons), on the agenda (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012b: 7/8, 24/25, 33-39),
21
because “as neoclassical realists took the reasonable step of adding factors to the systemic
perspective, they elegantly jumped over the spatial factor and landed in states' domestic societies
and decisionmaking procedures” (Mouritzen/Wivel 2012: 8). And both remedy this omission by
inserting an interstate level of analysis between the systemic and the intrastate levels. In other
words, Mouritzen and Wivel enables us to explain the cooperative, or competitive, or even hostile
relationship among two or more states within a shared neighbourhood. In this new level of analysis
seems to be very fruitful in view of the empirical cases to be explained. And the enhanced NCR
framework enables us to link the international system, the interstate relations and intrastate factors
all guiding the foreign policy of a state in particular historical constellations together.
Another blindness of neoclassical realism: ideology and foreign policy
The aim of the paper was to provide the scene and arguing the rationale of my research, and to ask
for further factors on the intrastate level guiding the foreign policy of a state, in particular Russian
foreign policy in the Putin era. For sure, it is quite debatable which motives and gains - security
concern, geopolitics, domestic politics, or a new and ideological driven humanitarian
interventionism - drove Russia into war with Georgia in 2008, and what lies behind the Crimea
intervention in 2014. Different and linked realist approaches to foreign policy may help us to deal
with the puzzle and questions.
However, in light of Russian foreign policy in the shared neigbourhood, it is obvious that
there is another critical weakness that NCR has inherited from neo-realism and Waltz: Whereas
Mouritzen and Wivel argue with a spatial blindness of NCR for more proximate power concerns of
Eurasian states (2012b: 7/8), and bring the environment of states, seeking for spheres of influence
and geopolitics as the new interstate level of analysis and explanatory into the NCR agenda, I
conclude in this paper that there is another free site in the intrastate pillar of the NCR analytical
framework: a blindness for ideological factors driving and shaping a state's foreign policy which is
disguised by moral or, as in the Russian case, legalist arguments. In other words, there are very
good reasons to think about Russian irredentism disguised as humanitarian interventionism as a sort
of state ideology and new pattern of a Pan-Russian power politics in order to “save and reunite the
Russian ethnos” and widen Russian territory. This ideological blindness is all the more surprising,
because NCR is also based on the core insights of classical realism about the state, statesmen, and
domestic politics. And the founder of the classical realist tradition in IR, Morgenthau, had warned
against a Wilsonian ideological driven reckless power politics disguised as “moral” or “legalist
approach” in the name of democracy promotion, anti-communism, or humanitarian reasoning.
Realist until today are discussing the pitfalls and perils of this U.S.-styled Liberal Internationalism
22
and Liberal Interventionism (Schweller 2000). Consequently, as I have indicated in the title and
introduction of the paper, and tried to develop through the paper, in light of Russian authoritarian
interventionism and annexation policy, it could be a worthily endeavour to revisit the theoretical
framework of NCR, and to bring the ideological factor back into the realist picture in order to
analyse and explain Russian foreign policy today.
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