Chapter One
The Problems of Liberal Italy 1870-1914
Introduction
Italian Fascism did not just suddenly appear. It had roots in pre-First World War political and
cultural movements, and also in the war itself. Its success cannot be property understood
without considering Italy's political, economic, religious and social development following its
emergence as a unified state in the middle of the nineteenth century. It has been seen by some
historians as the logical consequence of all the weaknesses and defects of the Liberal state
created at unification.
Problems resulting from the Unification of Italy
The emergence of the united Italian state between 1861 and 1870 was the outcome of a
complex series of interrelated processes known as the 'Risorgimento', meaning the resurgence
or rebirth of Italy, stretching back into the mid-eighteenth century. Italian independence and
unification were brought about by a small, dynamic elite, the moderate Liberals led by Camillo
Cavour, and a pre-national state, Piedmont, using the means of diplomacy and war between 18591870. The masses were notably absent from the events which brought about independence and
unification. On the surface it seemed like a good idea but...it aroused amongst politically
conscious Italians exaggerated expectations concerning Italy's immediate prospects of power
and prosperity; and in forging a new nation without involving or satisfying the mass of the
population it threw up a socio-political system riddled with potential weaknesses.
Liberal Italy and its Problems
a) Real and legal Italy
The unified state - 'Liberal Italy' - which emerged from the Risorgimento was largely the
creation of a tiny elite, the northern and central Italian ruling class. The failure to involve the
masses in the movement for independence and unification was to have far reaching
consequences, for the unified state was really two Italys rather than one-'real' Italy and
'legal' Italy. 'Legal" Italy was the King and parliament, the politicians and bureaucrats
concentrated in a distant capital: "real" Italy was the mass of the peasant population. One half
of Italy felt it had been forced into a country and it always resented the elite that had formed
it. Communication between the two was rare and unfriendly. Contact between the two Italys
was most rare in the Southern regions.
b) Failure to tackle problems in the South
The failure of successive governments to solve the appalling problems at the root of peasant
discontent and violence in the South was the result of the alliance which the Northern ruling
class had concluded with its Southern counterpart. This ruling southern class was given a
virtually free hand in its relations with the peasantry and its corrupt control of local
government in return for supporting national government at election time. The peasants of the
South felt they had been betrayed and they were no better off.
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c) Political problems
1) Old Constitution
Given the leading role played by Piedmont during the struggles for independence and unity, it is
hardly surprising that the political system of the new Italy should have been fashioned in her
image. Thus, Italy in 1861 received not a new 'tailor-made' constitution drawn up by a widely
elected constituent assembly but the Statuto, the existing constitution of Piedmont. An old,
flawed Constitution was adopted which was not truly republican in nature.
2) Narrow franchise
Though parliament was undoubtedly Italy's most truly national institution, it was also a weak
flawed one, its main weakness lying in the very narrow franchise which was restricted by age,
gender, literacy, tax and property qualifications to less than 2 per cent of the population. Even
after the electoral reform of 1882 a mere 8 per cent had the vote, (only around half a million
male Italians out of a population of approximately 32 million were enfranchised between 1870
and electoral reform of 1881), whilst between then and the next reform in 1912 the electorate
grew from 2 million to 3 million. In these circumstances, until the suffrage was extended to the
bulk of the male population in 1912, a tiny, exclusive political class ruled Italy whose essential
ideology and economic class interests, prevented the emergence of a party system. Apart from
the Radicals and Republicans, almost all Italian politicians before the First World War were
merely of different shadings of a broadly liberal-conservative fashion. As a result of small
constituencies, electoral corruption and clientelism was commonplace, especially in the South.
3. Coalition Governments
At a national level, political leaders, resorted to 'transformismo', a form of bribing their
opponents, in order to create and sustain parliamentary majorities so they could form
governments. Clientelism, the winning of votes at a constituency level through the distribution
of favours to 'clients', was the other side of the coin of 'transformismo'.
4. Lack of Prestige
It also has to be said that some of Italy's most powerful leaders, most notably Cavour, Crispi,
Giolitti, often treated parliament with scant respect. As a result parliament enjoyed little
prestige, even among sections of the political class itself.
5. Centralised Control
The other most characteristic feature of the new Italian State was the rigid centralised
control of local government through the system of prefect, (provincial governors) and the
police.
Political Summary
The new state, endowed with a limited monarchy, a liberal- parliamentary constitution, a corrupt
central and local political system and a highly centralised administration, was from the start
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resented by many. National consciousness was uneven and, throughout much of rural, provincial
Italy, extremely low; loyalties to fallen dynasties and historic regions persisted, whilst for
millions of peasants the only reality was the locality. As the Piedmontese statesman D'Azeglio
remarked, 'We have made Italy - now we must make Italians.” The Italians as a whole felt
little loyalty to Italy, why should they fight to make it work?
d) Religion
The absorption of papal territories into the new Italian kingdom provoked the papacy into
adopting a hostile posture towards the new state; for the rest of the century most Catholics
took no part in politics. The Liberals' modernising programme led to legislation which took
control of marriage law and education from the Church and severely cut back its property and
legal privileges. But the process of unifying the Italian states necessarily involved the
destruction of the Pope's power: his territorial sovereignty over the Papal States of Central
Italy. Despite all the attempts of Cavour and his successors to find a compromise solution, Pope
Pius IX did not accept the loss of his temporal power (political) and refused to recognise the
Kingdom of Italy. This policy was continued, on a formal basis at least, until 1929. The Roman
Question had damaging consequences for Italy, which Mussolini and the Fascists were
eventually able to exploit. The conflict widened the gulf between 'real' and 'legal' Italy,
because the Church's hostility reinforced the natural diffidence of many of the peasantry
towards the new state. In addition, the Papal decree 'Non Expedit', which forbade Catholics
from participating in the politics of the Italian state, reduced the tiny electorate still further.
But the most damaging effect of the conflict was the way in which it bred a lack of confidence
in and commitment to the parliamentary institutions of the Liberal state among the clergy and
the bulk of the population. Aggrieved by the treatment of the Church at the hands of the
Liberal political class, these groups were eventually to turn to the Fascists to provide an
authoritarian solution to the Roman Question.
e) Economic and Social problems
Italy was a latecomer to the economic developments of the nineteenth century. At her
unification in 1861, Italy was economically backward and underdeveloped. Several factors
hindered economic progress: poor communications, as a result of mountainous barriers, few
navigable rivers or canals and no integrated or fully developed railway system; lack of raw
materials and sources of energy and the appalling financial condition of the new state due to
the cost of the wars of independence and unification. Italy's industrial base before 1915 was
essentially located in the north-west of the country, in the 'industrial triangle' of Milan, Turin
and Genoa. The South, apart from the great port of Naples, was almost bereft of industry on
any scale. The 'southern problem', avoided by early liberal governments, became worse as
industrialization and agricultural modernization widened the gap between north and south. On
the eve of the First World War, therefore, Italy, despite the undoubted economic progress
which she had made, was still lagging far behind in the world industrial-manufacturing league
tables. It is significant that in 1913 Italy's share of world manufacturing output was almost
exactly the same as it had been in 1750.
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F) Foreign policy
The new Italian State started with many territorial problems. They felt dissatisfied with the
new state because of the “ unredeemed lands”. They never gained all the land they claimed on
their north-east border. Austria owned them and the new Italy was not strong enough to get
them back. War was risky; it might unify Italians or cause discontent. They also wanted great
power status so looked to take on colonies. This would have terrible consequences for them
later. They wanted Tunisia but France beat them to it. They attempted to take over Abyssinia
but were badly beaten at Adowa. This caused great discontent amongst the population.
The End of Century Crisis
The emergence of the working-class and Catholic subcultures was also of great significance
during the decade of economic, social and political crisis which Italy was to experience in the
1890s: the 'End of Century Crisis'. World economic recession, bad harvests, a 'tariff war'
with France and high taxation due to heavy military spending on colonial ventures, all
contributed to a worsening of the economic conditions of ‘real’ Italy and consequently to
recurrent outbursts of violence on the part of both peasants and urban workers. The response
of the political class to this unrest was, as usual, repressive. This time the alarm of the political
class was compounded by their fear of the activities and influence of the working-class
movement and to a lesser extent the Catholic movement. As a result peasant leagues, trade
unions, the Socialist Party and some organisations of the Catholic movement were dissolved,
their newspapers closed down and their leaders put on trial for sedition. In 1893-4 the
electoral rolls were purged of ‘undesirables’ and between 1898 and 1900 a concerted effort was
made to restrict political debate and civil liberties. Government was based on Royal decrees.
This serious attempt to put the constitutional clock back and to refashion Italy's political
system in the image of Bismarck's Germany, was ultimately a failure. But it does clearly
demonstrate the fragility of the Liberal State and the reactionary instincts of some of its
political class. Italy was to be less fortunate during the second crisis of the Liberal State in
the early 1920s. Then, reaction was to be triumphant in the shape of a Fascist take-over.
The Nationalist Challenge to the state and other critics of Liberalism
1. The Italian working-class movement truly took off in the 1890s with the establishment of
trade unions, co-operatives and peasant leagues. In 1892 the Italian Socialist Party (P.S.I.)
was founded under Marxist inspiration. But the fragmented nature of the Italian working class
was reflected in the movement itself, which was highly prone to ideological splits.
2. On the extreme left, and effectively outside the party, were the Revolutionary Syndicalists,
who believed in imminent revolution to be fostered by constant use of the strike weapon,
culminating in a great, insurrectionary general strike. By 1914 some syndicalists had moved
further. Convinced that the PSI could not achieve revolution, and that the source of Italy's ills
was not Italian capitalism which they now considered insufficiently developed but the political
class, they concluded that the liberal establishment must be overturned by a revolution. This
position was similar with that of the more conservative Nationalists, so the two groups' shared
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antagonism towards liberalism and socialism drew them together into an embrace which helped
to spawn fascism.
3. Mainstream Marxists inside the PSI split the party by dividing into Reformists and
Maximalists.
4. In response to the Socialist challenge, and under the inspiration of Pope Leo XIII, the
Catholic movement established rival trade unions, co-operatives, peasant leagues and mutual
credit institutions. By 1914 the network of Catholic economic and social organisations, though
not as extensive or as well supported as those of the Socialists, could rely on the loyalty of
large sections of Italy's poorer classes, especially small peasant farmers and women workers.
5. The Nationalists were a tiny minority movement, but a vocal and influential one in the circles
of 'high politics, who were ashamed that Italy's economic weakness obliged millions of her sons
and daughters to seek a living elsewhere and who thus felt a deep national inferiority complex.
Attributing Italy's economic backwardness and low international standing to the weakness and
corruption of its political class, the intrinsic defects of liberalism, the Nationalists advocated
authoritarian government, unrestrained capitalist development, and an imperialist foreign policy.
Solidarity among all social classes within a 'proletarian nation' like Italy would, they insisted,
make possible the maximization of the country's productive energies and enable it, through
imperialism, successfully to challenge 'plutocratic' nations like Britain and France. Although
attracting only modest popular support, chiefly within the educated middle class, the
Nationalists established important contacts and influence among conservative politicians,
Catholics, and the business community
6. An even more radical rejection of existing values was offered by the most avant gardist of all
cultural movements in Italy before the First World War, the Futurists. What the Futurists
proposed was nothing less than a cultural revolution for Italy- 'Heap up the fires to the
shelves of the libraries! Divert the canals to flood the canals to flood the cellars of the
museums.”
Italy in the Age of Giolitti: How far did he succeed in bringing Italians together?
After the turbulence of the 1890s, the fifteen years which followed were relatively tranquil,
thanks to improving economic conditions and to Giovanni Giolitti, who dominated politics in
these years he was in power 1903-1914. Giolitti was the leading political representative of the
more progressive sections of the Italian ruling class. It was Giolitti's attitude to the Socialists,
and the working classes which they represented, which formed the basis of the strategy which
we call 'Giolittianism'.
Could he solve the two following problems:
•
Gain the support of the masses yet keep the elite happy?
•
Reconcile Catholicism and the newly developing forces of Socialism and nationalism into the
new state?
Under Giolitti, the first serious attempt was made to reconcile 'real' and 'legal' Italy, to meet
the just demands of the working masses by reform rather than repression and, in a broader
sense, to bring the masses into the political system.
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Reforms
1. Giolitti laid down a new policy of state impartiality in labour disputes, coupled with reform of
working conditions, the introduction of some elements of social insurance and reforms in
female and child labour
2. Electoral reform that gave the vote to the overwhelming majority of the adult male
population in 1912. In 1912 Giolitti's electoral reform tripled the electorate to almost 9
million, suddenly giving Italy near-universal male suffrage.
However he ran into trouble for many reasons
a) The economic boom of 1890-1907 slowed from 1907-8 and people blamed him for economic
decline.
b) As he increased the franchise he alienated Liberals who feared that workers and Catholics
would have more influence.
c) Industrial reforms had not gone far enough so alienated socialists who could now vote.
d) 1911 Giolitti committed Italy to the seizure of Libya from the fast-declining Ottoman
Empire. This somewhat appeased conservatives and Nationalists but alienated most
socialists and helped strengthen the hand of the PSI's increasingly powerful and vociferous
left wing. His decision to embark on a colonial war in Libya in 1911, destroyed the delicate
relationship which he had built up with the Socialists. Many Italians were conscripted and
resentment grew. Among the most militant socialist opponents of the Libyan war was the 28year-old Benito Mussolini. At the 1912 national congress of the PSI, the revolutionary left
succeeded in taking over the party organization. Henceforth, the Deputies of the Socialist
Party were forbidden to co-operate in any way with the representatives of the 'capitalistbourgeois' parties in parliament.
e) To stay in power he resorted to Trasformismo-he ended up being no different to anyone
else.
The end of Giolitti
Socialist advances at the 1913 elections, subsequent strikes and near revolutionary activity
exposed the limitations of Giolitti's achievement. Those on the right in revolt against the liberal
state had one thing in common, they feared the social and political revolution which was
underway in Italy, the emergence of the working-class movement and mass politics, and they
blamed Giolitti and his democratic tendencies for encouraging these developments. However,
the left shared the common opposition to Giolitti and all he stood for, as he had not gone far
enough. In June 1914 there was mass social unrest and riots. Two areas declared themselves
republics; a general strike was called. Thousands of soldiers were used to restore order. “Red
Week” frightened the bourgeoisie. Italian politics generally took a turn to the right when
Giolitti resigned in March 1914 and the government was taken over by his conservative critics.
Italian politics was now polarising around an extreme left and an extreme right. It is no
exaggeration to say that Giolitti’s failure to launch Italy on the path of a representative, mass
democracy in the pre-war years helped to open the way for Mussolini and Fascism in the post
war period. However, attention was a turning to bigger things in Europe as the war clouds were
gathering. It is clear that Italy’s position in 1914 was very fragile, the war would transform its
future.
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Summary-Four Key themes
1.
2.
3.
4.
Enormous problems as a result of unification: Financial, economic, political and religious
Growth of extremist groups who were highly critical of Liberal Italy
Failure of Giolitti to solve Italy’s problems
The failure to ever reconcile the North and South
Chapter Two
World War I and its effects on Italy
Intervention for and against
Italy remained neutral in 1914. Few had sympathy with allies in the Triple Alliance as they
feared Austrian ambitions and were resentful of their rule over the unredeemed lands of
Trieste and Trentino.
Interventionists
Left: Britain and France against German militarism and may bring class revolution to Italy.
Nationalists and Futurists: Only by fighting Austria could territorial gains be made and the
power of the old elite broken.
Liberals: War would bring pride and unity to the Italian people whilst restoring power to
the Liberal ruling class.
King: King tied up with armed forces who very loyal to him
Non-Interventionists
Socialists: Condemned the War as a squabble between capitalists.
Catholics: Did not want to fight Catholic Austria.
Liberals: Use neutrality to gain Austrian Concessions
Decision to join
The issue of the unredeemed lands was the main driving force behind intervention. The
government negotiated with both sides and in the Treaty of London of May 1915 joined the
Allies. The treaty secretly promised gains like Trieste, Trentino and South Tyrol. At the same
time belligerent Nationalists launched a campaign for war which led to belief they had
influenced it.
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The War: Caporetto and Consequences
Overall a painful experience. Economic weakness was revealed and incompetence in political and
military circles exposed. Rapidly became a stalemate. Massive conscript armies. Morale low, low
pay, appalling conditions, etc. October 1917-key battle Caporetto, in which Italians had
10,000 killed, 300,000 wounded and 300,000 captured. Action squads, elite troops formed to
counter Austrians Arditi, many of these became the core of the Fascist movement after the
War. Austrians went 30 miles into Italy. The experience of war came as a massive shock to
Italy. In 1918 the Austrians collapsed and Italians occupied Triento and Trieste in Nov 1918.
Effects of the War on industry, agriculture and politics
1) Industry-expanded rapidly during the War to meet demands but soldier’s wages and food
subsidies led to a massive deficit. Money printed led to massive inflation. 400% inflation
rate between 1913 and 1918. Labour force had expanded but with strict wartime controls
and prices rising faster than wages, there was a great potential for discontent.
Furthermore, soldiers resented the workers who were paid more than the soldiers and this
was to be a great source of tension after the war.
2) Agriculture-Came out quite well. Much surplus labour soaked up with the military. Inflation
wiped out debts and some even became prosperous for the first time. This created a
demand for land and the govt. promised the peasant soldiers they would have land after the
war. After the defeat at Caporetto they had to be promised something! They would not
forget this after the war.
3) Politics-widened existing political divisions. Liberals could not decide whether fighting a war
of liberation from Austria or a war of conquest. Socialists split as well between those who
were for and against. Nationalists wanted greater success and blamed the govt. for lack of
progress. Reputation of Army largely intact at the end of the war by blaming the
government and the treachery of the Socialists who continued their neutral stance. Created
a bitterness between the military and left
The Post War Crisis
a) Economic Problems
Severe economic problems: sudden switch from wartime to peacetime economy as govt. orders
ceased and foreign demand dried up. Massive trade deficit and huge budget deficit, foreign
loans ceased. Inflation wiped out middle class savings. Everyone was suffering. Unemployment
was not too bad immediately but it rose rapidly to 2 million by 1920. Educated and professional
classes being particularly badly hit. Thousands of ex-soldiers did not have jobs and they found
it hard to adjust psychologically to peacetime conditions.
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b) Political Problems
A Catholic party was formed in 1919-Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI), as the pope lifted the
ban on political involvement. He wanted to protect Italy from the socialist menace but did
support Catholic peasants in their claims for land. Many ex-servicemen became involved in
politics and veterans associations. (Including the Fascists.) The PSI had been radicalized in the
war. It looked to Bolshevik Russia and saw the change there. However, the leadership was
divided on how to implement the same in Italy. However, the PSI would not take part in Liberal
coalitions. The demand for change and to try and please population led to two new developments
•
In December 1918: the franchise was extended to all men
•
August 1919: Proportional Representation was introduced.
Government instability and problems
The first election in 1919 under the new rules meant that the PSI and PPI became the 2 largest
parties. The Liberal vote was reduced massively. Why? radicalism of masses, disappointment
with their long term performance, universal desire for change and huge release of Catholic
votes. It was now very difficult for governments to form coalitions. Therefore a political
stalemate and paralysis developed. Socialist deputies withdrew from parliament. The PPI was
totally inexperienced and many liberals could not accept new changes and would not work with
each other. Govts. were therefore clearly incapable of solving the political problems which had
developed. In their desire for a solution to problems Italians began to look for stronger parties
to sort them out.
The “Mutilated Victory” and Fiume
Mutilated victory
Orlando went to Paris looking forward to getting the gains promised in The Treaty of London
and most were granted. However, Wilson would not allow Italy to have the Dalmatian coast. Nor
would he give them Fiume (not mentioned in Treaty) even though it was a largely Italian
speaking town. The Italians left Paris in disgust when they were denied a share of the African
colonies. The Nationalist poet D’Annuzio summed up his nation’s anger by calling it “A Mutilated
Victory”.
Fiume
In September 1919 D’Annunzio seized Fiume along with former Arditi and 2000 nationalists.
The PM Nitti did not act as he feared his popularity in Italy but the great powers were also
annoyed. His regime in Fiume lasted just over a year. Giolliti returned as PM in June 1920 and
negotiated a settlement with Yugoslavia in which Fuime would remain independent. In December
1920 the Navy blockaded the port and D’Annunzio’s supporters melted away. It is a very
important episode because his methods and style were watched by the fledging fascists
and they were to copy him later. He had carried out a daring adventure and had got away
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with it. Force appeared to be more productive than negotiation and the use of parliament.
Furthermore, the government lost even more credibility, as it was slow to sort the crisis.
The Red Two Years Biennio Rosso 1918-1920
There was great militancy of the working masses from 1918 to 1920 both in the cities and the
countryside, this was to be known as The Red Two Years (Red for Communist!)
Urban
In summer of 1919 a rise in prices provoked riots in central and northern Italy. Shops were
looted and granaries robbed. Govt. ordered prefects to hold down prices. Socialists who blamed
prices on greedy shopkeepers gloated. Now shopkeepers and traders were angry! The
government also backed down when faced with unrest from factories. Mazzoni factory in
Pinerolo was occupied for higher wages and govt. put in its own manager. Many responded to
strikes with wage increases, thus fuelling inflation. Many were accompanied by occupations. In
April 1920 there was a ten day strike in Piedmont. In June army units mutinied and supported
the workers. The climax came in September when more than 400,000 workers in the industrial
north occupied factories. This looked like the start of a revolution. Giolitti refused to use force
in case there was trouble. It lasted 8 weeks, then “fizzled out”. There had been a compromise in
which workers were offered roles in running the factories. Once again, the govt. appeared
weak in the face of socialism.
Rural
As turbulent in the countryside: Peasants returned from the war expecting land. There was
plenty of land but it was owned by wealthy landowners. Many soldiers joined ex-servicemen’s
associations and also had support from Catholic leagues. A million hectares passed into peasant
hands. Peasants were also discontented in Central and Northern Italy. By 1920 the socialist
agricultural federation had 900,000 members. Militant workers demonstrated their power. In
Ferrara a strike lasted 12 days between Feb and March 1920. Wage rises were granted and only
unionized labour recruited. Massive strike in July 1920 by 500,000 Tuscans. Landlords forced
to concede again. They conceded, as they knew they would get no support from central govt.
Consequences of Two Red Years
1. The Socialists lost confidence, as the revolution they had waited for had come so close
but did not happen. Trade Union membership declined as many felt that a great
opportunity had been wasted.
2. Landowning and property owning classes were angered by the concessions they had had
to give and were dismayed by what they saw as govt. weakness in the face of the
socialist threat.
3. The Middle classes were also disillusioned with democratic govt. as it seemed more
interested in appeasing socialism than dealing with law and order.
It therefore lost massive support amongst the people who would later turn to fascism.
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Conclusion
The effects of the War were disastrous!
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Italy was humiliated
Economic and social problems were massive
There was political chaos following the war
There was a growth of radicalism
The myth of the “Mutilated Victory” weakened an already weak government.
The Red Two Years destabilized Italy
All the problems, which the war flung up, had a totally opposite effect to the hopes of those
who had wanted war. It split and humiliated Italy and caused such massive problems that govts.
lost all credibility. In 1920 Socialists made big gains in the elections which further alarmed the
property-owning classes. People began to turn to the only movement that seemed willing and
able to fight back: The Fascists. The Socialist Party was to become a victim of its own success
as their difference in opinion about how to proceed was to split them and this helps to explain
why they were not able to counter the growth of fascism in the next few years.
Chapter Three
The Origins of Fascism in Italy 1919-1921
What is Fascism?
A political ideology with broad ideas and one which changed according to the circumstances of
the time. One can say that Fascism generally has the following characteristics:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Nationalistic
Powerful leader
One party government
National unity
Paramilitary organisations
Glory in War
Easy to say what it opposed
•
•
•
•
Communism because of its internationalism
Liberal democracy as weak, inefficient and too tolerant of minority groups in society
Class conflict
Pacifism
It is seen as a response to the political and social turmoil of WWI when the old order collapsed.
Right wing but originally had left wing elements. Began as a revolutionary movement then wanted
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to keep status quo. It actually gained as much support for what it opposed as for what it
offered.
The Rise of Fascism in Italy
The Early Life of Mussolini
Born 1883 in small town in Romagna. Father socialist-republican blacksmith. Qualified as a
schoolmaster in 1902. Bully, violent and womaniser. Two years as a labourer in Switzerland
1902-1904 and military service 1904-1906. From 1908 left wing journalist first in Austrian
ruled Trent then in Forli. As secretary of town’s socialist organisation and editor of socialist
newspaper. Leapt to prominence within the PSI from his local base between 1911-1912 as leading
spokesman of radical wing. He was opposed to war in Libya and co-operation with Giolitti.
Mussolini became more prominent as editor of leading Socialist newspaper Avanti. He also towed
party line and opposed participation in WWI. By 1914 had moved to “active neutrality”
sympathetic to France and Britain. As a result forced to resign as editor then expelled from
PSI. His allies in interventionist cause were the revolutionary syndicalists, Futurists, radical
republicans and right-wing Nationalists, this bizarre coalition was later to from the nucleus of
Fascism in Italy.
Why did he suddenly change his stance? No one can tell for sure. His socialism, although
authentic, at first was highly personalised and did not tow the Marxist line. His horizons were
always essentially Italian. He returned from Switzerland to do military service and this
indicates his patriotism in action. It was Italy itself and the political class that ruled it that he
saw as rotten and whatever would change it he identified with. His principal target was the
narrow ruling class as much as the capitalist system. and his goal was revolution in itself rather
than the socialist utopia that would follow. Events of 1913-1914 persuaded him that Marxist
revolution was unsuited to Italy. The events of “Red Week” in 1914 convinced him the Italian
working class was incapable of revolution. The behaviour of workers in Europe in response to the
call for War convinced him that there was no international solidarity and on the contrary
indicated that Nationalism was a stronger force. He therefore embraced the view that Italy
could be made great again by intervening in the war. It would unleash a non-Marxian revolution
which would overturn the ruling class and bring a new and better ruling class to the fore. His
immediate prospects were not good though as he sank into insignificance once the war began. He
served in the war and was invalided out. This experience was important to him, as he was able to
claim comradeship of other soldiers when he founded the fascist movement. He returned to
journalism and became editor of a new newspaper “The Italian People”. He now dedicated
himself to the task of bringing about revolution. By the end of his war his newspaper had
abandoned a socialist stance and declared itself the voice of “soldiers and producers” against
parasitic liberals and unpatriotic socialists. However, he appeared to be stranded on the edge of
political life though.
The Formation of the Fascist Movement
Fascism was the name given to the 100 or so men and a few women who met in a hall in Milan on
23rd March 1919. Named Italian Combat Group or Fascio Il Combattimento. It had been
summoned by Mussolini through the pages of his newspaper. Name derived from Fascio meaning
members of a particular group. Gave themselves title of “Fascists of the First Hour”. They
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were an odd assortment of ex-soldiers, former socialists, National Syndicalists and Futurists.
The programme had no manifesto and was simply a forum to channel the protests of new forces
thrown up by the war against organisations and bureaucracies. He did not want to create a party
but a movement, which would have the flexibility to attract a wide range of support.
Throughout his speeches in the following years prior to the March on Rome Mussolini made it
clear that his aim was to seize power. He embarked on a vigorous programme of gaining support.
He condemned all political parties and only allowed his to become one in 1921. This shows his
contempt for political institutions. He went against socialism for standing against intervention in
the War and detested their emphasis on class struggle and lack of national unity.
The Importance of the Arditi
Some of the early recruits to fascism were the Arditi or elite formations of shock troops of
WWI. Their uniform was black and they had not found it easy to adapt to civilian life. They
remained in touch through ex-servicemen’s organisations. Many ex-soldiers joined Mussolini as
they found a natural camaraderie in the movement and the Socialists who saw them as class
traitors had treated them with disrespect when they returned home.
Early Failure
His ideas did not amount to a coherent or credible political programme, partly because Mussolini
himself could not decide what he wanted. However, this did give him the freedom to develop his
programme organically and did not fix him to a doctrine. The movement saw itself as a left-wing
challenger for the working class support for socialism. Its programme was largely republican,
anti-clerical, and democratic, female suffrage, decentralisation and PR, minimum wage, 8 hour
day, confiscation of war profits, worker participation in management decisions and
nationalisation of the arms industry. The anti-clericalism was toned down as many recruits saw
the fascists as a good counter to Marxism but were strongly Catholic. In the November 1919
election most Fascist groups fought locally on their own programme and therefore some were
more right wing than Mussolini was. This was fine at first as the movement was always flexible
but Mussolini’s decision to stand in the election was unwise: no Fascist was elected and even in
their Milan stronghold they got fewer than 5000 votes, the new movement appeared to be dead.
Why did they fail?
By the end of 1919 there were only 1000 members in the movement-why had they failed so
spectacularly? Most importantly, for the great majority of Italians it was the economic
situation, which dominated their lives. The pain of Italy converting to consumer goods was acute
and there were huge numbers of unemployed soldiers on the loose. Both the socialists and the
Catholics gained massive votes and were the greatest parties but why could the Fascists not
gain ground? At first their programme seemed aggressive and people wanted to return to
peacetime politics. The decision to enter the 1919 elections was a grave mistake. In 1919 the
Fascists were seen as a leftist party and as such a rival to the PSI. Being a larger and more
established party the majority of the votes naturally went to them. However, the movement
was kept alive by money from wealthy Milanese businessmen who sensed the anti-socialist
appeal of the movement and from 1920 it entered into a new and crucial stage in its history.
13
The development of Fascism 1919-1921:expansion and growing support
The Challenge of D’Annuzio
D’Annunzio’s seizure of Fiume in 1919 presented Mussolini with a challenge. In public he had to
praise him but he had no desire to give way to someone who stole the limelight. He was relived
when the regime collapsed. Mussolini had taken careful note of the reasons for his success: the
balcony speeches, Blackshirts and the emphasis on nationalism and militarism. One thing was
clear, only a drift to the right would save the fascist movement. He also learnt from
D’Annunzio’s mistakes, seizing power in out of the way Fiume was not the way forward,
D’Annunzio had not moved forward and people had become disillusioned. He would not make this
error.
The Move to the right. What did the fascist programme offer?
The movement began to become more respectable from 1920 and the emphasis was placed on
bringing order to Italy and restoring its power. To develop the economy and abolish harmful
state controls, and re-establish law and strong leadership. By September 1922, republicanism
had been dropped, so had anti-clericalism, the dropping of votes for women and for taxes on
war profits. Increasingly the emphasis was on nationalism and a strong foreign policy. It was
never put into a party programme though-why? Because it would be difficult for him to unite all
the disparate groups around a programme to suit all. Therefore in summary, clearly a move to
the right was logical, as this had been successful before. There was still no programme as it
would be virtually impossible to produce a manifesto to suit all.
Support for Fascism-Urban
During 1920 Mussolini began to sense that if fascism were to succeed it would have to become a
right-wing movement. Why? - Because of D’Annunzios’s mistakes and realising that controlling
cities and bringing order to the streets was more important than occupation of factories and
strikes. He could see a large untapped reservoir of support for a group that would bring order.
Mussolini was helped by his rival’s elimination and by the influx of Blackshirts to his movement.
In May 1920 anti-capitalist slogans were dropped and class collaboration called for. AntiCatholic rhetoric was also dropped. Conservative businessmen began to fund him. When the
industrialists gave in to their demands the strikers had left the factories but the owners now
wanted revenge. The industrialists had regained their nerve but the state seemed unwilling to
help them. Although it was not a conscious decision for Mussolini to let his Blackshirts be used
as bodyguards and strike breakers, (it was happening anyway) it was to his advantage. Those
that left the movement in disgust were replaced by many new right wing graduates who were
drawn to the romanticism of the movement. The collapse of the strike and the ending of the
“Red Two years” convinced him that the left was incapable of bringing about a revolution. He
could now intensify the anti-socialist elements of his movement. In return for money, arms and
transport for the expansion of his movement, he ordered his regional bosses to organise their
Black-Shirt squads along paramilitary lines. Violence and notoriety followed and he soon realised
that violence went unpunished by the authorities long as it was against the left. He had thus
gained support amongst the urban petty bourgeoisie who had felt a collective sense of
insecurity and were prone to radical socialist groups. Many were ex-soldiers or small capitalists
14
who feared for their livelihood. However, the real growth of support came unexpectedly from
the countryside.
Support for fascism rural or agrarian
Outside the cities the movement was growing rapidly by locally formed fasci led by RAS, (local
fascist leaders). These locally based groups are seen both as vital in the growth of fascism and
reducing the importance of Mussolini. However, he was important in the sense that he gave a
focus to the movement as he was a nationally recognized leader. However, it would be several
years before he had full control of the movement.
Agrarian fascism began almost spontaneously around the north and centre of Italy and
especially in the Po valley where Catholic peasant leagues and socialist unions had threatened
the power of the agrari, estate managers and middle class small landowners. This group of
people had become fed up with the gains the left had made in the “Red Two Years” and the
success of the socialists in the local government elections of 1920. They wanted to redress the
balance, as the authorities seemed powerless to do anything. The moves to the right that the
fascists had made in 1920 were enough and small fascist nuclei in provincial capitals found
themselves feted by these people and a policy of violence towards the socialist element began.
They were known as Squadrismo (special vigilante squads). They began on a small scale but grew
with support. They attacked offices of left wing organizations, broke strikes and Catholic
peasant leagues and attacked the offices of left wing newspapers. On Dec 20th Four Fascists
were killed and this provoked rage and a growth in membership. As the post war depression hit
landowners were determined not to lose any more to the socialists. The local Ras organized a
policy of tax strikes, which made it increasingly difficult for left wing councils to govern. Often
they had support from local police and between 1920 and 1921 they had been amazingly
successful. By spring of 1921 fascism was now a rural phenomenon and fascist membership was
mushrooming. By 1922 most of the left wing infrastructure in the countryside had been
eliminated. While strikes and membership of the left had declined so the fascists gained
membership. By 1922 most provinces contained an extensive fascist organization headed by a
ras.
Why was rural fascism so successful?
1. Owed a lot to the ras (local leaders), who were often energetic and ruthless. They exploited
the loose framework of the movement and built independent powerbases for themselves.
They were driven to eliminate socialism as much to gain power for themselves.
2. It appealed and revived the support of two social groups who felt they had been hard done
by the Italian political system: Large landowners that employed braccianti but were
prepared to finance and equip the squads. Lower middle class and professionals: e.g.
shopkeepers who disliked price controls, share-croppers who were frightened by the idea of
collectivization and small businesses who had to take on workers whether they wanted them
or not from the peasant leagues. Anyone who felt threatened by the left! It made no impact
in areas where socialism was weak, which indicates it was largely a “knee-jerk” reaction to
the growth of socialism.
15
The role of violence in its success
Whilst it was an extremely violent movement many welcomed it as a necessary antidote to
socialism. It could be used as a tool and then dispensed with. Giolitti's inclusion in his
government of 1921 hardly encouraged people to reject the fascists. He was using the old
politics of transformismo and he hoped to tame them. It was always easier to collaborate and
attempt to tame rather then upset them and maybe risk civil war.
Summary-who supported fascism and why did it grow?
1. Large landowners and all others in countryside, sharecroppers etc who were not peasants or
in the leagues who felt the left had too much power and control for too long and the
government wasn’t going to do anything about it. Even worse, the left seemed to be getting
even more power by 1920.
2. A collective sense of insecurity from the petty bourgeoisie ensured that the movement
would grow and take on all those not attracted by socialism or who had too much to lose.
3. Large scale Industrialists in the towns who had much to gain from supporting fascism and
felt the liberal governments were giving too much away to the workers.
4. Students and youths eager for adventure, for whom the fascist movement offered
romanticism. They were bored with the daily routine of their lives.
5. Ex-soldiers, for whom the camaraderie and nationalist appeal of the movement was
irresistible. They saw socialists as unpatriotic.
6. Working class: by reviving or retaining some socialist aspects of the movement like talk of
giving land to peasants, many felt the Fascists could succeed where the socialists had failed.
Furthermore, many in the working classes increasingly found they could only get work
through fascist syndicates, and many ex-socialists were now members. They also did not like
socialist tactics against “Blacklegs”.
Support had been rapid and massive but was largely due to the peoples’ fears of socialism and
not what the fascist offered as a policy. It is therefore impossible to clearly define what it was
that attracted people to the movement or who exactly supported them. There are therefore
two distinct groups who supported fascism: those who actually joined the movement and those
who were prepared to support it for their own ends.
Why did opposition to fascism fail?
Naturally it was the left who saw him as the greatest danger. But their greatest weakness was
their disunity and division. Mussolini had by 1922 ½ million Blackshirts and virtually controlled
many regions but the left was far stronger numerically. The Socialists had been allowed to
develop into a serious threat by liberal governments who seemed unwilling to stop them. Yet the
same problem always haunted the opponents of Fascism: Liberal, Socialist and Catholic
opponents were unable to co-operate. When in July 1922 moderates in the PPI agreed to join
the Liberals in an anti-fascist coalition government, Giolitti withheld his support and the plan
16
collapsed. Liberal politicians were still putting their selfish needs above the need for united
action. The Socialists’ power had peaked in 1920 and since then they been weakened by
unemployment, attack and demoralization. What mattered was what people believed and they
still saw the Left as a threat. In August 1922 this was confirmed when the Socialists called for
a general Strike to protest at the fascist violence. This turned out to be an “own goal” as the
fascists seized on this as evidence they were needed and the strike collapsed after one day.
Interestingly enough the greatest threat to the success of the fascists may have been
from within the party itself. Many Ras wanted to seize control of the movement, as they were
becoming impatient with Mussolini. He considered he might achieve power legally instead. It has
to be said as well that neither the king nor the Pope opposed fascism at this stage.
Mussolini’s position from 1921
1921 Fascism enters parliament
Early in 1921 Mussolini was worried that the fascist movement could slip out of his control. The
ras had a lot of power but had no taste for electoral politics. In the general election of 1921
Giolitti tried to tame fascism by bringing into the mainstream of politics. Fascists were allowed
to join the electoral lists but it was a disastrous mistake. There was an orgy of violence and 40
people were killed on polling day alone. The ras were particularly active and intimidated many
voters. Several local state authorities ignored the violence but only 35 Fascist deputies were
eventually elected. The vote for the PSI held up well. They remained the largest party of them
all and Giolitti resigned in contempt as his nationalist bloc of fascists, liberals and nationalists
still failed to win an outright majority. However, the entry to parliament by fascism was
absolutely crucial for the movement as it had given them a respectable face, this now gave the
security apparatus of Italy, the prefects, police etc an excuse to ignore their violence as they
were now “legitimate”. Mussolini’s strategy from 1921 has been called “Carrot and stick”,
parliamentary maneuvering and extra-parliamentary pressure to gain power at a national level.
However, he realised he would have to work hard and abandon some of his more radical features
if he was to maintain the support of Catholics and conservatives. His first speech was
remarkable for he totally abandoned anti-clericalism and praised the pope.
Pact of Pacification
In some ways the escalating violence in the countryside and a de-facto civil war was good for
Mussolini but in other ways it was not. For he could claim that the fascists were the only people
capable of stopping and controlling the violence and restoring order but he was also worried it
was getting out of hand. So concessions would have to be made. Most worrying was the
formation of left-wing paramilitary units who were putting up resistance to the fascists. He also
risked a conservative backlash and total lack of control over the fascist squads. Hence the
attempt to impose the Pact of Pacification on 2nd August 1921. In a stunning reversal he
offered a pact of reconciliation with the PSI. It seems he was so desperate for power he would
try anything to achieve it. Also it was a bid to tame the ras. He was worried that he was
alienating middle class opinion. The ras were furious as their power was based on violence and
they were not convinced their socialist enemies were defeated. Many were syndicalists who did
not want anything to do with parliament and dreamed of a genuine socialist revolution. Balbo and
Grandi led opposition to the pact and D’Annunzio was offered as a possible successor to
17
Mussolini. Mussolini resigned in disgust from the fascist national executive but they soon
realized they needed each other.
The formation of a party
Mussolini realized he could not alienate the rank and file of the movement and the regional
bosses realized that their authority to carry out their attacks would soon disappear if the
fascists could not gain power on a national level. To carry on violence in the provinces would
eventually wear people down and the fascists would lose support. They had to become
mainstream. Only Mussolini was well known enough nationally to be the true leader. So in
November 1921 a compromise was reached. Mussolini abandoned the Pact of Pacification (and
the truce with the Socialists) and the ras agreed to the formation of the Party Nationale
Fascist: A fascist political party. This now gave him a degree of central control over the party
but the ras remained in control of their squads. The first party programme was remarkable for
the move to the right it had made. It assured the business community that it would privatize
industry and it made a firm commitment to the regulation of industrial relations. This appeared
to do the trick and funds began to pour in from businesses both industrial and agrarian. It also
appeared to have abandoned any anti-Catholicism. It was now opposed to divorce and it agreed
with the PPI that the peasants should get a better deal from the Landlords. It was also
announced that the fascists were prepared to settle the Roman Question in agreement with
the Pope. The RAS in turn adopted a more conservative line in response to Mussolini allowing
them to keep control of their squads. This crucial unity came at a crucial moment. They had
reconciled their differences and come together at a time when all their opponents, Catholics,
Socialists and liberals were falling apart. This unity paid off and by the end of 1921 the party
could claim 200,000 active members. Many people were joining the party now that it had
become respectable. Mussolini’s’ gamble had paid off. However, he was acutely aware that he
still faced a problem with the RAS squads and that he would have to start taming them properly
if he were to succeed. He appealed to the conservatives saying that only he could tame them. If
he became leader then he would stop the violence.
The Deepening Parliamentary Crisis
The power of the local ras squads did not diminish and their continued attacks were sapping the
authority of the state, which found itself weakened, and under criticism. There was a situation
of near civil war, which the government seemed unable to stop. Fascist violence was extreme in
May and June 1922 with Balbo taking possession of Ferrara with more than 40,000 Blackshirts.
This presented a serious crisis for parliament who needed to be united to deal with the growing
disorder. These developments presented Mussolini with both an opportunity and two problems.
The fascist assault strengthened his hand in bargaining with parliamentary leaders; he could call
off their action in return for things. He could demand to be included in a government. However,
the violence could get out of control and the army may be used against them. However, the
paralysis worked for him as no government could be formed which would take a strong line. Also,
the continued violence may have exposed the contradictions and splits in the movement, which
could tear it apart. The longer it went on the more dangerous this situation became. On
September 12th 1922 rival groups began to fight each other. Anarchy was looming: Mussolini
needed to be bold.
18
Mussolini was handed a gift at the end of July/beginning of August, when the Labour Alliance, a
broad grouping of socialist groups who had survived the fascist violence, called a general strike.
It was a fiasco, as only a small number went on strike but most importantly it was another “own
goal”. They presented yet another propaganda coup for the fascists who could claim they were
protecting the country against Bolshevism. Through their strike breaking activities they
convinced people they were the only group who could defend them. Their take over of key cities
like Trento, Trieste and other North Italian towns made the government look totally
incompetent. The parties who might have stood up to fascism were in total disarray by the
beginning of October 1922. They had been battered and the socialists had not helped
themselves through poor propaganda. The working class movement had disintegrated as a
political force through disunity and splits. In January 1921 the PSI had been weakened when it
split to form the Communist Party, although they did not gain many seats in 1921 it was enough
for the fascists to claim that there was a “Red Threat”. The PSI leaders continued to
underestimate the fascist threat though. They vetoed all attempts by more moderate socialists
to form an anti-fascist coalition. Some were disgruntled and would form yet another party the
PSU in October 1922 as a result of the strike. By 1922 it was increasingly difficult for parties
to work together to form coalitions. The failure of the government to stop the violence forced
the PPI to pull out of the coalition in July 1922. Most importantly, the political liberal elite, the
Vatican and senators did not approve of an alliance of the centre parties with the left. They did
not want a broad fascist alliance either and saw it as dangerous. The belief was that a
compromise and a bringing into government of the fascists on a temporary basis would cure the
problem. Giolitti, the man Mussolini feared most, had already indicated his willingness to preside
over a cabinet including fascists. The situation was therefore chaotic and the parliamentary
system was in tatters, what or who was going to fill this void?
The March on Rome: Mussolini appointed PM.
In the deepening crisis it seemed that the Fascist’s hour had come. The election of a new antiBolshevik pope Pious XI in 1922 was a blow to the anti-fascists, and he gave his unspoken
support for the new movement. However, Mussolini was constantly aware throughout 1922 that
the continued violence could produce a backlash against him and the anti-fascist bloc of army,
liberals etc may prove fatal. So he therefore continued dialogue hoping to form a coalition with
fascists in it. It was precisely because parliamentary paralysis might come to an end and
the anti-fascists might come together that he decided to bow to the hard-liners in the
party. He had of course been given a boost by the general strike of August. On 16th Oct 1922
Mussolini met senior members of the PNF and the ras to plan the Fascist “March on Rome”.
Given that they were running much of Italy and they continued to take over more and more
towns he had to do so or else his movement would fall apart, he could no longer appease the
more radical elements in his party. He was still hoping he could be handed power. On 24th
October there was a massive rally of 40,000 Blackshirts in Naples, ( a congress actually planned
before) and he cleverly kept his options open by demanding power legally or by force. He
demanded key posts in the cabinet and threatened “to march” if they were not granted.
During the night of 27-28th October the fascists started to occupy key government buildings
in provincial capitals all over Italy, in preparation for the March on Rome. Those that assembled
in the three key areas were a sorry looking bunch and out of 50,000 only about 10,0000 showed
up. Even at this stage Mussolini was not sure it would work and even had a ticket to Switzerland
should it fail. He stayed in Milan, his home power base, which was close enough to the border
19
for a speedy escape. All that stood between him and the PM was a weak caretaker govt. led by
Facta and the King. Facta hoped that Giolitti would form a government but he did not. The
government prepared to resist and drew up a decree for the king to sign declaring martial law;
furthermore the Rome garrison was ready to resist the march. However, the King at first
agreed then refused to sign the decree. Why?
1. It may have been that there was no serious alternative to having fascists in the government
considering the fragmented parliamentary system.
2. He was also worried about the loss of his throne to his glamorous cousin the Duke of Aosta,
a pro-fascist.
3. Maybe the army would not obey him too.
4. He genuinely feared civil war and more disruption.
5. Simply overestimated the strength and support of fascism
6. Leading industrialists put pressure on him to accommodate fascism.
Luckily for Mussolini, who could not afford a confrontation with the army, his bluff worked. The
King asked Mussolini on 29th October 1922 to form a government and he was sworn in as PM on
30th October. On the 31st, there was a victory parade in front of the king and the Blackshirts
were mixed in with regular army units.
What was the actual “March”?
It is important to realize that he did not seize power by force, the Fascists arrived in
Rome after he had been appointed PM. They arrived in a variety of transport and there was
never even a “March”. However, the threat of force and the assembling of fascist units
certainly played a part in his appointment. He was given power by the King and with the backing
of leading Liberal-Conservative politicians. Most of the establishment was prepared to work
with him for anti-Bolshevik reasons. He was therefore given power legally and constitutionally.
The administration that he eventually formed had nationalists and Liberals included and was not
very different from any other coalition that had gone before him. What was unusual was the
extra-parliamentary pressure that had got him there. Also he was given emergency powers for a
year which was to become crucial. Lastly, although they only had 35 seats they undoubtedly had
a much higher degree of support in the countryside than this would suggest.
Summary
I t had not been a military coup but by threat and seizure of buildings outside Rome it had been
a political coup, and to many it was just another coalition govt. not a “fascist revolution”. For
Mussolini however, it was the reality of power that really mattered. The whole thing had been
an illusion, a confidence trick! Mussolini had done well, he had kept his party together at time of
growing membership, had used his newspaper ( Il Popolo d’Itlaia ) well to control propaganda,
had carried out good speeches to reassure the middle class that he was no threat (key speech
20th September), and consolidated gains in areas fascists controlled. Lead the PNF and
negotiated with hard liners. In many ways his appointment as PM on a platform to end the
violence was outrageous, as the fascists had been responsible for most of the violence in the
last two years.
20
The Consolidation of Power 1922-1925
Mussolini’s Position after the March
When he became PM on 30th October 1922 Mussolini’s prime aim was to stay in power for
as long as possible-he had no fixed ideas how he was going to do it. Most believed would not
last that long, like all the others. Only a handful of fascists were in the govt. and it was a
coalition like all the others before it. He had been deliberately vague about his aims and this
had enabled him to convince the different groups he would solve their problems. The king, the
military, the industrialists and the landowners and many deputies saw him as a strong man who
would safeguard them against the left. However, within his party, there were radical elements
like the syndicalists and the ras who wanted him to sweep away everything that had gone
before. He would have to be skillful, and over the next few years he showed himself to be a
marvelous opportunist, as well as being aided by the squabbles of his opponents and a lot of luck.
By 1925 he was dictator of Italy and his domination was complete-how did he achieved this in
three years?
The formation of Mussolini’s government
He realized he would have to appease both the Squadristi and the establishment. The first
thing was to allow the squads to march past on the 31st October 1922. However, his first
cabinet contained only 4 fascists out of 13. He appointed a general and an admiral to appease
the military and calm them. He did take three posts himself, PM, Foreign Minister and Minister
of the Interior. Law and order was firmly the responsibility of the fascists by making Bianchi,
the secretary of the fascist party, his deputy at the MOI and General De Bono Chief of police.
Some of the more thuggish elements were made MOI ministers.
Mussolini in parliament
On 16th November when he first faced the chamber of deputies he intimidated them by
announcing that he could have closed down parliament with the backing of his squads but he
preferred to rule with their co-operation. The Chamber and the Senate responded with a huge
vote of confidence. This gave his govt. emergency powers for 12 months. Most believed he was
acting constitutionally and that his power would be directed against the left. Only the PSI
voted against him but many were happy that he seemed intent on destroying liberal-bourgeois
institutions.
Violence continues
A wave of violence followed, especially in the big cities, as local fascist gangs set out to destroy
their opponents. Three deputies were killed and 50 attacked in public. They were made to drink
castor oil and petrol. This was carried out with Mussolini’s consent and he relished the fact that
the left was being further intimidated.
Mussolini’s dilemma
He was reminded by the violence that there were many in the movement who were impatient for
change. Syndicalists were expecting a complete creation of syndicates in industry and
21
agriculture. These would be run by employer and employee in the interest of the country. The
ras supported them and wanted to replace the state machinery with their own power. He was
wary of their demands, he knew that the conservatives who supported him in the Chamber
wanted to see liberalism and socialism destroyed but they did not it to be replaced by fascist
thugs. He did not want the ras to have decentralized power either, he wanted an all-powerful
central dictatorship. However, most importantly he realized he needed the squads and without
them to destroy his opponents he would be finished. He therefore faced two main tasks, both
to create a fascist state and to bring the party’s radicals under control.
Appeasing the Radicals: The Party
Through his control of the MOI he announced that fascists would go unpunished. In December
1922 however, he established the Fascist Grand Council-an alternative to the cabinet
consisting entirely of fascist party members. (It had no legal status until 1928), the functions
of the legitimate cabinet had been destroyed overnight as it increasingly usurped the legal one.
Appeasing the Radicals-the Squadristi
His solution to the Squads was to transform them. In January 1923 he created the fascist
militia MSVN answerable only to himself. It was commanded by General De Bono and paid for by
the state. He hoped that this would give him more power and help to undermine the power of
the ras as he could increasingly control them from the centre. At the same time he had a
private army who could guard buildings, organize parades and act as a visible sign of fascist
power. This was not a total solution and the ras continued their violence for several more years
and the army were always suspicious of the MVSN.
Appeasing the Establishment
1. Nationalists: In his first cabinet he had appointed the nationalist Federzone as colonial
minister. Although they were a small part of the Chamber they had close links to business
and the army. They also had an 80,000 strong Blue shirt Militia who had frequently clashed
with the Black-Shirts. In February 1923 they crucially decided to merge with the fascists
which helped the Fascists to win the 1924 election in the south where the Nationalists had
been strong.
2. Confindustria and the Agrari: The Confindustria was a national association of major
industrial leaders. It welcomed Mussolini’s appointment as they saw it as a vital counter
weight to the left but they were worried about the syndicalist elements within the party.
He eased their fears by allowing them to form syndicates of business and cartels without
the workers. His economic policies were also appealing: low taxes, price and rent controls
were abolished and many state enterprises were privatized. To appease the Agrari, the law
on land reform was suspended, death duties reduced and government subsidies to
agricultural co-operatives were withdrawn.
3. The PPI and Pope: The PPI had been divided over their attitude to fascism before
Mussolini’s appointment and he widened this split by appointing two right-wing members of
their party in his coalition. The majority of the PPI, under influence of their leader, became
opponents. The pro-fascist pope, the bishop of Milan, who had never liked the PPI’s hostility
22
to fascism, decided to directly negotiate with the fascists on “The Roman Question” to
secure the interests of the Church. In January 1923 the pope’s Secretary of State held a
meeting with Mussolini at which they discussed the long-standing problem of the church’s
relation with the state. They both saw the problem as being Sturzo, the PPI leader, and it
was agreed that he would be removed. Mussolini announced a package of concessions, like
supporting the Vatican Bank and promising to make religion compulsory in schools. He also
offered support for a new Catholic university and banned distribution of contraceptives.
When the PPI met in April 1923 and still opposed fascism, Mussolini dismissed the two PPI
members of the cabinet. The pope then dismissed Sturzo as leader in 1923.
Summary
From starting off in a very weak position in 1922 Mussolini by 1923 had skillfully consolidated
his power. Until the summer of 1924 the initiative lay with fascism as his enemies were too
weak to oppose it and Mussolini was doing many things right to appease those in power. Big
Business, landowners, nationalists and the pope had all been appeased but he had largely left
the ras and the Squadristi alone. However, it was far from a monolithic party or movement and
this worried Mussolini the most. Another way of consolidating his power was to initiate electoral
reform.
The Acerbo Election Law July 1923
Despite the dismissing of the two PPI members of the government, Mussolini was still in a weak
position. He could do one of three things:
1. Dissolve parliament
2. Stay with the existing system
3. Change the rules
He went for the third. To be sure of gaining an outright majority in the 1924 election the law
would have to be changed. The fascist deputy Acerbo introduced a new law in July 1923, which
would reform the electoral system. Under his proposal, the party or coalition winning the most
votes, (they would have to have at least 25%), would be allocated 2/3 of the seats in the
Chamber.
Only the Socialists and Communists voted against the bill. The PPI abstained, their party split,
their leader forced to resign and in confusion. Many supported it because they believed the
propaganda that a strong government was needed. The continued process of PR had chronically
weakened Italian politics for decade, this would undoubtedly produce a strong govt. Giolitti had
been a fierce critic of PR. Furthermore, many saw that if they did not support it, parliament
might be abolished and that would be even worse. However, he did not leave things to chance,
Black Shirts were present during the debating of the Law, which undoubtedly intimidated many.
The Bill was carried 303 to 140. In the Senate it was higher at 165 to 41. The stage was set
for Mussolini’s dictatorship, the cornerstone had been laid.
23
The 1924 Election
The election campaign of April 1924 was marred by extreme violence from the fascists who
systematically terrorized and bullied opponents in all regions of Italy. The most remarkable
feature of the election was that they not only won two thirds of the seats but two thirds of
the votes as well. They had 374 out of 535 deputies but only about 60% in the Chamber were
fascists, many were die-hard nationalists etc who had adopted the label to get elected.
However, their grip was not yet total. Why had they had such success?
1. Much of this success can be attributed to the “Big list” they put forward, which included 13
defectors from the PPI and 80 liberal conservative candidates. It was thus a broad
electoral coalition with lots of appeal. Thus the spectacular triumph of the fascists in the
south where previously they had no impact.
2. A genuine feeling that the Fascists had brought stability and order to Italy. They had also
benefited from a general upturn in world trade which made it look as if their economic
polices were sound.
3. Intimidation, violence and fraud secured many votes as well, especially in the Northern and
Central areas of Italy. It certainly demoralized anti-fascists and discouraged many from
going to the polls.
4. Opposition parties failed to provide a united front to fascism and the most serious fault was
hopeless divisions in the working class movement which could not agree on how best to cope
with the fascist menace. There were three separate rival socialist parties, the PPI, the
original PSI and the reformist PSU, if they had united they may have robbed Mussolini of
his victory.
The Matteotti Crisis: May 1924
Mussolini’s strong, seemingly impregnable position was suddenly swept away by this crisis and
the press and the police almost unanimously turned against him overnight. On May 30th 1924
the leader of the Socialist Union Party, (PSU) Matteotti, made a speech in the Chamber of
deputies heavily criticizing Mussolini and denouncing the violence of the April elections. He
claimed that widescale fraud had allowed the Fascists to take over. Mussolini was naturally
furious at this speech and so was Rossi the head of the Fascist Press Office. On June 10th on
his way to the Chamber, Matteotti disappeared. Eyewitnesses claimed he had been bundled into
a car. The car was traced and was found to have bloodstains inside. This naturally suggested
that Matteotti had been murdered. The car was owned by a friend of Rossi and the police
established that two members of Mussolini’s secret police The Cheka were responsible. This
meant Mussolini was implicated himself. Had he ordered the murder? When questioned about it
on June 12th he was evasive. He suddenly seemed to lose his nerve.
Why was this crisis so crucial for Mussolini and why was it so different?
1. What made this so different from all the other violence was that Matteotti was attacked in
the discharge of his parliamentary duties as an elected politician and this seemed to people
to be an attack on the system itself.
2. For the first time the leader himself had been implicated in the violence.
24
3. The opposition to him over the crisis represented the real opposition that had been subdued
during the election. It revealed the extent of how unpopular the Fascists were. The
opponents could now “come out of the woodwork”. Here was their chance to unite and
overthrow fascism.
4. Italians were forced the face the question they had been ignoring for two years. Was the
regime Italians had elected a thuggish illegal one based on terrorism or was it legal and
trustworthy operating within the law?
The Aventine Secession June 1924
At the end of June most of the opposition deputies decided to walk out of the Chamber. They
hoped that this would emphasise Matteotti’s claim that that the Chamber had been corruptly
elected. And they were banking that the King would dismiss Mussolini as a result. It became
known as The Aventine Secession, as they were emulating what ancient Romans did when
opposing unjust rule.
How did he initially respond?
The MSVN militia was mobilized immediately incase of trouble and tighter controls of the press
were enforced. Mussolini had to act quickly, as he was surprised at the level of anger. Rossi and
Marinelli were arrested, Finzi was sacked and General De Bono resigned as head of police and
the MSVN. By the end of the month Dumini and his leading gang of Cheka were under arrest.
How did he survive the initial crisis?
1. The Aventine Secession proved to be a fatal error and the oposition handed Mussolini a
lifeline by leaving parliament. The exit of the deputies provided the king with a perfect
excuse for doing nothing. They had chosen not to work within the system so he could
ignore them. The only place a PM could be overthrown was from within parliament itself.
With the absence of a parliamentary vote the King could do nothing. This allowed Mussolini
to take the moral “high ground” as he now posed as the defender of parliamentary legitimacy
and was able to claim that it was now the opposition who were behaving in an extraparliamentary manner. This helped him a great deal.
2. The King was unwilling to dismiss Mussolini for other reasons, most importantly he feared
the two alternatives: A socialist Government or civil war. His reluctance seemed justified
when on June 26th 1924 the Senate voted overwhelmingly to support the govt. (225 to 21).
3. The opposition parties were typically ineffectual and disunited and could not decide how
best to oppose him. With all other parties suspicious of the communists cooperation seemed
unlikely.
4. In July the Pope intervened to end discussions between the leaders of the Aventine
Secession and the PPI about forming a united front. He still regarded socialism as a greater
threat.
5. The liberals and the Confindustria allowed him to survive the worst of the crisis because
they hoped to extract some political advantage from him. They hoped this would finally
force him to curb the more violent aspects of his movement. Like the pope they wanted to
retain fascism as a tool and they believed it could still be tamed.
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6. The army allowed him to stay as they squeezed concessions from Mussolini. They had always
been suspicious of the militia and in August 1924 they got Mussolini to agree that ex-army
officers would run the militia and the militia would take an oath of loyalty to the king as well.
However, although he seemed to have survived the initial crisis it was reaching a new peak in
December 1924.
The peak of the crisis: December 1924
The crisis had greatly agitated the ras. To them it had demonstrated the extreme weakness of
parliamentary govt. Mussolini had tried to exploit their anger by making a rousing speech to the
National Council of the Fascist party in August. He promised to destroy liberty and supported
their demand for a fascist revolution. But he then enraged the ras by his concessions to the
army, which threatened their control of the squads. Furthermore, no sooner had Balbo been
appointed C–in–C of the Militia when he had to resign. He was implicated in Socialist attacks and
the murder of a Catholic priest, Don Minzoni. This seemed to be a betrayal of everything
fascism stood for: they should not have to answer to parliament for anything. Furthermore,
Mussolini was betraying them, as he had promised to protect fascism and to rule with an iron
fist in August. By December there were rumours of a coup by the ras who were looking to Balbo
for leadership.
The Rossi Memorandum and “The Revolt of the Consuls”
On 27th December the liberal newspaper Il Mondo published a memorandum by Rossi blaming
Mussolini personally for some of the worst excesses of the fascist thugs. Four days later
Mussolini faced a delegation of 33 senior militia commanders (31st December) who demanded
that he immediately clamp down on the opposition and release fascists from prison. This was to
become known as “The Revolt of the Consuls”. He knew he had little choice now and the
memorandum had destroyed any chance that he could continue as a constitutional PM. He was
now backed into a corner and if he were to remain in power he would finally have to bow to the
demands of the extremists. Although they had forced him into a corner it probably just
confirmed him in the action he was about to take.
Mussolini promises a dictatorship
On January 3rd 1925, he told the Chamber that he took full responsibility for the violence of
fascism but stopped short of taking responsibility for Matteotti’s murder. He was careful to
blame the opposition for the breakdown of constitutional rule and promised the imposition of
tough new measures within 48 hours. It was a skillful triumph for Mussolini who had managed to
just about appease everyone by taking some blame but promising action. He took more credit
for the success of fascism then he was entitled but crucially he had kept the party united and
staved off threats of a coup. With the Aventine parties still boycotting the parliament and the
king still unwilling to dismiss him, the remaining parties were cowed into silence. There was no
going back, the stage was set for the imposition of tough new measures and the stage was set,
in effect for the dictatorship. Over the new few months, the promise of a dictatorship became
real.
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Summary of the Matteotti Crisis
Why was it so serious? A very serious time for Mussolini, the time when Italians faced the
reality of the “monster” they had created. A very good chance that his own party could have
removed him, or the king or the opposition groups could have united and forced him to resign
but he survived why?
1. King did not act.
2. Opposition groups left the chamber (Aventine Secession) and forfeited a chance to get him
out
3. Outside parliament the opposition could not unite, they were all suspicious of each other.
4. The Pope still supported fascism and would not allow his party into an anti-fascist alliance.
5. Mussolini took steps to punish those involved this appeased some.
6. He skillfully pleased the army so there was no coup
7. He Dealt with the Revolt of the Consuls and promised a dictatorship
8. He chose his time well to make a speech, he took some responsibility and knew that without
opposition in parliament he could pass it.
9. There was still no real alternative to fascism and they had had some success, maybe they
should be given more time?
Significance of the crisis
The results were far more important than the question of whether Mussolini was involved. It
marked the true turning point of his regime. From parliamentary legality and legitimacy, to
dictatorship. Liberal freedoms were taken away and power was concentrated into the
hands of one man.
However-remember
1.
2.
3.
4.
It did not lead to a dictatorship straight away. It took at least 6 months.
Mussolini never admitted full responsibility for his murder.
Mussolini was often uncertain how to act during the crisis.
Although there was suppression and arrests after his January speech it took two years to
create the real apparatus of the dictatorship.
5. The most important decree, making Mussolini Head of the Government was not passed until
18 months after Matteotti's murder. (Dec 1925)
Establishing the Dictatorship 1925
January 1925
Speech in which Mussolini takes full responsibility for Matteotti’s
murder and consequently promises a dictatorship.
February 1925
With violence continuing, with the aid of Farinacci who had been
made national secretary of the PNF in January, the ras squads were
purged. Centralization of the party under Farinacci continues.
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July 1925
Full press censorship is introduced. Opposition leaders or anyone
else who speaks out face beatings and severe intimidation.
August 1925
All opposition party meetings are banned.
October 1925
The first attempt on Mussolini’s life precipitates the banning of the
PSU.
October 1925
The murder of foreign tourists by ras squads gives Mussolini the
excuse to disband them altogether.
October 1925
Trade Unions banned
November 1925
When the deputies from the Aventine Secession tried to re-enter
parliament they are violently ejected.
December 1925
“Decree on the Powers of Head of the Government”, Mussolini is
responsible only to the king and not the government for his actions.
Decides on what business comes before the govt. and can make laws
by using personal decrees. The end of Italy’s parliamentary system
and the government had lost all legislative and executive powers.
Laws could be made and enforced by the same person.
December 1925
After another attempt on Mussolini’s life, all opposition parties are
banned,
Summary of the rise of fascism in Italy
1.Italy had suffered badly during the war, 460,000 soldiers were killed and the country was
heavily in debt. The Italian army had been heavily defeated and had only won its first major
victory at Vittorio Veneto in October 1918.
2. Italy had been promised extra land by Britain and France during the war, but when the war
ended it was not handed over. This made it look as if the Italian Government had been ignored.
3. The governments after the war were weak; they were coalitions (made up of more than one
party) and were not able to take decisions.
4. There was rising unemployment and this led to unrest in many cities and many people began to
support the Communists.
5.Mussolini set up the Fascist Party and posed as a strong man who could sort out Italy's
problems. He promised to rebuild Italy and recreate the Roman Empire.
6. Mussolini organised armed gangs, called the Blackshirts, in ras squads, who dealt with
troublemakers and criminals. They also broke up strikes. In some cities, Bologna for example,
the Fascists were the police force.
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7.Mussolini's newspaper, "II Popolo d'Italia", spread his ideas. As unemployment grew and
people became more desperate, they turned to Mussolini to solve Italy's problems.
8. In October 1922 Mussolini threatened to “march on Rome” if he was not appointed Prime
Minister. The king of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III, who supported Mussolini, refused to back the
existing government and invited him to become Prime Minister.
9.Once he was Prime Minister, Mussolini persuaded the king to allow him to rule as a dictator
for one year and then passed the Acerbo Law. This stated that whichever party won the next
general election would receive two-thirds of the seats in parliament.
10.In April 1924 the Fascists won 60% of the votes and gained 375 seats out of 535. When a
leader of the Socialist party, Giacomo Matteotti, spoke out against the Fascists he was
kidnapped and found murdered. Mussolini was not involved, but it was a warning for the future.
11.In January 1925 Mussolini takes responsibility for the violence but not the murder and
promises a dictatorship. In the next few years Mussolini set about establishing a dictatorship in
Italy, the most important law coming in December 1925, which made him Head of the
Government.
Essay titles and model answers
1. Describe the main stages by which Fascism developed into an effective political
movement between March 1919 and October 1922.
Stage One: Formation of the Fascist Movement
Fascism was the name given to the 100 or so men and a few women who met in a hall in Milan on
23rd March 1919. They were an odd assortment of ex-soldiers, former socialists, National
Syndicalists and Futurists. The programme had no manifesto and was simply a forum to channel
the protests of new forces thrown up by the war against rules, organisations and bureaucracies.
He did not want to create a party but a movement, which would have the flexibility to attract a
wide range of support. Throughout his speeches in the following years prior to the March on
Rome Mussolini made it clear that his aim was to seize power. He embarked on a vigorous
programme of gaining support. He condemned all political parties and only allowed his to become
on in 1921. This shows his contempt for political institutions. He opposed socialism for going
against intervention and detested their emphasis on class struggle and not national unity. The
movement saw itself as a left-wing challenger for working class support. Its programme was
largely republican, anti-clerical, and democratic: female suffrage, decentralisation and PR,
minimum wage, 8 hour day, confiscation of war profits, worker participation in management
decisions and nationalisation of the arms industry. The anti-clericalism was toned down as many
recruits saw the fascists as a good counter to Marxism but were strongly Catholic. In the
November 1919 election, most Fascist groups fought locally on their own programme. Mussolini’s
decision to stand in the election was unwise: no Fascist was elected and even in their Milan
stronghold they got fewer than 5000 votes, the new movement appeared to be dead.
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Stage Two: the drift to the right
Mussolini had taken careful note of the reasons for D’Annunzio’s success in Fiume in September
1919: the balcony speeches, Blackshirts and the emphasis on nationalism and militarism. One
thing was clear, only a drift to the right would save the fascist movement. He also learnt from
D’Annunzio's mistakes, seizing power in out of the way Fiume was not the way forward. He would
not make this error. The movement began to become more respectable from 1920 and an
emphasis was placed on bringing order to Italy and restoring its power. To develop the economy
and abolish harmful state controls, and re-establish law and strong leadership. In May 1920
anti-capitalist slogans were dropped and class collaboration called for. Anti- Catholic rhetoric
was also dropped. Conservative businessmen began to fund him. The state was neutral in
industrial relations and eventually the strikes were ended by a wise Giolittian policy of realising
this was the climax of the movement not the beginning. The industrialists had regained their
nerve and were now looking for revenge against the workers but the state seemed unwilling to
help them. Although this was not a conscious decision for Mussolini to let his Blackshirts be
used as bodyguards and strike breakers, (it was happening anyway) it was to his advantage.
Those that left the movement in disgust were replaced by many new right wing graduates who
were drawn to the romanticism of the movement. The collapse of the strikes and the ending of
the “Red Two years” convinced him that the left was incapable of bringing about a revolution.
He could now intensify the anti-socialist elements of his movement. In return for money, arms
and transport for the expansion of his movement, he ordered his regional bosses to organise
their Black-Shirt squads along paramilitary lines. Violence and notoriety followed and he soon
realised that violence went unpunished by the authorities long as it was against the left. He had
thus gained support amongst the urban petty bourgeoisie who had felt a collective sense of
insecurity and were prone to radical groups. Many were ex-soldiers or small capitalists who
feared for their livelihood. However, the real growth of support came unexpectedly from the
countryside.
The moves to the right that the Fascists had made in 1920 were enough for the landowners in
the countryside and small fascist nuclei in provincial capitals found themselves feted by these
people and a policy of violence towards the socialist elements began. They were known as
Squadrismo (special vigilante squads). They began on a small scale but grew with support. They
attacked offices of left wing organizations, broke strikes and Catholic peasant leagues and
attacked the offices of left wing newspapers. On Dec 20th 1920 Four Fascists were killed and
this provoked rage and a growth in membership. As the post war depression hit landowners were
determined not to lose any more to the socialists. The local ras organized a policy of tax
strikes, which made it increasingly difficult for left wing councils to govern. Often they had
support from local police and between 1920 and 1921 they had been amazingly successful. By
spring of 1921 fascism was now a rural phenomenon and fascist membership was mushrooming
Stage Three: Getting onto Giolitti's political platform
Another key stage at which Fascism developed into a political movement was getting onto
Giolliti’s electoral platform inn May 1921. The moves to the right and the growing support for
fascism in the countryside and urban areas convinced Giolitti that they would help his cause. In
typical transformismo style he hoped to use fascism to bolster his position and get more votes
for his “list”. 35 fascists were elected, including Mussolini himself and fascism had made its
first step to legitimate power. It was becoming an effective political movement.
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Stage Four The formation of the Fascist Party
Mussolini abandoned the Pact of Pacification of August 1921 with the PSI and formed a party,
the PNF in October 1921. It gave Mussolini a degree of central control and placed him as the
figurehead of a national movement, but in practice the ras held control in the countryside. He
quickly wooed the conservative establishment by proclaiming that fascism was now opposed to
divorce and was prepared to settle the Roman question. No left wing polices were heard of
again. This was a crucial stage on the road to becoming an effective political movement: now
they were a party they had become more respectable and on paper less radical. This convinced
many more that they could be trusted.
Stage Five: Offering the only hope against Socialism
During the spring and summer of 1922, Fascism seemed the only force capable of stopping
socialism. It had some deputies, a strong paramilitary force and a defined political party.
Mussolini disassociated himself from the violence but when talking to the conservatives told
them that he was the only one capable of stopping the violence. In the June general strike,
Mussolini used this opportunity to show that the left was still a threat. As the strike began the
fascists took over the entire infrastructure of the cities and running of public transport etc.
This showed that they were an effective, discipline force. The fascist actions impressed the
middle class and convinced them that fascism could be trusted in a share of government. By
September 1922, republicanism had been dropped, so had anti-clericalism, the dropping of votes
for women and for taxes on war profits. Increasingly the emphasis was on nationalism and a
strong foreign policy. It was an effective political force as it offered a lot to many in the
population.
Conclusion
Therefore in summary, clearly a move to the right had been the most important factor in
creating an effective political movement. Having an identifiable political party and recognized
leader helped, as did the decision to enter parliament and form coalitions.
2. What opposition did Mussolini face as Prime minister in the years 1922-1925?
There were 6 main groups
1. Socialists
3. PPI
4. Liberals
5. The army and generals
6. RAS squads and fascist movement himself
7. General public
1. Naturally it was the left who saw him as the greatest danger. But their greatest weakness
was their disunity and divisions. Mussolini had by 1922 ½ million Black shirts and virtually
controlled many regions but the left was far stronger. They had been allowed to develop into
31
a serious threat by liberal governments who seemed unwilling to stop them. Matteotti spoke
in the chamber after the 1924 elections and was murdered as a result. Socialists and
Communists only deputies to vote against the Acerbo election law in 1923. Aventine
secession still showed that many opposed him.
2. PPI leader, Sturzo opposed fascism and the majority became opponents of the Fascist
party. Sturzo removed by the pro-fascist Pope, the Bishop of Milan in July 1923.
3. Liberals reacted against Mussolini during the Matteotti crisis and hoped that this could be
used to control him. Mussolini prevented the Liberal Amendoal from holding meetings during
the 1924 election
4. Created the MSVN, or Fascist militia, in January 1923 to appease the army. They were army
trained and led by army officers but they distrusted them for years.
5. Revolt of the Consuls over the Matteotti murder in December 1924 forced Mussolini into a
dictatorship in January 1925. They had always opposed his legitimate rise to power and were
pushing for further revolution.
6. Wave of outage over the Matteotti murder but difficult to measure.
3. Account for the growth of fascism 1919-1922
Points to include in your answer
 At first the fascist movement attracted a diverse group of people
Ex-soldiers, middle class youths, some socialists, Nationalists and Futurists. It appealed to
people who felt they did not fit into any one category.
 However, it remained a fringe movement and only had a few thousand members in its first
year.
 The turning point came with the Red Two Years 1918-1920.
1. The fascists began to gain mass support as they appeared to be the only force capable of
stopping socialism
2. In the 1920 local elections there was a massive swing to the left and this frightened the
bourgeoisie.
3. This gave them control over labour exchanges, which meant they controlled labour. Farmers
had to raise wages and accept extra workers they could not afford.
4. They also stated that they would collectivize land.
5. The landowners and bourgeoisie therefore turned to the fascist squads for help.
6. Unemployed, students, adventurers and thugs who did not fit in found a place in the
movement.
7. Between Sep 1920 and October 1922 they went on an orgy of violence and bullied the
socialists in to submission.
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This was a bottom up “Agrarian fascist revolution” that Mussolini did not control. However,
combined with this was the “top down” revolution that Mussolini himself initiated.
1. He dropped his anti-clerical views in November 1921 (creation of the PNF)
2. He dropped his anti-Republican views in November 1921
“
3. He played up the nationalist side of fascism to appeal to those who wanted revenge for the
”Mutilated Victory”
4. He came across as a respectable leader.
5. He used propaganda skillfully to exaggerate a socialist threat through his newspaper.
6. He wooed businessmen in the cities to finance him when he promised to defend their
property and businesses against strikes.
So really there are three key factors
1. The Socialist threat which spontaneously turned people to fascism in the countryside and
accounted for its massive growth.
2. The skills of Mussolini in seeing an opportunity for the movement to grow and exploiting it
3. Factors that were present anyway, disillusionment with the Liberal state, the economic and
parliamentary paralysis: people just felt it was time for a change.
1. Appeal of Fascism 2. Weaknesses of Liberal Italy 3. Mussolini’s skill and opportunism
4. Did Fascism come to power more through its own strengths or the weaknesses of its
opponents?
Fascism came to power in 1922 due to a combination of the weaknesses of its opponents and
through its own strengths. Fascism certainly had much appeal: it was glamorous, appealed to
ex-soldiers, appeared to be the only force capable of destroying communism, was nationalistic in
outlook and was ultimately conciliatory towards the Catholic Church. Furthermore, as a leader,
Mussolini was a great strength for the movement, as he was able to take opportunities when
they came and changed the nature of the movement when it was necessary. However, his
opponents made crucial errors at critical times and most importantly, failed to unite when they
had a chance to stop Italian Fascism. It is therefore difficult to say whether Fascism came to
power more through its own strengths or the weaknesses of its opponents.
The Fascist movement certainly had many strengths, most importantly it had Mussolini as a
leader. He was an excellent orator who knew how to appeal to a crowd and he used his
newspaper “Il Popolo d’Italia” skillfully to spread the message of fascism to the people. He was
an opportunist who took great chances and risks at crucial times. The Fascists might never have
come to power in 1922 had he not held out for the post of Prime minister when offered a minor
post in the government. He offered to give Italy strong leadership and restore pride in the
country through an aggressive foreign policy. Mussolini started Fascism as a movement and not a
party, and thus ensured that it would have the widest possible appeal. Most importantly, he
changed the nature of the movement to gain support when he felt it was necessary. It began as
a left wing movement with elements of syndicalism but changed to a party that supported big
business against unions in order to gain power in 1921. He made timely concessions to the
establishment by deciding to join the political process in 1921, made peace with the Catholic
33
church from 1920 and was willing to work with coalition governments when he needed to.
Furthermore, he skillfully kept the extremists within his own party happy thus avoiding a major
split within the Fascist movement. Clearly, many other leaders would not have seen the
opportunities that Mussolini did or would not have adopted such pragmatic polices in the early
years. Mussolini, as leader, was therefore one of the great strengths of the fascist movement.
The movement held great appeal for a mass of disillusioned young people and ex-servicemen, a
group that would play a large part in fascist success in the early years. Many ex-soldiers felt
that the Liberal government had betrayed them in the War and were naturally drawn to
fascism, as it offered a paramilitary life style with uniforms, parades and camps. Furthermore,
it promised to restore Italian pride and through an aggressive foreign policy would gain the
“unredeemed lands”. For young people with no prospects, in an Italy of high unemployment, the
fascists offered glamour, a stable income and clothing. They promised radical change and to
smash the old corrupt system. Lastly, it had an efficient propaganda system, which spread the
ideas and theories of fascism to the masses. Therefore, the inherent strengths within the
movement itself certainly help to explain why fascism came to power.
The movement also appealed to many who were not young or ex-servicemen. Most importantly, it
appealed to shop-keepers, land owners, businessmen and the rentier class who were all united in
their fear of socialism. At that time, with the “Red Two Years” raging, there appeared to be
only one force capable of standing up to Communism: fascism. The Ras squads and the terror
that they struck into the hearts of their opponents was enough to ensure that millions
supported fascism, if not through the ballot box then at least through turning a blind eye to the
violence. It could therefore be argued that the greatest strength of fascism and perhaps the
strongest reason for the movement coming to power, was the violence it employed against the
socialist threat. The most influential sections of Italian society therefore saw fascism as the
most important tool in their struggle against the left.
It is clear that Fascism had wide appeal in post war Italy. It had a strong leader, a popular
message, was glamorous and appeared to be winning the battle against the socialists. However,
this is not enough to explain the remarkable rise in their popularity, their entry into parliament
in 1921 or their assumption of power in 1922. Clearly, their opponents made many mistakes,
mistakes that enabled Mussolini to capitalize on the movement’s early success.
The Liberal governments that ran Italy after the War seemed weak and corrupt. They could not
break out of the cycle of “Transformismo” and most elections seemed to “managed” in some
way, especially in the South. The governments were always short-lived and the many coalitions
appeared unable to solve the problems the country was facing. Post war conditions further
undermined democracy, with high inflation, unemployment and industrial unrest all contributing
to the image of sick and incapable governments. Furthermore, the post-war Liberal governments
could have gained a powerful ally in the Catholic Church by solving the “Roman Question”, which
had plagued Italy from its inception, yet they seemed unwilling to tackle this issue. One of their
greatest mistakes was not dealing effectively with the Fiume Crisis of 1919.When D’Annunzio
seized this port the government of the time did nothing for a year. This convinced people they
would not respond to a challenge and that they could not be relied upon to deal with any future
uprisings. However, perhaps their greatest mistake was not being able to deal with the chaos of
34
the “Bienno Rosso”. This convinced many that the greatest threat to Italy was from the left
and that their current system of government could not be relied upon to save the country from
the “Socialist menace”. Therefore, people began to look for alternatives to the existing system
and were naturally drawn to fascism as a result. Giolitti himself made a grave mistake in 1921 by
inviting the Fascists into government, hoping they could be used against the left and to further
support his own position. They would not be happy with a minor role and when they threatened a
”March on Rome” in 1922 no-one appeared willing to stand up to them. It therefore appears
that the mistakes of the Liberal governments, and their failure to tackle the many problems
facing Italy after the War, certainly contributed to the growth and popularity of fascism
between 1919 and 1922.
The mistakes of the post war Liberal governments certainly encouraged the growth of fascism
but the mistakes of fascism’s political opponents were even more serious. The Catholic Party
(PPI) could certainly have been a powerful counterbalance to the fascist movement but
infighting and disputes with the Vatican plagued them from the start. Some wanted to work
with fascism whilst others wanted to retain socialist elements and work against them. The Pope
fell out with Luigi Sturzo over this very issue, and eventually removed him as the PPI leader.
However, it was perhaps the Socialist parties, which made the greatest mistakes between 1919
and 1922. Firstly, for calling the series of strikes that were to become known as “The Red Two
Years”, the left “played into the hands” of fascism. The chaos that resulted in post war Italy
convinced many people that the left was a serious menace and had to be destroyed. The Liberal
governments seemed unfit for the task and so people naturally turned to fascism. If they had
been conciliatory and less of a threat, then people would have seen no need for the violence of
the fascist Ras squads. Their greatest mistake came in August 1922 when they called a general
strike. This convinced people once and for all that socialism in Italy had to be destroyed. At a
time when Mussolini was trying to control the violence of his squads and people were turning
against extreme Fascist violence, he was able to once again raise the spectre of a communist
revolution. None of this would have been so serious had the parties remained united but
divisions and rifts within their ranks plagued them too. In January 1921 the Italian Socialist
Party, (the PSI) split into three. A radical group, which became the Italian Communist Party
broke away, and the remaining party itself split between radical and moderate socialists. The
trade unions had the same problem as the General Confederation of Labour split into two
groups, those who wanted to apply peaceful pressure on the government and those who wanted
full revolution. The result was a broken and divided left wing movement, which could never
effectively unite against the Fascist threat. When they finally united in 1924 over the murder
of Matteotti it was too late, fascism was already in power.
It therefore appears that the growth of the fascist movement was clearly helped the many
mistakes of their opponents. However, perhaps the greatest mistakes of their opponents
occurred over the appointment of Mussolini as Prime minister in 1922. When Mussolini
threatened a “March on Rome” in 1922, the King declared Martial Law but did not stick to it.
Fearing his own position and the alternatives to fascism he hastily withdrew the order and gave
Mussolini the chance he needed. Had he stuck to his order, the army would have stopped the
squads and Fascism may never have come to power at all. Da Facta and other Liberal ministers
refused to work together and appeared hopelessly divided at a crucial time. Salandra was unable
to persuade Mussolini to join his government as a minister, so urged his appointment as P.M. to
block Giolitti. Giolitti alone had the authority and power to prevent this from happening but he
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was tired of politics and refused to return to Rome for a conference. The army itself could
have stopped the squads but they too were divided at a crucial time. The generals warned the
King that certain elements were sympathetic to fascism and this no doubt persuaded him that
civil war might result if he went through with the order for martial law. It appears that despite
the numerous mistakes of fascism’s opponents between 1919 and 1922, Mussolini’s appointment
as Prime Minister in 1922 was by no means certain. There were many opportunities in October
1922 to block him and he became leader of Italy due to the last minute mistakes of his leading
opponents.
It is clear that Fascism came to power for a number of reasons. It is too simplistic to say that
it was successful purely on the basis of the movement’s strengths or the mistakes of its
opponents. Sometimes these factors acted independently and sometimes together. Fascism
certainly had many strengths, it had strong anti-socialist squads, efficient propaganda, a
powerful leader, was well organized and appealed to many forgotten sections of Italian society.
It appeared to offer something for everyone whilst promising to restore Italy’s pride. However,
this would never have been enough if Fascist opponents had united at crucial times, had the
Liberal governments of 1919-1922 not underestimated fascist strength, had the King not been
weak and selfish at certain times and had the post-war economic conditions been more
favourable to political stability. In conclusion, explaining the fascist rise to power is not
straightforward. There were many inter-related factors which came to together between 1919
and 1922, and it was a combination of both the strengths of fascism, mistakes of the
movement’s opponents and weaknesses in Liberal Italy itself which account for their great
success.
5. Why was Mussolini able to rise to power?
Plan
1.
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2.
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3.
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Long term structural preconditions
Italian unification
Industrialization
Medium term accelerators
The economic impact of the First World War
The rise of new and destabilizing political movements
The weakness of liberalism
Unstable governments
Social unrest
The Versailles Settlement and the Mutilated victory
Short-Term Deciders
Factory occupations
Mussolini’s leadership and opportunism
The fragmentation of political opposition
Miscalculations of key players
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Introduction
To appreciate why Mussolini rose to power so quickly and why he was able to assume power; an
examination must be made of long-term, medium and short-term factors. By examining the
interplay between these factors it becomes clear that Mussolini’s rise to power was very much a
multi-causal phenomenon.
1. Long term structural preconditions
 Italian unification
Completed in 1870 when the last independent territory fell to Italian troops. But, this process
had failed to create “Italians”. The liberal model of Unification and government stored up
problems for the future. Radicals and republicans felt Unification had been a betrayal and the
Catholic Church distanced itself from the new kingdom. The electorate was therefore very
small, fragmented and largely illiterate. The bottom up involvement of peasants was discouraged
and resentment towards the state of piedmont which had driven unification. It had imposed its
own brand of governance and imposed high taxes. The new Italy after unification therefore
took on the appearance of being narrowly based and dominated by liberal-conservatives. This
meant that government was always unstable (33 different cabinets between 1861 and 1896).
This was a key factor in people looking towards strong government in the future and
government, which would replace the weak and narrow liberal Conservative elite.

Industrialization
The process of industrialization increased the problems of unification with the North
prospering and the South lagging behind. It led to the growth of socialist movements and a
feeling of unfulfilled expectations amongst the lower classes. New and aggressive socialist
political parties and Trade union movements emerged that was critical of the government and
elite. Secondly, a new from of political Catholicism developed out of the previously abstentionist
RCC. It wanted representation in a rapidly changing political system. The PPI took on the reigns.
Then a new nationalist movement grew, encouraged by involvement in Abyssinia and desiring the
unredeemed lands. These essentially anti-system forces served to destabilize parliamentary
liberalism. The political system responded by applying transformismo and the result was a spate
of pre-war liberal reforms. However, the reforms only increased the electorate, which was
hungry for more reform, and were not bale to survive the upheaval of WWI.
2. Medium term accelerators
 The economic impact of the First World War
A key accelerator hastening the decline of liberal Italy was the War, as its effects covered not
only the economic but also the political sphere. The economic impact of the War was real but
compared to other European countries not that bad. The only real impact, like other countries,
was to fuel the growth of political movements.
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
The rise of new and destabilizing political movements
The decision to join the War in 1915 compounded the political divisions in Italy as some had
wanted neutrality and others saw it as a chance to recover the irredeemed lands. The War
itself and the defeat at Capporetto reinforced divisions. But, the most importance consequence
was the further destabilization of politics as a result of the growth of the new political parties.
The PSI became the largest single group in parliament.

The weakness of liberalism
Liberalism seemed faded and unable to cope with this new growth. The assault from the left
was mirrored by an assault from the Right.
 Unstable governments
The governments of this time were weak and unstable and as soon as one was formed it seemed
to fail
 Social unrest
There was great social unrest in the years 1919-1920, often referred to as the Red Two Years.
The Liberal governments seemed powerless to stop the growth in social disorder. There was
great fear in the middle and upper classes that a socialist revolution was imminent and what was
the government doing to prevent it?
 The Versailles Settlement and the Mutilated victory
The government was further resented, as it had been unable to secure significant territorial
gains at Versailles. This angered the right and the nationalists who wanted more from
Versailles. Thus the myth grew of "The Mutilated Victory”. Under this banner D’Annunzio seized
the disputed port of Fiume. Thus the Myth grew that the glories had begun to be recovered
only to be denied by Liberals like Giolitti.
Thus, the Liberal governments of the War and Post war were faced with a complex interplay of
economic and political accelerators sand Italy found it difficult to adjust to the needs of a
peacetime economy. Italian Liberalism was at its weakest and most susceptible to short-term
“tremors” that would effectively decide its fate. This is born out that at the same time that
Liberal Italy was at its weakest so was Mussolini and his movement.
3. Short-Term Deciders
The Liberal regime although seriously weakened was capable of surviving but it was faced with
four short-term factors, which accelerated its demise.
 Factory occupations
There was a spate of factory occupations and agrarian unrest in 1919-1920, which allowed the
fascists to be seen as the saviours of Italy. They gained a lot of Middle and upper class support
as the only thing defending Italy from Socialism. The local elections of 1920 were also critical,
as the PSI confirmed their status as the dominant group, thus adding fuel to the fire. The
treaty of Rappalo, furthered played into the hands of the Nationalists who played on the theme
of “Mutilated victory”.
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 Mussolini’s leadership and opportunism
Mussolini’s own brand of opportunism and his great political skill allowed him to capitalize on the
disorder and problems. His encouragement of thuggism in the town and country effectively beat
his opponents into submission. He was editor of a newspaper, had championed intervention in the
War and so as not to alarm the middle and upper classes he was changing his approach to power
from a revolutionary to a parliamentary one. In 1921 he had 35 deputies whereas in 1919 he had
none. He was gaining support all the time. He had therefore cultivated a wide base of support.
All those opposed to the left: industrialists, small landowners, those on the left interested in
social reform, social reform, against the Liberal elite and war veterans who felt isolated and
disappointed with Versailles. He therefore displayed great political skill and leadership in
gaining support and dropping more radical elements of his polices at the right time.
 The fragmentation of political opposition
At the same time as fascism was gaining appeal, the opposition began to crumble. In 1921 the
communists split from the PSI to from the PCI. Then the Moderates left to from the PSU. In
January a new Pope was elected, Pius XI, who was sympathetic to fascism, he withdrew his
support from the PPI, as they were anti-Fascist. Mussolini had skillfully wooed the Church as
well; the two movements, which represented the greatest threat to fascism, were now melting
away, the PPI and the PSI.

Miscalculations of key players
1.The main players who could have prevented Mussolini coming to power miscalculated the
danger he posed. 1.Rather than coming to terms with the PSI, the Liberals co-operated in the
1921 elections, thus marginalizing and allowing the fascist to enter parliament. He calculated
that they could be controlled and tame once in government but this was not to be.
2.The Socialists, unable to agree on a uniform strategy to defeat the fascists, decided on a
disastrous strike in 1922. This allowed Mussolini to claim that he was needed more than ever.
3.The King and Facta finally miscalculated after the March on Rome, as the King refused to
support Facta's belated demand for action against Mussolini. He was invited to become PM and
in a short period of time Liberalism and democracy was dead.
Conclusion
It is therefore clear that there are many complex and inter-related reasons why Mussolini and
the Fascists were able to gain power in 1922. The regime was never really stable, even from
1870 and it was seriously weakened as a result of the War. It then suffered further
complications in the immediate post war period. Through a clever combination of opportunism
and threat Mussolini was able to exploit the weaknesses of the state and the fear of the middle
and upper classes that the Socialists would take over in a revolution. The one great barrier to
his rise, the Pope and the PPI were pacified and won over and once the key leaders had played
39