NEWS ANALYSIS
November 2014
Tunisia Between the Elections in 2014
Martin Beck
News:
In a way unprecedented in the Arab Middle East, on October 26, 2014, Tunisians
caused the electoral defeat of the party that had won the first free elections three years
ago, thereby paving the way for the establishment of a government that will be led by
a secular party. With Presidential elections to follow in November 2014, Tunisia
appears to be a lighthouse of democratic transition in the Arab World and beyond.
Keywords:
Tunisia, Transition, “Arab Spring”.
Summary:
The present article analyzes the Tunisian Parliamentary elections in the light of a new
political diversity, which has been a major feature of the Middle East since the Arab
Uprisings in 2010/11. A comparison between recent political developments in Egypt
and Tunisia respectively shows how much more advanced Tunisia is in terms of the
democratization. Yet, also in Tunisia many obstacles are yet to be removed from the
way to a successful transition process.
Martin Beck: Tunisia Between the Elections in 2014
Analysis:
Tunisian development and political diversity in the Arab Middle East
Currently, media coverage on the Arab world is dominated by reports on civil
war situations in Syria, Iraq and Libya and the attempts of the Islamic State to
establish a “caliphate.” Against this background, the peaceful democratic
elections in Tunisia on October 26, 2014, pale in the minds of many observers of
the Arab Middle East. However, in light of the paradigm of Middle Eastern
Exceptionalism—the Middle East is the only world region on which none of the
major waves of democratization in the 20th century had a major impact—it is to
be considered a real milestone that Tunisia witnessed two regular free and
democratic Parliamentary elections in a row. Moreover, for the first time in
Arab history, a new government was elected in a peaceful, democratic way: The
government headed by Ennahda had, as a result of the first elections after the
Tunisian Revolution on October 23, 2011, stepped down in January 2014 in
order to pave the way for the establishment of a technocratic interim
government and to hold early elections under the new constitution. On the day
after the October 2014 elections, when still only few results had been released,
the head of Ennahda, Rashid al-Ghannushi, called Beji Caid el Sebsi, the leader
of Nidaa Tounes, to congratulate him with his victory over Ennahda.1
When putting Tunisia’s political development after the Uprisings of
2010/11 in a regional context, recent Tunisian elections prove that—as a result of
the “Arab Spring”—an unprecedented political diversity of the Arab world has
emerged. Up to the Tunisian Revolution, the Arab political systems in general
were characterized by consolidated authoritarian regimes. Nowadays we find
an unprecedented variety of political systems: Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which
for decades seemed stable, is heavily challenged by an opposition who in the
course of the uprisings in Syria turned increasingly authoritarian—and, with
the territorial expansion of the Islamic State: oppressive itself. Libya after
Muammar Gaddafi increasingly appears to be in danger of becoming a “failed
state”; in Egypt a transition process had been aborted or at least interrupted,
when the military as a protagonist of the “ancien régime”—an appropriate term
1
Carlotta Gall, Islamist party in Tunisia concedes to secularists, New York Times, October 27, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/world/africa/nidaa-tounes-ennahda-tunisian-parliamentaryelection.html.
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Martin Beck: Tunisia Between the Elections in 2014
(only)
if
we
still
consider
3
the
Egyptian
uprisings
of
2010/11
as
“revolutionary”—took over power by a coup in July 2013.2 Amman and Rabat
responded to the Arab Spring by accelerating a reform process, which,
particularly in Jordan, however, hardly exceeds the limits of cosmetics if
analyzed in more depth. Last but not least, notwithstanding some differences
between them, the leaderships of the Gulf monarchies hardly make an effort to
even claim substantial reform processes. In contrast to that, Tunisia appears to
be on the path of genuine transition despite rather unfavorable economic
conditions and a kulturkampf like situation between Islamists and Secularists.
Similarities and dissimilarities between developments in Tunisia and Egypt
Anti-Islamist actors replaced Islamist governments in Egypt in 2013 and one
year later in Tunisia.3 However, although outcomes are similar, the means how
they were achieved vary: a military coup versus democratic elections. How can
this difference be explained?
A major institutional difference between the current political systems of
Egypt and Tunisia respectively is that the military in Egypt is much politicized
and enjoys a high degree of economic and political autonomy. In contrast, as
one of the legacies of the ancien régime in Tunis, the military in Tunisia is
depoliticized and does not control financial means beyond access to the civil
administration.4
Yet, despite the fact that both the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party and
Ennahda share some ideological ideas rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood, there
are significant differences in their capabilities and readiness to compromise
with liberal and secular forces. As Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz show, the
genuine acceptance of non-Islamist actors was already part of the ideology of
2
Martin Beck 2013: The July 2013 military coup in Egypt. One normative clarification and some
empirical issues, Resource Center of the Center for Contemporary Middle East Studies at the University
of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//A/D/3/%7BAD3D4AD4-2CE1-4C46-90ED81FDD82DF7B3%7DMB0913.pdf; Mervat Hatem 2013: The debate on the July 2013 military coup in
Egypt. It is about much more than the definition of a coup (Part I),
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//3/2/3/%7B32343A2D-841B-4B69-954B674C41C8CF6D%7DMH1013.pdf; Mervat Hatem 2013: The debate on the July 2013 military coup in
Egypt. It is about much more than the definition of a coup (Part II),
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//3/7/B/%7B37BCEEAA-C02D-4EA0-94DC3C3F70F67C35%7DMH1113.pdf.
3
Ennahda refrained from putting a candidate for the Presidential elections in November 2014.
4
Zoltan Barany 2011: The role of the military, Journal of Democracy 22(4), 27.
Martin Beck: Tunisia Between the Elections in 2014
4
Ennahda when it was legalized in March 2011, whereas
the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt back then still stuck to its highly undemocratic platform
of the 2007 elections.5 Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi pushed through a
new constitution by hastily setting up a referendum in December 2012, whereas
Ghannushi successfully opted for a painstaking bargaining process with the
secularist opposition, in the course of which Ennahda accepted many farreaching compromises, before the constitution was finally adopted in January
2014.6
We do know much more about the ideological differences between Morsi
and Ghannushi and their parties than about those of the new political
strongmen in Egypt and Tunisa, Abdul Fatah al-Sisi and Sebsi. Both of the latter
were members of the establishment of the old authoritarian regime. However,
since political procedures often shape political socialization and convictions,
there are good reasons to assume that Sebsi and his party will be more inclusive
towards Islamists than Sisi and his entourage: For Sisi elections were just a
manipulative instrument to gain some legitimacy of a reign he seized by force,
whereas for
Sebsi democratic elections were
a genuine
means for
empowerment. Still, the future government headed by Nidaa Tounes has yet to
prove its democratic maturity, firstly by respecting the democratic rights of
Ennahda as the major opposition party (unless a unity government will be
formed). Secondly, as thus far mainly the process of electing the government
has been democratized but many state institutions haven’t been so, and a major
task of the new legislative period is to narrow down the gap between the
standards of the new constitution and constitutional reality.
The normative dimension: Are there democrats and if so, who are they?
As Monica Marks argues in a convincing way, it would be highly misleading to
assess the Tunisian Parliamentary elections on the basis of a dichotomy
between “enlightened secularists versus backwards Islamists.”7 When the
5
Alred Stepan and Juan J. Linz 2013: Democratization theory and the “Arab Spring,” Journal of
Democracy 24(2), 23.
6
Monica L. Marks 2014: Convince, coerce, or compromise? Ennahda’s approach to Tunisia’s
constitution, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper 10,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/02/10%20ennahda%20tunisia%20constitut
ion%20marks/ennahda%20approach%20tunisia%20constitution%20english.pdf.
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Monica Marks, The Tunisian election result isn’t simply a victory for secularism over Islamism. The
battle between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda is more complex than enlightened secularists versus
Martin Beck: Tunisia Between the Elections in 2014
criterion of democratic inner structure is applied, Ennahda even appears to be
much more advanced than Nidaa Tounes.8
To put it differently : It is very often overlooked that we do not only have
good reasons to suspect the democratic orientation of Islamism but equally
good reasons to do so with regards to liberal secularists in the Arab Middle
East. In Europe, liberalism made its peace with democracy when it learned to
trust that basic freedom and political rights remain unchallenged even if
political parties win elections that have mixed feelings about them. This trust is
missing in the Arab Middle East. Moreover, decade-long authoritarianism
produced a political culture of the winner takes it all. 9
Challenges for a continuation of the transition process
The Tunisian transition process is far from having reached a successful end: Its
political system is not to be considered a consolidated democracy and there are
major challenges ahead that could very well endanger a successful
democratization process. Among the most eminent of these challenges the
democratic identity of the major political forces is not yet consolidated: Not all
wings of Ennahda have abandoned the idea of curtailing political and liberty
rights without which a democracy cannot function. At the same time, liberal
and secular parties still have to prove that they respect Islamism—which
refrains from using violence as a means of politics and accepts electoral results
even if they are not in their favor—as a legitimate political force. Moreover,
political platforms of all major parties tend to be populist and politics are highly
personalized. At the same time, nostalgia for the “good old days” of the regime
of Ben Ali is growing, as it provided people “at least” with security and
stability.
10
According to recent polls, currently only 59 % of all Tunisians
believe that democracy is the best political system as opposed to 78 % in 2012;
75 % of the population do not trust political parties, and nearly half of Tunisians
backwards Islamists, The Guardian, October 29, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/29/tunisian-election-result-secularism-islamismnidaa-tounes-ennahda.
8
Ibid.
9
Martin Beck 2013 (Footnote 2)
10
Monica Marks (Footnote 7).
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Martin Beck: Tunisia Between the Elections in 2014
sensed that they are worse off than before 2011.11 Furthermore, major reform
projects have been of limited success only, for instance a re-organization of the
security forces,12 which appears to be of utmost importance due to the fact that
Tunisia under Ben Ali was a police state.13 However, the most pressing issue is
to deal with the ongoing socio-economic crisis of Tunisia since it appears to be
very difficult to consolidate the transition process if many people experience
deterioration in socio-economic terms. The low turnout among the young
generation in the Parliamentary elections is an alarm signal that calls for
generating sustainable economic growth to the benefit particularly of the
comparatively well-educated young generation.14
Conclusion
Tunisia is by far the most advanced Arab country in terms of democratization.
However, Tunisia is not a consolidated democracy and there are difficult
hurdles in the way of becoming one. Ennahda did some remarkable attempts to
foster a democratic political culture, particularly by giving into the pressure of
liberal secularists to accept early elections and to admit and accept its electoral
defeat in October 2014 without ifs and buts. It remains to be seen whether the
successful Nidaa Tounes will now do its part for a sustainable change of
Tunisian political culture by accepting Ennahda and its islamist approach as a
legitimate competitor in the Tunisian political system. Moreover, a successful
transition process requires that political institutions will be democratized in the
new legislative period.
11
Lindsay Benstead, Ellen Lust, Dhafer Malouche and Jakob Wichmann, Tunisian elections bring hope in
uncertain times, October 27, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/10/27/tunisian-elections-bring-hope-in-uncertain-times/.
12
Haykel Ben Mahfoudh 2014: Security sector reform in Tunisia. Three years into the democratic
transition, http://www.arab-reform.net/sites/default/files/Mahfoudh%20-%20Tunisia%20SSR%20%20July%202014%20-%20ARI.pdf.
13
For the contested issue of transitional reconciliation see Christopher K. Lamont, Transnational justice
and the politics of lustration in Tunisia, Middle East Institute, December 26, 2013,
http://www.mei.edu/content/transitional-justice-and-politics-lustration-tunisia.
14
Eileen Byrne, Tunisians vote in first Parliamentary election under new constitution. Turnout estimated
at about 50% in poll taking place almost four years after the uprising ousted Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, The
Guardian, October 26, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/26/tunisia-vote-parliamentaryelection-new-constitution.
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Martin Beck: Tunisia Between the Elections in 2014
About the author:
Martin Beck is a professor at the Center for Contemporary Middle East Studies
at the University of Southern Denmark in Odense.
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